In the spring of 1144, the body of a twelve-year-old apprentice named William was found in Thorpe Wood outside Norwich. Nobody knows who killed him. A few years later a monk named Thomas of Monmouth arrived at the cathedral priory and began assembling an account that solved the crime and improved it: the Jews of Norwich, he wrote, had taken the boy at Passover and killed him in mockery of the crucifixion. Thomas was writing hagiography, the most prestigious literary form his civilization possessed, and he was doing the most virtuous work his world could imagine, glorifying a martyr, defending the faith, warning the flock. The blood libel, the accusation that would travel for eight centuries and get Jews killed from Blois to Kielce, entered the world as an act of piety. The men who spread it were devout Christians.
That is the pattern this essay traces. Antisemitism is old; its reasons are always new. In every era it presents itself in the moral vocabulary that era finds most compelling, which means it presents itself as virtue. When the highest good was faith, Jews were enemies of God. When the highest good was reason, Jews were carriers of superstition. When the highest good was the nation, Jews were the nation's solvent. When the highest good was science, Jews were a biological defect. When the highest good was the working class, Jews were capital. When the highest good was anti-imperialism, Jews were imperialism's agents. And in an age whose highest good is human rights, the oldest hatred arrives speaking of human rights. The costume changes on schedule. The body underneath does not.
When hostility toward Jews as Jews flourishes, it does not announce itself or even experience itself as hatred, because open hatred is expensive in every society. Instead, it usually lives and speaks in the language of love and righteousness because it comes from a desire to protect the home team. So the history of antisemitism is, read in a mirror, a history of what each civilization held sacred.
Let’s go deeper. People hate whatever threatens them (and threats to cherished beliefs might be more painful than other threats). Different groups in different times and places have different things to protect (such as status, resources, land, faith, nation, and hero systems). In an anarchic world of limited resources and dangerous threats from unpredictable neighbors, there are no permanent allies. Instead, there are group interests that are pursued through the language of the sacred because what could be more sacred to a group than its own survival? No other attitude makes evolutionary sense.
That is the thread. Follow it down.
Begin in Christendom, where the sacred was salvation. The theological indictment was older than Thomas of Monmouth: the charge of deicide, formalized by church fathers, declared Jews the enemy of God. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) taught that Jews should survive in degradation as living proof of Christian truth, a doctrine that protected Jewish life while guaranteeing Jewish misery, mercy and contempt fused into policy. The medieval escalations all spoke scripture. Crusaders who massacred the Rhineland communities in 1096 were en route to redeem the Holy Sepulchre. The expulsions, England 1290, France repeatedly, Spain 1492, were framed as the purification of Christian kingdoms. And at the Reformation the pattern crossed confessional lines intact: Martin Luther (1483-1546), in his 1543 tract on the Jews and their lies, called for burning synagogues, razing Jewish homes, and confiscating prayer books, all presented as severe mercy, the last hope of bringing a stiff-necked people to Christ or at least protecting Christians from blasphemy. Luther applied his own hero system at full pressure. Whatever a reader today thinks of the theology, the most learned men of the age, performing its highest virtue, arrived at the same target as the mob.
Then the sacred changed, and the indictment changed with it, sometimes within a single lifetime. The Enlightenment made war on the world that had produced the blood libel, on superstition, clerical power, and inherited dogma, and one might have expected the Jews, superstition's oldest victims, to benefit. Many philosophes did argue for toleration. But watch what happened inside the new vocabulary. Voltaire (1694-1778), the century's most celebrated enemy of fanaticism, filled his Philosophical Dictionary's entry on the Jews with contempt, portraying them as the original fanatics, an ignorant and superstitious tribe whose scriptures had infected Europe with the very unreason he fought. The man who spent his life crying out against religious persecution wrote of Jews with a venom he reserved for few others, and he did it as reason's champion. The indictment had been translated, deicide out, obscurantism in, and the translation was performed by the era's foremost moralist in the era's proudest idiom. A Jew reading Voltaire could be forgiven for noticing that the verdict had survived the revolution that overthrew the court.
The nineteenth century made the nation sacred, and the translation office worked overtime. Picture a study in Berlin in November 1879. Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) held the most influential chair of history in Germany; his lectures drew the sons of the elite; he sat in the Reichstag; he edited the Preussische Jahrbücher, the respectable organ of educated national liberalism. In its pages that month he published an essay on the Jewish question whose closing phrase, “the Jews are our misfortune,” would be quoted for six decades and eventually run as the masthead slogan of a Nazi tabloid. Treitschke wrote as a patriot performing a painful duty, warning that an unassimilable element threatened German unity, the fragile new sacred object that a professor was obligated to defend. Status details matter here: the essay's power came from the professorship, the journal's gray respectability, the tone of reluctant candor, a gentleman saying at last what gentlemen supposedly thought. Berlin's Jewish community understood the mechanism immediately; the scholar Harry Bresslau and others answered in print that the professor had given the street permission. The same decade supplied the parallel cases. In Vienna, Karl Lueger (1844-1910) built the first modern political machine on municipal virtue, defending the little man, the artisan, the Christian family, against Jewish capital, and became a beloved mayor whom a young Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) studied with admiration. In France, Édouard Drumont (1844-1917) sold hundreds of thousands of copies of a book that framed Jew-hatred as the defense of la France profonde against cosmopolitan finance, and the Dreyfus affair split the republic over a Jewish officer accused, in the name of the army's honor, the nation's sacred instrument, of treason. In each country the vocabulary was love of nation.
Science was next. Science carried the 19th century's supreme epistemic prestige, and the hatred wanted that prestige the way it had wanted the pulpit's. The word is evidence. In 1879, the same year as Treitschke's essay, the German agitator Wilhelm Marr (1819-1904) popularized a new coinage, Antisemitismus, because the old word, Judenhass, Jew-hatred, sounded medieval and emotional. The new term sounded taxonomic, cool, biological, a scientific position rather than a passion. It was a rebranding, and it worked. Race science supplied the doctrine: Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927) gave it a bestselling synthesis; respectable anthropologists measured skulls; eugenics, embraced across the political spectrum from progressive reformers to reactionaries as the era's forward-looking hygiene, provided the idiom in which exclusion could be discussed as public health. By the twentieth century's second quarter, the men who administered the catastrophe wore lab coats and doctorates alongside uniforms, and the murder of a people was organized in the language of disinfection, epidemiology, and racial hygiene.
The sacred changed again after 1945 and race biology became anathema, the one vocabulary whose invocation now destroys the speaker. The racial justification is the one that makes an antisemite more disliked. The robe is radioactive. The tailors moved on.
They had, in fact, already been working the other side of the street for a century, because the left generated its own translation early. When the sacred was the laboring class, Jews appeared as capital incarnate. The young Karl Marx (1818-1883), grandson of rabbis, wrote in 1844 an essay on the Jewish question whose second part identified Judaism with huckstering and money and looked forward to society’s emancipation from it, a text still fought over, but whose vocabulary became a template. Through the late nineteenth century, portions of the European socialist movement flirted with the equation of Jew and exploiter so persistently that the German socialist leader August Bebel (1840-1913) is credited with the era’s best diagnostic epigram, the description of antisemitism as the socialism of fools.
Yet the Russian Revolution began by opening doors, and the doors mattered as much as what later came through them. The Bolsheviks abolished the Pale of Settlement, struck down the tsarist quotas, and made pogrom agitation a crime; Lenin recorded a 1919 speech denouncing antisemitism as a landlords’ trick. Jews answered the opening the way they had answered America’s, and Yuri Slezkine (b. 1956) argues in The Jewish Century that in 1900 three promised lands competed for the Jews of the Pale, New York, Palestine, and Moscow, and that for the first Soviet generation Moscow looked like the winning ticket.
Within two decades Jews had become the most urbanized and educated nationality in the Soviet Union, overrepresented in the universities, medicine, the officer corps, the diplomatic service, the party apparatus, and the security organs, with Trotsky (1879-1940) commanding the Red Army and Jews prominent throughout the revolutionary leadership. The flourishing was real, comparable in speed and scale to the American ascent of Jews.
The purges thinned the Jewish old Bolsheviks in the late 1930s; the murder of the actor Solomon Mikhoels in 1948 and the liquidation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee opened the postwar campaign; and the vocabulary throughout was flawlessly proletarian. Watch one more scene: January 13, 1953, Pravda announces the discovery of a terrorist group of doctors, most with recognizably Jewish names, Kremlin physicians, men at the summit of Soviet medicine, accused of murdering Soviet leaders on behalf of an American Jewish organization. The doctors are agents of imperialism, tools of bourgeois nationalism; the campaign that preceded it had purged Jewish writers as rootless cosmopolitans, enemies of the people insufficiently loyal to socialist internationalism’s homeland.
Stalin (1878-1953) died weeks later and the plot was disowned, but the template survived him: for the next three decades Soviet propaganda conducted a well-funded campaign against Zionism in the language of anti-imperialism and anti-racism, exporting it to client states and liberation movements, complete with cartoons whose imagery any reader of Drumont would have recognized.
Within one century, Jews were indicted as communism’s carriers by the capitalist right and as capitalism’s carriers by the communist left, each indictment sincere in its own sacred vocabulary, each finding the same address.
At the same time, Jews rose to power and safety in the Soviet Union to the same degree that they did in America, and suffered far less communist persecution than did Christians.
Which brings the story to the present sacred. After 1945, and accelerating through the postcolonial era, the moral vocabulary of the West and of the international institutions it built became human rights, anti-racism, and anti-colonialism, the ethical lingua franca in which all claims must now be filed. By the thesis of this essay, one should predict that hostility toward Jews, where it persists, will file its claims in exactly that language, and the prediction is not hard to check. The scene: the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 1975, the thirty-seventh anniversary of Kristallnacht, as several delegates noted. The Assembly adopts Resolution 3379, determining that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination, the era's gravest moral category applied to the Jewish national movement, with sponsorship from the Soviet bloc and much of the Arab and postcolonial world. Israel's ambassador Chaim Herzog (1918-1997), who as a British officer had entered liberated Bergen-Belsen thirty years earlier, tore the resolution in half at the podium. The American ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1927-2003) declared that his country “will never acquiesce in this infamous act,” and made the analytic point that matters here: the resolution's danger lay in drawing down the moral capital of the anti-racist cause itself, spending the century's most sacred word on the century's oldest target. The General Assembly repealed 3379 in 1991, the only resolution it has ever revoked, which is its own kind of evidence that something other than ordinary politics had occurred.
The decades since have supplied the pattern's contemporary material. Israel is a state; states act; its actions in war and occupation are debated, reported, condemned, and defended in the same human-rights vocabulary applied to every state, and the majority of people using that vocabulary about Israel, including many Jews and Israelis, are doing what the vocabulary was built for. What the pattern predicts, and what the record shows, is that anti-Jewish hostility now travels almost exclusively inside this vocabulary, because no other vocabulary grants license. Americans, and left-leaning Americans especially, who firmly dislike a person who says he does not like Jews, dislike him significantly less when he appends a justification about Israel and Palestinian rights. The justification functions as a solvent. And the observational record since October 2023 shows the solvent at work in the wild: American anti-Jewish hate crimes more than doubling as a share of all hate crimes, synagogues and kosher restaurants and Jewish students, not Israeli institutions, absorbing the attacks, each incident deniable in the era's virtue-language as anti-Zionism, exactly as a Kielce pogrom was deniable as piety and a Vienna boycott as protection of the little man.
If sacred vocabularies license hatred, they also license the abuse of hatred's name, and the charge of antisemitism, carrying the moral weight it earned at Belsen, can be deployed as a weapon to place group conduct beyond criticism. That deployment is frequent. To do otherwise would not make evolutionary sense.
Notes
Norwich 1144 and Thomas of Monmouth: Gavin Langmuir, “Thomas of Monmouth: Detector of Ritual Murder,” Speculum 59 (1984); accessible overview, E. M. Rose, The Murder of William of Norwich (Oxford, 2015). The unsolved status of the actual killing is the scholarly consensus. Blood libel deaths at Blois (1171) and Kielce (1946): standard chronology; on Kielce, Jan Gross, Fear (Random House, 2006).
Ingroup love versus outgroup hate: Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?”, Journal of Social Issues 55:3 (1999), 429-444.
Augustine’s witness doctrine: Paula Fredriksen, Augustine and the Jews (Doubleday, 2008). Rhineland massacres of 1096: Robert Chazan, European Jewry and the First Crusade (California, 1987). Expulsions of 1290 and 1492: standard chronology.
Luther‘s 1543 On the Jews and Their Lies: Luther’s Works, American Edition, vol. 47; Thomas Kaufmann, Luther’s Jews (Oxford, 2017).
Voltaire: the “Juifs” entry in the Dictionnaire philosophique; Arthur Hertzberg, The French Enlightenment and the Jews (Columbia, 1968). My characterization paraphrases rather than quotes.
Treitschke: “Unsere Aussichten,” Preussische Jahrbücher, November 1879; the phrase “Die Juden sind unser Unglück” and its afterlife as the Der Stürmer masthead are documented in the Berlin Antisemitism Controversy literature; Marcel Stoetzler, The State, the Nation, and the Jews (Nebraska, 2008). Bresslau‘s reply is in the published Antisemitismusstreit corpus. Treitschke’s chair, Reichstag seat, and editorship are standard biography.
Lueger and Hitler‘s admiration: Mein Kampf‘s Vienna chapters; Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna (Oxford, 1999). Drumont‘s La France juive (1886) and the Dreyfus framing: Frederick Brown, For the Soul of France (Knopf, 2010).
Marr and the coinage: Moshe Zimmermann, Wilhelm Marr: The Patriarch of Anti-Semitism (Oxford, 1986); the deliberate scientific-sounding rebranding away from Judenhass is Zimmermann’s account. Chamberlain: The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1899). Eugenics as trans-ideologically prestigious: Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics (Knopf, 1985). Race hygiene and the medical profession: Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis (Harvard, 1988).
The licensing experiments, racial justification backfiring; the Israel and human-rights justifications reducing dislike among liberals; pre-registration: Jordan W. Moon, Michael Barlev, and Steven L. Neuberg, “Justifying Antisemitism: Political Liberalism and Perceptions of Prejudices,” forthcoming in American Psychologist; pre-registrations and materials at OSF.
Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” (1844): the second essay’s identification of Judaism with huckstering is in any edition; the scholarly fight over its meaning is real and the text is flagged as contested rather than settled. Bebel and “socialism of fools”: the attribution is conventional and slightly uncertain, sometimes traced to Ferdinand Kronawetter; the hedge “is credited with” is deliberate and should be preserved.
Abolition of the Pale, removal of quotas, criminalization of pogrom agitation, and Lenin‘s recorded 1919 speech, “On the Pogrom Persecution of the Jews”: text at Marxists Internet Archive.
Slezkine‘s three promised lands and the Soviet Jewish ascent, urbanization, education, overrepresentation in professions, party, and security services: Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton, 2004), especially chapter 4. The “most urbanized and educated nationality” claim tracks the interwar census data as Slezkine presents it; his chapter 4 has the specific figures if a number is wanted. Trotsky: any standard biography, e.g., Robert Service, Trotsky (Harvard, 2009).
Mikhoels‘s murder, January 1948, and the liquidation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, executions August 12, 1952, the Night of the Murdered Poets: Joshua Rubenstein, Stalin’s Secret Pogrom (Yale, 2001).
Doctors’ Plot: Pravda, January 13, 1953; Jonathan Brent and Vladimir Naumov, Stalin’s Last Crime (HarperCollins, 2003). Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda apparatus post-1967 and its export: Izabella Tabarovsky’s essays.
Resolution 3379, November 10, 1975: text and vote at Wikipedia; Herzog tearing the resolution and his Belsen biography: Chaim Herzog, Living History (Pantheon, 1996); Moynihan‘s speech, from which the seven-word fragment is quoted: A Dangerous Place (Little, Brown, 1978); the Kristallnacht anniversary observation was made in the debate itself. Repeal by Resolution 46/86, December 16, 1991, the only revocation of its kind.
FBI hate-crime shares, 11% to 27% of all hate crimes, year before to year after October 2023, and campus incident data: the Moon, Barlev, and Neuberg manuscript, citing the FBI Crime Data Explorer and ADL 2024. The observation that attacks fell on synagogues and kosher establishments rather than Israeli institutions is documented at the aggregate level in the same ADL and FBI data.
The four diagnostics are my synthesis; the “singularity of standard” test parallels Natan Sharansky‘s 3D framework, demonization, double standards, delegitimization, which you may cite or avoid depending on how much apparatus you want.
The position-based resolution in the closing section, the constant as position rather than essence: the underlying scholarship is the middleman-minority literature, Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities,” American Sociological Review 38 (1973); Thomas Sowell‘s essays on middleman minorities in Black Rednecks and White Liberals (Encounter, 2005); Amy Chua, World on Fire (Doubleday, 2003); and on the literacy-driven occupational position specifically, Maristella Botticini and Zvi Eckstein, The Chosen Few (Princeton, 2012). The reef sentence is mine.
Extrapolations without links, which I judge self-evident or flagged in text: the status texture of Treitschke’s Berlin and the 1953 Pravda scene; the characterization of hagiography’s prestige in twelfth-century monastic culture; the sincerity attributed to each era’s threat story, which follows from the Brewer and Moon citations rather than from any source describing the historical actors’ inner lives; and the closing tailor figure, which is a device, not a claim.
