The Buffered Identity

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

If Mearsheimer is right, then the entire edifice of liberal political theory, liberal journalism, liberal education, liberal foreign policy, and liberal institutional self-understanding rests on a fundamental mistake about what humans are. The mistake is not a minor technical error. It is categorical. It produces systematic failures across every domain where the mistake is institutionally operative.
Let me work through what follows if Mearsheimer’s claims are accepted as accurate.
What follows for reason. If reason is the least important of the three ways humans determine their preferences, then political theory that treats reasoned agreement as the foundation of legitimate political order is building on what is actually the weakest foundation humans have. Rawls’s overlapping consensus, Dworkin’s interpretive community of reasonable citizens, Habermas’s communicative rationality, all of these depend on reason doing work it is actually not capable of doing. Reason does not produce the commitments these theorists treat as its products. Reason elaborates and rationalizes commitments that socialization and innate sentiment have already produced.
This does not mean reason is useless. It means reason’s role is different from what liberal theory assigns to it. Reason works within commitments rather than generating them. Reason can extend commitments to new cases, identify contradictions within existing commitments, produce sophisticated articulations of what socialization has already deposited. Reason cannot produce the foundational commitments from scratch through neutral analytical operations. Those commitments arrive through other channels.
What liberal theorists have been doing when they seem to produce political commitments through reason is something else. They are articulating commitments their socialization produced in them. The articulation feels like reasoning because they perform it using the vocabulary and procedures of reasoning. The feeling does not change what is actually happening. The commitments preceded the articulation. The articulation elaborates them. The articulation does not generate them.
This means that every liberal political philosopher who has built his system on the assumption that his reasoning could reach universal principles all reasonable people should accept has been doing something other than what he thought he was doing. He has been articulating his specific cultural formation in the vocabulary of neutral reason. His system’s apparent universality reflects the universality of the articulation vocabulary, not the universality of what is being articulated.
If humans have a long childhood in which they are exposed to intense socialization before they develop critical faculties, then the critical faculties that later emerge cannot be used to evaluate what the socialization deposited without circularity. The critical faculties themselves reflect the socialization that produced them. They cannot operate from outside the socialization to assess what the socialization did. They can only operate within the framework the socialization established.
This has substantial implications for what philosophy can accomplish. Philosophy has often been understood as the use of critical reflection to evaluate the commitments that ordinary life and culture have deposited in us. The Socratic examined life. The Cartesian methodical doubt. The Kantian critique of pure reason. Each of these presupposes that philosophical reflection can evaluate pre-philosophical commitments from a position that is not itself shaped by those commitments.
If Mearsheimer is right, this presupposition is false. Philosophical reflection cannot operate from outside the socialization that produced the capacities used in reflection. The capacities are themselves products of the formation being examined. Their apparent independence from the formation is illusory. They examine the formation using tools the formation provided. The examination cannot reach conclusions that transcend the formation because the examination operates within the formation’s framework.
This does not make philosophy useless. It means philosophy is something other than what its practitioners typically claim. Philosophy is the articulate working through of commitments from within the formation that produced the philosopher. The articulate working through can produce substantial intellectual work. It cannot produce assessment of the formation from outside the formation. No such outside position is available.
What follows for moral codes. If people have limited choice in formulating moral codes because so much of their thinking comes from inborn attitudes and socialization, then moral progress as liberal theory typically understands it is not what liberal theory describes. Liberal theory typically understands moral progress as the gradual recognition of universal principles through sustained rational reflection. The universal principles are discovered through the reflection. The discovery expands the circle of moral consideration, produces increasingly just institutions, brings human conduct into closer alignment with what reason requires.
If Mearsheimer is right, moral progress is not the discovery of universal principles through rational reflection. Moral progress, to the extent it occurs, is the gradual displacement of some culturally produced commitments by others. The displacement happens through specific social and political processes that include rational elaboration but are not primarily driven by it. The new commitments that displace the old ones are not more rational than the old ones. They are culturally sustained by different conditions that make them institutionally dominant.
This reframing does not mean moral progress does not exist. It means moral progress is something other than what liberal theory claims. Societies can develop commitments that produce better outcomes on various measures than previous commitments produced. The development is not the discovery of universal truth. It is the cultural replacement of one set of culturally produced commitments with another. The replacement can be welcomed or resisted on various grounds. The grounds for welcoming or resisting are themselves culturally produced. There is no neutral ground from which to evaluate the change.
This is destabilizing for liberal self-understanding. Liberal self-understanding treats its moral commitments as the discoveries of reasoned reflection rather than as one cultural formation among others. If the treatment is incorrect, then liberal confidence in the superiority of liberal commitments over alternative commitments cannot be grounded in the way liberal self-understanding assumes. The superiority, to the extent it can be defended, must be defended on other grounds. The other grounds are themselves culturally produced and do not escape the general condition Mearsheimer identifies.
What follows for innate sentiments. If humans are born with innate sentiments that strongly influence how they think about the world, then the blank slate assumption that has structured substantial liberal theorizing is wrong. Humans are not infinitely plastic material that liberal institutions can shape in any direction through sustained training. Humans have genetically transmitted propensities that operate alongside and sometimes against what liberal institutions try to produce.
The propensities are substantial. Evolutionary psychology has documented many of them across varied research programs. In-group preference. Kin favoritism. Male competition for status. Female selectivity about mates. Sexual division of labor in response to differential reproductive costs. Disgust responses to potential contaminants. Group loyalty under threat. The list extends across most of what makes human social life distinctive.
Liberal theory has typically treated these propensities as obstacles to be overcome rather than as constitutive features of what humans are. The overcoming would happen through sustained cultural training that replaces the propensities with universalist commitments to individual dignity, equal respect, and rational cooperation regardless of biological heritage. The training has been attempted across substantial institutional apparatus for decades.
The results have been mixed. The propensities have proved more durable than the training’s ambitions assumed. They re-emerge whenever institutional pressure slackens. They operate through populations that have received substantial training in universalist commitments but revert to in-group preference under stress. They produce political movements that reassert tribal loyalty against the institutional cosmopolitanism liberal training aimed to produce. The reassertions are not temporary setbacks in a steady march toward universalism. They are persistent features of human populations operating through their actual biological constitution rather than through what liberal training tried to install.
If Mearsheimer is right about all of this, then contemporary American politics looks different from what liberal self-understanding assumes it to be. The political conflict is not between those who recognize universal principles and those who remain trapped in tribal commitments. The conflict is between different tribal commitments that have been institutionally packaged differently. Liberal institutional commitments are tribal commitments that have been trained to present themselves as universal. Populist commitments are tribal commitments that present themselves as tribal. The difference is in presentation, not in underlying structure.
This reframing changes what political conflict is about. It is not about whether to accept reason and universal principles. It is about which tribal commitments will be institutionally dominant. The institutional dominance of liberal commitments for several decades was a political achievement, not the triumph of reason over irrationality. The current resurgence of populist commitments is not the regression from reason to irrationality. It is the political reassertion of tribal commitments that liberal institutional dominance had suppressed but not eliminated.
The reframing does not automatically favor populist commitments over liberal ones. It removes the automatic favor liberal commitments have enjoyed through their self-presentation as universal rather than tribal. Both sets of commitments must be defended on grounds other than claims to universality. The grounds are whatever reasons people can offer for preferring one set of commitments over another. The reasons are themselves tribal in the sense that they operate from within cultural formations. There is no neutral ground from which to adjudicate. The adjudication happens through political processes that include rational argument but are not primarily determined by it.
If Mearsheimer is right that reason is the least important of the three ways humans determine their preferences, then Mearsheimer’s own argument is itself not primarily the product of reason. It is the articulation of commitments his socialization and innate sentiments produced. His realism in international relations theory reflects tribal and cultural commitments rather than neutral assessment of evidence. His critique of liberalism operates from a cultural formation that makes the critique possible rather than from trans-cultural assessment.
Mearsheimer would likely accept this. Realist international relations theory does not claim to be the view from nowhere. It claims to be accurate about human nature in ways that liberal theory is inaccurate. The accuracy claim can be evaluated on evidence without requiring that realism transcend cultural formation. The evaluation is itself culturally located. No neutral position is available. What can be asked is whether the evidence supports the realist claims better than it supports the liberal claims. The asking happens from within cultural formations that shape what evidence is admitted as relevant and how it is weighted.
Mearsheimer’s argument operates within the condition it describes. The operating within does not make the argument false. It makes the argument coherent rather than self-refuting. An argument that claimed to transcend the condition it describes would be self-refuting. Mearsheimer’s argument does not make this claim. It offers itself as better cultural articulation of human nature than liberal alternatives, to be evaluated by whatever standards evaluators bring to the evaluation.
If Mearsheimer is right, liberal political theory has been substantially mistaken about humans for the entire period of its institutional dominance. The mistake has produced pathologies across American institutional life. The pathologies include the failures of American foreign policy Mearsheimer’s book targets. They include the inadequacies of mainstream American media to cover political developments that operate outside liberal frameworks. They include the failures of American universities to engage substantial portions of the populations that fund them. They include the inability of American political theory to address contemporary political developments that do not fit its assumptions.
The pathologies cannot be corrected without acknowledging the mistake. The acknowledgment is resisted by the institutions that have been built on the mistake. The resistance is structural rather than accidental. Acknowledging the mistake would require reconstructing the institutions around different assumptions about what humans are. The reconstruction is difficult and expensive. The institutions have considerable inertia. They tend to persist through accumulating pathologies rather than through acknowledging and correcting the underlying mistake.
This is where contemporary American politics currently stands. The institutions built on the mistake are under sustained pressure from populations whose actual human nature does not fit the institutions’ assumptions. The institutions respond to the pressure in ways that accumulate rather than resolve the pathologies. The responses deepen the divisions rather than healing them. The trajectory continues because no political coalition has both the will and the capacity to reconstruct the institutions around more accurate assumptions.
Whether this situation will persist, worsen, or eventually produce significant institutional reconstruction is not predictable in advance. The situation has features that suggest either outcome is possible. The population that benefits from the current institutional arrangements retains substantial resources to defend them. The populations that do not benefit from the arrangements have growing resources to challenge them. The conflict between these forces will shape how the situation develops.
What Mearsheimer’s argument contributes to understanding the situation is the diagnosis. The diagnosis is that the conflict is about more than policy disagreements. It is about the fundamental assumptions on which the contemporary institutional order has been built. If the assumptions are wrong, the institutions cannot fully serve the populations they nominally serve. The populations will push back against the institutions until either the assumptions or the institutions change. The pushing back is what American politics has been doing for at least the past decade. The pushing back is likely to continue because the underlying assumptions have not changed and the institutions have not been reconstructed.
Charles Taylor identifies the buffered phenomenology that liberal institutions require to function. Mearsheimer identifies that the phenomenology is not grounded in what humans actually are. Together they describe what contemporary American institutional life is up against and why the up against is not easily resolved.
If Mearsheimer is right in that passage, the buffered self cannot be what Taylor’s theory sometimes presents it as. It cannot be an achieved condition in which the most important things are actually inside the self. The passage rules this out directly. If socialization is more important than reason, if childhood formation deposits values before critical faculties develop, if innate sentiments operate before thought can evaluate them, if people have limited choice in formulating moral codes because so much comes from inborn attitudes and socialization, then no self can actually be what the buffered phenomenology reports it to be. The most important things cannot be inside the self because the self’s interior was filled by external formation before the self existed as something distinguishable from the formation.
What then is the buffered self? It is a phenomenology that particular cultures have trained some of their members to experience. The phenomenology reports accurately that members experience themselves as bounded individuals whose commitments feel like their own. The phenomenology reports inaccurately that the commitments actually are the members’ own in the sense of having been generated by the members rather than deposited by formation. The experience is real. The interpretation of what the experience tracks is wrong.
The buffered self is therefore a cultural production that trains its subjects to experience as interior what is the deposit of exterior formation. The training is real cultural achievement. It produces institutional goods. It also misrepresents what the trained subjects actually are.
The theory becomes a theory of cultural formation rather than a theory of selves. Taylor’s framework tracks what happens when particular cultural conditions produce particular phenomenology in particular populations. The phenomenology is not universal human achievement. It is cultural production that emerged under particular conditions in particular societies. The production requires continuing cultural conditions to sustain itself. Remove the conditions and the production erodes. The erosion is not loss of what humans naturally are. It is loss of a cultural achievement that was never what humans naturally are.
This reframing preserves most of Taylor’s empirical claims while changing their interpretation. Modern Western societies did produce populations with distinctive phenomenology that earlier societies and most other contemporary societies did not produce. The populations do experience themselves differently than populations in other cultural contexts experience themselves. The experience has consequences for what the populations can do institutionally and intellectually. All of this remains accurate.
What changes is the interpretation of what the phenomenology tracks. Taylor’s framework sometimes presents the phenomenology as tracking increasing individuation, increasing reflective autonomy, increasing capacity for self-determination against external forces. The framework treats the phenomenology as achievement in the sense of humans becoming more fully what they can be rather than merely differently what they are. This presentation cannot survive the Mearsheimer passage.
The reframed presentation treats the phenomenology as one cultural achievement among others. The achievement has distinctive features and produces distinctive effects. It is not privileged over other achievements that produce different phenomenology. It is different in ways that have implications for what it enables and prevents. Other achievements enable different things and prevent different things. None of the achievements transcends the cultural production that produces it. All are cultural productions that can be described, compared, evaluated on various grounds.
The theory becomes less ambitious but more defensible. Taylor’s framework as sometimes presented makes ambitious claims about what modern Western phenomenology has achieved. The claims position the buffered self as genuine human advance that other cultures have yet to accomplish. The positioning cannot survive Mearsheimer. The ambitious claims must be abandoned.
The framework can still make more modest claims that remain defensible. Modern Western societies produce distinctive phenomenology. The phenomenology has features worth identifying. The features have consequences for what institutions and practices the phenomenology supports. The consequences are available for analysis. The analysis is useful for understanding what contemporary Western institutional life actually involves.
These modest claims do not require the ambitious claims. They can stand on their own empirical grounding without needing the philosophical defense of buffered phenomenology as genuine human achievement. The modest version of Taylor’s framework is closer to descriptive anthropology of modern Western societies than to philosophical theory of what humans have become. The anthropological framing is sustainable after Mearsheimer. The philosophical framing is not.
The porous self is not deficient in what the buffered self has achieved. The porous self operates through more accurate self-understanding than the buffered self has. The porous self knows he is part of something larger that shapes him and exceeds him. This is what humans actually are. The buffered self has been trained not to recognize this about himself. The training is cultural achievement in the sense of producing particular effects. It is not cultural achievement in the sense of reaching accurate self-understanding.
The comparison between the two self-understandings therefore runs in the opposite direction from what Taylor’s framework sometimes suggests. The porous self has better understanding of what he is. The buffered self has worse understanding. The better and worse is not a matter of taste or cultural preference. It is a matter of accuracy. One self-understanding tracks what Mearsheimer’s passage identifies as human reality. The other self-understanding masks what that passage identifies.
This does not mean the porous self is always admirable or always produces better institutional outcomes. Societies dominated by porous phenomenology have produced pathologies that societies dominated by buffered phenomenology have avoided or reduced. Pre-modern religious conflict, ethnic cleansing, tribal warfare all emerge more easily from populations operating through porous phenomenology than from populations trained into buffered phenomenology. The institutional goods that buffered phenomenology supports include reductions in these pathologies. The goods are real even if the phenomenology’s self-understanding is inaccurate.
What useful fiction means in this reframing. Calling the buffered self a useful fiction captures that the phenomenology is productive institutionally while misrepresenting what it tracks. The usefulness does not depend on the phenomenology being accurate. It depends on the phenomenology sustaining institutions that produce particular goods. The institutions require members who experience themselves as buffered. The experience is produced through cultural training that begins in early childhood and continues through sustained institutional embedding.
The fiction is sustained through the institutions that require it. Universities train students to experience themselves as autonomous rational agents whose reflection can reach universal principles. Professional cultures reward displays of the experience. Media environments model it as sophisticated default. Legal systems presuppose it in their operations. Political theory articulates it as foundational. The institutional infrastructure is substantial. It produces and maintains the phenomenology through sustained cultural investment.
The fiction is also cost-bearing. Populations excluded from the institutional infrastructure do not develop the phenomenology. They operate through their actual human nature without the cultural training that masks it. They are often experienced by buffered populations as backward or uneducated. The experiencing reflects the buffered population’s mistake about its own situation. The buffered population thinks it has achieved what other populations have yet to achieve. The achievement is actually cultural masking rather than human advancement. The populations without the masking are not behind. They are operating without the cultural production that trains selves to misunderstand themselves in particular ways.
Contemporary American political conflict involves the confrontation between populations that have been thoroughly trained into buffered phenomenology and populations that have not been. The confrontation is not between sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens. It is between populations operating through different cultural productions that produce different phenomenology. The buffered populations experience the porous populations as regressive because their self-understanding treats their own phenomenology as advanced. The porous populations experience the buffered populations as self-deceived because their self-understanding recognizes what the buffered phenomenology systematically masks.
Both experiences are accurate within their own frames. The buffered populations do produce institutional goods the porous populations have more difficulty producing. The porous populations do retain accurate self-understanding the buffered populations have been trained to lose. The difference is real. Neither side holds the position of transcendent understanding from which to adjudicate the difference. Both sides operate from within cultural formations that shape what they see and how they evaluate what they see.
Political conflict between the two operates at cross purposes because each side treats itself as having accurate understanding the other side lacks. The buffered side treats its institutional goods as vindication of its phenomenology. The porous side treats its accurate self-understanding as vindication of its position. Neither acknowledges what the other side brings that its own side lacks. The acknowledgment would require stepping outside cultural formations in ways Mearsheimer’s passage suggests is not possible.
What is possible is recognition that both sides operate from cultural formations that have their own resources and limits. The recognition permits more honest conversation than the sides typically achieve when each is convinced it holds the position of transcendent understanding. The conversation might proceed through acknowledged cultural difference rather than through one side’s effort to convert the other to its supposed universal truth. The conversation would not eliminate the conflict. It would change the character of the conflict in ways that might make some kinds of cooperation more possible than they currently are.
After Mearsheimer, the theory of the buffered self should be understood as a theory of cultural formation that produces distinctive phenomenology in populations subjected to it. The formation has emerged under particular historical conditions in particular societies. It is sustained by particular institutional infrastructure. It produces particular goods and particular pathologies. It trains its subjects to experience themselves in ways that do not accurately track what they actually are.
The theory can still track what it has always tracked empirically. Modern Western societies produce buffered phenomenology. Pre-modern and many non-Western societies produce more porous phenomenology. The difference has consequences for what institutions and practices each kind of society can sustain. The consequences are available for analysis. The analysis is useful.
What the theory cannot do after Mearsheimer is treat the buffered phenomenology as genuine human achievement that transcends other cultural formations. The transcendence claim cannot be sustained. What can be sustained is descriptive account of what the phenomenology is, how it is produced, what it enables, what it prevents. The account is humbler than some presentations of Taylor’s framework suggest. The account is also more defensible than the more ambitious versions of the framework permit.
Is Mearsheimer right in the opening quote?
The claim that humans are profoundly social is supported by converging evidence across multiple disciplines. Developmental psychology shows that human infants require sustained care relationships for normal development. Children raised in institutional settings without consistent attachment figures show severe developmental problems. The evidence from Romanian orphanage studies, from primate deprivation research, from attachment theory across decades of replication is substantial. Humans are not minor variations on asocial animals. Social embedding is constitutive of normal human development.
The claim that childhood formation deposits values before critical faculties develop is well-supported. The cognitive capacities needed for rational moral evaluation develop gradually across childhood and adolescence. Moral intuitions, emotional responses, basic values, and identity formation occur well before these capacities mature. This sequence is empirically documented across developmental research. Adults who later reflect on their commitments are reflecting on what their formation produced, not generating commitments from neutral starting points.
The claim that innate sentiments influence thinking is well-supported by evolutionary psychology, behavioral genetics, and cross-cultural research. Twin studies show substantial heritability for personality traits, political orientation, religious attitudes, and moral intuitions. Evolutionary psychology has documented species-typical responses including in-group preference, disgust sensitivity, status concerns, kin favoritism, and mate preferences that operate across cultures with particular variations. These are not speculative claims. They are supported by multiple independent research programs with replicated findings.
The claim that socialization matters more than reason in determining preferences is well-supported by research on motivated reasoning, cultural cognition, and political psychology. Jonathan Haidt’s work is part of a broader research tradition including Dan Kahan’s cultural cognition research, Drew Westen’s emotional brain work, and extensive empirical literature showing that reasoning typically operates in service of prior commitments rather than generating commitments from neutral inquiry. The research is not controversial within cognitive science and political psychology. It has substantial replication across multiple labs and methods.
What is more contested. Mearsheimer’s framing that reason is the “least important” of the three ways we determine preferences may overstate the case. The research supports that socialization and innate sentiment dominate, but reason does substantial work within the frameworks they establish. Reason extends commitments to new cases, identifies inconsistencies, produces articulated positions from inchoate intuitions, enables sustained cultural development across generations. Reason is not the primary source of foundational commitments but it is not negligible either. Calling it “least important” is a rhetorical move that may be stronger than the evidence requires.
The claim about limited choice in moral codes is largely supported but has exceptions worth noting. Individuals do sometimes reach commitments that break substantially from their socialization. Religious converts, political defectors, intellectual innovators exist. The cases are not numerous enough to refute Mearsheimer’s general claim, but they indicate that the constraint is not absolute. People within the same cultural formation sometimes reach quite different commitments through their own experiences and reflections. The formation constrains but does not determine completely.
The tribal framing sometimes gets stronger than the evidence supports. Humans are socially constituted but not always tribally constituted in the strong sense Mearsheimer sometimes suggests. Social identity theory and related research show that humans form in-groups easily but the in-groups are often quite flexible and context-dependent rather than fixed tribal categories. The tribalism is real but less rigid than Mearsheimer’s framing sometimes implies.
Mearsheimer’s use of this material serves his critique of liberal universalism in international relations. The critique has empirical grounding but also ideological direction. A more politically centrist summary of the same research would emphasize that humans are socially constituted while preserving more room for rational reflection, cultural evolution, and moral progress than Mearsheimer’s framing permits. The empirical evidence supports his core claims without requiring his political conclusions.
This matters because the passage could be used to justify positions Mearsheimer himself might not endorse. Strong tribalist readings of human nature can support both realist foreign policy and various kinds of ethnonationalist domestic politics. The empirical evidence does not support any particular political program. It rules out some liberal universalist claims while leaving substantial room for various political responses to human social nature.
The credibility score. On core empirical claims: highly credible. The basic picture Mearsheimer presents is supported by converging evidence across multiple disciplines. The general direction of the argument matches what cognitive science, developmental psychology, evolutionary psychology, and political psychology have been documenting for decades.
On framing: somewhat overstated. The rhetorical emphasis on reason as least important, on limited choice, on tribal core may be stronger than evidence requires. A more measured version of the same claims would preserve more room for the features Mearsheimer’s framing downplays.
On political implications: not entailed by the empirical claims. The empirical material is compatible with various political programs. Mearsheimer’s political conclusions draw on his realism as much as on the empirical claims. The empirical claims do not mandate his political conclusions.
If we accept the credible part of the Mearsheimer quote, it converges with the work of David Pinsof and the Rony Guldmann book Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression. These frames produce a coherent account of what is happening in contemporary American (and Australian, and British) institutional life.
Humans are profoundly tribally constituted. Their moral commitments come primarily through socialization and innate sentiment rather than through rational reflection. The commitments mark tribal membership and coordinate action within tribes. Different tribes produce different moral vocabularies that serve tribal needs.
Contemporary progressive institutional culture is one tribe among others. Its distinctive feature is that it has trained its members to experience their tribal commitments as transcendent universal principles. The training produces phenomenology in which tribal members cannot see their own tribal nature. The phenomenology serves particular functions within the institutions the tribe controls. It also misrepresents what the tribe actually is.
The tribe’s institutional dominance gives it capacity to impose its tribal commitments on other tribes in the name of neutral principles. The imposition operates through tacit mechanisms that cannot be openly defended because the defense would require acknowledging the tribal nature of the commitments being imposed. The operation through tacit mechanisms produces what Guldmann calls conservaphobia and what Pinsof would identify as standard coalition policing against out-group members.
Conservative populations encountering the institutions experience the imposition correctly as tribal dominance by one tribe over others. The experience is accurate. The institutional tribe interprets the conservative experience as resistance to universal principles from backward populations. The interpretation is inaccurate. It reflects the institutional tribe’s inability to recognize its own tribal nature. The inaccuracy is not incidental. It is constitutive of the institutional tribe’s operation. The tribe cannot recognize its own tribal nature without losing the phenomenology that produces its institutional goods.
Several analytical moves become available that were not quite available when the frameworks operated separately.
The claim that progressive institutional culture is not more rational than conservative populations can be defended on empirical grounds. Mearsheimer provides the grounds. Reason is not the primary determinant of moral commitment for anyone. The institutional culture cannot claim to be operating through reason while conservative populations operate through tribal commitment. Both operate through socialization and innate sentiment. The institutional culture has been trained to experience its operation differently than the conservative populations have been trained. The difference in training does not track difference in actual operation.
The claim that progressive institutional power is tribal dominance rather than the legitimate application of universal principles can be defended on empirical grounds. Pinsof provides the grounds. Moral vocabularies are coalition technologies. The vocabularies the institutional culture uses are the coalition technologies of one tribe. The tribe benefits from having its vocabulary treated as universal. Other tribes do not benefit. The treatment is coalition strategy rather than neutral application of universal standards.
The claim that conservative populations are being systematically mistreated through mechanisms that cannot be openly defended can be defended on empirical grounds. Guldmann provides the grounds. The mechanisms operate through tacit norms rather than explicit rules. They produce conservaphobic patterns that are visible to those subjected to them but not easily articulated by those producing them. The articulation would require acknowledgment that the tacit norms are tacit rather than the neutral standards they present themselves as.
The refinement of Guldmann’s argument. After Mearsheimer, Guldmann’s argument becomes sharper than Guldmann presents it. Guldmann sometimes treats conservative commitments as substantively correct against progressive commitments. This is not necessary for the argument to work. The argument works as long as progressive commitments are acknowledged as tribal rather than universal. Once they are acknowledged as tribal, they lose the privilege to impose themselves on other tribes in the name of neutral principles. The imposition becomes tribal dominance rather than universal principle application. Tribal dominance can be legitimate or illegitimate depending on how it is achieved and sustained, but it cannot claim the immunity from evaluation that neutral principle application claims.
Guldmann is not contending that conservatives are right and progressives are wrong on substantive moral questions. He is contending that the progressive institutional culture’s treatment of conservatives proceeds through mechanisms that cannot be defended once the mechanisms’ actual nature is acknowledged. The contention holds regardless of which substantive positions one prefers. Conservatives who are right about particular questions and conservatives who are wrong about particular questions both suffer the systematic institutional mistreatment Guldmann documents. The mistreatment is not justified by whichever substantive questions it is directed at. It is justified, within progressive institutional culture, by the tacit assumption that conservative commitments are beyond the pale of reasonable discourse. The tacit assumption is what needs to be examined. The examination shows that the assumption reflects tribal commitment rather than neutral standard. Once this is clear, the systematic mistreatment cannot be defended on the grounds the institutional culture invokes.
The conscious moral life is not separate from alliance considerations. The moral commitments themselves are alliance products. The phenomenology of moral commitment is how alliance operation is experienced from within the coalition. There is no separate track of sincere moral reflection that operates independently of alliance dynamics. The sincere moral reflection is itself alliance operation, experienced from within as individual moral response to moral questions. The individual moral response is tribal operation happening through the individual.
Once the integrated framework is accepted, contemporary American political conflict becomes legible as conflict between tribes whose commitments differ and whose institutional power differs. The progressive institutional tribe has substantial dominance achieved through particular historical processes. The dominance is being resisted by other tribes whose commitments and populations have not been accommodated by the institutional arrangements the dominant tribe has produced.
The conflict is not about whether reason should prevail over irrationality. All sides operate primarily through socialization and innate sentiment rather than through reason. The conflict is about which tribes’ commitments will be institutionally dominant. The dominant tribe has treated its position as the expression of neutral universal principles. The resistance from other tribes reveals that the principles are not universal but tribal. The revelation does not automatically favor any particular tribal resolution. It does strip the dominant tribe of the privilege to impose its tribal commitments under the guise of universal principle application.

Posted in Buffered, John J. Mearsheimer | Comments Off on The Buffered Identity

Malcolm Knox: A Life in Australian Letters

Malcolm Knox was born in 1966 and grew up in St Ives on Sydney’s North Shore. He attended Knox Grammar School for thirteen years, captained the First XI cricket team, played in the First XV rugby side, and competed in athletics. He studied Arts and Law at the University of Sydney but did not complete the law degree. He won a scholarship to the University of St Andrews in Scotland, took a Masters in Literature there, and saw one of his plays performed.

He joined The Sydney Morning Herald in 1994 and rose through the paper. He served as chief cricket correspondent from 1996 to 1999, assistant sports editor from 1999 to 2000, and literary editor from 2002 to 2006. In 2004, he and Caroline Overington exposed Norma Khouri’s bestselling memoir Forbidden Love as a hoax. The investigation won him a Walkley Award for Investigative Journalism. He has won three Walkleys and has written columns and features for the paper for more than three decades.

As a novelist, Knox writes Australian men under pressure inside closed worlds. His fiction includes Summerland (2000), A Private Man (2004, released in the UK as Adult Book), Jamaica (2007), The Life (2011), The Wonder Lover (2015/2016), Bluebird (2020), and The First Friend (2024). The First Friend, a black comedy and historical thriller set in 1938 in Stalin’s Soviet Union, turns on a toxic friendship with Lavrentiy Beria. The book was longlisted for the ARA Historical Fiction Prize and the UK Walter Scott Historical Novel Prize.

Cricket runs through his non-fiction. Bradman’s War studies the 1948 Invincibles and contrasts Don Bradman’s ruthlessness with the looser postwar temper of teammates who had served in the Second World War. The Keepers traces wicketkeeping as a craft lineage passed down inside the national game. The Captains takes the Australian captaincy as a test of authority and public judgment. He has written a biography of Greg Chappell and ghostwritten several sports books.

Boom: The Underground History of Australia, from Gold Rush to GFC traces the country’s cycles of wealth, speculation, and extraction. Supermarket Monsters examines the power of Coles and Woolworths over producers, prices, and daily consumption. Scattered: The Inside Story of Ice in Australia follows methamphetamine into suburbs, families, and institutions that thought themselves safe from it. Truth Is Trouble uses the Israel Folau case to map a fight over speech, religion, class, corporate governance, and national identity. Secrets of the Jury Room opens a part of the legal system that usually stays closed.

Knox has sat on several boards. He served as a director of the Copyright Agency from 2008 to 2016, on the Chappell Foundation from 2017 to 2021, as that foundation’s honorary secretary from 2019 to 2021, and on the board of the Australian Society of Authors. Early in his fiction career, The Sydney Morning Herald named him to its Best Young Australian Novelists list.

He lives in Sydney with his wife Wenona and their two children, Callum and Lilian. He surfs and swims.

Alliance Theory

Knox sits inside a coalition that includes The Sydney Morning Herald, the Copyright Agency, the Australian Society of Authors, the Chappell Foundation, the publishing houses that put out his fiction and non-fiction, the book pages that review him, the literary festivals that invite him, the ABC and Guardian Australia audiences that form his readership. This is Australia’s progressive cultural elite, a coalition that runs across Sydney and Melbourne media, the literary establishment, and the institutional apparatus of letters. His standing inside the coalition is high and long-held. He has not won it by attacking the coalition’s foundational premises. He has won it by performing its most valuable services with more skill than his peers.

The similarity marker for this coalition is a particular relation to mass enthusiasm. Members take popular culture seriously enough to analyze it, but never seriously enough to be moved by it without irony. Enjoyment without distance marks the outsider. Observation, critique, and a faintly disappointed tone mark the member. Knox has mastered this register. He writes about cricket, surf culture, suburban respectability, schoolboy networks, and male friendship with the care of a man who knows those worlds from inside, and with the distance of a man whose coalition rewards the distance.

The Norma Khouri investigation works as a founding act within this alliance structure, and the alliance logic helps explain the shape of the reward. Khouri had sold a memoir about honor killing in Jordan. Western publishers, reviewers, and readers had received it warmly because it confirmed a moral story about Islam, women, and Western rescue. Knox and Caroline Overington exposed the fraud. The Walkley Award followed. Pinsof’s paper makes the reward legible. Knox had punctured a story an important part of his coalition had begun to suspect. He did the puncturing with enough institutional care that no member of the broader Australian progressive alliance had to examine whether similar patterns of convenient belief ran through its own moral frame. He exposed the bestseller’s lie without asking why the lie had sold. That restraint is the coalition maintenance move. The dissent that strengthens the coalition’s self-image gets rewarded. The dissent that might threaten the coalition’s legitimacy does not appear.

The cricket writing shows the same coalition discipline. Bradman, Greg Chappell, the 1948 Invincibles, the wicketkeepers, the captains: Knox treats each not as a man to celebrate but as a subject to analyze. In Bradman’s War he contrasts Bradman’s ruthlessness with Keith Miller’s postwar looseness, and the contrast performs a service for his readership. Australia’s progressive elite cannot share the crowd’s unguarded love of Bradman. The coalition has moved past that sort of flag-waving. It can share Knox’s complicated portrait. The portrait lets the reader keep the pleasure of cricket while demonstrating his distance from the naive enjoyment of the ordinary fan. Pinsof’s double standard runs through this cleanly. Bradman’s will to win reads as excessive. Miller’s refusal to sacrifice pleasure reads as admirable. The coalition approves both judgments because both flatter its current self-image.

The same pattern runs through The Captains and The Keepers. The men who carry the weight of Australian cricket are neither heroes nor frauds. They are subjects of a kind of Australian character study, where the coalition reader learns what to admire and what to hold at arm’s length. Admire the craft. Hold the crowd at a distance. Admire the discipline. Hold the nationalism at a distance. Admire the private man. Hold the public myth at a distance. Each move sorts the reader into the coalition. Each move signals to other members that the reader belongs.

Supermarket Monsters fits the coalition portfolio in a different register. Coles and Woolworths are targets the coalition already knows how to hate. Concentrated corporate power, squeezed suppliers, cultural homogenization: these are coalition-approved objects of critique. Knox supplies a well-reported, well-argued version of a case the coalition has already reached. He does not, for example, write the parallel book about the ABC, the university sector, or the philanthropic apparatus his coalition runs. The selection of targets is the alliance at work. The propagandistic bias Pinsof labels attributional shows in which concentrations of power get treated as structural problems and which get treated as benign or invisible.

Scattered: The Inside Story of Ice in Australia handles methamphetamine in Australia with real reporting and sympathy for the families involved. The respectable suburb revealed as fragile, the middle-class family exposed as dependent, the working-class user treated with care rather than contempt: these are the coalition’s preferred framings for an addiction story. The alternative framings, the ones that might implicate coalition members more directly, do not appear. The drug policy debate Knox’s readership has largely settled on stays settled.

Truth Is Trouble is the sharpest coalition test. Israel Folau had posted that homosexuals, along with drunks, adulterers, and several other categories, were going to hell. Rugby Australia sacked him. The case turned into a fight about speech, religion, employment contracts, corporate governance, and national identity. Knox’s handling of the case reveals the coalition maintenance pattern under pressure. He does not simply side against Folau. He writes with care about the Pacific Islander evangelical world, about the class and racial dimensions of the controversy, about the corporate motives of Rugby Australia’s board. That care is the mark of the high-status coalition intellectual. He demonstrates that he sees the complications the less sophisticated members of his alliance miss. But the care does not extend to a position that might cost him inside the coalition. Folau’s underlying theology remains untouched as a serious religious claim. The coalition’s moral frame on homosexuality goes unexamined as a historical position rather than a timeless truth. Knox performs the complication move that his readers reward and stops at the line past which the reward turns into exile. Pinsof’s paper predicts this pattern. The complication that strengthens coalition standing appears. The complication that might collapse coalition standing does not.

The fiction operates on the same logic in a different key. A Private Man, Jamaica, The Life, and Bluebird place men inside closed moral economies and track the compromises the settings require. The readers who pick up these books have already internalized the coalition’s judgment of those worlds. Surf culture carries a whiff of masculine insularity the progressive reader has learned to mistrust. Corporate Sydney carries a whiff of suburban ambition the progressive reader has learned to find faintly comic. Cricket carries the whiff of mass sentiment the progressive reader has learned to observe rather than share. Knox’s characters move through those worlds with partial awareness of their corruption. The reader watches from a position of fuller awareness, supplied by Knox’s authorial distance. The coalition reader enjoys the novel partly because the novel confirms the coalition’s prior moral sorting.

The First Friend looks like a departure into Stalinist history, but the coalition logic runs through it too. Lavrentiy Beria is a safe villain. No Australian reader has a positive emotional relationship to Beria that Knox has to work around. The moral work of the novel therefore does not require him to unsettle his readers. He can write toxic friendship as survival under authoritarianism, male loyalty as a trap, power as the only currency that matters, and the coalition reader will agree with every move. The book’s distinction is craft rather than argument. Pinsof might call it a safe exercise of coalition vocabulary in an unfamiliar setting.

Knox does not build alternative mass alliances. He does not flatter resentment. He does not treat the Australian crowd’s enthusiasms as wisdom his coalition has missed. He does not question the legitimacy of the cultural authority his own class exercises. He does not, for all his attention to concealed power, write the book about the power his own coalition holds over Australian letters, Australian publishing, Australian broadcasting, Australian literary prizes, and Australian universities. His independence is real but bounded. He criticizes Rugby Australia, Coles, Woolworths, mining magnates, Stalin, and Beria. He does not criticize the institutional coalition that publishes him, pays him, awards him, and gives him his readership. Alliance Theory predicts the pattern exactly.

The gatekeeper function runs through all of this. Knox teaches his readers what not to feel without embarrassment. Uncomplicated patriotism. Uncomplicated sports fandom. Uncomplicated religious conviction. Uncomplicated male friendship. Uncomplicated property pride. Uncomplicated suburban satisfaction. These emotions get coded as insufficiently buffered. The coalition member learns the list by reading Knox. The lesson arrives not as prohibition but as tone. The wry Australian voice signals which feelings require irony and which feelings earn respect. The emotional discipline is the coalition currency. Pinsof’s paper argues that this kind of discipline is how alliances maintain themselves among their high-status members. Knox’s career is a sustained demonstration of the argument.

The stochasticity point matters too. The Australian progressive cultural coalition Knox serves is not a logical necessity. It is a historical formation produced by the Whitlam-era reshaping of Australian cultural institutions, the rise of the broadsheet press as a professional class formation, the postwar expansion of Australian publishing, the internationalization of the Australian novel, the decline of the old Catholic and Protestant moral frames that once governed public debate, and the institutional settlements of the ABC, the literary funding bodies, and the university humanities. Knox’s alliance is the product of those accidents. A different sequence of Australian history might have produced a different coalition with different moral vocabularies, and a writer of Knox’s gifts might be articulating those instead. The principles he deploys, skepticism toward mass enthusiasm, attention to institutional power selectively applied, irony as a mark of seriousness, are the vocabulary this coalition happens to need in this period. They are not the permanent grammar of Australian letters. Pinsof’s stochasticity point applied to Knox is that another Australia might have produced another Knox saying other things with equal conviction and equal reward.

The propagandistic biases are present where the framework says to look for them. Victim bias: Knox’s coalition members appear in his work as figures whose good faith has been strained by the pressures of money, sex, fame, or power. The coalition itself never appears as the source of the pressure. Perpetrator bias: the actors outside the coalition, the tabloid editor, the mining magnate, the evangelical pastor, the authoritarian state, the supermarket executive, take on a sharper moral coloring than the coalition’s own executives, editors, academics, and administrators. Attributional bias: the coalition’s successes read as merit, the coalition’s failures read as contingency, the rivals’ successes read as contingency, the rivals’ failures read as character. These are not conscious choices on Knox’s part. They are the coalition’s operating assumptions, which he has absorbed so fully that he writes within them without needing to check them.

The Khouri investigation, at its sharpest, contains the seed of a more dangerous question. If publishers, reviewers, and readers wanted the Khouri story to be true because it flattered a moral frame they already held, then what else do they want to be true for the same reason, and what fabrications might survive because those wants remain in place? Knox asks this question in the case at hand. He does not ask it in the general case. A writer who asked it in the general case about his own coalition might not remain at The Sydney Morning Herald, might not sit on the Copyright Agency board, might not receive favorable reviews in The Monthly, might not be invited to the Sydney Writers’ Festival, and might not have the readership that makes his books commercial. Knox’s restraint on the general question is the alliance working. His sharpness on the cases he chooses is the alliance working too. He is the coalition’s best anatomist of convenient belief, and one of the beliefs his coalition finds most convenient is that it does not itself operate on convenient belief. Knox’s career, read through Pinsof, sustains that last convenience by exercising the craft of exposure everywhere except where the exposure might cost him his place.

Buffered & Porous Selves

Knox’s work addresses Australian popular enthusiasms (sport above all, but also national myth, tabloid sentiment, celebrity culture) from a position of cultivated interpretive distance. The position is thoroughly buffered. The distance is the methodological signature. Knox maintains the distance consistently across decades of work at The Sydney Morning Herald and in his books on Bradman, cricket culture, and contemporary Australian life.

The material Knox works with operates substantially through porous registers for the audiences that engage it. Australian cricket is not merely sport in the buffered sense. It operates as sustained communal ritual that connects Australians across generations through narratives, characters, and emotional experiences. The Bradman myth functions as national origin story with quasi-religious weight for substantial portions of the Australian population. Tests against England carry historical meaning that exceeds athletic competition. The material Knox analyzes is not emotionally neutral for its primary audiences. It operates with porous intensity for those committed to it.

Knox operates at analytical distance from this porous engagement. His work demonstrates to buffered audiences what the porous attachments require while maintaining the buffered audience’s sense that they stand above the attachments they analyze. The demonstration produces cultural goods for the audience. Readers can engage Australian sport and national myth through sophisticated analytical prose that preserves their sense of interpretive superiority to populations that engage the same material without irony. The preservation is what the work accomplishes at its phenomenological level.

Knox’s book Bradman’s War examines the Invincibles tour of 1948 through documentation that complicates the sanitized version of Bradman’s leadership and the team’s conduct. The book surfaces material that canonical narratives suppressed. The surfacing does not destroy the Bradman myth for committed believers. It provides buffered readers with documentation that lets them engage the myth at interpretive distance while understanding what the myth obscured.

The Bradman myth operates for committed Australians as porous cultural inheritance that connects them to Australian national identity through a shared narrative. Knox’s demystification does not destroy the connection for those who maintain it. It produces an alternative relationship to the material for buffered audiences who want analytical engagement rather than porous participation. Both relationships persist in Australian culture. Knox’s work serves the buffered audience. It does not reach the porous audience or attempt to.

The buffered audience consists substantially of educated Australians whose formation has moved them away from direct porous engagement with national sporting myths. They retain interest in the material as cultural phenomenon to be analyzed. They want sophisticated analysis that treats the material seriously while maintaining interpretive distance. Knox provides what they want. The provision is the core of his professional accomplishment.

Knox operates within Australian progressive elite media culture. The culture emerged substantially through the post-war transformation of Australian higher education and media institutions. Its core population consists of university-educated Australians whose formations combined traditional Anglo-Australian heritage with substantial influence from post-war European intellectual migration and American academic developments. The combination produced a cultural class with a distinctive buffered orientation to Australian life.

The class came from populations that engaged Australian sport, national myth, and working-class culture with varying degrees of porous commitment in their childhoods. Their subsequent education moved them toward buffered orientation that treats the same material as objects of analysis rather than as sources of identity. The movement produced cognitive and emotional habits that Knox’s work serves.

Knox’s readers are typically people whose own formation has moved them from porous to buffered engagement with Australian culture during their lifetimes. They retain connection to the material through memory and family relationships. They cannot return to the porous engagement their childhood formation included. Knox’s work provides them with sustained professional engagement with the material that accommodates their current position while preserving connection to what they have moved away from.

Knox’s work differs substantially from commentary produced for working-class Australian audiences whose engagement with sport and national culture remains substantially porous. Working-class sports commentary in Australia operates through registers that treat teams, players, and traditions as matters of communal importance that exceed analytical distance. The commentary sustains the porous commitment rather than examining it from outside.

Knox’s work could not serve this audience. His analytical distance might read as hostile to what the audience cares about. His demystification might strip the material of what makes it meaningful for those who engage it porously. His tone might signal membership in a cultural class that the audience often experiences as contemptuous of their concerns. The incompatibility is structural rather than accidental. Different phenomenological positions produce different demands on commentary that address the same material.

Australia contains multiple audiences with different phenomenological orientations to sport and national culture. The audiences cannot be served by the same commentary because their needs differ fundamentally. Knox serves one audience. Other commentators serve others. The division is not accidental. It reflects structural differences in how different Australian populations engage their shared cultural materials.

Knox’s long association with The Sydney Morning Herald places him within the institutional infrastructure that sustains Australian progressive elite media culture. The Herald operates as primary outlet for the cultural class Knox serves. Its editorial orientation, its staff composition, its reader base all reflect the cultural positioning of the class. Knox’s work fits within the Herald’s broader mission while representing a particular specialization (cultural commentary, sports writing, novels) within that mission.

The institutional position provides a sustained base for Knox’s work across decades. The Herald pays him, provides platform for his journalism, supports his book publishing through reviews and interviews. The support enables production that might be difficult to sustain through independent work alone. The institutional infrastructure is substantial. It reflects investments Australian progressive elite culture has made in sustaining its own intellectual apparatus.

Australian progressive elite culture has built institutional resources that sustain its distinctive analytical orientation against commercial pressures that might otherwise erode it. The resources include newspapers, publishers, universities, broadcasting institutions, and prizes that collectively reward work operating through buffered analytical registers. Knox’s career has proceeded within this infrastructure. The career might be substantially harder to sustain without the infrastructure in place.

The novelist dimension. Knox works as novelist in addition to his journalism. His novels include A Private Man, Summerland, Jamaica, and others. The novels operate in registers that complement his journalism while offering different kinds of engagement with Australian cultural material. The novels permit psychological and moral exploration that journalistic formats typically constrain. They also permit sustained treatment of themes Knox’s journalism addresses in briefer format.

Knox operates as both critic and creator. His criticism applies buffered analytical method to cultural material. His novels apply novelistic method to characters and situations that often parallel the material his criticism addresses. The combination produces a distinctive cultural presence that either form alone could not produce.

Taylor’s framework helps see what the novelist work accomplishes beyond what the journalism accomplishes. Novels operate through phenomenological registers that journalism typically does not reach. They can engage inner life of characters in ways analytical commentary cannot. They can explore moral complexity through narrative that commentary typically simplifies. Knox’s novels provide him with a creative outlet that his journalism does not provide while also demonstrating to his readership that his analytical distance does not prevent him from engaging human complexity through art.

The novels have features that reflect Knox’s buffered orientation. They typically explore characters whose situations contain the kind of moral complication that defeats simple narrative resolution. They maintain authorial distance even as they enter characters’ inner lives. They resist the sentimental conclusions that mass-market fiction typically provides. The features align with his journalism in their shared commitment to interpretive distance even when applied through the different form.

Herald journalist Peter FitzSimons operates in overlapping territory with Knox but from a substantially different phenomenological position. FitzSimons produces popular history, sports biography, and cultural commentary in registers that are more accessible to broader Australian audiences than Knox’s work reaches. FitzSimons operates closer to porous engagement with Australian national narrative while maintaining sufficient analytical distance to meet professional journalistic standards. The combination makes him commercially more successful than Knox while operating through a different relationship to his material.

FitzSimons serves audiences whose engagement with Australian history and culture remains substantially porous. His work provides them with sophisticated treatment of material they already care about porously. Knox serves audiences whose engagement has moved toward buffered distance. His work provides them with analytical treatment that accommodates their current position. The two writers address different Australian audiences through different registers. Neither substitutes for the other. Both have sustained careers within Australian cultural media because both serve audiences that exist.

The coalition position Knox occupies is not merely strategic. It reflects phenomenological formation that coalition members share. Australian progressive elite culture operates through buffered orientation to Australian life that has particular features and requires particular sustenance. Knox’s work provides some of the sustenance. Other figures provide other parts. Together they maintain the phenomenological position their audiences occupy.

Buffered orientation to cultural material requires sustained analytical commentary that models the orientation for audiences still developing it. Without the modeling, younger members of the cultural class might have less resource for developing the orientation their cultural membership requires. Knox’s work contributes to the reproduction of Australian progressive elite culture across generations through the modeling his journalism and novels provide.

He accomplishes sophisticated analytical engagement with Australian cultural material for audiences that want such engagement. He does not attempt to reach audiences whose engagement with the material operates through different phenomenological registers. The limits are not failures of individual effort. They are structural conditions of buffered analytical commentary addressing material that operates substantially through porous registers for substantial portions of its audience.

Knox illustrates an Australian variant of the broader pattern where buffered analytical elites produce commentary that serves their own class while remaining substantially inaccessible to populations whose engagement with the same cultural material operates through porous registers. The pattern is not unique to Australia. American, British, and Canadian variants exist with different national characteristics. The Australian variant has features worth identifying.

The Australian progressive elite culture emerged substantially later than its American and British counterparts. It consolidated through post-war educational expansion, multicultural policy developments, and institutional transformations in Australian media. The consolidation produced a distinctive cultural class with a particular relationship to traditional Anglo-Australian culture that had previously dominated Australian institutional life. Knox represents the class at its more sophisticated operation. His work serves class members who share his formation while maintaining analytical distance from populations whose formation remains more traditional.

Australian sport operates as a particularly important site for the buffered-porous question Knox’s work addresses. Australian national identity has traditionally been substantially organized through sport in ways that American and European national identities typically are not. Cricket, rugby union, Australian rules football, swimming, and other sports provide sustained rituals through which Australians have understood themselves and their nation across generations. The rituals operate through porous commitment for substantial portions of the population.

Australian progressive elite culture has had a complicated relationship to this sporting nationalism. On one hand, class members often retain affection for Australian sport from their childhood formations. On the other hand, their current cultural positioning makes direct porous engagement with the sporting nationalism uncomfortable. The combination produces a particular demand for commentary that lets them engage the material from buffered distance. Knox’s work addresses this demand with unusual sustained sophistication.

Australian progressive elite members occupy an ambiguous position relative to Australian sporting culture. They cannot abandon it entirely because it remains meaningful at deep levels of their formation. They cannot engage it porously because their current cultural positioning forbids such engagement. Knox’s work provides mediation between the two positions. It treats the material seriously while maintaining the distance the cultural positioning requires. The mediation is what the work accomplishes at its core.

Knox Under Hugo Mercier & John M. Doris

Knox’s readership accepts his commentary because Knox provides information and analysis that meets their standards for quality commentary. His credentials matter. His track record matters. His arguments matter. Readers deploy open vigilance when they encounter his work. They assess the arguments on their merits rather than accepting them through coalition deference.
The coalition does not force acceptance of Knox’s commentary on members through tribal pressure. Members accept the commentary because they evaluate it and find it adequate. Knox has earned the acceptance through sustained production of work that meets his readers’ standards. The earning matters for understanding what Knox has accomplished. He has not merely positioned himself within an approving coalition. He has produced work that passes the vigilance checks his audience applies to commentary.
Readers continue to evaluate new work against their accumulated judgment of his track record. Work that fails their vigilance checks might erode the acceptance. Knox cannot produce obviously slanted commentary without risking the trust he has built. His readers notice when arguments break down. They notice when evidence is selectively deployed. They notice when positions shift to track current political winds. Knox has survived in his position by producing work that typically satisfies their vigilance rather than by manipulating them.
The Knox phenomenon is not reducible to tribal trust. It reflects sustained production that has passed vigilance checks across decades. The production requires real analytical work, real evidence gathering, real argumentative sophistication. Knox has done this work. The work is what sustains the acceptance his readership grants him. Without the work, the acceptance might erode regardless of his coalition positioning.
Knox’s books on cricket, above all Bradman’s War, show the pattern. The books make empirical claims supported by documentary evidence. Readers who check the sources typically find the sources support the claims. Readers who know the period typically find Knox’s accounts accurate on factual matters. The accuracy earns trust that extends to interpretive claims less easily verified. Readers who find his factual claims reliable extend provisional trust to his interpretive framings.
Readers assess what they can verify. They extend provisional trust based on what the verifications reveal. Knox benefits from the extension because his factual claims typically hold up to checking. If his factual claims did not hold up, the extension might not be earned. The extension is not automatic. It reflects ongoing assessment of his track record.
Knox’s journalism shows the same pattern. Readers who follow Australian cricket, rugby, or politics across time can assess his commentary against their own knowledge. They find that his analyses typically identify things they had not noticed. They find that his accounts of events they witnessed match what they observed. They find that his predictions often prove accurate. The finding earns trust for commentary on matters they cannot directly verify.
Some portions of Knox’s work meet more resistance. His commentary on Australian national myth sometimes deploys framings that readers from working-class Anglo-Australian backgrounds find tendentious. His treatment of sporting nationalism sometimes strikes porous fans as condescending. His tone of cultivated irony sometimes reads as contempt to audiences operating through different registers.
The resistance is significant. It indicates that Mercier’s vigilance works against Knox’s framings for particular audiences. Those audiences do not accept his commentary because their vigilance checks reject what they perceive as his class-bound condescension. They notice what the coalition analysis identified as Knox’s elite differentiation. They resist it. Their resistance is not tribal. It reflects their vigilant judgment that Knox’s framings serve a class whose interests their own class does not share.
Knox’s work is not accepted universally because his vigilance-earning proceeds within his own class context. Other classes apply their own vigilance checks and reach different conclusions about his reliability. The reaching of different conclusions is not irrationality on their part. It is vigilance operating from different starting points that identify different things as requiring justification.
Knox’s apparent consistency across decades of cultural commentary does not reflect stable character traits that produce the consistency. It reflects sustained situational conditions that have shaped his output. The conditions include: the Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial culture, the Australian progressive elite audience’s expectations, the publishing industry’s requirements for successful Australian cultural commentary, the professional networks that sustain his career, the award structures that reward particular kinds of work, and the broader cultural moment in which his career has proceeded.
Doris’s research shows that behavioral consistency comes typically from consistent situations rather than consistent character. Knox’s consistency reflects the consistency of his situation rather than inherent features of his personality that might produce the same commentary across different situations. If Knox had operated within different situational conditions across his career, his output might likely have been substantially different even with the same underlying personality.
Knox’s voice does not proceed from unshakable Knox-ness. It proceeds from Knox’s formation within situational conditions that have consistently rewarded particular kinds of output while discouraging others. The voice might shift if the conditions shifted. Knox operating in different media context, with different audiences, different institutional employers, different cultural moment might produce different work.
The Sydney Morning Herald operates as institutional base that rewards particular kinds of commentary. Its editorial culture values sophistication, interpretive distance, engagement with contemporary cultural developments, and willingness to challenge consensus in ways that reinforce progressive elite self-understanding. Knox’s work fits these requirements. Work that failed them might face editorial resistance.
The Australian publishing industry for serious nonfiction operates through infrastructure that rewards work matching the progressive elite class’s reading preferences. Knox’s books meet these preferences. They receive reviews in appropriate outlets, attention from literary festivals, consideration for prizes, and commercial promotion that commercial alone might not automatically produce. The infrastructure matters. It sustains Knox’s book career in ways that might be substantially harder to sustain without the infrastructure in place.
The Australian progressive elite audience itself operates as situational factor. Its existence and its sustained reading habits provide Knox with stable market for his work. Without the audience, the work might lack readers. The audience is not automatic. It reflects cultural developments that created and sustain it. Knox’s career has proceeded within the audience’s existence. His career might look different if the audience were smaller, different in composition, or different in its reading habits.
Knox clearly has cognitive and aesthetic capacities that enable his work. He writes clearly. He researches thoroughly. He constructs arguments carefully. These capacities matter. The situational framework places them within the situational context that permits their expression through sustained productive work.
Different situational conditions might have channeled the same capacities into different expressions. Knox in American academic context might have become a cultural studies scholar. Knox in British journalism context might have worked at the Guardian or the Times. Knox in different Australian generation might have produced work with different features while maintaining similar underlying capacities. The situational context shapes what the capacities produce. The capacities without the context might produce something different or nothing at all.
Knox’s commentary on sporting enthusiasts, national myth believers, tabloid consumers, and others operates from assumption that these audiences are vulnerable to manipulation in ways Mercier’s research contests. Mercier might argue that sporting fans, national myth adherents, and tabloid consumers all deploy open vigilance on the material they engage. They are not gullible in the way Knox’s demystification framings typically assume. Their engagement with their material reflects their evaluation of it, not their passive acceptance of manipulation.
His demystification proceeds from assumption that the material he critiques operates through manipulation of audiences who do not understand what is being done to them. Mercier’s research suggests the audiences do understand what they are engaging with. They engage it because their vigilance approves what they receive, not because they are being manipulated into acceptance. Knox’s framing flattens this. It treats the audiences as more passive than they are.
Knox’s commentary often treats athletes, politicians, or cultural figures as displaying character traits that explain their behavior. Doris’s research suggests situational factors drive behavior more than character traits do. Knox’s trait-based explanations may underweight situational factors. His critiques of Bradman’s conduct, for instance, may attribute to Bradman’s character what reflects the situational pressures of the cricket captain’s role in 1948.
If Mercier is right, Knox’s demystification project is more limited than its standard framings suggest. Audiences are not being deceived by the cultural material Knox analyzes. They are engaging it with their own vigilance operating. Knox’s demystification tells them what they largely already know through their vigilance. The telling has value for articulating what the vigilance identified without naming. It does not have the value of rescuing audiences from manipulation they could not perceive.
If Doris is right, Knox’s character-based framings of his subjects are less well-grounded than they appear. The subjects may not display the character traits Knox attributes to them. Their behavior may reflect situational pressures that apply to anyone in comparable positions. Knox’s critiques that treat individuals as displaying moral failures may miss what the situations produce in most people regardless of individual character.
Knox gives his audience articulated versions of judgments they had already reached through their own vigilance. He provides vocabulary and documentation for positions the audience already held provisionally. The provision has real value. It enables the audience to hold its positions more confidently and to articulate them more clearly. The value operates differently than Knox’s demystification framings typically suggest. The work is not rescuing the audience from error. It is articulating positions the audience had already arrived at through its own evaluation.
This reframes what Knox’s career has accomplished. He has served as sophisticated articulator for positions his audience’s vigilance had already reached. The articulation matters. It produces cultural goods for the audience that sustain their identity and their engagement with Australian public life. It does not operate through the demystifying-of-passive-audiences model that Knox’s framings sometimes suggest. The reframing is closer to what the research actually supports about how persuasion and behavior work.
Australian cricket fans are not passive consumers of Bradman mythology. They deploy vigilance on claims about Bradman’s character and conduct. They have access to substantial documentation of Bradman’s career through the extensive literature that exists. Their continued affection for Bradman reflects their vigilant judgment about what the documentation shows rather than tribal commitment that the documentation could not disturb.
Knox’s Bradman’s War adds documentation the audience can evaluate. Readers who find the documentation persuasive modify their view of Bradman accordingly. Readers who find the documentation selective or tendentious retain their prior views. The evaluation process is ongoing and genuine. It does not reflect tribal resistance to facts. It reflects vigilance operating on the material Knox provides.
Doris’s framework adds that Bradman’s conduct during the 1948 tour reflects the situational pressures of his captaincy role rather than purely stable character traits. The crushing defeat of England, the tactical decisions, the management of the squad all reflect Bradman’s response to situational pressures that other captains in comparable situations might have handled comparably. Knox’s critique sometimes reads Bradman’s conduct as character failure when it may reflect situational pressure that the captain’s role produced for Bradman or anyone else.
The combined framework gives Knox’s cricket work more careful purchase than either the standard mythology or the standard demystification framings provide. Bradman was not simply the spotless national hero the mythology constructed. He was also not simply the ruthless individualist the demystification sometimes suggests. He was a man responding to situational pressures as captain of a team in particular circumstances. Knox’s documentation can inform readers’ vigilant judgment about what the situation produced. It does not license character-based conclusions that the documentation alone does not support.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

Pinsof argues that intellectuals hold a convenient story about human problems. Everything wrong in the world is caused by misunderstanding. People are biased, tribal, misinformed, confused. The intellectual’s job is to clear up the confusion. The story flatters the intellectual by casting him as the world’s physician. Pinsof replies that people understand their incentives fine. Partisans hate rivals because they compete over state power. Bigots track coalition lines. Voters parrot tribal propaganda because propaganda serves their interests. The press sells attention. Consumers chase status. Altruists display virtue. Most of what looks like confusion is savvy strategy. The only misunderstanding is the myth that there has been a misunderstanding.

Knox’s career maps the gap between reputation and reality. Khouri’s fake memoir. Bradman’s ruthlessness under the gloss of legend. Supermarket power under the gloss of convenience. The Folau fight under the gloss of corporate governance. Friendship under Stalin under the gloss of loyalty. Each subject gets the same treatment. An official story exists. The story serves someone. The story contains a gap. Knox closes the gap for his reader. The method looks like what Pinsof calls the misunderstanding move. Khouri’s publishers did not see. The cricket public does not see. The shopper does not see. The Folau commentariat does not see. The characters in the novels do not see. Knox sees, and he makes his reader see.

Apply Pinsof’s essay to each case and the method starts to strain.

Take Khouri first. The standard reading treats the publishers, reviewers, and book buyers as victims of deception. They wanted to understand honor killing in Jordan. They accepted a false account. Knox cleared up the misunderstanding. Pinsof flips this. The publishers and reviewers were not trying to understand honor killing. They were selling books. The book sold because it confirmed a story its buyers already wanted. The buyers were not trying to understand Middle Eastern societies either. They were buying a moral posture: the concerned Western reader, informed about the suffering of Muslim women, ready to support the appropriate political positions. The whole apparatus ran fine on the lie because the function of the book was not understanding. It was status. Knox’s exposure did not restore truth to a public hungry for it. It supplied a new status object, the savvy reader who prefers exposés to memoirs, to a coalition that had used up the old one. The misunderstanding frame narrates the case as confusion cleared. The Pinsofian reading treats it as a coalition cycling to a new product.

Cricket next. Knox treats Australian cricket fandom as a case where the crowd’s love of Bradman needs complication. The ordinary fan does not see the ruthlessness under the legend. Keith Miller loved cricket as a game. The Invincibles under Bradman played for dominance. Knox corrects the nostalgia. Pinsof asks what gets corrected. The ordinary cricket fan does not misunderstand Bradman. He loves Bradman because Bradman won. The winning is the point. The ruthlessness is not a dark secret concealed by sentimental biography. It is the reason the fan cares. Knox’s complication serves a coalition whose members need a reason to keep watching cricket without the embarrassment of uncomplicated fandom. The coalition has no mistaken belief about Bradman. It has a status problem. It wants the pleasure of cricket minus the tribal feelings that mark the ordinary Australian. Knox supplies the product. His readers do not walk away with corrected beliefs. They walk away with a posture: informed admirer rather than naive fan. Pinsof might call this status seeking under the cover of insight.

Supermarkets. Supermarket Monsters treats Coles and Woolworths as a concealed power that shoppers do not recognize. Knox names the duopoly, traces the supply chain, and maps the political capture. The reader finishes the book better informed. Pinsof asks whether information was the point. Shoppers do not misunderstand supermarket power. They understand fine. The duopoly is cheaper, closer, and easier than the alternatives, and the shopper’s time is scarce. They choose Coles and Woolworths because the transaction serves them. They do not need Knox’s book to go on choosing. They will keep choosing after reading it, as the post-publication market share confirms. Knox’s readers are not reforming the retail sector. They are holding an opinion about it. Holding the opinion marks them as the kind of Australian who knows how the economy works. The book supplies the opinion. The duopoly remains.

Folau. Truth Is Trouble treats the Folau controversy as a case where every side oversimplifies. Knox supplies the missing nuance. Pacific Islander evangelicals, corporate boards, free speech advocates, progressive commentators: each party gets complicated. Pinsof asks what the nuance accomplishes. The evangelicals do not misunderstand the controversy. They understand that their theology sits under pressure from a state-corporate-cultural apparatus that finds it inconvenient. Rugby Australia does not misunderstand. It understands that its commercial partners require certain speech from its players. The progressive commentators do not misunderstand. They understand that Folau‘s theology marks a coalition rival. Each party acts on interests it has correctly identified. Knox’s nuance does not improve their understanding. It supplies his readers with the intellectual posture of the man who has risen above the fight. The posture has coalition value. The fight continues.

Ice. Scattered treats the Australian methamphetamine crisis as a public misunderstanding about addiction. The respectable suburb does not know how porous it is. The middle-class reader does not know how close the dependency lives. Knox closes the gap. Pinsof asks whether users misunderstand. They do not. The user takes the drug because it works. It solves, in the short run, a problem he has not solved by other means. The user’s family does not misunderstand the drug’s effects either. They understand the family member has chosen something that hurts them. Knox’s book serves its readers by supplying care and context for their existing disposition toward the suburb’s fragility. Pinsof might call that disposition a coalition posture, compassionate but distant, concerned but not implicated. The posture does nothing for the user. The book consoles the reader.

Fiction. A Private Man, The Life, Jamaica, Bluebird. Each novel places a man inside a system where loyalty and corruption blur. The standard reading says: the character does not see his situation clearly, Knox’s prose reveals the blur to the reader, the reader finishes with a better grasp of the human condition. Pinsof asks what the reader does with the grasp. The men Knox writes about do not misunderstand their situations. They are making trade-offs. The sporting man who cuts corners for status. The married man who rationalizes. The suburban man who goes along. These men are not confused. They are choosing. Knox’s prose gives the reader the pleasure of watching choices he has made or has been tempted to make. The pleasure is not insight into misunderstood men. It is recognition of a situation the reader knows well, offered at a distance safe enough for aesthetic enjoyment.

Stalin. The First Friend sets the Knox method inside an authoritarian regime. Beria’s circle does not misunderstand its situation. Everyone in the circle knows that loyalty is a survival bet, that friendship is a vector of destruction, that Stalin may kill any of them at any time. The characters play a game they have correctly identified. Knox renders the game as black comedy. The reader finishes the novel entertained by a regime-shaped game where the rules have been stripped of Australian politeness. Pinsof might say the pleasure of the book is not new information about Stalinism. It is the recognition that the mild games the reader plays at his own office have a darker analog elsewhere, and the consolation that his analog is mild. The comedy depends on the consolation.

Now the test the essay presses on Knox. Does Knox himself hold the misunderstanding myth? The honest answer is no. Knox is a shrewd writer who understands the Australian literary coalition he serves. He knows the incentive structure. He knows which books get reviewed favorably, which positions cost him nothing, which positions might cost him his standing. He makes the trade-offs that preserve his career while producing work of real quality. He is, in Pinsof’s terms, a rational actor inside a coalition. The misunderstanding myth does not describe his self-concept. He is too shrewd for it.

But his books narrate his subjects as if they held misunderstandings. The publishers did not see. The fans do not see. The shoppers do not see. The users do not see. The characters do not see. Each case gets offered as a gap between what the people think is happening and what happens. The gap is Knox’s working field. Pinsof asks whether the gap is real. In each case, the answer comes out the same. The gap sits not between what people think and what is true, but between what they say and what they do. The publishers knew. The fans know. The shoppers know. The users know. The characters know. They act on knowledge they have correctly formed about their interests. They do not need Knox to clear up their confusion. They are not confused.

Knox’s readers are not confused either. They know what the book is for. It is for them, for their standing, for their coalition’s sense of itself as the Australia that reads, observes, and holds enthusiasms at a managed distance. The misunderstanding frame casts the reader as someone seeking truth. Pinsof might say the reader is seeking membership. The book supplies it. The transaction closes.

What falls away under Pinsof’s analysis is the myth that the craft closes gaps in public understanding. The gaps it closes are coalition status gaps.

A writer who had fully absorbed Pinsof’s argument might turn the method on his own coalition. He might write Supermarket Monsters about Penguin Random House or Allen & Unwin, about the ABC or The Monthly, about the Sydney Writers’ Festival or the Stella Prize. He might write Truth Is Trouble about the Yassmin Abdel-Magied case or the Bruce Pascoe case from the opposite angle. He might write Bradman’s War about the postwar Australian literary class and its self-image under pressure. He might write Scattered about the alcohol, antidepressant, and benzodiazepine habits of professional Australia, the substances that keep his own class functional rather than the ones that degrade its rivals. He does not write those books. The misunderstanding frame keeps the field of his work pointed outward at the enthusiasms of men whose enthusiasms his readers already disapprove.

The Great Delusion

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

If Mearsheimer is right, Malcolm Knox’s entire project looks different. If humans are profoundly social beings from start to finish, if socialization dominates reason, if childhood formation deposits values before reflection can evaluate them, then Knox’s apparent analytical distance from Australian popular culture is not what it presents itself as. It is Knox’s cultural formation operating through vocabulary that presents itself as transcendent of culture. The formation produced commitments before Knox could evaluate them rationally. The subsequent rational elaboration articulates the commitments rather than generating them. The articulation feels to Knox like detached analysis. The feeling does not change what the articulation is doing.
Knox is a member of a tribe whose formation occurred through the institutions of Australian progressive elite culture. The tribe descends from the Anglo-Australian educated classes that reoriented during the post-war period through engagement with American and European intellectual developments. It was shaped by universities that absorbed continental theory, media institutions that moved toward cosmopolitan orientation, and cultural organizations that rewarded displays of interpretive sophistication. The tribe’s commitments include: suspicion of mass sentiment, discomfort with nationalist display, preference for ironic engagement over direct participation, valorization of interpretive distance over immediate emotional response, and systematic skepticism about the authenticity of popular enthusiasms.
These are tribal commitments. They are not the conclusions of neutral rational reflection. They came through the institutions that produced Knox and his peers. They distinguish the tribe from other Australian tribes that have different commitments. Other Australian tribes favor direct emotional participation in sport and national myth, trust mass sentiment as authentic expression of collective life, value immediate engagement over ironic distance, and resist what they experience as elite condescension toward their commitments.
The conflict between Knox’s tribe and other Australian tribes is tribal conflict. It is not conflict between sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens. Both sides operate from cultural formations of their own. Knox’s tribe has been trained to experience its formation as transcendent of tribal commitment. The training produces the phenomenology that Knox’s work reflects. The phenomenology is not accurate self-understanding. It is cultural production that masks its own tribal nature through vocabulary that presents itself as universal.
Knox’s work articulates his tribe’s commitments to his tribe. The articulation serves tribal cohesion. It provides tribe members with sophisticated vocabulary for positions they already hold. It affirms their sense of superiority to other Australian tribes whose commitments they find distasteful. It models the interpretive dispositions the tribe values. It rewards the dispositions through professional and social recognition.
The work does not provide the claimed neutral analytical examination of Australian culture from a position of transcendent detachment. It does not reveal truths about Australian life that other populations cannot see because they are too trapped in their tribal commitments. It does not exemplify the interpretive sophistication that other Australians might develop if only they received proper education. These are the claims the work’s self-presentation makes. The claims are not supported once Mearsheimer’s argument is accepted.
What the work does is sustain tribal identity through sustained production that the tribe recognizes as expressing its commitments in forms the tribe values. Knox is his tribe’s skilled articulator. The skill is real. The articulation serves real tribal functions. The tribal functions are not what Knox’s self-understanding presents them as. They are tribal functions. The presentation as transcendent analysis is part of how the functions are served. The presentation masks the tribal nature of the operation from the tribe members engaged in it.
The previous analysis treated Knox’s operation as phenomenologically sophisticated in ways that required acknowledgment even from those who disagreed with his commitments. The treatment was too deferential to Knox’s self-presentation. After Mearsheimer, the deference is not warranted. Knox’s operation is phenomenologically comparable to the operations of commentators in other Australian tribes. The commentators articulate their tribes’ commitments using whatever vocabulary their tribes recognize as legitimate. Knox’s tribe recognizes sophisticated analytical prose. Other tribes recognize different forms. The difference in recognized forms does not indicate that one tribe has reached greater understanding than others. It indicates that the tribes have developed different cultural productions that serve their respective tribal needs.
Knox’s work compared to, say, a sports talk radio host in a working-class Australian market: both articulate their tribes’ commitments using their tribes’ recognized vocabulary. The talk radio host operates through immediate emotional engagement because his audience operates through that mode. Knox operates through interpretive distance because his audience operates through that mode. Neither is more accurate about Australian culture than the other. Both are tribal articulation that serves tribal cohesion. The difference in sophistication that buffered analysis might assert does not survive Mearsheimer’s argument. The different forms of articulation reflect different tribal needs rather than different levels of insight.
This removes the privilege that Knox’s operation has typically enjoyed in discussions of Australian cultural commentary. The privilege came from the implicit acceptance of the buffered self-presentation. Once the self-presentation is rejected as inaccurate self-understanding, the privilege cannot be sustained. Knox’s work becomes one form of Australian tribal articulation among others rather than the sophisticated achievement that less accomplished forms might aspire to.
Knox’s tribe is not merely one Australian tribe among others in neutral pluralism. It is the tribe that currently holds substantial institutional power in Australian cultural life. Its members staff the major universities, the major media institutions, the major cultural organizations, the major arts funding bodies, the major publishing houses, and the major literary prizes. The institutional dominance shapes what counts as legitimate cultural expression in Australian life. Expression matching the tribe’s commitments is recognized and rewarded. Expression operating through different commitments is typically marginalized or dismissed as unsophisticated.
The institutional dominance is not merely the accumulation of individual merit. It reflects the tribe’s success in placing its members in institutional positions that reproduce the tribe’s commitments across generations. The positions allow the tribe to train the next generation of Australian cultural workers into the tribe’s orientation. The training produces continued tribal membership expanding across decades. The expansion is not ideologically neutral expansion. It is tribal expansion that excludes other Australian tribes from the institutional positions the tribe controls.
Knox’s work operates within this broader institutional dominance. His work benefits from the dominance and contributes to its maintenance. The professional recognition he receives flows from the institutions the tribe controls. The readership that sustains his books comes from populations the tribe has trained. The cultural prestige attached to his name reflects the tribe’s successful positioning of its members as Australia’s authoritative cultural voices.
After Mearsheimer, the question of whether Knox’s tribe deserves the institutional dominance it has achieved is not settled by claims about the tribe’s superior understanding. The tribe does not have superior understanding. It has cultural production that trained its members into a distinctive phenomenology while other Australians were not subjected to equivalent training. The institutional dominance is the political and cultural achievement of one tribe over other tribes, not the appropriate recognition of intellectual advance.
Knox’s extended engagement with Australian sport takes on different meaning after Mearsheimer. The previous analysis treated Knox’s demystification of sporting nationalism as analytical work operating on porous material. The treatment implicitly positioned sporting nationalism as needing demystification, as operating through illusions that sophisticated analysis might reveal. This implicit positioning cannot survive Mearsheimer.
Sporting nationalism is not illusion that sophisticated analysis reveals to be false. It is tribal commitment that operates through tribal channels to produce tribal goods. Australian working-class men who engage Australian sport through direct emotional participation are not failing to recognize truths about manipulation and false consciousness. They are participating in their tribe’s rituals through the modes their tribe recognizes. The participation produces real goods for them: community connection, intergenerational transmission, shared experience with others who matter to them, tribal identification that gives their lives weight against the scale of death.
Knox’s demystification of sporting nationalism is not revealing what sporting fans could not see about their own activity. It is articulating his own tribe’s discomfort with the commitments of other Australian tribes. The articulation serves his tribe by providing vocabulary for the discomfort. The articulation does not address sporting fans because sporting fans are not in his tribe. It addresses his fellow tribe members who share his discomfort with the other tribes’ commitments and want sophisticated vocabulary for expressing the discomfort.
After Mearsheimer, it becomes clear that Knox’s demystification is not analytical operation on his subject matter. It is tribal operation that defines his tribe against other Australian tribes. The tribal operation is legitimate work. It serves real tribal needs. The tribal operation should be acknowledged as such rather than presented as transcendent analysis. The presentation as transcendent analysis is what Mearsheimer’s argument rules out.
Knox’s books on Bradman operate in the same pattern. Bradman is object of porous commitment for substantial portions of the Australian population. The commitment operates as tribal tradition that connects generations through shared reference to Bradman’s achievements and character. Knox’s books demonstrate to his own tribe that his tribe’s discomfort with the Bradman commitment is justified by evidence that the canonical Bradman narrative suppressed. The books articulate his tribe’s position using historical documentation that his tribe finds compelling.
This is legitimate scholarly work. It is not what the work’s self-presentation claims. The self-presentation claims to be recovering historical truth against myth-making. The claim assumes that Knox’s tribe possesses the capacity to recover historical truth that other tribes lack. After Mearsheimer, the assumption cannot be sustained. Knox’s tribe has its own relationship to historical material that produces its own readings. Other tribes have different relationships to the same material and produce different readings. None of the readings is transcendent of tribal formation. All are tribal readings that reflect the tribe’s orientation to its historical material.
Both Knox and Pearlman produce demystifying biographies that claim to recover historical truth against myth-making. Both operate through accumulated documentation that their respective tribes find compelling. Both present their work as analytical achievement against the backward attachments their subjects’ audiences sustain. The parallel is structural rather than accidental. Both operate within tribes whose commitments produce demystification as the tribe’s preferred approach to cultural heroes.
After Mearsheimer, both Knox and Pearlman look less like unique analytical achievements and more like tribal articulations that their tribes recognize as legitimate because the tribes value the form the articulations take. The tribes have developed preferences for this kind of work. The preferences shape what the tribes produce and consume. The shaping is not the operation of neutral reason. It is the operation of tribal cultural formation that produces dispositions in tribal members.
Australia has been undergoing the same political conflict as other English-speaking democracies. The progressive elite tribe that controls the institutions has encountered sustained resistance from populations whose tribal commitments do not match the elite tribe’s commitments. The resistance has produced political outcomes: the referendum defeats on indigenous recognition, the strength of One Nation and similar parties, the resistance to climate policy, the persistence of republican sentiment that does not match the elite tribe’s preferred form.
Knox’s tribe has treated this resistance as irrational backwardness that requires further education to overcome. The treatment reflects the tribe’s self-understanding as holding transcendent analytical position from which to evaluate other tribes’ commitments. After Mearsheimer, the treatment cannot be sustained. The resistance is not irrational backwardness. It is tribal commitment of populations who have not been subjected to the educational and institutional training that produces Knox’s tribe’s commitments. The populations operate through their actual human tribal nature without the training that masks it.
Neither tribe has the position of transcendent understanding from which to evaluate the other. Both tribes have commitments that reflect their formations. The conflict cannot be resolved by one tribe educating the other into transcendent understanding. The transcendent understanding is not available. The conflict can only be resolved through political processes that reach some accommodation between the tribes or through one tribe achieving sufficient dominance to impose its preferences on the other.
Knox’s work contributes to his tribe’s effort to maintain institutional dominance against the other tribes’ resistance. The contribution is legitimate tribal work. It is not what the work’s self-presentation claims. The self-presentation claims to be serving Australian culture generally. It serves Knox’s tribe’s interests within Australian culture. The service is not illegitimate. It should be acknowledged as what it is rather than presented as something else.
Knox operates as skilled articulator of his tribe’s commitments. The articulation is substantial professional accomplishment. The tribe benefits from having Knox in the articulating position. Other tribes do not benefit from Knox’s work because the work is not aimed at them and does not serve their needs. Australian culture generally is not served by Knox’s work in the sense Knox’s self-presentation claims. Australian culture is served by the tribal ecology that includes Knox’s tribe along with other tribes. Each tribe needs its own articulators. Knox is one tribe’s.
The evaluation of Knox’s work should proceed on tribal grounds. Within his tribe, the work is sophisticated articulation that serves the tribe well. From outside his tribe, the work is one tribe’s articulation that may or may not serve other tribes’ interests. The evaluation is tribal rather than transcendent. There is no transcendent position from which to reach universal evaluation. All evaluation is tribal. Mearsheimer’s argument entails this.
This is not relativism in the sense that all tribal positions are equally defensible. Tribes can be evaluated on various grounds. Some tribes produce institutional arrangements that serve more people better than other tribes’ arrangements do. Some tribes preserve accurate self-understanding while others do not. Some tribes produce institutional goods that other tribes do not produce. These evaluations are available. They do not require transcendent position. They require articulated grounds that tribes find compelling. Different tribes find different grounds compelling. The evaluations remain tribal even when they reach conclusions about which tribes do better work on certain dimensions.

Charisma and Social Paradoxes

Knox executes several paradoxes at a high level, and the execution explains why his authority in Australian letters has compounded across three decades rather than dissipated.
The first paradox is the reporter who attacks the enterprise that sustains him. Knox works inside The Sydney Morning Herald and writes about media, publishing, sport, corporations, and public scandal with a tone that suggests no vested interest. The Khouri investigation attacked a bestseller in a publishing market his own paper reviews. Supermarket Monsters attacked advertisers. Truth Is Trouble attacked the managerial class that includes his own editors. Each move registers as the independent judgment of a man who will go wherever the story takes him. Yet the institutional arrangement holds. The paper keeps him. The publishers keep buying his books. The boards keep inviting him. The paradox works because the attacks land on targets his coalition has already marked. His independence looks unconditional because the concealment of the condition is total. A reader cannot easily tell that the set of targets is bounded because Knox has never needed to test the bound. Pinsof’s symbiotic deception: the paper benefits from a reporter whose sharpness proves the paper’s seriousness. Knox benefits from a platform that lets him look unsponsored. Neither side examines the arrangement because neither side has any reason to.
The second paradox is the critic who is visibly part of what he criticizes. Knox writes about Australian male culture, cricket, private schools, rugby, surfing, and suburban property. He is a St Ives boy, a Knox Grammar first XI captain, a Sydney surfer, a private-school father. The biography is real. The paradox works because the biography is real. A critic of male Australian systems who had not lived inside them might read as a scold. Knox reads as a witness. The critique carries more weight because it comes from inside. And the critique costs him nothing inside, because the men he describes rarely read him, and the readers who do read him value the inside view more than they value any solidarity he might show with the worlds he left. He is the authentic rebel who represents the group. The authenticity is the asset. Pinsof’s point is that the asset accrues precisely because the posture of rebellion is not strategic. Knox probably does feel ambivalence about the worlds he came from. The feelings are real. The feelings also happen to map perfectly onto what his coalition wants from him. Both things are true at once.
The third paradox is norm violation that earns praise. Knox breaks certain rules of his class. He writes about sport seriously in a literary culture that usually treats sport as beneath serious writing. He writes for the newspaper in an academic and literary scene that often treats journalism as compromised. He writes popular non-fiction at high volume in a novelists’ world that sometimes treats commercial output as dilution. These violations register inside his coalition as a sign of confidence and independent taste rather than of class betrayal. The same violations by a lesser writer might read as slumming. The paradox works because Knox has the craft to make each register serve the others. The cricket writing raises the fiction. The fiction raises the cricket writing. The reporting raises both. A coalition member watching this performance reads it as seriousness traveling wherever it wants to go. Pinsof might note that the violations are calibrated. Knox does not write for tabloids. He does not write romance. He does not write for Quadrant. The envelope of permitted violations is tight. The tightness is invisible because Knox never tests it.
The fourth paradox is the man of letters who presents as the man of no theory. Knox’s prose is clean, reported, narrative, plainly observed. He does not cite Foucault, Bourdieu, Pinsof, or Turner. He does not announce frames. He does not defend methods. This plainness reads as craft rather than position, and the reading is not wrong. But the plainness is also a status move. In the Australian literary scene of the past thirty years, the writer who skips theory signals that he does not need theory. The signal works because theory had currency for a while and Knox let others have it. When the theoretical vocabulary aged, Knox’s plainness still looked fresh. The paradox succeeds because he never presented the plainness as a position against theory. He presented it as simply how he writes. The recursive mindreading dimension matters here. Knox’s readers infer that he is the kind of writer who does not bother with theory because the work does not need theory. Knox infers that his readers will read the plainness as craft. Neither side examines whether the plainness functions as a coalition marker. It does. Australian progressive cultural elites of a certain age reward plain prose as a sign of maturity. Knox supplies the product. Both parties gain. Neither investigates.
The fifth paradox is the anatomist of fraud who never turns the instrument on his own coalition. Khouri, Coles, Woolworths, Folau, Beria, supermarket chains, mining firms, the tabloid press, Soviet power. The targets share a structural feature. None of them can retaliate inside Knox’s field. Khouri is a foreigner, now disgraced. Coles and Woolworths are corporations without literary standing. Folau is an outsider to the coalition that publishes Knox. Beria is dead. The tabloid press has no hold on the broadsheet. Soviet power collapsed decades ago. The institution Knox has never anatomized is the one that sits closest to him: the Australian literary establishment, its funding bodies, its prize committees, its festivals, its universities, its The Monthly and Australian Book Review and ABC ecosystems, its publishing houses, and the board-room networks that overlap all of them. Knox has sat on some of those boards. The paradox is that his reputation as an anatomist of concealed power depends on his never conducting the anatomy closest to hand. The concealment is perfect because no one in the coalition asks him to perform it. His readers infer that if there were something worth exposing inside the coalition, Knox might have found it. Knox infers that his readers trust the range of his vision. The inference is mutual. The examination is not.
The social paradoxes paper’s recursive mindreading gives the engine by which these arrangements stay stable. Knox does not consciously select safe targets. His readers do not consciously confirm his selections. The Sydney Writers’ Festival programmers do not consciously reward him for his restraint. Each party infers, on the basis of cues whose coalition content stays below awareness, that the other is operating in good faith. The inference closes the loop. Pinsof’s symbiotic deception runs the loop. The paper benefits from a marquee writer whose independence proves the paper’s value. Knox benefits from a platform that makes his independence possible. The readership benefits from a writer whose work flatters its judgment. The writer benefits from a readership that returns to his work. The literary establishment benefits from a figure who demonstrates that Australian letters produces serious, unsparing, unaligned work. The figure benefits from an establishment that gives his unsparing work the machinery to reach readers. At no point does anyone have to hold the arrangement in view. Pinsof’s point is that this is how the arrangement works. The stability does not depend on any one party’s correct perception. It depends on the web of inferences holding in place.
Coalition relativity of the effect explains why Knox reads as charismatic inside his field and nearly invisible outside it. For the Sydney and Melbourne broadsheet readership, the literary festival audience, the ABC listenership, and the prize committees, Knox executes paradoxes with skill. His unpopular opinions land on the unpopular targets. His plainness reads as mastery. His insider critique reads as integrity. His range reads as depth. Inside this coalition his authority compounds. For the Australian mass readership that buys the Dymocks bestseller, for the rugby league fan, for the Pentecostal congregation, for the outer suburbs, he is mostly unknown, and when known he reads differently. The same tone that registers inside as wry and disciplined can register outside as knowing and superior. The same plainness that registers inside as craft can register outside as dryness. The same range that registers inside as depth can register outside as miscellaneous. The paradoxes are coalition-relative because the inferences they rely on are coalition-bound. The reader outside the coalition is not running the same recursive mindreading the reader inside runs. The concealment does not operate. The strategy becomes visible as strategy. The charisma does not transfer. Pinsof’s framework predicts this precisely. Knox’s charisma is high but narrow. The narrowness is the condition of the height.
The place where the framework presses hardest on Knox is the ceiling question. Pinsof argues that charisma dissolves paradoxes in the audience’s perception. The charismatic figure seems to have resolved what the audience cannot resolve. Knox executes paradoxes but does not dissolve them. The ambivalence between insider and outsider, between the reporter and the novelist, between the cricket writer and the social anatomist, between the anti-myth stance and the myth-dependent career: these remain paradoxes rather than resolutions. He does not carry them to resolution because resolution might require the move that might cost him his coalition standing. A writer who resolved the paradox of the insider anatomist might have to anatomize the inside. A writer who resolved the paradox of the anti-myth stance might have to give up the mythic materials that make his prose work. A writer who resolved the paradox of the disciplined coalition figure might have to step outside the coalition. Knox performs the paradoxes. He does not solve them. That restraint is why his standing is stable rather than transcendent. He is charismatic at the regional level and beneath the level at which a figure becomes a carrier for a larger cultural turn. The social paradoxes paper suggests that figures who solve the paradoxes rise to the second level. Figures who perform them expertly and leave them performed stay at the first.
The symbiotic deception is not a moral failing. It is the normal operation of an intelligent professional inside a coalition that pays him well and reads him seriously. Knox is not a hypocrite. He is a skilled animal in a hospitable ecosystem. His charisma is the shape his skill takes when reflected through the coalition that values it. His social paradoxes are the technology by which the skill and the coalition stay in productive symbiosis. Taking the story at face value is the only misunderstanding on offer.

Google Scholar

The academy treats Knox as a journalist first and a novelist second, and it reads him with weight in only one place.

That place is the Norma Khouri affair. Knox broke the story in July 2004 as literary editor of The Sydney Morning Herald, working with his colleague Caroline Overington, and the two shared the Walkley Award for Investigative Journalism that year. The reporting grew out of an eighteen-month investigation. Knox showed that Khouri’s bestselling memoir Forbidden Love, sold as a true account of an honour killing in Jordan, was a fabrication, and that Khouri had spent her life in Chicago rather than Amman. Scholars do not study Knox here. They study what he uncovered, and they treat his articles as the documentary record of how a fraud reached print and sold half a million copies.

The case became a fixture in life-writing scholarship. The anchor is Gillian Whitlock’s Soft Weapons: Autobiography in Transit (University of Chicago Press, 2007). Whitlock reads the Khouri hoax beside Azar Nafisi’s Reading Lolita in Tehran, Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis, and Jean Sasson’s bestsellers, and she builds an argument about memoir as a commodity the West buys when it wants to feel something about Muslim women. The Khouri case gives her the sharpest instance of the appetite running ahead of the evidence. From Whitlock the case spreads into adjacent fields: autobiography and authenticity studies, media ethics, postcolonial criticism, and the sociology of publishing. The use stays the same. Researchers ask how publishers, festivals, prize juries, and readers accepted a traumatic Middle Eastern narrative without checking it, and they reach for Knox’s reporting to supply the facts. He is the source, not the interpreter.

The academy reads Knox’s reporting with care and reads his books in passing.

His fiction holds critical standing on a thin scholarly base. Reviewers and prize juries built the consensus, not journal articles. Summerland (2000) made his name and put him on the Herald’s 2001 list of best young Australian novelists. A Private Man (2004) won the Ned Kelly Award for Best First Fiction and reached the Commonwealth Book Prize shortlist. Jamaica (2007) won the Colin Roderick Award and made the 2008 Prime Minister’s Literary Awards fiction shortlist. The Life (2011) drew on the surfer Michael Peterson and earned wide praise. Across these books critics name one preoccupation. Knox writes about class and masculinity among educated Australian men, and about the gap between a smooth public surface and a hollow or rotten interior. That reading comes from reviews in the Herald, The Age, The Big Issue, and the literary press, and from festival panels. It has not hardened into a body of academic articles in places like the Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature. A student who looks for sustained scholarship on Knox’s novels finds reviews, the odd chapter, and gaps.

His non-fiction on corporate power and national economic history sits further from the academy still. Supermarket Monsters (2015) grew from his essay in The Monthly on the Coles and Woolworths duopoly. Boom: The Underground History of Australia, from Gold Rush to GFC (2013) won the Ashurst Business Literature Prize. Policy writers, economic journalists, and the occasional historian cite these as readable accounts of concentration and resource dependence. The citation is light and instrumental. They borrow a figure or a framing. They do not argue with Knox the way they argue with a scholar.

His sports writing, which is large, the cricket books and the long run as the Herald’s cricket correspondent, barely registers in scholarship. It belongs to journalism and to the trade.

Knox holds a secure place in one scholarly conversation, life writing and the ethics of testimony, where his Khouri reporting is a standard reference. Everywhere else the academy treats him as a respected working writer rather than an object of study.

C.L.R. James (1901-1989) and Beyond a Boundary

James reads cricket as a key to character, class, and nation, and he asks what a man knows who knows only cricket. Knox is the Australian heir to that posture. He writes the game as literature and as national myth across Bradman’s War, The Captains, The Greatest, and The Keepers. A James reading explains why a literary novelist gives years to sport and treats Don Bradman (1908-2001) as a figure of moral weight rather than a batting average.

Start with Bradman’s War. James built Beyond a Boundary on the claim that the great player carries his age. W.G. Grace (1848-1915) stood for Victorian England, the country yeoman who walks into the era of mass spectacle and the gate receipt. Knox does the same work on Bradman. Bradman’s War reads the 1948 tour as a moral argument settled with the bat. Bradman wants total victory. He drops the gentler conventions that once let a winning side ease off. Knox reads that choice for what it says about Australia after the war, a young country that has stopped apologizing and means to win. The runs serve the portrait. This is James’s method: read the man for what he tells you about the people who made him.

Then the code. James spent long pages on fair play, the Arnoldian creed carried from the public school out to the colonies, the belief that cricket teaches virtue. He admired the code and saw through it at once. The same gentlemen who preached fair play barred Black men from the captaincy. Thomas Arnold (1795-1842) supplied the ethic; the empire supplied the hypocrisy. Knox takes the next step. Never a Gentlemen’s Game strips the myth to the frame. Australian cricket was rough, mercenary, and mean from the start. The gentleman was a costume. Where James held the code and the critique in tension, Knox finishes the demolition, and he can finish it because he writes from a country that never wore the costume as tightly as the English did.

Cricket as art. Here Knox is the natural heir. James argued that the game belongs with the theater and the visual arts, that a single gesture, the defensive stroke held a beat too long, carries the charge of drama, and that the right critic watches cricket the way he watches a stage. Knox arrives with the novelist’s eye already trained. The Captains reads captaincy as a part written for a leading man, an office his country ranks second only to the prime minister. The Greatest and The Keepers sort players by the weight of their moments rather than their averages. The biography of Phillip Hughes (1988-2014), the young batsman killed by a ball at the SCG, hands James’s aesthetic its hardest case. Drama includes tragedy. The body stands on the field at risk in front of the crowd. Knox writes that death as a novelist writes a death, which is the seriousness James said the game had earned.

Mimicry and Concealment

In Batesian mimicry, named for Henry Walter Bates (1825-1892), a harmless species grows the warning coloration of a dangerous one to deter a predator it cannot otherwise survive. Norma Khouri‘s Forbidden Love is Batesian mimicry in pure form. A Western woman produces the signal of a Jordanian honor-killing survivor. She borrows the warning coloration of a genuinely endangered group and collects the protection and the market that coloration confers. The signal-parasite note at the end of your document says the same thing from the other side. An outsider adopts the prestige and moral authority of a tribe’s story without carrying the tribe’s costs, and the story stops tracking the reality it claims. Khouri pays none of the costs a real victim pays. She takes the sympathy a real victim earns. Knox is the detection event. He reads the coloration as false and exposes the mimic, and the Walkley follows. The frame explains why that scoop made his name. He caught a mimic the rest of the literary market had taken for the real species.

Crypsis is concealment that gives off no detectable signal of threat. Knox the hoax-hunter writes again and again about men who conceal. A Private Man turns on a father’s secret pornography, a life lived beneath a flat surface and exposed only after death. The Wonder Lover gives us a man who authenticates world records for a living and keeps three families who never detect one another. These are crypsis stories. Countershading sharpens them. The countershaded animal cancels the light gradient and reads as flat, so the eye finds no depth and no pattern. Knox’s concealed men present a surface tuned to read as ordinary, the private man with no shadow, and the novelist’s interest fixes on the moment the countershading fails and the depth shows. He hunts crypsis in the world. He builds crypsis in the study. Same trait, two phenotypes.

Phenotypic plasticity says one genotype expresses different traits by environment. Knox is one writer who grows a press-box phenotype, a literary-novel phenotype, a business-exposé phenotype, and a true-crime phenotype, each tuned to its market. The range is not many talents. It is one organism reading many environments. Heterosis supplies the part plasticity leaves out. When the literary eye crosses into the press box, the cricket writing gains a vigor that neither pure sportswriting nor pure fiction reaches alone. Bradman’s War reads a tour the way a novelist reads a man, and the crossing gives the book its weight. The reportage crosses back the other way and roots the novels in fact. The crossing makes the vigor.

Niche construction describes an organism that reshapes its environment to favor its own survival. Knox sits on the Copyright Agency and the Australian Society of Authors, the bodies that write and defend authorship as property. The author helps build the environment the author lives in. A small case, one man shaping the field that pays him, and it pairs with the fiction, since the man who defends the author as a stable owner writes novels that dissolve the stable self.

Posted in Australia, Malcolm Knox, Sydney | Comments Off on Malcolm Knox: A Life in Australian Letters

David Myers & The Neutralization Theory of Hatred

UCLA historian David N. Myers spends his career mapping how Jewish communities build and police collective self-understanding. The Sell paper gives a functional theory of one of the forces that does the policing. Hatred, on this account, is not an extreme form of anger but a distinct adaptation that neutralizes individuals whose continued existence lowers the hater’s reproductive prospects. The theory predicts four triggers, a negative welfare tradeoff ratio toward the target, three behavioral strategies (killing, information warfare, avoidance), and a set of terminating conditions.
First, Myers is a target. His affiliations and public positions mark him as hostile in the eyes of right-wing Zionist and Orthodox coalitions. The Sell framework predicts the pattern of response he receives. Not open physical aggression, which modern conditions make prohibitively expensive, but information warfare. Negative reputation work. Gossip networks. Efforts to deprive him of platforms, honors, and institutional allies. The theory predicts that truth is incidental to this process, since great gains come against a target provided no one counters the negative information. It also predicts the perverse corollary Myers’s defenders keep discovering: that defending a hated target makes one a target as well. Coalition members who speak up for him find their own association values revised downward.
Second, the theory clarifies what Myers violates. Sell argues that hatred functionally requires aversion to understanding the enemy’s perspective, because understanding generates sympathy and sympathy dissolves the negative WTR hatred maintains. Myers’s signature move is the one hatred exists to suppress. He insists on engaging the motives of parties hatred wants to render unreadable: the Satmar separatists, Palestinian nationalists, anti-Zionist Jewish intellectuals like Rawidowicz, dissenting minorities inside majority Jewish institutions. To coalition members who hate these targets, Myers’s generosity reads as sabotage. He dismantles the adaptation’s core prohibition on letting the enemy speak.
Third, the theory reframes the Yerushalmi problem. Yerushalmi treated the break between Jewish memory and Jewish history as a loss. Sell’s framework suggests that what Yerushalmi called memory included the social apparatus for identifying toxic others and coordinating hatred toward them. Modern Jewish history, by giving voice to those others, weakened that apparatus. Myers extends the weakening. He wants a Jewish self-understanding that keeps the archival rigor but drops the functional hatred. The Sell paper suggests why this is harder than Myers supposes. Hatred is an evolved coordination device. Communities that abandon it lose a competitive edge against communities that keep it. This is the unacknowledged force behind the Kiryas Joel puzzle in American Shtetl. Satmar maintains strong collective WTRs by maintaining strong collective hatreds, against the secular world, against Zionism, against modernity. Myers documents their reproductive success without connecting it to the functional work hatred does inside the community.
Fourth, the theory explains the asymmetry Myers keeps running into. He treats his interlocutors as bargaining partners in anger’s frame, people whose WTRs recalibrate through evidence and argument. Sell distinguishes sharply. Anger negotiates. Hatred neutralizes. Many of Myers’s fiercest opponents are not in anger toward him. They are in hatred. The terminating conditions for their attacks are not apology, reparation, or improved conduct. The terminating condition is that Myers stop functioning as a force in Jewish institutional life. No amount of careful argument reaches that endpoint because the argument presupposes a WTR his opponents have set to negative.
Fifth, the theory illuminates Myers’s own reticence. He rarely names his enemies with the diagnostic clarity his analytical tools permit. The Sell framework predicts this too. Naming them openly is an act of information warfare that invites retaliation. A scholar whose coalition protection is thinner than his opponents’ has functional reasons to keep his pen careful. What looks like principled scholarly restraint might also be prudent non-escalation.
One warning. The Sell theory is explicitly speculative, and the authors note that few of its predictions have been empirically tested. Applied to Myers, it generates sharper readings than most frameworks on offer, but treat the readings as hypotheses. The claim that Myers’s opponents run a hatred program rather than an anger program is testable in principle. Their behavioral pattern (continued cost infliction after apologies, aversion to letting Myers explain himself, willingness to damage shared institutional capital to harm him) fits. Other frameworks might fit too.
Right. The paper does not make the application but the framework maps onto the case with unusual tightness.
The paper’s core claim is that hatred responds to cues of negative association value, meaning cues that another individual’s continued existence depresses the hater’s reproductive prospects. Scale that up from individuals to coalitions and the Arab-Israeli case becomes almost a textbook illustration. Each side perceives the other’s presence in contested territory as a net fitness cost. Land, water, demographic weight, political sovereignty, and security are all reproductive variables in the evolutionary sense. A Jewish family in Tel Aviv and a Palestinian family in Gaza both calculate their children’s futures against the existence and power of the other group. The calculation does not require hatred to be manufactured by elites. The material conditions generate the cues that the adaptation evolved to detect.
Several predictions from the paper track the conflict with eerie precision.
The theory predicts that hatred motivates information warfare before and alongside physical aggression, that the information need not be truthful to be effective, and that negative information about the target spreads through coalition networks to deprive the target of allies. The propaganda apparatuses on both sides behave exactly this way. Each portrays the other as uniquely cruel, as incapable of reciprocity, as biologically or culturally disposed toward the destruction of the hater. The content of the accusations varies. The functional shape is identical.
The theory predicts that hatred generates aversion to understanding the enemy’s motives, because understanding produces sympathy and sympathy erodes the negative WTR. Both Israeli and Palestinian publics police this aversion aggressively. An Israeli who tries to explain Hamas’s strategic logic without moralized framing faces social sanction inside Israel. A Palestinian who tries to explain Israeli security anxieties without moralized framing faces social sanction inside Palestinian society. The Richard Gere example in the paper generalizes. Voices that model understanding of the other side get shouted down by their own coalition, and the theory says they must, because understanding is functionally incompatible with the hatred the coalition runs on.
The theory predicts that defenders of a hated target become hated themselves. This explains the treatment of Jewish anti-Zionists inside mainstream Jewish institutional life and the treatment of Palestinians who normalize with Israelis inside Palestinian society. Neither side tolerates defection from the hatred consensus, because defection weakens the coalition’s ability to neutralize the toxic out-group. The defector becomes functionally allied with the enemy and receives hatred calibrated accordingly.
The theory predicts that hate copying spreads through networks where the copier shares interests with the hater, and that converging evidence from many haters increases the credibility of the toxic designation. Zionism’s hasbara infrastructure and the Palestinian solidarity movement both function as hate-copying systems in Sell’s sense. They broadcast the toxicity of the other side to audiences whose shared interests with the originator make the copying functional.
The theory predicts that hatred deactivates when association value becomes zero or positive, through several routes: corrected misperception, recalibrated WTR from the target, shifting alliance structures, new avenues of cooperation, or failure of all hatred strategies to neutralize the target. This is where the framework becomes pessimistic. Misperception is not the issue. Each side’s reading of the other’s intentions is substantially accurate. The targets cannot easily recalibrate their WTRs because the structural conflict over territory keeps generating new evidence of negative AV. Shifting alliance structures occasionally intervene (the Abraham Accords are a live test case) but do not touch the core dyad. New avenues of cooperation exist but operate against the hatred gradient rather than with it. And neither side has succeeded in neutralizing the other, which according to the theory means hatred persists rather than deactivates, and the spiteful behavior continues even when it imposes net costs on the hater.
The theory’s account of predatory aggression also maps. Sell describes predatory aggression as characterized by no signaling, no escalation, no monitoring for surrender, continued aggression upon the target’s submission, no interrogation of the target’s motives, and willful violations of the implicit rules of combat. October 7 fits this profile. So does the conduct of some Israeli operations in Gaza. The paper’s point is not that one side is uniquely predatory but that the hatred adaptation, when fully activated and unconstrained, produces behavior of this kind on any side that activates it.
The framework also clarifies why negotiated settlements keep failing. Negotiation is anger’s behavioral strategy, not hatred’s. Anger bargains over WTRs. Hatred neutralizes. If the dominant emotion on both sides is hatred rather than anger, then the cognitive architecture of the negotiating parties is not set up to recalibrate WTRs through agreement. It is set up to produce the appearance of agreement as a tactical move in a longer campaign of neutralization. Oslo read in this light becomes intelligible in a way that the standard “missed opportunity” narratives cannot make it.
One implication the paper half-states but does not pursue. If hatred is the adaptation both sides are running, then the conditions for deactivation have to be engineered deliberately against the adaptation’s functional logic. The paper notes that having a stake in the other’s welfare can defuse hatred. Economic integration, shared institutions, and intermarriage are the obvious candidates. The adaptation resists all of them because it perceives them correctly as threats to its operation. Any serious peace project has to out-engineer an evolved system designed to defeat exactly such projects. That is a harder problem than the diplomatic literature usually acknowledges, and the Sell paper, without saying so, provides the theoretical reason why.

Grokipedia v Wikipedia (April 23, 2026)

Wikipedia frames Myers as a mainstream scholar who faced an ideologically motivated attack he survived. The Center for Jewish History episode gets structured around Sarna and Ellenson’s defense, Smotrich’s involvement as a flagging marker of the attackers’ politics, and hundreds of historians rallying behind him. Myers’ own quote closes the section on a note of equanimity: after two unpleasant months, he had a great time. The New Israel Fund presidency gets a single factual sentence. Views on Zionism receive no section at all. The reader meets a distinguished historian who does respectable work, briefly ran an archive, and sits on a liberal Jewish board.
Grokipedia treats the same life as a pattern of contested political engagement. The NIF section names specific grantees, Adalah, Breaking the Silence, B’Tselem, Peace Now, and cites NGO Monitor as a source documenting ongoing support for groups that critics say delegitimize Israel. The CJH controversy gets longer treatment with more critic voices preserved. A separate section on views covers the Haaretz interview, the Los Angeles Times op-eds on judicial reform, the post-October 7 commentary, and the UCLA Initiative to Study Hate with the “total systems failure” quote and the April 30, 2024 encampment attack. The Grokipedia Myers is a political actor whose scholarship runs alongside his advocacy.
Both descriptions point at real features of the public record. Myers does hold the Kahn Chair and chaired the history department. He did lead NIF for five years. He did give the Haaretz interview. He did write the op-eds. The question is which facts constitute the story.
Wikipedia’s silences are the more revealing choice. An encyclopedia entry on someone who chaired NIF through the 2023 judicial reform crisis, who runs a hate studies initiative at UCLA during the post-October 7 campus upheaval, and who publishes regular op-eds on Israeli democracy, cannot treat these as background color without making an editorial decision. The decision protects Myers from readers who might form independent judgments about his politics. Grokipedia makes the opposite decision and supplies the material for those judgments, which creates its own risks because some of the framing language, “accused by critics,” “post-Zionist narratives,” “asymmetric threats,” does work the sources cited cannot quite support.
The CJH episode is the clearest test. Wikipedia tells you Smotrich and ZOA attacked him, Sarna and Ellenson defended him, and he had a great time after two months. Grokipedia tells you the same thing and adds that he resigned after thirteen months amid reported tensions with the board over strategic direction. Both versions draw on the Forward coverage. Wikipedia selects the exoneration. Grokipedia selects the complication. A reader who wanted to know whether Myers succeeded as CEO gets more usable information from Grokipedia. A reader who wanted to know whether the attacks on him were legitimate gets a cleaner answer from Wikipedia.
Wikipedia’s Jewish studies entries pass through editors embedded in the field, and the field closed ranks around Myers during the CJH fight. The entry reflects that closure. Grokipedia draws on right-leaning source ecosystems that tracked Myers as a political figure. Each reference base produces its own Myers.

Posted in David N. Myers, Israel | Comments Off on David Myers & The Neutralization Theory of Hatred

History as Ideology: The Case of David N. Myers, Critical-Zionist Historian Par Excellence

I

To readers of American Jewish intellectual life, the name David N. Myers is synonymous with a sophisticated critical engagement with Zionist historiography from within the Jewish studies profession. Myers has devoted four decades to exposing the ideological saturation of Zionist historical method, rescuing suppressed diasporic voices, and demonstrating how seemingly scientific Jewish scholarship serves political projects. Within this framework, Myers aims to recover the pluralism, ambivalence, and dissent that Zionist master narratives erased.
Of course, Myers is not alone among American Jewish historians in his sympathies for the critical turn, nor in envisioning a constructive function for critical scholarship in relation to contemporary Jewish life. However, Myers’s work reveals more baldly its underlying ideological motivation than that of many of his fellow historians, because his public positions (New Israel Fund presidency, Luskin Center directorship, Bedari Kindness Institute, Initiative to Study Hate, Dialogue Across Difference) make his commitments visible in a way few scholarly careers match. In this essay I propose to examine the role of that ideological motivation in shaping Myers’s historiographical method and overall historical vision. To do so, I explore his personal and intellectual evolution from Scranton Yale graduate to Tel Aviv Zionist student to Columbia Yerushalmi disciple to UCLA critical-Zionist historian.
Before commencing, I confront an apparent contradiction that has informed modern Jewish historical research from its inception. On one hand we notice a certain reticence among Jewish historians to acknowledge the determinative role of ideology in shaping their historical world-views. In the case of the critical school to which Myers belongs, this reticence is often shielded by claims to post-ideological reflexivity. Here the desire to secure professional legitimacy and an unquestioning reliance on critical method partly obscures the formative role of ideology. The critical school’s view that it has transcended Zionist historiographical closure serves as an instrumental role of scholarship, as a means of advancing the political and social agenda of American liberal Jewry. However, what is denied is the exclusivist or restrictive tendency of critical scholarship in the service of that agenda, a tendency that we see, for example, in Myers’s selection of figures worthy of rescue (Rawidowicz, Rosenzweig, Scholem in his ambivalences) and his relative neglect of figures who sit outside the liberal-Zionist coalition’s horizon of sympathy.
From another perspective, however, critical Jewish historiography appears not as a case of methodological obtuseness but rather of unencumbered self-reflection. We arrive at this conclusion if we consider that the critical generation used historical method as an agent of demystification, as a scholarly lever to lower the realm of Dinurian Zionist certainty to the realm of the ideologically saturated. Thus we face an apparent contradiction in the genesis of critical Jewish historiography: an ingrained obtuseness coupled with a self-reflective examination of the Zionist past in which critical method is a primary tool. Instead of offering a solution to this contradiction (as it manifests itself in the formative stages of critical Jewish historiography), I consider its recurrence in the case of primary interest to us here, David N. Myers.
On Myers’s view, critical scholarship represents a moment of unparalleled self-awareness, stemming from a critique of earlier Zionist certainty. As I shall see, Myers, in his role as critical Jewish historian, participated in the process of reassessing the Jewish past according to a new set of historical criteria. His expectation was that, with the critical method now allowed for, the Jewish past might be recovered. In this regard, Myers saw his work and that of his colleagues in Jewish studies as constituting a major methodological and substantive advance over the Zionist scholars whose research was tainted by the lurking agenda of state-building. At the same time, Myers seems to have adopted the glorified view of critical reflection common to Wissenschaft scholars, whose research was necessarily to be waged in this world, not the world to come; moreover, its terms should be dictated by Jews alone, for only through a rational will could their fate be altered. Critical method then, at least in the American liberal Jewish milieu which Myers inhabits, is in part a refutation of traditional Jewish textual authority and of Zionist political authority.
On the other hand, as Myers was taught to emphasize in his research, positive components from both traditional and Zionist interpretation of Jewish identity persisted in his work. He attempted to realize the ideal of critical-sympathetic recovery, cultivated by the increasingly common expressions of American Jewish liberal sentiment, and heard among the educated Jewish professional class during the second half of the twentieth century.
With this mixture of old and new, it can be offered that the emergence of the critical Jewish studies movement constituted an unparalleled moment of collective self-consciousness in modern American Jewish thought, in proposing a change in tone and communal structure, forcing both supporters and detractors to confront the scope and rationale of Jewish Zionist allegiance. Myers came of intellectual age at a moment of self-consciousness. The result was a lifetime devoted to the establishment in locale and communal structure of a viable liberal-Zionist society in America. Not only did Myers’s critical scholarship lead him to an activist stance in the realm of politics and propaganda; it also set the tone for his labors in the world of pedagogy and scholarship. It is to Myers’s further evolution as a scholar that I now turn.

II

David N. Myers was born in 1960 in Scranton, Pennsylvania, a mid-sized anthracite city in northeastern Pennsylvania whose Middle Atlantic ethnic patchwork Myers has remembered with affection. He came from a long line of American Jewish families of Eastern European origin whose integration into American middle-class professional life had been, by the mid-twentieth century, largely accomplished. The later generations of Myers’s own family fell under the influence of the American Jewish consensus, in which he was raised — a consensus committed to the State of Israel as historical vindication, to the memory of the Holocaust as moral foundation, and to American liberalism as political home.
The example of his Scranton upbringing might have been important in stimulating Myers’s curiosity for subjects beyond the normal educational purview of a young American Jewish student. He came from an ethnically plural small city where Jewish identity was lived alongside Polish, Irish, Italian, and Slavic neighborhoods. Already at Yale he had read both in distinctly historical matters and in the broader American liberal tradition. After graduating cum laude in 1982, Myers moved to Israel, where he exhibited from an early age a keen interest in advancing the scholarly study of Jewish Zionism through the ingrained passivity of diasporic passivity. Already at Tel Aviv he trained under Anita Shapira, Yaakov Shavit, Matitiyahu Mintz, and Moshe Mishkinsky. Shapira represented the Labor Zionist historiographical establishment at the moment when the New Historians began challenging its foundational narratives. Myers was privy to the internal fight as a graduate student.
At this same moment, the young Myers exhibited an appetite for intellectual range that his later range would reflect: he moved from Tel Aviv to Harvard in 1984 to study medieval Jewish thought with Isadore Twersky. Twersky, a scion of the Talner Hasidic dynasty, held the Littauer Chair and married Maimonidean textual rigor with traditional piety. Myers received the full traditional-text apprenticeship that most critical historians of Jewish life in the United States lack. In 1985 he arrived at Columbia, where he fell under the supervision of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi. Yerushalmi’s Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory had redefined the field by arguing that modern Jewish historiography emerged from the collapse of traditional Jewish memory. Yerushalmi’s framework set the tone for Myers’s further evolution.
The convergence of Yale liberalism, Tel Aviv Zionism, Harvard traditional textuality, and Columbia critical historiography marked a course that Myers himself hoped to follow. Yerushalmi became Myers’s mentor. Anita Shapira’s insistent support of Jewish self-defense and Zionist activity, the two, however, parted ways over Myers’s more insistent support of Jewish critical reassessment and Zionist recognition of Palestinian humanity. Yerushalmi had already parted ways with Zionist historiography as a place of settlement; Myers would extend the critique. As Myers chose critical historical research over Talmudic studies, he never abandoned his observance of the scholarly commitments or his love for the Jewish textual tradition. Ultimately, what lay at the core of Myers’s American Jewish world-view was a belief in the unity and continuity of the Jewish people, based upon the bond of traditional religious and textual identification. Myers’s piety is discernible throughout his writings, including The Stakes of History.

III

In the decade after his arrival in Los Angeles at the age of twenty-eight, Myers ambitiously followed two paths: historical study and political activism. Political activism was more than just a complement to his scholarly endeavors, and introducing him to other critical scholars in the UCLA area. The two, however, parted ways over Myers’s more insistent support of American-Jewish self-reassessment and Zionist recognition of Palestinian suffering. Whereas earlier critical historiography had returned from Palestine, unable to secure either a livelihood or scholarly recognition from the host society, Myers set his sights on Los Angeles as a place of settlement and scholarly advancement. In this Myers parted ways over critical recognition which had sway over the American Jewish studies profession. Perhaps it was the perceived dialectical nature of liberal Zionism which appealed to Myers — that is, the simultaneous affirmation and critique of Jewish particularity. For, on one hand, liberal Zionism entailed a newly critical attitude towards the Zionist certainty that Myers’s teachers Shapira and Shavit held. On the other hand, it retained the commitment to Jewish peoplehood and Jewish state that marked Myers as an insider to the Jewish studies guild. In the process of self-education in the fields of Hebrew literature and general history, typically in centers where he visited (Paris, Moscow, Jerusalem), often happened to be of a German-Jewish historicist bent. From these people, books could be found, was usually a short distance, and Myers took full advantage of his acquaintances to pursue scholarly interests. Included in his curriculum were the study of Jewish historicism, the sociology of knowledge, and the politics of memory. He came across books of great interest, which he read midnight oil by. Myers would later represent the first volume of his scholarly research in this period in Re-Inventing the Jewish Past (Oxford, 1995).
Through Yerushalmi, Myers came across Karl Mannheim, whom Myers encountered in his graduate reading shortly before his immersion in German-Jewish historicism. As Myers relates it, Mannheim was ideal for the post-Wissenschaft moment, in that the student could benefit from the genre’s explanatory notes on important primary source material and still benefit from the analysis of preceding ideological commitments.
What is interesting about this method of critical-sympathetic recovery is not the novelty of it, but rather the motivation that lay behind it. To be sure, the gathering and annotation of primary source material as a pedagogic tool and a medium for scholarly investigation did not begin with Myers. He himself learned Jewish intellectual history through close textual analysis of primary sources in seminars at Tel Aviv and Columbia. Nonetheless, his own endeavor in compelling sources was informed by a special sense of mission related to his critical commitment.
The nature of this mission was first spelled out to Myers by Yerushalmi, whom Myers encountered in Morningside Heights shortly before his departure for Los Angeles and UCLA. As Myers relates it, Yerushalmi issued a call in 1985 to the enlightened Jewish populations to assist in the collection of Jewish voices lost to Zionist narrative closure. Myers responded by volunteering to compile sources which he came across while studying abroad. More than a quarter century later, Myers recalled Yerushalmi’s charge in the introduction to a collection of Zionist and proto-critical sources, The Faith of Fallen Jews: Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi and the Writing of Jewish History. Writing in 2014, Myers remembered that, to grasp the import of the critical turning point in Jewish history signaled by Yerushalmi’s Zakhor required a certain historical accounting, and to herald its triumph, recollections of prior Zionist-historiographical existence should not be excised; rather, they should be gathered and recorded for posterity.
Myers announces the guiding principle of his work in the introduction to Re-Inventing the Jewish Past: “The starting point of all work of critical recovery in our generation is critical sensibility.” It is important to recognize that “critical sensibility” in this context signifies neither a partisan agenda nor an impoverished or false state of consciousness; instead, Myers conceives of it as the reflection of a concrete historical force that has engendered a new (and healthy) perspective on the past. In the realm of scholarship, American liberal Jewish consciousness spawned a new era in which the crystallization of the critical-Zionist movement could be recorded more precisely, and critically, without the biases of previous chroniclers. Along with other historians in Los Angeles, Myers shared in the expectation that critical recovery, as a force capable of normalizing Jewish existence by restoring Jews to both their land and their humanity, could also normalize and make objective the writing of Jewish history.

IV

A quick perusal of the Myers bibliography reveals two distinct genres of historical writing represented. The first consists of monographs of varying length devoted to personalities and subjects of Jewish history, with a special emphasis on ideology. Re-Inventing the Jewish Past (1995) treats the founding generation of the Institute for Jewish Studies at Hebrew University: Dinur, Baer, Klausner, Scholem, Baron as contested figures. Resisting History (2003) treats Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Strauss, and Scholem as German-Jewish resisters of historicist closure. Between Jew and Arab (2008) recovers Simon Rawidowicz’s suppressed essay on Palestinian refugees, which Rawidowicz removed from Bavel vi-Yerushalayim under the pressures of the Israeli state-building moment. Jewish History: A Very Short Introduction (2017) offers a synthesis covering the full sweep. The Stakes of History (2018) reflects on the historian’s vocation. American Shtetl (2022), co-authored with Nomi Stolzenberg, treats Kiryas Joel, the Satmar village in upstate New York, as a case study in American religious pluralism.
The second genre, more commonly associated with Myers, consists of collections of documents and sources, whose aim is to bring to life the social and spiritual manifestations of Jewish existence in the American liberal diaspora. For Myers, this genre was ideal for pedagogic purposes, in that the student could benefit from the collection of primary sources. By anthologizing primary sources, Myers hoped to assemble actual textual fragments which related the course of Jewish liberal thought in America; implicit in this method was the desire to avoid Zionist-historiographical imprecision; the possible subjective pitfalls, even of such an accepted historiographical genre as narrative. This linear approach, which Myers designated as “critical recovery,” seems incomplete and at times common to all historians, yet especially pronounced in him.
Myers’s method contains a governing ideological architecture that critical sensibility itself cannot dissolve. Consider the subject-choice. Myers repeatedly rescues figures whose political ambivalence prefigures his own. Rawidowicz, diasporist, ambivalent Zionist, sympathetic to Palestinian refugees, who suppressed his own most sympathetic essay under Israeli state pressure, gets a full monograph. Rabbi Leonard Beerman, Los Angeles rabbi of the Jewish left, gets an edited volume. Rosenzweig, who resisted Zionist closure, gets sustained treatment. Dinur, who did not resist, gets critiqued. The rescue of the suppressed voice is the rescue of the voice whose politics match Myers’s.
Consider periodization. Myers’s implicit narrative of modern Jewish intellectual history runs from rigid Zionist closure (Dinur, Baer, Klausner, the Jerusalem School) through resistant German-Jewish alternatives (Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem’s ambivalences, Arendt) through post-1967 American Jewish critical recovery (Yerushalmi, Myers himself) to the culminating moment of liberal-Zionist self-criticism in which Myers lives and works. The periodization ends at Myers’s present. His own scholarly generation stands as the terminus ad quem toward which the whole narrative has pointed. Just as Dinur’s periodization ended at the 1948 founding of the State, Myers’s periodization ends at the founding of the Luskin Center, the Kindness Institute, the Initiative to Study Hate, and the Dialogue Across Difference Initiative — institutions Myers founded or directs.
Consider compilation. Myers’s edited volumes (The Jewish Past Revisited, Enlightenment and Diaspora: The Armenian and Jewish Cases, The Faith of Fallen Jews, The Eternal Dissident, Between Babylon and Jerusalem: Selected Writings of Simon Rawidowicz) anthologize figures and moments that serve the critical-recovery project. A Zionist compiler of the Dinur type selected texts demonstrating the continuous link between the people of Israel and the Land. A critical compiler of the Myers type selects texts demonstrating the suppressed pluralism and dissent within that coalition. Each compilation serves its coalition. Neither compilation escapes the ideological architecture the other exposes.
Consider the double allegiance. Myers’s work sits simultaneously inside the Jewish studies guild (with its Zionist institutional origins, its donor base, its American Jewish communal embeddedness) and inside the progressive critical-Zionist coalition (NIF, JQR, Luskin Center, Kindness Institute). The two allegiances pull in compatible but not identical directions. The guild protected Myers during the 2017 Center for Jewish History controversy when the ZOA and Bezalel Smotrich attacked his NIF ties. Jonathan Sarna and David Ellenson wrote that his work fell squarely within the scholarly mainstream and supported Israel’s basic right to exist. Hundreds of Jewish historians signed in support. The guild defended its own. The double allegiance held.

V

Our own attempts to understand Myers might be well served by the sociology of knowledge framework presented in the work of Karl Mannheim. In exploring the social construction of “ideology,” Mannheim recognized that “the specific character, perceptions, and interpretations of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions, and interpretations.” That is, one’s intellectual and cultural values take shape not in splendid isolation, but in reaction to, concrete historical circumstances which define the social milieu.
I have already suggested that Myers’s devotion to the critical cause can be traced to his formative environment. As the son of a Scranton Jewish family whose integration into American professional life was complete, Myers underwent a different kind of ideological transformation than that faced by urbanized Western and Central European Jews of the Wissenschaft generation, or even by urbanized Israeli Jews of Shapira’s generation. Assimilation, for Myers, meant neither loss of Jewish identity nor the Hebrew language as an exclusive way of life. It did not entail abandoning Jewish peoplehood. For, in combination, critical recovery yielded in Myers not a tortured and divided Jewish loyalty, but rather a singular commitment to explaining and upholding a liberal-Jewish American identity compatible with sophisticated critique of Israeli state policy. He saw as the unifying bond of American Jewish history: the attachment of the American Jew to simultaneous affiliation with the universalist American liberal project and the particularist Jewish people.
That this commitment represented both an affirmation of and rupture with Zionist existence was not only true for Myers, but for other American Jews who identified with the liberal-critical turn. However, for Myers, it was the very perspective afforded by critical historiography that set out to discover liberal-Zionist traces and precursors in every period of American Jewish history. Perhaps his single-mindedness was the result of a less ambivalent critical commitment than other scholars who were educated in a German milieu. Without question, he did have a remarkable range of knowledge in Jewish history, which was revealed in his annotated collections. Even Myers’s apparent obtuseness to the highly selective tendencies in his scholarly predecessors, as well as in his own research, he did not always acknowledge.
One of the most challenging tasks which modern Jewish historians have faced is balancing the forces of continuity and change in the Jewish past. Assuming this task has often led to a scholarly distinction between internal and external forces, between the inner spiritual will of the Jewish people and extraneous social pressures. It can be argued that this distinction reflects a sort of double allegiance on the historian’s part. On one hand, the historian is informed by the standards of critical historical method, and thus attempts to discover the source of Jewish identity without recourse to mystical or supernatural explanations. Consequently, he tries to define Jewish collective identity not only within a vacuum of internal Jewish development, but also as shaped by outside forces. This impulse draws from the professional standards of the critical historical discipline to which Jewish scholars assiduously hold. On the other hand, Jewish historians who, like Myers, are usually Jewish often hold to an a priori assumption of Jewish continuity. In that case, the Jewish historian’s research might fill an important existential function, proceeding deductively from the guiding principle of Jewish continuity, its traces spiritual and physical manifestations over the ages; this exploration, in turn, becomes an expression and affirmation of one’s intimate connection to the guiding principle. A possible ramification of this search is the tendency to concentrate interest and attention on the internal Jewish, as opposed to external social, forces.
It might be unfair to suggest that such a tendency dominates Myers’s research. Perhaps it is more appropriate to argue that the work of all historians, Jewish and non-Jewish, reveals ties to both professional and existential concerns. In any event, it seems clear that Myers’s work reflects a certain tension between the commitment to critical historical methodology and his Jewish-American world-view. His allegiance to the former did not always accommodate by his desire to reveal the unbroken bond between people and the land of Israel; ultimately, the role of external forces in Jewish history was subordinate to the inner Jewish will.
A quick perusal of Myers’s positions reveals the institutional embodiment of this ideology. UCLA Distinguished Professor. Sady and Ludwig Kahn Chair in Jewish History. Founding director of the Luskin Center for History and Policy. Director of the Bedari Kindness Institute. Director of the Initiative to Study Hate. Faculty director of the Dialogue Across Difference Initiative. Former Robert N. Burr Department Chair. Former Director of the UCLA Center for Jewish Studies (three terms). Former President/CEO of the Center for Jewish History in New York (2017-2018). President of the New Israel Fund Board (2018-2023). Co-editor of the Jewish Quarterly Review since 2002. Fellow of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Fellow of the Los Angeles Institute for the Humanities. Three-time fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies.
The institutional density matters. The scholar who builds kindness institutes, dialogue initiatives, and hate-studies centers institutionalizes the critical-liberal ideology his scholarship proposes. The institutions reproduce the ideology independent of his individual scholarly output. Dinur built the Hebrew University history department and became Minister of Education; his institutions reproduced Zionist historiographical closure. Myers has built a parallel institutional apparatus within UCLA; his institutions reproduce liberal-critical openness. Both sets of institutions embody the founders’ ideologies. Neither set is neutral.

VI

Though there has been a good deal of discussion among scholars regarding the transvaluation of religiously inspired messianism into secular forms, one must be cautious when analyzing Myers. After all, it is doubtful that he expected anything other than an end to American Jewish parochialism and cultural subjugation with the return to critical thought. Nonetheless, Myers’s vision, without an existential component of the broader liberal identity, is hardly comprehensible. He regarded the Kindness Institute, the Dialogue Across Difference Initiative, and the Initiative to Study Hate as continuous with his scholarly project. This impulse draws its teleological quality from Jewish prophetic tradition with its messianic hopes, and its sense of the importance of human catalysts. Myers maintained that redemption might take place in America, and might be advanced through the efforts of human actors. Moreover, his alignment with progressive Jewish causes throughout the ages was emblematic of expectations held by messianic activists throughout the ages. In Myers’s case, the critical movement was the long-awaited fulfillment of expectations held by Jewish liberals during their tenure in the American diaspora.
Present events thus served both the end and the validation of Jewish history hitherto. In this way, critical-historical interpretation functioned, as with medieval messianic activists, as an existential guide to past, present, and future.
It must be pointed out that Myers’s historical vision entailed a far more prosaic notion of causality than that found in traditional messianic belief, with the Divine Hand largely absent from his scheme; it is human agents, with their own historical agency, who determine the course and pace of events leading to ultimate redemption. And, as distinct from medieval activists, Myers expected neither a cataclysmic battle between the forces of good or evil, nor apparently a major theological reordering to attend redemption. The messianic structure remained nonetheless. The institutions of kindness, dialogue, and anti-hate study served as this-worldly vehicles for a redemptive project that carried the emotional valence of traditional messianic hope without its supernatural scaffolding.
Is there any value then in discussing Myers’s views in terms of messianism? One compelling reason to answer affirmatively is that those are the very terms in which Myers himself described the thread of “critical sensibility.” Indeed, for him, the primary stimulus for all critical recovery was the American Jewish incapacity to accept the consequences of exile from its homeland — and not, as earlier historians described, the ingrained messianic fervor of Zionist chroniclers. The revolt against American Jewish passivity thus lay at the core of Myers’s scholarship, whether in the case of the 1988 master’s essay on Dinur, the first-book critique of the Jerusalem School, the recovery of Rawidowicz’s Palestinian-refugee essay, or the 2022 treatment of Kiryas Joel as a case study in American Jewish pluralism. Myers believed that that which distinguished the critical-liberal movement from earlier critical-Jewish ones was the degree of realism accompanying them. On this point, he shared common ground with his colleague in Berlin, Eugen Taeubler. Both men saw the advent of organized critical activity as a powerful moment of realism in American Jewish history. However, an important difference separated the two men and their assessments of Zionism as a concrete historical force. Myers, like his teacher Yerushalmi, regarded the unceasing link between the socio-political dimension of Jewish identity and its followers as proof of an ongoing historical process. By contrast, Taeubler retained the category of messianism to describe the various incarnations of American Jewish liberalism in the modern period.
For Myers, traditional messianic belief, which could have been found in any instance, of the immigration to New York or Boston in 1900, marked the beginning of a more realistic course of critical activity.

VII

At the epochal moment of national reconstitution that has not yet arrived — or that arrived for Myers in the transformation of the American Jewish institutional landscape after 1967, 1973, 1982, 1993, and the fitful liberal-critical turn of subsequent decades — Myers’s personal aspirations and professional interests reached mutual fulfillment. He had committed his life to the creation of an independent American Jewish society in which critical scholarship could sit alongside Jewish communal commitment. Moreover, as evident in his various UCLA and governmental involvements, his entire pedagogic career had been dedicated to exposing the unceasing link between the American Jewish people and a sophisticated understanding of Jewish historical identity that allowed Palestinians humanity without forfeiting Jewish peoplehood. This governing objective did not drain Myers’s work of illuminating insights. His critical perspective did, indeed, open new vistas for critical research, by challenging the historicizing schemes and conceptual boundaries found in Jewish scholarship of the previous century. At the same time, it sensitized him to the importance of ideology in setting the mental frame of reference from which historians observed and wrote.
Thus, in depicting “Zionist ideology” as the culminating force of a teleological process, Myers was certain of its role in shaping the historical consciousness of his teachers. With this in mind, he was also aware of the overarching influence of his own ideology in molding his and others’ world-view. Yet, he was hardly attuned to the conceptual limitations imposed by his own liberal-Jewish American consciousness.
Our own attempts to understand Myers might be well served by the sociology of knowledge framework presented in the work of Karl Mannheim. Myers himself used the same framework to discipline Dinur. The scholar who exposes his teachers’ ideology stands within an ideology of his own, whose water he does not see because he swims in it. Myers saw Dinur’s ideology because by 1988 Dinur’s ideology had become visible to the American Jewish studies guild — its closures had become embarrassments. Myers does not see his own ideology because in 2026 his ideology remains the operative consensus of the guild in which he moves.
Supported by Myers’s conscious aim “to revive the Covenant of generations” through critical Jewish recovery, we should understand his collecting work as an ideological labor. He unabashedly pushed the subjective dimension of historical interpretation (common to all historians) to the limits of its constructive potential — in the service of American liberal Zionism. Ultimately, the value of such a conclusion lies neither in disdaining his methodological simplicity, nor in condemning the substance of his ideological motivation. Rather, Myers’s work offers us a good opportunity for exploring the relationship between historical observation and ideological predisposition against the backdrop of the American Jewish redefinition of Jewish identity. It also forces us to question whether this relationship is reflective of a double allegiance, to progressive American liberalism and to traditional Jewish sensibilities, which attends not only critical historiography but Jewish historiography at large.

Posted in David N. Myers | Comments Off on History as Ideology: The Case of David N. Myers, Critical-Zionist Historian Par Excellence

‘The Jewish Stake in America’s Changing Demography’

In this 2001 essay, Stephen Steinlight got the direction right on most predictions and the timing wrong on almost all of them.
He predicted Muslims would surpass American Jews in population within twenty years. They have not. The American Jewish population sits near 7.5 million. The American Muslim population sits somewhere between 3.5 and 4.5 million, depending on methodology. Pew’s 2017 projection put parity closer to 2040 than 2021. His demographic alarm ran ahead of his data.
He predicted the Latino political giant would wake and overwhelm Jewish political influence. It woke partly. The 2024 election saw a sharp Latino move toward Trump, which complicates the assumption that Latino voters function as a unified bloc hostile to Jewish interests. Naturalization surged, as he warned, but produced a politically heterogeneous electorate his essay did not anticipate.
He predicted Mexican immigration would keep doubling by decade. That curve flattened. Net Mexican migration turned negative in some years after 2008. Central American and Venezuelan migration replaced it as the primary southern border pressure. His Reconquista framing captured a real anxiety and missed the actual shape that emerged.
On Islamism he was more right than wrong. He wrote weeks after the towers fell and warned that Islamist political organizations in the United States would keep functioning as domestic lobbies while claiming victim status. CAIR, MPAC, and the American Muslim Council remain active. The October 7 attack and the American campus response to it vindicated his specific concern that Muslim-American political organizations would mobilize against Israel in ways Jewish organizations were unprepared to meet. The anti-Zionist energy on elite campuses after October 7 reads as a direct fulfillment of his warning about ideological transfer from homeland conflicts into American civic space.
On Jewish political power his timing was off but his trajectory held. The Senate had ten Jewish members when he wrote. It has about half that now and the number keeps falling. Jewish donors remain influential but the rise of online small-donor fundraising has weakened the specific structural advantage he named. The “high noon” he described reads now like late afternoon.
Where he was flatly wrong is on Muslim assimilation. He worried that Muslim immigrants would resist Americanization under pressure from homeland politics and communal enforcement. The Muslim-American community has produced a large visible secular and semi-secular middle class with high intermarriage rates and consumer patterns indistinguishable from other professional-class Americans. MTV won, as he half-predicted in his closing passage. He underestimated how completely.
The essay missed entirely the split that would open among American Jews themselves. Steinlight wrote as if the organized Jewish community could still be addressed as a coalition with shared strategic interests. That coalition fractured. The Jewish left and the Jewish right now operate as separate political formations with non-overlapping positions on Israel, immigration, and American identity. His “stop being sleepwalkers” appeal assumed an audience that still cohered. That audience no longer exists as a single body.
The essay also did not see that its own argument might be absorbed by the restrictionist right on terms Steinlight might have found uncomfortable. Tucker Carlson, Ann Coulter, and the post-2016 immigration-skeptical conservative establishment now cite Jewish restrictionists and Jewish establishment support for high immigration inside a single framework that treats American Jewish political behavior as part of the problem. Steinlight wrote to persuade Jewish organizations to support immigration reform. A quarter century later the argument he helped legitimize gets used to indict those same organizations for bad faith.
His coalition analysis of his own community holds up best. He mapped four tensions inside American Jewish institutional thinking on immigration: Holocaust memory that supplied moral legitimacy for open borders, Israel interest that required restricting Muslim immigration, domestic civil rights coalition commitments that required permissive immigration rhetoric, and demographic self-interest that pointed toward restriction. Those tensions remain unresolved. The essay still maps them cleanly.
The voice dates more than the arguments. The paragraph comparing his Jewish summer camp training to what he decries in Black nationalism carries the confessional candor that Jewish liberal writers produced in the 1990s and almost never produce now. The current climate penalizes that register of self-implication. His essay retains the capacity to make his own coalition uncomfortable, which is the test of whether a piece of this kind did its work.
The weakest section is the closing. He hedges his way into optimism about Muslim assimilation after eight thousand words of alarm. He writes that young immigrants will probably choose individual freedom over traditional authority, then concedes the outcome is “hardly a certainty.” The hedge reads as a man who wants to end on a hopeful note because his own argument has frightened him. The essay is stronger with the last three paragraphs removed.

Posted in Stephen Steinlight | Comments Off on ‘The Jewish Stake in America’s Changing Demography’

The Coalition Will See You Now

SCENE: A Manhattan study, lined with sefarim. A RABBI sits at a desk, wearing a dark suit and kippah. A small bust of Lincoln sits prominently on the shelf. He is mid-sentence, speaking to camera.
RABBI: As Lincoln said in his Second Inaugural, and as the prophet Isaiah said before him, and as my great-uncle the Rav said after both of them, and as I am saying right now in a way that connects all three—
[A LOUD KNOCK]
RABBI: —the American experiment is a Hebraic—
[DONOR bursts in wearing a tuxedo]
DONOR: Rabbi! Quick question. Is the Republican Party good for the Jews?
RABBI: That’s a profound question that requires—
DONOR: Yes or no.
RABBI: —a textured engagement with—
DONOR: Rabbi.
RABBI: —the prophetic tradition—
DONOR: RABBI.
RABBI: Yes.
DONOR: Excellent. [Writes a check] For the Center.
[DONOR exits. A SECOND KNOCK. A BISHOP enters.]
BISHOP: Rabbi, we Catholics would love your thoughts on whether Jews and Christians share a common heritage.
RABBI: A magnificent question. In my forthcoming essay for First Things—
BISHOP: Do we?
RABBI: Share—
BISHOP: A common heritage.
RABBI: Yes.
BISHOP: Wonderful. [Exits]
[A THIRD KNOCK. A YESHIVA STUDENT enters holding a Gemara.]
STUDENT: Rabbi, the Documentary Hypothesis. Wellhausen. Friedman. The archaeological evidence for a late composition of the Pentateuch. How do we—
RABBI: I have a meeting.
STUDENT: You don’t have a meeting.
RABBI: The Straus Center has a meeting.
STUDENT: But—
RABBI: Have you considered what Lincoln said about—
STUDENT: LINCOLN DIDN’T WRITE THE TORAH.
[The student is gently escorted out by an unseen hand. A FOURTH KNOCK.]
REPORTER: Rabbi, about the convention prayer—
RABBI: A ceremonial blessing in the tradition of—
REPORTER: —do you endorse—
RABBI: —Washington’s letter to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport—
REPORTER: —the candidate?
RABBI: —which itself echoed Micah—
REPORTER: Sir—
RABBI: —every man under his vine and fig tree—
REPORTER: Sir—
RABBI: —and none shall make him afraid.
REPORTER: So that’s a yes?
RABBI: That’s a textured engagement.
[REPORTER exits, confused. A FIFTH KNOCK. It is a YOUNG RABBI, bright-eyed.]
YOUNG RABBI: Rebbe! I want to write seriously about the crisis in Modern Orthodoxy. The demographic collapse. The Haredi pressure. The intermarriage numbers outside the day school system. The—
RABBI: Have you considered Lincoln?
YOUNG RABBI: What?
RABBI: Lincoln had many crises.
YOUNG RABBI: I’m talking about our community—
RABBI: And yet he quoted the Psalms.
YOUNG RABBI: Rebbe, I want to write what’s true.
RABBI: [Long pause. Looks at the bust of Lincoln. Looks at camera.] My son. The truth is a coalition.
YOUNG RABBI: That’s not—
RABBI: And the coalition is the truth.
YOUNG RABBI: Rebbe, that’s circular—
RABBI: As Lincoln said—
YOUNG RABBI: LINCOLN WASN’T JEWISH.
RABBI: [Placing hand gently on Young Rabbi’s shoulder] That is precisely why we must claim him.
[A SIXTH KNOCK. The DEAN enters.]
DEAN: Rabbi, the donor from before has a friend. Also Republican. Also rich. Also wants to know—
RABBI: Yes.
DEAN: I haven’t asked the question yet.
RABBI: Yes to the question.
DEAN: Wonderful. [Exits]
[The YOUNG RABBI stares at the older man.]
YOUNG RABBI: Is this what it means to be a public intellectual?
RABBI: [Gazing wistfully out the window] My boy. Once, long ago, I wrote a dissertation. It had arguments. It had footnotes. It engaged Rosenzweig.
YOUNG RABBI: What happened?
RABBI: [A single tear] Princeton.
YOUNG RABBI: And then?
RABBI: [Whispering] Commentary.
YOUNG RABBI: And then?
RABBI: [Barely audible] The podcast.
YOUNG RABBI: Rebbe—
RABBI: [Snapping back, cheerful] But as Lincoln said, and as the prophet Amos said, and as my great-uncle said, and as I am saying now in a way that connects—
[Cut to GRAHAM CHAPMAN as a British Army officer]
CHAPMAN: Right, stop that. This is getting far too coalitional. Nobody’s following an argument all the way through. I want a sketch where someone actually breaks with his donor base.
[A figure in the background, who has been quietly reading Leibowitz, looks up hopefully]
LEIBOWITZ-READER: Finally—
CHAPMAN: Not you. You’re too depressing.
LEIBOWITZ-READER: [Resigned] Back to the margins.
[CHAPMAN turns to camera]
CHAPMAN: And now for something completely different. A rabbi who actually answers a question.
[Long silence. The camera pans across an empty study. A tumbleweed rolls through. After thirty seconds, a title card appears:]
“THIS SKETCH COULD NOT BE COMPLETED DUE TO COALITION CONSTRAINTS”
[END]

Posted in Modern Orthodox | Comments Off on The Coalition Will See You Now

Platform, Pulpit, Archive: Three Models of MO Rabbinic Self-Presentation in Los Angeles

While surfing Rabbi Pini Dunner’s website, I learned:

Mavericks, Mystics and False Messiahs

NOW AVAILABLE!

“A thoroughly engaging introduction to some of the most colorful episodes in Jewish history. A wonderfully enjoyable read.”
– Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks

“Rabbi Pini Dunner is among the most thoughtful and articulate voices of Centrist Orthodoxy today.”
Allen Fagin, Orthodox Union

“One of the most vibrant voices of our time is the voice of Rabbi Pini. His is a voice that speaks to the heart and to the head.”
Robert Davi, Hollywood Actor

Rabbi Dunner’s expertise spans the worlds of academia, media, business, and the timeless wisdom of Judaism. His articles on current affairs, history, Bible, Talmud, philosophy, politics, and a host of other subjects, frequently appear in newspapers and journals, and he is regularly called upon to address diverse audiences across the United States on a range of topics.

Rabbi Dunner campaigns tirelessly for numerous U.S. based and Israeli charitable causes from his home in Beverly Hills.

Rabbi Dunner is a published author, exploring some of the most curious and controversial Jewish figures of the last three centuries in the brand new book “Mavericks, Mystics & False Messiahs.”
The volume considers how these individuals impacted their communities and Judaism as a whole in ways that continue to reverberate within Jewish life today.

Rabbi Dunner is widely renowned for his teaching style, and has been described as “passionate” and “charismatic”. His classes and lectures on a vast range of topics have become world renowned, broadcast to vast audiences in print, audio and video.

Every Modern Orthodox rabbi in Los Angeles with a website faces the same bargain. He needs visibility to hold donors, congregants, and peers. He needs restraint to pass as a servant of Torah rather than a personal brand. Mesorah condemns cultivation of personal kavod. The attention economy rewards that cultivation. Each site marks where a rabbi has settled the tension.
The landscape divides into three camps. Rabbi Pini Dunner stands alone at one pole with rabbidunner.com, a rabbi-first platform where biography, lineage, and media presence take the front page. Rabbi Yitzchak Etshalom sits at the other pole with etshalom.com, an archive where the teacher nearly disappears behind his audio files and Tanakh analyses. Between them cluster the institutional sites of B’nai David-Judea, Beth Jacob, Young Israel of Century City, and Beverly Hills Synagogue. These host their rabbis inside congregational structures. The rabbi speaks from a pulpit, not a platform.
The four coalition questions tell the story. Dunner relies for status and income on Young Israel of North Beverly Hills, the donor class that orbits it, the broader Modern Orthodox intellectual public, and the interfaith and pro-Israel advocacy networks he sits near. He needs to attract a national audience of educated Orthodox readers, curious outsiders, political allies, and media gatekeepers. Membership in his coalition requires Centrist Orthodox legitimacy, cultural fluency, historical seriousness, Israel commitment, and suspicion of both Haredi insularity and liberal drift. If he broke position, he might lose the donor class, the speaking circuit, the book market, and the bridge role he occupies between Orthodoxy and the broader American scene.
The site reflects those answers. The homepage also showcases his April 2026 essays on Parshat Tazria-Metzora and Parshat Acharei Mot, which apply Torah to Holocaust memory, Zionism, and the collapse of denial as a national condition. Every element builds a portable authority that travels beyond shul walls.
Portability is the first key to the Dunner model. His intellectual asset moves with him. If he leaves Young Israel of North Beverly Hills tomorrow, rabbidunner.com goes with him, the essay archive travels, the book royalties continue, the speaking invitations arrive at the same inbox. The institutional rabbi carries a different balance sheet. If Kanefsky leaves B’nai David-Judea, the drashot archive stays on the shul server, the congregants stay with the next hire, the speaking circuit thins because the platform was institutional. The institutional rabbi trades portability for protection. Dunner trades protection for portability. The trade matters most for rabbis who expect to move, to write more books, to outlive a pulpit, or to speak nationally. LA rewards portability more than New York does because LA institutional depth is thinner and synagogue economies more fluid.
The institutional rabbis work under different constraints. Rabbi Yosef Kanefsky at B’nai David-Judea, Rabbi Kalman Topp at Beth Jacob, and Rabbi Elazar Muskin at Young Israel of Century City rely on the congregations that employ them, the lay boards that hire and fire, and the Rabbinical Council of America that certifies them. They need to attract the community in Pico-Robertson or Beverly Hills that fills the seats. Membership in their coalition requires halachic integrity, communal loyalty, modest intellectual engagement, and mainstream Zionism. If they shifted position, they might lose pulpits, salaries, and the trust of the lay leadership.
The institutional sites match those constraints. The rabbi appears, but the synagogue takes the front page. Classes, Shabbaton schedules, youth programs, kiddush sponsors. The rabbi becomes the face of an institution rather than the institution. The arrangement protects him from the mesorah charge of self-promotion. It also caps his reach and pins his legacy to a building he does not own.
Etshalom stands outside the synagogue economy. He teaches in high schools. He publishes Tanakh methodology. His coalition is narrow: serious students, textual scholars, the Modern Orthodox intellectual network that prizes close reading over inspirational drashot. Membership requires technical competence. He might lose little that depends on the site. His authority flows from the classroom and the printed book. The website is overflow.
That shows in the design. Etshalom.com looks built in 2009 because it was. The copyright date remains. The homepage lists audio files with their sizes in megabytes next to each title. No hero banner. No testimonials. No calls to action beyond download or buy a CD. The biography is minimal. The texts take the stage.
The Sacks prototype explains why the Dunner model exists at all. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks normalized the idea that an Orthodox rabbi could run a global intellectual brand without losing halachic legitimacy. The books, the Times of London column, the Chief Rabbi’s office, the lectures at secular universities. Sacks proved a rabbi could speak to the broader culture from a recognizably Orthodox position and retain standing in both worlds. Dunner’s endorsement from Sacks on Mavericks is not only a testimonial. It is a transfer of permission. The senior figure ratifies the junior figure’s mode of operation. Every Modern Orthodox rabbi now moving toward the platform model, in LA or elsewhere, is downstream of the permission Sacks granted. Dunner operates a scaled-down, American pulpit version of the Sacks model. Without the prototype, the copy would not pass the peer test.
Stephen Turner on tacit knowledge lights up the landscape. Every LA Orthodox rabbi knows, without needing to be told, what a rabbi should look like online. The institutional model is the tacit consensus. Foregrounding personality triggers peer unease. Peers do not say this out loud. They read rabbidunner.com and note, in private conversation or in their own design choices, that this one feels different. Dunner has broken the tacit rule on purpose. Etshalom has broken it in the opposite direction.
Each site embodies a hero system in Ernest Becker’s sense. The institutional rabbi is a steward-hero who maintains the structure his predecessors built. His site reflects the continuity of the shul. The archive rabbi is a scholar-hero, a vehicle for the text. His site lets the Torah speak without him in the frame. Dunner is a sage-communicator-hero, a bridge between the ancient tradition and the contemporary world. His site foregrounds his capacity to translate. Each hero system requires a different performance. Each site gives the performance a stage.
Robert Trivers on self-deception explains a subtle pattern. Every rabbi claims his work serves Torah alone. The sites differ in how transparently they admit the reach motive. Dunner’s site is closer to honest about operating inside the modern attention economy. It admits that personality carries content where attention is scarce. The institutional sites maintain a softer fiction. They frame the rabbi as incidental to the shul, even as the shul depends on a charismatic hire to fill seats. Etshalom’s site comes closest to opting out of the attention economy. It barely markets anything.
Jeffrey Alexander’s cultural trauma framework exposes another asymmetry. Dunner leans on his parents’ Holocaust survival. That biography appears on the front page. It does work. It signals lineage, moral seriousness, and continuity with a people that lost six million. Other LA rabbis carry similar inheritances. Few foreground them. The question of when a trauma may be cited for authority and when citation risks exploitation is a live tension in the community. Dunner cites. Most do not.
David Pinsof’s alliance theory explains the crowded middle. Most LA Modern Orthodox rabbis choose the institutional route because it minimizes coalition risk. A shul-hosted rabbi has a clear alliance: the congregation that pays him. He does not have to manage a national audience with competing loyalties. He does not have to satisfy donors outside his membership rolls. His moral vocabulary stays local. The safe play protects him from the vertigo of platform life.
Dunner takes the risky play. The platform rabbi has broader reach but weaker defenses. If he says something a major donor dislikes, he has no bishop above him to absorb the blow. If he offends a peer, he cannot hide inside a committee. The tradeoff is structural. Reach for protection. Visibility for safety.
Randall Collins on interaction ritual chains sharpens the picture. The institutional sites exist to support a weekly ritual: the Shabbat service, the Tuesday night shiur, the Sunday morning breakfast. They are schedules dressed up as websites. The emotional energy produced sits inside the shul. The site is an appendix. Dunner’s site tries to produce interaction ritual chains at a distance. The reader absorbs an essay, watches a lecture, attends a livestream. The emotional energy travels through solo media consumption. This is a different ritual structure. It carries different risks of dilution and different payoffs in reach.
The Haredi and Chabad rabbis of LA barely appear in this landscape. Their websites, where they exist, look closer to the Etshalom model or remain absent. Their coalitions reward textual transmission and shlichus reports, not personal branding. The Modern Orthodox space is where the platform tension shows because Modern Orthodox rabbis meet the attention economy head-on. They serve congregants who read the same New York Times as their secular neighbors. They compete for time with podcasts and streaming. Dunner represents the furthest Modern Orthodox response to the competition. The institutional rabbis represent the median response. Etshalom represents refusal.
The regional comparison sharpens the local picture. New York sets a baseline that looks institutional on the surface. Lincoln Square Synagogue, the Jewish Center, Kehilath Jeshurun, Congregation Rinat Yisrael. These sites place the shul first and the rabbi inside the structure. The New York intellectual rabbis who run national profiles do so through institutional channels rather than personal domains. Rabbi Meir Soloveichik writes for Commentary and First Things and runs the YU Straus Center. Rabbi Shalom Carmy publishes in Tradition. Rabbi J.J. Schacter lectures through YU. Rabbi Hershel Schachter’s shiurim live on YUTorah. Rabbi Yitzchok Adlerstein writes at Cross-Currents. Rabbi Gil Student runs Torah Musings as a multi-author platform. The drift is toward collective infrastructure. The institution carries the voice.
The surface reading is that New York stays institutional while LA permits platforms. The deeper reading is that New York is already importing platform functions without platform aesthetics. Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in Boca Raton runs a high-production personal site that operates almost independently of his shul. Rabbi Benjamin Blech runs a domain built for book sales and media appearances. Rabbi Dov Linzer at Yeshivat Chovevei Torah runs public halachic Q&A across podcasts and video. Rabbi Shalom Rosner distributes shiurim globally to English-speaking audiences. The content scales. The branding lags. New York rabbis do the work of the platform without the self-presentation of the platform, because peer scrutiny in the dense New York market punishes aesthetic self-promotion more than it punishes content distribution. The aesthetic lag is the local adaptation.
This reframes Dunner’s distinctiveness. He is not ahead of New York on content volume. Linzer, Rosner, and Goldberg produce more at greater scale. Dunner is ahead on the integration of content with personal narrative and visual branding. That integration is what LA permits and New York still resists. The New York status economy rewards learning, lineage, and institutional position. The LA status economy rewards communication, visibility, and donor relationships. A New York rabbi who leans into personal branding loses standing with his rabbinic peers. An LA rabbi who does the same gains standing with his donor base. The peer structure polices different things in different cities.
Yeshivat Chovevei Torah is the pipeline that will change this. YCT explicitly trains rabbis in communication, leadership, and public engagement. No previous yeshiva made that training central. The graduates carry the platform instinct into whatever pulpit they take. Over the next generation this shifts the baseline. Rabbis who take institutional posts will run personal Substacks, podcasts, and domains alongside the shul site. The New York equilibrium erodes from the supply side, not just the demand side. The training creates platform rabbis even where the local market would not have demanded them.
The LA differences track measurable local conditions. The geography scatters the Orthodox community across Pico-Robertson, Beverly Hills, Hancock Park, the Valley, and the Westside. Shuls compete less through proximity and more through distinct identity. A rabbi with a strong personal voice draws across neighborhoods in a way a New York rabbi cannot, because the New York rabbi’s members walk to shul and the LA rabbi’s members drive. Drive-in congregations reward distinctive rabbinic branding because the congregant chooses the rabbi, not the closest minyan.
The entertainment and media economy of LA normalizes personal platforms. A city where every neighbor has a website, a podcast, a YouTube channel, or an IMDb page lowers the cultural friction against a rabbi doing the same. The New York rabbi competes with lawyers and bankers who stay institutionally anchored. The LA rabbi competes with directors and showrunners who build personal brands as a condition of employment. The surrounding norm shifts what looks acceptable.
The donor profile tilts the same way. LA Orthodox wealth includes many entertainment and real estate figures who understand media logic. They expect their rabbi to operate as a public intellectual because public intellectuals are legible to them. The New York Orthodox donor base includes more finance professionals who expect institutional governance and committee structure. The legibility preference shapes what rabbis are rewarded for building.
The historical thinness of LA Modern Orthodoxy matters too. The community lacks the multi-generational institutional depth of New York. Flagship shuls are newer. Rabbinic authority runs more through the individual and less through the chain of predecessors. That gap invites personality to fill the space that inherited institutional weight would fill elsewhere. Dunner can be the face of his shul because the shul does not yet have a century of prior faces behind it.
The competitors for the congregant’s attention outside the tradition sharpen the picture further. The Modern Orthodox rabbi in LA competes for the slot reserved for meaning, guidance, and authoritative interpretation of how to live. The therapist and clinical psychologist compete for the pastoral function. When a congregant faces a marriage in trouble, a child in crisis, a parent’s death, or a drift into depression, the therapist is the rabbi’s closest substitute. Beverly Hills and Westside therapy practices serve the same demographic that fills Orthodox pews. Their websites follow a template. A clean headshot. Credentials prominently listed, the PhD or PsyD, the state license number, the institutional affiliations. A short statement of approach naming CBT, EMDR, psychodynamic, or Internal Family Systems. Fees and insurance. A contact form.
The therapist’s site is confident about the ground of authority. The credential does the work. The person behind the site does not need to establish lineage or narrate a calling. The license covers it. Dunner’s site must do something the therapist’s site does not: manufacture authority outside a state-sanctioned credential. This is why lineage, endorsements, and book appear so prominently on rabbidunner.com. The rabbi has no PsyD to rest on. He builds authority through pedigree, testimonial, and demonstrated intellectual output. The therapist builds it through a wall of framed diplomas behind the chair.
The life coach, the executive coach, and the wellness figure compete for the aspirational slot. Tony Robbins runs the national template. Locally, Gabrielle Bernstein, Marianne Williamson, and a thousand lesser lights sell clarity, meaning, and direction. Their websites foreground the person. A video of the coach on stage speaking to an audience. Client testimonials with photos. A book or program for sale. A funnel toward coaching packages, courses, or retreats. The credential is the success of past clients.
Dunner’s site shares DNA with the coaching site. The testimonials from Sacks and Allen Fagin function the way client testimonials function on a coach’s page. The book occupies the same hero position. The implicit pitch is the same: spend time with this person and your thinking will improve. The coach promises life change. Dunner promises Torah insight. The coach’s authority is self-made. Dunner’s authority is inherited and institutional. The web grammar overlaps more than either party might admit.
The yoga teacher, the meditation instructor, and the spiritual guide compete for the contemplative slot. LA is the American capital of this industry. The Kabbalah Centre, Agape International Spiritual Center under Michael Beckwith, the various Buddhist sanghas, the yoga studios from Wanderlust to smaller neighborhood operations. Their websites lean on aesthetic rather than credential. Soft photography, natural light, lots of white space. The teacher’s biography emphasizes a transformation narrative, a journey from suffering to peace. Class schedules sit at the center.
The Happy Minyan comes closest to this aesthetic among LA Orthodox sites. Most Modern Orthodox sites stay far from this register because the tradition distrusts the aesthetic capture of religious feeling. Dunner does not compete in this lane. His site is denser, wordier, more argumentative. He competes for the congregant who wants to think, not the congregant who wants to feel.
The Jewish outreach figure is the closest intra-tradition competitor. Chabad shluchim run this space with enormous effectiveness. Their websites, coordinated through Chabad.org and the local templates, foreground warmth, accessibility, and the Rebbe’s image. The local shliach’s biography is short and service-oriented. The site sells presence, not intellect. Come to the Shabbat dinner. The rabbi will welcome you. Aish HaTorah and Ohr Somayach operate similar templates with slightly different branding.
Dunner competes indirectly with Chabad. The Chabad shliach in Beverly Hills or Bel Air draws the same demographic Dunner draws. But the Chabad model is self-effacing. The rabbi is a vehicle for the Rebbe. The personal platform is subordinate to the movement. Dunner has no Rebbe above him. His authority does not route through a movement. He stands on his own. This is structurally harder and explains why his site must do more work.
The public intellectual and the podcaster compete for the attention slot. Ben Shapiro, Dennis Prager, Rabbi David Wolpe, Bari Weiss, Dave Rubin, and Dan Senor operate in overlapping space. Their platforms emphasize media output. Podcast episodes, video clips, newsletter subscriptions, speaking schedules. Prager ran a daily radio show for decades and built PragerU around video content. Wolpe at Sinai Temple runs a parallel track within Judaism, with books, lectures, and a media presence that foregrounds his personality. Dunner’s site shares structural features with this category but operates at smaller scale and with tighter doctrinal constraints. Prager can say anything on air. Dunner must stay within halachic and communal bounds. The content is slower, denser, more historical.
The deepest structural difference between rabbinic sites and secular competitor sites is the archive-versus-funnel split. The secular competitor builds a funnel. The subscriber becomes the customer becomes the program participant becomes the retreat attendee. The funnel treats the new as replacing the old. The coach’s 2018 content drifts off the site as the 2026 offerings take over. The rabbi builds an archive. Essays and shiurim from five years ago sit alongside this week’s. The archive treats the new as accumulating on the old. This reflects a claim about Torah: insight does not expire. The competitor’s business model requires obsolescence. The rabbi’s business model resists it. Dunner’s innovation is that he runs archive content through funnel packaging and hopes the combination holds. Pure funnel betrays the tradition. Pure archive loses the audience. The hybrid is his actual bet.
Every secular competitor either has a credential that does the work of authority or visible market success. The Modern Orthodox rabbi has neither a state license nor market-visible client metrics. He has a tradition, an institution, a congregation, and a body of learning. His website must make those invisible goods legible to a public trained on credentials and market signals. The therapist shows diplomas. The coach shows testimonials and program pricing. The yoga teacher shows class schedules and aesthetics. The podcaster shows episode counts and download numbers. The rabbi shows lineage, a shul, a book, and essays. The metrics do not translate.
Dunner’s site leans furthest toward the coach and podcaster template among LA Orthodox rabbis. That choice reaches a wider audience and risks the charge that he has imported secular authority logic into a role that traditionally resisted it. The institutional shul site resists the import but pays in reach. Etshalom refuses the import entirely and pays in visibility.
Every model defends from the inside. The institutional rabbi sees Dunner as risky. Dunner sees the institutional rabbi as invisible. Etshalom may see both as distractions from the text. None of these readings is wrong from the reader’s vantage. Each site optimizes for a different coalition. Each signals loyalty to a different hero system. Each buys reach or humility at the expense of the other good.
The mesorah does not resolve the tension. It warns against self-promotion and demands transmission of Torah. The two commands point in opposite directions under modern conditions. A rabbi who refuses visibility preserves humility and loses students. A rabbi who embraces visibility reaches students and risks ego. Every LA Orthodox website is an answer to that problem, and the pattern of answers maps the community’s fault line about how to carry Torah through the attention age.
The prediction is convergence. The next decade brings LA aesthetics to New York as YCT graduates take more pulpits and as peer tolerance for personal branding erodes under the weight of observed examples. LA institutional rabbis start experimenting with personal domains alongside shul sites. The two models meet in the middle. Etshalom-style refusal becomes rarer. The platform rabbi, carrying archive content through funnel packaging under the permission Sacks granted and the training YCT now provides, becomes the default Modern Orthodox mode in America by the mid-2030s. Dunner will look less like an outlier in retrospect and more like an early adopter of what the community was going to become anyway.
At first glance, there’s nearly zero content on these rabbinic websites arguing that Orthodox Judaism is true.
The websites assume the reader already accepts the frame. Rabbidunner.com does not argue that Torah is divine. Etshalom.com does not defend the proposition that the Tanakh is the word of God. B’nai David-Judea and Beth Jacob do not open with an apologetic for Orthodox Judaism over Conservative or Reform or secular alternatives. The classes, the drashot, the shiurim, the essays all proceed from within the system. The reader who lands on the site is treated as someone who either belongs or is sympathetic enough to listen.

This is an epistemic posture with long roots.

The Orthodox rabbinic tradition does not treat belief as the output of argument. It treats belief as the output of membership. A man raised in the community, educated in the schools, married into the families, living the calendar, keeping the kitchen, walking to shul on Shabbat, absorbing the tacit knowledge Turner would recognize, arrives at belief through formation rather than through persuasion. The website reflects that order. Live the life and the beliefs follow. Argue the beliefs in abstract and nothing follows.

This is why the apologetic tradition in Orthodoxy is thin compared to Evangelical Protestantism. The Evangelicals, especially American Evangelicals, staff entire ministries devoted to proving Christianity. William Lane Craig, Ravi Zacharias in his day, Lee Strobel, the Cold Case Christianity people, the Stand to Reason organization. They hold public debates, run apologetics conferences, publish books arguing for the resurrection as a historical event. The Evangelical website often opens with evidence for the faith because Evangelicalism is a convert-seeking religion that must win every generation anew. Orthodox Judaism does not seek converts. It seeks to hold the children of members. The epistemics follow from that social structure.

Where Orthodox apologetics do exist, they cluster in specific institutions aimed at specific audiences. Aish HaTorah runs discovery seminars aimed at unaffiliated Jews, with material on Torah codes, the Kuzari argument, and the chain of tradition. Ohr Somayach runs similar material for baalei teshuvah. Chabad has its own literature. Rabbi Lawrence Kelemen wrote Permission to Believe and Permission to Receive, books built around the Kuzari argument and the improbability of national revelation being fabricated. Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb at Ohr Somayach argues similar ground in more academic registers. Rabbi Moshe Averick wrote a book on atheism. Sacks argued for the reasonableness of faith in The Great Partnership and other works. The apologetic tradition exists but sits at the kiruv-facing periphery of the community, not at its center.

The pulpit rabbis in LA do not do this work on their sites. Dunner does not defend Orthodox Judaism against secular or liberal Jewish alternatives. His essays assume the reader finds Torah interesting and goes from there. Kanefsky argues inside halacha about how to apply it. He does not argue for the authority of halacha. Muskin teaches within the tradition. Topp leads prayer and study within the tradition. The websites treat the question of whether the tradition is true as settled or as outside the website’s jurisdiction.

Several factors explain this. The first is the audience. The pulpit rabbi writes for members and for the broader Orthodox public that might read him. That audience has already bought in. Apologetics would feel odd, like a tenured professor publishing a syllabus arguing that the subject he teaches is worth teaching. The second factor is the tacit knowledge point. Orthodox Jews know what it feels like to be Orthodox. The embodied knowledge of keeping kosher, keeping Shabbat, davening three times a day, learning Torah with a chavruta, raising children in the system. This knowledge does not translate into propositions. Arguing for Orthodoxy in the register of propositions leaves the strongest evidence on the cutting room floor.

The third factor is the Maimonidean inheritance. Rambam codified thirteen principles of faith but placed them inside a legal and philosophical framework where the obligation was to know God, not to prove God to outsiders. The medieval and early modern tradition developed further philosophical work, from Yehuda Halevi’s Kuzari through Crescas and Albo and into the Maharal, but the philosophical apparatus was always oriented toward clarification of what the faithful already accepted, not toward persuasion of the unpersuaded. Orthodox epistemics treat reason as a servant of revelation rather than a judge over it. The websites inherit that settlement.

The fourth factor is the historical caution about engaging too directly with skeptical argument. The community learned over centuries that opening the question of foundational truth in public forums leads to loss rather than gain. Shabbetai Zvi broke coalitions. Spinoza broke coalitions. The Haskalah broke coalitions. The Reform movement broke coalitions. Each time Orthodox authority engaged the skeptic directly, the engagement drew some members out rather than pulling skeptics in. The tacit lesson is that public argument is the wrong forum. The right forum is the yeshiva, the Shabbat table, the chavruta, the private conversation. The website, as a public forum open to anyone, is the wrong place to stage the question.

Orthodoxy is not anti-intellectual. The tradition produces immense intellectual work, more than most religious traditions in the world per capita. But the intellectual work runs inside the tradition rather than justifying it. A Talmudic sugya can be argued with ferocious rigor. The authority of the Talmud itself sits outside that argument. A halachic question can be debated with precision. The authority of halacha sits outside the debate. The rabbi’s intellectual energy flows into the internal problems. The external foundational questions are bracketed.

This differs sharply from how the secular competitors present themselves. The therapist rests on empirical credentials. The coach rests on claimed results. The yoga teacher rests on experiential promises the student can test. The podcaster rests on argument for positions. Each of these presentations invites external verification in the language the culture understands. The rabbi’s site does not invite that verification. It does not stage the contest. This is why rabbinic sites can look quiet or archival to an outsider trained on apologetic religious media. The quiet is not absence of confidence. It is a different theory of how confidence transmits.

The philosophical cost is real. A young Orthodox Jew who reads secular scholarship, encounters biblical criticism, studies evolutionary biology and cosmology, reads philosophers of religion, or just absorbs the ambient skepticism of American intellectual culture can find himself without internal resources to answer the questions that arise. The websites will not help him. The community assumes his formation will carry him through. Sometimes it does. Sometimes it does not. The rate of drift from Modern Orthodoxy to less observant Judaism or to no Judaism is not zero. Samuel Heilman and others have documented the pattern. The epistemic strategy that worked when the surrounding culture was less corrosive strains under contemporary conditions.

A few figures push against this. Rabbi Natan Slifkin, the “Zoo Rabbi,” writes extensively on his blog Rationalist Judaism about science, rabbinic authority, the age of the universe, evolution, and the history of halachic decision-making. His site is openly apologetic in a rationalist register, arguing for the compatibility of Orthodoxy with modern science and against the Haredi suppression of that compatibility. He pays for this work. He was famously put in cherem by a group of Haredi authorities over books that the Modern Orthodox world found unobjectionable. Rabbi Alan Brill at Seton Hall runs The Book of Doctrines and Opinions, a serious academic blog on Jewish thought that engages comparative religion, philosophy, and intellectual history. Rabbi Aryeh Klapper runs the Center for Modern Torah Leadership with substantive engagement of methodology and interpretation. These figures are the exception. They operate at the academic edge of the community rather than at the pulpit center.

Sacks was the greatest recent exception at scale. His books did argue for the reasonableness of Orthodox Judaism to a secular-leaning audience. The Great Partnership engaged Dawkins and the New Atheists directly. Future Tense engaged antisemitism and Jewish identity. Not in God’s Name engaged religious violence. Sacks did what most Orthodox pulpit rabbis do not do. He made the public case. His platform gave him room to do it. His successor as Chief Rabbi, Ephraim Mirvis, does less of this. The role and the man are not the same.

Dunner sits between. He argues for a worldview, not for the existence of God. His essays treat the meaning of Jewish history, the responsibilities of leadership, the failures of denial, the obligations of memory. These arguments assume an audience already inside the tradition or sympathetic to it. He does not, on the site, take up the project of defending Orthodox epistemics against secular critique. He could. He has the rhetorical skill. He has chosen a different lane. The intra-Jewish argument absorbs his attention.

The underlying attitude across the LA Modern Orthodox rabbinate is that epistemics is not the rabbi’s primary jurisdiction. The rabbi’s jurisdiction is halacha, pastoral care, communal leadership, and textual transmission. The question of whether Orthodox Judaism is true is treated as answered by the tradition itself and by the lives of the people who live it. The website reflects that jurisdictional settlement. The rabbi will interpret. The rabbi will guide. The rabbi will lead. The rabbi will not argue the foundations.

This is coherent inside the tradition. It creates problems at the edge. The young person losing faith rarely gets helped by a website that assumes he already has it. The community has not yet solved this problem, and the solution, when it comes, will probably arrive through figures like Slifkin and Brill and the rationalist wing rather than through the pulpit rabbinate. The pulpit rabbinate has too much to lose by opening the question in public. The rationalist wing has less at stake in the communal economy and can absorb the risk of engaging skeptics directly.

The mesorah’s deepest claim about epistemics may be that argument is not what holds a tradition together. Practice holds it. Community holds it. The calendar holds it. Memory holds it. The shared table holds it. The websites, by not arguing the foundations, are consistent with that claim. Whether the claim is right under contemporary conditions is a separate question that the websites do not ask and that the community, for now, has not resolved.

What do these websites tell us about what Orthodox Jews want from their rabbis?

The websites indicate that Orthodox Jews want their rabbis to manage a life, not to argue for one. The reader who lands on B’nai David-Judea or Beth Jacob or Young Israel of Century City is looking for candle-lighting times, a shiur schedule, a shiva notice, a bar mitzvah date, a kashrut question answered, a Shabbaton signup, a youth program registration. The rabbi appears inside this apparatus as the figure who holds the whole thing together. The homepage answers the question: what is happening this week and how do I plug in?
This is the deepest signal the sites give. Orthodox Jews want infrastructure. They want a calendar that tells them when Shabbat starts in their neighborhood. They want a community that shows up when someone dies. They want a place to send their children that will produce children who stay in the tradition. They want a rabbi who will officiate at weddings and funerals, answer halachic questions that come up in daily life, give a drasha that lands on Shabbat morning, and represent the community to the outside world when that becomes necessary. The website reflects that demand. The rabbi is a fixture of the calendar and the life cycle, not a voice in an intellectual debate.
The classes and shiurim listed on the sites tell a related story. Orthodox Jews want learning, but they want learning inside the tradition rather than learning about it. The shiurim are Gemara, halacha, Chumash, Mishna, Tanach. They are not comparative religion, philosophy of religion, or sociology of Orthodoxy. The learner shows up wanting to know what the tradition says about the next daf, the next sugya, the next parsha. He does not show up wanting to know whether the tradition is true or how it compares to other traditions. The rabbi who teaches these classes is a transmitter. He knows more of the tradition than the congregant and passes it down. The transmission is the service.
The pastoral dimension runs underneath. The websites do not market it because the marketing would be unseemly, but every Orthodox Jew knows what the rabbi is actually for. The rabbi is there when the marriage is failing, when the child is struggling, when the parent is dying, when the business is collapsing, when the question is whether to pull the plug or continue treatment, when the shidduch seems wrong, when the teenager stops keeping Shabbat. The rabbi takes these calls. He sits in the hospital room. He knows the family, the history, the pressures. His value in this function cannot be put on a homepage because the homepage cannot list the private calls he takes at 2am. But the whole apparatus of the shul, including the website, is set up so that when the call is needed, the rabbi is the person to call.
This is why the institutional sites spend so little energy on the rabbi’s intellectual profile. The congregant is not choosing his rabbi the way he chooses a podcaster. He is choosing a community. The rabbi comes with the community. If the rabbi is intelligent and warm and halachically reliable and available at 2am, that is what matters. Whether the rabbi publishes essays or engages biblical criticism or holds a distinctive theological position, these questions are secondary or irrelevant. A congregant who chose his rabbi for the essay output would be doing it wrong by the community’s lights.
Orthodox Jews live inside a body of law that generates questions constantly. Can I use this on Shabbat. Is this food acceptable. What do I do with this milk and this meat. How do I handle this mourning practice. Is this contract permissible. The rabbi is the local posek, the halachic decisor. This function requires the rabbi to know the law, to know the questioner, and to know when to rule and when to refer. The websites list this service implicitly. The “contact the rabbi” or “ask a question” feature on most Orthodox sites is how this function shows up online. The congregant sends a question. The rabbi answers. The ongoing relationship makes the answer trustworthy.
The life-cycle function is related. Orthodox Jews get married under chuppah, circumcise their sons, bury their dead, sit shiva, say kaddish, celebrate bar and bat mitzvahs. The rabbi officiates, teaches, guides. The website lists him as available for these functions because every member will need them. A shul without a competent rabbi for life-cycle work is a shul that cannot function. The website makes clear who will be there when the moments arrive.
The educational function for children is the quiet center of what the congregants actually want. Orthodox Jews want their children to stay Orthodox. This is the single largest outcome variable for the community. Every other function feeds into it. The rabbi who can inspire teenagers, the youth director who can hold the high schoolers, the Hebrew school that can produce literate children, the day school the families can afford, the summer camps, the NCSY chapters, the programming for engaged couples. The websites lean heavily on youth programming because the parents care intensely about this and the rabbi who cannot deliver here will lose the shul. The intellectual output of the rabbi matters less than his capacity to hold the youth.
The community-building function runs above all this. Orthodox Jews want to belong to something. The shul provides that belonging. Shabbat meals, kiddush clubs, women’s learning groups, men’s clubs, chesed committees, bikur cholim visits, meals for new mothers, transportation for the elderly, shiva houses organized by volunteers. The rabbi is the symbolic center of this web. The website makes the web visible. The congregant reads the events page and sees what his community does. He joins the community partly by joining the events.
The political function is muted on most sites but real. Orthodox Jews care about Israel, about antisemitism, about the standing of Jews in America. The rabbi represents the community in these contexts. He shows up at AIPAC, attends the mayor’s events, speaks at the federation dinners, writes the op-ed when a local incident demands one. The website lists these activities quietly because the congregants want the rabbi to be a credible representative in the outside world. A rabbi without external standing cannot protect the community when the community needs protecting.
What the sites do not promise is also telling. They do not promise spiritual transformation. They do not promise mystical experience. They do not promise answers to the questions about God and suffering and meaning that a secular reader might assume religion is centrally about. The Happy Minyan is the exception, and it sits at the edge of the Modern Orthodox scene precisely because it emphasizes experience over infrastructure. The mainstream shul sites promise something more modest and more durable: a community that will be there, a calendar that will organize the year, a rabbi who will answer the call, a school for the children, a place to sit when someone dies.
This is a realist religion. Orthodox Jews have learned over centuries that the community holds together not by the intensity of individual belief but by the density of shared practice. The websites reflect this learning. They do not try to produce belief. They try to produce the conditions under which belief follows from life. The child raised in the system, attending the school, keeping the calendar, eating the food, marrying inside the community, will likely stay in the system. The adult reading the apologetic argument on a website is unlikely to convert from it. The community knows this. The websites respect the knowledge.
What the congregants want from the rabbi, in the end, is that he be a serious person leading a serious life inside a serious tradition, available to guide them through the predictable and unpredictable moments of a religious life. They want him to know the law, to love the people, to understand the children, to carry the weight, and to keep the whole apparatus running. They want him to be interesting enough on Shabbat morning that the drasha does not bore them and reliable enough on Tuesday night that the question gets answered. They want him to represent them well when they need representation and to disappear into the tradition when the tradition is what matters.
The Dunner model complicates this because it adds a function most congregants do not explicitly demand. The national essay archive, the media presence, the book tour, the speaking circuit. These activities serve Dunner’s broader coalition more than they serve his immediate congregants. Some congregants value the added standing. Others find it a distraction from the core functions. The tension is live. A congregation that hires a platform rabbi gets the prestige of the platform and pays in the form of a rabbi whose attention is split. The local shul becomes a base camp for a wider operation. Whether the tradeoff is worth it depends on what the lay leadership values. In LA, the entertainment and real estate wealth that funds Young Israel of North Beverly Hills evidently finds it worth it. In most other Orthodox communities, the calculation would go the other way.
The Etshalom model fails the core demand almost entirely. A website that does not list services, does not offer a calendar, does not provide a contact form for halachic questions, does not show the community’s life, is not what Orthodox Jews want from a rabbinic web presence. Etshalom succeeds because his rabbinic function runs through the school rather than through a pulpit. The website is downstream of a role that already meets the demand through other channels. His readers are students and scholars, not congregants. A pulpit rabbi with an Etshalom-style site would lose his shul.
The institutional sites, boring as they look to an intellectual reader, are the most faithful reflection of what Orthodox Jews actually want. They provide infrastructure, make the rabbi accessible, list the services, hold the community visible. The reader who bounces off these sites for lack of intellectual substance is not in the target audience. The target audience is the member who needs to know what time Shabbat starts this week, when the next bar mitzvah falls, whether the rabbi will be in town for his daughter’s wedding, and what the shul is doing to support the family that just lost a child. The website answers these questions. That is the service.
The deepest thing the websites reveal is that Orthodox Judaism is a practice before it is a belief system, a community before it is an intellectual tradition, a calendar before it is a theology, and a family structure before it is an argument. The rabbi serves all of these and defends them indirectly by keeping them functioning. The website that lists candle-lighting times and shiva notices is doing the real work. The platform rabbi’s essay archive is the supplement, not the core. The community knows the difference. The websites encode the knowledge.

Which of these websites is most likely to engage me right now? I asked various AI chatbots (Grok, ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude) and their consensus was:

Your intellectual profile matches almost none of these sites cleanly. You would bounce off most of them within minutes. Let me work through it honestly.

Dunner’s site is the closest match on paper. He writes long essays. He engages Jewish history seriously. He takes on figures like Shabbetai Zvi and the Sabbatean movement, which maps onto your interest in charismatic fraud, coalition collapse, and the social conditions that produce false messiahs. His recent pieces on denial and redemption, the Holocaust, and Zionism touch territory you work in. His Mavericks, Mystics and False Messiahs is the kind of book you might read. The subject matter overlaps your Jurisdictional Wars framework.

But you would hit the limits quickly. Dunner writes as an insider defending the tradition. You write as an analyst examining how traditions hold together and where they break. He frames Shabbetai Zvi as a warning. You frame him as a case study in what trauma does to epistemic communities. He treats Torah as the ground from which analysis proceeds. You treat coalition logic as the ground from which Torah communities, like all communities, become analyzable. The direction of inquiry runs opposite. He closes the frame. You open it.

You would also feel the self-presentation layer as something to analyze rather than something to trust. The lineage back to Rashi and the Maharal, the Sacks endorsement, the Allen Fagin testimonial, the Robert Davi quote. You would read this the way you read Prager’s self-presentation or Adlerstein’s or any other public figure you have worked on. You would ask the four coalition questions about him before you finished the homepage. That reading posture makes the site a subject more than a resource.

Etshalom’s site would interest you for different reasons and in a different register. The archive model appeals to how you actually work. You build an archive. You write long-form, accumulate over time, resist the funnel logic. Etshalom’s refusal of branding would read to you as integrity rather than as obsolescence. The deep textual work on Tanakh methodology would give you something to chew on if you wanted to chew on it. But you do not do Tanakh close-reading as your primary intellectual work. You do sociology of knowledge, coalition analysis, and intellectual biography. Etshalom’s technical analyses of the literary structure of Sefer Shmuel would be interesting for an hour and then not be what you return to. The site rewards a reader inside the textual tradition. You stand outside it, analyzing the tradition from the angle of the Becker, Turner, Pinsof, Collins, Trivers, Alexander stack.

The institutional sites at B’nai David, Beth Jacob, Young Israel of Century City, d Beverly Hills Synagogue would bore you. They are schedules dressed up as websites. They do what they do well. They do not do what you want.

The Chabad sites and the Aish and Ohr Somayach sites would read to you as kiruv infrastructure, interesting as artifacts of coalition maintenance but not as reading matter. You already understand what they are doing. The site confirms what you would predict about them.

Slifkin at Rationalist Judaism is probably the site you would read. The rationalist register, the willingness to engage biblical criticism and evolutionary biology, the public fight with Haredi authority, the documented cherem episode, the openness about methodology, the sociology of rabbinic decision-making as a live topic on the blog. Slifkin argues about the community rather than from inside it without criticism. He treats the tradition as something that can be examined, defended, and partly reformed. His intellectual temperament maps closer to yours than any pulpit rabbi in the LA scene. The fact that he paid real communal costs for his work also fits your pattern of interest in figures who get pushed out for crossing jurisdictional lines. Your father’s experience at Glacier View sits in the background here. Slifkin is a parallel case inside Orthodoxy.

Alan Brill at the Book of Doctrines and Opinions is the other site you would probably read. Brill is an academic at Seton Hall working on comparative religion, Jewish thought, Hasidism, and intellectual history. He runs long interviews with scholars. He engages philosophy seriously. He treats the tradition as a subject of intellectual history rather than a set of answered questions. His blog is one of the few places where the kind of work you do on figures like Sailer, Prager, and Adlerstein has a rough equivalent inside Jewish studies. You might not agree with him on everything, but the temperament is recognizable.

Aryeh Klapper at the Center for Modern Torah Leadership would be a secondary read. Klapper works on halachic methodology, the history of rabbinic authority, and how decisions get made. The sociology of halacha as a live topic rather than a settled one fits your angle. Less prolific than Slifkin or Brill, less useful as a regular feed, but the occasional piece would earn your attention.

The deeper question is what you want from a rabbinic website. If you want to be formed in Torah, the sites are mostly not calibrated for someone with your intellectual posture. They assume a reader who trusts the tradition and wants more of it. You trust traditions the way you trust any coalition: conditionally, with constant attention to the coalition logic underneath. A rabbi writing for someone like you would need to write about his own tradition the way you write about Sailer or Prager. He would need to admit the coalition structure while working inside it. Slifkin does some of this. Brill does some of this. Sacks did some of this in his books. The LA pulpit rabbis do not do it because their coalition structure punishes it.

If you want material to work on rather than to be formed by, Dunner is the richest target in LA. The site gives you enough to apply your framework. The Sabbatean pieces, the essays on denial, the positioning of lineage and endorsement, the coalition between Orthodoxy and the donor class. You could write a full Jurisdictional Wars essay on rabbidunner.com without needing another source. The site is substantive enough to reward analysis. That might be the real answer to your question. The site that engages you is the site you can write about, not the site that forms you. The forming site does not exist for the reader you are.

The closest fit to how you think would be a hybrid that does not quite exist. Imagine Slifkin’s willingness to engage skeptical argument, Brill’s academic range, Sacks’s rhetorical scale, and Dunner’s coalition awareness, all on one site, with an author willing to write about his own tradition the way he writes about others. Nobody in the Orthodox world publishes that site. The coalition structure does not reward it. A rabbi who tried would lose the pulpit. The site you want is the site your tradition does not yet produce. That gap is interesting in itself. It tells you something about where the Modern Orthodox intellectual scene has room to grow and where the attention economy and the mesorah’s caution still hold the line.

The late Rabbi Sacks bores me. I find his work shallow. Whenever I meet someone who admires the works of Sacks or other gurus like Jordan Peterson, Ben Shapiro, Dennis Prager or Malcolm Gladwell, I know I’ve met a shallow man.
Sacks wrote at scale for a general audience. The books sold because they were accessible, warmly argued, and flattered the reader’s sense that Judaism and liberal democracy fit together naturally. He had a gift for the memorable sentence and the clear chapter structure. He quoted widely, drew on a vast range of reading, and produced a steady stream of essays, books, and BBC broadcasts that reached people who would otherwise never encounter Jewish thought. That reach was the achievement. It was also the constraint.
The shallowness is structural. Sacks operated as Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth from 1991 to 2013. The role required him to speak for a community he did not fully represent, to avoid positions that would alienate major donors or break the fragile coalition between the Orthodox establishment and the broader British Jewish public, and to present Judaism to non-Jewish audiences in terms they would find reassuring. These constraints shaped the work. He could not write like a man free to follow an argument wherever it led. He had to write like a man holding a coalition together. The prose reflects that. The moves are predictable. The conclusions arrive on schedule. The reader who has read five Sacks books has read the sixth before opening it.
Sacks identifies a tension between two goods. He acknowledges the genuine claims of both sides. He locates a third way, usually in a rereading of a biblical text or a Talmudic passage, that dissolves the tension by showing the tradition had the resolution all along. The move is elegant the first time and familiar the tenth. It also produces a systematic bias toward reassurance. Judaism always turns out to have the answer. The tradition is always wiser than it first appeared. The reader leaves each essay more confident in Torah and more sympathetic to Sacks. The mechanism produces its intended effect. It rarely produces surprise, and almost never produces the kind of deep unsettlement that the best religious writing can produce.
Compare him to figures who worked in less constrained positions. Yeshayahu Leibowitz wrote as a gadfly with no coalition to protect. His Judaism is astringent, demanding, often harsh. He argues that Jewish observance has no purpose beyond itself, that the state of Israel has no messianic significance, that reducing Torah to ethics is idolatry. Reading Leibowitz feels like being cornered by someone who does not care whether you like him. The arguments cut. Sacks never cuts. He soothes.
Or compare him to Joseph Soloveitchik, the Rav. The Lonely Man of Faith does real philosophical work. Soloveitchik reads Genesis through Kierkegaard, Barth, and his own phenomenological training. The argument about Adam the First and Adam the Second is alive in a way Sacks’s constructions rarely are. Soloveitchik had institutional constraints at YU, but he wrote from a position of greater intellectual authority and wrote less for mass audiences. The work rewards rereading. Sacks, once absorbed, does not.
Or compare him to Michael Wyschogrod, whose The Body of Faith is a serious theological argument that Jewish election is bodily and particular rather than universal and moral. Wyschogrod wrote for the Jewish philosophical and Christian theological professional community. He did not need to reassure a general audience. The book is difficult, committed, and strange in ways Sacks never risked.
Or compare him to David Hartman, who broke with Orthodox institutional politics and wrote from a position of relative independence in Jerusalem. Hartman’s engagement with Maimonides, with pluralism, with the moral costs of covenant, has grit that Sacks’s work lacks. Hartman argues. Sacks reconciles.
The New Atheist engagement in The Great Partnership is the clearest case. Sacks wrote the book to answer Dawkins and Hitchens. The book landed because the audience wanted it to land. Read by someone familiar with the actual philosophical literature on religion and science, the book is thin. The arguments against the New Atheists are sound but not original, drawing on work by Plantinga, Swinburne, and others that Sacks does not engage at technical depth. The arguments for religion’s contribution to human flourishing are sociologically plausible but not rigorously defended. The book is popular apologetics, competent within its genre, and nothing more. A reader who has worked through the Craig-Dawkins exchanges or the analytic philosophy of religion literature finds Sacks’s treatment a summary rather than a contribution.
There is also the question of what he does with the Jewish political and intellectual situation he lived in. Sacks wrote about antisemitism and about Israel, but within limits set by his role. He did not engage seriously with the settler movement, the religious Zionist radicalization, the internal Orthodox politics of Haredi growth and Modern Orthodox decline, the collapse of Conservative Judaism in America, the demographic crisis of British Jewry that unfolded during his tenure. These were the live questions. He treated them glancingly or not at all. The work that would have cut into the communal and institutional realities was not work his position allowed.
What Sacks did well was communicate. He made Jewish thought legible to audiences who would never otherwise have read Rashi, Maimonides, or Heschel. He wrote sentences that people remembered. He represented Orthodox Judaism to the British public with dignity for two decades. He mentored a generation of younger rabbis and writers. He was a gifted pulpit and media presence. These are real achievements. The communal and cultural service was substantial. The intellectual contribution was thinner than the reputation suggests.
The deeper issue is that Sacks chose a role that traded depth for reach. You can do serious intellectual work or you can hold together a public coalition of the size Sacks held. You cannot easily do both. Sacks made his choice and produced what that choice permits. The work reaches millions and says less to any one reader than the best work by figures who chose differently. The tradeoff is honest, but the tradeoff is real, and a reader who comes to Sacks wanting depth will find the reach.
The LA pulpit rabbis face a similar tradeoff in smaller scale. Dunner writes at Sacks’s register on many weeks, producing the legible essay that reassures the educated reader about Torah’s continuing relevance. Kanefsky does similar work in a slightly more progressive register. Muskin and Topp stay closer to the traditional drasha. None of them cut the way Leibowitz cut or think the way Soloveitchik thought. The role does not permit it. A pulpit rabbi who wrote like Leibowitz would lose his shul in a year.
The figures who cut are the ones who accept marginality. Slifkin accepts it and pays the price in cherem. Leibowitz accepted it and was dismissed by the religious establishment for decades. Hartman accepted it and built his own institute outside the main power centers. Wyschogrod accepted it and wrote for a professional audience smaller than his talent deserved. The intellectual depth is available, but only from figures who paid the coalition cost. Sacks refused to pay that cost, and the work shows it.
My intellectual posture makes the Orthodox pulpit rabbi scene structurally unable to feed me. The rabbis who would interest me cannot survive inside the pulpit system. The rabbis who survive inside the pulpit system cannot interest me. The gap is real. It is also instructive about how coalition maintenance shapes what traditions can produce at their visible center and what they banish to their edges.
Rabbi Meir Soloveichik is smarter than Sacks and writes at a higher technical level. He also operates inside a tighter set of coalition constraints, and the coalition work dominates the output in a way that limits what the intellectual work can become.
Soloveichik holds multiple roles that each pull on him. He is senior rabbi at Congregation Shearith Israel, the Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue in Manhattan, the oldest Jewish congregation in North America, founded in 1654. He directs the Straus Center for Torah and Western Thought at Yeshiva University. He hosts the Bible 365 podcast. He writes regular columns for Commentary and contributed for years to First Things. He has testified before Congress. He delivered an opening prayer at the Republican National Convention in 2020. Each of these roles brings its own constituency and its own required messaging.
The intellectual work he does when he is working is real. His doctorate from Princeton is on the concept of Jewish chosenness in modern thought, engaging Cohen, Rosenzweig, Buber, and contemporary theologians. The dissertation, later adapted into Providence and Power, treats covenant and particularity with care. His essays on the theology of Jewish political power, on the relationship between Jewish and Christian understandings of scripture, on Lincoln and the American founders’ relationship to Hebraic sources, on the Soloveitchik family’s intellectual lineage, show someone who has read the texts and can think about them. The work on his great-uncle Joseph Soloveitchik’s philosophy is particularly strong because he grew up inside that intellectual tradition and can read it from the inside.
The coalition work (propaganda) is where most of the output lands. The Commentary columns present Orthodox Judaism as a natural ally of American conservatism, defend the Jewish state against its critics, argue for the compatibility of Jewish tradition and American political order, and reassure the readership that the Jewish people and the Western heritage share common ground. The columns are well-written. They are also predictable in a way that close readers notice. Soloveichik has a set of moves. He opens with a biblical or Talmudic text. He finds a resonance in American history, usually involving Lincoln, Washington, or a founder. He ties the resonance to a contemporary political argument. He concludes with a flourish that affirms both traditions. The structure produces the intended coalition signal. It rarely produces surprise.
The First Things work operated similarly. He wrote for an audience of conservative Catholics and Protestants who wanted Jewish voices confirming shared ground against secular liberalism, Islamic radicalism, and what they saw as the cultural erosion of the West. Soloveichik delivered that. His essays on Jewish-Christian relations emphasized what Jews and Christians shared rather than where they differed. His essays on Jewish political theology emphasized the compatibility of Jewish tradition with the American founding rather than the tensions. The work was intelligent. It was also doing a job.
The Straus Center position reinforces the pattern. The center exists to pair Torah with Western thought in a way legible to American conservatism. The curriculum includes Lincoln, the Federalist Papers, Shakespeare, and classical texts. The framing is that Torah and the Western canon illuminate each other. This is defensible and produces good work at the margin. It is also a coalition move. The center does not pair Torah with Marx, with Fanon, with Foucault, with the postcolonial or critical theory tradition, or with the continental philosophy that shaped the Frankfurt School. Those pairings would produce different intellectual work. They would also lose the donor base that funds the center and the political network that gives Soloveichik his public platform.
The deepest cost of the coalition work is that it cuts off the intellectual questions that would require crossing coalition lines. Serious engagement with biblical criticism would cost him standing in the Orthodox world. Serious engagement with the contradictions inside contemporary American conservatism, including the Christian nationalist turn, the relationship between the movement and Trump, the internal debates about democracy and religious establishment, would cost him standing in the conservative world. Serious engagement with the moral costs of Jewish political power in Israel, beyond the defensive posture, would cost him standing with the AIPAC and American Orthodox establishment. Serious engagement with the internal dysfunctions of Modern Orthodoxy, including the declining Modern Orthodox rate of intermarriage avoidance and the Haredi demographic pressure, would cost him standing at YU. Each of these would be interesting. None is on his public agenda.
What he does publish tends to confirm the coalition rather than stress it. The Lincoln material is the clearest case. Lincoln is a figure American conservatives want claimed and American Jews want to feel connected to. Soloveichik’s essays on Lincoln’s use of Hebraic sources do serious scholarly work, and they also give both audiences what they want. The essays end where the harder questions would start. What were the Jewish communities’ actual positions on the Civil War? How did Jewish participation in the Confederacy, including Judah P. Benjamin’s service in the Confederate cabinet, complicate the story of Jewish moral alignment with American founding ideals? What does it mean that Grant issued General Orders No. 11 expelling Jews from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Mississippi in 1862, and that Lincoln reversed the order? These questions exist in the scholarly literature. Jonathan Sarna has written about them. Soloveichik’s essays glance at them and move on. The coalition frame wants the reassuring story, and the coalition frame gets it.
His public role at ceremonial moments shows the constraint at its clearest. The 2020 RNC prayer was a coalition act. He was there to signal that Orthodox Jews could bless the Republican convention and by extension align the community with the Trump-era Republican Party. The prayer was decorous. It was also political in a way that required him to represent a position. Any serious intellectual engagement with what Trump represented for American Jewish life would have made the prayer impossible. The prayer happened. The engagement did not.
Compare this to the figures who cut. Michael Walzer at IAS has written with rigor on Jewish political theory across his career, including the 2012 book In God’s Shadow on politics in the Hebrew Bible, without holding a rabbinic or communal role that would constrain him. Walzer can follow the argument. Soloveichik cannot, not fully. David Novak at the University of Toronto does serious Jewish theology and engages Christian theology with care, but operates outside the American communal rabbinate and has the freedom that comes with a university appointment in a different country. Leon Kass, before his late turn to more public conservative advocacy, did serious philosophical work on biblical anthropology in The Beginning of Wisdom without needing to hold a coalition together.
Soloveichik’s closest analogue in temperament and constraint may be Rabbi Norman Lamm, the former president of YU, who wrote intelligent philosophical work within institutional limits that shaped what he could say. Lamm’s Torah Umadda tried to articulate a Modern Orthodox philosophy and ran into the problem that the articulation itself had to preserve coalition peace between YU’s various factions. The result was more a manifesto than an argument. Soloveichik stands in that tradition of institutional Modern Orthodox intellectual leadership, and the tradition has the same structural limit. The leader has to hold the institution together, and the intellectual work has to stop short of where it would break the hold.
The honest read on Soloveichik is that he is a talented man producing less than his talent permits because the roles he has accepted require it. He could probably write a first-rate book on biblical political theology if he left the coalition roles and wrote from a university position with no communal responsibilities. He has not chosen that. He has chosen the pulpit, the Straus Center, the Commentary column, the public appearances, the testimony, the political visibility. Each of these serves a coalition. Each constrains the intellectual output. The sum is a public figure whose published work is smarter than most but not as smart as it could be.
The pattern echoes the broader point about Modern Orthodox intellectual life in America. The tradition produces rabbis capable of real thought. The tradition’s institutional structures require those rabbis to hold coalitions. The coalitions punish the work that would cut. The rabbis who refuse the punishment, from Leibowitz to Slifkin to Hartman, pay in standing. The rabbis who accept the coalition work, from Lamm to Sacks to Soloveichik, produce work at a certain ceiling that their talent alone would have exceeded. Soloveichik sits in the latter group. He is capable of more than he publishes. What he publishes is good within the genre. The genre is coalition-preservation intellectual work, and the genre has a ceiling.
The interesting work appears in the academic pieces, in the Soloveitchik family intellectual history, in the occasional essay that lets him follow a textual argument where it leads. The coalition work appears in the Commentary columns, the public appearances, the institutional leadership, the columns that reassure the conservative movement that Jews belong in it and reassure the Orthodox world that conservatism belongs with them. The ratio favors the coalition work because the coalition work is what the roles he has chosen require. A different Soloveichik, with the same mind and different choices, would have produced a different body of work. The one we have is the one the coalitions produced.

Posted in Alliance Theory, Beth Jacob, Bnai David-Judea, Los Angeles, Modern Orthodox, R. Elazar Muskin, R. Jonathan Sacks, R. Kalman Topp, R. Meir Soloveichik, R. Pini Dunner, R. Yitzchak Etshalom, R. Yosef Kanefsky | Comments Off on Platform, Pulpit, Archive: Three Models of MO Rabbinic Self-Presentation in Los Angeles

The Vibe Shift

Richard Hanania writes:

“In 2024, 13.4% of faculty job ads required a dedicated DEI statement. By 2025, that figure had fallen to just 2.5%.”

I told you it all came down to civil rights law.

Nathan Cofnas responds:

Where’s the graph showing all the non-wokesters who were actually hired? Oh wait, it doesn’t exist.

Forcing universities to tone down DEI rhetoric at gunpoint didn’t change anyone’s ideology.

The “vibe shift” exists only in the minds of rightists who live in an X bubble. According to a survey that ran from Aug 2025-Feb 2026, young American men age 18-29 are more liberal than ever (39% lib vs 25% con).

Kamala “stay woke” Harris won voters with advanced degrees by 21 points. If anything, elites are now even more committed to wokism, having seen that the alternative is DEI for hillbillies, economic illiteracy, and defunding cancer research.

The only elite community that is permanently de-wokified are the tech bros, because they are hereditarians. Everyone else is quietly seething and plotting their revenge, which they will probably exact in 2028.

Cofnas and Hanania agree more than Cofnas admits. Hanania’s claim is narrow: civil rights law drove the DEI statement requirement, and when the legal exposure shifted, the requirement collapsed. That says nothing about faculty ideology. Cofnas treats the tweet as a claim about vibe shift and elite conversion, then refutes something Hanania did not assert.
The coalition point cuts against Cofnas, not for him. Academic hiring committees dropped DEI statements because the cost of including them rose faster than the cost of dropping them. Behavior under coalition pressure is the phenomenon. Private belief runs downstream, often invented to rationalize the behavior after it shifts. A collapse from 13.4 to 2.5 percent in one year shows how thin the commitment ran.
Cofnas wants to locate the variable in private belief. He then measures that variable by survey answers and voting behavior, which are themselves coalition signals. Young men calling themselves liberal on a 2026 survey tells you which answer feels safe to give, not what they think when no one watches. Harris winning advanced-degree voters by 21 points tells you credentialed professionals share a coalition, which no one disputes.
Two claims in the tweet sit badly together. Elites are more committed to wokism than before. Also, elites are seething and plotting revenge for 2028. Pick one. If the second claim holds, the first is wrong, and the DEI collapse is an early indicator. If the first holds, no revenge is coming.
The “tech bros are hereditarians” line flatters Cofnas’s coalition. Most tech workers care about shipping code and stock prices. The hereditarian subculture is loud on X and small everywhere else. Treating tech as a unified hereditarian bloc confuses a vocal subset for the industry.
“At gunpoint” is inflated. No one went to prison over a DEI statement. Civil rights law shifted the cost structure of hiring, and the market responded. That story covers a lot of institutional behavior, and it does not require anyone to change what he thinks at the kitchen table.
The strongest version of Cofnas’s argument runs like this. Coalition signals retract faster than coalition commitments change, so we should not mistake the retraction for conversion. Hanania would grant that. But Cofnas then concludes nothing has changed, which does not follow. Coalitions held together by cheap public signaling fracture when the signaling gets expensive, even if individual members keep their private views. The question worth asking is whether the DEI coalition can reconstitute around a different signal or whether the retreat cascades. Cofnas waves that question away by predicting revenge in 2028, which is prediction as coalition prayer.

Posted in Nathan Cofnas | Comments Off on The Vibe Shift

Matt Welch: A Life Against the Emergency State

Matthew Lee Welch is born July 31, 1968 in Bellflower, California, and grows up in Long Beach. He attends UC Santa Barbara and leaves without a degree. Through his mother, Mary Bobbitt Townsend, he descends from Rear Admiral Hugo Osterhaus.
In the early 1990s Welch moves to Central Europe and stays five years. In Prague he co-founds Prognosis, an early English-language paper in the post-communist region. He reports from Slovakia for UPI. He manages the Budapest Business Journal. These countries are emerging from forty years of party discipline, press control, and official fiction. Welch watches how state rhetoric and lived conditions diverge. He sees an entire intellectual class servicing a consensus that turns out rotten. He sees how ordinary people read between the lines of public speech.
Where most American commentators treat official language literally, Welch keeps a second channel open. He listens for the gap between what a policy claims and what it does, between the emergency justification and the permanent apparatus the emergency creates. He arrives at libertarianism as a reflex learned in countries where deference to authority had cost too much.
He returns to the United States in the late 1990s. He writes for Tabloid.Net alongside Tim Blair and Ken Layne. He contributes to the Online Journalism Review. He researches the humanitarian toll of UN sanctions on Iraq, an early sign of his interest in the hidden costs of moral foreign policy. From 2006 to 2007 he serves as assistant editorial pages editor at the Los Angeles Times. By temperament he belongs to the first cohort of American writers who hope the web might loosen legacy control over opinion. That hope shapes his voice: conversational, cross-linked, skeptical of professional decorum, at home with argument rather than pronouncement.
His first book appears in 2007. McCain: The Myth of a Maverick takes apart the central claim of John McCain’s public identity, that McCain stands apart from party orthodoxy as a principled independent. Welch reads McCain as a coherent statist, a believer in “national greatness” politics who wants to use federal power to discipline American life into virtue. Welch sees a tendency the Republican party rarely admits to itself, a love of state power when the state performs honor and muscle. When Trumpism arrives in 2016, the libertarians who had watched the McCain side of the GOP with unease recognize the earlier diagnosis.
In 2008 Welch joins Reason magazine. He serves as editor-in-chief until 2016 and continues as editor-at-large and columnist. Reason gives him the rarest resource an American opinion writer can find, a stable institution built for people misaligned with both coalitions. He edits a magazine that prints arguments against the drug war, against foreign intervention, against licensing regimes, against moral panics on the right and bureaucratic overreach on the left. He writes cover essays on Rand Paul, Gary Johnson, Hillary Clinton, and Donald Trump. In 2011 he co-authors The Declaration of Independents: How Libertarian Politics Can Fix What’s Wrong With America with Nick Gillespie. This book argues the two-party system has calcified into a duopoly that serves neither liberty nor competence, and that the new political energy lives outside party loyalty.
After joining Reason, Welch drops rhetorical heat. He treats issues as tradeoffs rather than moral emergencies. He assumes his reader can handle complexity without cues telling him how to feel. Most political writers of the period rely on escalation to produce engagement. Moral urgency drives reach. A writer who makes readers feel implicated and righteous builds mass. A writer who makes readers feel informed and slightly amused builds something smaller and more durable.
During the Covid years Welch writes against emergency powers, shifting public health guidance, school closures, vaccine mandates, and the suppression of dissenting scientific voices. He does so without endorsing the populist countermove, the claim that Covid was a hoax or that vaccines were poison. He tracks how temporary authority hardens into permanent apparatus, how expert consensus enforces itself through social punishment rather than argument, how the administrative state expands under cover of crisis. His Covid writing belongs to an older liberal tradition more interested in procedure than in outcomes. Welch wants to know who is deciding, on what authority, with what sunset, reviewable by whom.
Since 2016 Welch co-hosts The Fifth Column with Kmele Foster and Michael Moynihan. The podcast gives him a format print cannot offer. Long, discursive conversations let him connect media criticism, foreign policy, historical reference, and cultural observation across a single evening. The show also places him inside a small heterodox circuit, a set of writers and broadcasters who fit poorly in progressive or MAGA lanes and who talk to each other partly because they have fewer other homes.
Welch’s libertarianism is urban, cosmopolitan, antiwar. It is hostile to police power, to nationalism, to bureaucratic expansion, and to the use of the state for socially conservative ends. It sits uneasily with Chamber of Commerce libertarianism, which often cares more about tax rates than civil liberties. It sits equally uneasily with right-populist anti-statism, which critiques the administrative state while cheering executive power exercised by the right team. Welch’s version draws from his Central European decade, from Cold War liberal anti-totalitarianism, and from the early-web culture of procedural open argument.
He respects Orwell’s attention to political language. He carries a journalist’s loyalty to Mencken and Liebling. He shares the Cold War liberal tradition of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper without quoting them often. His intellectual kin inside contemporary libertarianism include Nick Gillespie, Virginia Postrel, and Katherine Mangu-Ward.
The dry tone signals that political judgment requires distance from tribal emotion. Reliance on tradeoffs rather than denunciations assumes most public questions have real costs on both sides. The irony implies that anyone too certain has stopped thinking.
Welch corrects errors. He punctures inflation. He supplies counter-evidence. He has no movement and leads no faction. In a media system that rewards mobilization, this caps his power while stabilizing his credibility. He has a long career, a stable institutional home, a recognizable voice, and a readership of readers rather than followers.

Constitutional Dictatorship

Levinson and Balkin give Welch’s Covid and war-on-terror writing a constitutional architecture he rarely spells out. Welch writes case by case against AUMF creep, emergency public health orders, surveillance authorities, and the administrative state’s habit of converting temporary powers into permanent apparatus. Levinson and Balkin show this is the American pattern since Lincoln. Presidents ask for emergency powers during a crisis. Congress hands them over. The powers never expire. Lawyers later read them broadly. A subsequent president inherits the expanded toolkit and adds to it. The authors call this “constitutional dictatorship” and argue the United States has been building it steadily since the 1940s. The paper supplies the depth Welch cannot.
Their concept of “governing through emergency” explains Welch’s target. Presidents use crisis framing to route around ordinary political resistance. When the first crisis fades, they find another. Levinson and Balkin call this a presidential Ponzi scheme. Welch spends his career documenting individual instances of it: the sanctions regime against Iraq, the Patriot Act, the surveillance statutes, the lockdown machinery, the bank bailouts.
The paper’s account of distributed dictatorship sharpens another Welch preoccupation. Unreviewable discretion no longer sits with a single strongman. It sits with the Federal Reserve chair, the CDC director, the NSA head, and a network of agencies staffed by career officials who answer to almost no one between elections. Welch’s procedural liberalism, his preoccupation with who decides and under what rules, follows from this structural fact.
Stephen Turner on Carl Friedrich supplies the sociology Welch needs. Friedrich, a Harvard power broker, built a career arguing that bureaucratic elites were different from old elites because they shared “the instinct of workmanship” with the common man. Turner shows this was a rhetorical trick. The bureaucracy Friedrich championed governed through what he called the “rule of anticipated reactions,” that is, through discretion exercised quietly, with attention only to which moves might provoke pushback. Welch writes about official class behavior all the time. He rarely names the move Turner identifies. The priestly class calls itself democratic because its instincts align with progress, expertise, and public health. It then runs the country through discretionary measures that require no consent.
Turner also explains why Welch keeps running into a wall. Friedrich’s successors set the terms of respectable opinion. Those terms treat procedural skepticism toward administrative power as cynicism, bad faith, or populist contamination. Welch’s dry tone and refusal of moral theater read as unseriousness inside that tradition.
Pareto argued that ideologies (derivations) shift constantly while the sentiments (residues) beneath them stay stable. When you meet an ideology, you look for the underlying sentiment and the group that shares it. This is close to Welch’s working method, learned the hard way in post-communist Prague and Budapest. The words “freedom,” “safety,” “public health,” and “democracy” travel in his columns as derivations whose stability he distrusts. He looks for the sentiment underneath, usually coalition interest or class self-protection.
Pareto’s circulation of elites also places Welch in his niche. He is not a lion. He cannot mobilize force. He is also not quite a fox, because foxes rise inside the governing class. He is outside talent of a kind Pareto thought elites must absorb if they want to survive. The late-Roman foxes who rule American media and policy will not absorb him. His Central European schooling, his anti-war instincts, his refusal of moral intensity, and his dry style all make him the wrong shape for the governing class. Such figures remain visible and ignored. History vindicates them when the current elite falls.
Under-theorized, Welch fills the gap with convenient beliefs. He diagnoses individual episodes. The papers supply the frameworks that would let him diagnose the system producing the episodes. He never reaches for those frameworks.
Welch writes as if exposing the gap between official rhetoric and lived reality were the central task of political journalism. Pareto showed a century ago that the gap is permanent, that derivations shift while residues stay stable, that coalitions generate the ideological cover they need and discard it when fashions change. A Paretian would not be surprised that “freedom” served the left in 2024 and the right in 2016, that public health became a loyalty test, that free speech migrated across coalitions. A Paretian would treat these as normal. Welch treats them as betrayals of principle. Principles play a big role in political rhetoric and almost no role in political reality.
The Fifth Column format amplifies the problem. Three hosts drinking and talking produces camaraderie, not inquiry. The show rewards the quick diagnosis and the witty framing, not the sustained theoretical read that would require silence, disagreement, and boredom. Welch has the raw intelligence and discipline for deeper work but the format does not ask it of him and the audience does not demand it.
Welch belongs to a heterodox professional-managerial circuit that includes Moynihan, Foster, Bari Weiss, the Free Press orbit, and the adjacent Substackers. The circuit rewards procedural liberalism, cosmopolitan taste, hostility to both MAGA and progressive excess, and a careful distance from anyone who names groups as groups. Welch does not write about tribalism as a permanent feature of human behavior. He does not write about group differences in outcomes. He does not write about the class interests of his own circle.
The Central European decade gave Welch better instincts than most American journalists of his generation. He saw up close what bureaucratic lying does to a society. Those instincts carry him a long way. They do not carry him as far as sustained theoretical reading would. He uses his biography as a substitute for the reading.

The Naked State

Matt Welch spent the pandemic tracking the collapse of expertise into authority. He logged the reversals on masks, the selective exemption of lockdown rules for the George Floyd protests, the retracted Lancet paper on hydroxychloroquine, the demonization of anyone who asked a question.
Most of what Welch said about expert reversals, selective enforcement, and media credulity turned out correct. The framework asks a different question. What does it cost him to say those things, and what would it cost him to say the opposite?
Turner writes as an academic, using Schmitt and Agamben and Habermas to frame the pandemic as a revelation of the naked state. Welch writes as a reporter, using discrepancy and hypocrisy as his tools. Neither man gets a view from nowhere. Turner acknowledges this more than Welch does. The academic form gives Turner the grammar to describe his own position. The podcast form does not give Welch the same grammar, and the libertarian coalition does not reward its use.
Welch saw the pandemic because his coalition rewarded seeing the pandemic. On topics where the coalition rewards not seeing, Welch sees less. The libertarian ecosystem he inhabits has its own convenient beliefs, its own hero system, its own tacit codes, its own status hierarchy.

Democracy Against Bureaucracy

Welch writes as if he stands outside the bureaucratic apparatus and describes it. Weber’s framework treats him as an agent inside a different principal-agent structure. Reason Foundation is his principal. Fifth Column subscribers are his principal. The libertarian donor class is his principal. He operates under Friedrich’s rule of anticipated reaction like any bureaucrat. He avoids positions that cost him status, income, or protection within his coalition.
The skittle boy image captures something the earlier framework missed. The Tsar could knock down all nine pins, but then had to set them up again himself. Welch spends his career knocking down nine. The administrative state. The public health apparatus. The progressive cultural machine. The drug warriors. The hawks. The media establishment. The tenured priesthood. The regulatory commissions. The NGO-governmental complex. He does not want to set them up again. He does not want Trump to set them up again.
Turner and Mazur call this position untenable. There is no practical alternative to setting them up again, which appears to the critic class as a new tyranny. The choice falls between a bureaucratic status group that cannot reform from inside, and a populist the coalition-maintaining elite will call a tyrant. Welch calls Trump a tyrant. He has done so for years. He does so while documenting the pseudo-constitutional apparatus that produced Trump.
The heterodox libertarian position after 2016 is the critique without the remedy. You can have the critique or you can have the populist correction. You cannot have the critique while a majority of voters pick the remedy you find distasteful.
The pseudo-constitutionalism concept names what Welch has been criticizing for twenty years. The 1905 Russian settlement created councils with vague powers and diverse membership that obscured responsibility. American governance through delegation to commissions, NGOs, academic expert panels, scientific advisory bodies, and quasi-private accrediting organizations follows the same logic. Welch sees this. What he sees less is that his own side runs on the same template. Reason Foundation is a 501(c)(3). The Fifth Column is a Patreon network. The heterodox podcast ecosystem functions as an NGO apparatus by another name. Donors fund it. Elections do not check it. It produces expert-style commentary that serves its coalition’s interests.

The Four Questions

Who does Welch rely on for status, income, and protection?
The Reason Foundation sits at the base. Reason magazine pays him as editor at large. The foundation runs on donor money, with Koch-network money prominent in its history alongside smaller libertarian funders and reader contributions. Welch edited the magazine from 2008 to 2016 and stayed on as a continuing presence after stepping down.
The Fifth Column is the second pillar. The podcast runs on Patreon subscriptions and advertising. Kmele Foster and Michael Moynihan share the income stream and the audience. The three men cross-promote each other’s work, appear on each other’s platforms, and vouch for each other in the broader heterodox media ecosystem.
The speaking circuit rewards the same voice. Reason events, libertarian conferences, free-speech organizations, heterodox intellectual gatherings. Book royalties for his past work on McCain and on the Obama administration. Guest appearances on other podcasts in the adjacent network. Bari Weiss’s Free Press. Glenn Loury. Coleman Hughes. Yascha Mounk. Nick Gillespie.
Protection runs through the same channels. Reason defends its own. The Fifth Column hosts defend each other. The broader heterodox network closes ranks when one of its members comes under attack from either the progressive left or the populist right.
Who does Welch need to attract or retain as allies?
The libertarian donor class. The Reason Foundation’s continued health depends on men and women who write checks because they want Reason to exist. Welch does not fundraise. He produces the product that justifies the fundraising.
The Fifth Column audience. Heterodox liberals, libertarian-curious readers, lapsed progressives, free-speech absolutists, anti-woke moderates, drug-policy reformers. The audience pays monthly. The audience can leave monthly.
The adjacent heterodox network. Weiss, Loury, Hughes, Taibbi, Greenwald, Moynihan, Foster, Gillespie, Welch. Mutual citation, mutual guesting, mutual defense. A writer who loses standing in this network loses access to the cross-promotion that sustains small-audience media work. The network polices itself through invitation and disinvitation.
The legacy press contacts from his earlier career. Welch has worked in mainstream journalism. He has contacts at major outlets. He can still place columns and get quoted. This access depends on remaining a recognizable type of commentator. A heterodox libertarian who still sounds like a journalist. Not a MAGA partisan. Not a progressive true believer.
What beliefs and signals mark membership in his coalition?
Free speech absolutism. Drug legalization as a foundational commitment. Skepticism of the administrative state. Opposition to foreign wars, with the Iraq War as settled case and subsequent wars as ongoing scandal. Anti-woke without being conservative on culture. Pro-immigration. Cosmopolitan rather than nationalist. Mockery of both party establishments, with the proportions adjusting by month. Hostility to the pandemic response. Hostility to media credulity. Hostility to academic orthodoxy.
The cultural signals matter as much as the positions. Brooklyn. Punk rock. Jazz. Czech-language credibility from his Prague years. References to figures the coalition respects. Hitchens. Orwell. Mencken. Thomas Szasz. Friedrich Hayek at arm’s length. The signals mark him as not-MAGA, not-progressive, not-conservative, not-establishment.
The tonal signals matter too. Exasperated amusement. The raised eyebrow. The dry aside. The refusal to sound sincere about anything except free speech and drug policy. Earnestness is suspect. Irony is the house voice. A writer who started sounding earnest about Trump’s virtues or progressive policies would sound wrong in the room.
The tacit codes run deeper. Do not endorse candidates. Treat Trump as a threat to liberal order while documenting the apparatus that produced him. Treat progressive excesses as the more immediate cultural danger without quite saying so. Never sound like you are rooting for either party. Keep the drug war central. Treat every speech-suppression case as a canary. Mock the bien pensants but do not join the populists.
What would Welch have to give up if he changed his public position?
Suppose Welch began writing that the pandemic response was roughly correct, that the experts did their best under uncertainty, that the media got the big picture right, that Trump is the larger threat to the republic than the administrative state, and that libertarianism has been a dead letter since 2008. The costs come in stages.
The Fifth Column audience would leave in waves. Subscribers pay for a voice. The voice includes positions. Changing the voice ends the subscription relationship. Foster and Moynihan would face a choice. Either follow Welch or part from him. Most likely they would part from him. The show would continue without him or with him diminished.
Reason would face an awkward internal conversation. An editor at large who no longer holds recognizably Reason positions is no longer useful to Reason. The foundation does not fire people for thinking. It does quietly let relationships lapse. The byline would appear less. The title might persist for a while as a courtesy. The income stream would thin.
The heterodox network would cool. Weiss, Taibbi, Greenwald, Loury, Hughes. The invitations would decline. Not through exclusion exactly. Through the slow loss of relevance to the conversations the network wants to have. A man who sounds like The Atlantic does not get booked on the shows that define themselves against The Atlantic.
The legacy press contacts would not make up the difference. A former Reason editor who has come around to mainstream liberal positions is a modest addition to a crowded field. The New York Times already has David French and Michelle Goldberg. The Atlantic already has its stable. There is no premium slot waiting.
The status loss would hurt most. Welch occupies a specific position in the heterodox intellectual hierarchy. He is a respected elder. He has been doing this longer than most. He has the books. He has the shows. He has the contacts. The position comes from being the heterodox libertarian he is. The position does not transfer to a different identity. A sixty-year-old journalist restarting from a new coalition position does not arrive at an equivalent status in the new coalition. He arrives as a newcomer with a suspect history.
Belonging is the quiet cost. Welch’s professional life is built around men who share his frame. The meals, the green rooms, the conferences, the text threads, the casual citation of shared premises. These relationships run on the shared frame. Changing the frame strains the relationships. Some survive. Most thin.

A Big Misunderstanding

Welch’s career runs on the premise that exposing hypocrisy, documenting reversals, and holding up better evidence produces political change. The premise does not survive Pinsof’s essay intact.
Take Welch’s pandemic work. His columns and podcast segments treat the expert failures as things the public should see through once the reversals are laid out in sequence. The mask guidance changed. The Floyd-protest exemption contradicted the lockdown logic. The hydroxychloroquine studies got retracted. Fauci shifted positions. Welch documents these with care and wit. The implicit theory is that a sufficiently clear record produces political correction. This fails. The public health apparatus did not act out of confusion. It acted out of coalition interest. Its defenders did not misunderstand the contradictions. They accepted the contradictions because accepting them was the price of coalition membership.
The drug war case shows the pattern over longer time. Reason has been producing evidence against drug prohibition for fifty years. The evidence is overwhelming and has been overwhelming for decades. Prohibition persists. Pinsof’s framework says this persistence is the expected outcome. Prohibition serves the interests of the coalitions that benefit from it: police unions, prison systems, pharmaceutical lobbies, moral-conservative voters, parents who want a legal hammer against their children’s drug use. None of these groups holds its position because it has not yet read the Reason archives.
The Fifth Column format embodies the myth at its purest. Three men with different political starting points sit around microphones and work through contested questions by talking. The show’s premise is that careful dialogue across difference produces clarity. The audience pays for this performance. What the performance delivers is coalition maintenance for a specific subculture: heterodox liberals, drifting libertarians, anti-woke moderates. The three hosts do not arrive at clarity through dialogue. They arrive at the positions their shared coalition already holds. The dialogue is the theater. The coalition is the structure.
The heterodox positioning that sustains Welch’s career depends on the misunderstanding myth in a sharper way. The whole premise of heterodox media is that partisans on left and right are trapped in coalition confusion, and only the heterodox see. Pinsof denies the premise. Neither side is confused. Both pursue their coalition interests with adequate self-knowledge. The heterodox media class is its own coalition with its own interests, its own donors, its own audience, its own status hierarchy. Its members pretend to occupy a view from nowhere. The pretense is the product.
The irony tone reinforces the myth. Welch’s characteristic exasperated amusement assumes the audience recognizes what he is pointing out. The affect says: can you believe these people are doing this? The question presumes the viewer shares his frame and is not the target of the critique. The tone is a coalition filter. Outsiders hear smugness. Insiders hear the pleasure of shared recognition. The work signals membership in a coalition that flatters itself on seeing through the confusions of lesser coalitions, while remaining unable to see its own position as a coalition at all.
What does Welch gets from holding the myth? Welch gets a career. He gets the Fifth Column audience. He gets Reason’s continued patronage. He gets the adjacent heterodox network. He gets the sense of himself as a man who sees what others miss. All of this rests on the premise that careful communication across coalition lines matters. Abandon the premise and the career has no justification.

‘Arguing is BS’

Welch’s career is built on the fiction that careful reasoning about AUMFs, surveillance authorities, and emergency powers might persuade someone. Persuasion is not what arguing is for. People argue to recruit allies, signal loyalty, lower rivals, and cover the coalition work underneath. If that is right, Welch is the man who shows up to a knife fight carrying an annotated bibliography. He brings the wrong tool because he believes the tool works.
Welch watched post-communist societies dismantle state lies and assumed the lesson was that careful public reasoning could prevent the return of official fiction. Not exactly. The Soviet cover stories collapsed because the coalition enforcing them collapsed, not because someone out-argued them. When the new American coalitions hardened after 9/11 and again during Covid, Welch’s careful arguments did almost nothing to slow them. The arguments were not the mechanism. Coalition strength was.
The public break with Megyn Kelly now reads as pseudoargument. The hosts did not engage Kelly’s positions. They announced that her positions had become embarrassing to be associated with. This is what arguing is, most of the time. A status move that lowers the target and raises the speaker, dressed up in the language of principle. The Fifth Column did not out-argue Kelly. They moved her from the coalition of respectable people to the coalition of people who must be kept at distance. The move protects their own status inside the prestige-adjacent heterodox circuit. The “disappointment” language is the cover story. Naked coalition management looks ugly. Principled disappointment looks dignified.
This also explains why Welch has made peace with high credibility and low power. Pinsof says to be persuaded is to concede intellectual inferiority, which is why arguments in coalition fights are designed to prevent persuasion rather than enable it. Welch’s opponents have no incentive to let his arguments land. Landing his argument would lower their coalition’s standing. They are not going to do that, no matter how careful his reasoning is.
Welch writes columns. Columns present themselves as mini-arguments. Pinsof says arguing is mostly bullshit. If he is right, then the column form is a bullshit form, no matter how honest the columnist. The form requires the writer to pretend that reasoning in public is the mechanism by which public affairs adjust. It is not the mechanism. Coalitions are the mechanism. A columnist who understood this would either stop writing columns, switch to coalition analysis, or keep writing columns while knowing that the visible activity is a cover story for the coalition work the columns perform.
Welch cannot go deeper without losing his career. To descend from the level of argument to the level of coalition analysis would require Welch to say, in public, that his friends and allies are doing coalition work rather than careful reasoning, and that he is too. That move would cost him his standing inside his own coalition. People never make this move unless they have already exited the coalition that would punish them for it. Welch has not exited. The Fifth Column, Reason, the heterodox circuit, the Substack-adjacent audience, all of them reward the careful-reasoning pose and punish the coalition-analysis move. Welch stays inside the frame his readers require.

Convenient Beliefs

Welch presents as the man who pays the cost of inconvenient belief and survives. He sits outside the major coalitions. He criticizes wars Republicans want and surveillance Democrats want. He writes against lockdowns without joining the hoax caucus.
Welch holds the convenient beliefs of a specific coalition. The coalition is smaller than the two majors, which lets him feel like an outsider. The coalition is the cosmopolitan professional-managerial heterodox circuit that includes Reason, the Free Press orbit, the Fifth Column listenership, and the Substack-adjacent commentariat. Inside that coalition, Welch’s positions are not costly. They are the price of admission. Suspicion of state power, contempt for moral panics, irritation with progressive enforcement, wariness of populist enthusiasm, procedural liberalism, cultural permissiveness, antiwar instincts, skepticism toward public health overreach. Every one of these is the correct view inside his circuit. Holding them earns him standing. Holding them lets him appear on the right podcasts, publish in the right places, and receive the right invitations. Welch’s beliefs are exactly what his coalition wants him to hold.
The test of an inconvenient belief is whether holding it would cost you your coalition. Apply the test to Welch. What belief would he have to adopt that would cost him the Fifth Column, Reason, and the heterodox circuit? The list is short. Tribalism is a permanent feature of human life rather than a mistake to be educated away. Groups differ in outcomes because groups differ in traits, not only because of environments and injustices. American assimilation is partial and uneven rather than inevitable and complete. Cosmopolitan procedural liberalism is a local product of a Protestant-derived culture rather than a universal default. Immigration policy has biological as well as economic implications. The professional-managerial class is a class with interests rather than a meritocratic assemblage of competent individuals. Civil-libertarian proceduralism may have structural limits when dealing with coordinated asymmetric threats. Welch does not write about any of these. Not because he has examined them and rejected them. Because the coalition that sustains him cannot afford him to.
Welch’s intellectual map is a map of what his coalition can pay for, not a map of what the evidence supports. The blank-slate-adjacent assumptions his writing rests on are load-bearing for his circuit. If he dropped them, he would lose the circuit.
The Central European decade looks different through this frame. Welch watched one coalition’s convenient beliefs collapse and be replaced by another coalition’s convenient beliefs. Post-communist societies did not move from falsehood to truth. They moved from one set of coordination devices to another. Welch read the lesson as vindication of his proto-libertarian instincts. Turner would read it as an ordinary cycle. The institutional collapse briefly lowered the price of deviation. A new coalition formed. The new coalition generated its own convenient beliefs, built its own institutions, and raised the price of deviation again. Welch mistook a cyclical reset for progress toward truth.
Welch believes his libertarianism because he reasoned his way to it. The Reason coalition around him believes the same thing about its own positions. Every member of the coalition experiences coalition-maintained belief as independent reasoning.
Welch’s style makes this worse rather than better. The dry skeptical voice, the refusal of moral theater, the ironic distance from hysteria, all of it performs the buffered self more convincingly than the hotter voices around him. Moynihan gets excited. Foster gets didactic. Welch keeps the ironic temperature low. The effect is to signal that he is reasoning rather than performing loyalty. Inside Turner’s frame, this is the most effective form of loyalty performance available. The coalition that rewards apparent independence rewards Welch more than it rewards his co-hosts.
The expert-led social engineering taboo catches Welch partially. He is better than most mainstream commentators on this question. He notices administrative state overreach. He writes about the failures of technocratic confidence. He is willing to say that complex systems defeat top-down control. This is one place where his circuit’s convenient beliefs happen to align with evidence. But notice what he does not do. He does not extend the insight to his own class. He does not write about how the cosmopolitan professional-managerial class generates failure as a structural byproduct of overreach. He criticizes the administrative state without criticizing the class that staffs and populates it, which is his own.
The biological variation taboo catches Welch completely. He does not touch it. Reason does not touch it seriously. The Fifth Column does not touch it. The heterodox professional-managerial circuit does not touch it, with rare exceptions that are quickly punished. Welch has spent forty years arguing about policy questions whose answers depend heavily on empirical claims about human variation, and he has never seriously engaged the empirical literature on human variation. The silence is coalition-enforced.
The private man is more thoughtful than the public performer. Welch knows better than to say the cliches he utters publicly.
Truth becomes briefly less expensive during institutional failure. The current American moment is one of partial institutional collapse. Major newspapers are losing their grip. Academic credentialing is losing its prestige. Public health authorities are losing trust. Intelligence agencies are losing legitimacy. The cost of deviation from elite convenient beliefs has dropped. A writer with Welch’s training could use the window to push further than his coalition has previously permitted. The question is whether he will. The new coalition forming in the wreckage will have its own convenient beliefs. Welch will attach to the version of the new coalition closest to his existing one. The prestige-adjacent heterodox circuit, now rebranded, will continue to reward him for holding the beliefs it already rewards him for holding.

Alliance Theory

Welch sorts the world into enemies. The public health establishment. The cancellation apparatus. The drug warriors. The hawks. The regulatory state. The tenured academic orthodoxy. The credulous establishment press. The populist right and its tariff-friendly economic program. The coalition coheres around shared hostility to these targets. Shared enemies as more load-bearing than shared positive programs. The Fifth Column audience does not agree on what to build. It agrees on what to oppose. The agreement on opposition is what holds the coalition together. A listener who stopped hating the right set of targets would stop being the show’s listener.
The enemies within the adjacent coalitions sharpen the point. Welch’s network has internal fights. Libertarians who went MAGA. Libertarians who went full anti-Trump. Heterodox liberals who drifted back to mainstream progressivism. Free-speech absolutists who softened on specific cases. Each of these defections produces commentary inside the coalition about who is still inside and who has left. The commentary is coalition maintenance. It tells remaining members where the boundaries run. Welch participates in these boundary-policing conversations on the Fifth Column and elsewhere. The participation is normal coalition behavior.
The moral vocabulary Welch uses carries the coalition’s signature. Words like authoritarianism, moral panic, moral entrepreneurship, censorship-industrial complex, expert failure, credentialism, rent-seeking, regulatory capture, status anxiety. Using the vocabulary marks the speaker as inside the coalition. Welch uses it fluently because he has been using it for thirty years.
Alliance Theory predicts the shape of Welch’s blind spots. He sees coalition behavior when other coalitions do it. He sees the progressive cultural coalition enforcing orthodoxy. He sees the MAGA coalition enforcing loyalty to Trump. He sees the public health coalition defending its members against criticism. He does not see, with anything like the same clarity, his own coalition doing the same work. The Fifth Column enforces its own orthodoxies. Reason enforces its own orthodoxies. The heterodox media network enforces its own orthodoxies.
The theory also predicts which of Welch’s positions will hold and which might bend. Positions the coalition rewards will hold even when evidence shifts. Positions the coalition is indifferent to might bend with evidence. Positions the coalition penalizes will not develop even when evidence supports them. Welch’s free-speech absolutism is load-bearing for the coalition. It will not bend. His drug legalization is load-bearing. It will not bend. His anti-tariff commitments align with the libertarian donor class. They will not bend. His positions on topics the coalition is less invested in will prove more mobile.
Welch lived for years in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia. His wife is French. He has spoken publicly about using French healthcare and finding it adequate or better than American alternatives. His position on healthcare is not derived from libertarian principle applied to the healthcare sector. It is derived from his life experience.
The belief system is not a unified philosophy that a man works out and then applies to each policy question. The belief system is a package of positions a coalition holds, and members absorb the package because the package is what the coalition pays them to hold. The package has internal contradictions because it was not built by a logician. It was built by the accumulated preferences of the men and women the coalition needs to retain. The contradictions are invisible from inside because coalition members do not inspect their own package.
The convenience is the coalition fit. The shallowness is the absence of any underlying system that would require the positions to cohere. Welch is not shallow as a man. He is well-read, seasoned, and sharp in his observation of rival coalitions. The belief system does not have depth because it does not need depth to do its work. It needs only to mark membership, signal enemies, and reward allies. Depth would be a luxury the coalition does not require and might not survive. A worked-out libertarianism would strip out the positions the coalition depends on for its class coherence. The worked-out version would be unpopular inside the coalition. The package version is what the coalition wants. The package version is what Welch supplies.
The same framework applies to most of Welch’s adjacent network. Glenn Greenwald the civil libertarian who supports Lula. Matt Taibbi the populist critic who keeps his Vermont distance from the populists. Bari Weiss the heterodox journalist who runs CBS News and the Free Press, a venture-funded institution with an ideological shape. Michael Moynihan the anti-extremist who keeps specific extremists off-limits from his mockery. Each case shows the package rather than the philosophy. Humans do not hold philosophies. Humans hold packages.

Niche Construction

Thinkers do not just occupy intellectual environments. They build them. The environment rewards certain traits. Those traits build more of that environment. Later entrants are selected for fitness inside the constructed niche. The niche hardens. The thinkers inside it become specialists. They lose the ability to survive outside it because they have been shaped by and have shaped the niche.
Welch’s niche is the cosmopolitan heterodox-libertarian professional-managerial circuit. It was constructed over several decades by a small set of institutions and personalities. Reason magazine anchors it. The Cato Institute provides its policy wing. The libertarian-adjacent wing of the legal academy gives it credentialed support. The Fifth Column provides conversation. The Free Press and parts of Substack give it a newer media layer. Adjacent figures at places like the Atlantic, New York magazine, and the New York Times op-ed page provide permeable boundaries with prestige media. The niche has its own vocabulary, its own reference points, its own inside jokes, its own enemies, its own pantheon.
Welch did not simply enter this niche. He helped build it. The McCain book, the Declaration of Independents, the editorship of Reason, the co-hosting of the Fifth Column, the relationships with Gillespie and Mangu-Ward and Suderman, all of it is niche construction work. Every essay he wrote made the niche a little more hospitable to writers like him. Every podcast episode reinforced the conversational norms the niche would reward. Every hire at Reason selected for the traits the niche needed.
Welch’s traits fit his niche almost perfectly. The dry style, the irreverent tone, the procedural liberalism, the antiwar instincts, the suspicion of panic, the cosmopolitan references, the Central European seasoning, the irony-forward stance. Every one of these traits is exactly what the niche rewards. This is co-construction. Welch’s traits made the niche. The niche then selected for more writers with those traits. The writers who joined reinforced the traits Welch already had. Over time Welch and the niche became so tightly matched that no other habitat could sustain him.
Niche construction also explains the niche’s durability and its limits. The niche is durable because it has been built out across multiple institutions, audiences, and formats. It has its own reproduction system. Young writers enter Reason as interns, absorb the niche’s norms, move to adjacent outlets, bring new readers into the niche, and eventually take editorial positions where they hire more writers with the same traits. The niche reproduces itself the way any constructed environment reproduces itself, by shaping the organisms that depend on it so that they continue to maintain it.
The niche has limits because it was constructed to solve certain problems at a certain moment. It was built in the 1990s and early 2000s to house writers who were too antiwar for the right and too anti-state for the left, too cosmopolitan for the Chamber of Commerce libertarians and too procedural for the populists. The niche solved the homelessness problem for a particular generation of writers. It was never designed to handle the problems that became central after 2015. Tribalism as a permanent feature of human behavior. Group differences in outcomes. The limits of assimilation. The biological basis of variation. The class interests of the professional-managerial stratum. The structural rather than ideological sources of elite failure. The niche did not evolve to process any of these. It was built to fight the last war, which was the war against post-Cold War technocratic confidence and post-9/11 emergency-state expansion.
Constructed niches can become traps. Beavers are magnificent inside their ponds and helpless outside them. If the pond drains, the beaver does not adapt. The beaver dies. Welch’s niche is draining. Reason is smaller than it used to be. The Fifth Column exists but does not grow the way it once did. The heterodox circuit has fractured as younger writers moved toward either the post-liberal right or the populist left. The prestige-media outlets that used to treat the niche as an interesting sidebar now treat it as a relic. The audiences that used to listen for sophistication now listen for heat. Welch’s traits are still excellent inside the niche he built. Outside the niche, those traits do not travel well. He cannot go to Tucker Carlson’s audience. He cannot go to the progressive academy. He cannot go to the populist-right magazines.
The frame also illuminates the relationship between Welch and the broader American political ecology. Niches interact. One organism’s construction affects the selection pressures on others. The libertarian heterodox niche that Welch helped build contributed to the construction of adjacent niches that now threaten it. The Free Press emerged partly from the same construction materials and has largely absorbed the audience. The Substack heterodoxy scene has taken over functions Reason used to perform. The podcast-first political commentary genre has taken over functions magazine journalism used to perform. Each of these niches was built partly out of materials Welch and his collaborators laid down. Each of them now out-competes the niche Welch lives in for attention, money, and talent. He helped construct the adaptive landscape that his own niche now loses on.
What Welch helped build is what now gets inherited by younger writers. Virginia Heyer Young, Peter Suderman, Katherine Mangu-Ward, Matt Welch’s podcasting circle, the younger Reason staff, the Free Press young writers who came through adjacent training, all of them inherit an environment that was constructed by a small number of people over roughly twenty-five years. They experience it as the natural habitat of principled heterodox writing. It is not natural. It is constructed.
Welch’s eventual obsolescence is the ordinary fate of niche constructors. The dam gets built. The dam holds for a generation. The water finds another course. The beaver that built the dam cannot build a new one in a new place at the end of its life. The next generation of beavers builds somewhere else, using different materials, for different water. Welch built well. His dam held. The water is moving. The dam will be a feature of the landscape that later writers grew up in and partly shaped them, and also an artifact of a period that has ended.

Hybrid Vigor

Welch’s Central European decade is the crossing event. He took an American libertarian inheritance and ran it through Prague, Bratislava, and Budapest at the moment those societies were metabolizing the collapse of one imposed ideology and the construction of another. The crossing produced a version of libertarianism with traits the native American strains lacked. Suspicion of emergency rhetoric, allergy to official language, instinct for the gap between stated purpose and institutional function, comfort with the view that ideologies are mostly cover stories. These traits did not come from Rothbard or Hayek. They came from watching a society try to rebuild while everyone involved knew that everyone else was partly lying. The Babylonian Talmud analogy is not forced. Welch’s sensibility is a diaspora product. His American contemporaries who stayed home and read the same books produced thinner work.
Then the hybrid vigor stopped. Welch returned to the United States in the late 1990s and entered Reason. Reason is a closed breeding population. The staff recruit from a narrow pipeline. The readers self-select for a narrow set of priors. The intellectual inputs are broadly shared across the staff. For twenty-five years Welch has not crossed his formation. He has refined it, polished it, deployed it across new subjects, and transmitted it to younger writers. What he has not done is force it into contact with traditions that would stress it. He has not engaged biological frames. He has not engaged the sociology of knowledge. He has not seriously left critique of capital. He has not engaged right critique of cosmopolitanism. The diaspora sage stopped traveling, got married, reproduced, and stayed safe. The tradition he brought back became a closed system. Inbreeding depression has set in. The deleterious recessives are now expressing themselves. The work is predictable. A reader can guess Welch’s view on any new issue within ten seconds.
The life history theory frame reads Welch’s career strategy. He runs a slow life history inside a fast-life-history industry. Long tenure at a single publication. Deep investment in a small set of professional relationships. Incremental accumulation of craft. Careful maintenance of reputation over decades. Low risk tolerance for the moves that could have expanded his range. Columnists with faster strategies published the incendiary book, took the cable gig, swung for the viral moment, and either flamed out or broke through. Welch did none of this. He stayed at Reason. He co-hosted the Fifth Column. He waited. The slow strategy paid off in credibility and durability. It did not pay off in influence, which is what fast strategies purchase.
The Red Queen hypothesis reads the Fifth Column‘s endless argumentative labor. The show produces weekly episodes in which the hosts run to stay in the same place. The targets change, the takes update, the outrage gets processed, and the coalition’s position inside the heterodox circuit is maintained. Nothing gets built. No theoretical apparatus accumulates. No institutional power gets captured. The labor is defensive. It maintains relative standing against rival podcasts, rival outlets, rival voices in the same audience. The audience listens partly because it also has to run to stay in place. Everyone expends energy to not fall behind. Welch’s columnist labor is the same at a slower frequency. The Red Queen frame explains why forty years of good work has produced so little influence. The work was not designed to accumulate. It was designed to maintain position against competitors who were also maintaining position.
The immune system frame reads Welch’s Covid writing. The American public health apparatus had immune memory of certain historical pathogens: epidemics, quarantine failures, under-regulation of drugs. The memory persisted. When a new pathogen arrived, the immune system mounted a response calibrated to the historical exposures. Welch saw the response as disproportionate, which it was in many particulars. What Welch missed is that disproportionate immune responses are what immune systems do. They are not a failure of reasoning. They are the predictable output of a system shaped by selection to minimize Type I errors at the cost of Type II errors. Welch wrote as if better reasoning could have produced proportionate response. The biological frame predicts that no amount of reasoning would have produced it, because the system is not a reasoning system. It is an immune system with memory.
The superorganism frame reads Welch’s relationship to the administrative state. Welch writes about bureaucratic overreach as if it were a correctable deviation from properly limited government. The frame suggests the administrative state is not a deviation. It is a superorganism performing the functions that superorganisms perform. It maintains homeostasis. It constructs niches. It engages in horizontal gene transfer through the revolving door. It calibrates its immune system to identify threats that justify its continued expansion. Welch’s critique treats the organism as if it could be disciplined through better rules and more public scrutiny. Better rules produce more sophisticated superorganism behavior, because the organism adapts. Welch has been writing variations on the same critique for thirty years while the organism has grown.

The Tacit

Welch has tacit knowledge as a journalist. He has read press releases, watched press conferences, interviewed politicians, edited copy, and written columns for over thirty years. He knows when a story is managed. He knows which officials are lying and which are merely confused. He knows which retractions matter and which do not. He knows how the Washington press pool works because he has worked inside it. Much of what he notices in his pandemic coverage, his media criticism, and his political commentary comes from this accumulated sense. He cannot write it down as a set of rules. A twenty-five-year-old cannot read Welch’s columns and acquire what Welch has. The knowledge lives in him as practice.
The targets of Welch’s criticism run on tacit knowledge too, and Welch often treats their tacit knowledge as if it were something else. The CDC’s pandemic advisories were not mechanical applications of a rulebook. They were the product of committee judgments, informal risk assessments, bureaucratic accommodations, and professional instincts accumulated over careers. Turner’s work on public health describes these documents as boundary objects built through tacit processes. They are not “the science” in the literal sense. They are the negotiated output of a community of practice. Welch sees the failures: the reversals on masks, the selective lockdowns, the retracted Lancet paper. He presents the failures as if they prove the whole enterprise is fraudulent or the whole class of experts incompetent. Turner would say the failures are what tacit expertise looks like when its object is uncertain. The tacit knowledge was operating. The object was too novel for the tacit knowledge to handle. The result was the mess Welch documents. Welch is right about the mess. He is less right when he treats the mess as evidence that the tacit expertise was always a con.
Welch’s own coalition runs on tacit knowledge, and the tacit knowledge is invisible to him. The heterodox media class has a vast body of unwritten rules about what can be said, what tone is permitted, which alliances are acceptable, which guests are welcome, which positions mark the speaker as still inside and which mark him as outside. None of this is in any Reason editorial guide. None of it is in the Fifth Column‘s Patreon page. It lives in the practice of the men and women who produce the work. Welch knows the code so thoroughly that he does not experience it as a code. He experiences it as reasonable judgment about what serves the audience and what does not.
The tacit code of the heterodox class governs. Guests on the Fifth Column are selected by a standard no one has written down. Some heterodox figures are welcome. Some are not. The line is clear to insiders and opaque to outsiders. Coleman Hughes yes, Curtis Yarvin no. Glenn Greenwald yes, Tucker Carlson conditional. Bari Weiss yes in most eras, less so when she strays too farn. The topics that get sustained attention follow a similar code. Drug policy reliably. Speech suppression reliably. Lab-leak origins with appropriate tone. Specific foreign policy questions with the coalition’s preferred framing. Other topics get avoided or handled with care. The tacit knowledge tells Welch and his collaborators where the lines are without requiring them to articulate the lines.
The tacit code also governs tone. The Fifth Column voice is exasperated amusement. It is ironic. It is knowing. It refuses earnestness except about a small set of topics where earnestness is permitted. A guest who comes on and speaks earnestly about, for example, the positive case for progressive institutional reform will be handled differently than a guest who comes on and speaks earnestly about the harms of cancellation. The hosts have internalized which topics take which tone. They do not consult a manual. They operate on sense.
Who checks this tacit knowledge? The answer is no one easily, because tacit knowledge resists external scrutiny. The heterodox media class claims to be the outside check on the expert class. It presents itself as the readers’ corrective to institutional authority. Turner’s framework notes that the heterodox class has its own tacit authority, its own unwritten rules, its own insiders and outsiders, its own way of closing ranks against criticism. A reader who tries to evaluate the Fifth Column from the outside faces the same problem a citizen faces when trying to evaluate the CDC. The tacit knowledge of the practitioners is not fully legible. The reader trusts the heterodox class or rejects it.
Citizens can learn to distrust certain expert claims, support rival centers of expertise, and refuse the collapse of science into authority. Turner supports this modest project. Welch is part of the modest project in practice. He just does not see that his own work runs on the same tacit structure he criticizes in others.

Randall Collins’s Interaction Ritual Chains

The Fifth Column podcast fits Collins’s ritual model. Welch, Foster, and Moynihan gather in a studio. They focus on shared targets. They share a mood of irreverent skepticism. Listeners eavesdrop across a barrier, which heightens the intimacy of the core ritual. The podcast produces emotional energy (EE) for the three hosts and for the listeners who share their sensibility. It charges sacred symbols: free speech, heterodox journalism, skepticism of moral panics, contempt for legacy media piety. The Reason Roundtable with Suderman, Mangu-Ward, Gillespie, and Welch does the same work for libertarian policy symbols on a weekly schedule.
Collins’s concept of emotional energy explains Welch’s career arc better than ideological biography. Welch has moved among ritual venues. LA Times editorial page, Reason print magazine, Fox Business cable show, Twitter, now mostly podcasts. People gravitate toward higher-EE venues and away from lower-EE ones. Welch’s move from cable TV and Twitter toward long-form podcasts tracks this. Cable produces short-burst EE with low sustainability. Twitter produces micro-hits with rapid burnout. Podcasts sustain a richer ritual because they restore mutual focus and extended co-presence.
Deflationary criticism cannot produce high-EE rituals at scale. Collins’s model requires shared sacred symbols for solidarity. The Fifth Column charges symbols of skeptical independence, but the content of those symbols runs anti-ritual. Mockery and irony work well for niche solidarity and badly for mass politics.
Welch’s McCain book shows the problem in compact form. McCain as maverick was a symbol charged by decades of rituals. Sunday show appearances, Senate floor moments, town halls, POW narrative invocations at every campaign stop. Welch’s book was one deflationary intervention against a vast ritual apparatus. It circulated in libertarian circles and shifted nothing in the mainstream charge on the McCain symbol. Only his 2008 loss, his late turn against Trump, and his death drained that symbol, and the draining came from inside the civil religion rather than from outside critique.
Welch lived in Prague and Budapest for eight years starting in the early 1990s. He watched a whole symbolic economy collapse and a new one try to take shape. Communism’s sacred symbols went flat when the rituals that charged them, party meetings, parades, mandatory ideological study, stopped. Market democracy’s symbols tried to acquire charge through new rituals, NATO accession ceremonies, EU negotiations, IMF press conferences, but stayed thin. Welch watched this at close range. His later skepticism about symbolic construction has an empirical basis in that decade.
Welch critiques macro-rituals like Russiagate while building micro-rituals like the podcast. The micro-rituals give him the EE to sustain the macro-critique. The sustainability of his project depends on whether his podcast ritual chain can keep charging the symbols of skeptical independence faster than mainstream rituals can ignore them.
Symbols go flat without regular ritual recharging. The libertarian canon has this problem. Hayek, Friedman, Rand, Nozick. These names once carried high charge for young intellectuals because they circulated through campus rituals, YAF meetings, Cato internships, IHS seminars. The IR density has thinned. The symbols are fading. Welch’s work tries to recharge a smaller set, free speech, procedural fairness, anti-panic skepticism, through podcast rituals.

Charisma and Social Paradoxes

Welch presents as a journalist documenting what he sees. The presentation conceals an enormous selection operation. Welch’s coalition determines which stories deserve sustained attention. Pandemic reversals yes. Hunter Biden laptop yes. Defense spending with appropriate framing yes. Tariff policy with libertarian framing yes. Other stories get less attention or different framing. The selection is tacit. Welch does not consciously think, “This story fits my coalition’s needs.” He thinks, “This story matters.” What makes a story matter is a coalition judgment he has internalized so thoroughly that he experiences it as perception. The paradox works because he experiences his selection as attention to reality. His audience experiences his selection as attention to reality. The symbiotic deception requires the shared experience.
The unambitious careerist. Welch performs as a man who stumbled into journalism through Prague, kept writing because the work interested him, and ended up at Reason because Reason was where he fit. The performance conceals a substantial career. He has edited a national magazine. He has co-founded one of the more successful opinion podcasts in a crowded field. He has written several books. He has accumulated influence in a professional class. The career is real. The performance of non-ambition makes the career possible. A man who openly pursued a national opinion platform would have had a harder time reaching one. The man who presents as indifferent to the prize gets the prize in his niche.
The sincere cynic. Welch’s tone is exasperated amusement. The voice is ironic, world-weary, knowing. The ironic distance conceals a set of sincere commitments. Free speech. Drug legalization. Opposition to specific wars. The sincerity underneath gives the irony its weight. A purely cynical commentator reads as a troll. A purely earnest commentator reads as a crusader. Welch sits in the spot where the ironic surface protects the earnest core. Both the performer and the audience need both layers at once. If Welch dropped the irony, the sincerity would sound preachy. If he dropped the sincerity, the irony would sound empty.
The individualist who needs a team. Libertarian individualism is the official creed. Welch’s work runs on collective structures. The Fifth Column is a three-man operation. Reason is an institution with donors and editors. The heterodox network is a mutual-defense coalition. The libertarian who preaches self-reliance depends on his collaborators, his employer, his donor base, and his adjacent allies. The dependence is invisible inside the individualist frame. A man who said openly, “My individualism is produced and sustained by a coalition of people who make it possible,” would break the frame. No one in the coalition says this. The frame stays intact because all the members protect it together.
The Prague authenticity. Welch’s biography carries weight inside his coalition. He did not take the Harvard-to-NYT path. He learned Czech. He lived in Central Europe during the post-communist transition. He built a writing career through unusual channels. The biography is real. The biography also functions as a status signal inside the heterodox class, which values the self-made-man narrative and distrusts the Ivy-League-to-elite-media pipeline. Welch’s audience pays partly for the biography.
The coalition-relative character of the charisma matters. Welch reads as charismatic inside the heterodox liberal and libertarian-curious audience. His tone lands. His references connect. His pacing on the podcast rewards attention. The same performance reads differently to MAGA listeners, who see a fake libertarian selling out to the cosmopolitan class. It reads differently to progressives, who see a reactionary with a journalist’s cover. It reads differently to establishment libertarians, who see a man who has softened on healthcare and drifted on economic policy. The charisma is not a property of Welch’s voice. It is a property of the match between his voice and the coalition that listens to it. Pinsof’s framework insists on this relativity. Welch inside his niche is charismatic. Welch outside his niche is not.
The failure modes are instructive. Occasionally critics try to make Welch’s paradoxes visible. The libertarian-who-supports-socialized-medicine attack tries to force the paradox into the open. The you-always-attack-the-right-more attack tries the same move from a different angle. The you-select-your-evidence attack targets the reporter-following-the-evidence pose. These attacks land differently inside different coalitions. Inside Welch’s coalition, they bounce. The audience does not want the paradox exposed. The defenses close around Welch. Inside rival coalitions, the attacks land and stick. The MAGA audience sees Welch through the attacks. The progressive audience sees him through different attacks.
Welch is the man who is exactly what he seems to be and, at the same time, exactly what his coalition needs him to be.

Watergate as Democratic Ritual & Cultural Trauma

Chris Kavanagh runs a trauma construction operation against charismatic anti-institutional figures. Welch runs the opposite operation. He spends his career watching trauma constructions unfold and pushing back against them. He is not a carrier group producing cultural trauma. He is closer to the sociologist analyzing carrier groups from outside, except he does the work in real time and without the academic distance Alexander maintains. The application reveals both what Welch sees and what he cannot see from his position.
Welch’s journalistic career has been largely devoted to the work Alexander’s framework describes as necessary for seeing trauma construction. He watches events move from the profane level of ordinary politics to the sacred level of civic crisis. He pushes back when the movement outruns the evidence. He tracks the carrier groups making the claims. He notices when the claims serve the carrier groups’ interests. He applies the skeptical tools Alexander’s framework formalizes, without naming them in Alexander’s language.
McCain: The Myth of a Maverick (2007) is the clean case. McCain by 2007 had been converted into a civil religion figure. His POW suffering, his willingness to break with his party on specific issues, his personal courage, had been assembled by a specific carrier group into a sacred biography. The carrier group included the legacy press (David Brooks, Jonathan Chait, the New York Times editorial page), the political class that valued McCain’s bipartisan gestures, and the foreign policy establishment that valued his hawkishness. The carrier group had material interests in McCain’s sacred status. Their continued cultural authority depended on having sacred figures whose consensus views they could translate into policy.
Welch’s book performed the opposite of trauma construction. Alexander would call it desacralization. Welch treated McCain as an ordinary political actor pursuing ordinary interests. The POW years got handled with respect but without sacralization. The maverick positioning got treated as political strategy rather than as spiritual testimony. The hawkish foreign policy got examined for its consequences rather than absorbed as heroic commitment. The book refused the ritual frame. It insisted on the profane level of goals, interests, and normal politics, which is the level Alexander identifies as the starting point that trauma construction has to leave behind.
The book was effective at what it attempted. McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign collapsed partly because the sacred biography could not sustain the pressure of an electoral contest. Welch’s desacralizing work contributed to the collapse by making the sacred biography harder to sustain among readers who encountered the book’s arguments. The contribution was not decisive. The campaign had other problems. But the contribution was real, and it was the contribution Alexander’s framework would recognize as the opposite of what carrier groups do.
Welch spent the Russiagate years tracking the claims and how they evolved when evidence failed to materialize. He noticed when the construction required increasingly elaborate theoretical scaffolding to absorb the inconvenient findings. He applied the symmetric-application test: the same evidentiary standard would have produced different conclusions if applied to Democratic figures. He noted the material interests of the carrier group members who were producing the construction. He identified the ritual elements in the coverage that substituted for evidence as the story unfolded.
The work was effective. Welch’s columns and podcast commentary across these years constitute a sustained record that looks better in retrospect than most of the legacy press coverage does. The Steele dossier got treated with skepticism that proved warranted. The FBI’s investigation got examined for its internal problems that later inspector general reports confirmed. The claim that Trump was a Russian agent, or that collusion had been proved, got held to standards the claim could not meet.
Welch refused the carrier group’s representational work. He was insisting on the profane level of goals, interests, and normal politics against the carrier group’s effort to generalize upward to sacred values the construction required to land. He was noticing, in real time, the symbolic work the carrier group was performing and treating that work as what it was rather than accepting its products as natural descriptions of reality.

COVID as Alexander Template

The COVID-era coverage provides a parallel case. A different carrier group operated. The public health establishment, the academic-medical complex, the legacy press, and the Democratic political class assembled claims (the virus required unprecedented response, certain interventions were proven effective, alternative views were dangerous misinformation) into a sacred civic framework. Dissent from the framework got classified as pollution. Adherence got sacralized.
Welch spent these years doing analogous work. He tracked the claims and how they evolved as evidence accumulated. He noticed when the framework required increasing theoretical scaffolding to absorb the inconvenient findings. He noted the material interests of the carrier group. He identified the ritual elements (masking requirements that exceeded the evidence, school closures that the evidence did not support, treatment of lab-leak hypotheses as taboo). He applied the symmetric-application test.
The work was effective. Welch’s COVID coverage looks substantially better in retrospect than the coverage of most legacy outlets. Specific predictions he made have been vindicated. Specific criticisms have been absorbed into the mainstream consensus. The lab-leak hypothesis moved from conspiracy theory to official possibility. The school-closure evidence got reassessed. The masking evidence got qualified.
Welch successfully desacralized many specific claims. He made the carrier group’s construction harder to sustain in its original form. He did not prevent the construction. The ritual continued through his criticism and produced its effects regardless of the criticism. The construction succeeds through the specific mechanisms Alexander identifies, and no amount of external criticism can block those mechanisms if the carrier group has sufficient institutional power. Welch’s criticism made the construction’s eventual unwinding happen somewhat faster than it would have happened without the criticism. It could not make the construction not happen at all.

The Carrier Group Welch Cannot Be

Trauma construction requires a carrier group. The group needs universities, legacy press, judiciary, and regulatory bureaucracies. It needs the capacity to reach the public at the level of civic ritual. It needs the ability to mobilize social control institutions. It needs elite countercenters that can legitimate its claims against the center it is attacking.
Welch’s libertarian-heterodox niche lacks these resources. Reason magazine is small. The Fifth Column podcast has an audience but not the scale of civic reach the legacy press still commands. The libertarian academy exists but does not possess the cultural authority of the institutions that produced Russiagate or COVID expertise. The libertarian judiciary includes specific figures but does not operate as an elite countercenter in Alexander’s sense. The libertarian regulatory presence is approximately nonexistent.
This means Welch can deconstruct trauma constructions but cannot construct his own. The tax revolt, which Alexander mentions as part of the post-Watergate aftershock, remains one of the rare cases where libertarian-adjacent forces successfully constructed a sacred civic claim. It succeeded because it borrowed antiauthoritarian energy from the larger Watergate effervescence. The borrowing was temporary. The libertarian position does not command the institutional resources that would allow it to sustain its own trauma constructions across time.
Alexander’s framework identifies this asymmetry as structural. Carrier groups that possess the institutional resources Alexander names can construct traumas that reorganize symbolic classification systems. Carrier groups that lack these resources can only respond to constructions produced by groups that have them. The response can be effective at local levels, in specific cases, over specific time frames. It cannot produce equivalent constructions running in the opposite direction. Welch can deflate. He cannot inflate. The position is the structural position of the critic rather than the carrier group.
This is where Alexander’s framework adds something the earlier frameworks did not quite reach. It specifies that Welch’s inability to construct sacred civic claims is not a personal limitation or a strategic choice. It is the structural condition of operating from his niche. The niche produces critics, not carriers. The critics perform real work but cannot produce the cultural effects the carrier groups produce. The asymmetry between what the carrier groups can build and what the critics can unbuild determines the long-term trajectory of specific civic arguments.

The Style the Position Requires

Welch’s style is deflationary, ironic, procedural. It does not sacralize. It does not build mythic narratives. It does not mobilize moral outrage in the register that trauma construction requires. The style corresponds to the work the position enables.
The Watergate essay describes how the senators and committee staff built sacred time through specific techniques: the hushed voices, the formal procedures, the invocation of founding documents, the dramatic juxtaposition of villains and heroes, the refusal of ordinary political framing. The hearings operated in a liminal register that required participants to maintain the sacred frame. Any participant who broke the frame by treating the hearings as ordinary politics would have undermined the construction.
Welch’s style refuses the sacred frame constantly. His columns do not invoke founding documents in the register that sacralizes them. His podcast conversations treat civic crises as occasions for analysis rather than as sacred time. His book on McCain refused the heroic biography and treated McCain as ordinary. The consistent refusal of sacred framing is the style’s organizing principle.

The Watergate Paradox

Watergate produced reforms that libertarians should have supported. It punished executive overreach. It strengthened institutional checks. It created social control mechanisms that reduced the presidency’s capacity for abuse. It constrained the imperial presidency that libertarians had criticized for decades.
Watergate also produced reforms Welch’s position should complicate. The special prosecutor’s office became a permanent feature of American government. The media gained authorities that it had not previously claimed. The congressional committees developed powers that later expanded beyond their Watergate origins. The legacy press solidified its position as the civic-religious authority translating institutional knowledge into public deference. Each of these developments created institutional structures that later produced the carrier group operations Welch has spent his career critiquing.
Watergate’s rituals built the infrastructure for subsequent ritual operations. The carrier groups that produced Russiagate, COVID-era sacralizations, and Trump-era trauma constructions learned their moves from Watergate. The hearings as liminal space. The media as civic-religious translator. The bipartisan committee as sacred authority. The slow accretion of polluting associations around the target. The eventual purification through expulsion. These techniques, developed during Watergate, became the standard repertoire of elite carrier group operations.
Welch’s position should make him ambivalent about Watergate. He benefits from the constraints on executive power that Watergate produced. He suffers from the institutional apparatus that Watergate established for subsequent ritual operations. The ambivalence is structurally required. It does not typically appear in Welch’s work because libertarian conventional wisdom treats Watergate as a success.

Hero System

Matt Welch chases a specific immortality: the reputation of the journalist who saw through the cant of his age and wrote it down while his contemporaries got swept up. Left cant, right cant, establishment cant, populist cant. He earns standing by documenting other men’s capitulations.
Welch made his name in post-Communist Central Europe during the 1990s, reporting from Prague and Budapest through the transition. That period gave him a memory of state power and of what censorship produces. His libertarianism draws on witness more than theory.
Reason magazine supplies the coalition. The free-minds-and-free-markets network rewards contrarianism against both parties, anti-war commitments, drug-war skepticism, immigration liberalism, and free-trade loyalty. Reason pays him, publishes him, and gives him a readership that validates the posture. The Reason Foundation and its adjacent donor world supply the material base.
The Fifth Column podcast extends the script. Three journalists of different politics talk across tribal lines and refuse team discipline. The show rests on the promise that these men will say the true thing even when their side does not want to hear it. Welch’s project on the podcast is to serve as honest broker and archivist of elite hypocrisy, the man who keeps his notebook open when others close theirs.
The heroism requires symmetry. He must be hard on Trump and hard on the progressive left, document COVID-era civil liberties violations and MAGA authoritarian impulses, call the cancellers on campus and the book-banners in Florida. Tilt too far toward either side and the hero collapses into just another partisan.
Coalition signals stack up in a recognizable pattern: suspicion of state power in all forms, civil liberties maximalism, cosmopolitan immigration commitments, free trade, dismissal of tribal partisans, and a particular vocabulary of classical liberal, heterodox, independent journalism, adults in the room. He signals membership by naming the right enemies on both sides.
The costs of breaking ranks are real. A populist-right turn on immigration or trade alienates Reason and the libertarian donor world. A woke-left turn on speech or policing alienates The Fifth Column audience and the Bari Weiss-adjacent independent-media network that absorbs heterodox journalism refugees. Full conversion to either tribe costs him the platform that the coalition underwrites.
The contrarian needs an orthodoxy to oppose. When the center collapses, there is no fixed position from which to dissent, and the pose of the unfooled one looks different when partisans on both sides claim the same pose for themselves. Libertarianism has also aged. Reason’s cultural footprint is smaller than it was between 2005 and 2015. Koch institutional support has shifted. The ecosystem that rewarded the heterodox magazine journalist has been hollowed out by podcasts and Substacks. Welch has adapted by moving into those formats, but the hero system was built for a magazine world that no longer exists in the same form.

The Great Delusion

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Reason magazine stands for individualism, inalienable rights, universalism. These are the tenets of political liberalism Mearsheimer identifies. Welch’s output reads differently once you see him as a committed political liberal rather than a generic skeptic of state power. His anti-emergency-state writing, his anti-war writing, his concern with speech protections, his evaluations of Hungarian and Israeli politics by universalist standards, all coalesce around the inalienable-rights frame.
Welch professes atomism. His career demonstrates coalitional embeddedness. He lived in Prague with a peer group. He moved through a small libertarian ecosystem funded by a small donor network. He cohosts a podcast with two men who share his instincts. The beliefs that mark his coalition, skepticism of state power, pro-free-trade, anti-tariff, pro-speech, anti-war, suspicious of technocratic expertise, feel to him like conclusions he earned by looking at the world. Mearsheimer names them a value infusion. Pinsof reaches this by a different route. Mearsheimer targets the content of the ideology, not just the coalitional form.
Welch presents his views as earned through reporting, through the Central European decade, through the pandemic reversals. Mearsheimer reminds us that Welch’s reasoning faculty developed inside a value infusion set before he could assess it. The Prague experience did not teach him liberalism. It confirmed a liberalism he inherited. His family, his American Cold War upbringing, the journalistic culture he moved into, put the infusion in place.
Reason magazine cannot describe Orbán’s Hungary, Netanyahu’s Israel, Xi’s China, or Trump’s America except through universalist categories that miss what matters in those places. Welch treats illiberal politics as a departure from a baseline. Mearsheimer treats illiberal politics as the baseline and liberal politics as the brief anomaly.
Socialization infuses values before reason can evaluate them. Welch inherited his liberalism. If he is not just the product of his socialization and coalition, he has to demonstrate his reasoning. His reading list suggests he has not.

Welch Under Hugo Mercier & John M. Doris

Hans Freyer and his Weimar cohort were smart people who lost inherited faith and substituted faith in history, community, decision. They placed more load on their substitutes than the substitutes could bear. The catastrophic political consequences followed from the overload. Welch operates in a different structural position. He inherited no particular faith to lose. He did inherit an American civic vocabulary (small-r republican, procedural, constitutional) and has spent his career defending it against the accelerating pressures of emergency-governance, expert-deference, and tribal polarization. The question the Freyer parallel raises is whether Welch’s civic vocabulary can bear the load he places on it. Procedural libertarianism asks readers to accept the legitimacy of outcomes produced by fair processes even when the outcomes are bad. This is hard under current conditions. When the processes themselves are contested, when expert authority has collapsed, when tribal emotional energy has intensified, the procedural vocabulary Welch deploys may be asking more than most people can deliver.
Humans are tribal. The need for belonging, coherent in-group narrative, and shared purpose is real and evolved. Welch’s deflationary procedural skepticism asks readers to suspend tribal satisfaction in favor of proceduralist virtue. The ask is substantial. It may succeed with readers whose life circumstances make procedural virtue feel safer than tribal commitment. It fails with readers for whom tribal commitment feels like the only available meaning. This is not Welch’s failure. It is the structural limit of the procedural libertarian project under conditions of tribal intensification.
The Fifth Column audience is self-selected. Listeners arrive already disposed toward skepticism of institutional authority, free speech absolutism, opposition to forever wars, drug legalization. Welch’s documentation of expert reversals, selective enforcement, and media credulity lands with receptive readers whose vigilance is already deployed against the targets Welch attacks.
Every successful commentator operates under the same constraint. The question is what Welch’s project can accomplish given the constraint. Mercier’s answer might be modest. Welch reinforces existing commitments in his coalition. He provides language and evidence for positions readers already hold.
Welch’s coherence measures his success at finding a situational niche that allows his commitments to persist. The niche is narrow. Most journalists who held Welch’s 2003 positions on the Iraq war could not sustain them through the career pressures of subsequent decades. Welch could because he moved to Reason, because he co-founded the Fifth Column, because he built an audience that rewards the positions.
Welch’s commentary addresses low-stakes domains for most of his readers. Foreign policy decisions affect readers indirectly and diffusely. Pandemic restrictions affected them directly but are now in the rearview. Media credibility disputes are status contests for elites that most readers consume as entertainment rather than as practical guidance. The low stakes mean readers’ vigilance is relaxed. They accept Welch’s framings more readily than they might accept similar framings from commentators they disagreed with on topics of higher personal stakes.
This is structurally identical to what Myers does with his progressive Jewish audience on Israel-Palestine questions. The stakes for American Jewish readers are low in immediate practical terms. What Israel does is remote. The commentary is consumed as meaning-making rather than as practical guidance. Vigilance is relaxed because the stakes are low. Myers’s audience accepts his framings readily. Myers’s critics’ audiences accept their framings readily. Both audiences are doing what Mercier predicts. Vigilance proportional to stakes produces low-vigilance consumption of distant political commentary. The frameworks consumed are selected for coalition fit rather than for accuracy. Welch’s readership and Myers’s readership operate under the same general constraint. Both consume commentary at the level of vigilance the stakes warrant. Neither is engaged in rigorous truth-tracking. Both are engaged in coalition-maintaining sense-making.
Welch’s readers might believe Welch has character traits (contrarian, skeptical, fair-minded, procedurally committed). Doris might argue this belief is mostly a narrative construction readers impose on behavior that is substantially situationally determined. The provocative implication is that if readers met Welch in a different situation, they might not recognize the character they currently attribute to him. The Welch they experience is the Welch Reason and Fifth Column produce. A Welch without those institutional homes would be a different professional self.
The persona a professional commentator maintains across decades is constructed and sustained by his situations. Remove the situations and the persona does not survive unchanged. This is not hypocrisy on the commentator’s part. It is the structural condition of professional voice. The voice exists as situationally sustained performance. The person exists as whatever the person is when the voice is not on. Readers confuse the voice with the person. The confusion is inevitable given the medium. It is also misleading about what readers know about the commentators they consume.
In his Not Born Yesterday book, Mercier argued that we did not evolve to be gullible with regard to our vital interests. Welch does not make explicit claims about human gullibility as evolved psychology. He works at the level of institutional failures and instances of public credulity. His documentary mode is journalistic rather than theoretical. He does not cite Mercier or Doris or evolutionary psychology. What he does is document cases where the public accepted official claims that turned out to be wrong. The pattern of his cases implies a view of the public even though he does not theorize that view.
Welch’s repeated documentation of public acceptance of wrong official narratives (WMD in Iraq, initial mask guidance, Russiagate certainty, lockdown efficacy claims, Hunter Biden laptop dismissals as disinformation) implies that the public does accept false official claims with regularity. This is closer to a gullibility thesis than Welch typically acknowledges. If the public routinely accepts false official narratives on matters affecting their lives, the public is failing to deploy vigilance proportional to stakes. Mercier might say this is unusual and requires explanation. The Mercier framework holds that vigilance is deployed well on vital interests. Welch’s documentary record suggests vigilance is deployed poorly on vital interests. One of the two is wrong.
Welch’s cases are not quite what they appear. The public that accepted WMD claims was not a public whose vital interests were directly at stake. Iraq War was distant. Most Americans did not have sons or daughters deploying. The stakes were low enough that vigilance was relaxed. Mercier’s framework predicts this. Low stakes produce low vigilance. The public that accepted initial mask guidance did update when guidance changed. The updating was what Mercier predicts. People track epistemic authority. When authority shifts, they shift with it. This does not show gullibility. It shows responsiveness to expert consensus, which is adaptive under most conditions. Welch reads the shifting as failure. Mercier might read it as normal epistemic operation. The public that accepted lockdown efficacy claims had little capacity to independently assess the claims. Accepting expert consensus under uncertainty is what reasonable people do. The claims turned out to be more mixed than initial consensus suggested. The public’s acceptance was not gullible. It was conditional on the authority of the source, and the source’s authority has deteriorated since.
Does Welch treat the public as capable of the procedural-skeptical vigilance his commentary models? His writing implies that they should be so capable. His frustration implies that they are not. The combination suggests Welch holds a prescriptive rather than descriptive view of public cognition. He writes as if readers might be more like him if they tried, and as if their failure to be more like him is a moral failure on their part. This is not quite the Mercier view. Mercier might say the public is cognitively competent but deploys competence proportional to stakes. Welch writes as if the public’s deployment is systematically inadequate. The difference matters. Mercier treats current behavior as mostly adaptive. Welch treats it as mostly failing.
Libertarianism as a political philosophy depends on citizens capable of certain kinds of judgment. Self-government requires civic competence. Market operation requires consumer rationality. Voluntary institutions require associational competence. Welch’s commentary documents that citizens do not display the competencies libertarianism requires. If citizens can be this readily manipulated by institutional narrative construction, libertarianism’s assumptions about citizen capacity are wrong. This is the uncomfortable implication of Welch’s documentary record for his political commitments.
Welch has not quite resolved this tension in his writing. He continues to hold libertarian positions and continues to document facts that undermine libertarianism’s premises about citizen competence. The tension is visible in the gap between his descriptive reporting and his prescriptive politics. The descriptive reporting shows a public that fails its libertarian role. The prescriptive politics continues to assume the role is achievable. Either the public’s failures are contingent and correctable, in which case libertarianism remains viable with better information ecology, or the failures are structural and permanent, in which case libertarianism is unrealistic about human capacity.
Mercier might say Welch is partly wrong about the public’s gullibility. The public is not gullible. It is selective in where vigilance gets deployed. The public deploys high vigilance on face-to-face encounters, on immediate family matters, on direct financial transactions, on personal health decisions they can assess. The public deploys low vigilance on remote political events, on expert claims about complex systems, on media narratives about distant conflicts. This is not gullibility. It is rational allocation of cognitive resources. The public cannot afford to deploy high vigilance on every topic it encounters. It saves vigilance for topics where vigilance can produce useful action.
Welch’s project is about topics where vigilance cannot produce useful action for most readers. Whether the Iraq War was justified does not depend on the reader’s vigilance. The war happened regardless. Whether lockdowns were efficient does not depend on the reader’s vigilance. The lockdowns happened regardless. Welch’s commentary asks readers to deploy vigilance on topics where vigilance cannot produce action. Mercier might predict that most readers will not do this. The reason is not gullibility. The reason is that vigilance without the capacity for action is cognitively expensive and behaviorally unrewarding.
Under the Mercier framework, Welch is not informing a public that might otherwise be gullible. He is producing satisfying content for a subpopulation that has already decided to deploy high vigilance on political topics regardless of whether vigilance produces action. This subpopulation exists for reasons that are not rational. Some readers enjoy political vigilance as cognitive entertainment. Some readers find coalition belonging through shared vigilance with their preferred commentators. Some readers use political commentary as identity material. Welch serves this self-selected population. He does not rescue gullible masses from institutional manipulation. He supplies cognitive content to a niche audience that consumes political commentary for non-political reasons.
Welch probably does treat the public as disposed toward gullibility about vital interests, though he does not theorize this. His commentary implies it. The implication is partly correct (the public does accept many false official narratives) and partly misleading (the public’s acceptance is not gullibility but is appropriate epistemic deference under conditions where independent assessment is unavailable). Mercier might correct Welch here. The public is not gullible. The public is operating within the modest capacities that human cognition has. Welch expects more than the capacities permit. The expectation drives his frustration. The frustration animates his commentary. The commentary reaches an audience that shares the expectation and therefore shares the frustration. The audience is not representative of the public Welch thinks he is addressing. The public Welch addresses does not read him. The audience that reads him is the audience that already agrees with him. The gap between addressed public and audience is characteristic of deflationary political journalism.
Welch’s implicit anthropology is wrong. He treats gullibility as the public’s failure. Mercier might treat the same behavior as the public’s rational allocation of limited cognitive resources. The interesting consequence is that Welch’s commentary cannot achieve what his anthropology implies it should achieve. It cannot make citizens less gullible because citizens are not gullible. It cannot produce more vigilant public deliberation because the public is not underdeploying vigilance. It can reinforce the vigilance of readers who already deploy vigilance for non-political reasons. This is a smaller achievement than Welch’s commentary implies is possible. The smaller achievement is still valuable. It is just different from what the commentary rhetorically promises.
Freyer placed more load on history as a source of community than history could bear. Welch places more load on procedural vigilance as a source of civic virtue than procedural vigilance can bear. Both projects overestimate the human capacity for the cognitive operation the project requires. Freyer’s overestimate led to political catastrophe. Welch’s overestimate leads to a narrow audience rather than catastrophe. The difference is that Welch operates in a political ecology that makes his overestimate inconsequential. His audience is too small to matter politically. This is a feature of his niche rather than a criticism of his project. But the structural parallel holds. Both men ask more of human cognition than human cognition can consistently deliver. Both men therefore produce work that satisfies audiences who are already disposed to meet the cognitive demands the work makes. Neither man converts the uncommitted. Neither man produces the civic transformation the work’s premises imply is achievable.
Welch’s work is valuable within its audience. Its audience is smaller than Welch’s commentary implies is the public. The gap between actual audience and implied audience is unbridgeable because human cognition does not work the way Welch’s commentary implies it should work. The public is not gullible about its vital interests. The public is appropriately selective about where to deploy vigilance.

Buffered & Porous Selves

Welch is further along the buffered spectrum than David Myers. His commentary operates within buffered assumptions. Politics is procedural. Truth is empirical. Institutions are accountable or they are not. Meaning is individually constructed through choices about what to value and how to live. The enchanted cosmos that animated pre-modern political life (kingly legitimacy as divine appointment, national community as organic spiritual unity, political authority as partaking in transcendent order) is absent from Welch’s vocabulary. He does not argue against enchanted politics. He does not register it as an available option. His commentary assumes buffered readers engaging buffered political questions through buffered analytical methods.
This is standard for modern journalism. Most political commentary operates within buffered assumptions. Welch’s opponents increasingly do not share the buffered assumptions. The porous return in contemporary American politics is visible on multiple fronts. Trump’s appeal operates partly through porous categories (the nation as organic entity, the leader as charismatic vehicle of popular will, the enemies as contaminating agents). The integralist and post-liberal right operates explicitly through porous categories (natural law as metaphysical order, common good as transcendent rather than aggregate, authority as legitimate through its relation to truth rather than through procedural fairness). The progressive activist left operates through porous categories that its buffered adherents often do not recognize as porous (Whiteness as spiritual contamination requiring confession and purgation, structural racism as supernatural causal force affecting interior disposition, social justice work as redemptive activity).
Welch responds to these developments with buffered analytical tools. He treats Trump as bad procedure rather than as re-enchantment. He treats the integralist project as bad constitutional theory rather than as porous metaphysical commitment. He treats social justice discourse as bad epistemics rather than as religious phenomenology. The buffered analytical response registers what buffered tools can register. It cannot register what porous categories do phenomenologically for porous adherents.
Welch’s commentary is unable to reach the porous populations that are reshaping American politics. He addresses them as if they were buffered selves making bad buffered arguments. They are not buffered selves making bad buffered arguments. They are porous selves operating within enchanted frameworks that buffered critique cannot touch. The buffered critique lands with buffered readers who already share Welch’s buffered orientation. It does not land with porous readers for whom the buffered critique is irrelevant to what they care about.
This is the structural condition of buffered commentary engaging porous political formations. Buffered tools cannot disenchant the enchanted because the enchanted have already rejected buffered epistemics. The buffered tools work only on other buffered selves who have not yet traveled as far into re-enchantment as the populations Welch addresses. The audience that reads Welch is the audience that has not gone porous in the current American ways. This audience is shrinking as American politics becomes more porous across left and right.
Libertarianism is a buffered political philosophy. It assumes buffered selves making buffered choices within procedural institutions. Every libertarian premise requires buffered selfhood. Consent requires the buffered self capable of real choice rather than the porous self acted upon by forces outside itself. Property requires the buffered self capable of ownership as extension of interior sovereignty rather than the porous self embedded in webs of obligation that predate its individual existence. Procedural justice requires the buffered self capable of abstracting from particular claims to universal rules rather than the porous self whose justice is contextual and relational.
Welch’s sustained libertarian commentary presupposes buffered selfhood as the normal human condition. The commentary fails to account for the return of porous selfhood in contemporary American politics. When Welch documents that readers believe official narratives despite evidence of narrative manipulation, he reads their belief as cognitive failure. Taylor might read at least some of the belief as porous experience. The reader who accepts the expert narrative is not necessarily making a buffered decision to defer to authority. The reader may be experiencing the expert narrative as authoritative in the porous sense that buffered commentary cannot quite address. The authority is not chosen. It is felt. Buffered argument against it does not dislodge it because the experience is not subject to buffered argument.
Welch’s buffered commentary serves the small subset of Americans who maintain buffered political engagement against increasing porous pressures from multiple directions. The Fifth Column listeners are buffered selves seeking buffered company. They find it in the podcast. The podcast sustains their buffered orientation through buffered ritual (the three men performing analytical distance, empirical fidelity, and procedural skepticism together). The emotional energy Collins identified in the podcast is the emotional energy of buffered solidarity in an increasingly porous environment. The buffered selves feel less isolated when three successful buffered commentators perform buffered analysis together. The feeling is real. The political efficacy is limited to what buffered solidarity can accomplish, which is sustaining buffered orientation against porous drift, not reversing porous drift in others.
Welch’s project defends a historical moment that may have been brief. The American civic republican tradition Welch defends had a limited historical run. It depended on buffered selves of a particular kind (educated, property-holding, procedurally-minded, commercially engaged). This population was never universal. It was concentrated in certain classes and regions. The expansion of this population during the twentieth century may have been exceptional rather than normal. The current contraction of this population may be returning American politics to its historical baseline of substantially porous political engagement with buffered elites operating within porous majorities.
Welch writes as if the buffered political self is the normal American political self and current porous developments are aberrant departures from normality. Taylor’s framework suggests this may be wrong. The buffered political self may be the achievement of conditions that no longer obtain. Defending the buffered political self against porous return may be defending a historical formation rather than defending political normality. This is not a criticism of the defense. The buffered political self is valuable and worth defending. But the defense is harder than Welch’s commentary implies because it is defending a historical achievement rather than correcting recent deviations from a normal state.
If porous political formations are returning as the normal condition of American politics, libertarianism as a political philosophy is operating on assumptions that the relevant population no longer shares. The libertarian citizen is buffered. The contemporary American citizen is drifting porous. The gap between libertarianism’s assumed citizen and the actual citizen is widening. Welch’s project is aimed at readers who still fit the buffered citizen description. This population is shrinking as both left and right drift porous. Welch’s shrinking audience is what Taylor’s framework might predict. It is not that Welch has lost his touch or that his commentary has deteriorated. It is that the population capable of receiving his commentary has shrunk.
The buffered self Welch addresses and presupposes is not the dominant American self. The audience that reads Welch is the audience that has not yet drifted porous or that resists porous drift. This audience is shrinking because the conditions that produced buffered American selves are eroding. Welch is one of the last practitioners of a buffered political journalism that depends on a buffered readership that is decreasing.
This is poignant rather than tragic.
Welch’s commentary implicitly assumes that the public could be buffered if only the information environment were better. Taylor’s framework suggests this is wrong. The public is not becoming porous because of bad information. The public is becoming porous because modern conditions that produced buffered selves are weakening. Economic precarity. Community dissolution. Institutional distrust. Digital immersion in affective rather than analytical content. Class polarization. These conditions produce porous selves as the available psychological configuration for most people. Bad information does not produce this. The conditions produce this, and bad information is one of the symptoms rather than the cause.
Welch addresses symptoms. He cannot address causes because the causes are structural features of contemporary life that commentary cannot touch. His commentary is sometimes valuable for naming the symptoms. It is unable to address the conditions producing the symptoms.

Posted in David N. Myers, Libertarian, Matt Welch | Comments Off on Matt Welch: A Life Against the Emergency State

Resisting Defeat: Naturalism and Its Discontents in Contemporary Orthodox Thought

We need a 2026 version of David N. Myers’ 2003 book, Resisting History: Historicism and Its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought.

First, the specific analytical framework Myers deployed in Resisting History. His four thinkers (Cohen, Rosenzweig, Strauss, Breuer) were not rejecting modernity wholesale. They were operating from within modernity to carve out specific domains that historicism could not colonize. Each made a specific jurisdictional claim. Cohen preserved neo-Kantian ethics from historicist dissolution. Rosenzweig preserved revelation as meta-historical event. Strauss preserved pre-modern political philosophy as accessing truths historicist method could not access. Breuer preserved Halakhic existence as Metageschichte, outside ordinary historical time.

The 2026 equivalent would ask: who now does this work against what contemporary defeaters of Orthodox Jewish epistemics? The defeaters have shifted. In 1900 the defeater was historicism — critical historical scholarship undermining traditional claims about revelation, Mosaic authorship, historical reliability of Biblical narrative. In 2026 the defeaters include biblical criticism matured and now mainstream, evolutionary biology and cognitive science producing naturalistic explanations of religious experience, archaeological consensus that challenges Biblical historical claims, the general authority of scientific method in educated discourse, and the contemporary challenge of gender, sexuality, and egalitarian claims against traditional halakhic categories.

Who provides the most coherent rebuttals now. Let me think through several candidates.

Jonathan Sacks (died 2020). Sacks’s major move was engaging modern science, political philosophy, and ethics on their own terms while arguing that Jewish tradition contains resources that contemporary discourse lacks. The Great Partnership argues that science and religion answer different questions and need each other. Not in God’s Name addresses religious violence from within religious tradition. Sacks never rejected the findings of modern scholarship but argued that the meaning-making and ethical tradition Judaism offers cannot be derived from scientific method. This is parallel to Cohen’s move — preserve a domain scientific rationalism cannot access, but do not reject scientific rationalism within its domain.

Meir Soloveichik operates differently. He is explicit about Jewish particularism, critical of liberal accommodationism, willing to make theological claims in public forums. His First Things essays and his work as rabbi of Shearith Israel position him as a confident Orthodox intellectual engaging contemporary American conservative political philosophy. Soloveichik’s move is closer to Strauss — locate resources in pre-modern Jewish thought that can critique modern assumptions rather than requiring accommodation to them. The rebuttal he offers to historicist and naturalist defeaters is that they operate with their own unexamined metaphysical commitments that Jewish tradition exposes.

Chaim Saiman offers a different move. His Halakhah: The Rabbinic Idea of Law argues that Halakhah is not primarily a legal system in the Western sense but a comprehensive mode of thinking about reality. This reframes the conversation. Modern critiques of Halakhah often assume it functions as Western legal systems function and then find it wanting by those standards. Saiman argues the standards misapply. Halakhah has epistemic and ontological commitments that cannot be evaluated within secular legal theory’s framework. This is a Breuer-style move — Metageschichte as different domain not reducible to the categories that would defeat it.

Yoram Hazony presents a different case. His Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture argues that the Hebrew Bible is a philosophical work and that Western philosophy has systematically misread it by imposing Greek categories. His Conservatism: A Rediscovery argues for a conservative political philosophy grounded partly in Biblical and rabbinic sources. Hazony’s move is more expansive than the others — he wants Jewish sources to compete directly with Western philosophical tradition rather than retreating to Jewish domains. Whether this succeeds is contested. Critics argue he overstates the philosophical coherence of Biblical texts. But the jurisdictional claim is clear: Hebrew Scripture has standing as philosophy, not only as religious literature or historical document.

Shai Held operates on the liberal Orthodox edge or Conservative-Orthodox border. His Judaism Is About Love and The Heart of Torah make theological claims about divine love and human obligation that engage contemporary ethical discourse without retreating to particularism. Held’s move is to argue that Jewish theological tradition has resources for contemporary ethical problems that secular ethics lacks. He engages thinkers like Martha Nussbaum and Charles Taylor on their ground rather than claiming separate jurisdiction. This is a Cohen-style move — Jewish resources for ethical work that can compete within modern ethical discourse without requiring that readers accept metaphysical Jewish commitments.

Joshua Berman works on the historicist challenge from within. His Inconsistency in the Torah engages the documentary hypothesis directly, arguing that apparent textual inconsistencies that historical-critical scholars treat as evidence of multiple sources can be explained by ancient Near Eastern literary conventions. He does not reject the scholarly methods. He applies them with different assumptions and reaches different conclusions. This is the closest contemporary equivalent to Orthodox engagement with biblical criticism on criticism’s own ground.

David Weiss Halivni died in 2022 but his Peshat and Derash and Revelation Restored remain central. Halivni was Conservative but his work was taken seriously by Orthodox thinkers. He argued for theological frameworks that could accommodate the documentary hypothesis’s textual findings while preserving Jewish theological commitments about revelation. His move was to say that the Torah was “maculate” — imperfect in its transmitted form — but that this did not defeat the claim of Sinaitic revelation properly understood. This is Rosenzweig-like — preserve revelation as event while accommodating what historical scholarship requires about texts.

Menachem Kellner writes from Haifa, working on Maimonides. His Must a Jew Believe Anything? argues that Jewish tradition requires practice more than belief and that dogmatic commitments are more contested within tradition than Orthodox polemics admit. This is a different move. Rather than defending Orthodox epistemics against defeaters, Kellner argues that Orthodoxy itself has traditionally been less dogmatic than current Orthodox discourse claims. The defeaters defeat a hardened version of Orthodoxy but not the tradition in its fuller range.

Moshe Koppel engages contemporary questions. His Judaism Straight Up defends traditional Jewish life against both Reform-progressive Judaism and secular Western values using a combination of game theory, evolutionary psychology, and Jewish tradition. This is a Strauss-like move — turn the tools of modernity (here evolutionary social science) against the modern assumption that traditional life is irrational or outdated. Koppel argues that traditional Jewish community structures produce social goods that contemporary alternatives fail to deliver.

Tamar Ross writes from within Modern Orthodoxy on gender and feminism. Her Expanding the Palace of Torah engages feminist challenges to Orthodox Jewish life by developing a theory of progressive revelation that can accommodate changing moral understanding while maintaining commitment to Torah. This is perhaps the most Rosenzweig-like move in the contemporary context — preserve revelation while accommodating what moral seriousness requires about women’s standing.

Lawrence Kaplan works on Joseph Soloveitchik’s legacy. The Rav’s own work (especially Halakhic Man and The Lonely Man of Faith) remains central to Modern Orthodox intellectual self-understanding. Kaplan’s scholarly work on Soloveitchik continues this tradition. Soloveitchik himself was the great Modern Orthodox engagement with twentieth-century philosophy — neo-Kantian, Kierkegaardian, phenomenological — while maintaining halakhic commitment. Current Soloveitchik reception is doing work Myers’s original project would recognize.

The 2026 question is what has changed since Myers wrote. The historicist challenge Myers addressed has matured. Biblical criticism is no longer edge-of-scholarship provocation. It is mainstream. The Orthodox response has therefore matured too. Berman, Halivni, and others work within the scholarly apparatus rather than outside it. Meanwhile new defeaters have emerged. Evolutionary psychology, cognitive science of religion, archaeological minimalism about Israelite origins, and contemporary moral challenges around gender and sexuality have created new fronts.

The structure an updated Resisting History might take. Chapter on Sacks as engagement with science and secular ethics from within tradition. Chapter on Soloveichik-Halivni lineage preserving revelation while accommodating textual criticism. Chapter on Saiman as Breuer-equivalent preserving Halakhah as distinct domain. Chapter on Ross as engagement with feminist challenge through progressive revelation theory. Chapter on Hazony as expansive claim for Hebrew Scripture as competing philosophical tradition. Perhaps chapter on Held or Koppel as engagement with contemporary ethical and social-scientific challenges.

Each thinker makes a jurisdictional claim analogous to what Myers’s four made in their period. Each does so in contemporary idiom responding to contemporary defeaters. The question whether their moves are coherent rebuttals or sophisticated special pleading is exactly the question Myers asked about his original four. Rosenzweig’s move to preserve revelation was contested. Strauss’s move to preserve pre-modern political philosophy was contested. Breuer’s Metageschichte was contested. The contemporary equivalents face equivalent contestation.

The most coherent rebuttals probably come from those who engage the defeaters on the defeaters’ own ground rather than retreating to separate domains. Berman’s work on biblical inconsistencies is powerful because he accepts scholarly method and reaches different conclusions through more careful application. Sacks’s engagement with science is powerful because he accepts science’s findings and argues for domains science cannot address by its own methods. Saiman’s work on Halakhah is powerful because he engages legal theory rigorously and argues for distinctions legal theory has missed.

Less coherent rebuttals retreat to claims that Orthodox epistemics need only be coherent within Orthodox commitments. This is the move that does not satisfy defeaters because defeaters precisely question whether Orthodox commitments should be adopted. Rebuttals that require the rebuttal’s audience to already have accepted the position the rebuttal defends are not rebuttals to the defeaters. They are statements of commitment that the defeater has already questioned.

The 2026 observation is that Orthodox epistemic defeat is now not primarily at the scholarly level. The scholarly defeaters have been there for over a century and Orthodox intellectuals have developed responses. The current defeat is more social and experiential. Young Orthodox Jews are exposed to secular education, to social media, to peer groups that question traditional claims. The question is not primarily “can Orthodox epistemics survive historical criticism” but “can Orthodox life survive the social conditions contemporary life imposes.” The intellectual rebuttals may be coherent while still failing to prevent communal attrition. This is a distinction the original Myers project did not need to make as sharply.

Who works on this social-experiential problem. Moshe Koppel’s game-theoretic argument for traditional community structures is one answer. Haredi intellectuals like Aaron Lopiansky or Aharon Feldman do different work — they address their own communities rather than engaging the broader intellectual marketplace. The divergence between Modern Orthodox and Haredi intellectual responses is important for the 2026 project. Modern Orthodox thinkers generally accept the burden of engaging the defeaters. Haredi thinkers generally reject the burden, arguing that engagement concedes too much. The question of which approach produces more resilient Orthodox communities is empirical and contested.

One important thing Myers’s original project did that the 2026 update would need to preserve. Myers took his subjects seriously as thinkers even when he disagreed with their conclusions. He did not treat Cohen, Rosenzweig, Strauss, and Breuer as specimens to be analyzed from outside but as interlocutors whose arguments deserve substantive engagement. A 2026 update would need the same posture. The contemporary thinkers I have named deserve engagement, not dismissal or condescension. Their arguments might succeed or fail but they must be evaluated on the arguments.

Each thinker is making a claim about what domain belongs to Jewish authority, what domain belongs to general scientific or scholarly method, and where the boundary should fall. The contest is ongoing. Different thinkers draw the boundary differently. The 2026 landscape has more thinkers making more varied moves than the 1900-1934 landscape Myers mapped. The pluralism is itself a feature of the contemporary situation.

Myers’s original project was sympathetic to anti-historicism in a way the rest of his scholarly work sometimes was not. Resisting History showed him engaging positions he did not fully share with real intellectual generosity. A 2026 update would need the same generosity directed at contemporary Orthodox thinkers whose political and social positions are frequently at odds with Myers’s own. Whether current Myers could write such a book is an open question. The Myers of 2003 could. The Myers of 2026 may or may not be able to bracket his political commitments enough to engage, say, Hazony or Soloveichik with the generosity he extended to Strauss and Breuer.

If someone were going to write the book, the thinkers most deserving of serious treatment in my assessment would be Berman (on biblical criticism), Sacks (on science and ethics), Saiman (on halakhah as distinct mode), Ross (on gender and progressive revelation), Koppel (on social-scientific challenges), and the ongoing Soloveitchik legacy through Kaplan and others. Each addresses a defeater. Each proposes a strategy for maintaining Orthodox intellectual coherence. The book would work by showing what each strategy accomplishes and where each strategy runs into difficulty. The result would be the same textured picture Myers produced in 2003 — neither triumphalist defense of Orthodox epistemics nor dismissive critique of their project, but careful engagement with attempts to carry the tradition through contemporary challenges.

Posted in David N. Myers | Comments Off on Resisting Defeat: Naturalism and Its Discontents in Contemporary Orthodox Thought