I’m pretty shocked that Donald Trump is pushing back at institutions that pushed against him during his first-term and its humiliating afterlife.
Journalists tend to be secular, so they might not have heard of the Biblical insight that you reap what you sow.
Since taking office in January, Trump has threatened and extracted expansive settlements from top universities, law firms, tech and media companies. He sent U.S. Marines to Los Angeles over the objection of local elected officials, and took over Washington’s police force, ordering thousands of troops and federal officers into the streets. He fired the economics official who produced a monthly jobs report that irked him; ordered the firing of career officials at agencies; and even sought to fire officials at institutions he technically doesn’t run, including the National Portrait Gallery. Few aides have pushed back on any of the moves, and he has often been cheered on…
Trump is motivated by “having control over all American institutions,” said Douglas Brinkley, a presidential historian at Rice University. “He seems to want to grab everyone by the neck and say ‘I’m in charge.’”
ChatGPT says:
The WSJ piece gives tons of detail about Trump’s current second-term behavior (ignoring advisers, firing career staff, threatening Fed independence, sending Marines into LA, re-decorating the Oval) but it doesn’t explicitly connect the dots: this shift is a reaction to the institutional “chokepoints” he ran into from 2017–2020.
You can see the outlines in their reporting:
They mention John Kelly, Gary Cohn, Donald McGahn, Steve Mnuchin — all first-term figures who blocked or watered down his instincts.
They note that Trump “complained often” in the first term about DOJ, Fed, NSC, Kennedy Center but “did little to actually shape them.”
They point out that back then he deferred to advisers who told him he couldn’t host summits at his properties or interfere with the Fed.
But they don’t frame it as cause → effect. The cause being institutions checking him the first time, the effect being his current obsession with total control. Instead, the WSJ headline paints him as simply “bolder” and “unchecked,” as if it’s just personality growth, not a structural reaction to being constrained.
Why the omission? Likely editorial stance. The WSJ has an incentive to cast Trump as a singular authoritarian personality (“he wants gold flourishes, he ignores advice, he likes being called dictator”) rather than to highlight the institutional struggle — because if you admit institutions fought him hard the first time, it complicates the story. It shows he’s not simply a rogue authoritarian but someone who’s learned from losing bureaucratic fights. That makes the second-term strategy look less like personal eccentricity and more like a deliberate institutional counter-attack.
In short: the WSJ is reporting the surface moves, but missing the underlying dialectic — Trump’s drive to dominate institutions now is inseparable from the fact that those institutions dominated him before.
Trump’s second-term project of “mastering” institutions is very much a reaction to how institutions constrained his first term. In 2017–2020, nearly every traditional American power center—bureaucracy, courts, military brass, intelligence agencies, media, universities, corporate HR, even parts of his own party—resisted him. He came in thinking the presidency was like running a business where the CEO gives orders. Instead, he found entrenched networks that stalled, ignored, or sabotaged directives.
Key examples:
Courts repeatedly blocked his travel bans, immigration orders, and environmental rollbacks.
The intelligence community undercut him with leaks and the Russia investigation.
The military openly pushed back against his foreign policy instincts (e.g., Syria withdrawal, NATO skepticism).
Congress—even Republican-controlled early on—resisted big parts of his agenda, especially funding for the border wall.
The media and cultural institutions launched an unrelenting campaign of delegitimization.
From Trump’s perspective, he won an election but wasn’t allowed to govern. That produced a lesson: if he comes back, he wants loyalists, structural changes, and fewer veto points. Hence the push for Schedule F (reclassifying civil servants so they can be fired and replaced), tightening control over DOJ, Pentagon, and intelligence, and building outside networks (Heritage’s “Project 2025,” Federalist Society–aligned judges, loyal media channels) to pre-wire government in his favor.
So yes—his second-term “institutional mastery” is a direct reaction. The first term taught him that winning the presidency isn’t enough. The system can corral a president who isn’t in harmony with it. Now, he’s trying to make sure the system bends instead of resists.
1. Institution-by-Institution “Revenge Map”
Justice Department / FBI
First term: Trump was constantly frustrated by DOJ/FBI independence: Sessions recused himself, Mueller probe dominated two years, Barr wouldn’t fully bend on 2020 election.
Second term: He’s actively moving to purge career DOJ/FBI leadership, float “Schedule F” firings, and directly pressure prosecutions.
Intelligence community
First term: Leaks crippled him, intelligence chiefs contradicted him in public hearings, IC pushed back on Russia ties and North Korea diplomacy.
Second term: He’s installed loyalists and sidelined agencies, keeping intelligence reporting closer to the White House.
Pentagon / Military brass
First term: Mattis, Milley, Kelly, McMaster repeatedly resisted troop withdrawals, use of military domestically, NATO skepticism. Milley famously apologized for being in Trump’s Lafayette Square photo-op.
Second term: Now Trump’s SecDef is Pete Hegseth, a loyalist with no interest in restraining him. He’s already deployed Marines domestically — exactly what brass blocked in 2020.
Federal Reserve
First term: Powell ignored Trump’s demands to slash rates; Trump couldn’t get traction trying to remove governors.
Second term: He’s openly trying to fire Lisa Cook and bring the Fed under political control.
Universities / Law firms / Media companies
First term: Trump groused about “liberal elites” but didn’t move against them directly.
Second term: He’s extracting settlements, threatening accreditation, and going after institutions that define elite legitimacy.
State & Local Governments
First term: Governors and mayors blocked him on COVID rules, immigration enforcement, National Guard deployments.
Second term: He’s coercing local governments to abandon policies (like cashless bail) and has sent federal troops into cities over state objections.
Civil Service (the bureaucracy)
First term: “Deep State” constantly frustrated him — slow-rolling orders, leaking, resisting firings.
Second term: He’s trying to revive “Schedule F” to gut job protections and replace tens of thousands with loyalists.
2. Institutions that didn’t oppose him in his first term
There were a few, but very few:
Supreme Court (post-2018 shift): He got Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett. By late first term, SCOTUS was giving him key wins (immigration restrictions, deference on executive power). He doesn’t seem to be targeting them now — in fact, they’re an asset. The one caveat: the Court just signaled Fed independence, so now he’s picking a fight there.
Republican Senate (when GOP-controlled 2017–2019): McConnell delivered judges and tax cuts. Trump didn’t go after McConnell until after Jan. 6. Now, with Senate opposition muted, he’s not waging war on the institution itself, but he is sidelining traditional Republicans.
Federal judiciary more broadly: District and circuit courts often blocked him, but the Federalist Society pipeline gave him hundreds of judges — that part of the judiciary was his ally. He’s not targeting them.
Business community (Wall Street, corporate America): Early on, markets liked tax cuts and deregulation. Opposition hardened after Jan. 6 when companies cut PAC donations. Now he’s much more hostile — going after “woke” corporations, law firms, tech giants.
So the pattern is: Trump isn’t targeting institutions that helped him in Term 1. He’s targeting precisely the ones that blocked, embarrassed, or constrained him.
3. The Shift in Strategy
The through-line is clear: Trump didn’t understand in 2017 that the presidency sits inside a web of veto players. Now, he’s learned the lesson and is deliberately trying to cut them out or bend them into instruments of his will.
here’s a ranking of which institutions Trump is most likely to bend to his will vs. which are structurally more resistant in his second term.
Most Vulnerable
1. The Bureaucracy / Civil Service
Why vulnerable: Career protections can be gutted via “Schedule F.” Tens of thousands of policy-level employees could be reclassified and replaced with loyalists. This is administrative, not legislative — so it only takes executive orders and aggressive implementation.
Why it matters: Bureaucrats are the “muscle memory” of government; if they’re swapped out, institutional resistance collapses.
2. DOJ & FBI
Why vulnerable: Leadership is appointed, and Trump now knows how to avoid another Sessions/Barr problem. With Schedule F and mass firings, he could politicize prosecutions.
Past check: Mueller probe.
Now: Very little internal ballast if top leadership is purged.
3. Pentagon / Military Leadership
Why vulnerable: Civilian control is constitutional; Trump has stacked civilian leadership with loyalists like Hegseth. Generals can complain but ultimately answer to SecDef.
Past check: Brass stopped him from deploying troops domestically in 2020.
Now: Already deploying Marines — shows he’s overcome that veto point.
4. State & Local Governments
Why vulnerable: The feds control funding levers and can pressure locals via DOJ, DHS, and conditional grants. Deploying federal troops in cities sets precedent that state objections can be ignored.
Past check: Governors and mayors resisted immigration enforcement, COVID orders, 2020 deployments.
Now: More coercive posture.
Middle Ground — Vulnerable but with Counterweights
5. The Federal Reserve
Why partly resistant: SCOTUS signaled Fed independence is constitutionally protected. But Trump is openly trying to fire governors, pressure rate policy, and insert loyalists.
Realistic outcome: He won’t abolish Fed independence entirely, but he could erode it by intimidation and selective firings.
6. Media & Universities
Why partly resistant: They’re private, decentralized, and culturally powerful. Trump can extract settlements, deny federal funds, or intimidate, but he can’t totally control them.
Realistic outcome: More chilled speech and “loyalist” media ecosystem, but not full mastery.
7. Business / Corporate America
Why partly resistant: CEOs can push back, markets can punish. But Trump controls regulatory and enforcement arms.
Realistic outcome: Corporates mute criticism and adapt to survive, but remain semi-independent.
Most Resilient
8. The Supreme Court
Why resilient: Life tenure. Conservative majority already aligned with Trump on many issues. He’s not attacking them wholesale, though he may try to pressure specific rulings (e.g., Fed independence).
Realistic outcome: SCOTUS is less a target than a shield — but Trump may bristle when they draw red lines.
9. Congress
Why resilient: Even GOP members have their own power bases and electoral incentives. Trump has more sway than in 2017, but Congress still controls budgets and oversight.
Realistic outcome: Polarized chamber may limit Trump more through gridlock than open resistance.
10. Federalist Society Judiciary (lower courts he stacked)
Why resilient: These judges are his legacy; they’re ideological conservatives, not personal loyalists. Some will back him, some won’t (remember dozens rejected 2020 election suits).
Realistic outcome: Mixed record — they’ll hand him wins on executive power but balk at raw election subversion.
Big Picture
Most vulnerable: Bureaucracy, DOJ/FBI, Pentagon — because these rely on top-down executive appointments and Trump has learned how to staff them with loyalists.
Middle ground: Fed, media, universities, corporations — he can bully and weaken but not outright control.
Most resilient: SCOTUS, Congress, and judiciary more broadly — partly insulated by structure and legitimacy.
here’s a plausible “endgame” scenario if Trump pushes as far as possible by 2028, based on the trajectory we see now:
1. The Bureaucracy Hollowed Out
By 2028, “Schedule F” or its equivalent has stripped job protections for tens of thousands of civil servants. Agencies that used to resist (EPA, DOJ, DHS, State, IRS, Education) are staffed top-to-bottom with political loyalists or those too afraid to dissent.
Effect: Agencies no longer act as semi-autonomous technocratic institutions. They act as direct extensions of White House political will.
2. DOJ as a Political Weapon
DOJ prosecutions reflect presidential priorities. High-profile investigations target political opponents, media figures, and disfavored corporations/universities.
Effect: Deterrence by example — anyone outside Trump’s coalition risks being investigated or fined.
Echo: A kind of “Americanized” version of how Hungary or Turkey use prosecutors as political bludgeons.
3. Pentagon Brought to Heel
Civilian leadership (Hegseth, etc.) enforces Trump’s line. Generals who object are fired or marginalized. Military deployments inside U.S. cities — once a red line — become normalized.
Effect: Military loses its apolitical reputation. Public begins to see it as Trump’s institution, not the nation’s.
4. Federal Reserve Weakened
SCOTUS preserves some nominal independence, but constant Trump threats and selective firings intimidate governors. Rate decisions track political needs (e.g., election-year cuts).
Effect: Markets adjust by pricing in political volatility. The dollar weakens long-term, but short-term Trump can juice the economy when politically necessary.
5. Academia, Media, Corporates on Defense
Universities: Federal funds tied to “neutrality” on DEI, speech, and curricula. Lawsuits/settlements intimidate them. Many self-censor.
Media: Legacy outlets still exist but are financially squeezed and legally harassed. Right-aligned outlets flourish with state backing (access, ad buys, DOJ not targeting them).
Corporates: Regulatory muscle forces companies to avoid overt opposition. Business adapts by aligning with Trump’s messaging or staying silent.
6. States and Localities Subordinated
Federal coercion (via DOJ, DHS, funding) curtails local control. Deployments into cities (Chicago, Baltimore, Los Angeles) create a precedent: local autonomy is tolerated only when it aligns with federal priorities.
Effect: “Laboratories of democracy” shrink; blue-state policies exist at sufferance of the White House.
7. Supreme Court and Judiciary
SCOTUS: Conservative majority mostly aligns with Trump’s project, especially on executive power, but may draw a few hard lines (e.g., trying to literally fire Fed governors or alter constitutional term limits). Trump fumes but doesn’t dismantle SCOTUS.
Lower courts: Conservative judges give him leeway on regulation, immigration, and executive reach. But as in 2020, some still resist outright election nullification.
Effect: Judiciary is not neutered, but the courts tilt heavily toward enabling Trump’s consolidation.
8. Political Culture Shift
Elections: Mail-in voting curtailed, federal oversight of local election boards asserted. Opponents run in elections but under conditions stacked against them.
Public symbols: The presidency increasingly resembles a “monarchical executive” — parades, flags, gold flourishes, direct command over institutions.
Opposition politics: Democrats and dissenting Republicans can still campaign, but institutional levers (prosecutions, funding, media dominance) make it harder to translate votes into real power.
The “Endgame” Landscape by 2028
The presidency is the dominant institution, no longer balanced by bureaucracy, DOJ, or Pentagon.
SCOTUS still checks the most extreme moves, but often sides with executive power.
Local/state autonomy is fragile.
Media, universities, and corporations self-censor or adapt to survive.
The country formally remains democratic — elections still happen — but substantively resembles an illiberal democracy like Hungary, Turkey, or early Putin-era Russia.
