In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:
My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization…
That’s the best summary of the human condition I have seen. Mearsheimer doesn’t put much effort into supporting his argument. He draws his social ontology from a thin bibliography, mostly Aristotle, Burke, and Herder. The literature behind his claim is much deeper than his footnotes suggest, and it splits into four traditions that rarely read each other.
The first is the sociological classic line that made socialization the central fact. Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) built the whole case in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, where the sacred is society worshipping itself and moral categories arrive from the group rather than from reflection. Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) extended it in The Gift and in his 1938 essay on the category of the person, which traces how the bounded individual became a Western legal and religious invention. George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) gave the psychological version in Mind, Self, and Society: the self emerges from taking the attitude of others toward oneself, so the social precedes the individual in the order of development. Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) argued the same for cognition in Mind in Society, where thought starts as external speech between people and only later moves inside. Peter Berger (1929-2017) and Thomas Luckmann (1927-2016) systematized the whole thing in The Social Construction of Reality, and their chapter on primary socialization is the best short statement of Mearsheimer’s point about the long childhood. Norbert Elias (1897-1990) wrote on the puzzle in The Society of Individuals, arguing that the sense of an inner self walled off from others is a late historical achievement.
The second tradition is comparative anthropology, which tested whether the Western person is normal. Louis Dumont (1911-1998) wrote Homo Hierarchicus, which reads caste India as a society organized around the whole, and Essays on Individualism traces how the West got from the Christian individual-in-relation-to-God to the modern individual-in-the-world. Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) made the famous remark in Local Knowledge that the Western idea of the person as a bounded, unique, integrated center of awareness is a peculiar notion set against the world’s other cultures. Marshall Sahlins (1930-2021) wrote the short polemical version in The Western Illusion of Human Nature, about a hundred pages, which argues that the Hobbesian picture of the presocial self-interested actor is a local folk theory the West mistook for science. Mary Douglas (1921-2007) is the practical one: Natural Symbols and How Institutions Think show that classification, memory, and even what counts as a good argument run through group structure. Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889) wrote The Ancient City in 1864 and it remains the best account of a world where the family cult is the unit of everything.
The third tradition is the evolutionary and cognitive work, which is where the current action is. Joseph Henrich (b. 1968) matters most for Mearsheimer’s argument. The Secret of Our Success argues that humans survive by cultural learning rather than individual intelligence, and The WEIRDest People in the World explains Western individualism as the downstream effect of the medieval Church dismantling cousin marriage and clan structure. Read together they concede Mearsheimer’s premise and then historicize his opponent, which is more damaging to liberalism than a frontal attack. Michael Tomasello (b. 1950) supplies the developmental evidence in A Natural History of Human Thinking and Becoming Human, showing that shared intentionality appears in children before anything resembling individual reasoning. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (b. 1946) wrote Mothers and Others on cooperative breeding, and it is the best answer to why the human childhood is so long and so dependent. Christopher Boehm (1937-2021) gives the political version in Hierarchy in the Forest and Moral Origins, where conscience is internalized group sanction. Peter Richerson (b. 1943) and Robert Boyd (b. 1948) provide the formal theory in Not by Genes Alone. Robin Dunbar (b. 1947) on group size in Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, and David Sloan Wilson (b. 1949) on religion as group adaptation in Darwin’s Cathedral, round it out. Mark Moffett’s The Human Swarm covers how societies mark membership and how they split.
The fourth tradition is the philosophical critique of liberal atomism, and this is the literature Mearsheimer is closest to without citing. Charles Taylor (b. 1931) wrote the founding essay, “Atomism,” in the second volume of his philosophical papers, and then the long historical version in Sources of the Self and A Secular Age, where the buffered self replaces the porous one. Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-2025) gives the sharpest version in After Virtue and, more to your point, in Dependent Rational Animals, which starts from human vulnerability and dependence and reaches a politics from there. Michael Sandel (b. 1953) attacked Rawls on exactly this ground in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice with the argument about the unencumbered self. Michael Walzer (b. 1935) offers the pluralist alternative in Spheres of Justice. Robert Bellah (1927-2013) and his colleagues did the empirical American version in Habits of the Heart. C.B. Macpherson (1911-1987) wrote the classic genealogy in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, tracing atomism to Hobbes and Locke. Larry Siedentop (b. 1936) argues the opposite causal story in Inventing the Individual, that Christianity produced the individual rather than displacing the group, which makes him the best foil for Henrich and Dumont both.
On the rights half of Mearsheimer’s argument, read Samuel Moyn (b. 1972) beyond the quoted line. The Last Utopia dates the human rights breakthrough to the 1970s and treats it as a replacement for failed socialist and anticolonial politics, and Not Enough argues that rights talk grew as material equality collapsed. Mary Ann Glendon (b. 1938) wrote Rights Talk on how the American rights idiom crowds out responsibility and relationship. MacIntyre’s line in After Virtue about belief in natural rights standing with belief in witches and unicorns is the hard version.
For the nationalism payoff, where Mearsheimer takes all this, the essential books are Ernest Gellner (1925-1995), Nations and Nationalism, Anthony D. Smith (1939-2016), The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Walker Connor (1926-2017), Ethnonationalism, and Azar Gat (b. 1959), Nations, which argues for deep premodern roots against Gellner’s modernism. Pierre van den Berghe (1933-2019) wrote the sociobiological version in The Ethnic Phenomenon. Yoram Hazony (b. 1964) published The Virtue of Nationalism the same year as Mearsheimer’s book and argues a parallel case from a different starting point.
If you want four books rather than forty: Dumont’s Essays on Individualism for the comparative frame, Henrich’s The WEIRDest People in the World for the causal history, Berger and Luckmann for socialization, and Taylor’s “Atomism” for the philosophical target.
My quote comes from Chapter 2, “Human Nature and Politics,” which names two people pop evolution.
The first is Jonathan Haidt (b. 1963), quoted for the line that children end up with a morality unique to their culture or group. Mearsheimer (b. 1947) calls him a social psychologist and uses him once, to prop up the claim that socialization outranks reason. The second is Antonio Damasio (b. 1944), cited for the point that emotion cannot be scrubbed out of reasoning and in fact helps it. There is also an unnamed reference to “some social psychologists” who hold that reason mostly rationalizes intuition, which is the moral-intuitionist school Haidt belongs to, and a dismissive aside about “some sociobiologists” who claim humans are naturally aggressive, a position Mearsheimer rejects along with Hans Morgenthau’s (1904-1980) animus dominandi.
The rest of the chapter runs on political theory and sociology rather than biology. Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) opens it. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) supplies habitus. Émile Durkheim gets the line that society is not a mere sum of individuals. Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) supplies the infinity of traces. Edmund Burke (1729-1797) supplies the partnership of the living, the dead, and the unborn. Alasdair MacIntyre supplies the interminability of moral disagreement. Leo Strauss (1899-1973) gets several pages. Then Hume, Rousseau, Condorcet, William Godwin, John Dewey, Daniel Defoe on Robinson Crusoe, Brad Gregory (b. 1963) on the Reformation, Richard Posner (b. 1939) and Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) and Oliver Wendell Holmes on law, Irving Kristol on economics, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) and Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) on whether man is good or bad, Thucydides, Harold Lasswell, and Locke.
So the sociality argument rests on assertion and on a handful of political theorists, with Haidt doing the empirical work almost alone. Mearsheimer does not cite Tomasello, Boehm, Hrdy, Richerson and Boyd, Henrich, Dunbar, or E.O. Wilson except to wave off the sociobiologists. He says the evidence that humans are hardwired for social life is overwhelming and then does not produce it. His endnotes for the chapter are not in the copy I could reach, so I cannot rule out a citation buried in note 2 or note 42, and you would want to check those two before quoting me on this in print. Note 2 hangs on the sentence about social groups as survival vehicles, and note 42 hangs on survival as the reason humans operate in groups larger than the family. Those are the two places where a Boehm or a Hrdy would sit if he consulted one.
