Sociologist Philip N. Cohen

Ithaca, New York, sometime around 1986. An eighteen-year-old sits at a news desk in front of an IBM Selectric. To his right, a stack of tape cartridges, each one labeled on the front so the label can be read while the cart sits in the machine. To his left, single sheets of paper laid out on the table, each sheet paired with a cart. Each pair is a story.

The work runs like this. Interviews get recorded on cassette in the field, on reel-to-reel in the office. Back at the station the useful seconds get copied onto the carts. If a clip needs trimming, you cut the tape with a razor blade and splice it. As he types each story he takes a cart off the stack on his right and sets it beside the page on his left. When it is time for the newscast he carries the pairs down the hall to the booth, hands the carts in order to the engineer, who is also the disc jockey, and keeps the pages to read. When he reaches the part with the quote in it, he points, and the engineer fires the cart. The cart rewinds to the start of the clip and waits, in case it is needed again.

He is a reporter at WHCU-AM/FM, the CBS affiliate, about thirty hours a week at something like five dollars an hour. He graduated from the local alternative high school in 1985 and did not feel ready for college. He had trained in news at WVBR, the Cornell student station, through a school district internship. He got the interview at WHCU because his parents were friends with the news director. He covers city council, school board, planning board, crime, and research news out of Cornell University.

The craft has rules. Each story needs two versions, each carrying a different quote, to run on alternating half-hour newscasts, plus one-sentence headline versions for the quarter hours. Same length every time, whether the story is a fire or a zoning variance. The quotes have to be gathered in person, which means walking up to the mayor after the meeting and managing an interaction with an adult who outranks you while listening closely enough to know whether you have two clean stretches of fifteen seconds. And the newscast is live. At the end of the local evening news he wraps the market report and the weather while the second hand sweeps toward twelve, because at six o'clock the CBS World News Roundup begins and his time is over.

In May 2026, when the CBS Radio Network shut down after ninety-nine years, Philip N. Cohen (b. August 12, 1967) posted the photograph of himself at that desk and explained the workflow to readers who have never seen a Fidelipac. He noted what Ithaca had then: fewer than thirty thousand year-round residents and three radio stations with full-time news reporters, plus reporters from the Ithaca Journal, the Ithaca Times, the Grapevine, and the student papers. Four or five reporters at a school board meeting. When something big happened, more came down from Syracuse and Binghamton.

He added a footnote his students have not read. He still runs an undergraduate class to fill the time allotted, and says thank you as the last second elapses.

Forty years later he is a professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, the author of the leading undergraduate textbook on American families, the founder of the largest nonprofit preprint archive in the social sciences, a former plaintiff against a sitting president, and the man most likely to tell you, with the arithmetic attached, that a celebrated study cannot be right. The habits from the news desk are visible in all of it: fixed deadlines, no retakes, an insistence on getting the quote in person, and a working assumption that a story exists to be handed to strangers rather than to colleagues.

He came from a house where science was the family trade and where the terms of women's employment in it were a live subject at the dinner table. His father, Marshall Cohen, took a doctorate in mathematics at Michigan in 1965, did a postdoc at Princeton, where Philip was born, and then went to Cornell as a geometric topologist and combinatorial group theorist. His mother, Avis H. Cohen (1941–2026), took a bachelor's degree at Michigan in 1964, moved with two small boys to Ithaca, and started graduate school at Cornell in the early 1970s. Writing about that decision decades later, she gave two reasons. One was that she had already worked out a view of dynamical systems, before enrolling, and had found a new Cornell professor in neurobiology who shared it. The other was shorter: “Being a full time mom was wearing very thin.”

Her dissertation concerned locomotion in rats. She switched nerves across muscles and filmed the animals running with x-ray cinematography. Her adviser, the biolinguist Eric Lenneberg (1921–1975), died before she finished. She took the degree in 1977 and went to the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm for two years, the family with her, and there she did the work she is known for. Cut a short segment out of a lamprey's spinal cord, isolate it in a dish, and the nerves keep firing in the pattern of swimming. No brain required. The capacity to generate the rhythm is distributed along the cord. Back at Cornell she worked with mathematicians on a model of these central pattern generators that neuroscientists still cite, and the finding turned out to matter most to engineers: robots walk better when the pattern lives in the limbs and gets corrected by feedback than when the brain has to compose each step. Her most cited paper is about a quadruped robot.

Cornell kept her for ten years as a research associate. She won her own federal grants and ran a lab. No tenure-track offer came. Maryland hired her in 1990 as a full professor, and she went on to found its interdisciplinary neuroscience program, direct a National Science Foundation project for women in science, and be elected a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Her son's judgment on the Cornell decade, published on his blog after her death, is characteristically split into the defensible part and the indefensible part: passing on her in 1979 may have been reasonable, and passing on her by 1990, with the grants and the publications in hand, was not. He notes that Suzanne Bianchi, the Census Bureau demographer who became his mentor at Maryland and died in 2013, followed the same route. Faculty women who were never assistant professors.

Avis Cohen liked to say that her understanding of nervous systems bore on how people should think about their societies, and that the nervous system was less hierarchical than male scientists had assumed. She also told a story from her Illinois girlhood in the 1950s: that if she got all A's, no one would want to marry her. Someone did.

Her son has never, as far as I can find, drawn the obvious line in print between a mother who showed that coordination can be distributed rather than commanded and a career spent dismantling central authorities in his own discipline. The facts sit next to each other and the reader can do what he likes with them.

Before sociology there was more journalism and more politics. He reviewed local bands for the Ithaca Times, finding something to write about every weekend on a weekly deadline. He worked in the Ithaca left, the environmental and labor and alternative-media world that a college town of that size sustained in the 1980s. He did editorial work at the Michigan Daily as an undergraduate. He took his bachelor's degree in American culture at Michigan in 1992, with high distinction, a master's in sociology at Massachusetts in 1995, and a doctorate at Maryland in 1999 under Reeve Vanneman, with a dissertation on Black population size and the structure of American labor market inequality. The sequence matters for reading him: he came to sociology as a writer with political commitments who then acquired the tools to test claims, rather than as a scholar who later learned to write for strangers.

Two apprenticeships in the government's statistical apparatus completed the training. He was a research assistant at the National Center for Health Statistics in 1997 and a statistician and demographer at the United States Census Bureau from 1998 to 1999. Anyone who has built a household roster for a federal survey learns the same lesson, and it turns up in his work for the next thirty years: the categories are constructed by people for purposes, they change, and when they change the numbers move even if the world stands still.

He went to the University of California, Irvine, in 1999, and made his reputation there with Matt L. Huffman on the economics of gender at work. The two of them pushed past the familiar observation that women crowd into low-paying jobs. They examined whether an occupation pays less because it has come to be identified with women, and found evidence that it does. They joined individual earnings data to organizations, occupations, and metropolitan labor markets, which became his lasting methodological commitment: a worker's education and experience are worth what the surrounding structure will pay for them. Their 2007 article in American Sociological Review on female managers and the gender wage gap won the section award for sex and gender; later work with Jessica Pearlman on workplace desegregation won an award from the organizations and work section. He extended the same logic into the home, studying housework, care work, paid domestic labor, and the way state policy and wage structures set the terms of bargaining between spouses.

At the University of North Carolina from 2005, and at Maryland from 2012, the subject shifted from labor markets to families, with inequality still the question. Families distribute money, time, care, housing, standing, and risk. They shelter people from markets and reproduce advantage between generations. An early paper with Lynne Casper reconstructed historical levels of unmarried cohabitation from census data, and the exercise shows the pattern of his mind: before you explain a trend, establish that the instrument did not change.

Three words organize his textbook, The Family: Diversity, Inequality, and Social Change, now in its fourth edition and the standard assignment in the course. The mid-century arrangement of early marriage, a breadwinning husband, a homemaking wife, and several children was a historical episode resting on a particular labor market, legal order, and economic expansion. Its erosion widened women's options and produced cohabitation, later marriage, same-sex marriage, one-person homes, childless adults, and stepfamilies. Diversity did not abolish hierarchy. People with money, education, health, and support build flexible family lives; people without them experience the same freedom as instability.

His essay collection Enduring Bonds appeared in 2018 from the University of California Press. His wife, the historian Judy Ruttenberg, supplied the title, having found the phrase in Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges. The subtitle promises everything that makes families great and terrible, and the book delivers the second half as fully as the first. The same bonds that produce intimacy and obligation produce dependency, unequal labor, and stigma. His position is that sociology's job is to explain how the benefits and burdens get distributed.

The paper that made him famous among people who follow family statistics is “The Coming Divorce Decline.” He posted it to his own archive in September 2018, where three thousand people downloaded it, and Socius published it a year later. The proportion of married women divorcing each year fell about eighteen percent in the decade after 2008; adjusting for age, education, race and ethnicity, nativity, marriage order, and years married, it still fell about eight percent. The decline came from younger women. Newer marriages carry lower risk because the people entering them are older, better educated, more often marrying for the first time, and less often bringing children into the marriage. His conclusion was not comforting to either side. Marriage is becoming rarer and more durable at once, and stable marriage is concentrating among people who already have the resources that make it stable. He then did the thing that distinguishes him: every year, when the new American Community Survey data came out, he checked his own prediction in public. And in his own comment section he let a reader make the case against his framing, that divorce has become a poorer measure of instability as cohabitation, serial cohabitation, and third marriages have risen, and that a falling divorce rate can be used to paint a rosy picture.

This is the ground on which he has fought his longest fight, against what its advocates call the success sequence: finish school, get a job, marry, then have children, and you will very probably avoid poverty. Cohen does not dispute the correlations. His objection is that the sequence converts a description of who is not poor into an instruction for people who are, and that a public campaign urging the sequence supplies none of the things that make the sequence available, which are affordable schooling, steady employment, health care, housing, and a suitable partner. He points to the federal marriage promotion programs and their evaluations, where couples received their allotted hours of services and the measured effects on marital stability came out small or absent. His research with Joanna Pepin sharpened the argument into a question of supply: the availability of unmarried men differs sharply between Black and White metropolitan populations, so the advocates who compare married people with unmarried people and attribute the difference to marriage are assuming that the men are there to be married.

His antagonist in this argument has been W. Bradford Wilcox (b. 1970) of the University of Virginia and the Institute for Family Studies, and the argument has not stayed methodological. Cohen accuses Wilcox of overstating the causal benefits of marriage, minimizing selection, and presenting a preferred family form as an empirical result, and his blog post titles now say plainly that Wilcox lies. A reader who wants to evaluate the selection argument has to walk past the accusation to get to it. That is the recurring cost of his method, and he has never shown much interest in avoiding it.

Two research controversies established his standing as a man who audits his own side. The first was Mark Regnerus's 2012 study of adults whose parents had same-sex relationships, which conservative litigators used against same-sex marriage. Cohen was among roughly two hundred researchers who signed a letter arguing that the comparison groups did not support the conclusions, and he spent years on the study's funding, its review process, and its afterlife in court filings. Politically, that intervention cost him nothing.

The second cost him something. Alice Goffman's On the Run, an ethnography of policing and warrants in a poor Black Philadelphia neighborhood, had been celebrated in the discipline and beyond it. Cohen went at the one component of the work that could be checked by anybody: a household survey Goffman reported conducting with a man she calls Chuck. Her article in American Sociological Review described 217 homes in the neighborhood, 308 men aged eighteen to thirty found in residence, and 144 of them with warrants outstanding. Cohen did the arithmetic against census figures for comparable Philadelphia neighborhoods and found more than twice as many young men as those homes should hold. He noted that the residence rule, three days a week, could count the same man in two places, and that the reporting fell short of ordinary standards. Goffman's answer was that this was an ethnographic survey with different sampling and different definitions of who belongs to a home, designed to capture people whom conventional surveys never see. Readers can decide whether that answer covers the arithmetic.

American Sociological Review declined to publish his comment. The editors agreed he had identified errors and chose not to correct the record. He put the comment on his university web page and eventually published a version as a review in Social Forces in 2017. What began as a dispute about one survey became his standing complaint about the discipline: that a request to inspect the evidence behind admired work gets treated as a breach of manners.

Ten years later he is still counting. In December 2025, having been invited to talk with a National Academies panel on corrections and retractions, he sat down and went through Volume 90 of American Sociological Review article by article, clicking the links, and posted the results. Of eighteen quantitative papers, twelve provided code and data or information about obtaining the data, and six provided nothing. He counted the qualitative and mixed papers too. He gave his earlier tallies for comparison: four of fifteen in 2020, eight of twenty-five in 2023. He described his own methods as squishy and invited corrections, to be mailed to his office written on the back of a fifty-dollar bill. He noted that one article has been retracted from an American Sociological Association journal this century, in a case of documented fraud by a Dutch psychologist, and that the association's 2018 guide for editors does not contain the word retraction. He also advised the journal's staff to click their own links before publishing, since several papers carried blinded review links, and one pointed to a repository that required asking the author's permission.

In the comments, one of the authors he had marked as providing nothing agreed with him, promised a replication package when teaching quieted down, and thanked him.

The association was the institution he tried hardest to fix from inside. He chaired its family section, served as secretary-treasurer of its population section, sat three years as an elected member of its Committee on Publications, and co-edited Contexts, its public-facing magazine, with Syed Ali. In 2019 the association's leadership signed a letter to the White House opposing open distribution of federally funded research. He organized a petition against it, gathered more than two hundred signatures, got the Publications Committee to pass a resolution urging the governing Council to take up the question, and watched the Council ignore it. Committee members spent years trying to get the journals to adopt a policy that would merely tell readers whether a published article came with its data and code. Two subcommittees produced a mild version. The Council rejected it. At one point, he says, staff invented a rule that would have barred him from taking part in the discussion of his own proposal.

He resigned his membership in November 2021 and published his reasons. Membership and the annual meeting cost too much, and the association's own survey said so. The staff outlast the elected leadership and can stall anything. Publications are the largest source of revenue, which means library subscriptions, which means a transfer from teaching-heavy institutions to research-heavy ones, since publication in the association's journals is dominated by elite universities. Subscription prices had more than doubled in eight years. The association signed a new seven-year contract with Sage in 2018 without notifying members in advance. And, in the sentence that gives the whole document its flavor: “Sage throws the leadership a nice party at the conference.”

He also listed what the association does well, which he does more often than his reputation suggests. It publishes good research. It creates community. It has raised the standing of women and scholars of color through member elections. His conclusion was that these were no longer enough for him, and that the organization would have to hit bottom first.

The best objection came from his own comment section, from a junior scholar who agreed with the analysis and asked where new people would build professional networks if established people left. Cohen, a tenured full professor at a research university with a large blog audience, is the man in this dispute least exposed to the cost of exit. A commenter who said they had grown up with him added that they had always been the sibling who made trouble and started arguments about what was right, and that it was nice to see he had picked up the habit.

The other exit was involuntary. On June 6, 2017, the president of the United States posted about a plan to hand air traffic control to a private nonprofit. Cohen, who had learned that the fastest replies to a presidential tweet get the most attention, and who was verified, replied with a picture of Donald Trump (b. 1946) and a caption: “Corrupt Incompetent Authoritarian. And then there are the policies. Resist.” He had no view on air traffic control. Fifteen minutes later he found he was blocked.

He became one of seven individual plaintiffs in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, filed in the Southern District of New York in July 2017, arguing that the interactive space beneath the president's tweets was a public forum from which citizens could not be excluded for their views. The district court agreed in May 2018 and granted declaratory relief. The Second Circuit affirmed in July 2019. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment as moot in 2021, after Trump had left office and the account was gone.

The best image of him comes from a reporter at the courthouse. Leaving a hearing, Cohen hands the clerk his numbered chip, gets his phone back, and says: “Who knows what he did while we were in here?” Outside on Pearl Street he bounds down the steps to the photographers and holds the phone up to the cameras so they can shoot the blocked notice on the screen. He told a British education reporter that some of his friends thought the whole enterprise was a waste of time, playing into the president's hands and feeding the outrage industry without improving anything. “And honestly, they may be right,” he said.

His other public campaign was quieter and worked. In May 2021 he circulated an open letter to the Pew Research Center, signed by roughly a hundred and fifty demographers and social scientists, urging it to stop using labels like Silent Generation, Baby Boom, X, Millennial, and Z. The argument: the boundaries are arbitrary, they invite stereotyping, and they blur the difference between the effects of age, the effects of a period, and the effects of a birth cohort. Pew's director of social trends, Kim Parker, replied in July that “Generations are one of many analytical lenses researchers use,” acknowledged the risk of age stereotyping, and offered to discuss it. In May 2023 Pew published a new policy: generational analysis only where historical data allow comparison of people at the same age in different periods, the standard labels used sparingly, readers advised to treat them as reference points.

Cohen's own illustration of the distinction is the essay he wrote on turning fifty. Being fifty was of no analytic interest. Having been fourteen in 1981 placed him at a particular intersection of technology, music, politics, and money.

He founded SocArXiv in 2016, after Elsevier bought the Social Science Research Network and the discipline discovered how a commercial owner can change the terms of a repository it has acquired. The archive is free, nonprofit, run through the Open Science Framework, and supported by the University of Maryland Libraries. Its rationale is a sociological claim about sociology: journals do not only transmit findings, they allocate prestige, impose delay, restrict access, and convert unpaid academic labor into corporate revenue. A preprint archive cannot flatten the hierarchy. It can let work circulate before the hierarchy has processed it, and let a researcher in a country whose libraries cannot buy the packages read the same paper as a researcher at Harvard.

By the time the Kohli Foundation gave it the 2025 Infrastructure Prize for Sociology, ten thousand euros and an invitation to Fiesole, the archive held around seventeen thousand papers. It accepted 3,162 new ones in 2025, twenty percent more than the year before, and in early 2026 was running at a pace of about forty-three hundred a year.

Then the volume turned into a different problem than the one he built the thing to solve. Much of the growth was machine-generated. In November 2025 the archive stopped accepting papers about artificial intelligence to relieve its moderators. In February 2026 he wrote up the case that had unsettled him. Someone submitted a paper the archive would have accepted a few years earlier: dull, unoriginal, thin on literature, competent in its statistics, coherent, relevant, with real citations. Attached was a disclosure listing the tools used to generate the code, run the literature search, advise on the models, and draft the text. The author claimed to have formulated the question, chosen the variables, directed the analysis, interpreted the results, and verified every data point and quotation, and offered an audit on request. To reject it, the archive would have to reject it for the tools.

He worked through the arguments in public, against himself as much as anyone. He is not persuaded that using such tools is unethical, because all knowledge is learned from someone else and no norm requires citing everything you read. He thinks training may be fair use and that displacing the original producers' income would not be. He grants that an archive that assigns digital object identifiers without peer review is an attractive place for machines to deposit and to harvest. He also says he will not enter an arms race he expects to lose, and that a disclosure requirement he cannot verify is close to useless, since the chatbots read the rules too. And he says, more bluntly than most administrators would, that there is a great deal of bad work on his platform, that this does not damage the good work, and that where rejecting is more expensive than accepting, accepting may be the practical course.

The policy came out in March 2026, drafted by a subcommittee and revised by the full moderation team. One passage in his announcement is worth setting beside everything else in his career: “We feel the need to express our humanity in this process.” The archive will make human judgments, will not defer to automated detection, and promises fairness without any claim to algorithmic purity.

The man who spent a decade demanding that journals let readers check the code has ended up defending a queue of volunteers reading papers by hand and admitting that their standard cannot be written down completely.

His third book, Citizen Scholar: Public Engagement for Social Scientists, appeared from Columbia University Press in January 2025, and is the closest thing he has written to a statement of method. Its argument is that a researcher need not choose between an invented neutrality and unrestrained advocacy. Values shape the questions anyone asks. The obligations that follow are disclosure of where you stand, honesty about uncertainty, deference to evidence, and clarity about the edges of your expertise. A man may speak as a researcher, a teacher, an activist, an officer of an institution, a litigant, or a private citizen, and the trouble starts when academic authority is used to smuggle him from one role into another.

He practices the disclosure part relentlessly and without vanity. In June 2026 he published a tribute to his mother nine days after her death, including his own assessment of the promotion she did not get, and quoted the line she had used near the end when asked how she was: “Thank god, I'm fine!”, which he notes tended to amuse the doctors treating whatever was wrong with her. In her last years she would tell him that he had grown. He would protest that he was fifty-eight. She insisted. Two weeks later he published an account of a year on a weight-loss drug, including the detail that his state government health plan covers GLP-1 medications only for diabetes, so the year cost him about six thousand dollars out of pocket, and the advice that people should not comment on anyone's body unless invited. A demographer who publishes on deaths from alcohol, overdose, and suicide, and on the mortality of the married and the unmarried, treating his own metabolism as a public data point with the insurance code attached.

The same instinct produces his least defensible work. In July 2026 he published a post whose title asserts that Lyman Stone, a demographer associated with conservative family research, is a bigot, and set out the evidence: a 2023 thread in which Stone said the share of the population that is baptized and churchgoing is his primary measure of a good society and that he would dislike a high-functioning Sikh country, and a January 2026 post in which Stone wrote that “The Somali community is a scourge on the republic” and called for reviewing naturalization forms and deporting those with deportable offenses. Stone's defense, quoted in the post, is that the objection concerns pastoralist clan social organization rather than race, and that plenty of other African immigrants do fine. Cohen answers that condemning a whole community for its supposed behavior is the oldest available cover for condemning it, and compares Stone to Charles Murray (b. 1943), who once told him that his own position was not shouting fire in a crowded theater but “saying quietly and unhysterically, 'there's smoke.'” Cohen ends by saying that he would not hire Stone or publish his work and that his readers should not either.

Everything in that post is sourced, quoted, and linked, which is more than most such accusations offer. It is also a piece of writing whose conclusion is a hiring recommendation, from a man whose authority rests on his willingness to check arithmetic. Readers who think that judgments about evidence and judgments about character should travel separately will find the post an argument against its author's method. Readers who think a scholar owes the public a verdict when the evidence supports one will find it the method's fulfillment. He knows the reaction; he mentions, in a footnote, that Stone regularly calls him a liar.

He has kept a running account of how he is seen. Updating the media page on his website, he found himself mentioned in a piece about a journal editor, and in the anonymous comments beneath it, one reader asking “Why give Philip N. Cohen a voice in this discussion?” and another answering, with a laughing emoji, that he was the best sociologist of his generation. He posted both, said ouch, and added the observation that time spent on public outreach is time not spent on research, so if he had fewer media mentions he might have more research worth mentioning. The alumni blog of his old high school, meanwhile, has filed his career under a crusade for equality.

The checkable work has moved things. Anyone can recount the divorce rates in the American Community Survey, and the finding that marriage is becoming rarer and steadier has entered the standard account. Anyone can compare the number of young men Goffman reported in 217 homes with the number census data would predict, and the episode changed what sociologists expect to be able to inspect in celebrated ethnography. Anyone can count how many articles in a volume of the flagship journal come with their code, which is why the fraction has climbed from roughly a quarter to two-thirds in five years. Anyone can read the arbitrary birth years behind a generational label, which is why the largest survey organization in the country changed its policy. And anyone can download a paper from his archive without a subscription.

The unverifiable work has moved less. Whether a researcher at a think tank is lying or merely wrong, whether a man's views disqualify him from employment, whether an association's staff act in bad faith or merely in their own interest: these are judgments that ask the reader to trust the writer's character, and they are exactly the sort of claim that his own program says should be inspectable. He makes them anyway, in the prosecutorial register he learned reading copy against a clock, and they are the reason some colleagues who accept every one of his statistical arguments will not cite him.

His career amounts to an argument that sociology should be answerable to its data, its subjects, its students, the public that pays for it, and the readers who never get past the paywall. He has made that argument in journals, in a textbook, in a thousand blog posts, in federal court, in a letter to a survey organization, and finally in infrastructure, which is the form that outlasts an argument. What remains uncertain is whether the tool he built can survive a flood of writing that no one wrote, and whether the discipline that keeps improving its transparency numbers under his counting will keep counting once he stops.

He is fifty-eight, turning fifty-nine in August. He still posts most weeks. He still ends class as the second hand reaches twelve, and says thank you.

Notes

Opening scene (1986 newsroom). All detail is from his own account — the Selectric, the carts and paired pages, razor-blade editing, pointing at the engineer, two versions per story plus quarter-hour headline versions, ~30 hours/week at ~$5/hour, the job obtained through his parents’ friendship with the WHCU news director, WVBR training via a school-district internship, high school graduation 1985, the 6:00 p.m. CBS World News Roundup, the Ithaca media census, and the footnote about ending classes on the second. The photograph of him at the desk is in that post if you want to describe or reproduce it. Earlier account of the Ithaca Times music reviewing (a review due every weekend, around 1988) and his Mastodon note to the same effect.

Parents. Marshall Cohen’s Cornell page (PhD Michigan 1965; geometric topology, combinatorial group theory). Avis Cohen’s obituary post, the source for her birth (November 29, 1941, Chicago) and death (June 6, 2026), the 1964 Michigan BS, the Cornell PhD in 1977, Lenneberg, Karolinska 1977–79, the lamprey work, the ten years as research associate without a tenure-track offer, the Maryland professorship, NACS, the AAAS fellowship (2008), Distinguished Scholar-Teacher (2011–12), the robotics afterlife of central pattern generators, the Bianchi comparison, the “all A’s” story, “Thank god, I’m fine!” and “You’ve grown!” — verbatim quotes used: “Being a full time mom was wearing very thin.” (originally from her 2013 GGSTEM essay, quoted in his post) and “Thank god, I’m fine!” There is also a Transmitter obituary linked from his post. One softening on my part: his post says Lenneberg died by suicide. I wrote only that Lenneberg died before she finished.

Lehman Alternative Community School. Confirmed by Wikipedia and by his old school’s alumni blog, which titled its profile of him “How ACS Inspired Philip Cohen’s Crusade for Equality” (November 22, 2017) (search that title if the URL has moved).

Degrees, positions, awards. His CV and Wikipedia. Date discrepancy to resolve: Wikipedia gives UNC 2005–2011 and Maryland 2011–; his CV-derived material gives professor at UNC in 2011 and Maryland from 2012. I used 2012. Same for Contexts: Wikipedia says 2014–2017, his own site says 2015–2017.

Huffman collaboration. “Working for the Woman? Female Managers and the Gender Wage Gap,” ASR 2007, and Huffman, Cohen and Pearlman on workplace desegregation, 1975–2005. Award citations are on his CV.

Divorce decline. Paper: Socius 2019. Preprint. Blog version with the 18% unadjusted and 8% adjusted figures and the reader objection about serial cohabitation and redivorce. The three thousand preprint downloads before journal publication.

Success sequence and Wilcox. The failure of the success sequence; on marriage markets and partner availability, Who are you gonna marry?; on the Supporting Healthy Marriage evaluation and the 27 hours of services, This Supporting Healthy Marriage, I do not think it means; the 2025 post whose title accuses Wilcox of lying.

Goffman. His comment as filed; the original blog post with the arithmetic; the ASR rejection; the Social Forces review (95:4, June 2017, p. e5) and the full text. Goffman’s “ethnographic survey” reply is as paraphrased by Jesse Singal and quoted in Cohen’s post. The 217/308/144 figures are from her 2009 ASR article. Paul Campos’s Chronicle piece is the other place the arithmetic is laid out. Note: I deliberately did not say the ethnography was fabricated, and neither did he.

Regnerus. I wrote “among roughly two hundred researchers who signed” rather than crediting him with organizing the letter, because the 2012 letter to Social Science Research was organized by Gary Gates and others. His account of the review process.

ASR transparency audits. The December 2025 audit, with the 2025, 2023 and 2020 counts, the National Academies panel invitation, the single retraction from an ASA journal this century, the 2018 Publications Manual lacking the word retraction, the fifty-dollar-bill joke, the advice about blinded OSF links, and the author conceding in the comments. Earlier audits: Sociologist, scientist: toward transparency, accountability, and a sharing culture and Quick update on American Sociological Review’s failure to meet current social science standards. Sociological Science’s reproducibility policy, which he holds up as the comparison.

ASA. The two-stage exit: end of his elected term on the Committee on Publications and the resignation, source for the doubled subscription fees, the 2018 Sage contract, the library wealth-transfer argument, the invented rule barring him from discussing his own proposal, his list of what ASA does well, and the verbatim quote “Sage throws the leadership a nice party at the conference.” The petition against the 2019 ASA letter to the White House. The junior scholar’s objection and the sibling’s comment are both in the comment thread of the resignation post. I did not name the commenter who says they grew up with him, and did not assign a gender or relationship beyond their own words; the display name is “Ness Blackbird.” Also note: there is a widely circulated 2025 “Letter of Resignation from the American Sociological Association” over the Sociologists for Palestine resolution. It is by a different sociologist.

Trump. The tweet, the block fifteen minutes later, and the June 6, 2017 air traffic control post: complaint coverage at Forward and Lawfare. The courthouse scene, including the numbered chip, the steps on Pearl Street, and the verbatim quote “Who knows what he did while we were in here?” His explanation that he replies fast without reading, and the verbatim quote “And honestly, they may be right.” Case history: SDNY May 2018; Second Circuit, 928 F.3d 226 (2019); vacated as moot by the Supreme Court in 2021. Full plaintiff list: Buckwalter-Poza, Cohen, Figueroa O’Reilly, Gu, Neely, Papp, Pappas.

Pew. Open letter, May 26, 2021. Signatory count is reported variously as ~150 and ~170; I used “roughly a hundred and fifty.” Kim Parker’s July 12, 2021 response, source of the verbatim quote “Generations are one of many analytical lenses researchers use.” Pew’s new policy, May 22, 2023. His Washington Post op-ed, “Generation labels mean nothing. It’s time to retire them.” The turning-fifty essay.

SocArXiv. The archive’s own public figure is about 17,000 papers. See SocOpen news and essays. It accepted 3,162 papers in 2025, up 20%, and was running at roughly 4,300/year in early 2026: SocArXiv new submissions at record pace. Kohli Prize (€10,000, ceremony November 2025 at the European University Institute, Fiesole): SocArXiv wins Kohli Foundation for Sociology 2025 Infrastructure Prize and Kohli Foundation. The AI material is the freshest and most useful thing in the file: the case of the paper he would once have accepted, at Where should SocArXiv draw the AI line?, and the policy announcement at SocArXiv releases AI policy, source of the verbatim quote “We feel the need to express our humanity in this process.” The November 2025 moratorium on AI-topic papers and the November 2025 decision to stop accepting arts and humanities work are linked from those posts.

Citizen Scholar. January 2025.

GLP-1 post — source for the insurance detail (state plan covers GLP-1s only for diabetes; about $6,000 out of pocket for the year) and the verbatim quote “never comment on anyone’s body unless invited.” I omitted his weight, BMI, and body-composition numbers, which are in the post. They are his to disclose and I saw no reason to relay them.

Lyman Stone post — source for both Stone quotations (Cohen links the original X posts), Stone’s clan-organization defense, the Murray comparison, the hiring recommendation, and the footnote about Stone calling him a liar. The Murray line, verbatim “saying quietly and unhysterically, ‘there’s smoke,'” comes from What they say about race, where Cohen reports Murray confirming it to him. I gave Stone’s own framing in his own terms and left the adjudication to the reader.

Self-assessment. The anonymous exchange about giving him a voice, and his remark that outreach eats research time (verbatim quote used: “Why give Philip N. Cohen a voice in this discussion?”).

Extrapolations I made without citation: that a razor-blade splice, a live newscast, and a weekly music-review deadline train particular habits; that anyone building a federal household roster learns categories are constructed; that a tenured full professor bears less risk in leaving a professional association than a job candidate does. The one interpretive move I want to flag explicitly is the paragraph pairing his mother’s distributed-control science with his own institution-building. I say in the text that he has not drawn that line in print, and I did not assert a causal relationship. Her claim about hierarchy and nervous systems is quoted from his own post and is hers, not mine.

Luc Boltanski

In Paris, at the start of the 1980s, a sociologist sat with a box of letters that a newspaper had received and not printed. Luc Boltanski (b. January 4, 1940) had 275 of them, sent to Le Monde between 1979 and 1981 by people who wanted an injustice exposed. Working with Yann Darré and Marie-Ange Schiltz, he coded everything he could think of. The characteristics of the affair. How long it had been going on. Whether the letter came typed or on letterhead. Whether the writer had underlined heavily. Whether he had used insults.

Then he did the two things that made the study. He convened a jury of ordinary readers and asked each of them to rate every file for normality after one quick pass. And he defined the positions any denunciation has to fill: a victim, a denouncer, a persecutor, and a judge. Each position got coded for size, on an axis running from a single named individual to a collective.

What came back from the jury was not a ranking of grievances by how badly the writer had been wronged. It was a ranking by configuration. A letter in which a man speaks for himself about a persecutor who wronged him alone reads as private business, or as illness. The same complaint, with the victim enlarged into a category and the persecutor turned from a man into an office, reads as a cause. Boltanski called the work required to move from the first to the second desingularization, and the rise to generality. His paper's central sentence, in the standard English rendering, is that a normal denunciation is marked by the otherness of the denouncer and the victim, and that carrying one out requires the standing to speak up for someone else, to come symbolically to his aid.

Normality here is a judgment made by an audience. It runs loose from truth. A man can be right and be filed.

Boltanski built this instrument at the moment he was breaking with Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) over what a sociologist does. Bourdieu's sociologist unmasks. Boltanski's studies the unmasking, treating ordinary people as competent accusers whose grammar can be described. He got a theory of denunciation by declining to denounce. Anyone who picks up the instrument should keep that in view, because the model rates admissibility and says nothing about who deserves condemnation. Used as a verdict, it becomes the thing it describes.

Philip Cohen has spent twenty years filling the denouncer position in a discipline that has no established procedure for it. His work sorts cleanly along Boltanski's axis, and the sort explains something that complaints about his tone cannot.

Start with the case that works.

In December 2025, having been asked to meet a National Academies panel on corrections and retractions, Cohen opened Volume 90 of American Sociological Review and went through it article by article, clicking the links to see whether the code and data were there. Eighteen quantitative papers. Twelve arrived with replication packages or directions to the data. Six arrived with nothing. He counted the qualitative and mixed papers too, and he printed his earlier tallies for comparison: four of fifteen in 2020, eight of twenty-five in 2023. He added that the association's 2018 guide for editors does not contain the word retraction, and that a single article has been pulled from an association journal this century, in a documented fraud case involving a Dutch psychologist.

Now read the positions. The victim is anyone who wants to check a result and cannot, which is a category with no face. The persecutor is a procedure, a journal that permits the phrase available upon request. The judge is any reader holding the same volume, and the judge can overturn the denouncer, which Cohen invites when he calls his own methods squishy and asks that corrections be mailed to his office written on the back of a fifty-dollar bill. He appears in the file as a man who counted, and who can be recounted.

Boltanski's jury would have rated it high, and the discipline did. An author whose paper Cohen had marked as providing nothing arrived in the comment thread, agreed he was right, promised a package once teaching quieted down, and thanked him for what he does for the field. The share of quantitative papers shipping code has roughly tripled across the three audits.

The Pew campaign has the same architecture built by a different route. There Cohen enlarged the denouncer rather than shrinking him: an open letter in May 2021 carrying about a hundred and fifty signatures from demographers and social scientists. The victim is a category, everyone sorted by arbitrary birth years and described by traits assigned to the sort. The persecutor is a practice at a research organization, never a person. Kim Parker answered in July in the organization's voice, granting the risk of age stereotyping. In May 2023 the organization published a new policy: generational analysis only where the data support comparing people at the same age in different periods, the labels used sparingly.

Nobody was accused of anything. The configuration did the work.

The most exacting case in the file is the one where the victim is his mother.

Avis Cohen ran a lab at Cornell University for ten years on her own federal grants and got no tenure-track offer. Maryland hired her as a full professor in 1990. Her son published his account of this nine days after her death in June 2026, and every operation Boltanski describes is visible in the paragraph. He concedes the defensible version first: passing on her right after the postdoc may have been reasonable. He specifies the indefensible one: with the grants and the publications she held by 1990, it was not. He names no chairman and no colleague. The persecutor is a department that had no offer for her. And then he desingularizes the victim, setting Suzanne Bianchi beside her and naming the category they share, faculty women who were never assistant professors.

A grieving son writing about his own mother sits in the corner of the diagram Boltanski's jury filed as pathology, and Cohen gets out of that corner in four sentences. He knows how the filter works. He passed his mother through it.

The Goffman affair is where the configuration starts to move.

Cohen went after the one element of On the Run a stranger could test: a household survey reporting 217 homes on the block, 308 men aged eighteen to thirty in residence, and 144 of them carrying warrants. Census figures for comparable Philadelphia neighborhoods gave less than half that many young men. The residence rule, three days a week, could put the same man in two homes. He declined to say the ethnography was fabricated, which kept the persecutor from collapsing into a single young scholar: the file also indicted the referees who let the survey through, the committees that gave the book its prizes, and the professional habit of treating a request for the evidence as a discourtesy.

Then American Sociological Review rejected his comment. The editors agreed he had found errors and chose not to correct the record.

At that moment Cohen became the victim of his own affair, which is the position from which no denunciation travels. Watch the repair. He published the rejection. He put the comment on his university web page and later a version of it in Social Forces. And ten years on, in the audit, his rejected comments appear as evidence about journals rather than as evidence about him: two comments submitted, errors conceded by editors both times, no correction either time, one case described and the other withheld. The injury got converted into a data point in a series. Boltanski would recognize the maneuver as the only legitimate route out of that corner. A denouncer who is also the victim can be heard if he makes his own injury an instance of a general condition.

The Wilcox posts run the other way.

The empirical dispute has a high-normality victim: people with no money being instructed that finishing school, working, marrying and then having children will keep them out of poverty, when the schooling, the work, the health care and the available partners are the things they lack. That victim is a category, and the argument about selection into marriage is checkable by anyone who understands what a comparison group has to do.

Then there is the title asserting that Brad Wilcox lies, and the tag on the end of it, part whatever.

Boltanski's team coded for insults. They also coded for duration, the accumulating file, the correspondent who writes again. Both markers are in that title, one announcing the insult and the other announcing the series. And the persecutor has contracted to a single named man at the moment the reader needed him to stay general. The consequence is measurable in the reading: a person who wants the selection argument has to walk past a character verdict to reach it. The selection argument invites him to check. The verdict asks him to trust.

The Lyman Stone post from July 2026 is the strongest file in the drawer on evidence and the weakest on form.

The victims are general and plural: Somalis, and everyone outside the denouncing party's religion. The evidence is sourced and linked, which is more than most such accusations offer, and it consists of Stone's own posts. Stone's defense is in the file too, that his objection concerns clan social organization rather than ancestry.

Two moves then take the configuration apart. Cohen delivers the verdict rather than submitting the case, and he instructs the judge to act against the man: he would not hire Stone or publish his work, and neither should you. The judge position folds into the denouncer position, and the audience Boltanski's model reserves for weighing is handed a sentence to execute. Then Stone returns the same word, calling Cohen a liar, and Cohen answers in a footnote that he will not spell it out and that readers should ask Stone for receipts.

Two men trading the accusation of lying is the configuration ordinary readers file as a quarrel, whatever the record shows. None of this bears on whether Cohen has read Stone correctly. The jury in Paris was not rating truth.

The association posts are the interesting mixed case, because Cohen was himself the injured party and knew it.

He had served three years on the Committee on Publications and failed to get a policy adopted that would have told readers whether a published article came with its data. He says the staff invented a rule that would have barred him from taking part in the discussion of his own proposal. That grievance is as singular as a grievance gets, one man wronged by named colleagues in a committee room.

His resignation post in November 2021 puts the money first. Dues and conference costs that the association's own membership survey identified as the largest problem. Subscription prices more than doubled in eight years. A seven-year contract signed with a commercial publisher in 2018 without notice to members. Library revenue that transfers money from teaching-heavy institutions to research-heavy ones, since publication in the association's journals is dominated by elite universities. The personal insult about the invented rule appears well down the page, after the victim has been established as somebody else.

And then the model's signature: the victim showed up. A community college instructor wrote in the comment thread that the subscription fees had always been prohibitive for faculty like her, that she had stayed out of commitment to the organization, and that she was now cancelling. A denunciation that has completed its rise to generality recruits the people it claimed to speak for.

The best reply in that thread also turns on configuration. A junior scholar agreed with the whole analysis and asked where new people would build networks if established people left. The question resingularizes Cohen. A tenured full professor at a research university with a large audience bears none of the cost of exit. He speaks for the community college instructor and he does not stand where she stands. Boltanski's requirement of standing to come to another man's aid cuts in both directions, and the junior scholar found the edge that cuts back.

Something in the 2026 material suggests Cohen understands all of this in practice, whatever he would say about it.

His archive spent late 2025 and early 2026 drowning in machine-written submissions, and had to start refusing papers it would once have taken. Read the March 2026 policy announcement next to the July post about Stone. The policy comes in the first person plural. It names the five people on the subcommittee. It states the competing interests it is trying to balance, the scholars who want a reliable literature, the volunteers facing the queue each day, the independent researchers who need guidance. It declines to promise a fair standard that could be written down completely, says the archive will make human judgments and will not defer to detection software, and invites appeals. The line everyone quotes from it is that the team felt a need to express its humanity in the process.

That is a man writing from the judge's chair, and writing carefully, four months before he wrote a hiring recommendation from the denouncer's.

Which is what the frame earns. A complaint about tone locates the trouble inside a man, where nothing can be done about it, and where the complaint doubles as an excuse for ignoring arithmetic that happens to be correct. Boltanski locates it in a system of places, and places can be occupied differently. Cohen's consequential work stands where the injured party is somebody else and the accused is a procedure. His inconsequential work stands where he is the injured party and the accused has a name and a face.

Two things follow that are worth carrying past this case.

The filter has a cost, and the cost falls on the people it looks most reasonable to protect. Requiring desingularization means that a man wronged by an institution, alone, with nobody to speak for him and no series to attach himself to, cannot make himself heard until he finds a category to stand in front of. Institutions benefit from that requirement continuously and without arranging it. The editors who conceded Cohen's error and printed no correction were protected by his singularity for ten years, until he could file his injury as one of a pair inside a longer count. Most people never get the second instance.

And arithmetic is the cheapest desingularization available. A number anyone can recount arrives without an author. The reason Cohen's audits move journals while his verdicts move nobody is that a count of replication packages in Volume 90 has no interest in the outcome, no history with the accused, and no standing to establish. It does not need to come symbolically to anyone's aid. It just needs to be right, and to be checkable by a stranger with the same volume open on his desk.

Notes

Luc Boltanski, with Yann Darré and Marie-Ange Schiltz, “La dénonciation,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 51 (March 1984), 3–40. Full text free at Persée: https://www.persee.fr/doc/arss_0335-5322_1984_num_51_1_2212. Corpus confirmed as 275 letters sent to Le Monde, 1979–1981 (summary at https://www.tau.ac.il/~adarr/index.files/bibliographies/polemique/boltanski1984resume.htm ; a useful pedantic correction of a common overstatement of the corpus size is at https://thesociologicalpages.org — see https://thesocietypages.org/theory/2021/01/06/shai-dromi-reads-luc-boltanski/, which notes the letters went to something like the paper’s investigative desk). The English-language development is Love and Justice as Competences (Polity, 2012), whose opening chapter is the source for the coding scheme (typewriter or letterhead, underlining, insults), the jury of ordinary readers rating each file for normality after a rapid first reading, the four actants, and the coding of each actant for size on a singular-general axis. The key sentence I paraphrase about the otherness of denouncer and victim is Boltanski et al. 1984, p. 32; the English rendering I worked from appears in a 2025 Open Book Publishers volume applying the model to denunciations in the arts. On normality as a function of how a political order relates private interest to the common good, see the discussion of Love and Justice as Competences pp. 193–94 in https://academic.oup.com/ips/article/16/1/olab024/6408727. On the Bourdieu break and the pragmatic sociology of critique: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luc_Boltanski and Boltanski, “Sociologie critique et sociologie de la critique,” Politix 10–11 (1990).

There was a fortieth-anniversary colloquium in Paris in March 2024 with Boltanski present, and a resulting volume, Théories et pratiques de la dénonciation publique (Le Bord de l’Eau, 2026): https://www.editionsbdl.com/produit/theories-et-pratiques-de-la-denonciation-publique/ and https://carism.assas-universite.fr/fr/colloque-scenes-denonciation-publique-medias-langages-societes.

I applied only the 1984 model and its direct extension in Love and Justice as Competences. I kept Distant Suffering and On Justification out, though both are tempting: the topic of denunciation in the former and the orders of worth in the latter would each pull the essay into a second frame. The single line I let in from outside is the historical note that Boltanski developed the model while breaking with Bourdieu, which sets up the instrument rather than analyzing Cohen with it.

Two claims I want to flag as mine rather than Boltanski’s. First, that arithmetic is the cheapest desingularization available, because a recountable number arrives without an author. Boltanski does not say this; the singular-general axis in his paper runs over persons and collectives, not over kinds of evidence. It follows from his framework and it is the closest thing in this essay to an original contribution, so it should be defended as an extension rather than smuggled in as exegesis. Second, that the requirement to desingularize systematically advantages institutions over the individuals they have injured. Boltanski implies something adjacent when he says the constraints of normality depend on how a political order relates private interest to the common good, and he is describing rather than complaining. The sharper version is mine.

The essay reaches an unflattering conclusion about Cohen’s verdicts and a flattering one about his counts, and it reaches both by the same procedure, which is the only defense against the charge that the frame was chosen for the outcome. The Stone passage states his evidence, states Stone’s defense, and declines to say who is right, which keeps me out of a fight neither man needs me in. The guardrail paragraph is early on, that the model rates admissibility and not merit. Without it a reader can take the essay as a claim that Cohen’s accusations are false, which it does not make and which the frame cannot support.

The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification

Michael Power trained in the philosophy of the social sciences, then qualified as a chartered accountant and did audit work for Deloitte Haskins and Sells. He arrived at the London School of Economics as a lecturer in accounting and finance in 1987, which put him in Britain at the moment the word audit slipped its moorings. Medical audit. Environmental audit. Teaching audit. Technology audit. Quality audit. Value-for-money audit. A term that had meant a licensed professional checking a company’s books against evidence was suddenly available for any activity that somebody wanted held to account.

He wrote a pamphlet about it for Demos in 1994 called The Audit Explosion, and three years later a book of 183 pages, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, from Oxford. The argument has six moves, and the chapter titles carry them: the rise of audit, the audit explosion, audit and the dialectic of regulatory failure, audit knowledge and the construction of auditees, and then the last chapter, “Beyond Audit, Towards Trust.”

The core claims are these. Audit expands where confidence in professional self-regulation has failed, which means audit demand is a symptom of withdrawn trust. Audit does not restore the trust whose absence created it; it relocates trust onto the audit process and the auditor, at a further remove and with less visibility. What audits check, once they scale, is the system of control rather than the substance of the work, which Power calls control of control. Activities do not arrive auditable; they have to be made auditable, and the making reorganizes them around what can be documented. And the audited respond in one of two ways, either by producing compliance for the inspection while leaving the work untouched, or by internalizing the audit’s categories until the activity becomes the thing the audit can see.

Power has been careful about being read as a debunker. In a 2021 paper on the logic of the audit trail he wrote that accounting and auditing are “not inherently value-subverting and may be value-enhancing.” His complaint has always been narrower and harder to answer: the audit explosion has never been subjected to the scrutiny it applies to everything else.

Philip Cohen calls his own procedure an audit. In December 2025, reporting that two-thirds of the quantitative papers in the most recent volume of American Sociological Review came with replication packages, he described this as better than the results of his previous informal audits.

The word fits the practice, and the practice is extensive. He counts replication packages by volume. He counts how many articles have been retracted from the association’s journals this century, and arrives at one. He counts the birth years behind generational labels and demonstrates that the boundaries float. He counts the association’s subscription price increases across eight years and reads its revenue structure out of its own audited accounts. He counted the households and young men in Alice Goffman’s neighborhood survey against census figures for comparable Philadelphia blocks. He counts his archive’s submissions in thirty-day windows and posts the Stata code that pulls the metadata. When his own divorce prediction was published under a title that promised a future trend, he went back every year as new survey data landed and checked it in public.

A sociologist who does this much counting of other people’s compliance is running a private regulatory regime with no budget, no statutory basis, and one employee.

Power’s precondition for that regime is stated more clearly by Cohen than by any regulator. Asked to meet a National Academies panel on corrections and retractions, Cohen’s message was that sociology almost never corrects or retracts, and that the reason is circular: the discipline’s practices make it impossible to know whether serious errors or fraud are occurring. Trust cannot be extended because nothing can be checked, and nothing can be checked because trust has been extended. Elsewhere he describes the professional reflex he ran into over the Goffman survey, where asking to inspect the evidence behind an admired book got treated as a breach of collegial manners. That reflex is the claim of professional self-regulation, and Power’s whole book is about what happens after the claim stops being believed.

Here is where the frame earns its place, because it identifies exactly what Cohen’s numbers measure.

He does not count correct findings. He counts whether a package exists. In the 2020 version of the audit he said so, noting that he had assessed the packages at a glance and had not tested anybody’s code. The improvement he has documented, from four of fifteen quantitative papers in 2020 to eight of twenty-five in 2023 to twelve of eighteen in 2025, is an improvement in documentation. Whether the code runs, whether the data support the tables, whether the models were specified before or after the results were seen: none of that is in the count. Nobody has run those replications. The audit checks the control system.

Power’s term for the produced condition is auditability, and the tripled proportion is a record of auditability being manufactured across five years. The relation between auditability and correctness is an open empirical question that Cohen’s series does not address and could not address, and he does not claim otherwise.

The auditees behaved as Power’s fifth chapter predicts. Cohen’s tables catalogue the ceremonial forms: data available from the corresponding author on reasonable request, materials on the author’s personal website where they are not, a PDF of the code linked from a homepage, a repository link that requires asking permission, and blinded review links pasted into published articles by authors who had no interest in whether a reader could follow them. He tells the journal’s staff to click their own links before publishing. Each of those artifacts is what compliance looks like when the count is known and the substance is not.

Then the other response arrived in his comment thread. A sociologist who had published in a journal with a mandatory reproducibility policy wrote that assembling a replication package for the first time took a full day of work despite tidy file management, that people default to available upon request because collating for a stranger is labor rather than because they are hiding anything, that most researchers keep a system only they understand, and that the experience had converted him: he plans to build packages from now on whether or not journals require them, and at fifty-nine he does not accept being set in one’s ways as an excuse.

Both of Power’s responses to audit, ceremonial compliance and internal conversion, appeared in the same thread on the same December morning, one in the tables and one in the comments. The compliance cost the convert described, a day of skilled labor per paper, appears nowhere in the count. Power’s observation is that audit generates work whose value is invisible to the audit that generated it.

The regress is the part of Power’s argument that usually closes the trap. If audit displaces trust onto the auditor, then the auditor has to be trusted, and audit has produced a new object of faith rather than eliminating the need for faith. Financial audit cannot escape this, because the evidence the auditor examined belongs to the client and the auditor’s report is an opinion delivered to a principal. The public gets the opinion and never the working papers.

Cohen’s practice escapes it, and this is the most defensible thing about him. His evidence is a journal volume sitting on a library shelf. His caveat is that his methods are squishy. His invitation is that corrections be mailed to his office, written on the back of a fifty-dollar bill. His metadata code is posted. Anyone who thinks he has miscounted Volume 90 can open Volume 90. The audit’s inputs are as public as its output, which makes trust in the auditor optional, and optional trust is the only kind that survives contact with a discipline that has stopped extending it.

That is also the best available account of why his counts move institutions and his verdicts do not. A count anyone can redo carries no author with it.

The costs of his regime are visible in two places. The first is his own career, which has migrated from first-order work to second-order work. The man who established a reputation on the devaluation of women’s work, on metropolitan labor markets, on divorce rates and marriage markets, now spends December afternoons clicking other people’s links. He has said as much: time spent on public outreach eats research time, and with fewer media mentions he might have more research worth mentioning. Power’s audit explosion is precisely the growth of second-order activity, checking, at the expense of the first-order activity being checked, and here it can be traced through one publication record.

The second is the archive, which publishes its own compliance costs. Rejection rates far above historical levels. Moderation burden up. Revised versions now passing through the queue, which is welcome and which doubles the reading. Volunteers thanked. Cohen is one of the few people running an inspection regime who audits the cost of his own inspection in public.

Then came the paper that took the argument to its end.

Somebody submitted work to the archive that would have been accepted a few years earlier. It had an abstract. It had a title that reflected the contents. It had an ORCID. It had cited references, and the citations and quotations appeared to be real. Its statistical models were complex and apparently competent, with graphical and tabular results. It was coherent and relevant to existing research. The code was in a public repository. And at the end there was an AI disclosure listing the tools used to write the code, run the literature search, advise on the statistics, and draft nearly all of the text, alongside the author’s claim to have formulated the question, chosen the framework and the variables, directed the analytical decisions, interpreted the results, and verified every data claim and every citation. He offered a methodology audit on request.

Every element of the audit trail was present. The paper was dull, unoriginal, superficial, thin in its literature review, and empty where it claimed a theoretical contribution.

Power’s 2026 essay on auditability in the digital age describes the general condition: notions of evidence and auditability have become fluid, the spread of algorithms through the systems being audited pushes audit toward becoming algorithmic in turn, and the evidentiary basis loses its independence, until at the limit the audit becomes self-referential and the auditor is left as a “de-skilled curator” of models and their outputs. Cohen reached the same place from the other direction and wrote it out in the first person. The audit trail was manufactured by the technology whose presence the trail exists to disclose. He noted that a disclosure requirement he cannot verify is close to worthless, since the chatbots read the rules and will help an author appear to satisfy them, and that any attempt at detection would be an arms race against the people who own the machines, lost at the cost of the archive’s actual work.

He conceded the further problem in the same breath. His platform accepts work without peer review and assigns digital object identifiers and the other trappings of scholarly legitimacy, which makes it an attractive place both to deposit synthetic papers and to harvest real ones. He built an institution that issues auditable form without quality judgment, and the form is now being produced at industrial scale by systems with no interest in the judgment.

The policy that came out in March 2026 reads like the last chapter of Power’s book. It is written in the collective voice with the five members of the drafting subcommittee named. It states the competing interests it tries to balance. It refuses automated detection, refuses the arms race, commits the moderators to human judgment using perception and experience, makes no promise of a rule that could be stated completely, and invites appeals. Cohen and his colleagues wrote that they felt a need to insist on their humanity in the process.

Beyond audit, towards trust, arrived at by the auditor.

Which leaves the concession that anybody applying this frame has to make, and Power supplies the warrant for it. Cohen did not choose audit over gentler methods. He spent three years as an elected member of the association’s publications committee trying to get a policy adopted that would merely tell readers whether a published article came with its data. Two subcommittees produced a mild version. The governing council rejected it. He organized a petition against the association’s letter opposing open distribution of federally funded research, got more than two hundred signatures, got the committee to pass a resolution, and watched the council ignore it. Persuasion inside the institution moved nothing across three years. Counting in public moved the proportion of quantitative articles shipping code from a quarter to two-thirds across five. A reader who takes Power’s book as an argument against auditing has to explain that record, and Power’s own revision, that these practices are not inherently value-subverting and may add value, is the honest place to stand.

What the frame recovers is the limit rather than a verdict. An audit trail records what a person can be made to show. It was always a proxy, and everyone involved knew it, and the proxy held for as long as producing the trail was more expensive than doing the work. That condition failed sometime in 2025. The archive’s queue is now full of papers whose trails are immaculate, and the only remaining question about them is the one no trail has ever been able to answer, which is whether anybody meant it.

Cohen built the trail, followed it to the end, and came out into a room where somebody has to decide.

Notes

Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press, 1997; paperback 1999), 183 pages, six chapters, the last titled “Beyond Audit, Towards Trust.” Table of contents and publisher description. The precursor pamphlet is The Audit Explosion (Demos, 1994). Biographical detail, including the philosophy training, the Deloitte Haskins and Sells years, and the 1987 arrival at LSE, is from https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/michael-power and the publisher’s author note.

The two later pieces I lean on: “Modelling the Microfoundations of the Audit Society: Organizations and the Logic of the Audit Trail,” Academy of Management Review 46, no. 1 (2021): 6–32, open access at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100243/, source of the verbatim phrase “not inherently value-subverting and may be value-enhancing” and of the argument that the audit trail is performative of the conditions of its own expansion. And “Auditability in the Digital Age,” International Journal of Auditing (2026), https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.70038, source of the fluidity of evidence, the platformization risk, the non-independence of the evidentiary basis, and the verbatim phrase “de-skilled curator.” Also relevant: “Theorizing the Economy of Traces: From Audit Society to Surveillance Capitalism,” Organization Theory 3, no. 3 (2022), which won the 2024 James G. March Prize, and the new book Economy of Traces: Traceability, Tracking and the Accounts We Live By (Oxford, 2026). The self-critical retrospective is “Afterword: Audit Society 2.0?” (2022), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/115189/.

Power’s own vocabulary carries the essay. I kept out the neighboring literature that would have turned this into a composite: Espeland and Sauder on reactivity, Meyer and Rowan on ceremonial conformity, Strathern on audit cultures, Muller on metric fixation. The two-response pattern I describe as ceremonial compliance and internal conversion is Power’s chapter 5 material on the construction of auditees, in his terms rather than the institutionalist terms it draws on.

Two claims that are mine. First, that Cohen’s practice escapes Power’s regress of trust because his audit inputs are public in a way financial audit evidence never is. Power’s regress argument turns on the privacy of audit evidence and the delivery of an opinion to a principal; he does not consider the case where the audited material is a published artifact available to every reader. This is the essay’s contribution and it is arguable, since a reader still has to trust Cohen’s coding decisions about what counts as a package, which is why his squishy-methods caveat is doing more work than it appears to. Second, that the proxy held only while producing the trail cost more than doing the work, and that the condition failed in 2025. Power’s 2026 essay gestures at the same collapse without dating it.

The debunking pull is real and the essay resists it in three places: the paragraph early on where Power disclaims being read as a debunker, the sentence conceding that the relation between auditability and correctness is unknown in both directions rather than known to be absent, and the late paragraph laying out the three years of failed committee work against the five years of successful counting.

The obvious next move is to ask whether Cohen’s audits have improved the correctness of published sociology, and the honest answer is that nobody knows, because the replications have not been run. Saying more than that would require me to assert something the record does not support. It is also, if you want it, the strongest single sentence available to a critic of open-science reform, and the fact that Cohen has never claimed otherwise is to his credit.

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Herb K – Recovery Teacher

Atlanta, the first days of July 2015. Around fifty-seven thousand members of Alcoholics Anonymous filled the convention halls and the stadium for the fellowship’s eightieth anniversary. Herbert Kaighan (b. c. 1940) was there with his family, celebrating two things at once: his seventy-fifth birthday and his thirty-first year without a drink. It was his first International Convention. He spent part of it counting.

Over three days he tallied more than two hundred and twenty topic meetings. Then he sorted them. By his count, about thirty percent touched the book Alcoholics Anonymous, the Twelve Steps, spiritual awakening, or the daily practice of Steps Ten, Eleven, and Twelve. The rest were about something else. Fourteen months later, on September 13, 2016, he published the arithmetic in an open letter to AA’s General Service Office leadership and Board of Trustees under a single question: when did AA meetings become the AA program?

The letter is a claim he has been making for four decades. Meetings gave him fellowship and kept him from drinking. They did not change him. The change came from a precise personal application of twelve written instructions, and he thinks the fellowship that owns those instructions has drifted away from teaching them. He named the slogans he considers dangerous, the ones about putting the plug in the jug and making meetings, and wrote that they may function as death sentences. He noted that the Big Book mentions meetings twice. He proposed that the 2020 convention in Detroit be built around the renewal of AA’s first legacy.

He was seventy-six years old, unpaid, with no office and no standing in the service structure, writing to a board about a book.

The man who wrote that letter had spent thirty years in rooms where nothing worked. He entered a Claretian seminary and stayed seven years, preparing for the priesthood, and left before ordination. He pursued graduate study in psychology for about four years and went through therapy for longer. He tried the self-improvement movements available to an educated Southern Californian in the 1970s and early 1980s. He learned the vocabularies. He acquired the religious one, then the psychological one, then the therapeutic one. His conduct held steady. In the open letter he described the whole stretch in five words: “a seeker but not a finder.”
retreat

Alongside it he built a career in human resources consulting, work he has described as forty years and elsewhere as forty-one, advising large insurance brokerages, retiring in November 2006. The corporate trade left a mark on everything he later built. He thinks about spiritual change the way a consultant thinks about competency: assignments, sequence, worksheets, definitions, review, accountability, a binder.

Mary Catherine Flanagan (1941–2018) came to California from Chicago in 1962 and took a human resources job at Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Part of her work was welcoming new employees. One of the new hires was Herbert Kaighan. They married in April 1966 and had three children: Christina, then Kymberly in 1970, then Michael in 1972. Mary kept the home and volunteered through the parish schools, St. John Fisher through the 1980s, later Bishop Montgomery High School. When the children left, she started giving time to the Daughters of Mary and Joseph Retreat Center on Crest Road in Rancho Palos Verdes, above the ocean, and rose to become its first lay director. She held that post until she retired in 2006, the same year her husband left consulting. Her family remembered that she ended phone calls by telling people “to have as much fun as possible.” She was also an alcoholic.

Her treatment, in 1984, is what put Herb in a treatment center. He went to support her. Several weeks in, the staff asked him to stop drinking while she was in the program. He agreed, and the next day, February 21, 1984, became his sobriety date. Then they asked him to write out his history with alcohol, honestly.

The writing took about an hour. On the page a thirty-year pattern assembled itself, beginning with his first drink at twelve: he drank everything available, blacked out, passed out, and woke in his own vomit. What unsettled him was not the presence of a drinking problem. It was that the evidence had been in plain sight for three decades and he had never seen it. His mind had been sorting experience the entire time, keeping the picture of himself intact. He has described this since as a closed system, and it became the center of his teaching.

In April he went to his first AA meeting and introduced himself as Herb, exploring whether he was an alcoholic. After several meetings he dropped the qualifier. The elders told him to get a sponsor. The sponsor told him to call daily, attend daily, and be of service. He did all of it for four years and stayed sober, and by his own account remained restless, irritable, and discontented, in trouble at work and at home, a man without internal governing principles.

That gap is the load he has been carrying ever since. In his reading of Step One, the wreckage a drinker leaves behind is the first half. Jobs, money, health, and marriages can improve once the drinking stops. The second half concerns the man’s inability to regulate his own thinking, release a grievance, tolerate an outcome he did not choose, or stop managing other people’s conduct and opinions. The alcohol can be gone while the bondage of self stays.

In 1988 he heard a man at a meeting describe being changed by working the Twelve Steps as the book gives them. He asked the man for help. Over roughly a year they went through reading, prayer, writing, disclosure, inventory, and amends. By the end of Step Nine, Kaighan says, he had been radically changed in how he thought, felt, and behaved, and he insists on the grammar: the thing was done to him, not by him. His part had been willingness. His career problems resolved. His marriage healed. He calls this an authentic spiritual awakening and he draws the definition from Appendix II of the book, which distinguishes the sudden spiritual experience from the slower educational variety. No vision, no voice, no conversion drama. The evidence sits in changed behavior.

Then he did the entire Step process four more times over fifteen years with four different guides. Each guide asked different questions. One took him through what alcohol had done to his body, another through the failures of his will, another through his inherited ideas about God. He describes the Steps as a spiral rather than a checklist. A man comes back to the same paragraph with less capacity for self-deception and finds material he could not see the first time.

This explains the shape of what he built. Anyone can watch it work. The 2026 workshop meets on Zoom, Tuesdays, four to five thirty in the afternoon Pacific time, starting January 6. Registration is free. The suggested donation is five dollars a week for technology, administration, and materials. A volunteer named Nan handles the mailing list. Participants are asked to bring an unmarked Fourth Edition of the Big Book, a binder, paper, and a pen, to pray daily, read weekly, listen to the recorded commentary for each Step, write weekly, and show up to discuss.

The assignments run to thirty-three over twelve months, and they read like a training manual written by a man who does not trust vague introspection. Assignment One asks the participant to compose and pray a Set Aside Prayer: a request that everything he thinks he knows about himself, his unmanageability, the Steps, and God be set aside so he can have an open mind and a new experience of all four. It is prayed every morning and again before touching any assignment. Assignment Two gives four questions to hold while reading the front matter, with the instruction not to answer them but to ask them, and then, after the reading is done, to write one sentence to one page on each. Then the dictionary work begins. Look up anonymous. Look up recovered. Later, allergy, phenomenon, craving, addiction, reprieve, malady, concede, willfulness, solipsism, bedevilment. Write the definitions out. Highlight while reading, always, whether or not the instruction says to.

Step One breaks into three weeks of worksheets: body, mind, will. Step Two asks the participant to write what he believes about God, with the qualifier that the question is not what he knows, feels, wants, or has been told. Then he rereads the chapter “We Agnostics” in a second color, marking only what he resists, and a third time in another color, marking only what he can accept, and from that second list he chooses attributes he needs a higher power to have, and writes out a concept. Step Three asks him to identify a relationship, Architect, Healer, Teacher, Coach, and to compose his own prayer modeled on the one in the book.

Step Four is an audit. Column one is a list of resentments, with resentment defined as anger still felt in the present moment rather than remembered. Column two lists causes, lettered a, b, c, one per incident. In the middle of these instructions Kaighan drops an aside about his own list: “I had A-Z for my father.” Column three is a printed worksheet, three at a time. Column four asks the five questions from page sixty-seven and adds others, and the instruction attached to it draws the line he draws everywhere: this is not self-blame, it is taking responsibility for your own anger, and your reaction is the problem. For deep resentments he tells the participant to write a prayer for their removal and pray it every morning, one prayer per person, suggesting he do it on his knees, and to keep at it until he knows in his body that the resentment is gone. Eight resentments, eight prayers. He warns that the first one may take many months.
Amazon

The fear inventory begins with an uncensored dump, then a walk through life in brackets, grammar school, each year of high school, each year after. Then the participant takes one fear onto its own page and asks why he has it, and asks again of the answer, and again, pushing past comfort until he hits a wall or the answers start circling. The sex inventory runs from earliest memory forward and ends by turning the ninth question, what should we have done instead, into a list of principles the man is willing to live up to, with a note attached: no one here is the arbiter of anyone else’s sexual conduct, and the book has no opinion. Step Eight moves onto three-by-five cards, one per person or institution, carrying the harm, the act, the damage done, and the proportional repair. Every card gets reviewed with a guide before the amend is made, and if the guide has no experience with that kind of amend, the participant finds someone who does.

The 2026 supporting document runs seventy-one pages of graphics, commentary, prayers, and worksheets, and includes material from the DSM on personality disorder. The bibliography is where the traditionalism cracks open. Thomas Keating (1923–2018) is there, and Thomas Merton, and Thich Nhat Hanh, Shunryu Suzuki, Ken Wilber, Teilhard de Chardin, Gurdjieff, Byron Katie, Viktor Frankl, William James (1842–1910), Judith Herman’s Trauma and Recovery, Gregory Boyle, Richard Rohr, and four books by the psychologist Allen Berger. One entry carries a ranking in Kaighan’s own hand: Frederic Luskin’s Forgive for Good is second in importance in his development, behind the Big Book.

So the man who tells AA to return to one text has assembled a reading list drawn from Cistercian contemplatives, Zen teachers, integral theory, and trauma psychiatry. His fidelity attaches to a sequence of actions, not to a sealed canon. Anything that helps a man complete the actions is admissible. The Steps are the process; the rest is equipment.

Two collaborations organize his later work. With Berger, a clinical psychologist sober since July 1971 who came into recovery through a program for Marines returning from Vietnam, he teaches emotional sobriety. Berger supplies the language of dependency, self-esteem, differentiation, and the true self. Kaighan supplies Step Ten as the daily instrument and the distinction between not drinking and not needing the world to arrange itself around you. For a Berlin group they built a thirty-six month rotation: Kaighan on a Step one month, Berger on the same Step the next, both together in the third, twelve Steps deep. With Luskin, director of the Stanford Forgiveness Projects, he teaches forgiveness as a process rather than an event, defined by what it excludes: it does not require condoning, forgetting, tolerating, staying, or reconciling. Kaighan wrote the foreword to Luskin and Lyndon Harris’s The Forgive for Good Recovery Workbook, published by New Harbinger in April 2025, which brings a research-based secular method into the same room as Step Four.

His own books are self-consciously unliterary. Twelve-Step Guide to Using The Alcoholics Anonymous Big Book came out from Capizon Publishing in 2004, a hundred and forty-four oversized pages built around assignment focus and intent. His description of it on a recovery bookseller’s page is flat: “It is a book of instructions.” No commentary, no editorializing, no personal experience. Twelve Steps to Spiritual Awakening: Enlightenment for Everyone followed from the same press in 2010 at three hundred and fifty pages, extending the claim past alcoholism to anyone trapped in illusion, fear, resentment, and the need to control. Hazelden published Practicing the Here and Now in 2017, two hundred pages on Step Eleven and what he calls intentional consciousness. A revised edition of the 2010 book was listed for pre-order through Mascot Books in the summer of 2026. In his author note he sets out the mission in a sentence: “To help others get on a spiritual path and stay on it.”

The contemplative line is more specific than the books suggest. He began a daily meditation practice from the Step Eleven instructions in 1989. In 1990, by his account, Thomas Keating initiated him into centering prayer, and he has practiced it every day since and led a centering prayer group at the Mary & Joseph Retreat Center for decades. That is the same center his wife directed. She died at home on March 27, 2018, after almost fifty-two years of marriage. He kept teaching in her building.

The credentials accumulated in institutions that rarely share a table. He completed a three-year program for certification as a spiritual director, which he dates to 1989 and one of his profiles dates to 1990. He taught a full-semester course in Twelve-Step spirituality to fourth-year theologians at St. John’s Seminary in Camarillo, ran workshops through Loyola Marymount’s Los Angeles Center for Spirituality, and taught in the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health’s clergy academy. He served as outreach coordinator for the Thelma McMillen Center at Torrance Memorial Medical Center and gave spiritual counseling at an intensive outpatient program in Culver City. Catholic formation, twelve-step fellowship, clinical treatment, and county mental health each got a piece of him.

What he did that others in the Big Book revival did not do is publish the apparatus and give it away. HerbK.com holds the recorded workshops, the assignment manual, the seventy-one page document, the participation agreement, the Spanish translations, the Berlin talks, and fifty-two recordings from a previous year-long cycle. The site carries the standard disclaimer that it is neither endorsed nor approved by Alcoholics Anonymous World Services. The monthly Step Guide meeting, last Tuesday of the month, runs as a train-the-trainer group, recorded and posted for other time zones, with a recorded series called “Becoming a Lantern.” The rules there are thin by design. Participants should have finished the Step work or be finishing Step Nine. The list is confidential and is not a referral service. “We do not take roll”, the page says, and regular attendance is not required. The lantern gives light. It does not own the road.

By 2024 he was posting that his energy, stamina, and resilience had decreased, and asking the international twelve-step community to pick up the baton and run their own workshops. He did not retire. He narrowed. In 2025, he remarried. In 2026, in his mid-eighties, he was still running the Tuesday workshop, the Step Guide meeting, the centering prayer group, emotional sobriety sessions with Berger, and forgiveness sessions with Luskin, including a three-day retreat in June on the Palos Verdes bluffs.

A 2015 newspaper interview has him retiring in 1996 from consulting to insurance brokerages; his own biography says November 2006. He describes forty years in human resources in one place and forty-one in another. His certification as a spiritual director is dated 1989 by him and 1990 by a profile written about him. The workshops are dated to twenty years in one statement and twenty-seven in another. His birth date appears nowhere; it has to be inferred from a line about his seventy-fifth birthday falling in the summer of 2015. He named the man who guided him through the Steps in 1988 nowhere I can find. There is no controlled outcome data on any of it. The evidence for his method consists of his own testimony, four decades of workshop practice, and the accounts of participants.

His claim that the Steps as written are the only program of recovery will read as too narrow to anyone whose sobriety was assembled from medication, therapy, community, religion, mutual aid, and some Step work. His complaint about meetings lands hardest on the people who need meetings most, since the room is where a man first hears his own story in someone else’s mouth, and Kaighan himself got four sober years out of exactly that before he ever opened the book properly. And a twelve-month curriculum with dictionary assignments, weekly writing, printed worksheets, and a year of homework selects for people who can do a year of homework. The population that can meet his commitment is not the population in the worst trouble.

Set against that is the thing he identified, which travels well past alcoholism and past America. Practices that begin as preparation turn into substitutes for the work they were meant to prepare. Attendance stands in for inventory. Identification stands in for surrender. Discussion stands in for repair. Spiritual language stands in for spiritual change. Years of good standing become evidence that no further examination is required. Any institution that trains people can be audited on this, and most fail the audit, and the failure is comfortable for everyone inside it. Kaighan ran the audit on his own fellowship at seventy-six with a legal pad and a program of meetings, and published the number.

The convention he wanted redirected never met. Detroit 2020 was canceled in the pandemic. Its theme had been set as “Love and Tolerance Is Our Code,” not the one he proposed. When the fellowship next gathered, in Vancouver in July 2025 for its ninetieth anniversary, the theme was “90 Years – Language of the Heart.” His letter changed nothing at the top.

What he built instead sits on a website, free, in three languages, with a binder’s worth of worksheets, a monthly call for the people who guide other people, and a standing instruction to set aside everything you think you know before you begin.

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Live Questions in Philosophy

Philosophy has three prestige systems that overlap. Core analytic work in metaphysics, epistemology, language, mind, and logic still buys the most standing inside elite departments. Interdisciplinary work on artificial intelligence, sentience, democracy, and scientific practice draws the funding and the outside attention. Public-facing philosophy buys visibility that converts into book sales. A career can sit high in one system and low in another. Most confusion about who counts comes from mixing the three.

The first live question runs through artificial intelligence, and two questions travel together under that heading. One asks whether a large language model understands anything, holds concepts, acts for reasons, or acquires interests that make it a subject rather than an instrument. The other asks who decides what these systems optimize for, whose claims register in alignment, and whether private firms are becoming governing authorities without any democratic warrant. David Chalmers (b. 1966) frames the first question better than anyone, and has done so for thirty years. His talent is to identify a possibility before the field knows whether to take it seriously, which he did with the hard problem, then with virtual reality, and now with machine consciousness. The NYU Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness, which he directs with Ned Block, moved model sentience and machine moral status from the fringe into mainstream philosophy of mind. The literature has since arrived at something like a structural stalemate, where several positions remain defensible.

Seth Lazar at the Australian National University is the most productive answer-builder on the political side. He treats these systems as infrastructure that allocates authority and governs conduct, and his work on algorithmic cities and automatic authorities has reached policy audiences, including a United Nations development report. His MINT Lab joins normative philosophy to computing and institutional design. Raphaël Millière at Oxford is the rising star, with the American Philosophical Association’s AI2050 early-career prize in 2025 and a permanent Oxford post the same year.

The laboratories now hire philosophers. Anthropic runs a model welfare program, Google DeepMind has begun applying scientific theories of consciousness to its own systems, and Meta lists AI wellbeing among its concerns. NYU has hosted sessions on the findings of those corporate welfare assessments. Philosophy has acquired a wealthy patron for the first time since the Cold War funding of logic and decision theory, and the patron has preferences. “Could the model suffer?” and “How should it be aligned?” both flatter the buyer. “Who owns it?”, “Whose labor trained it?”, and “Should this system exist?” do not. Carmody Grey declined a collaboration with Anthropic on close to those grounds, arguing that the industry’s interest in the humanities risks converting critique into branding. One can disagree with her judgment and still see that she named the incentive correctly. This is agenda control rather than censorship, and agenda control has always been the more effective of the two.

The second question concerns where sentience begins. It now covers human infants, cognitively impaired adults, mammals, fish, insects, cephalopods, and artificial systems. Jonathan Birch at the London School of Economics has become the leading answerer. The Edge of Sentience offers a framework for decision under uncertainty instead of promising a theory of consciousness first. His earlier work helped put octopuses, crabs, and lobsters inside British animal-sentience law. LSE launched the Jeremy Coller Centre for Animal Sentience in 2025 with four million pounds and Birch as director, which shows how a department well below Oxford in general standing can become the institutional center of one question. Birch is the cleanest case in the discipline of a man gaining status by answering. He built an evidentiary framework, connected it to legislation, and then built an institution around it.

The third question belongs to social epistemology. The old question asked what knowledge is. The live one asks how intelligent people, each responding to evidence, end up in opposed worlds, and what happens when scores and rankings begin to reshape the values they were meant to record. C. Thi Nguyen at Utah is the outstanding framer here. He finds a phenomenon, gives it a name that sticks, and shows that it connects ordinary life to agency, technology, and politics. Echo chambers, games, value capture, and scoring systems all now circulate as vocabulary that other people use. Games: Agency as Art won the APA book prize, and The Score has extended his reach beyond the profession. Kevin Dorst at MIT is the rising answerer, using formal models and experiments to show how ambiguity and reasonable differences in priors can produce polarization inside rational cognition. He took tenure in 2024 and MIT’s Levitan Prize in 2026. Cailin O’Connor at UC Irvine builds the models that give the literature cumulative structure. Utah’s departmental rank stays modest, which tells you how far an individual reputation can outrun the standing of a department.

The fourth question moved political philosophy away from ideal institutions and toward domination inside actual ones. When do employers exercise private government? What does political equality require once wealth buys influence? What forms of protest, punishment, policing, and border enforcement remain legitimate under unjust conditions? Elizabeth Anderson (b. 1959) at Michigan is the rare figure who both asks a question that changes the object under discussion and supplies enough theory to make it answerable. Amia Srinivasan (b. 1984) holds the Chichele chair at Oxford and has a gift for exposing assumptions the regular participants in a debate have stopped noticing. Tommie Shelby at Harvard is the strongest systematic answerer, taking ghettos, racial solidarity, punishment, and abolition, reconstructing the best version of the position he opposes, and following the argument. Niko Kolodny at Berkeley works the purely analytic side of equality and authority. Daniel Wodak is the man to watch, since his argument that political equality means equal coauthorship of law reopened a question established egalitarian theory had treated as settled. The leading cluster is NYU, Oxford, Berkeley, and Michigan together.

Philosophy of science supplies the fifth question, about what models explain, when values enter science properly, and why disciplines become conservative. Jenann Ismael at Johns Hopkins asks how temporally situated agents fit into the world physics describes, and she has moved from specialist standing to something larger, with a Guggenheim in 2024 and selection as the 2027 Romanell Lecturer. David Wallace at Pittsburgh sits at the answering pole with his defense of the Everett interpretation, a position committed enough to be wrong. Pittsburgh and Irvine remain the institutional leaders.

The sixth question, grounding and metaphysical dependence, remains alive and has stopped expanding. Kit Fine (b. 1946) is still the supreme framework-builder, with Jonathan Schaffer, Karen Bennett, Ted Sider, and Shamik Dasgupta developing rival accounts. The strongest recent work distinguishes types of explanation or applies the tools to social entities such as money, race, and law. NYU and Rutgers remain its highest-status homes. Metaphysics keeps producing internal prestige and has less external momentum than it did a decade ago.

Population ethics forms the seventh. Derek Parfit (1942–2017) still sets the agenda posthumously, and Hilary Greaves, Johann Frick, and John Broome have produced the serious attempts at answers. This area is moving down institutionally while remaining hard intellectually. Oxford’s Global Priorities Institute closed at the end of July 2025. Longtermism now attracts adversarial scrutiny, which helps the philosophy and hurts anyone whose standing depended on presenting one contested framework as the natural output of impartial reasoning.

The eighth question concerns the discipline. Should philosophy stay organized around the European canon and twentieth-century analytic categories? What follows from treating Chinese, Indian, African, Islamic, and Indigenous philosophy as sources of argument? Sally Haslanger made social structure and ideology respectable inside core analytic work. Edouard Machery helped establish experimental methods. Specialty recognition has grown faster than departmental power, and the prestige hierarchy still rewards familiar analytic strengths.

On the question of who gains from asking rather than answering, philosophy pays differently from the sciences, because its product is partly the question. The highest-yield move is coining a portable phrase. The hard problem, epistemic injustice from Miranda Fricker (b. 1966), racial liberalism from Charles Mills (1951–2021), private government, value capture, the edge of sentience: each name travels into law, medicine, computer science, and journalism, and carries its author’s standing along with it. The currency of hiring stays technical, so the durable careers found a research program that others must then work inside. Chalmers, Fine, Anderson, and Haslanger all did that. Nguyen and Srinivasan are doing it now.

Among departments, Johns Hopkins is the clearest riser, from thirty-first in the previous Philosophical Gourmet Report to a tie for sixteenth, with Ismael, Hanna Pickard, Ian Phillips, and Yitzhak Melamed giving it an identity instead of a collection of stars. Texas at Austin made the largest jump near the top, from seventeenth to a tie for eighth. Berkeley has climbed from fourteenth in 2011 to a tie for sixth. Edinburgh has gone from twelfth in Britain to third. Columbia fell from twelfth to twenty-first. Pittsburgh dropped from fourth to eighth overall while its philosophy of science stayed first tier. Harvard slipped from a tie for seventh to a tie for tenth. Departments are small, so a handful of hires and retirements move them a long way, and these numbers measure reputation inside existing faculty networks rather than intellectual quality. NYU remains the most prestigious department in the ordinary sense. Oxford is the institution best placed to set the interdisciplinary agenda, since its Institute for Ethics in AI runs a continuing program on automated government, content moderation, power-seeking systems, and the distribution of technological power.

The hardest closure of questions now comes from governing boards and legislatures. Texas A&M’s regents restricted teaching on race, gender, and sexuality, and Martin Peterson was directed to remove selections from Plato’s Symposium from a course on contemporary moral issues. He resigned a tenured chair and moved to Southern Methodist University. Texas Senate Bill 37 has the University of Houston reviewing roughly forty percent of its core curriculum. Wyoming is dropping its philosophy major for students entering in 2027. Dundee plans to end philosophy as a named degree, Hertfordshire is eliminating it, Monmouth College is closing its major, Ohio legislation ended the major at Toledo, and Georgetown has suspended doctoral admissions. British humanities faculties have shed close to four thousand posts. A MacArthur-funded project now exists to count the shrinkage.

Inside the discipline, sex and gender remains the clearest case of soft closure, and both sides have built literatures, which turns it into a philosophical dispute about the ethics of inquiry. Talia Mae Bettcher argues that there may be ethical limits on which questions particular philosophers ought to raise. Her opponents argue that classifying a disputed position as activism permits professional sanction without answering the argument. No elite department announces that it closes questions. The work gets done by referees, hiring networks, conference invitations, and shared assumptions about which positions are respectable, all of which make some questions expensive to ask.

Rankings close questions too. The Gourmet Report measures reputation inside existing networks. It has no way to register a department that has identified an important question the established field failed to notice. Once hiring committees consult the measure, the measure starts shaping the activity it claimed to describe. Nguyen built his reputation on that pattern. His own profession supplies as good an instance as any he has published.

Jürgen Habermas (1929–2026) died on March 14, 2026, at ninety-six. He held a kind of authority that came from a public rather than from a department, and nobody inherits it.

The discipline is moving from isolated puzzles toward systems. The rising work asks how minds, machines, markets, scientific communities, and measurement regimes create the conditions under which men act, know, dominate, and suffer. Analytic technique remains the price of entry. The status goes to those who carry the technique into a domain where something is at stake, and who name what they find there in words other people can use.

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The List Problem

American economic nationalism has found its economist in Friedrich List (1789-1846), and the choice makes sense. List denied that the existing international division of labor was natural or permanent. He separated a nation’s present wealth from its productive powers, meaning its skills, its technical knowledge, its transport, its schools, its firms, and its capacity to make things it had never made before. A country could trade consumption today for capability tomorrow. A country that accepted free trade while its industries remained immature might never acquire the machinery, the trained workers, the suppliers, the engineers, or the commercial institutions needed to compete with an established leader. It might instead settle into permanent supply of raw materials to a manufacturing rival and call the arrangement efficient.

That argument is serious, and the profession has spent two centuries either ignoring it or rediscovering it under other names. The infant-industry case, learning by doing, agglomeration, path dependence, and most of the recent literature on industrial policy are List translated into the language of models.

The trouble with the American use of List is not that he was wrong. The trouble is that his own scheme assigns the United States to a different chapter.

The National System of Political Economy (1841) is built on a sequence of stages. A nation passes from hunting to pasturage to agriculture, then into manufacturing, then into manufacturing and commerce together. List attaches protection to one passage in that sequence, the transition into manufacturing, and he attaches it under conditions. The duties should be moderate. They should be temporary. They should cover industries with a plausible prospect of standing on their own. They should not extend to agriculture. They suit a country with sufficient territory, population, and coastline to support a full industrial system, and they are useless to a country that has no such prospect. Protection carried too long, List wrote, produces indolence in the firms it shelters.

Then he describes the nation that has reached the top of the sequence. That nation, he says, has an interest in free trade, and it preaches free trade to its rivals for that reason. His model of the case was England. England had climbed behind Navigation Acts and prohibitions and colonial monopoly, arrived at supremacy, and then announced that supremacy was the reward of open competition. List’s charge against Britain was hypocrisy, and Ha-Joon Chang (b. 1963) revived the charge under a better title in Kicking Away the Ladder (2002). But the charge only works because List agreed with the British about what a leading manufacturing nation should do. He expected Germany to arrive at the same place and adopt the same policy.

The United States now occupies the position List assigned to England. It is a mature, high-wage economy at or near the technological frontier in semiconductors, software, aerospace, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, finance, advanced energy, and scientific research. It issues the currency that made up roughly 57 percent of official foreign exchange reserves in early 2026. It has lost sectors, not a civilization. Its problem is selective industrial erosion inside an advanced economy, not national industrial infancy.

Citing List to protect the leader inverts his stage theory. That does not make protection wrong in 2026. It means the movement is invoking an authority who prescribed something else for its situation, and it has not noticed.

The second difficulty concerns what List wanted protected and how.

His unit of analysis was productive power. He counted engineers, schools, apprenticeships, roads, canals, patents, banks, and firms that could design as well as assemble. He would not have recognized the bilateral goods balance as an object of policy. A deficit tells you nothing about whether a country can build a machine tool, train a die maker, or bring a new chemical process from a laboratory to a plant. The movement has substituted an accounting figure for the thing List cared about, and the substitution is convenient, because the figure moves with a tariff schedule and productive power does not.

His practical career points the same way. From 1819 List served as the organizer of the German commercial association, and his first campaign was the abolition of the internal tariffs that divided the German states from each other. He wanted the Zollverein, which arrived in 1834. He promoted the national railway network and helped bring the Leipzig-Dresden line into existence. He wrote about technical education and public credit. The external duty was one instrument among several, and the several were the expensive ones, requiring a state capable of building things and teaching people.

So the first act of nineteenth-century German economic nationalism enlarged a market. A general duty against forty-six countries contracts one.

The American precedent runs on the same asymmetry. Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) submitted the Report on Manufactures in December 1791 and argued that bounties, meaning direct subsidies tied to output, were superior to prohibitions and preferable to high duties. Congress declined the bounties and kept the tariff. The American System took the cheap half in 1792 and takes the cheap half now.

The uncomfortable comparison is not nineteenth-century Germany. It is Edwardian Britain.

Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) launched the tariff reform campaign at Birmingham on May 15, 1903. His premise was that Britain’s early industrial lead was gone, that Germany and the United States had built larger industrial systems behind protective walls and continental markets, and that British free trade had stopped being a neutral doctrine. It exposed British manufacturers to foreign protection while enriching the shippers, insurers, bankers, and holders of overseas assets who lived off an open system. His remedy was duties on foreign goods and preference for goods from the Empire, a protected commercial bloc large enough to sustain British production, fund social provision, and answer the continental rivals.

Read Chamberlain’s speeches next to American Compass and the resemblance is close enough to be awkward. Cheap imports conceal the destruction of capacity. Free trade has become an ideology serving finance. Industrial weakness threatens military power. National cohesion requires national production. A protected bloc can replace dependence on competitors.

The campaign split his own party. Arthur Balfour (1848-1930) tried to hold both wings and held neither. The Unionist free traders defected. And the argument was lost at the grocery counter, on the price of bread, where the free traders campaigned with a big loaf and a little loaf and asked which one the voter preferred. The 1906 election destroyed the Conservative and Unionist position in the Commons. Chamberlain suffered a stroke in July of that year and never returned to active politics.

The sequel is the part American nationalists should sit with. Britain did eventually get protection. The Import Duties Act of 1932 imposed a general tariff, and the Ottawa agreements of August 1932 delivered imperial preference. Britain’s relative industrial decline continued.

Tariffs were not the cause of that decline, and free trade was not the cause either. Britain faced rivals with larger home markets, carried the costs of empire and two wars, returned to gold at an overvalued parity, and held early leads in industries where the early lead had left aging plant and settled methods. The instructive diagnosis comes from Alfred Chandler (1918-2007). Scale and Scope (1990) traces British underperformance to what he called personal capitalism: family firms that declined to invest in the managerial hierarchies, the distribution networks, and the in-house research that American and German competitors built. British firms stayed small, stayed owned by families, and stayed out of the three-pronged investment that made a first mover durable. Add the technical education deficit that British commissions documented for fifty years and did little about.

No tariff schedule supplies a managerial hierarchy. No duty trains a chemist. Chamberlain proposed to change the price of imports in a country whose deficiency lay in how its firms were owned, organized, and staffed. Aaron Friedberg’s The Weary Titan (1988) shows how hard British officials found it to see their own position accurately, which is the more general warning. A nation in relative decline reaches for the instrument it can operate rather than the one that addresses its condition.

The second comparison is import substitution.

Import substitution began from a real problem and a competent argument. Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986) and the economists at the Economic Commission for Latin America, founded in 1948, held that countries specialized in primary exports faced deteriorating terms of trade, unstable prices, chronic foreign exchange constraints, and technological dependence. Hans Singer (1910-2006) reached similar conclusions. Domestic industry was the route out. Judged against passive specialization in minerals and agriculture, the policy accomplished a great deal. Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina built factories, technical cadres, urban employment, infrastructure, and domestic firms that would not otherwise exist.

The failure came later and had a precise shape. Albert Hirschman (1915-2012) described it in 1968 in his essay on the political economy of import-substituting industrialization. The process ran backward. It began at the last stage of production, final assembly of consumer goods, using imported machinery, imported components, and imported technology. It skipped the learning. The entrepreneur who assembled radios behind a tariff wall never acquired the capability to design a radio or build the machines that made one. Substituting the final good left the demand for foreign exchange intact, because the inputs still came from abroad. The easy substitutions ran out. What remained were the hard ones, requiring capital, scale, and technical depth that the sheltered market had given nobody a reason to develop.

Then the politics closed around it. Anne Krueger (b. 1934) named the rent seeking in 1974 and Jagdish Bhagwati (b. 1934) generalized it. Tariff structures became negotiated rather than designed. Firms learned that a good relationship with the ministry paid better than a productivity gain. The infants aged without maturing. Capacity was visible, so capacity got mistaken for competitiveness. A government could point at factories and payrolls, and neither established that the protected sector could survive competition or earn the foreign exchange to pay for its own imported inputs.

The debt crisis of the 1980s had many causes and it would be careless to hang it on industrial protection. The durable lesson is narrower: a country can build industrial capacity while failing to build productivity growth or export competitiveness, and it can go a long time without finding out.

Here the American position produces an unexpected danger. The United States faces no comparable payments constraint. It borrows in its own currency and the world wants its assets. Argentina learned within a decade that its protected industries could not earn the exchange to buy their own machinery. The United States can finance an uncompetitive industry for thirty years out of an enormous domestic market, federal borrowing, protected procurement, and foreign demand for Treasuries. The privilege the movement wants to preserve is the same privilege that would hide the failure from view. America may escape the crisis and reproduce the underlying productivity failure in a slower and more politically durable form.

The standard answer to both comparisons is East Asia, and the answer has force. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan protected industries, directed credit, promoted investment, and coordinated technological development. Chalmers Johnson (1931-2010) described the apparatus in MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982). Robert Wade (b. 1944) documented Taiwan in Governing the Market (1990). Industrial policy worked.

Alice Amsden (1943-2012) identified the feature that made it work. In Asia’s Next Giant (1989) she described Korean support as reciprocal. Firms received cheap credit, protection, foreign exchange, and licenses, and in exchange they accepted performance standards that the state monitored and enforced: output targets, investment commitments, technological upgrading, and above all exports. The export requirement supplied a test the domestic market could not. A company can persuade its own ministry that it is strategically vital. Persuading a foreign purchaser to buy an inferior product at a higher price is harder.

The recent quantitative work supports a qualified version of the story. Nathaniel Lane’s study of Korea’s Heavy and Chemical Industry drive finds that targeted sectors expanded, developed new comparative advantage, raised productivity, and held the gains after the temporary support ended. Plant-level work by Minho Kim, Munseob Lee, and Yongseok Shin finds that the same program worsened the allocation of resources among firms inside the targeted industries. A real achievement, purchased at a cost.

Which puts the institutional question where it belongs. Protection is easy to start. Discipline is hard to sustain.

The American state has formidable promotional capacity. It funds basic research, builds infrastructure, guarantees loans, writes tax credits, and creates markets through procurement. Defense, aerospace, computing, biomedicine, and energy all carry its fingerprints. Its terminating capacity is another question. Congress represents districts and states, not a national production function. Once a subsidized plant exists, its continuation becomes a local interest with two senators attached. Once an industry is designated vital to national security, withdrawal of support becomes an argument about patriotism. Concentrated firms lobby better than diffuse consumers. A politician gains from announcing an investment and loses from closing a failed one nine years later.

The CHIPS program shows that conditions can be attached. It carried milestones, reporting requirements, restrictions on expansion in countries of concern, and clawback provisions. It also shows the limits of the technique. A national security condition is verifiable, because you can determine whether a company built prohibited capacity in China. A commercial performance condition requires someone to decide whether an American plant has become productive enough, innovative enough, or cheap enough to justify continued support, and to say no. Nobody has yet had to say no. The conversion of unpaid Intel grants into a federal equity stake in 2025 moved in the opposite direction, toward ownership, which is a relationship that makes exit harder rather than easier.

This is the core of the List problem. The case for protection rests on the state eventually exposing the protected firm to judgment. The politics of protection give both the firm and the state reasons to postpone the judgment forever.

The third complication is automation, and it separates two promises the movement makes together.

The first promise is restored industrial capacity. The second is restored industrial employment. A modern plant can deliver the first while disappointing the second, and the incentive runs that way by design. A firm that brings production into a high-wage country has every reason to substitute capital, software, and robotics for labor.

The CHIPS numbers are the available evidence. Against roughly $53 billion in authorized support, Bilge Erten, Joseph Stiglitz, and Eric Verhoogen estimate about 15,000 to 16,000 direct jobs in semiconductor production and equipment, and 28,000 to 35,000 indirect jobs in upstream industries and construction, with measurable wage gains in the affected counties. Those are real jobs, skilled and well paid. Beside the scale of public money and private capital, and beside the promise of restoring the industrial Midwest, they are small.

Which does not mean the program failed. Semiconductor fabrication is capital deep and always will be. Its justification is that advanced chips sit underneath military systems, communications, artificial intelligence, transport, and most of the modern economy, and that a country without domestic capacity holds a hostage relationship with Taiwan and South Korea. The honest defense is insurance. The dishonest defense is employment.

The contradiction is unavoidable. A program built to maximize productivity and competitiveness automates and hires few. A program built to maximize headcount preserves labor-intensive, low-productivity firms that will need protection permanently. The movement has not chosen, because choosing costs it either its economics or its voters.

And a factory is not a social order. Restoring steel, machine tools, ships, pharmaceuticals, or semiconductors does not restore affordable housing, stable families, local commerce, technical schools, solvent municipalities, or a household supported on one industrial wage. Those outcomes came from a settlement that included unions, regional banks, regulated utilities, restricted foreign competition, employer benefits, a young population, and a different balance between capital and labor. Industrial policy can contribute to regional reconstruction. It cannot substitute for it. The men who voted for reindustrialization heard a promise about their towns, and the policy addresses their supply chains.

Underneath all of this sits an arithmetic problem the movement discusses only in the abstract.

Reserve currency status draws foreign capital into American assets. Those inflows are the accounting counterpart of the current account deficit. Matthew Klein and Michael Pettis set the argument out in Trade Wars Are Class Wars (2020): the imbalance originates in savings and investment decisions, many of them made abroad, and the trade balance adjusts to accommodate the capital account. On that account a tariff redirects trade among foreign suppliers without touching the underlying relationship.

So the program as stated wants incompatible things. It wants the productive structure of an industrial nation, the consumption possibilities of a free-trading nation, and the financial privileges of a reserve-currency hegemon. Reducing imports while preserving unrestricted capital inflows, dollar supremacy, elevated asset prices, cheap consumer goods, and the global organization of American corporations describes a set of goals that do not fit together.

The test is available and simple. Pettis’s diagnosis implies capital-account measures: taxes on inbound portfolio flows, tolerance of a weaker dollar with higher long rates, and a willingness to give up some part of the reserve privilege. American Compass has adopted the diagnosis. Watch whether anyone in the movement proposes the medicine. Watch whether any elected nationalist tells the holders of dollar assets what reindustrialization would cost them. Until then Pettis is decoration, and the industrial program is being sold as an addition to the American order rather than a subtraction from it.

List gave a rising nation permission to protect its infant industries for a period, moderately, selectively, and on the way to something else. He gave the leading manufacturing nation a different instruction. And the parts of his program that required a competent state, the customs union that enlarged the market, the railways, the technical schools, the public credit, are the parts the movement has left on the shelf.

A policy he might recognize looks unlike a general duty. It would enlarge markets among trusted countries rather than tax them, because no advanced economy reproduces every mineral, chemical, component, machine tool, and subsystem inside its borders, and the relevant production unit is a bloc. It would spend on apprenticeship, technical education, and engineering capacity, which is where Britain lost and Germany won. It would attach performance standards to support and an export test where competitiveness is claimed, and it would say openly that capacity purchased for military reasons is defense procurement rather than economics. It would protect industries without protecting every incumbent inside them, and it would fund new entrants against the firms that already have the lobbyists. It would name, in advance, which privileges of the current order the country is prepared to trade away.

None of that is impossible. All of it is harder than a tariff, which is why the tariff is what exists.

The nationalists are right about the things that made them necessary. Industrial structure has consequences that consumer prices do not capture. National power cannot be reduced to the cost of a television. Markets that cross jurisdictions are shaped by states, currencies, security arrangements, and political choices, and the discipline that treated the global allocation of production as presumptively efficient was making an assumption rather than a finding.

What they have not done is explain why the United States escapes what happened to Britain, to Argentina, and to every protected sector that aged without maturing. They have not shown how a duty at the border overcomes the financial incentives created by the dollar. They have not shown which official will one day tell a subsidized firm in a swing state that its support is ending. They have not shown how an automated plant restores a town. And they have not decided what they will sacrifice.

List climbed those questions before he answered the tariff question. His American admirers have taken the answer and skipped the climb.

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Fred Luskin: Forgive for Good

I can’t think of a book that has helped me more over the past decade than Fred Luskin’s Forgive for Good.

I also can’t think of a book I’ve recommended more.

I can’t think of a book that is likely to be useful to the average man.

Frederic Michael Luskin (b. 1954) came to national attention in a lounge at Encina Hall in late January 2001 when eighteen people from Belfast finished a week of instruction under his direction.

The room filled with Northern Irish accents as the group came out of its final session. People headed for the deck to smoke and talk. Luskin stood among them, tall and thin, shaggy, running late, dressed in sweats and sneakers, his hard New York consonants carrying over the brogues. He was forty-six. A visiting reporter thought he could pass for a graduate student fifteen years younger.

Patricia Magee lived in Belfast. In 1992 her brother Martin was beaten to death by loyalists. The men who killed him went to prison and then came out under a prisoner release tied to the peace agreement. They lived near her family. She saw them on the street. For ten years she had not spoken about Martin outside her home, and she had never spoken about him at all without weeping.

Her new friend Florence Watts walked up. Watts was Protestant. The Irish Republican Army had killed her husband twenty years earlier. Magee touched her hand and said the two of them had each told their story that Sunday without crying, for the first time.

The man who had taught them the technique had learned it because he was not invited to a wedding.

Luskin was born in New York City on May 5, 1954, to Phillip Luskin, an accountant, and Barbara Luskin, a homemaker. He took a B.A. from SUNY Binghamton in 1976 and an M.S. from San José State in 1987. In between he co-owned a vegetarian restaurant. Then came the school psychology years, which read like a map of Bay Area and Long Island districts hiring on short contracts: San Benito High School in Hollister, Northport, Millbrae, Hollister again, San Mateo-Foster City, Woodside. He picked up a certificate in educational administration from Hofstra in 1993 and taught integral health studies as an adjunct at the California Institute of Integral Studies in 1995 and 1996. This is the resume of a competent man in his late thirties with no institutional standing and no research career.

The rupture came around 1990. A close friend, the man who had stood as Luskin’s best man, cut him off. The friend married and did not invite him. Luskin spent years turning the slight over, telling the story again, unable to accept that the friendship had ended. He had read in Eastern religion for years and began applying meditation and visualization to his own case. When he entered Stanford’s School of Education in 1996 for a doctorate in counseling and health psychology, he built the dissertation out of what he had done to himself.

He was forty-two, starting a Ph.D., in a program run by a man whose own career had begun with a death.

Carl Edwin Thoresen (1933-2020) was born in San Francisco to a Norwegian immigrant father who cooked for the Army. His father died of a heart attack when Thoresen was nineteen. Thoresen rowed at Cal, took a history degree, and spent five years teaching physical education in San Jose middle schools before a chance meeting with a counseling scholar redirected him. He came back to Stanford in 1967 and stayed on the education faculty thirty-one years.

Beginning in 1973 he worked with the cardiologist Meyer Friedman on the Recurrent Coronary Prevention Project, which followed 1,013 heart attack survivors for four and a half years to see whether Type A behavior could be modified. Thoresen designed and ran the psychological treatment. Recurrence dropped to 13 percent from 21 percent or higher, and after the first year the counseled group also died less often.

Anger entered American clinical science as a cardiac risk factor. By the time Luskin arrived, a Stanford professor had already spent twenty-five years proving that you could change how a man handled provocation and thereby change whether he had a second heart attack. Forgiveness training is Type A intervention with the vocabulary swapped. Luskin’s contribution was to notice that the swap could be made and to build the curriculum.

The money arrived at the same moment. During the late 1990s, with the Soviet collapse, Mandela’s election, and the Northern Irish ceasefire fresh, the John Templeton Foundation issued a call for proposals on forgiveness. Twenty grants followed, then a nonprofit called A Campaign for Forgiveness Research funded eight more, and the total reached nearly $10 million. The count of published studies went from 58 in 1997 to more than 1,100 by 2005. The initial tranche was roughly $3 million to about twenty teams in 1998, the same year Martin Seligman launched positive psychology from the presidency of the American Psychological Association.

Everett Worthington of Virginia Commonwealth
ran the Campaign and told a reporter in 2001 that perhaps fifty studies existed and that the field’s time had come. A field of fifty studies with ten million dollars behind it will produce eleven hundred studies. Whether it produces eleven hundred findings is a separate question, and the honest answer in 2026 is that nobody has settled it.

Luskin’s pilot used fifty-five Stanford students and reported a 15 percent average drop in self-assessed anger. On the strength of it, Thoresen won the Templeton grant in 1999 and became principal investigator of the Stanford Forgiveness Project, with Luskin as project director. They recruited 259 adults who described themselves as upset about an incident and unable to forgive.

Two facts about that recruitment.

The first is that they could not find men. Enrollment ran heavily female until Thoresen changed the advertising language from forgiveness to grudge and grudge management. Then the men came. Thoresen’s reading was that forgiveness sounded feminine and a grudge sounded like a job. A single noun substitution altered the sex ratio of a Stanford clinical trial. Anyone who designs public health messaging should keep that in a drawer.

The second is the exclusion criteria on the pilot. Students whose injury involved violence or physical or sexual abuse were kept out. Everyone admitted had to answer yes to a screening question asking whether they could at least imagine learning to feel differently about the matter they brought. The method was therefore validated on people who had already conceded the premise. That does not make the results false. It does mean the population most often invoked in praise of forgiveness research is the population the early research excluded.

A person suffers, in Luskin’s account, when he insists that another person obey a rule he has no power to enforce. The friend must invite him. The wife must understand. The father must apologize. The employer must recognize what he is worth. Luskin calls these unenforceable rules and teaches people to convert them into preferences, wishes, and goals. The demand may be just. Justice does not confer jurisdiction.

He taught it with a cactus. When a woman in a workshop described her frustration with a difficult partner, Luskin told her some people are like cacti, sharp by nature, and that throwing yourself against a cactus and getting jabbed is not the cactus’s doing. “It’s just standing there being a cactus.”

The second idea is the grievance story. A grievance story begins as an account of what happened and hardens into a rehearsed and slanted performance with a villain at the center. Luskin’s line was that these stories fix attention on the other person and what he will not do, and that this hands him power he should not have. Repeating the story raises blood pressure, dumps cholesterol into the blood, shortens the breath, and triggers the fight-or-flight response to an injury seven years old. So he taught breathing, attention on the area around the heart, gratitude for available goods, and a rewritten account in which the teller wanted something reasonable, did not get it, and remains capable of getting it elsewhere.

He charged $255 for six two-hour sessions. He also taught at Esalen in Big Sur. His students included Phyllis Mayberg, an administrative associate in Stanford’s genetics department, who had tried other counseling after her marriage failed and disliked being told her anger was acceptable, and Maryam Hellar, a real estate agent in Los Altos who had spent thousands on therapy for memories of an abusive father and first husband in Iran, and who said the class taught her that the forgiveness in question was of herself and the situation. Mayberg’s compliment was that he lacked the social worker voice. He kept the sessions from turning into crying, refused the neutral therapist’s posture, and used his own botched handling of his own friendship as the running example.

Northern Ireland was not his idea. Byron Bland, a Presbyterian minister and associate director of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, had followed the conflict for a decade. He framed the shift after the 1997 ceasefire as a move from how to reach a deal to how to build relationships that could hold one. He heard about Luskin’s work in 1999 and phoned him. The project was called HOPE, for Healing Our Past Experiences.

HOPE 1 brought five women whose sons had been killed to Stanford in 2000. Their scores on depression, anger, optimism, perceived stress, and the pain of the loss improved, including sleep, and they kept meeting in Ireland afterward and helped recruit the next group.

HOPE 2 ran in February 2001 with seventeen people, nine Catholic and eight Protestant, all of whom had a parent, child, spouse, or sibling murdered. Over seven days of group training, self-rated hurt fell from 6.5 to 4.1 on a ten-point scale. Depression scores fell about 20 percent. Somatic stress symptoms fell about 35 percent. Reported physical vitality rose. All four of those changes reached significance at the conventional threshold.

Trait anger moved from 19.9 to 17.8. Perceived stress fell about 14 percent at p under 0.08. On Rye’s forgiveness scale, fifteen participants rose and two came out less forgiving than they went in.

There was no control group, no randomization, and seventeen subjects, measured immediately after a week of intensive attention at a rich American university, a long way from Belfast. Luskin and Bland posted the numbers with the asterisks and the two reversals intact. That is more than most people do with their pilot data, and the design supports about as much weight as a pilot design ever supports.

The most useful thing anybody said that week was said by Bland, at the table, on the last day. He drew three elements. The death of a loved one in the middle. The community on one side. The family on the other. Because the community holds that it owns the death as much as the family does, it does not honor the family’s wish to heal, and it keeps hatred and revenge in service of its own politics. Brendan Bradley, who had lost five relatives, said people will tell you they understand and they do not. Heads went down around the room.

Bland’s own reading of the change was that the participants’ stories had shifted from victim to survivor. Pearl Marshall, whose son the IRA murdered in 1989, said she had stopped seeing the killers as Catholics and now saw them as IRA. Pat Campbell, whose son Philip was shot in 1991 as he stood at his vending cart in Belfast, said she was forgiving herself for having let his killers ruin her life, and that grief looked identical on either side of the divide. Magee had asked, before agreeing to come, whether the forgiveness could take place entirely inside her own head, since she would never in a million years stand in front of the men who killed Martin and absolve them. She was told yes. That was the goal. She came.

Forgiveness, in Luskin’s definition, is an internal change in a person’s relation to an injury. Reconciliation is a separate act requiring a second party. Excuse is a third thing. Legal and moral accountability is a fourth. Keeping them apart is what let a Catholic woman in Belfast accept help from a Jewish psychologist in California without betraying her brother.

The peer-reviewed record is thinner than the publicity. The main trial appeared in 2006 in the Journal of Clinical Psychology under Alex Harris’s name, with Luskin, Sonya Norman, Sam Standard, Jennifer Bruning, Stephanie Evans, and Thoresen. The six-week program cut negative thoughts and feelings about the target offense two to three times more than the control condition and produced larger gains in positive feeling toward the offender. Effects on stress, anger, hurt, forgiveness-likelihood, and optimism held at four months. The sample was mostly White and college-educated. The other core paper, with Karni Ginzburg and Thoresen, ran in 2005 in the Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, a venue that carries a fraction of the citation weight of the claim it published. A hypertension result with David Tibbits and others appeared in 2006 in the Journal of Pastoral Care and Counseling.

In the 2014 meta-analysis by Nathaniel Wade, William Hoyt, Everett Worthington, and colleagues, Luskin’s model is filed as an alternative to the two dominant protocols, Robert Enright’s process model and Worthington’s REACH, and grouped with other approaches too sparsely studied to analyze on their own. Templeton’s own retrospective names Enright’s and Worthington’s programs as the two with the strongest research support and puts everything else in a second tier with positive but limited evidence. Luskin sold more books than either of them.

The corporate work is where the claims outrun the design. In a project run with volunteers from four American Express Financial Services market groups, 120 participants completed one of eight pilots measuring the effect of emotional competence and forgiveness training on sales and quality of life. The training, called Maximizing Your Talent, opened with a one-day workshop, defined emotional competence in the morning, taught forgiveness and stress reduction in the afternoon, and continued through individual development plans and follow-up sessions. Luskin, Rick Aberman, and Anthony DeLorenzo reported in 2005 that the trained advisers averaged 24 percent more in gross sales than a matched control. The report sits with the Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations rather than in a journal. The participants volunteered. The outcome measure was revenue in a bull market. The number gets cited in consulting decks two decades later as though it were a coefficient.

Luskin now teaches mindfulness and positive psychology to executives through Stanford’s Graduate School of Business executive education program and coaches several Stanford athletic teams. He has worked as a research associate in preventive cardiology and a lecturer in wellness education at the medical school, and as a senior consultant in wellness at Vaden Health Center. Forgive for Good and Forgive for Love have together sold more than 225,000 copies. In 2025 New Harbinger published The Forgive for Good Recovery Workbook with Lyndon Harris and Herb Kaighan, applying the nine steps to addiction. Harris is a former Episcopal priest who ran a service mission for the responders at the World Trade Center site for more than eight months and whose life came apart afterward.

So a technique developed on a wounded friendship, tested on Stanford undergraduates who were screened for openness, extended to seventeen bereaved people from Belfast without a control group, and sold to financial advisers as a revenue lever, is now offered as a road map out of opioid and alcohol dependence. Each step is defensible. The chain is longer than the evidence under it.

The objections are older than the research. In 2002 the psychologist Sharon Lamb and the philosopher Jeffrie Murphy (1940-2020) published Before Forgiving, arguing that psychotherapy had adopted forgiveness as a strategy without examining it, and asking when a therapist should decline to recommend it and when the recommendation does harm. Their position is that forgiving a wrongdoer who has shown no remorse damages the victim’s self-respect and can reinforce the victimization. Murphy‘s Getting Even makes the affirmative case that anger, resentment, and the wish for revenge deserve more standing in moral and legal life than they are given, and that forgiveness should be granted more selectively. He also wrote the foreword to Thomas Brudholm‘s Resentment’s Virtue, on Jean Améry, which examines the assumption that a victim who forgives is a moral model and a victim who refuses is a patient.

James McNulty reported in 2011 that spouses who tended to express forgiveness had partners who reported more psychological and physical aggression. Over four years of marriage, aggression stayed flat for the more forgiving and declined for the less forgiving. His later work with Michelle Russell found the effect turns on the offender’s agreeableness: forgiveness reduced reoffending among agreeable partners and increased it among disagreeable ones, who read the forgiveness as permission. Enright and Richard Fitzgibbons answer that McNulty’s items measure excusing and letting go rather than forgiveness, and that people scoring high on his scale may be the ones doing the most condoning, which is what leaves them exposed. The dispute is about measurement.

Luskin answers that an unenforceable rule is dropped as a demand. Nothing in the nine steps requires the injured person to remain in the room, drop a lawsuit, or tell the offender anything. His formulation of the goal is “being resilient when things don’t go the way you want.”

The weak point in that answer is causal. The training works by lowering the physiological cost of an unchanged situation. Lowering the cost of tolerating something lowers the pressure to leave it. Whether the net effect on any given person is freedom or entrapment depends on facts the training does not measure, and the corporate application, which teaches emotional regulation to employees inside institutions the employees do not control, does not measure them either. A method that reduces the somatic cost of grievance is, in a workplace, indistinguishable from a method that reduces the rate of complaint.

In March 2026 he gave interviews on a new study of dispositional forgivingness alongside Richard Cowden of Harvard’s Human Flourishing Program, whose findings come out of the Global Flourishing Study, a two-wave analysis across twenty-two countries published in Nature. The field he entered when it had fifty studies now runs on samples of hundreds of thousands. His own contribution remains a six-week class and a nine-step list.

In the 2025 workbook he describes what his own injury gave him: empathy for people who are hurt, and “a bullshit detector that hears how people choose to stay stuck in victim mode.”

A man who could not stop telling one story about one wedding built a method for hearing when other people cannot stop telling theirs, and he built it from a cardiologist’s finding that rage shortens lives. What he took from religion was the obligation. What he left behind was the confession, the repentance, and the second party. A skill can be taught to seventeen people from Belfast in a week. It can also be assigned by an employer, priced at $255, and required as a condition of getting along. Both follow from the same translation, and the second is the reason the first traveled.

Sources

Core narrative scene (Encina Hall, workshop scenes, Magee, Watts, Campbell, Marshall, Bradley, Mayberg, Hellar, the cactus, the grievance story, $255 fee, Esalen, the vegetarian restaurant, the friend and the wedding, Bland’s diagram, HOPE origins): Joan O’C. Hamilton, “Peace Work,” Stanford Magazine, May/June 2001

Birth date, parents, marriages, children: Contemporary Authors entry via Encyclopedia.com · Degrees and the school-psychologist employment sequence: Prabook

Thoresen: Wikipedia (dates) · Stanford GSE obituary · Mercury News obituary · Recurrent Coronary Prevention Project with Meyer Friedman

Templeton funding and the growth of the field · Worthington’s 2024 response to positive-psychology critiques, with the 1998 figures

Pilot study design and exclusion criteria

HOPE 2 full results table · HOPE 1 · Sierra Leone project (18-page PDF, unexamined here)

Randomized trial: Harris, Luskin, Norman, Standard, Bruning, Evans, Thoresen, Journal of Clinical Psychology 62(6), 2006 · sample composition and four-month follow-up as summarized by Greater Good in Action · Luskin, Ginzburg, Thoresen 2005, Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 29: 163-184 · Tibbits, Ellis, Piramelli, Luskin, Lukman, hypertension, Journal of Pastoral Care and Counseling 60, 2006

Placement in the meta-analytic literature: Wade, Hoyt, Kidwell, Worthington, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 82(1), 2014 · Lundahl, Taylor, Stevenson, Roberts 2008 · Akhtar and Barlow 2018

American Express / Ameriprise study: Luskin, Aberman, DeLorenzo 2005, Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations · design summary · the 24 percent figure as it circulates

Critiques: Lamb and Murphy, Before Forgiving (Oxford, 2002) · Murphy, Getting Even · Murphy foreword to Brudholm’s Resentment’s Virtue · McNulty 2011 · McNulty and Russell 2016 · Enright and Fitzgibbons reply

Present positions, sales figures, 2025 workbook, Lyndon Harris: Greater Good · Fred Luskin · The Forgive for Good Recovery Workbook · the “bullshit detector” line is from the workbook’s introduction, reproduced at Dokumen.pub

March 2026 interview alongside Richard Cowden, Global Flourishing Study

The Hero and the Cuff

In February 2001 seventeen people from Belfast sat in a room at Stanford and answered a question on a printed form. On a scale of one to ten, how much does it hurt right now.

The average answer was 6.5. Seven days later the same seventeen people answered the same question and the average was 4.1. Nine of them were Catholic and eight were Protestant. Every one of them had a parent, a child, a spouse, or a sibling who had been murdered.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) would have wanted to know what happened to the missing 2.4.

Becker’s argument is that a man carries two intolerable pieces of knowledge. He will die, and he suspects he does not count. The first he can do nothing about. The second he can, and the doing of it is what Becker called a hero system: a scheme of cosmic significance that assigns a man a role, tells him what counts as a good performance, and promises that the performance outlasts the body. Every culture supplies one. Most men take the one they are handed. The system is experienced as reality.

A grievance is a hero system. It is cheap, it is portable, and it needs no congregation. It supplies a protagonist, an antagonist, a wrong that demands correction, and a future in which the correction arrives. It confers standing. The man who has been wronged is owed, and to be owed is to exist in someone else’s ledger. That is not nothing. For a great many people it is the only entry they have.

Luskin found this out. His best man married and did not invite him. He told the story of the slight for years. He knew the friendship was finished and he kept litigating it anyway, which is the behavior of a man who needs the case more than the verdict.

What he built out of that is a curriculum for taking the case away.

His own definition of forgiveness in Forgive for Good ends with the injured man learning to “become a hero instead of a victim in the story you tell.” He used the word. He understood that he was in the business of role reassignment. What he did not say, and may never have thought through, is that a role is issued by a system, that there are many systems, and that the one he was issuing from had a very short list of things it could count.

His method presents as removal. This is the part worth slowing down on.

You hold an unenforceable rule. The friend must invite you. The husband must understand. The father must apologize. Luskin’s teaching is that the rule is not a rule at all, because you have no jurisdiction, and that what you took for a moral fact is a wish with a badge on. Take the badge off. You are left with a preference. Nothing has been added. An illusion has been withdrawn, and what remains is the situation as it stands.

Then you hold a grievance story. It began as an account and hardened into a performance with a villain at the center, embellished, rehearsed, and slanted. Strip the embellishment. Nothing added. An accuracy restored.

Then your body reacts to a nine-year-old betrayal as though a man were coming through the door. Breathe. Attention to the region of the heart. The alarm was false. Nothing added. A false alarm silenced.

Three subtractions and out. This is the most persuasive thing about the system and the least examined.

Look at what got installed while the removals were happening. A self whose feelings are its own property and its own responsibility. A body understood as an asset with a maintenance schedule and a depreciation curve. A lifespan understood as the thing worth protecting, such that anything shortening it is thereby suspect. An offender with no standing, no debt, and no obligation to appear. And, holding all of it up, a universe with no bailiff.

An unenforceable rule is unenforceable only where no court sits. Tell a man his demand cannot be enforced and you have told him something about the furniture of the cosmos, and he will either agree with you or he will not, and if he does not, then your first subtraction was an amputation.

Take the word forgiveness and put it in six rooms.

In Luskin’s room it is private, unilateral, free of charge, and complete without the offender’s knowledge. When Patricia Magee asked before flying to California whether the forgiveness could happen only inside her own head, since she would not stand in front of Martin’s killers in a million years, she was told yes, and that this was the goal, and she came. The transaction has one party. It costs the murderer nothing and he need never learn it occurred. It is measurable on the Rye scale before and after.

Now the second room. In a Galilee village, a killing sets a process in motion. The clans appoint representatives who sign an authorization binding them to whatever the mediating committee decides. The committee negotiates a truce. The offending family offers a first payment, accepted in front of the community, and after that it is a disgrace for the bereaved family to take vengeance. The committee investigates and rules, and the ruling includes a sum to redeem the blood of the dead. It ends in a ceremony in the village square. One mediator’s account of why anyone consents: in Arab culture nothing stands higher than forgiveness, and the man who had the power to refuse and chose otherwise has reached the height of honor.

Put a jaha mediator in the Encina Hall lounge. He listens to the seven days of curriculum. He asks one question.

Who came to the door.

Nobody came, he is told. The offenders were released in a prisoner exchange and live down the street.

Then what has been given up, he says, and to whom, and what did the giving buy her.

In his system forgiveness is a public act that raises the forgiver’s rank, extracted from the offender’s kin at a price, witnessed, and irreversible because reversing it would shame two hundred people. In Luskin’s system it is a private adjustment that raises nothing, costs the offender nothing, and can be undone next Tuesday when she sees them on the street. Both men use the English word forgiveness. They are not describing the same object. They are barely describing the same species of act.

The third room. Maimonides (1138-1204) holds that Yom Kippur does not touch a sin against another man until the offender has made restitution and appeased the one he wronged. The offender must ask, and if refused must return with three of his friends, and again, and a third time, and if the wronged man still refuses, then the offender may go, and the sin now rests on the man who would not forgive.

Read the order of operations. Forgiveness is a response. It has a trigger and the trigger is the offender’s approach. A man who forgives before being asked has not fulfilled the law; he has skipped a step that was not his to skip, and he has denied the offender the appeasement that the offender’s own atonement required. The grievance is held in trust. It is released on presentation.

And there is a status clause. Maimonides also holds that a Torah scholar insulted in public may not forgive his honor, and is punished if he does, because the insult is not to him but to the Torah he carries. He should bear the grudge like a snake until the offender comes to him.

So within one hero system, one law, one author, the same act is obligatory for one man and forbidden for another, and the difference is rank. A grievance can be personal property, or it can be an office you hold. Luskin’s method has no way to represent the second case. It has no field for rank. It asks what the grievance is costing you, and the man holding an office answers that the cost is irrelevant, because the grievance is not his.

The fourth room. A Catholic priest hears the confession, assigns the penance, and pronounces the absolution. Three parties, a formula, a matter, a minister. The penitent’s peace of mind is a fruit of the sacrament and not the sacrament. Ask him what he makes of nine steps that produce peace without a confessor and he will say that peace is available by many routes, some of them grace and some of them technique, and that a man may be calm and unabsolved.

The fifth room. Pashtunwali. Badal comes first. The obligation to avenge a wrong falls not only on the man who suffered it but on his family and his tribe, which is why insults propagate and feuds outlive their causes. Feuds can be settled, through blood compensation, through mediation, through nanawatai, when the weaker party puts himself at the other’s mercy and the offer of peace is accepted. There are exits. All of them run through the collective.

A Pashtun elder given the nine steps would not call the man who used them forgiving. He would call him a thief. The grievance was joint property. Its holder was a trustee. He has disposed of an asset belonging to men not yet born, in exchange for a lower resting heart rate, and he did it without convening anyone.

The sixth room has fluorescent light and a folding table. A shop steward has a grievance form in front of him. In his trade the word means a filing, a step, a right secured by contract and enforceable by arbitration. The word Luskin uses for a pathology is the word he uses for a remedy. Bring him the training. He reads the corporate version, the one Luskin delivered to a hundred and twenty financial advisers with development plans and follow-up sessions, and he says what any steward says.

You’re telling my members their rules are unenforceable. My rules are in Article 12.

He is not being obtuse. He is reading correctly. A method that lowers the somatic cost of an unchanged situation lowers the pressure to change it. In a marriage that may be freedom. On a shop floor it is a reduction in filings, and reductions in filings have a dollar value, and somebody paid for the workshop.

Now take the word peace.

Luskin’s formulation is that forgiveness is another way of describing peacefulness, and elsewhere that the essence of the thing is “being resilient when things don’t go the way you want.” Peace here is a state of the nervous system. It has a pulse, a blood pressure, a Cohen score, a Spielberger score. It is the condition of a man for whom nothing is currently ringing the alarm.

Byron Bland, standing in the same building, meant something else. His framing of the Northern Irish problem after the 1997 ceasefire was that the question had changed from how to reach a deal into how to build relationships capable of holding one. Peace for him is a load-bearing structure between hostile populations. It is not a state of anyone’s body. It could exist in a country full of anxious people and fail in a country full of calm ones.

And the people Bland was addressing meant a third thing, which he had the honesty to draw on a sheet of paper in front of them. A death in the middle. The family on one side. The community on the other. Because the community holds that it owns the death as fully as the family does, it does not honor the family’s wish to heal, and it keeps the hatred and the revenge in service of its own politics.

That is the traditionalist and tribal position stated by a Presbyterian minister to a room of the bereaved, and it deserves better than the treatment it usually gets, which is to be filed under pathology. The community’s claim is coherent. A people whose accounts are open cannot afford members who close their own accounts privately, because each private closure lowers the price of the next injury. The community is not being cruel when it withholds permission to heal. It is defending a deterrent. Any man who has watched his group absorb a hit and do nothing understands what happens to the next hit.

Brendan Bradley had lost five relatives. His summary was that people will tell you they understand and they do not. He was talking about the outsiders. He may also, without meaning to, have been describing the room.

A Stoic freedman would side with Luskin more than with anyone else here, and the resemblance is genealogical rather than coincidental, since the rational-emotive therapy Luskin built on descends from that line. Epictetus (c. 50-135) taught a man to sort the world into what is up to him and what is not, and to keep his judgments in the first pile. What separates them is the warrant. The Stoic wants his opinions correct because the cosmos is rational and his soul should match it. Luskin wants them corrected because misjudgment dumps cholesterol into the blood. The technique survives the change of warrant. The reason for caring does not, and the reason is what a hero system is made of.

Take responsibility, which in his lineage means taking responsibility for your own emotions.

For Luskin that is emancipation. Your feeling is yours, it is produced inside you, and the man who caused it has no further control over the production line. He has been fired from the job of managing your inner weather.

For a gacaca court in Rwanda or a commissioner at a truth commission, responsibility runs the other way. It means the offender stands up and says what he did while the relatives listen. The victim’s interior is not the object. The public record is the object.

For a sponsor at a twelve-step table, responsibility means the fourth step and the eighth: a written inventory, a list of persons harmed, and amends made to them in person. That tradition agrees with Luskin about resentment more strongly than any church does. It holds resentment to be the chief destroyer of the alcoholic. And it prescribes confession to another human being and restitution to the injured party, which is exactly what Luskin’s private method dispenses with.

That collision is now inside a book. The 2025 recovery workbook carries Luskin’s name, Lyndon Harris’s, and Herb Kaighan’s, and applies the nine steps to addiction. Two hero systems have been merged in one paperback. One says get right with the people you hurt, out loud, by name, and then keep doing it for the rest of your life among witnesses. The other says the injury’s grip on your body is the target and the second party is optional. They can be made to cooperate. They cannot both be the ground.
Amazon

And take health, which is the warrant under everything.

Health arrived in this story from cardiology. Thoresen’s father died of a heart attack when Thoresen was nineteen, and Thoresen spent a quarter century with Meyer Friedman demonstrating that a modified temper produces a modified recurrence rate in men who have already had one infarction. Anger became a clinical variable before it became a moral one. Luskin’s dissertation stands in that inheritance, and the whole persuasive force of Forgive for Good is that it can offer a number.

An argument that runs on health can recommend only what is good for the body. It cannot form a sentence about what is worth dying for, and it cannot form a sentence about what is worth being sick for. It is not defective. It has a jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction ends at the skin.

Put four men in front of the same finding. The executive in the eight-hour session at the Graduate School of Business hears capacity and a longer earning arc. His employer hears fewer claims and fewer complaints. A man from a tradition of martyrdom hears a bad trade offered in confident language and declines it, because his people’s dead are not a stressor to be down-regulated. And a hospice nurse hears something Luskin would endorse and the executive would not, which is that a man with eleven weeks left has no cardiovascular reason to forgive anyone and might still want to.

How much of this does he know.

Some. He drew the line between forgiveness and reconciliation and enforced it, which is the single most protective thing in his system, because it meant no woman in that room was told to go back to anyone. He excluded violence and sexual abuse from the early trials rather than overclaim. He posted the Belfast data with the two participants who came out less forgiving left in. He says of his own equipment that his injury gave him empathy and “a bullshit detector that hears how people choose to stay stuck in victim mode.” That sentence knows that the victim role is chosen, which is to say it knows the role is a role.

What he appears not to have priced is that he is a vendor. His method is superb at the thing it measures and silent about the thing it changes. He has never studied whether the training reduces exit, whether the calm employee files less, whether the peaceful wife stays longer than she should, whether a population trained to be at peace with no asks for less. The question is answerable. It requires only a follow-up measure of behavior rather than affect, and in thirty years nobody in that program has taken it. That is what happens when a hero system tells you what to count.

His own hero. He is a clinician who buys years and pays for them in narrative, and his own immortality is the two hundred and twenty-five thousand copies and the seventeen people who slept better in Palo Alto. It is an American shape, built in a laboratory that had already proved that temper kills, funded by a foundation looking for virtues that scan, and sold in the only currency the country reliably accepts, which is a number attached to a lifespan.

The rival he never names is not the vengeful man. He handles the vengeful man easily. His rival is the man with a court: the halakhist whose grievance is held in trust until the offender comes with three witnesses, the elder whose grievance belongs to a lineage, the steward whose grievance is in Article 12, the widow whose village will assemble in the square when the price is paid. To all of them the phrase unenforceable rule is not a discovery but a jurisdictional claim, and one they reject. He has no argument against them. He has a blood pressure reading, which they have already told him is beside the point.

And the cost he cannot put a figure on is the one his instruments were never built to see. He took a duty that had cost the offender something and made it a skill that costs the injured man nothing, which is precisely why it travels, and a skill can be assigned, priced at two hundred and fifty-five dollars, taught to a hundred and twenty financial advisers, and made a condition of getting along. What the seventeen gave up in Encina Hall was 2.4 points of hurt and some part of the only office some of them had ever held. He measured the first with a clipboard. There is no clipboard for the second, and he did not build one, and the absence of that instrument is the research.

Sources

Becker‘s framework: The Denial of Death (1973) and Escape from Evil (1975).

Luskin’s own use of “hero”: the definition appears in Forgive for Good and is quoted at Montessori.org · his formulation of forgiveness as resilience, Greater Good · the “bullshit detector” line from the 2025 workbook’s introduction, The Forgive for Good Recovery Workbook

Sulha: the authorization, truce, first payment, blood redemption, and village-square ceremony, Business Conflict Management and ResearchGate · the mediator on forgiveness as the height of honor, Sharon Lang, “Sulha Peacemaking and the Politics of Persuasion

Maimonides: Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Teshuvah 2:9-10, and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 606:1 for the three requests and the transfer of sin, Sefaria and Unpacked · the Torah scholar who may not forgive his honor, Hilchot Teshuva

Pashtunwali, badal and nanawatai: GlobalSecurity.org and National Strategy

The corporate program, one hundred and twenty participants and eight pilots: Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations

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James C. Weidmann and the Making of Chateau Heartiste

On April 9, 2007, an anonymous man in Washington published a post called “Endless Dating.” He argued that prolonged serial dating and late marriage could not last, and that one of two things would follow. Either humans would evolve into animals capable of decades of hookups without turning to cats and pornography, or the people who dated serially and delayed children would fail to have enough of them, and selection would settle the matter. Twelve more posts followed that month. When a reader asked about the sex ratio at birth, the author answered in lowercase, offered sex-selective abortion and then the spontaneous abortion of male fetuses, floated pollutants, and closed by saying the imbalance meant nothing anyway because older men date younger women and no reverse trend compensates. The reader had asked a question. He received a ruling.

The scale was already larger than the evidence. That was the method, and it held for twelve years.

The archive index at heartiste.org lists every month of the run. Adding the monthly counts gives 5,409 posts between April 9, 2007, and May 9, 2019. The yearly totals are 153, 312, 299, 328, 288, 322, 378, 410, 555, 519, 677, 851, and then 317 in the final partial year. Anyone can check the sum in five minutes. The numbers matter later, because they contradict the way this story is usually told.

He called himself Roissy. In Story of O, published in Paris in 1954 by Anne Desclos (1907-1998) under the name Pauline Réage, with a preface by Jean Paulhan (1884-1968), a woman is taken to a château at Roissy and trained to serve a group of men. Choosing that name for a Washington dating blog was a claim about the reader as much as the writer. It said: this is not a seminar for men who cannot get dates. This is literature with a Continental pedigree.

Most of his readers had no idea. In a comment thread in March 2010, one man asked whether “Chateau” meant the author's studio apartment. Another sighed that he guessed nobody there had heard of Story of O. A third supplied the title of the sequel, Return to the Château, and added that it ended badly. The allusion worked as furniture. The house had a name in French and a man at the door.

The furniture was elaborate. Readers who submitted their own encounters did not simply email; they arrived. One rapped the wrought iron lion knocker seeking admittance. One whispered the password to the Chateau consigliere. One donned the black robes of a guest. At the end of the post the doors creaked shut and the readers were escorted to the property gate. The site ran standing features the way a magazine runs departments: Alpha Assessment, Beta of the Month and later Beta of the Year, Comment of the Week, Shiv of the Week, Hamster of the Month, Dating Market Value Test for Men, Dating Market Value Test for Women. Men wrote in with their failures and received numbered options for what they should have texted instead.

In the comment threads the proprietor did not reply in his own comment. He inserted a bracketed line inside another man's comment, lowercase, signed only “editor.” A reader's paragraph stands, and then, within it, beneath it, the ruling. No thread got away from him. A man could argue in the comments of Chateau Heartiste, and he could win against other commenters, and he could never have the last word.

Watch one thread. March 25, 2010, a post titled “Alpha Assessment: Big Tease Edition.” A reader named RF submits a text exchange in which a woman gives him her number, then tells him the next night that she is with her boyfriend, and he replies with “lol.” The proprietor spends four paragraphs establishing that the “lol” was a catastrophe, that it told her she had drawn blood, and then lists three better answers, ranked. Below, the commenters have noticed something else. Shel goes off topic: “Roissy in DC” sounded classy, well off, lucid, slightly predatory, and “Citizen Renegade” sounds like a basement, sophomoric, defensive. Switch it back. Stu asks what the name change is about. Carlton Grey asks whether the name is Chateau now. Charlie asks whether Chateau means his studio apartment, and gets the bracketed reply that Charlie has him confused with the bike messenger currently sleeping with Charlie's mother. Then, inside a friendly comment from a man called Dally, the editor explains himself: he had not been in Washington in a long while, so a name change was overdue, and beyond that, “i needed a new incarnation to keep me interested in doing this blog.”

That is a writer describing his own maintenance problem, in lowercase, in brackets, in the middle of someone else's paragraph. The persona had to be refreshed or the man behind it would stop.

The names moved in sequence. Roissy in DC on a WordPress subdomain, then Citizen Renegade by March 2010 while the underlying address stayed roissy.wordpress.com, then Chateau Heartiste at heartiste.wordpress.com, then, after 2019, heartiste.org. Anyone reconstructing the chronology from the surviving archive has to be careful here. The bylines and internal links in the old posts were normalized during the migrations, so a 2010 post now carries the byline Heartiste and links to pages that did not yet exist under that name. The comment text was not rewritten. When the archive and the comments disagree about what the site was called on a given day, the comments are the better witness.

The doctrine. Men fall along a scale from alpha to beta. The alpha generates desire; the beta supplies attention, money, security, and emotional labor and is spent rather than wanted. Attraction obeys triggers, and the triggers can be learned. Marriage suspends nothing. Two maxims from 2009 carried the argument for a decade: marriage offers no escape from the sexual market and the possibility of being outbid, and for many women five minutes of alpha outweighs five years of beta.

The bargain the blog offered was interpretation. A man arrived with a humiliation and left with a theory that made the humiliation legible and, better, general. He had not failed. He had been operating on false information supplied by a culture that told pretty lies, which was the site's tagline: “Where pretty lies perish.” His pain was tuition. Once he paid it he belonged to a small number of men who could see.

The style suited the bargain. He compressed well. He could take a diffuse social anxiety and reduce it to a line that sounded a century old. Never say it first. Give less than she gives. Keep her uncertain. Apologize twice in a lifetime and choose the occasions. Presented as tactics, these would have invited testing. Presented as commandments, numbered in Roman numerals, they invited obedience and memorization.

The epistemic architecture was built to be closed. A woman who chose a dominant man confirmed the theory. A woman who chose a gentle man was buying security, concealing her preferences, or running what the site called the rationalization hamster. A faithful marriage had not yet met the right temptation. A man who objected on moral grounds was a white knight performing chivalry for sexual return, and his objection became evidence about him. The vocabulary classified dissent before the dissent could be heard. That is efficient and it is fatal, because a system that converts every counterexample into a confirmation has stopped taking information from the world.

The site kept a permanent department for external validation: a category called Science Validates Game, 106 posts. In one of the last, from May 6, 2019, a political science paper finding that public apologies do not help politicians is read as confirmation of Commandment VIII, which had been published eleven years earlier. The literature arrived to ratify a conclusion already in force. Kate Barber, writing in Discourse, Context & Media in 2025, describes a related habit in extremist blogging. Embedded hyperlinks give an assertion the visual look of documentation while pointing at the writer's own site or at ideologically allied ones, and readers rarely click. She calls the effect quasi-objectification: the appearance of third-party responsibility for a claim the writer is making on his own authority. Chateau Heartiste appears in her material as one of the destinations.

Some of the observations underneath all this were sound. Desire is not a reward for good conduct. Kindness compels nothing. Status affects intimacy. People misreport their own motives, to others and to themselves. Marriage does not end competition. Most published relationship advice in 2007 was sentimental and told readers what they wanted to hear. A writer willing to say these things had material, and for several years he used it on particular people in particular rooms.

Then the particulars thinned. The woman at the bar in Dupont Circle became the American female. The unsuccessful man became a national type. The numbers show the change and they show something else that gets missed. Output ran near 300 posts a year from 2008 through 2013, rose to 555 in 2015, dipped to 519 in the election year of 2016, then climbed to 677 in 2017 and 851 in 2018. The peak month in the entire run is October 2018, with 128 posts. The site was at its most productive after Trump's election, not during the campaign, and by then its subject was no longer dating.

The category counts show what it had become. Game holds 1,101 posts and Girls 1,012, which is what you would expect. Ugly Truths holds 1,393. Culture holds 870, Goodbye America 759, Current Events 722, Globalization 443, Psy Ops 363, Trumperica 264, and a category using a slur-laden phrase about Jewish influence holds 275. Physiognomy Is Real holds 94. A man can file his own work and, in doing so, tell you what it was.

In seduction, the man who accepted the woman's emotional premises had lost the frame and would lose everything after it. In politics, the man who accepted his opponent's language had conceded before the argument started. Answer inside the categories and you lose; refuse the categories and you win. Donald Trump (b. 1946) fit the template on performance rather than policy. He boasted, exaggerated, insulted, declined to apologize, and appeared undamaged. The beta male stopped being the man who failed with women and became the journalist, the academic, the moderate conservative, the White man unwilling to defend his group.

Matthew N. Lyons, writing for Political Research Associates on January 20, 2017, listed James Weidmann under the name Roissy among alt-right figures who had also been active in the manosphere, and described “significant overlap between the manosphere and the Alt Right” across 4chan, 8chan, and Reddit. The site's own blogroll makes the same argument from the inside, and more precisely. It runs under three headings. GAME lists Roosh V, Rational Male, Krauser. MAGA MEN lists Steve Sailer (b. 1958), American Renaissance, Unqualified Reservations by Curtis Yarvin (b. 1973), Vox Popoli, West Hunter, Lion of the Blogosphere. A third heading, SYLLOGISM AND SYNTHESIS, lists Overcoming Bias by Robin Hanson (b. 1959), Arts & Letters Daily, and hbd chick. Read as a claim, the arrangement says that pickup writing, race science, academic contrarianism, and open racial nationalism form one continuous library, and that a man who reads the first shelf should feel no jolt reaching the last. That claim, presented as a sidebar, did more recruiting than most of the essays.

The synthesis never resolved two problems. A category called Marriage Is For Chumps holds 133 posts. The site spent years teaching men that marriage was a provisioning arrangement offering no protection, that the successful man kept his options and his leverage, and that emotional investment was a transfer to the other party. It also spent years arguing that White birth rates were collapsing and that women owed their people fidelity and children. A doctrine that praises male defection and demands female loyalty has a hole in the middle of it. The second problem is smaller in the writing and larger in the politics: the seduction theory was individualist to the bone, addressed to the exceptional man who could exploit a disordered market, and the racial program required solidarity from men who had been told for a decade that solidarity was how betas got used. Neoreaction wanted durable institutions and formal authority. The Chateau ran on opportunism.

The outing came early. On August 8, 2009, a Canadian feminist blogger published the name James C. Weidmann, asserted that his job involved investigating financial fraud, argued that a man employed to expose fraud should not be teaching men to defraud women, and called on his supposed employer and the D.C. police to hold him accountable. That is nine years and nine months before the blog ended. The name was in circulation, attached to an employer claim, from the second full year of the site's life.

He kept writing anonymous posts as though the outing had not happened, and the output rose. The later citations, David Futrelle's in December 2016 and Lyons's in January 2017, did not reveal the name. They normalized it. A claim that had lived in feminist blogs and hostile wikis became a line in a research report, and from there passed into academic writing, a Harvard-published glossary of red pill terms, and a 2021 report from Hope Not Hate on the overlap between misogyny and antisemitism.

WordPress removed the site in the second week of May 2019 and issued no itemized public explanation. Four accounts of that week survive.

At Lion of the Blogosphere the commenters sound bereaved. One writes that the deplatforming is beyond demoralizing. Another asks the missing man directly for instructions: CH, please advise, how can we help. A third works through the technical lesson, that hosting on someone else's servers exposes you and self-hosting only moves the problem to the ISP. These are men who had lost a room.

A sympathetic blogger reads it as a sequence. First the news industry, then social media, now hosting providers, and after that isolation, which is where tyranny starts.

A hostile blogger, writing at The Night Wind on May 13, 2019, makes the opposite argument on the same facts and takes the trouble to check something. He observes that the man ran a second WordPress site, a photojournal called Goodbye, America, that the second site stayed up with comments open, and that WordPress prohibits fairly narrow things. His conclusion: “Weidmann didn't get suspended for what he said, but for what he did.” He guesses incitement, on the strength of the race war material.

And Tyler Cowen (b. 1962) posted at Marginal Revolution on May 12, 2019, four sentences of economics. He remembered the years when a blog like his own would have had no platform at all, then the sudden arrival of millions of niches, and then the recent removals. By his accounting the internet had gained say 99 instead of say 100, and he advised against overreacting to the endowment effect of having briefly felt one had everything. Most of the removed sites he had never read.

Nobody in that week wrote about the women in the posts.

Seven years later the archive is still there The most recent post at heartiste.org is dated May 9, 2019, and the comment counts under the final entries are frozen: 64, 65, 171, 306. The footer reads 2026. The page metadata identifies the software as WooCommerce, and a banner at the bottom links to a chaga mushroom vendor with a tracking code. The site offers a Tor address. In the sidebar, above the category list, a live feed carries posts from a Gab account using the name Gaul Atreides, updated within the last week, writing in the house style about crime statistics, immigration, interracial couples, and Jewish influence, and advising that White women who cross the color line should be named and shamed.

James C. Weidmann is the standard attribution for Roissy, Citizen Renegade, and Heartiste, in circulation since 2009 and repeated by researchers, journalists, and reference works since. Here is what it does not support: a birth date, an education, a confirmed employer, a family, a current city, or an answer to whether the man writes today under another name. The employment claims, an accountant, a financial industry regulator, a nonprofit inside the Beltway, come from outing posts and hostile wikis and have never been confirmed on the record by anyone in a position to know. There is also a rumor about his ancestry, floated by rivals inside his own movement, who used the doctrine he had built to raise a question about whether he belonged to the people he claimed to defend. A writer who spends a decade teaching men to classify one another gets classified.

Lyons documented the overlap in personnel and platforms. Robin Mamié, Manoel Horta Ribeiro, and Robert West, at the ACM Web Science conference in 2021, tested the pipeline claim against more than 300 million comments across 115 subreddits and 526 YouTube channels between 2006 and 2018, and their result is more useful than either side's slogan. Users posting in pickup subreddits migrated to alt-right subreddits at rates above their comparison groups. Users commenting on pickup YouTube channels did not. Taken in aggregate the manosphere fed the alt-right less than the alt-lite did. Channels existed. A conveyor belt did not.

What Chateau Heartiste supplied was a grammar. Alpha and beta, frame and framing, cuck, hamster, pedestal, shiv. Terms invented to explain why a woman left a bar with one man rather than another turned out to be portable, and once a man had learned to see a dating scene as a status contest with a hidden hierarchy, he could see an election, an immigration debate, or a newsroom the same way, and feel that he was applying knowledge rather than acquiring an opinion. The grammar made politics feel bodily and personal, which is the source of both its reach and its unreliability.

He never converted any of it into a career. Neil Strauss (b. 1969) got a mass-market book out of the pickup world. Daryush Valizadeh (b. 1979) got books, a forum, a lecture tour, and eventually a religious conversion and a repudiation. Richard Spencer (b. 1978) got an organization and a press corps. Weidmann got 5,409 posts and a domain. When the audience moved to video, podcasts, and live audio, a voice with no face and no name had nowhere to go. The anonymity that made the persona credible, the observer who classified everyone and could be classified by no one, also fixed a ceiling on it. The asymmetry was the whole product. Give it up and the product is gone; keep it and the product cannot travel.

Sources

First post: “Endless Dating,” April 9, 2007, including the comment thread where he answers the sex-ratio question
The March 2010 renaming thread, with the reader comments (shel, Stu, Carlton Grey, Charlie, Dally) and the bracketed editor replies, including “i needed a new incarnation to keep me interested in doing this blog” Front page as of July 26, 2026: last native post May 9, 2019; 2026 copyright line; WooCommerce metadata; chaga affiliate banner; Tor address; the Gaul Atreides Gab feed
The post-count arithmetic: the monthly archive dropdown appears in the sidebar of every page on heartiste.org. Yearly totals 153 / 312 / 299 / 328 / 288 / 322 / 378 / 410 / 555 / 519 / 677 / 851 / 317, total 5,409. Peak month October 2018 at 128. I summed these myself; the claim that output peaked in 2017-2018 rather than 2016 is mine and rests entirely on that sum, so check it if you use it.
Category counts (Ugly Truths 1,393; Game 1,101; Girls 1,012; Culture 870; Goodbye America 759; Current Events 722; Globalization 443; Psy Ops 363; GloboHomoBezos 295; the antisemitic category 275; Trumperica 264; Marriage Is For Chumps 133; Science Validates Game 106; Physiognomy Is Real 94) also come from that same sidebar.
Science Validates Game” example, the apology study read as confirming Commandment VIII eleven years later
The blogroll headings and their contents (GAME / MAGA MEN / SYLLOGISM AND SYNTHESIS) are in the same sidebar. The reading of the blogroll as an implicit continuity claim is my inference, not the site’s statement.
Two of the last posts, if you want the late register in his own words: “Women Are Anathema to Revolutionary Movements” and “Ministry of Twatter

Attribution and identification:

The August 8, 2009 outing post, which is the earliest naming I located and which also originates the financial-regulator employment claim — This is the load-bearing correction to the received chronology. If you keep one new thing from this piece, keep this: the name was public in 2009, not 2016.
Matthew N. Lyons, “Ctrl-Alt-Delete,” Political Research Associates, January 20, 2017 — print version
Hope Not Hate, “Antisemitism and Misogyny: Overlap and Interplay,” 2021, by David Lawrence, which discusses him as a pickup writer who moved into racial and antisemitic politics. I have this from a secondhand snippet rather than the full report, so verify the page before citing. RationalWiki and incels.wiki are where most of the repeated biographical detail originates, including the accountant and FINRA claims. Both are unreliable and neither cites a primary source for any personal fact. Use them only as evidence about what circulated.

The 2019 removal, four points of view:

Readers Sympathetic reading (third pillar falling), which quotes and links the Hidden Dominion post of May 11, 2019 Hostile reading, including the observation that the second WordPress site stayed up Tyler Cowen, May 12, 2019
I checked and could not find any itemized public statement from WordPress naming the violated clause. If one exists I missed it.

Scholarship:

Kate Barber, “(Don’t) click here: Hyperlinks as a quasi-objectification strategy in epistemic legitimisation in extremists’ blog posts on sexual violence,” Discourse, Context & Media 66 (2025) 100912 — open PDF. Note the correction: her corpus is blog posts by extremist bloggers on sexual violence, and Chateau Heartiste appears as a link destination in that corpus. It is not a study of his hyperlinking. I described it accordingly.
Robin Mamié, Manoel Horta Ribeiro, Robert West, “Are Anti-Feminist Communities Gateways to the Far Right?,” Web Science 2021 — The specific finding I used, that pickup subreddit users migrated to alt-right subreddits while pickup YouTube commenters did not, and that the manosphere in aggregate migrated less than the alt-lite, is in their results section.

Posted in Alt Lite, Alt Right, Dating | Comments Off on James C. Weidmann and the Making of Chateau Heartiste

If the Populists Gain Power, Who Will be Their Favorite Economists?

I’m not going to lie, bro. The bench of populist economists is thin.

The star is Oren Cass, who does not have a doctorate. If nationalist populism becomes the governing philosophy of the Republican Party rather than a temporary Trump coalition, Cass is the person most likely to be treated as its principal economist. American Compass supplies what the movement otherwise lacks: a connected theory of tariffs, manufacturing, labor power, family policy, immigration restriction, financialization, and national economic sovereignty. Its political ascent is already visible. Vice President Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and Senator Josh Hawley have appeared at its major events. Bessent sat for a public discussion with Cass in June 2026.

Oren Cass’s importance would resemble that of John Kenneth Galbraith or Milton Friedman. He supplies the vocabulary, identifies the enemies, integrates policy fields, and tells politicians what their economic program means. He would probably become more powerful than economists with stronger academic records because he’ll be more useful.

Stephen Miran is the strongest candidate to become the movement’s technically credentialed economist. His importance is that he can translate Trump’s intuitions about tariffs, trade deficits, reserve currencies, and burden sharing into something resembling a formal macroeconomic theory. As chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, he argued that conventional trade models failed because they assumed that trade deficits would correct themselves through currency adjustment. He connected persistent deficits to the dollar’s reserve role and defended tariffs as a way to redirect investment toward the United States. Miran has since left both the CEA and Federal Reserve, but his brief ascent showed that a nationalist administration wants economists who can defend policies that most of the profession rejects.

Michael Pettis may become the deepest intellectual source. Pettis explains American deindustrialization through global savings, capital flows, suppressed foreign consumption, and the United States’ role as absorber of last resort. This gives nationalists a more sophisticated explanation of trade deficits than “foreigners are cheating us.” American Compass has already adopted his work as a central part of its globalization program. A serious nationalist government interested in managing capital inflows, the dollar, and persistent trade imbalances would eventually need Pettis more than it needs tariff slogans.

Michael Pettis will remain a favorite of the fighting, Trump-centered wing. He has an economics doctorate and possesses something more valuable in populist politics: complete willingness to attack the professional consensus in public. As of July 1, 2026, he remained Assistant to the President and Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing. Peter Navarro remained director of the National Economic Council. Navarro is likely to retain symbolic status as the economist who fought the free-trade establishment. His function is combat, justification, and bureaucratic pressure. Every time I hear him, or read him, I feel embarrassed and repulsed.

Kevin Hassett represents the continuing power of the older Republican economic establishment. He can defend tax reductions, deregulation, business investment, and conventional growth policy while accommodating Trump’s tariffs and immigration restrictions. The current administration’s program combines nationalist trade policy with large tax reductions, expensing, deregulation, and supply-side claims about investment. If the populists consolidate power without defeating the donor and business wings of the party, Hassett-style economists will remain inside the government as coalition managers.

George Borjas will be the favorite economist on immigration. His work argues that immigration can lower the wages of workers who compete most directly with new arrivals. American Compass is already using his research to argue that the H-1B system gives employers access to less mobile and less expensive labor. Nationalists will place Borjas against economists who emphasize aggregate growth, complementarities, entrepreneurship, and the relatively small average effects of immigration. He provides the movement with the simple and politically powerful proposition that labor scarcity raises worker bargaining power.

David Autor, Gordon Hanson, and David Dorn will be repeatedly cited. Their “China Shock” research established that exposure to Chinese import competition produced persistent employment and community effects that did not disappear through rapid worker relocation or adjustment. That research has already become evidentiary infrastructure for American Compass. Nationalists will invoke the findings while ignoring or opposing many of the authors’ other political positions. Autor will function as the establishment witness who admitted that the old trade story was inadequate.

Dani Rodrik will occupy a similar but more theoretical position. His argument that deep globalization, national self-government, and democratic politics cannot all be maximized simultaneously is almost perfectly designed for nationalist appropriation. His support for industrial policy and greater national policy autonomy makes him useful to them. His liberal politics, climate commitments, and opposition to authoritarianism will keep him from becoming identified with the American populist right. He will be the economist they quote when they want Harvard authority for limiting globalization.

Anne Case and Angus Deaton will be the movement’s favorite diagnosticians of working-class decline. Their research on deaths from drugs, alcohol, and suicide, and on the widening divide between Americans with and without college degrees, supplies empirical support for the claim that GDP growth concealed social disintegration. Nationalists will cite them to show that the market order failed non-college America.

Family-centered nationalism will elevate Melissa Kearney and Catherine Pakaluk. Kearney supplies mainstream empirical authority for the economic advantages associated with stable two-parent families. Pakaluk is more culturally aligned with religious and natalist conservatives. Her work examines women who deliberately choose large families despite falling fertility. Kearney would be the empirical citation. Pakaluk could become the movement intellectual.

E.J. Antoni is likely to gain official and media status if loyalty and rapid policy defense become more important than recognition inside academic economics. He is Heritage’s chief economist and has become a regular defender of the administration’s inflation, budget, and growth claims. He could become important in congressional hearings, conservative media, and staffing networks without becoming intellectually central.

Christopher Phelan and Aaron Hedlund represent another category: reputable academic macroeconomists willing to serve in a populist administration. They currently occupy the senior positions listed by the Council of Economic Advisers. Their status will depend on whether nationalist consolidation still seeks approval from academic economics. Phelan could provide institutional respectability. He is unlikely to become a mass political economist or ideological founder.

The historical canon would also change. Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek would be demoted. They would remain useful on regulation, socialism, school choice, and government bureaucracy. Arthur Laffer would survive as the authority for tax cuts.

The people moving upward in the historical canon would be Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, Henry Charles Carey, and perhaps John Maynard Keynes. Hamilton offers national development, public credit, and manufacturing. List offers productive power and infant-industry protection. Carey offers an indigenous American protectionist tradition. Keynes offers tools for managing investment, demand, capital flows, and international imbalances, although nationalist conservatives would separate those ideas from the later welfare-state Keynesianism.

The likely hierarchy according to ChatGPT is therefore:

Oren Cass as the movement builder.

Stephen Miran as the technical defender of Trump-era nationalism.

Michael Pettis as the most serious theorist of trade and capital imbalances.

Peter Navarro as the political combatant.

George Borjas as the immigration economist.

Autor, Dorn, and Hanson as the empirical witnesses for deindustrialization.

Dani Rodrik as the respectable heterodox authority.

Case and Deaton as the diagnosticians of social collapse.

Kearney and Pakaluk as the family and fertility economists.

Hassett, Phelan, and perhaps Laffer as bridges to the older Republican establishment.

The crucial point is that the nationalist-populist economic canon will be assembled issue by issue according to what is situationally convenient. Its leaders will take tariffs from Miran and Navarro, trade imbalances from Pettis, labor-market evidence from Autor and Borjas, industrial policy from Rodrik and Cass, family analysis from Kearney and Pakaluk, and tax policy from Hassett and Laffer. The political synthesis will come from Cass, Lighthizer, Bessent, and elected politicians. Most of them are not going to knock your socks off. They will provide ammunition, while those in power decide where to fire it.

The available material clusters in three areas: trade imbalances (Pettis, Autor), labor supply (Borjas), and family formation (Kearney, Pakaluk). There is no nationalist monetary theory, no nationalist account of the price level, no nationalist growth or productivity theory, and no nationalist fiscal framework. Those holes explain the personnel. Hassett (b. 1962), Warsh (b. 1970), and Laffer (b. 1940) stay inside a populist government because the movement has nothing of its own to put where they stand. The composition of the coalition follows from the gaps in the canon.

On whether economists matter, the useful literature separates channels. Daniel Hirschman and Elizabeth Popp Berman argued in 2014 that economists influence policy through three routes: professional authority, institutional position, and what Berman later called the economic style of reasoning, the cost-benefit habits embedded in agency procedure. Berman’s Thinking Like an Economist (2022) makes the case that the durable victories came through the second and third routes. Peter Hall‘s The Political Power of Economic Ideas (1989) and Mark Blyth‘s Great Transformations (2002) add that ideas do their work in periods of uncertainty, as weapons for assembling coalitions and then as blueprints for institutions. Marion Fourcade‘s Economists and Societies (2009) explains why the discipline reproduces the way it does. explains why the discipline reproduces the way it does.

Two things fall out of that literature.

First, economists hold the most power where the public is not watching. Bank capital rules, actuarial assumptions, Medicare payment formulas, the discount rate in a regulatory impact analysis. Trade and immigration are now the loudest subjects in American politics. High salience destroys technocratic authority. So the fields the populists care about most are the fields where no economist of any persuasion will govern, and the fields economists will keep governing are ones no populist will contest.

Second, the supply-side precedent settles the question of whether a thin bench is fatal. Jude Wanniski (1936-2005) was a journalist. Robert Bartley (1937-2003) was an editorial page editor. Laffer had a Stanford doctorate and modest standing in the profession. Norman Ture and Paul Craig Roberts (b. 1939) were staff economists. That group reorganized American tax policy for forty years against the near-unanimous view of academic macroeconomics. They won because they supplied a rule a congressman could state in one sentence and a staffer could apply without calling anyone, and because they spent three decades fighting over how the Joint Committee on Taxation scores a bill. A movement does not need great economists. It needs a decision procedure and a scoring convention.

Until February the tariff program ran on presidential discretion. On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The administration pivoted within days to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, a temporary balance-of-payments surcharge capped at 150 days. That surcharge expired by operation of law on July 24, 2026, with no extension legislation pending. The replacement is a Section 301 regime proposing duties of ten to twelve and a half percent across forty-six countries, which carries no statutory sunset.

Discretion required no economists. It required one man. Section 301 and Section 232 require administrative records: country-specific findings of unreasonable or discriminatory practice, hearings, responses to comments, injury evidence, causal claims that survive review in the Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit. That work gets done by staff economists at USTR, Commerce, and the International Trade Commission, an apparatus that has been running antidumping and countervailing injury determinations for decades without producing a single famous name. The Court did more to hand economists power over populist trade policy than any appointment could. Whether the movement can staff that apparatus is the test, and it will be settled by people who appear on nobody’s list of favorite economists.

The industrial policy toolkit is left-coded: Mazzucato (b. 1968), Ha-Joon Chang (b. 1963), Rodrik (b. 1957). The tax toolkit is right-coded. The evidentiary base belongs to liberals who reject the program, Autor (b. 1967), Case (b. 1958), Deaton (b. 1945). A canon assembled from other people’s research cannot run a seminar, and without a seminar there is no reproduction. Think tanks reproduce staff. Departments reproduce scholars. American Compass has produced a generation of Hill aides and no dissertations. That guarantees a movement whose sources will always be available for hostile quotation at the worst moment.

The personnel record already shows the strain. Miran left the Council of Economic Advisers on February 3, 2026, and left the Fed on May 22, 2026, succeeded by Warsh. Pierre Yared, the acting chairman since September, returned to Columbia at the end of June 2026. Three chairs or acting chairs in eighteen months. The credentialed people arrive, defend the policy, and go back to a university or a bank. The people who stay are the ones with no academic exit. As consolidation proceeds, that ratio shifts further toward the permanent staff, and forecast quality falls, because the man who can afford to say the number is wrong has already left the building.

What I would watch, in order of how much it predicts.

Measurement and scoring. Whether CBO’s baseline treats tariff revenue as durable. Whether OIRA’s cost-benefit guidance keeps the revisions to Circular A-4. Whether immigration’s fiscal effects get scored on a Borjas method or a National Academies method. Whether anyone institutionalizes a domestic-production statistic alongside GDP in the Federal statistical system, something Cass has wanted for years. A statistic embedded at BEA outlasts every name on the list.

The Pettis test. His theory implies capital-account measures: taxes on inbound portfolio flows, willingness to surrender reserve-currency privileges, a weaker dollar with higher long rates. Miran’s Mar-a-Lago paper flirted with it. If the movement takes the diagnosis and refuses the medicine, Pettis is decoration.

The List problem. List argued for protection by a rising industrial power catching up to a leader. The United States is a mature, high-wage, services-dominated economy holding the reserve currency with nobody ahead of it. The closer comparison is Britain after 1900, Chamberlain’s tariff reform, a declining industrial hegemon arguing about imperial preference and losing the argument for thirty years. Or Latin American import substitution, where capacity got built, productivity stalled, and the payments crisis arrived on schedule. The essay explaining why the American case escapes those outcomes has not been written.

Finally, the number. Manufacturing employment sits near twelve and a half million and has been flat for a decade. Run the tariffs for eight years. If the number does not move and consumers carry the cost, no canon saves the movement. If it goes to fifteen million, the profession will reorganize around the result inside a decade, and the same journals now publishing tariff skepticism will publish the revision, with citations to Autor and Pettis and none to Navarro.

Economists hold power when they hold a procedure. They hold little when they hold a microphone. The populist bench is short on microphones and shorter on procedures, and the Court just told them they need procedures to keep the policy they already have.

Posted in Economics | Comments Off on If the Populists Gain Power, Who Will be Their Favorite Economists?

Live Questions in Psychology

Psychology in 2026 has no sovereign question. It has a fight over what counts as a finding, and underneath that fight, a change in what it costs to produce one. The cost change explains most of the status movement, so I would start there.

The reform movement won. Preregistration, multi-site collaboration, adequate power, open data, severe testing. The victory raised the price of a high-prestige result. A clever experiment on ninety undergraduates used to buy a career. Now the price of admission is a consortium, a registry entry, a population cohort, or a randomized trial inside a real institution. Prestige in psychology has migrated from ingenuity to capital. That migration happened just as the American state began withdrawing the capital so fewer places can afford to do work the field respects, and the places that can will increasingly sit outside the United States.

The live questions.

First, whether psychology’s objects exist. When a researcher says depression, intelligence, grit, or self-control, what is he claiming is there? Denny Borsboom and the Amsterdam methods group own this question. Eiko Fried carries it into clinical research, where the network view treats symptoms as producing and sustaining one another. Nobody has answered it. The question has enormous downstream reach, because every other question in the discipline assumes it has been settled.

Second, whether psychology deserves belief. Simine Vazire made that question an editorial program by running Psychological Science, which she has edited since the start of 2024 on a four-year term. Brian Nosek supplies the infrastructure rather than the challenge. Vazire holds the more powerful position, because an editor decides what a finding has to look like before it can be a finding.

Third, whether artificial intelligence explains cognition or imitates its outputs. Iris van Rooij and Olivia Guest at Radboud published the critical case in 2026, arguing that psychology’s weak theory and AI‘s habit of confusing engineered artifacts for minds combine into a perfect storm. Guest puts the practical objection well: the point of science is to produce knowledge, and science cannot be automated. The constructive answer comes from Stanford, where the argument runs that a model trained on human-scale input and subjected to real experiments can serve as a testable theory. Van Rooij is rising because AI made her old demand for formal explanation urgent.

Fourth, what digital life does to young people. This is where public status and disciplinary status split most visibly. Jonathan Haidt (b. 1963) and Jean Twenge (b. 1971) hold the public and legislative ground. Amy Orben and Candice Odgers hold the methodological ground. The interesting development is that Orben stopped arguing and started spending. She and Dan Lewer
are running the IRL Trial in Bradford, roughly four thousand students aged twelve to fifteen, half of them randomly assigned to daily social media limits and a nine at night to seven in the morning curfew, with a comparison group under no restriction. Orben calls it the first large-scale experimental reduction of social media use in healthy minors anywhere. Read her own words carefully and the standard framing collapses: she says the evidence that social media harms individual children, including severe harm, is irrefutable. The dispute concerns population-level causal size, not whether harm occurs. Her group also expects results on the Australian under-sixteen ban within about a year. Within eighteen months this question gets an answer, and whoever is right collects a great deal of status.

Fifth, what genetics predicts and what prediction licenses. Kathryn Paige Harden at Texas asks the question in its morally loaded form. Original Sin: On the Genetics of Vice, the Problem of Blame, and the Future of Forgiveness came out from Random House in March 2026. Scientists called it magnificent. The Los Angeles Review of Books treated it as scientific Calvinism and a rehash of eugenics.

Sixth, morality and collective behavior under technological and institutional pressure. Crockett at Princeton took a 2026 Troland Research Award from the National Academy of Sciences for a mechanistic theory of moral cognition, with the citation pointing to how technologies such as social media exploit moral learning and erode community trust. Betsy Levy Paluck offers the answer template: pick a process, intervene in a school or a post-conflict society, and measure behavior.

Seventh, whether the discipline describes humanity or affluent institutional life. Joseph Henrich still owns the question. The answer is arriving through international networks, which weakens any single department’s claim to the topic.

Eighth, whether competing theories can be made to risk defeat. The consciousness field ran an adversarial collaboration on integrated information theory and global workspace theory, preregistered the contrasting predictions, separated theory owners from data collection, and embarrassed both camps. The method won, not either theory. Other subfields are copying it.

On the asker and answerer question, I would put it more sharply than a division of labor. Asking is portable and cheap. Answering is expensive and local. Metascience gave a generation of psychologists a route to high status that required no laboratory, no grant, no participants, and no wait. That is the cheapest prestige available in the discipline, which explains its growth better than its intellectual merit does, and its intellectual merit is real. The corresponding risk is a field full of people who audit and few who build. Vazire, van Rooij, Borsboom, and Guest ask. Nosek, Paluck, Orben, Frank, Goodman, Craske, and Jessica Schleider build.

The questions have become consortium-shaped. Princeton has the fastest rise, holding Crockett, Tom Griffiths, Paluck, Shafir, and Cohen at the intersection of computation, morality, and field experimentation. Stanford has the broadest claim and absorbs new questions rather than chasing them. Amsterdam owns the foundational question about what psychological objects are. Cambridge’s MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit owns adolescent digital mental health, and Orben directs the group there. Leiden, Radboud, and Northwestern are rising in narrower lanes. Two of my four leaders sit outside the United States, and I expect that share to grow.

Moving down. The losses attach to styles. Small samples. Counterintuitive single effects. Theory written after the results. Universal claims from American sophomores. Generic screen-time correlations. Candidate genes. Diagnostic categories treated as natural objects. Prediction models announced before prospective validation. The celebrity social psychologist who owns one memorable finding has lost the most.

The methodological closure is mostly deserved. It also has victims. Preregistration culture penalizes description, exploration, case study, and any population too small or too rare to power a trial. Some true things about unusual people are now hard to publish.

The editorial closure operates through harm standards. Nature Human Behaviour reserves the right to require changes or decline work when anticipated harm to groups outweighs benefit, and presents this as research ethics. Editors who hold that power can use it against accurate findings, and the policy does not have to be abused for authors to anticipate it and self-censor.

The professional closure runs through organizational position-taking. When a body like the American Psychological Association adopts a firm stance on a contested clinical question, youth gender medicine being the current example, it converts an empirical dispute into a loyalty test. Nobody has to be punished for the incentive to work.

The fiscal closure now outweighs the other three combined. The fiscal 2027 budget request released April 3, 2026 proposes dissolving the National Science Foundation’s Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences directorate and zeroing its funding, with continuing grants aligned to administration priorities transferred elsewhere. That directorate funds roughly sixty-three percent of American academic research in the social and psychological sciences. NSF leadership told staff the same day that it would begin dissolving the directorate before the end of the fiscal year, telling rotators to prepare to return to their universities. The agency has awarded about six hundred thirteen grants in fiscal 2026, roughly a fifth of the 2021 through 2024 pace, and has no confirmed director. The entire National Science Board was fired on April 25, 2026. Congress restored much of what the White House tried to cut a year earlier, so the outcome remains open, and the directorate page was still live in early July. The internal pressures shift what gets published. This one shifts what gets done.

I would add a fifth force nobody has priced yet. If large models can produce plausible synthetic participants and plausible literature reviews, the cheap end of psychology loses its reason to collect human data at all. Van Rooij and Guest argue that on epistemic grounds. The near-term effect will be economic, and it will arrive fastest in exactly the underfunded departments that can no longer afford real samples.

Editors, prize committees, and infrastructure owners still control status flows. The trade publisher has become an independent route around all three. Harden and Haidt both took it. Both gained enormous public standing and paid an internal price. That route will get more crowded as the grants dry up.

Posted in Psychology | Comments Off on Live Questions in Psychology

Live Questions in Jewish Studies

Jewish Studies in America runs on two currencies now, and they no longer trade at par.

The first is scholarly credit. It goes to the researcher who takes an inherited category, shows it does not hold, and then does the work in languages, archives, fieldwork, objects, law, or numbers to provide the replacement. The second is institutional credit. It goes to whoever can promise a president, a donor, or a federal investigator that the university is combating antisemitism, protecting Jewish students, honoring Holocaust memory, or defending Jewish civilization. A scholar can hold one currency in great quantity and almost none of the other. Some of the sharpest people in the field are invisible to donors. Some of the most visible people in the field such as Deborah Lipstadt do not set anyone’s research agenda.

No department owns the discipline. It sits in history, religion, literature, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, law, and a scattering of endowed centers. The Association for Jewish Studies carries well over 1,900 individual members and a conference of some 1,200 people across roughly 190 sessions. Authority is dispersed by design and by accident, which means the live questions get set by conference divisions, institute themes, and book prize.

The hottest question is what antisemitism is in the American setting. Not whether it rose after 2023, which everyone concedes, but what belongs under the name. Is it one prejudice among many, a distinct conspiracy structure, a form of racialization, a religious inheritance, a political tool, or some braid of all of them? How much of it comes from the right, the left, religious subcultures, online media, or the ordinary indifference of institutions? Where does campus anti-Zionism cross over? Can a university police conduct without policing historical judgment? And the which interventions reduce hostility rather than produce a statement, a training, an investigation, and a settlement.

Maurice Samuels at Yale built the most durable house for that question. He founded the program there in 2011 and has argued for keeping the subject historical while the politics around it boils. Jonathan Judaken (b. 1968) at Washington University is the one climbing fastest as a conceptual questioner. His work puts antisemitism into conversation with racism, colonialism, and critical theory, asks whether the inherited definitions still do any work, and collected a major historical prize in 2025. Lila Corwin Berman at NYU asks the institutional version, which is the sharper one: who gets to found an antisemitism center, write its mission, hire its staff, and speak for scholarship to the people writing the checks. Her willingness to criticize centers built around a predetermined mission has raised her standing among colleagues worried about who controls the field. Jeffrey Veidlinger at Michigan supplies the institutional answer. He runs a center that studies antisemitism alongside other hatreds and has held that comparative line against pressure to narrow it into advocacy.

Leonard Saxe and the Cohen Center at Brandeis hold down the empirical side. They run the surveys and campus studies that let anyone test a claim about Jewish students. The strength is evidence. The limit is that measurement inherits its definitions before the first question gets asked, so the survey can only settle arguments the survey design already permits. Public figures such as Deborah Lipstadt (b. 1947) carry enormous visibility.

The second live question is who counts as Jewish in America. The old version worried about intermarriage and disappearance. The new version asks about people with one Jewish parent, converts, Jews of no religion, Black and Asian and Latino Jews, queer and trans Jews, Haredim, secular Yiddishists, and anyone whose Jewishness is familial, political, linguistic, or occasional. Do population surveys find Jewish identity or manufacture an administrative copy of it? Who disappears when a foundation defines a countable population before deciding what to fund? Berman is the strongest senior questioner here because she ties identity to money and institutional power. Sarah Bunin Benor supplies an answer. Her work on Jewish languages shows people performing difference through vocabulary, accent, naming, and setting. Michigan has made the argument explicit by choosing Jewish peoplehood as a future institute theme. The continuity vocabulary is losing scholarly credit while surviving in fundraising, where urgency sells.

Third, Haredi life. For decades much American Jewish scholarship treated liberal denominational Judaism as the center and Haredim as a remnant with a birthrate. That position is gone. David Myers and Nomi Stolzenberg reframed the subject when they showed how a disciplined religious community uses American constitutional law, municipal incorporation, electoral bargaining, and property development to carve out autonomy inside a liberal state. Ayala Fader took the other route and found the doubters who stay inside, running concealed intellectual lives through their phones. Chaya Nove is the young scholar rising, and she argues the field romanticized Yiddish as the language of a murdered European past while ignoring the hundreds of thousands of people speaking and changing it in Brooklyn and Rockland County. Programs that keep treating the liberal synagogue as representative American Judaism will lose relevance. Institutions that combine language, ethnography, law, and sociology will gain.

Fourth, whether the field can stop treating Ashkenazi experience as the unmarked default. The question is whether emancipation, secularization, assimilation, diaspora, race, and modernity look different when the story starts in Salonica or Baghdad or Rabat instead of Berlin or Warsaw. Sarah Abrevaya Stein at UCLA and Devin Naar at Washington have made Sephardi and Ottoman material central. The AJS has written race, gender, queer studies, disability, and digital humanities into its formal divisions.

Fifth, the premodern question. Was there ever a single coherent Judaism, or have scholars projected a later idea of unified religion backward onto communities that shared little? How much authority did rabbis hold over people who left no texts? Mira Balberg reads rabbinic material as a system for organizing bodies, knowledge, and selfhood. Ra’anan Boustan has pushed social heterogeneity, material culture, and the construction of tradition. The movement runs from canonical text alone toward text plus archaeology, inscriptions, objects, food, illness, and the neighbors. Philological mastery still commands respect and no longer sets agendas.

Sixth, Jewish law and ethics. Julia Watts Belser made disability an analytic category, working across ethics, gender, sexuality, and rabbinic interpretation. Rebecca Epstein-Levi is rising fast on sex, risk, consent, and Jewish ethics, and she does the rare thing of posing the question and building the framework in the same book. This area has intellectual energy and little money, because its conclusions do not convert into a campaign.

Seventh, Holocaust memory after the survivors. Preservation is solved. The new questions are epistemological. Does digital testimony preserve encounter or simulate it? What breaks when an interview gets chopped into searchable clips tagged by someone else’s categories? What happens when a generative system produces plausible testimony that never happened? How does a scholar write about ordinary survival, compromise, and postwar family wreckage without bending it toward redemption? Hannah Pollin-Galay has gained standing by making language part of Holocaust history. Nove’s work treats recorded testimony as a linguistic archive carrying dialect, class, and migration. Public history institutions are gaining money faster than the archival theorists are gaining lines.

The eighth cluster has no commanding figure yet. Podcasts, streaming instruction, digital archives, online conversion and doubt, and models trained on digitized Jewish texts by people who cannot read them are all remaking who counts as an interpreter of Judaism. Michigan has already named media as a theme. The risk is that Jewish Studies cedes the whole territory to computer scientists and communications faculty with method and no Hebrew.

On askers and answerers, the field rarely rewards a provocateur. Berman asks who controls American Jewish institutions and categories and money, and demographers and institutional historians fill in behind her. Judaken and Samuels set the conceptual terms on antisemitism, Saxe and Brandeis supply the counts, Veidlinger supplies the model of a center that survives its own funding. Myers and Stolzenberg reframed Haredi autonomy as an American legal development, and Fader and Nove answer at close range with what people say and believe. Belser and Epstein-Levi do both jobs.

If department means department, NYU’s Skirball has the strongest claim: breadth, Berman’s American Jewish history center, and a new antisemitism center that embodies the exact tension she has criticized. For choosing frontier questions on purpose, Michigan’s Frankel Institute has the best claim, since its run of themes reads like a map of where the field is going. Penn’s Katz Center holds greater all-field convening prestige without binding fellows to a mission. Brandeis leads on contemporary evidence. Yale remains the respected address for antisemitism as a scholarly subject. UCLA stays near the top for Sephardi and Mediterranean work

Moving up intellectually: Berman, Judaken, Veidlinger, Benor, Belser, Epstein-Levi, Nove, Pollin-Galay, Ayelet Brinn. Moving up institutionally: Michigan, NYU, Brandeis, Cornell on the strength of a five million dollar gift that endows faculty lines, Florida Atlantic with a twenty million dollar gift and a new building, Denver with an endowed chair and expanded course offerings. Capacity and visibility are not the same as leadership, and the newer money buys the first two.

Indiana’s program has taken the clearest damage. A longtime director removed, a specialist in contemporary antisemitism installed over faculty objection, and then disputes over what a graduate student may research and travel to present. The removed director lost power and gained sympathy. His replacement gained control and became a contested figure inside the profession. Columbia’s standing suffers less from anything its Jewish Studies faculty did than from the spectacle of a university negotiating its academic priorities under a federal funding threat. At Washington, established faculty objected when the university built a parallel antisemitism operation staffed by people without equivalent expertise in the field, which is what bypassing a discipline looks like from inside it. A federal agency spent months trying to compel Penn to hand over names of Jewish faculty, students, and staff before dropping that demand this month.

Claims of closure from the left exist. The profession’s vocabulary and conference structure lean left-liberal, and work defending Zionism as a legitimate Jewish attachment or treating Jewish peoplehood in normative terms draws more suspicion than comparable work in anti-colonial framing. I have not seen a case of a left-led program stripping funding or replacing leadership over a research question that matches the documented record at Indiana. The field is pressed from four sides at once. Donors want compliance with a mission. Administrators want reputational cover. Governments want a demonstrable action. Activists want moral clarity. Scholars want permission to make distinctions that inconvenience all four.

The funding picture explains most of the rest. Targeted money floods in while the surrounding humanities contract. A single federal humanities grant of more than ten million dollars, the largest that agency has ever made, went to a Jewish civilization project whose purposes were named before the research began. Against that, the discipline’s own open awards look like pocket change: a thousand dollars for contingent faculty research, five thousand toward a first book, thirty-three thousand for a dissertation year, fifteen thousand for the top book prize. Many of the new antisemitism positions are temporary, off the tenure track, or housed in administration, which produces the strange result that the best-funded subject in the field employs the least protected scholars. Not every targeted gift restricts; Cornell’s appears to buy durable faculty capacity, and Michigan has shown that donor money can fund a comparative program. The test is whether the gift pays for scholars and infrastructure or for a conclusion.

Rank the money and you get the field’s future. Antisemitism, Holocaust education, student protection, and Jewish civilization are climbing. Demography and communal identity hold steady because they yield findings a foundation can act on. Sephardi, Haredi, race, gender, disability, and digital work rise in reputation while receiving little support. Languages, archives, philology, and ancient and medieval history keep their intellectual standing and lose bargaining power, because they cannot promise a president anything by Friday.

The danger is the conversion of a field that investigates Jewish life into a service provider hired to confirm what a university, a foundation, a government, or a communal organization already believes about Jewish life. Watch the grant titles. Wherever the title contains the finding, the research has already been spent.

Posted in Anti-Semitism, Jews | Comments Off on Live Questions in Jewish Studies

The Gap

FICTION WITH HELP FROM AI:

1.

Dale Pruitt, 56, preaches twenty-two minutes at the eleven o’clock service, and the elders tell him this is the best year of preaching in his twenty-nine.

Saturday at nine he sits in the study with the Barclay commentaries open on the desk and the laptop open on his knees. He types the passage, Luke 15, and his notes from Tuesday, and asks for three ways to structure it. The first is a sermon he has heard four times. The third is a sermon nobody should preach. The second has a turn in it he has never made, from the father running down the road to the older son doing arithmetic in the field, and he takes the turn and builds his own stairs under it. By midnight he has rewritten most of the words. The illustration about the mechanic who would not forgive his brother is his, from a man he buried in 2019.

Sunday a woman takes his hand at the door and says the Lord spoke through him this morning. He says thank you. He believes her and he believes himself, and he does not examine how both fit in one chest.

At the board meeting in April a young elder asks with his phone face down on the table. “Do you use the AI, pastor?”

“Like a concordance,” Dale says. “For the Greek.”

“Good,” the elder says. “Some people here would have a problem with it.”

“They would,” Dale says, and moves the meeting to the parking lot resurfacing.

2.

Marina Delgado, 38, charges twenty-two cents a word and keeps a small blue badge on her site that reads Human Written. The badge costs eighty dollars a year from a company in Austin that verifies nothing.

Her method: she feeds the brief, the client’s style guide, and the three strongest pieces from the client’s archive, and asks for an outline and a mediocre draft. The draft is mediocre. She takes the outline, throws out eighty percent of the sentences, and writes over the rest. Two hours later the piece would pass any test she can think of. It used to take six hours. She bills six, because she bid the project and not the hour.

In March a software client sends a new vendor agreement with an attestation clause. No generative AI in any deliverable. Breach means clawback of all fees paid. Marina reads it twice, signs it, and returns it as a PDF. Her daughter’s preschool costs two thousand a month. Her closest competitor works out of Manila for six cents a word, does what Marina does, faster, and signs the same page.

“I’d never use it for the writing,” she tells the client’s marketing director on the Thursday call. The director says she appreciates that, she really does, the brand voice is everything. The director’s own emails come out of a tool her company licensed in January. So does the deck on the screen between them. Neither woman mentions either thing, and the call ends four minutes early, and both of them say this was great.

3.

A conference room on the fourth floor of a humanities building, twelve faculty, one dean, and a policy draft in front of everyone stating that unauthorized use of generative artificial intelligence constitutes academic dishonesty and may result in suspension.

The dean has been explaining the detection vendor. Ninety-eight percent accurate, the vendor says.

Priya Raghunathan, associate professor, third year on this committee, puts down her pen. “Show of hands. Who wrote every word of his last recommendation letter?”

Nobody moves.

“Mine either. I wrote nine in October. I gave it the CV and my notes and it gave me a first pass and I fixed it and I signed it. Every sentence in those letters is true. I stand behind all of them. And on Monday I get to fail a nineteen-year-old for a smaller version of what I did in October. The difference between him and me is that I have a chair and he has a hearing.”

A man from classics says the two cases are different, and his reason is a real one. The student is assessed on the process. She is assessed on the outcome.

“Yes,” Priya says. “Who decided which of us gets assessed on process?”

From the end of the table, a lecturer who is not on the committee and came in for the coffee: “I teach four sections of composition at two campuses for forty-one thousand dollars a year. Four hundred and eighty essays a semester. You want to know how I get comments back inside a week.”

Nobody answers him.

The policy passes eleven to one. In August it appears in every syllabus in the college, in a standard paragraph most of the faculty paste without reading, drafted from a template the dean’s office produced in ninety seconds.

4.

Owen Vance, 19, has never written a school paper in a world where the machine was not sitting there.

He has worked out rules, and he did work them out, on a server with four hundred members who trade them the way earlier students traded old exams. Never paste. The version history in a Google Doc shows two thousand words landing in one block at 11:52 p.m., and that block has ended people. So type it, or run the extension that types it for you at ninety words a minute with pauses for thinking. Ask for a C-plus draft, because the A draft reads like nobody alive. Keep three of your own weak sentences per page. Leave one comma splice. Cite one source the machine cannot reach, something from the microfilm in the basement of the library, because a real page number in a 1974 issue of a journal nobody has digitized ends every conversation before it starts.

In seminar he says he uses it to brainstorm. The professor nods and says that is a legitimate use, that is what these tools are good for. Owen means about eleven percent of what he said.

He gets a 91 on the Melville paper. The comment says his close reading of the whiteness of the whale shows a real ear for the text. He reads it twice and feels something he has no word for, sitting close to pride and not the same.

5.

Hana Kim, 20, writes formal English because she learned it from textbooks and her mother’s red pen, and formal English reads as machine. The detector returns 87 percent on her Latin American history paper.

The hearing takes place at a laminate table with a box of tissues already on it, which tells her what these rooms are used to. She explains her drafting habits. She explains that she outlines on paper first. The associate dean is kind and asks whether she can prove it, and Hana understands that she has been asked to prove a negative to a number.

She keeps her grade after two weeks and one letter from her academic advisor. Since February she records her screen while she writes, every session, four hours of footage per essay, stored in a folder on her drive named Evidence. She has never once used the tool. Around half her friends use it every week.

She has stopped saying that she does not use it, because the sentence has been ruined. Everyone says it now. She hears her own voice saying it and hears the lie in it that is not hers.

6.

Ray Ocampo, 47, composites for a vendor shop in Culver City that has three floors, no signage, and a nondisclosure agreement running eleven pages. His client this quarter is a studio with a press release taped to the breakroom fridge announcing its lawsuit against an AI company for the unauthorized use of copyrighted material. Somebody drew a smiley face on it in January and nobody has taken it down.

His week: cleaning generated crowd extension for a battle sequence, a hundred and forty extras turned into eleven thousand, then a pass to fix hands and repair the edges where the machine loses interest. The shot list calls the work environment augmentation. The call sheet says nothing. The credit roll will say the name of the shop.

At the mixer in June a union rep he likes asks what they are running over there.

“Traditional comp, mostly,” Ray says. “Some machine-learning assist on the roto.”

That sentence was written in a conference room by a man in a quarter-zip and distributed to the floor as guidance. Ray has said it eleven times and it comes out smooth now. He has a mortgage in Sherman Oaks and a son starting at Cal State Northridge in the fall. His friend Teo, who told the same shop no in 2025 on principle, drives for a grocery delivery app and posts about integrity on Sundays, and Ray likes those posts, every one of them, from his phone in the parking lot.

7.

Bill Ferraro, 51, sits at his father’s kitchen table at two in the morning. The funeral is at ten. On the paper napkin in front of him he has written three lines in four hours: the 1962 Impala, second shift at the plant for thirty-one years, he paid for the wedding and never said one word about love.

He opens the laptop and types those three things and everything else he can remember, unsorted, eight hundred words, the fight about the truck, the smell of the garage, the way his father sat in the car in the driveway for ten minutes before coming in. He asks how to put it in order.

What comes back has one sentence in it he keeps, about a man who said what he meant with money and time because the other words were not given to him. The order of the paragraphs is not his. Everything else at the funeral is his, in his throat, in front of two hundred people at St. Anthony’s.

His sister holds his arm in the vestibule afterward and asks how he did that.

“I don’t know,” Bill says. “It just came.”

That night at the hotel he deletes the conversation from his history. He cannot say why he does it. He meant every word he said over his father’s coffin, and he knows he meant it, and he deletes it anyway before he sleeps.

8.

Corinne Whately, 34, illustrator, eleven years freelance, posts a process video in September because she is proud of the piece and because she believes in showing the work. In the video she says she generated a rough for the perspective on the cathedral interior, printed it, and painted the final in gouache over four days.

Twelve hours later the repost has forty thousand quotes. The anthology drops her piece on a Thursday. The gallery in Portland uses the word postpone. Her income falls sixty percent over the next quarter, and two commercial clients who never explain anything stop explaining anything.

Two of the accounts loudest in her mentions use the same tool she used. She knows their line work. She has known it since 2019. She says nothing, because saying it would confirm to everyone watching that she is the kind of person who thinks about this.

Her friends take one lesson from what happened to her, and the lesson is not about tools. The illustrators she knows still use what they use. They no longer make videos.

Devin Osei, 33, staff engineer, tells his father at Thanksgiving that it is basically autocomplete. Sixty-two percent of the lines he shipped in the last quarter arrived as suggestions he accepted, and he read every one of them, and he rejected plenty, and he would tell you the reading is the job now.

His VP shows the board a slide claiming a forty percent lift in engineering throughput, a number produced by a director who needed a number.

Sales tells the bank, whose vendor policy forbids third-party generative tools in any delivered code, that every line is written and reviewed by their engineers. The second half of that sentence holds. The bank’s own chief technology officer wrote the vendor policy in a tool his team has not finished approving, and he was pleased with how quickly it came together, and he mentioned that to no one.

The concealment is old. Speechwriters put words in mouths and the mouths took the credit. Ghostwriters delivered the memoirs of generals. Session players cut the records the band toured behind, and the sleeve said the band. Script doctors saved pictures and went uncredited by contract. Erving Goffman (1922-1982) described the back region as the place where the work of the performance gets done and out of which the audience is kept, and he noticed that audiences cooperate. They stay out. Nobody at dinner asks the host who cooked.

What has changed is the volume, the speed, and who gets asked. Priya signs nine letters and answers to nobody. Owen answers to a detector. Marina signs an attestation her client’s own marketing department violates on Tuesdays. Hana, who has done nothing, keeps four hours of video per essay in a folder called Evidence, and Corinne, who said out loud what half her field does in silence, lost a quarter of her year for it. The disclosure falls on the ones least able to refuse it. The rules get written by people using the tool to write them.

There is a case for the silence, and Dale Pruitt could make it. The mechanic in the sermon was his. Bill Ferraro’s love for his father was his. No man owes the room an itemized list of what sat on his desk while he worked, and the reader who wants to know what a thing cost to make is asking a question about himself.

There is a case against the silence, and Hana Kim could make it, and the buyer who paid twenty-two cents a word could make it, and the union rep at the mixer in June could make it if anyone told him what to ask.

Everyone in these scenes gives an account of his use, and every account runs shorter than the use. The gap is where the work got done. Nobody has agreed yet on whose business the gap is, and until that is settled, the people in it will keep giving the short account, because so far the short account is the one that gets you through the door.

Posted in AI | Comments Off on The Gap