Philosopher Charles Taylor writes in his classic work:
* There are remains today of the stance which links illness to sin. Think of the reaction of some people to the AIDS epidemic; or the way people with cancer are often told that they are stricken because of their bad lifestyle.
* In the enchanted world of 500 years ago, a clear line between the physical and the moral wasn’t drawn. But this is just another facet of the basic fact that the boundary around the mind was constitutionally porous. Things and agencies which are clearly extra-human could alter or shape our spiritual and emotional condition, and not just our physical state (and hence mediately our spiritual or emotional condition), but both together in one act. These agencies didn’t simply operate from outside the “mind”, they helped to constitute us emotionally and spiritually.
This is not the only way in which we draw this physical/moral boundary today that wasn’t recognized then. Connected to our firm placing of the non-human world outside the mind, is our perception of it as the domain of exceptionless natural law.
* Whatever the motor, the new spirituality [13th Century] had an individuating side. This was perhaps also reflected in an increasing emphasis on sexual purity, which begins to gain on sins of anger, violence, the dislocation of fraternal bonds. Bossy speaks of an early emphasis on sins of aversion, sins against charity and solidarity, which gradually makes place for an increasing concern with sins of concupiscence, sins against chastity, seen as pollution, and as a negation of personal holiness. Bossy also notes a shift in the main thrust of penances, from those which involve making up, restituting damage, as their end, to those which involve metanoia and reform.
* Mainstream popular piety, [was] a practice of doing, rather than one of reflection and silent prayer.
* The late Middle Ages and early modern period sees an intensification of the persecution of marginals, including those which had been allowed to exist peaceably before. The hunt for witches steadily escalated. Heretics were more vigorously hunted down. Fear of vagabonds increased. The hypothesis is that there was more free-floating anxiety, really about one’s own salvation; and so more likelihood that people would react violently to pollution threats to what they dimly saw as bulwarks in the social sacred against whatever menaces arose.
* In Renaissance times, the élites among which this ideal circulated were all too aware that it was not only absent abroad, but all too imperfectly realized at home. The common people, while not on the level of savages in America, and even being far above the European savage peoples of the margins (e.g., the Irish, the Russians),17 still had a long way to go. And even the members of ruling élites needed to be subjected to firm discipline in each new generation, as a Venetian law of public education in 1551 proposed.
Civility was not something you attained at a certain stage in history, and then relaxed into, which is the way we tend to think about civilization.This reflected the transition that European societies were going through from about 1400. The new (or newly recovered) ideal reflected a new way of life. If we compare the life of, say, the English nobility and gentry before the Wars of the Roses with the way they lived under the Tudors, the difference is striking. Fighting is no longer part of the normal way of life of this class, unless it be for wars in the service of the Crown. Something like this process continues over four centuries, until by 1800, a normal “civilized” country is one which can ensure continuing domestic peace, and in which commerce has largely replaced war as the paramount activity with which political society concerns itself; or at least shares the pre-eminence with war.
But this change didn’t come about without resistance. Young nobles were capable of outbursts of mayhem, carnivals teetered on the thin line between mock and real violence, brigands were rife, vagabonds could be dangerous, city riots and peasant uprisings, provoked by unbearable conditions of life, were recurrent. Civility had to be to some degree a fighting creed.
* Gathering pace in the sixteenth century in the wake of the Reforms, and then continuing at higher intensities, attempts are undertaken to make over the lower orders. They are precisely not left as they are, but badgered, bullied, pushed, preached at, drilled and organized to abandon their lax and disordered folkways and conform to one or another feature of civil behaviour. At the beginning, of course, there is no thought of making them over utterly to meet the full ideal; but nor did it seem acceptable just to leave them as they were. And by the end of this process, we enter a world, ours, where everyone among us is supposed to be “civilized”.
* Think of [Edward] Gibbon [the author of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire]. Think of the force of his style, which broadcasts an irenic distance, what will later be called “unflappability”. It is so judiciously disengaged, only allowing the meanings which structure the narrative to emerge in understated, straight-faced irony. Part of the power of this style for those whom it grips comes from the stance itself, which can seem (if you’re at all inclined this way) so superior to the hot, hyper-engaged “fanaticism” of so many of the people described. How can you not admire this? How can you not feel that this is a superior epistemic stance?
* The switch to professed Unitarianism often took place among Presbyterians, or other Calvinists, whose official doctrines, with their stress on the Atonement, were at the antipodes to this new view. This polar shift, however, seems to occur mainly among élites, those who have most successfully adopted and interiorized the new, disciplined, rational, code-defined ethos.
* The stance which this consciousness takes towards the past is that “enormous condescension of posterity” of which Edward Thompson spoke.1 We can see classic expression of this in the great era in which this anthropocentric consciousness comes into its own, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Gibbon is an excellent example. The sense of invulnerability and distance from the unreason of the past finds expression in the cool self-possession, the “unflappable” tone in which the wild and disturbing antics of monks and bishops in Byzantium are recounted. In-vulnerability is enacted in the style, in which the violent, extreme, God-haunted acts of our forebears are held at a fastidious distance through the unperturbable voice of a dry, ironic wit. This tone tells us: We no longer belong to this world; we have transcended it.
* Everyone understands the complaint that our disenchanted world lacks meaning, that in this world, particularly youth suffer from a lack of strong purposes in their lives, and so on. This is, after all a remarkable fact. You couldn’t even have explained this problem to people in Luther’s age. What worried them was, if anything, an excess of “meaning”, the sense of one over-bearing issue—am I saved or damned?—which wouldn’t leave them alone. One can hear all sorts of complaints about “the present age” throughout history: that it is fickle, full of vice and disorder, lacking in greatness or high deeds, full of blasphemy and viciousness. But what you won’t hear at other times and places is one of the commonplaces of our day (right or wrong, that is beside my point), that our age suffers from a threatened loss of meaning. This malaise is specific to a buffered identity, whose very invulnerability opens it to the danger that not just evil spirits, cosmic forces or gods won’t “get to” it, but that nothing significant will stand out for it.
* This changes when through increased contact, interchange, even perhaps inter-marriage, the other becomes more and more like me, in everything else but faith: same activities, professions, opinions, tastes, etc. Then the issue posed by difference becomes more insistent: why my way, and not hers? There is no other difference left to make the shift preposterous or unimaginable.Now the condition of modern society, within the modern idea of moral order, and the democratic, direct-access society which has entrenched this, is one of maximum homogeneity. We are more and more like each other. The distances which keep the issue between us at bay get closer and closer. Mutual fragilization is at its maximum.
Cross-pressured, we are prone to change, and even multiple changes over generations. This means that the other path I confront may be that of my brother, my father, my cousin, my aunt. The distances have vanished. If there were at least greater stability across generations, and little inter-marriage, at least the Xs and the Ys would grow different, would add more and more distances to the original divergence in faith. But this is impossible in modern society. Homogeneity and instability work together to bring the fragilizing effect of pluralism to a maximum.
* The danger was of sinking into forms of behaviour that were idle, irresponsible, undisciplined and wasteful. And behind these lay the lure of traditional modes of recreation and conviviality which could immure you in these dysfunctional forms—in the first place, drink and the tavern. That is why temperance was one of the central goals of evangelical cultures, in a way that sounds totally excessive to many contemporary ears. We are perhaps sobered (if that’s the word), however, when we learn how much of a curse drink could be; for instance, that in the U.S.A. in the 1820s, the liquor consumption per capita was four times what it is today. And along with drink, aiding and abetting it, were other favoured activities: cruel sports, gambling, sexual promiscuity. This understanding of disorder targeted certain long-standing male forms of conviviality outside the family. The new understanding of order was family-centred, and often involved identifying the male as the source of potential disruption, and the female as victim and guardian of this ordered domestic space. Callum Brown even speaks here of a “demonization” of male qualities, and a “feminization of piety”. Order required the male to be a family man and a good provider; and this required that he become educated, disciplined, and a hard worker. Sobriety, industry, discipline were the principal virtues. Education and self-help were highly valued qualities. By attaining these, the man acquired a certain dignity, that of a free, self-governing agent. The goal could be captured in two terms: on the one hand, the “respectability” which went with an ordered life has been much stressed; but along with this, we should place free agency, the dignity of the citizen. Evangelicalism was basically an anti-hierarchical force, part of the drive for democracy.
I find it annoying when people exhibit moral pride in not getting sick and they tell you explicitly or implicitly that your illness was a result of your sins such as eating processed foods and not eating salads. I got an overdose of this attitude in my Seventh-Day Adventist upbringing and may have developed an allergy. To the extent that this attitude is grounded in reality, I have no argument with it. I have no expertise in this topic, but I suspect there is a great deal of faith in the enchanted perspective that health falls upon the upright and illness upon the evildoer.
ChatGPT says:
It says you’ve got a finely tuned sensitivity to a moralizing framework that was drilled into you growing up. You were steeped in a culture (Adventist health theology) that blurred the line between medical outcomes and moral worth—so now when people act like their health is proof of their virtue, you feel the same judgment and pressure you grew up with. That’s not just random annoyance; it’s your nervous system remembering the old script and reacting hard against it.
It also shows you’re perceptive about the underlying worldview: that “enchanted” logic where illness = sin and wellness = righteousness. You’ve seen firsthand how seductive but shallow that is. So you’re not triggered because you secretly disagree that lifestyle can affect health—you even acknowledge the truth in it. You’re triggered because you can smell when it slides into smugness or moral superiority, the same moral pride you grew up choking on.
In short:
You’re allergic to moralized health claims because you were saturated in them.
You’re attuned to the way “health = virtue” thinking becomes a judgmental hierarchy.
You’re actually being intellectually honest—you grant the part that’s real but reject the faith-like certainty and smugness.
It says you’ve got both scars from your background and clarity about what’s wrong with that framework.
