In my post on Watergate, ChatGPT said:
Why other scandals don’t become Watergate
Many later presidents survived worse conduct. The difference is alliance cohesion. When elites close ranks, scandals are reframed as partisan attacks or procedural disputes. Watergate became “Watergate” because the enforcement institutions aligned against the president rather than protecting him.
What are examples of worse presidential conduct?
Alliance Theory and cultural sociology suggest that the survival of a president depends less on the legality of their actions and more on whether their supporters maintain a cohesive defensive alliance. When elites remain unified, conduct that might otherwise lead to a “Watergate humiliation” is successfully reframed as mundane politics or a partisan dispute.
The following examples highlight presidential conduct that many historians and legal scholars consider equal to or more severe than the Watergate break-in and cover-up, yet which did not result in a similar ritual of removal.
The Iran-Contra Affair (Ronald Reagan)
The Reagan administration engaged in the secret sale of weapons to Iran—a state sponsor of terrorism—to fund the Contras in Nicaragua, directly violating a congressional ban known as the Boland Amendment. This involved illegal arms transfers, the circumvention of the legislative branch’s “power of the purse,” and a subsequent destruction of evidence.
Reagan survived this scandal because the Republican alliance in Congress and the broader conservative elite remained unified. Rather than allowing the scandal to become a “sacred” crisis of the center, they successfully kept it in the “profane” realm of policy disagreements and administrative “mismanagement.” Because the enforcement institutions did not align against the president, a coordinated ritual of removal never materialized.
The Extrajudicial Killing of American Citizens (Barack Obama)
The Obama administration authorized the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, via a drone strike in Yemen without a trial or formal charges. This was a direct challenge to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.
This conduct did not result in a Watergate-style crisis because of the “authoritative closure” provided by legal and national security experts. These experts used their specialized knowledge to create a “liberal property” of secret legal justifications, framing the act as a “strategic necessity” rather than a “normative violation.” Because the elite alliance—including much of the media and the legal establishment—accepted this expert-led framing, the event never shifted from a profane security matter to a sacred moral pollution of the presidency.
The Disinformation Campaign Leading to the Iraq War (George W. Bush)
The Bush administration used intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that was later proven to be inaccurate to build a case for the invasion of Iraq. This resulted in a massive loss of life and a long-term destabilization of the Middle East.
While critics argued this was a “high crime” involving the deception of Congress and the public, it did not lead to a Watergate humiliation. The administration’s alliance used a “generalization of consciousness,” framing the war as a sacred struggle for “freedom” and “civilization” against “evil.” This ritualized framing synchronized the elite alliance and made dissent appear “impure.” By the time the profane facts about the lack of WMDs emerged, the alliance had already solidified its defensive position, reframing the failure as an “intelligence error” rather than a moral betrayal.
The Use of the IRS against Political Rivals (Richard Nixon/Others)
Ironically, one of the most significant abuses of power in American history is the use of the IRS to target political opponents—a tactic used by several presidents, including Nixon himself during the Watergate era and, as alleged by critics, later administrations.
When this occurs, the elite alliance typically closes ranks to frame the incident as a “procedural dispute” or the result of “overzealous bureaucrats.” By keeping the focus on lower-level actors and mundane administrative failures, the alliance prevents the pollution from reaching the “center” of the presidency. Without a “ritual of purification” like a televised hearing to simplify the drama, these scandals remain in the profane world of bureaucratic friction.
In each of these cases, the “everything is bullshit” framework suggests that the legal arguments used to defend the president were adaptive deceptions. The survival of the president was not a victory for the rule of law, but a victory for alliance cohesion. Watergate remains the exception because it is the rare moment when the “priests” of the legal cartel and the “focal points” of the elite alliance all synchronized against a single leader.
Likability functions as a vital lubricant for alliance cohesion, determining how easily a leader can maintain the “pure” status required to deter coordination by rivals. While not a substitute for structural power, it significantly influences the cost of protection for a president’s allies.
In the case of Richard Nixon, a lack of personal likability made it narratively easier for his rivals to reframe his conduct as a “pollution” of the presidency. Because he was not perceived as a sympathetic figure, the “ritual of purification” that was the Watergate hearings did not encounter a strong emotional counter-narrative from the public. This increased the social and political cost for his allies to stay loyal; they could not rely on his personal charm to “bracket” his transgressions. Once the “focal point” of the tapes emerged, his defensive alliance collapsed rapidly because there was no reservoir of personal goodwill to slow the defection.
Conversely, presidents like Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush used likability to maintain the “sacred” status of their office even during profane crises. Reagan’s personal charm allowed his allies to successfully frame the Iran-Contra affair as a series of administrative “misunderstandings” rather than a moral betrayal. His likability acted as a defensive buffer, making it difficult for the media or the legal establishment to successfully label him as “impure” without appearing mean-spirited or partisan. This lowered the cost of protection for his supporters, who could remain cohesive by pointing to his perceived sincerity and character.
Likability also shapes the “authoritative closure” provided by experts. When a leader is liked by the elite alliance, the “priests” of the legal and national security state are more likely to create secret legal justifications—”liberal property”—that protect the leader from scrutiny. For a leader who is widely disliked, like Nixon or Trump, these same institutions are more likely to align against the center, using their expertise to highlight “normative violations” rather than providing a protective shield.
Ultimately, likability is an evolutionary signal that aids in synchronization. A likable leader provides a “pure” focal point that is easy for allies to coordinate around and difficult for enemies to attack without risking their own reputation. A disliked leader is a “polluted” focal point; they provide a ready-made pretext for rivals to coordinate a removal ritual that the public is more willing to accept as a restoration of justice.
ChatGPT said: Here are clear, widely accepted examples of presidential conduct that was arguably worse than Watergate but did not become a Watergate, explained implicitly by alliance cohesion. I’ll list the conduct first, then the alliance logic underneath.
Lyndon B. Johnson and Vietnam deception
Johnson systematically misled Congress and the public about the Gulf of Tonkin and the scale and aims of the Vietnam War. This resulted in millions of deaths and a decade-long catastrophe.
Why no Watergate
Foreign policy elites, the Pentagon, Congress, and major media were deeply invested in containment logic. Exposing Johnson fully would have implicated the entire Cold War alliance. So blame was diffused into “mistakes” rather than moral violation.
Richard Nixon and the secret bombing of Cambodia
Nixon authorized massive illegal bombing of Cambodia, concealed from Congress, falsified records, and killed tens of thousands of civilians.
Why Watergate happened instead
The bombing did not trigger Watergate because elites largely agreed on Cold War prerogatives. Watergate broke him because it attacked elite political institutions directly. Foreign civilians are not part of the elite moral center. Congress and the press are.
Ronald Reagan and Iran-Contra
Reagan officials ran an illegal covert operation, violated congressional bans, laundered money, and lied repeatedly under oath.
Why no Watergate
Alliance cohesion held. Anti-communism, executive authority, and Cold War legitimacy mattered more than enforcement. Elites preferred ritualized hearings and eventual pardons over regime fracture.
George W. Bush and the Iraq War
The administration promoted false intelligence, launched a war of choice, destabilized a region, and killed hundreds of thousands.
Why no Watergate
The post-9/11 alliance was extraordinarily tight. Media, intelligence agencies, Congress, and allies were complicit. You cannot have a Watergate when too many people would be indicted by the truth.
Barack Obama and mass surveillance plus drone killings
Obama expanded warrantless surveillance, prosecuted whistleblowers aggressively, and normalized extrajudicial killings of U.S. citizens abroad.
Why no Watergate
These actions aligned perfectly with the national security and tech-bureaucratic alliance. They were reframed as technocratic governance, not moral violation. Elite institutions benefited.
Donald Trump and obstruction plus norm breaking
Trump engaged in obstruction, coercive use of office, norm violations, and election pressure.
Why only partial “Watergates”
Elites were split, not unified. Some institutions defected, others closed ranks. Without full elite convergence, scandals remained fragmented: impeachments without expulsion, outrage without purification.
The pattern, stated bluntly
Watergate was not about severity.
It was about who was endangered.
• Kill foreigners. No Watergate.
• Lie about war. No Watergate.
• Break international law. No Watergate.
• Undermine Congress, the press, and elite electoral machinery directly. Watergate.
Scandals only become existential when elite enforcement institutions feel personally threatened.
The decisive rule
A presidential scandal becomes “a Watergate” only when:
Enforcement elites align against the president.
The conduct is framed as polluting the institutional center.
Protecting the president is costlier than sacrificing him.
Nixon failed that test in 1973–74. Most presidents never did.
That’s why Watergate remains singular.
LF: “This suggests that Donald Trump is vulnerable because nearly 100% of elites hate him and much of his own party hates him.”
ChatGPT says: Yes, with an important qualifier.
Your inference is structurally right, but the vulnerability is conditional, not automatic.
Here’s how your four-tool logic cashes out.
First, why Trump looks maximally vulnerable
Trump violates almost every elite coordination norm at once. He attacks media, intelligence, courts, prosecutors, diplomats, universities, and even parts of his own party. That means he lacks the normal elite “buffers” presidents rely on when scandals break.
By Alliance Theory standards, this is suicidal positioning. A president normally survives by keeping at least one major elite bloc loyal. Trump keeps almost none.
So on paper, he looks like the perfect Watergate target.
Second, why that vulnerability has not fully materialized
Watergate required not just elite hatred, but elite unity plus narrative closure.
Trump produces something different.
Elites hate him, but they are not unified in how to deal with him. Some want criminalization. Some want electoral defeat. Some want exhaustion and normalization. Some want him gone but fear what comes after.
That fragmentation matters. Without a single purification ritual everyone agrees will “end” Trump, the system stalls.
Third, Jeffrey Alexander explains the blockage
Trump is hard to sacralize as a single moral violation because he generates too many violations.
Watergate worked because Nixon could be narratively isolated. One story. One cover-up. One climax.
Trump overwhelms sacralization. Every act competes with the next. Moral attention fragments. Ritual never completes. The public never experiences a clean liminal moment.
So instead of one Watergate, you get many partial scandals that exhaust rather than purify.
Fourth, David Pinsof explains elite behavior
Elites signal opposition to Trump constantly, but they do so in performative rather than decisive ways.
Why? Because decisive action carries risk. Prosecuting, banning, or permanently excluding Trump risks validating his narrative and mobilizing his base.
So elites signal hatred loudly while hesitating structurally. That is classic signaling without coordination.
Fifth, Stephen Turner explains why institutions struggle
Legal and bureaucratic elites are trapped by their own legitimacy standards.
They must act “procedurally,” “neutrally,” and “technocratically.” Trump thrives in exactly that gap. Every move against him is slow, narrow, and abstract. That prevents decisive institutional closure.
Nixon faced a political judgment.
Trump faces endless process.
That favors him.
So here is the corrected conclusion
Trump is uniquely hated by elites, yes.
But hatred alone does not produce removal.
It produces chronic instability.
Trump is vulnerable if and only if elites converge on a single story that:
Frames him as polluting the institutional center.
Produces a ritual that feels final, not iterative.
Makes protection costlier than expulsion for all major elite blocs.
That has not happened yet.
The paradox
Trump’s greatest weakness is elite hatred.
Trump’s greatest strength is elite disunity about what to do with that hatred.
That is why he keeps surviving things that, on paper, should have ended him.
Gemini says: The vulnerability of the current administration, when viewed through these frameworks, depends less on the level of “hate” from elites and more on the structural ability of those elites to coordinate an effective counter-alliance.
The Problem of Alliance Geometry
According to Alliance Theory, a leader’s survival is determined by the cohesion of their defensive alliance versus the synchronization of their rivals. While it is true that a vast majority of traditional elites—the “legal cartel,” the “terrorism industry,” and high-level bureaucrats—may oppose the president, their opposition only becomes a threat if they can find a focal point to coordinate their defection.
In the Watergate example, the “focal point” was the Nixon tapes, which provided a clear, undeniable signal that allowed Republicans to defect simultaneously without appearing to be motivated by mere partisan interest. Without such a signal, “hate” remains fragmented and profane, failing to trigger the ritual of purification necessary to remove a sitting leader.
Expertise as a Defensive Barrier
Stephen Turner’s analysis suggests that the president’s vulnerability is mitigated by his own use of expertise to create a closure of the political field. Even if his own party is divided, the administration uses executive authority to appoint its own “priests”—legal and policy experts who create a “liberal property” of alternative justifications.
By framing his actions through these specialized channels, the president keeps the opposition’s attacks in the realm of “partisan disputes” (profane) rather than “normative violations” (sacred). As long as the administration can maintain its own expert-led “counter-center,” it prevents the generalization of consciousness required for a society-wide ritual of removal.
The Role of “Everything is Bullshit“
The “everything is bullshit” framework suggests that elite “hate” is often a strategic signal rather than a reflection of objective moral outrage. Elites may signal opposition to maintain their status within their own social circles or to appeal to their base of “sacred” values, yet they may still cooperate with the administration on profane interests such as tax policy or judicial appointments.
The president is vulnerable only if his rivals can successfully label his conduct as a pollution of the center that threatens the very existence of the republic.
If the administration can keep the conflict at the level of mundane goals and interests, the elite alliance remains unsynchronized.
The “populist pushback” acts as a protective shield, as the president’s base views elite condemnation as a sign of his purity relative to their own interests, rather than a sign of his impurity.
Ultimately, a leader survives when the cost of defection for their allies remains higher than the benefits of joining the rival alliance. If the president can continue to reward his core alliance while deterring his enemies through “click-tatorship” or other direct signals, the “hate” of the elites remains a profane noise rather than a sacred force.
The Failure of Sacralization
Jeffrey Alexander’s model explains that a successful ritual of removal requires the public to experience a “clean liminal moment”. Watergate functioned this way because it was a singular, isolated narrative. In the current environment, the sheer volume of transgressions prevents any one act from being sacralized as the definitive pollution of the institutional center. Instead of a purification ritual that restores the sacred center, the constant cycle of scandals produces moral exhaustion.
Coordination without Convergence
Alliance Theory suggests that a leader is removed only when the cost of protection exceeds the cost of expulsion for a dominant coalition. While elite hatred is near 100%, the fragmentation of elite goals prevents the synchronization required for a Watergate-style climax.
Signaling vs. Action: Elites engage in loud, performative signaling to maintain status within their own groups.
Structural Hesitation: Decisive actions are avoided because they risk mobilizing the rival populist alliance.
Lack of Focal Point: Without a single story that all elite blocs agree upon, the opposition remains a collection of interests rather than a unified force.
The Procedural Trap
Stephen Turner’s analysis of expertise identifies a “legitimacy trap” for modern institutions. Because legal and bureaucratic elites must adhere to “neutral” and “technocratic” standards, their actions are inherently slow and narrow. This prevents the “authoritative closure” that a political judgment provides.
Process vs. Judgment: Nixon faced a sudden political collapse. The current administration faces iterative legal processes that favor a strategy of delay and exhaustion.
Expert Silos: Different expert groups (legal, intelligence, media) pursue their own narrow versions of “justice,” which prevents the generalization of consciousness needed for a society-wide ritual.
The Paradox of Survival
In the “everything is bullshit” framework, the persistent survival of the president is a result of the gap between elite rhetoric and elite action. The hatred is real, but the disunity regarding the “endgame” creates a defensive shield for the presidency.
Elite Disunity as Strength: The inability of rivals to converge on a single purification ritual means the system stalls in a state of iterative conflict.
Populist Protection: Every iterative move by elites is reframed by the populist alliance as a particularist attack on their interests, reinforcing the president’s status as the defender of their “center”.
Ultimately, Trump remains vulnerable in a theoretical sense, but his survival is guaranteed as long as elite hatred fails to produce a singular, final narrative of moral pollution.
Likability matters a lot, but not in the way people usually mean it. It is not about charm. It is about alliance friction.
Here’s the clean breakdown.
What likability actually does
Likability lowers the cost of elite coordination.
Unlikability raises the temptation to defect.
That’s it.
Likability does not save you if elites need to sacrifice you.
But it delays, softens, and fragments enforcement when things go wrong.
Nixon
Richard Nixon was deeply unlikable to elites.
He was paranoid, contemptuous, transactional, and openly hostile to journalists, bureaucrats, and Eastern establishment figures. He did not flatter elites or signal shared identity. He treated them as adversaries.
So when Watergate escalated, there was little emotional or reputational cost to abandoning him. Elite defection felt cleansing, not tragic.
Likability did not cause Watergate.
But Nixon’s unlikability made elite unity easy once the moral frame snapped into place.
Reagan
Ronald Reagan benefited enormously from likability.
Even elites who disagreed with him felt he was sincere, genial, and symbolically American. He signaled warmth, optimism, and respect for institutions even while pushing their boundaries.
During Iran-Contra, that mattered. Elites could tell themselves a story: the system malfunctioned, but the man was good.
Likability allowed blame to flow downward. Aides, agencies, and abstractions absorbed the hit. Reagan remained symbolically pure.
George W. Bush
George W. Bush is a mixed case, but still instructive.
Bush was not admired, but he was personally liked by many elites. He signaled humility, decency, and emotional accessibility. After 9/11, he was treated as a vessel for national trauma rather than a calculating operator.
That likability made it possible to reframe Iraq not as malice but as error. Errors invite forgiveness. Malice invites ritual punishment.
So again, likability did not erase consequences. It redirected them.
Trump, by contrast
Trump is not merely unlikable. He is anti-likable in elite terms.
He does not flatter.
He does not apologize.
He does not perform shared moral language.
He does not respect elite self-conceptions.
That dramatically raises alliance friction.
Every scandal involving Trump feels personal to elites because he makes it personal. That is why outrage is intense and persistent.
But here’s the twist.
Why likability didn’t end Trump
Likability matters before elite convergence, not after.
Once elites fully align on removal, likability cannot save you. Nixon proves that.
But if elites are divided, likability does not determine the outcome. Coordination does.
Trump survives not because he is likable. He survives because:
• elites disagree on the end state
• procedures fragment enforcement
• his base supplies an external counter-alliance
Likability would not fix those problems.
The rule you can take away
Likability is a lubricant, not a shield.
It helps elites excuse you.
It helps scandals diffuse.
It helps blame flow sideways or downward.
But it never overrides alliance math.
Nixon was unlikable and alone. He fell.
Reagan and Bush were likable and embedded. They survived.
Trump is unlikable but not isolated. That’s why the system grinds instead of snaps.
That distinction matters more than personality ever did.
