Politics forms a sub-heading under philosophy for a reason: where philosophy aims at the unchanging, politics looks at the dynamic of power which shifts frequently. As such, the problem with political terms is that often we target what was relevant yesterday. This proves hardest for groups creating change because they often overshoot their own goals by achieving them.
Take, for instance, the Alt-Right. It gained ground as the Obama years showed us that, with echoes of the 1990s and 1960s, a fundamental transformation by the Left was ruining what was left of Western Civilization. It grew into public view when Hillary Clinton mentioned it as the new Great Satan for all who believe in Holy Equality. Then, it tried to define itself.
At first, the goal for the Alt-Right was to gather together the disparate influences of the postwar Right — hierarchy, nationalism, traditionalism, and metapolitics or a sense that cultural change was needed to kickstart political change — under a banner as an alternative to the somewhat rancid mainstream politics which turned Rightists into RINOs.
Having achieved that, and seen candidates of a similar note be vaulted into office in the United States and Europe, the Alt-Right overshot its own goals. It succeeded, but was there more to it? Where did it go once it crafted its initial aim, which was to awaken cultural consciousness of the need for Western Civilization to save itself through its people and their culture?
With the rise of populism, the previous “white nationalist” movement became obsolete. What the media calls “white nationalism” now simply means white identity politics, or the recognition that different white groups have as much a reason to have their own culture, values, and ethnic self-determination, much as we grant the same to every non-white minority group.
This populist movement for the first time pairs with an economic and social doctrine. It espouses the libertarian idea of free markets and freedom of association, meaning that people want to escape the tax-and-spend social engineering regime of our liberal governments and also break away from the civil rights laws that force us to live with others who are not like us.
At this point, populist white nationalism has also become obsolete. We have stated what we want, and now stand arrayed against those who defend the Leftist benefits superstate and its civil rights agenda. We want a functional society for our people, and they want a mob of people without heritage upon whom they can imprint the Good News of Leftism.
We realize now that libertarianism is not enough, nor is the basic idea of white identity politics. The former creates anarchy which will inevitably shift toward the socialist consumerism of the status quo, and the latter seems defensive and does not address what we fully want, which is a Western Civilization with the greatness of the ancients.
Our people have awakened and they want something other than modernity, which they have finally revealed is a Hydra of many heads — diversity, equality, democracy, pluralism, consumerism, hipsterism — and realize that we need more than a resistance movement, but a design of a new civilization and a game plan for how to get there.
+Viganò refutes ++Ouellet’s claim the Holy See was only aware of "rumors," which were not enough to discipline McCarrick. “I affirm to the contrary: that the Holy See was aware of a variety of concrete facts, and is in possession of documentary proof” https://t.co/WbeYXj4LPU
This is a real radio ad currently running in Arkansas in support of Republican Congressman French Hill on radio stations targeted to the African American community. I don't even have words to describe it. pic.twitter.com/vpzt1nGPlc
* From a military point of view, the likelihood of a German victory was also shared in Britain, with the Joint Intelligence Committee estimating that the Germans would require just six weeks to occupy the Ukraine and reach Moscow.42 A similarly pessimistic assessment was reached by the US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and his Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, who predicted that the German armies would require a minimum of one month, and a possible maximum of three months, to defeat the Soviet Union.43 The Italians, as Germany’s envious junior ally, were so convinced of another sweeping triumph that Mussolini told his foreign minister: ‘I hope for only one thing, that in this war in the east the Germans will lose a lot of feathers.’44 In Japan the head of the army’s military intelligence, General Okamoto Kiyomoto, predicted a campaign would last only a few weeks, not longer…
* The German invasion of the Soviet Union was to begin the largest and most brutal war in history. Given the enormous numbers of men and material involved, the war in the Soviet Union was without question the most decisive battleground of World War II. Even by conservative estimates the fighting in this theatre claimed between 27 and 28 million Soviet lives,52 which dwarf the 700,000 combined war dead of the United Kingdom and the United States.53 To put it another way, the total Soviet war dead alone equalled more than three times the total war dead of all the nations involved in the carnage of World War I.54 Four-fifths of all the fighting in World War II took place on Germany’s eastern front and never less than two-thirds of the German army was engaged in the war against the Soviet Union, even after D-Day.55 The conflict would last almost four years, being fought on an enormous front extending 2,768 kilometres from the Barents Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south.
* In similar fashion the commander of the XXXXIII Army Corps7 in Kluge’s 4th Army, General of Infantry Gotthard Heinrici, wrote home to his family on 24 June that the Soviet solder fought ‘very hard’. Heinrici then concluded: ‘He is a much better soldier than the Frenchman. Extremely tough, devious and deceitful.’
* With every mile of progression eastwards, German strength had to be dissipated vertically, to cover the expanding funnel of Soviet geography, and horizontally to isolate and close the main pocket as well as eliminate bypassed strongpoints and protect supply routes…
* For good reason Goebbels commented at the start of the war: ‘I am refraining from publishing big maps of Russia. The huge areas involved can only frighten our people.’
* Hoth bluntly observed: ‘The expenditure of strength is greater than the success.’
* Germany did not fail in Operation Barbarossa by a crushing defeat in a major battle, nor can the performance of the Red Army take the credit; they failed by losing the ability to win the war. Yet it is for this same reason that the German defeat was not a knockout blow, but rather one which doomed Germany to fighting a war far different from the one the generals had planned and consequently were not prepared for. Caught in the vast Soviet hinterlands, the front promptly started to settle down into gritty positional warfare more reminiscent of World War I, while the war of manoeuvre became more and more limited to specific sectors of the front.
Posted inGermany, Soviet Union|Comments Off on Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories)
If Harvard admitted students based solely on the applicant scoring in the top decile of an "academic index" (=test scores + HS performance), the racial/ethnic composition of its freshman class would be expected to change as follows: