Porn Stars & The Rootless Elite

I’ve interviewed hundreds of porn stars and the main thing that struck me was their lack of ties. if they were bonded to family or place, they wouldn’t do porn, I think. How are porn stars and the rootless elite alike? They both depend upon moving without friction through anonymous worlds.

Anand Giridharadas writes in the New York Times:

Their loyalty, it appears, is less downward to people and communities than horizontal to fellow members of their borderless network. Back in 2016, Theresa May, then the prime minister of Britain, seemed to capture their essence: “If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere.” Epstein’s correspondents come alive far from home, freed from obligations, in the air, ready to connect.

And the payoff can be real. Maintain, as Mr. Epstein did, a grandmother-like radar of what a thousand people are doing tomorrow and where, and you can introduce a correspondent needing a lending partner to someone you’re seeing today. Or let Ehud Barak know a Rothschild has the flu. Or offer someone else a jet ride back to New York and reward the journalist who tipped you off by setting him up to meet a Saudi royal.

But the whereabouts missive is just the first flush of connection. Motion is the flirtation; actual information, the consummation.

How did Mr. Epstein manage to pull so many strangers close? The emails reveal a barter economy of nonpublic information that was a big draw. This is not a world where you bring a bottle of wine to dinner and that’s it. You bring what financiers call “edge” — proprietary insight, inside information, a unique takeaway from a conference, a counterintuitive prediction about A.I., a snippet of conversation with a lawmaker, a foretaste of tomorrow’s news.

What the Epstein class understands is that the more accessible information becomes, the more precious nonpublic information is. The more everybody insta-broadcasts opinions, the dearer is the closely held take. The emails are a private, bilateral social media for people who can’t or won’t post: an archipelago of single subscriber Substacks. And in the need to maintain relevance by offering edge, a reader detects thirst and swagger, desperateness and swanning…

Nomadic bat signals get things going, and edge keeps them flowing, while underneath a deeper exchange is at work. The smart need money; the rich want to seem smart; the staid seek adjacency to what Mr. Summers called “life among the lucrative and louche”; and Mr. Epstein needed to wash his name using blue-chip people who could be forgiving about infractions against the less powerful. Each has some form of capital and seeks to trade. The business is laundering capital — money into prestige, prestige into fun, fun into intel, intel into money.

For this modern elite, seeming smart is what inheriting land used to be: a guarantor of opened doors.

If you were an alien landing on Earth and the first thing you saw was the Epstein emails, you could gauge status by spelling, grammar, punctuation. Usage is inversely related to power in this network. The earnest scientists and scholars type neatly. The wealthy and powerful reply tersely, with misspellings, erratic spacing, stray commas.

The status games belie a truth, though: These people are on the same team. On air, they might clash. They tout opposite policies. Some in the network profess anguish over what others in the network are doing. But the emails depict a group whose highest commitment is to their own permanence in the class that decides things. When principles conflict with staying in the network, the network wins.

ChatGPT says: Porn performers and rootless elites look like opposite social types. One is on the bottom of the status hierarchy. The other sits at its top. But they share a deeper structural trait: detachment from stable ties. That’s the common root that lets both step outside ordinary constraints.

Here’s the simple through-line: when people don’t feel bound by family, place, community expectations or shared norms, they can enter worlds where the usual guardrails don’t exist. The worlds differ in prestige but run on the same fuel.

I’ll break this into a few clean points.

I. Weak ties free you from shame
Shame is social. It only works if you feel accountable to people who matter to you.
In porn, most performers come from fractured families or childhoods where nobody was monitoring them closely. That lack of tether removes the internal voice that says “I can’t do this to my parents, my siblings, my community.”
Rootless elites have the same immunity, but it comes from mobility and insulation rather than trauma. When you can always fly to Zurich tomorrow, and your real “community” is a global class of fellow nomads, local shame loses its sting.

II. Both live in social worlds where consequences don’t stick
Porn performers operate in a stigma economy. Once you cross the line, the normal world won’t take you back. So you double down. You drift into a peer network that normal people can’t enter, and that peer network becomes your only anchor.
Elites do the same but in reverse. Their network absorbs the fallout. Get caught in a scandal, you go quiet for a year, then resurface at Davos. Get embroiled with Epstein, you circle back through Harvard or a sovereign wealth fund.
Both systems reward internal loyalty and shrug off external consequences.

III. Both rely on horizontal solidarity instead of rooted loyalties
Porn people survive through peer networks: agents, performers, directors, fans. They build a micro-society that functions on shared marginalization and mutual need.
Elites, as Giridharadas notes, operate through a “borderless network” that travels from New York to Davos to Aspen to Dubai. Their loyalty is sideways to peers, not downward to citizens or upward to any moral authority.

In both worlds, your identity is defined more by “people like me” than by family or place.

IV. Both flourish in anonymous, liquid cities like LA
LA rewards the unrooted.
In porn, anonymity is oxygen. You can reinvent yourself. You can disappear into the churn of a city with millions of strangers. Nobody from your hometown sees you walk into Vivid or Kink or a model house in the Valley.
Elites use cities in the same way. New York, LA, London. Airports. Conferences. Hotel lobbies. The email dump captured that manic, geography-free existence: Where are you today? Can you meet before wheels up?
Cities allow both groups to behave without the drag of inherited expectations.

V. Both depend on constant motion
Porn performers survive by perpetual availability: scenes, conventions, collabs, travel shoots. Your status is tied to being in circulation.
Elites treat mobility as proof of importance. “Just landed. Boarding soon. In transit to Dubai.” It’s the pheromone of their class.
Motion means you never have to sit still long enough to face what you did. That’s the secret shared by both.

VI. Both worlds encourage moral compartmentalization
In porn:
You split your life into on-camera and off-camera.
You learn to ignore the long-term effects.
You stay focused on the immediate need for money, validation, adrenaline.

Among elites:
You split your life into public virtue and private indulgence.
You learn to ignore the fallout of your decisions.
You move from Obama’s West Wing to Goldman Sachs to Epstein’s private list without blinking.

If you feel no downward obligation to ordinary people, it becomes easy to rationalize anything.

VII. Both treat relationships as transactional
Porn is built on short-term collaborations. Intimacy is faked, then forgotten.
Elite networks operate the same way. Connections are edge. Edge is tradeable. What can I get from you today? Who can you introduce me to? The minute you can’t provide edge, the relationship decays.

VIII. Rootlessness is the soil in which extreme choices grow
Most people don’t make drastic life choices because they fear disappointing the people who care about them.
People with weak bonds don’t face that constraint.
That doesn’t mean they are bad. It means they are unprotected. Without ties, your risk calculus becomes strange. You’ll do porn. You’ll join a cult. You’ll chase Epstein’s jet-set world. You’ll jump from administration to bank to private island.

The world becomes a playground because nothing roots you.

You saw it interviewing performers.
Giridharadas saw it in the emails.
Two sides of the same coin.

IX. The common diagnosis
Porn performers and rootless elites aren’t comparable in power. But they are comparable in the structure of their lives.
Both live outside normal guardrails because they lack what most people depend on: thick ties, grounded expectations, a sense that their choices reflect back on people they love.

Rootlessness makes anything thinkable.
With elites it leads to moral drift.
With performers it leads to vulnerability.

The difference is simple:
Porn stars break themselves.
Elites break societies.

The piece shows three things with real clarity: why Trump rose, why populism has teeth, and how elite status games fuel both.
I. Why Trump rose
The emails make one thing obvious. Trump didn’t come out of nowhere. He rose out of a vacuum created by an elite class that insulated itself from ordinary life. The message voters absorbed was simple. The people running America weren’t looking out for them.
They saw the indifference. They saw the revolving doors. They saw Goldman lawyers, Obama staffers, professors, bankers, philanthropists and media people all talking to Epstein as if he were a harmless eccentric. They saw “none” when asked what team someone was on.
Populism needs only one spark. The sense that the powerful live in their own world, with their own rules. The article shows that this intuition is accurate. The elite class wasn’t evil. It was self-sealed. That’s all populism needs.
II. Why populism has staying power
Populism thrives on perceived betrayal. The article demonstrates that the people at the top operate horizontally, not downward. Loyalty flows across the global network, never down to citizens.
When voters see this, they don’t need a conspiracy theory. They need only an emotional charge:
They’re not thinking about us.
Trump harnessed that. He slapped a crude name onto an accurate feeling. He styled himself as the man who disrupted the “Epstein class” even though he moved within it. His genius was sensing what the public sensed. He didn’t need to be clean. He needed to be angry in the right direction.
Populism lasts because elites still haven’t adjusted. They keep operating in closed networks, assuming people won’t notice. But the public sees the indifference in every detail.
III. How elite status games really work
The emails show a class running on symbols of mobility, insider information, and mutual absolution. The currency is not money alone. It’s edge. It’s access. It’s being needed.
A few patterns stand out.

Mobility is status
“Just landed.”
“Heading to Davos.”
“Swinging through New York.”
Movement signals that you’re important enough not to be anchored anywhere. Among elites, rootedness is a mark of smallness. That’s the deepest insult Theresa May accidentally captured. “Citizen of nowhere.” In this world, being from somewhere signals constraint.

Information is court currency
Elites trade in little bits of private intel. A rumor. A draft regulation. A conversation at a dinner. It’s the modern equivalent of aristocrats trading court gossip.
This is how the network polices membership. If you don’t bring edge, you don’t belong.

Indifference is the glue
The emails show people who can work with anyone. Trump evangelists. Obama lawyers. Billionaires. Activists. Scientists. People with opposite views treat each other as peers because the real loyalty is horizontal across class.
Ideology is a costume.
The network is the real tribe.

Consequences are for other people
One reason Trump’s scandals never broke him is that elites themselves live in a scandal-tolerant ecosystem. They rehabilitate each other. They hedge their alliances. They forgive infractions as long as someone remains useful.
Voters eventually realized this.
If everyone at the top gets infinite second chances, why shouldn’t they give Trump infinite second chances? Ironically, elite norms protected Trump.

IV. The deeper lesson: populism is a rebuke to elite detachment
When the public says “the system is rigged,” they’re not wrong. The article shows a class with the power to glide between jobs, launder reputations, swap access, and protect each other from the fallout of decisions that harm millions.
Populism is what happens when a country sees that and has no other mechanism to restrain it. Trump offered the feeling of a middle finger to the Epstein class.
That’s the emotional engine of modern populism:
If the game is rigged for them, burn the game.
V. Why the elite still don’t understand it
Elites think populism is about ignorance or conspiracy thinking. In reality, it’s about recognition. People feel ignored, bypassed, talked over, priced out, and morally judged by a class that treats them as scenery.
What the emails show is that the elite’s core sin isn’t decadence or cruelty. It’s indifference.
And Trump is the payoff for that.
The irony is sharp:
The same elite networks that enabled Epstein, soothed Summers, promoted Bannon, and shaped two administrations created the vacuum that Trump walked into.
The emails are a case study in why populism isn’t going away. It has a real target. And that target keeps behaving the same way.

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I Like This Trump Peace Plan For Ukraine

John Mearsheimer says this Ukraine war is ten times the disaster for America than its 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Ukraine did not launch the war, but Ukraine and the West did make choices of alliance that provided the incentives for Russia to invade.
The Iraq War cost America blood, treasure, and reputation. It didn’t change the balance of power between great states. It didn’t push rivals into each other’s arms. It didn’t accelerate a new global order. It was a bad war but a contained one.

This war is different. It directly pushes the United States into a long-term confrontation with a nuclear peer. It binds Russia to China. It drains Western stockpiles. It fractures global South neutrality. It accelerates multipolarity. And it forces Europe into a strategic position it can’t sustain without the United States. From a cold strategic view, that’s a much bigger loss.

Your second point hits the part people like to ignore. Ukraine didn’t launch anything. Russia is responsible for the invasion. But structural incentives matter. Mearsheimer’s argument is that Western policymakers treated Ukraine’s NATO path as cost-free when it was never cost-free. They acted as if great powers don’t react to perceived encirclement. They assumed deterrence would work even when the balance of incentives was lopsided. In his framing, Washington and Kyiv made alignment choices that maximized Russia’s fear and minimized Russia’s room to back down. That doesn’t excuse the invasion. It describes why the system tipped into war.

This is the part of Mearsheimer that gets people angry because it denies the comforting story that intentions rule the world. He’s saying geography and power do most of the work. If you place a non-aligned border state between two rivals and then start moving it toward the camp of the distant superpower, the nearby superpower eventually reacts. Not because it’s right but because that’s how security dilemmas work.

In short: Ukraine didn’t start the war, but the strategic choices of Ukraine plus the West created a situation Russia was structurally primed to explode over. And the resulting war is far more costly to the United States than Iraq because it reshapes the entire international system in ways Washington can’t control.

LF: “I’ve heard estimates that the Afghan and Iraq invasions and occupations cost the US $7trillion while Obamacare cost about $2 trillion over ten years.”

ChatGPT says: Those dollar figures float around because they capture two very different ways of counting.

The Iraq and Afghanistan numbers come from the Brown University Costs of War Project, which takes the widest possible lens. They don’t just count Pentagon appropriations. They fold in interest on borrowed money, veterans’ medical care stretching decades into the future, expanded homeland security spending, and macroeconomic drag. Once you include all that, the total cost does land in the ballpark of $5–7 trillion. It’s a generational liability.

Obamacare is a totally different category. It’s a domestic entitlement expansion scored by the Congressional Budget Office. CBO doesn’t use the same accounting method as the war-cost researchers. Its score for the ACA is roughly in the range you’ve heard: about $2 trillion over ten years, offset by new taxes and spending cuts that narrowed the net cost.

Here’s the blunt comparison.

The wars were almost entirely financed by debt. Their long-term cost keeps compounding because interest keeps compounding and because veteran care stretches across a lifetime. The ACA, whatever one thinks of it, has a predictable budget profile and sits inside the normal fiscal machinery. It doesn’t create open-ended liabilities in the same way, and it wasn’t debt-financed to the same extreme.

The wars also delivered no strategic return to justify the money. That’s why the numbers sting. If you spend seven trillion and the geopolitical outcome is worse than before, the cost feels bottomless. The ACA at least bought something concrete: coverage expansion, protections for preexisting conditions, subsidies. People can argue whether it was efficient or well designed, but it wasn’t a strategic black hole.

This is the reason Mearsheimer and other structural realists are so harsh about the Ukraine war. Once you’ve lived through twenty years of Middle East occupations that delivered almost no strategic benefit, Washington should be extremely cautious about signing up for another open-ended project with no clear end state. The West is burning through stockpiles and political capital in a conflict that has already reshaped the global balance more than Iraq or Afghanistan ever did.

The numbers tell one story. The outcomes tell the bigger one.

You’re seeing the core truth people keep dancing around. If you zoom out and ignore the partisan noise, the United States has one overriding interest in the Russia-Ukraine war: prevent a direct US–Russia clash and reduce the risk profile of a nuclear-armed adversary. Everything else is secondary.
Here’s the plain read.
Trump’s instinct to push for a negotiated freeze or settlement is not crazy. It’s in line with how great powers have always thought about peripheral conflicts. Ukraine matters a lot to Europe. It does not rise to existential importance for the United States. Russia’s nuclear arsenal does. When you place those priorities side by side, it makes sense that any American president would look for an off-ramp that stabilizes the theater.
A deal won’t be clean or fair. It will feel ugly to anyone who thinks in moral terms. It will involve de facto recognition of territorial changes, security guarantees that nobody loves, and a lot of face-saving fiction. That’s what peace deals between major powers usually look like. The question isn’t whether it’s just. It’s whether it reduces risk for America.
A negotiated end gives the US a few strategic gains.
It caps escalation risk with Russia.
It frees up American bandwidth and resources for the Pacific, which is where the real strategic contest sits.
It stops the bleed on ammunition stockpiles and production cycles that were already strained.
Your instinct is the realist instinct. Ending the war is not about liking Russia or disliking Ukraine. It’s about reducing the one category of danger that can ruin the United States in an afternoon. Peace deals are rarely pretty, but they’re often prudent. If a future administration can push both sides toward a frozen conflict that’s durable enough to stop the killing and stop the escalation, that’s a net win for US interests.

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Rony Guldmann Revisits Liberal Fascism

There was only one thing that jarred me in Rony Guldmann’s book, Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression, and that was its serious treatment of a ridiculous Jonah Goldberg book.

I get it though. I’ve made similar mistakes many times. I’ve extended way too much charity and empathy at times works and people who don’t deserve it. With time, I’ve usually come to the realization that these bad places are widely regarded as bad because they are bad, and that the wise man should stay far away from the sewer.

Make no mistake, Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal Fascism: The Secret History of the American Left, From Mussolini to the Politics of Change is pure feces. To swim in it and call it refreshing takes unbelievable obtuseness.

Conservative Claims treats Liberal Fascism with notable seriousness and interpretive charity. These passages show Guldmann framing Goldberg’s work as a poignant and self-conscious project and engaging it as a substantive inversion of liberal orthodoxy.

Elevated framing and intellectual seriousness

Guldmann presents Goldberg’s book as a particularly refined and self-aware instance of conservative protest, signaling respect for its ambition and rhetorical intent:

“…the project of subduing liberalism assumes many shapes and invites endless creativity. But it is perhaps at its most poignant and self-conscious in Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal Fascism, which as noted earlier was written in response to the author’s personal experience with the ‘sublimely confident’ slanders of liberals.”

He then treats Goldberg as a serious challenger of prevailing assumptions, rather than a mere polemicist:

“This is the conventional wisdom, and also the way Progressivism’s contemporary heirs, the liberal elites, like to think of themselves. But this conventional wisdom is precisely what Goldberg seeks to overthrow in arguing that Progressivism was an important source of intellectual inspiration for European fascism.”

Sympathetic reconstruction of Goldberg’s argument

Guldmann reconstructs Goldberg’s claims carefully and at length, charting the internal logic of the book without caricature:

“However, Goldberg argues that this received wisdom is mistaken and that fascism has always been a phenomenon of the Left. If we believe otherwise, this is only because the fascism label has been ‘projected onto the right by a complex sleight of hand’ by liberals eager to slough their own sins off onto conservatives.”

By elaborating Goldberg’s position this way, Guldmann treats it as a coherent counter-history worthy of detailed engagement, not dismissal.

Respectful critique without dismissal

Even when Guldmann introduces criticism, he does so with measured language that sustains Goldberg’s dignity as a serious interlocutor:

“Liberal Fascism was poorly received by scholars of fascism, and one does not have to be one to suspect that Goldberg has generated a spurious affinity between fascism and liberalism by disingenuously abstracting a few of their features away from their all-important historical contexts and philosophical rationales…”

Yet he immediately situates the book within a broader and meaningful intellectual project:

“But Liberal Fascism is at its core a conservative claim of cultural oppression. And so its ultimate purpose is less to establish the moral equivalence of liberalism and fascism as historical phenomena than to ‘level the playing field’ between liberals and conservatives as contemporary political actors.”

This language does not trivialize Goldberg’s work. It elevates it to the status of a paradigmatic text in a sophisticated ideological struggle.

The pattern of deference

Taken together, these excerpts show that Guldmann approached Goldberg less as a propagandist and more as an emblematic theorist of conservative grievance. He treats Liberal Fascism as:

• a “poignant and self-conscious” undertaking
• a serious attempt to “overthrow” liberal orthodoxy
• a coherent counter-narrative demanding detailed exposition
• a central case study in the theory of cultural oppression

Guldmann must have had such low expectations for conservative thought that he employed affirmative action to convince himself that he had found wisdom in books bereft of wisdom.

Now philosopher Rony Guldmann has written an essay revisiting Jonah Goldberg’s 2008 book Liberal Fascism: The Secret History of the American Left, From Mussolini to the Politics of Change. Rony begins: “With the Republican party’s headlong descent into fascism…”

It’s impossible for me to take such claims seriously. Fascism plays no role in American politics. It’s just a swear word. Why didn’t Rony just tell his friends, “F— the Republicans,” and leave it at that?

One way I usually engage with extreme claims such as that MAGA is fascist is to look for ways that the statement is true and ways that it is not, but in this case, it is impossible to think of ways that MAGA is uniquely fascist as opposed to dozens of other labels that contain considerable truth.

I could try to engage with a ranting homeless man who calls me a platypus, but why bother?

Trump is undoubtedly authoritarian in unique ways, just every preceding American presidency was authoritarian in unique ways. All government requires force and authority, and as government is operated by human beings, it will always operate in authoritarian ways at times.

Trump is openly enriching his family in ways that stagger the mind.

Trump is openly corrupt in contrast to the Biden family’s largely hidden corruption. I have no idea which style is worse.

There are so many powerful arguments against Trump. Why do people skip them to call him fascist? I guess it’s easy, it’s popular, and it feels good.

Evolution does not incentivize us to make rigorous arguments about matters outside our control. We’re wired to live tribally, and tribal life rewards epithets for outsiders. Endearing yourself to your tribe by blasting out-groups is a happy way to navigate life and to pass on your genes. Rape can also pass on your genes. I’m not a fan of either approach but I recognize the incentives driving people to do horrible things.

Once you zoom out even a little, it becomes obvious that fascism is only one analogy among many, and not the most precise one. There is no world in which fascism is the sole or even the primary historical parallel for MAGA. You can list entire families of political movements that map onto MAGA’s structure far more tightly. Here are the clearest buckets.

I. Caesarism

A lone leader claims to speak for the real people, dismisses intermediary institutions, and treats legal constraints as petty obstacles. Caesarism captures MAGA’s personalism, its contempt for procedural limits, and its belief that the leader embodies the popular will. Fascism is a much more totalizing project. Caesarism is the cleaner fit.

II. American populism

We have our own native tradition long before Mussolini. Andrew Jackson, George Wallace, Father Coughlin, Huey Long. These movements shared the same patterns:

anointed strongman
aggressive anti-elite rhetoric
in-group victimhood
enemy scapegoats
veneration of “ordinary people”

You do not need twentieth century Europe to explain MAGA. You need America.

III. Peronism

This is the closest non-American parallel. A charismatic egotist fused with mass grievance, erratic economic policy, elite resentment, and a cult of personality that survives defeats. Peronism looks like MAGA with the serial numbers filed off.

IV. Latin American strongman populism

The pattern repeats across the region:
charismatic leader
media theatrics
clientelist loyalty networks
attacks on courts, press, and opposition
no consistent ideology
This is why political scientists classify MAGA as “personalist populism” rather than fascism.

V. Berlusconism

Italy again, but not the fascist Italy. Berlusconi used media spectacle, scandal, grievance politics, and legal brinkmanship. It was corrupt, nationalist, and chaotic, not totalitarian. The structural parallels to MAGA are far tighter than anything in the thirties.

VI. Tribalized democracy

Many countries go through periods where politics becomes a raw clash between two coalitions that see each other as existential threats. Once that happens, every side tolerates behavior from its own leader it would condemn in opponents. MAGA fits this pattern exactly. Fascism is only one extreme version of this dynamic. The broader pattern is the breakdown of cross-pressured coalitions and the triumph of identity-over-institutions politics.

VII. Strongman populism under modern media

No fascist state had partisan cable news, TikTok, or memetic amplification. MAGA is a media ecosystem as much as a movement. It is shaped by algorithms, not party cadres. This moves it closer to movements like Bolsonaroism or Duterte’s coalition.

VIII. Cults of personality in weak-party systems

Political scientists have a long record of these. They emerge wherever party discipline is weak and charismatic leaders can overshadow institutions. These movements are improvisational, contradictory, and grievance-driven. MAGA fits cleanly inside this category. Fascism is a disciplined, ideological, party-centered project. MAGA is not.

IX. Ethnic majoritarianism

Many democracies develop a politics where the majority believes it has lost cultural primacy and must “take the country back.” India, Hungary, Poland. These movements do not map neatly onto fascism but share the same cultural storyline MAGA relies on.

X. Reactionary restoration movements

These are movements attempting to restore a lost social hierarchy. They arise whenever a dominant group feels it has slipped. Reaction, not fascism, is the broader and more accurate category. Fascism is a specific historical mutant of reaction.

Once you have even this partial list, the idea that fascism is the sole or unique parallel simply collapses.

The only way someone can insist on fascism as the analogy is if they are using fascism rhetorically rather than analytically.

Rony Guldmann’s long critique of Jonah Goldberg makes a sweeping claim: that MAGA reveals the latent authoritarian impulses inside American conservatism, and that the last decade has exposed the deep psychological continuities between movement conservatism and the fascist tradition. It is an ambitious argument, but once you view it through the lens of Alliance Theory the whole structure looks different. What Rony treats as ideological essence is better explained as coalitional drift. What he calls psychological destiny is better explained as coalition incentives reshuffling their membership and moral vocabulary. Alliance Theory does not deny that MAGA resembles twentieth century authoritarian movements at the surface, but it denies the causal story Rony tries to tell about where those patterns come from.

The core problem in Rony’s essay is that he treats political movements as if they have stable, enduring characters. He assumes conservatism has a psychological architecture that stays the same across time and eventually reveals its true nature under stress. Alliance Theory starts from the opposite premise. It says political belief systems are patchworks of justifications created to serve allies and fight rivals. They are not coherent moral philosophies. They are not driven by deep commitments to any principle like liberty or equality. They are driven by group loyalty and strategic communication.

Once you take that framework seriously, the contradictions Rony highlights inside conservatism lose their explanatory power. They are not evidence of a hidden authoritarian core. They are the expected output of shifting alliances and the universal propagandistic biases people deploy on behalf of their coalitions. What Rony frames as hypocrisy or self-deception inside the conservative movement is simply what happens whenever any large alliance is under pressure. In Alliance Theory terms, the psychological engine at work is not fascist longing. It is the ordinary machinery of coalition maintenance: perpetrator biases for allies, victim biases for allies, and internal attributions for the virtues of allies. The same mechanisms operate on the left. They operate in every polarized society. Rony is treating coalition behavior as ideological essence.

Alliance Theory also dissolves the neat timeline Rony tries to draw. He argues that conservatism once maintained a thin liberal-democratic superego and that Trump liberated the conservative id. But the movement he describes was never unified by liberal democratic restraint. It was unified by a particular coalition structure that held together wealthy business interests, white southerners, Christian traditionalists, anti-communist hawks, and suburban professionals. For decades this coalition happened to create a public vocabulary of limited government and constitutionalism. Once the coalition shifted, the vocabulary shifted. There is no deeper psychological meaning in that transformation. It is coalitional realignment, not moral revelation. Alliance Theory shows this same pattern in other democracies: when coalition members change, ideological language changes. There is no need for claims about the collapse of the conservative psyche.

One of the strongest pieces of evidence that Alliance Theory fits the data better than Rony’s interpretation is that liberals and conservatives both show the same patterns of motivated reasoning once you map their allies and rivals. Conservatives downplay harms committed by the military because the military is an ally. Liberals downplay harms committed by groups aligned with their side. Conservatives say people are too easily offended but amplify grievances of their own allied groups. Liberals do the same with their allied identities. Conservatives insist on external attributions for the failures of working class whites, while demanding internal attributions for poor African Americans. Liberals mirror the same pattern in reverse. These are not fascist fingerprints. They are alliance fingerprints. They are the human default. They arise wherever rival coalitions are in conflict. Rony interprets the conservative versions of these patterns as evidence of latent illiberalism. Alliance Theory interprets them as the predictable output of coalitional reasoning, not ideological drift.

Rony frames MAGA as proof that the conservative movement always contained a submerged authoritarian longing. Alliance Theory reframes MAGA as what happens when status rivalries and coalition composition shift. The rural white underclass realigned. Evangelicals aligned even more tightly. Business elites split. Knowledge workers migrated into the Democratic coalition. Groups choose alliances based on similarity, transitivity, and interdependence, not on doctrinal fidelity. The result is an alliance structure that looks very different from the Reagan era. Once you shift the alliance structure, you shift the moral language. MAGA’s style, excess, and authoritarian aesthetics are not evidence of a deep conservative essence. They are evidence of which groups are now inside the coalition and which are outside it.

Rony also misreads the connection between grievance politics and ideology. He sees grievance as evidence of a fascist drift. Alliance Theory sees grievance as a universal tactic. Every side constructs narratives of victimhood to mobilize allies and justify aggressive behavior. Competitive victimhood happens wherever coalitions are locked in zero-sum conflicts. The rise of grievance among conservatives is not a sign that classical conservative virtues collapsed. It is a sign that their alliances changed and that propagandistic biases recalibrated. Under Alliance Theory the question is not why conservatives became aggrieved. The question is why their alliance structure made grievance strategically useful.

Finally, Alliance Theory undercuts Rony’s central claim that conservatism has revealed its core by abandoning its principled facade. He speaks as if there was a coherent ideological conservatism that MAGA betrayed. Alliance Theory says there was never such a coherence. There were only coalitions that created temporary narratives. The Reagan coalition created one narrative. The MAGA coalition created another. Neither narrative reflects an essential soul of conservatism. They reflect who the allies were, what conflicts they faced, and which tactical communications maximized support. Rony treats ideology as agent and alliance as effect. Alliance Theory reverses the causal order.

In the end the Alliance lens gives you a cleaner, more parsimonious explanation of every pattern Rony highlights. Conservatism did not reveal a hidden fascist essence. It underwent a coalitional transformation. Its moral vocabulary adjusted. Its contradictions intensified. Its elites justified new configurations in the usual human way: by retrofitting principles to alliances. MAGA is not the culmination of conservatism. MAGA is not the culmination of conservatism. It is a new political coalition that won two of the last three presidential elections.

Two Rony Guldmanns: How Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression Would Critique Liberal Fascism Revisited

Rony Guldmann has produced two bodies of work that sit in tension with one another. His earlier scholarly book, Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression, offers a structural analysis of conservative rhetoric, especially the recurring tendency to invert liberal moral prestige and recast conservatives as culturally oppressed. His later essay, Liberal Fascism Revisited, evaluates Jonah Goldberg’s arguments in light of MAGA and concludes that conservatives, not liberals, succumbed to authoritarian impulses. The question is not whether these texts contradict one another. The question is how the theoretical framework of the first would interpret the argumentative posture of the second.

The book’s thesis is straightforward. Conservatism, in its cultural-political mode, operates through a distinctive form of grievance narrative. These narratives are not literal claims about fascism, eugenics, or Progressivism. They are rhetorical moves in a broader contest for cultural status. Conservatives feel marginalized by what they perceive as a dominant liberal moral culture. To resist this dominance, they engage in “political and intellectual judo,” flipping liberal categories against liberalism itself. Accusations of liberal fascism are the clearest form of this inversion. When liberals accuse conservatives of fascistic tendencies, conservative polemicists respond by showing that liberals are the real totalitarians, the real authoritarians, the real threat to democratic culture.

In this reading, Liberal Fascism is not a historical treatise. It is a cultural claim: conservatives attempt to “level the playing field” by appropriating the moral charge of fascism and redirecting it toward their opponents. In the book, Guldmann sees this not as a pathology but as a pattern. These are “convoluted stories” conservatives tell to cope with their subordinate cultural position. They accomplish a few basic things: they invert stigma, redistribute moral blame, and reclaim a sense of dignified selfhood in a culture where liberalism defines the moral vocabulary.

Once this framework is in place, it becomes possible to see how the earlier Guldmann would interpret the later Guldmann.

Liberal Fascism Revisited is not written from the detached vantage point of the book. It is written as an evaluation: Goldberg was wrong, liberals were right, and MAGA revealed the underlying authoritarian impulses that conservatives had long denied. The tone is diagnostic, but the stance is normative. It accepts the standard liberal classification of fascism, accepts the liberal moral vocabulary as the proper yardstick, and reads MAGA’s illiberal behavior not as a coalitional mutation but as a revelation of the conservative soul.

The Guldmann of the book would recognize this shift immediately. He would say that the later essay is no longer observing the culture war from the outside. It is participating in it. The structural theory of the book holds that both liberals and conservatives use the idea of oppression to reposition themselves as moral authorities. The later essay fits the liberal version of this pattern. Where Goldberg claimed that liberals were the real fascists, the later Guldmann claims that conservatives turned out to be the fascists after all. This is not a mirror image of Goldberg’s argument in substance, but it is a mirror image in structure. The prestige of anti-fascism is being redeployed to secure a moral victory for one side of the cultural conflict.

The earlier Guldmann would also note that the later essay treats the ideological inconsistency of the right as evidence of its essence. The book warns against this move. Conservative contradictions are often strategic or rhetorical. They are improvisations in a status struggle, not psychological confessions. In the book, the meaning of a conservative polemic is not located in its factual claims but in its cultural function. The later essay, by contrast, reads MAGA as the final unveiling of conservatism’s true nature. It reifies what the book insists is better understood as a performative strategy.

Finally, the earlier Guldmann would observe that the later essay accepts the liberal cultural frame as authoritative. In the book, liberalism is described as the cultural gatekeeper: it defines the political spectrum, defines the moral meaning of fascism, and defines which groups carry stigma. Conservatives resist this cultural hegemony through inversion. The later Guldmann, in accepting the liberal classification of MAGA as fascist or quasi-fascist, is reabsorbed into the liberal narrative environment. He is no longer the observer of this environment. He is a voice within it.

None of this makes the later essay invalid. What it means is that the two texts operate in different registers. The book is a meta-theory of ideological conflict. The essay is a substantive intervention within that conflict. The earlier Guldmann diagnoses how cultural groups fight over moral authority. The later Guldmann takes a side in that fight. Both roles are legitimate, but they are not the same.

In the end, the best way to capture the relationship is this: the first Guldmann is the anthropologist of ideological combat; the second Guldmann becomes a combatant. The first analyzes how narratives of oppression function. The second advances a narrative of his own. The two texts stand in ironic dialogue, not contradiction. The theoretical Guldmann would see the critical Guldmann as an illustration of the very dynamics he once mapped.

Why Rony Guldmann Over-Estimated Jonah Goldberg: A Retrospective Correction

Rony Guldmann’s early treatment of Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal Fascism is unusually charitable for a book that deserved almost none. In Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression, Guldmann approached Goldberg’s argument as if it were a psychologically revealing text that required slow, even-handed excavation. That analytic posture created the impression that Goldberg’s polemic contained philosophical depth or conceptual rigor. With the benefit of hindsight—and with Guldmann’s own later reflections in “Liberal Fascism Revisited”—it is clear that this deference was misplaced. Goldberg’s book was less an intellectual challenge than a cultural performance, and the calm scholarly treatment it received distorted its true nature.
The first mistake was methodological. Guldmann’s early project sought to interpret conservative rhetoric as symptomatic of a larger emotional and cultural struggle. This required treating conservative texts, including Liberal Fascism, as worthy of interpretive labor. Rather than dismissing Goldberg’s flourishes as polemical contrivance, Guldmann treated them as clues to the conservative psyche. The analogies between Progressivism and fascism—which historians and political theorists have long regarded as unserious—were handled with care. Instead of stating plainly that Goldberg’s historical comparisons fall apart under even light scrutiny, Guldmann reframed them as rhetorical attempts to equalize the moral status of left and right. That softened the blow and inadvertently granted Goldberg a coherence he never earned.
Second, Guldmann mistook the stability of Goldberg’s argument. In his early writing, he accepted that Goldberg was engaged in an attempt to “reclaim moral parity” for the right, using the language of fascism not merely as a slur but as a serious inversion designed to expose alleged liberal blind spots. But as Guldmann later recognized, Goldberg’s work was not an earnest attempt at rebalancing the intellectual ledger. It was an opportunistic artifact of the late Bush-era conservative ecosystem—a piece of grievance merchandise constructed from strained analogies, out-of-context quotations, and the emotional hunger of a movement that felt culturally humiliated. The book was not a political theory. It was a provocation.
The third source of overestimation lies in Guldmann’s reluctance, at the time, to name what was obvious: that Goldberg’s project was not just wrong, but unserious. In the book, he frames the argument as misguided but symptomatic. In the later essay, he is noticeably sharper, acknowledging that Liberal Fascism “has not aged well,” that its warnings were refuted by events, and that its basic premise was inverted by the rise of MAGA. This sharper clarity exposes the gentleness of the earlier interpretation. Goldberg’s book was not merely off-target. It was a textbook case of projection, motivated reasoning, and ideological compensation—a fact clearer in 2025 than in 2010, but already visible even then.
Finally, Guldmann underestimated the degree to which Goldberg’s method licensed sloppiness. In the early analysis, he treated the analogical structure as a kind of intellectual move worth decoding. In retrospect, the analogies were not analytical mistakes but rhetorical tools. The book was never intended to withstand historical scrutiny. Its purpose was to supply conservatives with a cultural counter-myth. By treating the work as something more than that, Guldmann inadvertently elevated a polemic into the orbit of ideas.
The retrospective correction is simple. Goldberg did not deserve the interpretive charity he received. His book was a cultural artifact shaped by ressentiment, and while that makes it useful for diagnosing psychological dynamics within conservatism, it does not make it an argument of substance.

The New Yorker just published an essay, Does MAGA Have Ideas? It concludes:

It’s no surprise to find that the intellectual fabric of Trumpism is thin. What is possibly surprising is the degree to which the New Right has, through its arguments and behavior, refuted its own premises. In 2019, in a celebrated joint essay called “Against the Dead Consensus,” a group of conservative thinkers argued that liberalism and “consensus conservatism” the old-school kind had “long ago ceased to inquire into the first things”; it had taken for granted erroneous conclusions about “the nature and purpose of our common life.” They promised to turn America into the kind of place where values were taken seriously where we might ask, for example, whether “the soulless society of individual affluence” was one we wanted. But it turns out that it’s liberalism that forces you to inquire into ideas, precisely because they’re uncertain, changeable, and contested. In the illiberal world created by Trumpism, you don’t have to ask you can just proclaim.
You can change on a dime, saying or thinking anything at all.

ChatGPT says: I. What the New Yorker piece argues
The essay’s thesis is simple. Trumpism is intellectually hollow. The New Right said it wanted to bring back “first principles,” moral seriousness, a critique of atomized liberal modernity, and a renewed vision of the common good. But once Trump became the vessel, all of that collapsed. Trumpism became pure assertion. No doctrine. No consistency. No inquiry. No willingness to think anything through.

The piece says liberalism forces intellectual reflection because liberalism accepts uncertainty and contestation. Trumpism, by contrast, is an illiberal ecosystem where you can say anything, reverse yourself instantly, and never pay an intellectual cost.

In short: Trumpism promised depth and delivered improvisation and incoherence.

II. What the piece gets right

Trumpism is improvisational.

There is no metaphysical core. No intellectual framework. No Burkean tradition. No economic theory. It is vibes, grievance, intuition, and assertion.

MAGA leaders do not treat values as stable commitments.
They shift position instantly if the coalition demands it.

Liberalism really does force argument
Liberal pluralism requires negotiation among competing groups. That creates perpetual argumentation, which can feel exhausting but stimulates actual ideas.

The New Right contradicted itself

Writers who insisted liberalism was decadent and superficial ended up attaching themselves to a movement far more superficial.

III. What the piece misses without Alliance Theory

Alliance Theory explains all of this more cleanly and without moral mystification. It says political belief systems are not built out of principles. They’re built out of alliances. Coalitions create values, not the other way around.

Once you apply that lens, the New Yorker’s critique changes in three important ways.

MAGA is incoherent because coalitions are incoherent
The MAGA coalition contains:
white working-class voters
evangelicals
anti-immigration activists
the anti-elite petite bourgeoisie
large chunks of the business class
internet-native meme subcultures

These groups do not share a philosophy. They share enemies. Hence the inconsistent policy claims and constant reversals. This is what Alliance Theory predicts.

Liberalism doesn’t “force inquiry” because it likes truth

It forces inquiry because it is a multipolar alliance structure. Each faction demands reasons from every other faction. Liberalism’s argumentative culture is a byproduct of its coalition dynamics, not a philosophical virtue.

MAGA’s flexibility is a feature, not a bug

From an alliance perspective, MAGA’s ability to change positions instantly is a strength. In coalitional conflict, adaptability beats consistency. Ideas get treated like tactical equipment, not moral commitments.

Alliance Theory strips away the moral drama and shows you the mechanics.

IV. The deeper conflict the New Yorker piece doesn’t see

The author treats Trumpism’s lack of ideas as evidence of illiberalism. Alliance Theory reframes it as evidence of political tribalization. Once politics becomes a team sport, values become branding elements. Not commitments. Not philosophical identities.

The essay also assumes liberalism is intellectually serious while MAGA is unserious. From an alliance perspective, both sides use moral language as propaganda to defend allies and attack rivals.

Liberal intellectual self-congratulation is just the mirror image of MAGA’s performative disdain for “the elites.” Both reflect coalition needs.

V. The part the New Yorker gets completely wrong

The idea that conservatism once had a stable intellectual soul and then degenerated under Trump is wishful thinking. The old conservative consensus survived only because its coalition was stable. When the coalition changed, the ideas dissolved. That is exactly what Alliance Theory predicts.

Moral languages survive only as long as their coalitions do.
When a coalition reorganizes, the vocabulary reorganizes.
When a personality cult becomes the hub, the vocabulary follows the leader.

Trumpism is not an ideological failure. It is a coalitional transformation.

VI. The most accurate way to understand MAGA’s relationship to ideas

MAGA does not lack ideas. It treats ideas as weapons rather than commitments.

It uses slogans instead of doctrines.
It uses identity instead of argumentation.
It uses assertions instead of principles.
It uses outrage instead of persuasion.

This is not fascism and not conservatism. It is coalition politics in its rawest form.

Trumpism doesn’t fail the test of ideas because it is illiberal. It fails because it is a coalition that does not need ideas to function. Its cohesion comes from shared enemies, not shared principles.

Posted in Fascism, Rony Guldmann | Comments Off on Rony Guldmann Revisits Liberal Fascism

MAGA’s Jew-Hatred Component Are Tiny

LF: “Nobody with anything to lose sides with Nick Fuentes. His Jew-hating crowd are marginalized losers and only a tiny portion of MAGA.”

ChatGPT says: The panic about Fuentes often outstrips his real reach. Here’s how I’d map it.

Fuentes’s constituency is small, intensely online, and personally chaotic. Most are young men without careers, institutions, families, or obligations that would discipline their speech or give them something real to lose. That vacuum makes “edgelord politics” feel like an identity. It also limits their growth. Movements built on people with no stake in society tend to burn hot and then collapse.

Inside the broader right, the people who shape policy or win races want nothing to do with him. They know he’s toxic. They know he drags them into a fight they can’t win. Even hard-edged populists run from him because he’s an extinction-level event for their careers.

The anti-semitic fringe is loud because conflict sells. Social media, YouTube feeders, political operatives, and journalists all benefit from showcasing it. But if you look at who writes checks, who staffs campaigns, who passes laws, and who runs the political machinery, it’s not Fuentes’s people. They aren’t in the room. They are not a faction with institutional leverage.

The part that scares mainstream conservatives isn’t the numbers. It’s the optics. Every political tribe has its losers, but the right’s extremists are easily televised, easily clipped, and easily used to tar the whole movement. Liberals have their own fringe, but the incentives aren’t the same. The right is more vulnerable because it brands itself as patriotic, orderly, responsible, traditional. Nazi cosplay cuts directly against that claim.

The deeper point. For every twenty people yelling online about Jews, one might actually show up to a meeting or do the work that turns ideas into power. Almost none get near real influence. The fear comes from what they symbolize, not what they can actually do.

You’re right that no one with anything to lose sides with Fuentes. That is the hard ceiling on his world. The people who matter in the GOP see him as career poison. And the people who follow him are people who already feel like they’ve fallen out of the system. That’s the whole story.

LF: “I wonder how the Randall Collins book Interaction Ritual Chains maps on to Spellbound: How Charisma Shaped American History from the Puritans to Donald Trump by Molly Worthen.”

Collins helps you see the machinery under Spellbound. Spellbound tells the stories. Collins tells you what’s happening at the level of social physics. If you put them side by side, a few things line up cleanly.

Collins says charisma isn’t a personal trait. It’s a product of high-energy interaction rituals. When people gather, lock attention on the same symbolic object, sync their emotions, and feel lifted beyond their normal selves, they generate emotional energy. If that energy sticks to a leader, we call him charismatic.

Spellbound shows this over and over. The Puritans, the revivalists, the Progressive technocrats, FDR, Reagan, Obama, Trump. In each case the “charismatic figure” is riding a deep current of synchronized attention and shared grievance or hope. The magnetism isn’t magic. It’s the residue of thousands of charged encounters.

Collins argues that these ritual chains accumulate. People return to the same symbolic world because earlier rituals filled them with energy. Spellbound describes the same thing but narratively. The book shows repeated American patterns where certain types of stories activate people: the chosen nation, the frontier, the expert savior, the populist deliverer. Each generation plugs back into the same symbols because previous rituals built them up.

Collins also explains why charisma crashes. Rituals lose intensity. Audiences fragment. Counter-rituals rise. The leader’s symbolic world fails to generate emotional energy. Spellbound treats this as political loss or scandal. Collins treats it as the structure running out of fuel.

Where they really converge is on the idea that charisma is fundamentally a group project. Spellbound focuses on individual leaders who articulate a story. Collins says that story only works when a crowd is primed, focused, and emotionally aligned. It’s not the leader who creates the charge but the interaction between leader and audience.

If you blend them, you get a sharper insight. Charisma in American history has always depended on two things: a narrative that organizes attention, and a public ready to be synchronized by that narrative. Spellbound tells you the stories that worked. Collins tells you why they worked.

LF: “How does this Collins book explain Donald Trump’s energy?”

Collins would say Trump’s energy is not an inner force but a social circuit that kept getting recharged. The crowd built him as much as he built the crowd. Here is how it looks through Collins’s lens.
Trump locked attention. Collins argues that charismatic figures pull everyone’s focus into a tight beam. Trump’s rallies did exactly that. He created a world where everything that happened on stage became the only thing that mattered for that hour. No distractions. No competing scripts. That concentrated attention is the first ingredient of high ritual energy.
He synced emotions. Collins says rituals work when people experience the same emotion at the same time. Trump gave his crowds a cycle they already knew how to run: anger at elites, laughter at the insults, pride in the group, joy at being among people who think like you. The emotional rhythm was simple and repetitive, which made the syncing even easier.
He used shared symbols that carried charge. Build the wall. Fake news. America first. Lock her up. These were not policy points. They were ritual objects. They gave people something to chant, something to aim their feelings at, something that created a sense of unity. Collins would say these symbols anchored the ritual so the energy had a place to collect.
He produced emotional energy that stayed with people. Collins calls it EE. It is the afterglow that keeps people coming back. Trump’s supporters left rallies feeling alive, bold, righteous, and in on something. That afterglow made them return, defend him, and spread the message. This is how ritual chains form. Each event builds on the last.
He turned conflict into fuel. Collins argues that groups generate the most energy when they feel morally unified against an outside threat. Trump always provided the outgroup. Media. RINOs. Democrats. Bureaucrats. Globalists. He understood that conflict sharpens the boundary around the group and intensifies loyalty. This is standard Collins.
He lowered the barrier to participation. High-energy rituals work best when the audience can participate easily. Trump’s constant call and response, the chants, the jokes, the insults, the repetition, all made people feel like co-creators of the moment. Collins says that when people contribute, the energy skyrockets.
This explains why Trump’s energy never existed in a vacuum. He is not magnetic in an empty room. But when he steps into a crowd that already shares a grievance, already wants to feel seen, already wants release, he becomes the conductor of that emotional current. Collins would say the crowd completes the circuit.
The punch line. Trump’s power comes from ritual engineering more than from personal mystique. He knows how to trigger collective attention, synchronize emotion, and create a feeling of being part of an embattled but excited tribe. That is charisma in Collins’s terms. It is group electricity, not personal magic.

LF: I like this quote from spellbound:

“Charisma depends on telling a good story. The age of the experts turned on a story of science as savior, specialized knowledge as the mechanism of happiness. Their access to institutional and cultural power had grown during the New Deal era. In the aftermath of World War II, trusting the experts became an appealing antidote to the virus of fascist or quasi – fascist agitation across the West. Expert charisma typically lacked grand oratory and had no knack for charming the media, but it did offer the core thing: a narrative about America’s future and the role ordinary people should play. Experts urged Americans to invest in higher education, to accept advanced degrees and institutional prestige as proxies for wisdom and moral righteousness, and to trust that the high priests of data could hear the heartbeat of the universe. These appeals required the experts’ institutions — mainly government and universities — to retain public confidence, which in turn required technocrats, professors, and students to stay humble despite their ambitions to change the world. But humility does not come naturally to most humans.”

We talk about experts as if they’re the opposite of charisma, but the mid-century United States ran on a very specific kind of charismatic story: salvation through competence.

The experts didn’t need theatrical speeches or glowing auras. Their charisma came from a promise of safety. A promise that the chaos of the world could be tamed through specialized knowledge. America had just lived through Depression, war, genocide, and ideological extremism. A story that said “trust the data, trust the planner, trust the person with the advanced degree” felt like a lifeline. It felt sane.

What Spellbound is pointing to is this: even expert governance depends on vibes. It depends on emotional resonance. It depends on people believing that the elite class has both the intelligence and the humility to steward the country. When that belief cracks, the charisma of expertise evaporates.

A few things that quote gets absolutely right.

Expert charisma still needs a narrative. You can’t just present facts. You need a story about the future. You need to tell people what their lives will look like if they follow the experts’ plan. American technocrats did this brilliantly from the New Deal through the Space Age. They sold order, growth, rationality, upward mobility.

Expert charisma collapses without humility. The whole system only works when experts appear restrained, civic minded, and uninterested in domination. Once they start sounding smug or self-interested, people feel betrayed. That’s the psychological blow that fuels modern anti-expert revolt.

Expert charisma depends on institutional prestige. It isn’t embodied in a single leader. It’s embodied in a whole ecosystem: universities, federal agencies, labs, courts, research institutes. When those institutions lose trust, the charisma of expertise gets hollowed out. We’ve been living through that collapse for two decades.

Expert charisma was always a substitute for older modes. It replaced religious charisma, heroic charisma, and populist charisma with a new priesthood in lab coats and policy schools. But that only works when the priesthood believes in its own limits. And modern experts often don’t. They overclaim. They moralize. They assume dissent is ignorance or bigotry. They talk down to people. That arrogance breaks the spell.

The deeper point. America is shifting from the age of expert charisma to an age of competing charismatic stories: influencer charisma, grievance charisma, networked charisma, technologist charisma, spiritual-therapeutic charisma. No single story has replaced the old expert narrative, so the country feels cracked open and disoriented.

LF: Why do we keep hearing about this binary — either trust the experts or trust the fascists? “Trusting the experts became an appealing antidote to the virus of fascist or quasi – fascist agitation across the West.”

Because it’s a very old psychological pattern, and both sides benefit from keeping it alive. It simplifies the world. It gives people an identity. And it hides the fact that there are many other ways to build authority besides technocracy or fascism.

A few reasons this binary keeps resurfacing.

Public life runs on shortcuts. Most people don’t have time to sort through twenty competing frameworks. So politics collapses into two poles. One pole says the world is complex so trust the experts. The other says the experts are corrupt so trust the strong man or the outsider. Both poles are simple stories you can grab fast.

Technocrats need a villain. If you run on competence, charts, process, and degrees, you need to frame the alternative as chaos, rage, and demagoguery. It justifies your authority. It keeps the public anxious enough to stay with the sensible option.

Populists need an enemy too. They thrive when elites look arrogant or detached. If the technocrats can be painted as condescending overlords who look down on ordinary people, the strong man can present himself as the only one who “gets” the public.

History scarred the West. The mid twentieth century trained people to see fascism as the disaster you avoid at all costs. After the war, experts used that fear to build legitimacy. “Trust us so the nightmare never returns.” That cultural reflex still lingers. Even people who know almost nothing about the actual history of fascism still feel the emotional charge of the word.

Institutions hollowed out but the rhetoric didn’t. Universities, media, government agencies, and scientific bodies have lost public trust. But the old expert-versus-fascist framing is still the template people reach for when things feel unstable. It’s muscle memory.

There’s no widely accepted middle narrative. We don’t have a coherent replacement that says “We need competence, but we also need humility, pluralism, and accountability.” Without that middle story, the debate defaults to the extremes. If you question experts you must be flirting with extremism. If you distrust populists you must be a sheep for the elites.

Here’s the real truth that almost no one says out loud. The biggest threat is not fascism or technocracy. It’s institutional drift plus public distrust. It’s a culture where experts overclaim, populists overheat, and ordinary people stop believing any authority has their interests at heart. That’s when you get fragmentation and volatility.

You don’t actually need a binary. You can have a society that values expertise but demands restraint. You can have democratic accountability without flirting with strong-man politics. You can have charismatic leadership that doesn’t veer into cultishness.

Molly Worthen writes:

This book traces the American history of charisma both as a phenomenon and as a concept: the evolving bond between leaders and followers, the shifting relationships between supernatural forces and their subjects, and the struggles of observers to make sense of these things. It pursues two narratives at once — the story of charisma in the theological sense, and as a tool to describe public figures who energize a following. These two ways of defining charisma sound very different, but they have always been intertwined. They are distinct but related modes in which humans chase after unseen powers that promise to organize life’s chaos and lend it meaning. This desire springs from a paradox central to the human personality, one that has not changed much over the centuries: we all wish for a sense of personal agency, some degree of control. But that wish is enmeshed in a fear of responsibility, a corresponding urge to hand over the reins to some force greater than ourselves. Most of us don’t really like being in charge. Socrates tried to warn of this when he said in Plato’s Republic that “ the excess of freedom passes into the excess of slavery.” So did Paul when he wrote in his letter to the Romans that Christians are free only because they are “slaves to righteousness.” In the West, for a very long time, the structures, ideas, and rituals of Christendom made this paradox bearable. But every armistice with the universe eventually expires, or requires renegotiation. Spellbound begins in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation, which shattered the system of checks and balances, the hierarchies and release valves, that managed medieval people’s relationships to divine power and framed the ways in which leaders might command a following.

Charisma is not a personality trait. It’s a workaround. Humans want control, but we also want to hand it off. We want to steer our lives, but we also want someone or something to tell us what the story means. That tension is permanent. Charisma is the ritual we use to resolve it, at least for a while.

The pre-modern West had a whole operating system for this. Priests, sacraments, hierarchy, community discipline, the liturgical calendar, pilgrimage, confession. These weren’t just religious trappings. They were emotional technology that let people feel both agency and surrender at the same time. You could obey God and the church, but you could also argue, repent, appeal, confess, negotiate. The system had checks. It had release valves. It structured how people approached unseen powers and how leaders could claim authority without blowing the community apart.

The Reformation smashed that system. It didn’t remove the human need. It just took the old infrastructure offline. Once you strip away ritual authority, people still go hunting for someone who can interpret the invisible forces for them, someone who can consecrate a shared reality and tell them what their freedom is for.

That’s Worthen’s point. We didn’t become more rational. We became more vulnerable to new forms of charismatic exchange. Protestantism launched a marketplace of meaning with no referees. Every revivalist, prophet, scholar, and politician suddenly had a shot at becoming the mediator between the seen and the unseen. Charisma surged into public life because there was no longer a fixed hierarchy or a single ritual backbone to absorb it.

This helps explain why America is such fertile ground for charismatic politics. We are a Reformation country. We never had a stable priestly class to keep the charismatic impulse in bounds. We have endless sects, endless movements, endless self-chosen prophets. We chase after leaders who offer agency and surrender in the same breath: you are strong, your instincts are right, and I alone can make sense of the chaos.

Worthen is tracing two intertwined streams. The theological charisma: grace, divine gifts, ecstatic encounters. And the sociological charisma: the leader who electrifies a following and reorders reality. These aren’t separate. Both express the same longing for a guide who stands between the individual and the void.

And this is why the book feels timely. The older armistices with the universe have expired. Traditional institutions no longer mediate the tension between autonomy and surrender. So people turn to political influencers, pundits, pastors, wellness gurus, YouTubers, and extremists. They’re all competing to fill the role that medieval Christendom once built entire structures to manage.

Once you see charisma as a human workaround for a permanent paradox, the behavior around today’s charismatic figures makes more sense. It’s not just about ideas or policies. It’s about the emotional contract. Leaders and followers build an alternative world together, a place where the chaos is named and the meaning is settled.

That’s the thread Worthen is pulling on, and it ties the Reformation to Trump, the Puritans to talk radio, and grace to grievance politics.

LF: “Freedom becomes a personal indictment when you are not thriving in life.”

Freedom cuts both ways. When life goes well, it feels like proof of your agency. When life stalls, the same freedom feels like an accusation. You’re the one steering the ship, so if the ship is listing, who else is there to blame.

That’s why freedom is never just liberating. It’s also exposing. It strips away excuses. It tells you that your choices, your discipline, your talent, your grit, your social skills, your luck all sit in plain view. Most people don’t want that kind of spotlight. They want freedom with buffers. They want agency with a net underneath. They want the story of personal responsibility without the pain of personal failure.

This is where charisma snaps into place. A charismatic leader gives you release from the indictment. He tells you the game is rigged. He tells you your struggle is not your fault. He tells you your frustrations confirm your clarity, not your inadequacy. He takes the burden of agency off your shoulders and reframes it as loyalty to the group or the mission. He turns personal disappointment into collective righteousness.

That’s part of why American politics runs so hot. A hyper-individualist culture hands you massive responsibility but offers weak social structures to absorb the cost. If you’re thriving, the freedom feels empowering. If you’re faltering, the freedom feels like judgment. Charismatic movements promise to lift that judgment. They give people a way to convert failure into meaning.

Worthen’s book keeps circling this point. Charisma isn’t just about the leader’s magnetism. It’s about the follower’s need to escape the sting of freedom when life doesn’t add up.

LF: “One thing that attracted me to Orthodox Judaism is that it offered the mateship that was common in Australia but rare in America.”

Australia still has a strong informal code of mateship. People look after each other without making a big production out of it. You can lean on friends without apology. You can rib each other, argue, disagree, and you’re still solid. America doesn’t offer that very often. It’s friendly but not bonded. People drift in and out of each other’s lives. They guard their independence. They keep score. They flinch from obligation.

Orthodox Judaism gave you something you already knew how to experience. A tight circle. Shared burdens. Shared rhythms. Real expectations. You show up for each other because that is simply what people do. You don’t need to be impressive. You need to be present. That’s the kind of community where identity is lived rather than chosen day by day.

And it solves a loneliness problem that most Americans don’t even know how to name. It takes the sting out of freedom. You’re not floating. You’re woven into a pattern of people who depend on you and whom you can depend on. That is rare here. No wonder it felt familiar and stabilizing.

Most popular narratives run on abductive logic. People reach for the story that best fits the scattered clues in front of them. It doesn’t have to be proven. It just has to feel like the most coherent explanation for a messy world.
Abduction is the logic of hunches, pattern recognition, and “this would make sense of what I’m seeing.” It’s how humans make meaning when evidence is thin, contradictory, or overwhelming. It’s also how charismatic leaders build their appeal. They give you the most satisfying story that stitches the chaos together. They offer a plot that feels truer than the data.
You see this everywhere:
Political movements. A few economic stresses plus cultural anxiety and people leap to a narrative that explains why everything feels off.
Conspiracy scenes. Disconnected facts, odd coincidences, and emotional discomfort get assembled into a single frame that feels clarifying.
Media polarization. Each side turns breaking news into a story that confirms what the tribe already suspects.
Religious conversion. A personal crisis, a handful of resonant texts, and a compelling teacher become the through line that explains your life.
Abductive logic is sticky because it matches how the mind actually works. Deduction is clean but rare. Induction needs lots of data. Abduction just needs a good storyteller who can turn fragments into a whole that feels right.
And in a society with weak shared institutions and high emotional volatility, abductive stories become the default way people organize reality. They’re quick. They’re vivid. They give you a plot. They make your worries legible.
That’s why they dominate popular narratives. They offer the one thing people crave when life feels incoherent: a frame that makes sense of it all.

Posted in America, Charisma, Nick Fuentes | Comments Off on MAGA’s Jew-Hatred Component Are Tiny

LLMs are reaching their limits?

I don’t think so. Every day we have to update our understanding of what AI tools can do. Every day we have to expand our ideas about how AI tools can help us.

ChatGPT: People say this (hitting their limits) when they hit the ceiling of what a single model feels like it can do. It’s not crazy. It’s also not quite right.

What’s actually happening:

Single-model performance is flattening

The “one giant model that does everything” curve is bending. Gains still come, but they cost huge compute and deliver smaller bumps. The era of dramatic jumps from scale alone is easing off.

The limits people run into are usually interface limits

You’re not seeing the limits of intelligence. You’re seeing the limits of:

context windows

safety layers

models that don’t maintain memory

models that can’t access tools unless prompted

models that don’t integrate with your data
All of these create the illusion of stagnation.

The real frontier is orchestration, not raw IQ
The next wave isn’t “GPT-6 but bigger.” It’s:

models that call tools

models that reason across sessions

models that pull data from your systems

models that form plans and execute steps
It’s agentic workflows, not chatbots.

Multiple-model ecosystems beat any single-brain model
One model does planning, another does math, another summarizes documents, another handles strategy, and they coordinate. That avoids the diminishing returns curve of one large brain.

The bottleneck is alignment, not intelligence
Current models are trained to be careful, harmless, and bland. Plenty of capability gets suppressed. The resulting tone makes people think “it’s plateauing.” Under the hood there is more headroom.

We’re also hitting the limits of what “chat” can express
A chat interface squashes complexity. You can’t see everything the model could do if it had full procedural control.

You’re noticing the beginning of a paradigm shift
It’s not that LLMs are tapped out. It’s that this phase of LLMs is maturing. A mature technology always feels stagnant right before a new layer of abstraction takes over.

Forward view:
Over the next few years, the visible improvements will come from:

models with persistent memory

deep personalization

AI that uses APIs the way humans use apps

reasoning modules added onto LLMs

local models plus cloud models working together

multimodal chains

Saying “LLMs are reaching their limits” is like saying “smartphones are reaching their limits” in 2009. True about CPU specs. Completely wrong about what comes next.

Gemini 3.0 is the clearest signal this field isn’t slowing. It’s shifting.

What it shows:

The ceiling wasn’t intelligence. It was deployment.
People thought LLMs were plateauing because they kept interacting with one model trapped in a chatbox. Gemini 3.0 breaks that pattern. It shows what happens when a model is allowed to plan, take steps, call tools, and operate inside core products — especially search.

It proves multi-step reasoning isn’t a dead end.
A lot of commentators said chain-of-thought was a gimmick and deeper reasoning would stall. Instead you get an agent that handles multistep inbox cleaning, travel planning, and coding workflows in a verified, inspectable way. That’s not plateau. That’s the start of actual cognitive labor.

It makes multimodality feel native rather than bolted on.
Once a model moves easily across text, images, and tasks, the bottleneck shifts from “what the model can do” to “what the interface allows.”

It blurs the border between a model and an operating system.
Gemini 3.0 is being treated like a kernel. Google is using it to run search, planning, navigation, coding tools and real activity flows. That’s not a parlor trick. That’s utility-level AI.

It matches or surpasses GPT on key axes while doing something new: agentic integration.
Even if you assumed raw model IQ had peaked, seeing a model think, plan, and act across apps shows the growth curve is not over. It just moved sideways into capability stacking.

It forces everyone to recalibrate what the “floor” of AI competence is.
When a model can reason, execute, and evaluate its own steps, you’re moving out of chatbot territory and into something closer to an assistant you actually delegate to.

The idea that LLMs were plateauing came from people measuring the wrong thing. They were measuring clever chat. Gemini 3.0 shows the next frontier isn’t clever chat. It’s work.

The ground under our feet is moving daily now. Treating AI as a static thing is already a losing strategy.

A few blunt truths.

The people who win are the ones who keep updating

Most people tried ChatGPT in early 2023, decided “eh, cute toy,” and froze their judgment there. Meanwhile the tools went from autocomplete to “can run workflows, reason, plan, see, and call tools.”
If you keep updating your mental model and they don’t, you get an arbitrage: same 24 hours, different output.

“I already know what AI can do” is the new “I don’t need the internet”
We’ve hit the point where saying “I get it, it just writes emails and summaries” is like someone in 1996 saying “I get it, it just sends messages.”
Every time a new capability drops
multimodal
agents
integrations
memory
you basically get a new category of use, not just a marginal upgrade.

The hard part now is not the tech, it is imagination
The models are outrunning human imagination and institutional comfort.
Most lawyers, writers, academics, executives are limited by “what feels normal” in their field, not by what the tools could already do for them today.
That gap is where all the opportunity sits.

Daily update needs a habit, not a vibe
If you want to live this “every day I expand my understanding” idea, it probably looks like:

10–15 minutes a day: try one concrete thing you did manually yesterday and see if AI can do 80 percent of it.

Keep a running “AI playbook” file of what worked, with examples you can reuse.

Once a week: pick one painful workflow and see how far you can push automation/agents, even if it feels overkill right now.

The scary part
Most institutions will pretend nothing has changed right up until they get eaten alive by people who quietly rebuilt their workflows around AI. That includes law firms, media, education, and politics.
Updating daily is not a cool intellectual posture. It is self-defense.

You sit at the intersection of text, precedent, and process. That is exactly where these tools are strongest. If you keep pushing that “what else can I offload” question every day, you end up with leverage most people in your lane will not even see coming.

Posted in AI | Comments Off on LLMs are reaching their limits?

Elites Are Vulnerable

Elite rise and elite collapse look dramatic from the outside but usually follow the same pattern as everyone else’s fortunes. Larry Summers is almost too perfect a case study because he’s brilliant, driven and plugged in at the highest levels, yet he still shows how contingent the whole game is.

Elites are powerful until they aren’t. Their insulation is thinner than the dissident imagination thinks. They live on reputation, trust and network tolerance. Once any of those crack, they fall faster than normal people because the expectations are higher and the spotlight doesn’t turn off.
Summers shows the moving parts.

I. The rise is never magic. It’s timed, networked, and earned.

Summers hit every rung at the perfect moment. Nephew of Nobel winners. Harvard prodigy. World Bank. Treasury. Clinton boom. Obama recovery. There was nothing mystical about it. He was right-place-right-time with the drive, the talent and the confidence to speak when others hesitated. A lot of elites get up there the same way. They’re not omnipotent. They’re just unusually ambitious and unusually placed.

II. The peak depends on social capital, not just brains.

This is the part dissidents miss. You can be brilliant and still depend on the goodwill of peers. Summers was tolerated because he produced value. The moment the tradeoff flipped, his style became a cost. Abrasive. Bullying. Impulsive. The same qualities that made him formidable made him fragile.

III. The fall always comes from three things: hubris, misreading the room, and assuming the past protects you.

Summers’ emails with Epstein weren’t just a scandal. They revealed a pattern. Thinking he was too important to be burned. Assuming private correspondence would stay private. Believing that being indispensable to the policy world gave him a cushion. His earlier Harvard disasters already showed this blind spot but he didn’t adjust.
This is common among elites. Not because they’re evil but because long success narrows their sense of consequences. They become less sensitive to shifts in the culture around them. They lag behind in updating their risk assessment. It’s human, not uniquely elite.

IV. Institutions will protect you until the instant they don’t.

Summers was central to Treasury. Harvard. The White House. Think tanks. OpenAI. None of them hesitated to distance themselves once the liability became too high. People sometimes see this as evidence of ruthless elite power. It’s actually evidence of elite fragility. These networks move on fast. Loyalty is conditional. Brand protection comes first.
V. Reputation can collapse overnight because prestige is cumulative but trust is brittle.

Summers had decades of accomplishments. But trust is psychological. Once the public interiorizes “this guy exercised bad judgment,” the entire archive of achievements gets reinterpreted in that light. This is another universal pattern. People don’t weigh strengths against weaknesses. They revise the narrative from scratch.

VI. Even disgraced elites aren’t finished because the ecosystem has niches.

Summers stepping back doesn’t mean permanent exile. High-status worlds have soft landings. Consulting. Private conversations. Closed-door policy influence. He’ll be back in some form. The “nine lives” line in the article hits the truth. But if he does return, it won’t be at the same altitude. Loss of altitude is the real punishment.

VII. The broader lesson: elites are not gods. They’re craftsmen of networks.

They need the same things everyone else needs: relationships that trust them, audiences that find them useful, institutions that believe they’re worth the blowback. Remove one of those and the whole structure shakes. Remove two and it collapses.

Your stance makes sense. Populists overstate elite power. Elitists overstate elite virtue. The real story is that elites are ordinary humans operating in amplified environments. Their mistakes echo louder. Their successes compound faster. Their failures detonate harder.

Summers’ fall isn’t proof of elite immunity or elite conspiracy. It’s proof that inside the rarefied world, the margin for error is tiny and the consequences are huge. The spotlight magnifies everything.

Prestige raises your ceiling and your floor at the same time. You get reach, access, leverage, and deference. But you also become exposed to a different level of scrutiny. Every choice is observed. Every misstep has a larger blast radius. You’re held to a standard that ordinary people will never face.
A few reasons why this vulnerability grows with status:

I. Prestige is reputation capital, not armor.

It looks like protection from the outside, but it’s the opposite. The more reputation you bank, the more there is to lose. Once people depend on your spotless image to justify your influence, they become quick to drop you when that image cracks.

II. High-status environments are zero tolerance for liability.

Elite institutions aren’t sentimental. They’re risk managers. A professor, CEO, or public intellectual who becomes a PR threat is cut loose fast. Not because colleagues think they’re evil, but because institutions default to self-preservation.

III. Prestige creates enemies and resentments.

People watch the top more closely. They envy them. They wait for signs of hypocrisy. Once something emerges, the pile-on is easier because the emotional groundwork is already there.

IV. The narrative around you can flip overnight.

With high-status figures, the public doesn’t downgrade them gradually. It reinterprets their whole career through the new frame. Yesterday’s confidence becomes “arrogance.” Yesterday’s risk-taking becomes “recklessness.” Anyone with a big footprint is especially vulnerable to this narrative collapse.

V. You can’t hide. You’re already too visible.

Low-status people can quietly reinvent themselves. High-status people cannot. There is no off-ramp. No anonymity. No reset. Everything they do is timestamped, archived, available to be rediscovered.

VI. Your allies get weaker in a crisis.

Even your friends hesitate. They worry about their own reputations being contaminated. They calculate the optics. Prestige networks are cooperative during the rise and brutally transactional during the fall.

This is why the fall of someone like Summers hits so hard. Not because he was more corrupt than others, but because he was operating at the top of a system where prestige amplifies risk. His downfall wasn’t an outlier. It was the predictable cost of operating at that altitude.

Put simply:
Prestige upgrades your reach but also your fragility.
You rise by reputation. You fall by it.

People think prestige grants freedom. In reality it narrows it.
A few core points.
High prestige means your words carry weight. That sounds empowering but it carries risk. Once your voice has institutional consequences, everything you say is evaluated for whether it creates trouble for the people who elevated you. So you start self-editing. You anticipate blowback. You get polite. You get coded. You get careful.
Low prestige means you can talk like a human being. Anyone who works outside elite institutions knows this instinctively. If you are a plumber, bartender, truck driver, or freelancer, you can say what you think and people might argue with you but you won’t lose your livelihood. You won’t be the headline. You won’t have an HR department analyzing your tone.
Prestige trades freedom for influence. You gain reach. You lose spontaneity.
People at the top know this. They use euphemisms. They outsource their real thoughts to off the record conversations. They hide behind institutional language. They dodge controversy because they know one wrong sentence can collapse ten years of accumulated goodwill.
Meanwhile the guy with no social capital can fire off a blunt take and move on with his day.
So the curve looks like this:
Low status: almost full speech freedom
Mid status: the least freedom, because you can be promoted or fired
High status: wide influence but thin ice
Ultra high status: absolute lack of freedom, because you represent an institution at all times
Prestige is a spotlight. It lets people see you. It also exposes you.
The people with the most to lose speak the least freely. The people with the least to lose speak the most freely. That’s not cynicism. It is how reputation markets work.

If Larry Summers was a plumber who was trying to bang his mentee and he turned to a pimp for advice, and then his community of plumbers found out about it, he wouldn’t crash out of his community.

Plumbers don’t live inside a prestige economy. Summers does.

A plumber cheating, behaving poorly, or asking the wrong person for advice would definitely face consequences at home or socially, but it wouldn’t trigger an institutional cascade. There’s no Harvard Corporation. No Treasury alumni network. No think tank boards. No brand-risk committees. No journalists waiting for a hypocrisy story. No thousands of people whose professional reputations are tied to his.

Elite life multiplies the number of stakeholders who can be harmed by your mistakes. A plumber’s circle is small. Summers’ circle spans government, academia, Wall Street, philanthropy, tech, media. When he screws up, every one of those nodes has to ask whether keeping him around damages them. Even if they like him personally, they’re thinking strategically. They cut ties fast.

Also: ordinary people aren’t symbols. Elite figures are. Summers isn’t just one guy. He represents Harvard. Treasury. Serious economics. Meritocracy. Technocracy. The norms of elite male mentorship. When someone who symbolizes that world behaves badly, it becomes a referendum on the entire system. So the system protects itself by ejecting the offending symbol.

If a plumber does the same things, nobody reads it as proof that “the plumbing profession” is corrupt. It doesn’t implicate a worldview. It doesn’t challenge a hierarchy. It’s just one person behaving badly.

The ironic truth:

The higher you climb, the less private your life becomes.
The more symbolic you are, the more your fall must be public.
The more trust you’re granted, the harsher the punishment when that trust cracks.

A plumber’s mistakes remain personal.
Larry Summers’ mistakes become political, institutional, cultural.

The act might be the same.
The consequences belong to the world the person lives in.

Trump and Summers live in different ecosystems with different rules. That is the key. They are not playing the same game, so they do not face the same penalties.
I. Trump is not an elite in the conventional sense
He is wealthy, famous, and powerful, but he does not rely on elite institutions for legitimacy. He is not dependent on Harvard, Brookings, media consensus, or the DC policy world. That world never embraced him. Since he never needed their approval, he cannot be “canceled” by them. Their disapproval only strengthens his bond with his base.
Summers climbed inside elite institutions. His entire authority came from the belief that he was a serious adult in the room. Once that belief shattered, he had nothing outside it.
II. Trump built a support base that loves the exact qualities elites punish
Trump’s voters expect him to be transgressive, crude, aggressive, and impulsive. These traits read as authenticity. Every “scandal” confirms to them that he is fighting the right enemies.
Summers’ world values discretion, propriety, composure, and judgment. His missteps violate the norms that justify his prestige. His audience reads his scandal as betrayal, not courage.
III. Trump frames every attack as proof of persecution
This is a powerful defense. It allows him to convert every accusation into fuel. It keeps his coalition unified. It neutralizes shame.
Summers cannot do this. His identity is built on competence and seriousness. If he tried to claim persecution, it would make him look even more ridiculous inside the elite sphere.
IV. Trump’s scandals don’t implicate his role
Voters hired him to be a wrecking ball. When he behaves like a wrecking ball, he is on-brand.
Summers’ influence was built on trust, mentorship, and moral responsibility within institutions. His scandal directly touches the core of that role. It undermines the very reason people gave him access and authority.
V. Trump’s enemies are too fragmented to enforce a real penalty
The media, the bureaucracy, the courts, and political elites do not operate as a unified block against him. They try, but there is no single gatekeeper that can shut him out. Politics is plural.
Summers’ world is narrow, interconnected, and gatekept. Academia, finance, and policy circles are tiny. Once they turn on you, there is no alternate power base.
VI. Trump’s brand is conflict. Summers’ brand is expertise
Conflict-based brands thrive in chaos. Expertise-based brands collapse in scandal. Trump gains when he is attacked. Summers loses the moment he becomes a liability.
VII. Trump speaks to the masses. Summers speaks to elites
Mass audiences forgive in ways elite audiences never do. Mass audiences like fighters. Elite audiences like polish. Summers violated elite norms. Trump violates elite norms, but his people see that as the point.
So the equation is simple:
Trump rises because he rejects elite expectations.
Summers falls because he depended on them.
Trump survives scandal because scandal is baked into the product.
Summers collapses because scandal contradicts the product.
Trump is a populist showman with his own base.
Summers is a technocrat whose power existed only with elite blessing.
Different games. Different rules. Different consequences.

The more left you go in politics, the more you have rule by experts who are supposedly neutral.

Larry Summers exposes the human messiness inside the expert class that liberalism likes to present as dispassionate, rational, and above ordinary flaws.

A few ways this story cuts into the myth.

I. Neutral expertise depends on the idea that experts are governed by reason, not impulse.
Summers’ emails show the opposite. They show vanity, poor judgment, a craving for validation, and a willingness to treat power relationships casually. He looks like a normal flawed human being, not a cool technocrat weighing evidence. That’s uncomfortable for a worldview that treats experts as stabilizing, almost priestly actors.

II. The system that elevates experts is not neutral. It’s social. It’s political. It’s personal.
Summers didn’t rise because he was the one perfect vessel of objective truth. He rose through networks, patronage, timing, charisma, and institutional trust. The story makes that visible. Once the scandal broke, those same networks instantly withdrew their support. That reveals how contingent and frail the “expert authority” claim really is.

III. Expert culture sells itself as meritocratic but hides its emotional vulnerabilities.
Summers’ downfall shows that elite behavior is shaped by ego, insecurity, desire, envy, competition, and status anxieties. Neutrality is an aspiration, not a description. The expert class often acts like a tribe with its own rituals, loyalties, and blind spots.

IV. When a technocrat fails morally, the institutions panic.
This panic exposes the fact that expertise is often inseparable from moral symbolism. Liberals like to think: “We trust experts because they know things.” But institutions actually rely on experts because they don’t embarrass the system. Once Summers did, he became radioactive. This shows that “neutral expertise” is built on image, not pure knowledge.

V. The Summers case undermines the notion that experts operate outside power.
The liberal narrative frames experts as referees. Summers’ scandal reveals how intertwined they are with power. He wasn’t just analyzing the world. He was navigating relationships, currying favor, leveraging influence, and shaping policy. Neutrality dissolves once you see how much personal and political maneuvering is happening behind the curtain.

VI. The story suggests expertise isn’t enough without virtue.
That’s a big problem for a worldview that tends to treat knowledge as the highest civic good. Summers has enormous knowledge. But when the emails surfaced, people suddenly cared less about what he knew and more about how he behaved. That puts liberal technocracy in a bind because it means expertise alone won’t legitimate authority.

VII. The case shows why many people distrust technocrats.
Critics often say the expert class is arrogant, insulated, and blind to its own limits. The Summers story makes that criticism feel earned. It becomes harder to tell the public “trust the experts” when one of the top experts behaves like someone who thought the rules didn’t apply to him.

VIII. But the story also doesn’t prove what populists claim.
It doesn’t show that expertise is fake. Summers wasn’t wrong about economics because he had bad judgment in his personal life. What it does show is that the social construction of expert authority is more fragile, more human, and more political than liberal narratives admit.

So the impact looks like this:

It doesn’t discredit expertise. It discredits the myth of neutral experts.
It doesn’t prove technocrats are evil. It proves they’re human.
It doesn’t show elites control everything. It shows how quickly they lose control.

The liberal narrative needs experts to be above ordinary vice. Summers drags that ideal back into the dirty reality of human frailty. That tension won’t go away.

On Jan. 29, 2005, Steve Sailer wrote:

Those poor, oppressed lesbian lover engineers of academia. Ever since the Larry Summers brouhaha started, in which Dr. Denice “Speak Truth to Power” Denton, chancellor-designate of UC Santa Cruz played the second lead after Nancy Hopkins in denouncing Summers, I’ve been pointing out the lesbian back-scratching within the high levels of the UC system.

A reader points out that Dr. Denton and her close friend Gretchen Kalonji, both newly of high paying jobs at UC Santa Cruz, have been scratching each other’s, uh, backs for some time:

LEADERSHIP AWARD

Presented to

Gretchen Kalonji, Ph.D.

Nominator: Denice Denton, Dean

My reader asks, “What exactly do they mean by “nominator ” and ‘nominee’ here?” I dunno, maybe it’s a term used in the lesbian personal ads, like, “Nominator looking for nominee for long steamy nights of nominations.”

Steve Sailer wrote on Jan. 2, 2006:

Early in 2005, I wrote in The American Conservative about the financial conflicts of interest and web of backscratching among Harvard President Larry Summers’s most enraged feminist critics. After reviewing MIT professor Nancy Hopkins’s conflict of interest, I turned to a second case that wasn’t mentioned anywhere else in the voluminous commentary on Summers’s remarks on why science and engineering departments at Harvard are heavily male:

Similarly, Denice D. Denton was celebrated for standing up to Summers to, in her words, “speak truth to power.” This heroic tableau of the humble, no-doubt-discriminated-against woman engineering professor daring to defy the mighty male university president lost some luster when it emerged that Denton was UC Santa Cruz’s chancellor-designate at $275,000 annually. One college supremo attempting to intimidate another one into not mentioning inconvenient facts is not what most people visualize as speaking truth to power.

A few days later, Tanya Schevitz reported in the San Francisco Chronicle on how Denton plays the game. The headline read, “UC hires partner of chancellor: creates $192,000 post for Santa Cruz chief’s lesbian lover.” …

But Denton had a powerful defender in the woman scientist who had formerly headed UC Santa Cruz. M.R.C. Greenwood praised UCSC’s two-for-the-price-of-three deal for the lesbian academics as the cost of gender diversity: UCSC “should be commended for attracting and hiring two very qualified female engineers.”

Greenwood herself had just moved up to provost of the UC system, at $380,000 per year, almost $100,000 more than the man she replaced. Moreover, she had quietly brought with her a female scientist friend from Santa Cruz to fill the novel post of “Executive Faculty Associate to the Provost.”

Are you noticing a pattern here?

Schevitz now reports on the latest on Greenwood:

The University of California’s former No. 2 official, who resigned under a cloud last month, violated conflict-of-interest rules by helping to create a management job for a friend with whom she owned rental property, a UC investigation concluded Wednesday.

In addition, UC investigators found that a subordinate for the former official, ex-Provost M.R.C. Greenwood, had improperly helped create an internship for Greenwood’s son, though they couldn’t find evidence he had done so at Greenwood’s direction…

UC said it started the investigation after The Chronicle asked about Greenwood’s role in the hiring of two people: her friend and business partner, Lynda Goff, for a job at UC’s headquarters, and Greenwood’s son, James Greenwood, for a midcareer internship at UC Merced.

But UC won’t take any action against Greenwood, 62, as a result of the investigation. In fact, a separation agreement that Greenwood and UC agreed to in November, a month before the investigation was completed, grants the former No. 2 official a 15-month leave at $301,840 a year. The money is a combination of the salary she earned as provost and in her previous job as UC Santa Cruz chancellor.

UC also promised Greenwood the right to return after her leave to UC Davis, where she worked years earlier, as a tenured professor of nutrition and internal medicine earning $163,800. In addition, UC agreed to give her $100,000 in research funding.

Sheldon Steinbach, vice president and general counsel with the American Council on Education in Washington, D.C., said it was “highly unusual” for the university not to have waited until the investigation was complete before deciding the terms of Greenwood’s departure.

“This would seem indeed peculiar when you have mounting evidence of potential violations of university regulations to conclude a settlement prior to a determination of a full investigation,” Steinbach said. “It seems at variance with common practice.” …

The latest revelations come on the heels of reports in The Chronicle that UC gave employees hundreds of millions of dollars in hidden pay and perks in addition to salaries and overtime. The state Legislature, which oversees a significant portion of UC’s funding, is planning to hold hearings early next year into the university’s compensation practices.

In the report released Wednesday, UC’s general counsel said Greenwood should have recused herself from helping to promote Goff, 56, a UC Santa Cruz administrator who owned rental property with Greenwood in Davis.

Two months after Greenwood started as provost in April 2004, she hired Goff as an executive faculty associate. Then in August 2004, she hired Goff for a yearlong position in academic affairs with a $192,100 salary, a $44,300 raise from her pay at Santa Cruz.

In addition, the offer included a faculty relocation allowance of $50,000 and a low-interest housing loan if Goff were to take a permanent appointment in UC’s academic affairs office. She eventually did so.

This past August, Greenwood offered Goff a permanent position as director of UC’s new Science and Math Initiative, reporting to her. Goff took the job.

“Given their business relationship, Dr. Greenwood should not have participated in any way in decisions respecting Dr. Goff’s employment,” the UC report said.

Did there joint ownership of property reflect merely a business relationship?

In the Santa Cruz Sentinel, one Conn Hallinan, lecturer in journalism at UC Santa Cruz, was not pleased:

‘Integrity in hiring? UC? An oxymoron. What happened with Goff and Greenwood is part of a pattern I call “academic corruption.” The rationale is that these people could make so much more money working for some private university or private industry. I don’t see either beating a path to their doors.

They have well-paid jobs in the nicest state in the union, and we have to give them $70,000 to move 72 miles? We have to invent jobs for their kids or friends? We give them low-interest loans while students burden themselves with crushing debt at high interest in overcrowded classes that make it almost impossible to graduate in four years? We cut programs and services so some kid of a vice provost can get a made-up internship that cost $5,000 less than our entire journalism program? …

The corruption is not only at the level of the President’s Office, it is part of the structure of the university, and the Regents are no better. The only reason they are annoyed is they got sidelined on all of this. But letting the Regents investigate this all is like recruiting the foxes to find out who has been pinching chickens. This was stealing taxpayers’ money, plain and simple. You restore integrity by ending the skull-and-bones style of running a great public university and give it back to the people who send their children there.’

Of course, Larry Summers quickly backed down under pressure from these women, and promised $50 million to fund additional feminist corruption.

ChatGPT says: Denice Denton’s story is one of those moments when a prestige institution’s public myth collides with its private mess. She arrived at UC Santa Cruz as a rising star, a celebrated engineering dean, an advocate for women in STEM, and a symbol of what modern academic leadership was supposed to look like. Then the controversies started stacking up.
Her recruitment package drew early fire. She came in at roughly $275,000 a year plus a significant moving allowance. Her partner, Gretchen Kalonji, was brought in on a parallel track with a tenured appointment and a director-level job that paid close to $200,000 and came with housing assistance. All of this landed against a backdrop of budget pressure, tuition hikes and union fights, which made the numbers look worse than they otherwise would have.
The optics got harsher when the university renovated the chancellor’s residence for about $600,000. The part that stuck in the public imagination was the $30,000 dog run. Students were getting squeezed, staff were fighting for raises and suddenly the chancellor’s house looked like a symbol of everything alienating about university leadership.
Campus tensions rose. In 2006 students blocked her car to stage a protest about racism and custodial pay. A year earlier, someone had thrown a metal pole through her residence window. Denton was under pressure from above, below and outside. By June 2006 she had taken medical leave.
A few days later she went to San Francisco and jumped from the roof of a 43-story high-rise, landing on the tenth-floor terrace of a parking garage. She had been discharged the day before from Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, where she’d been treated for depression. Toxicology results showed antidepressants and sleep medication. Her mother told investigators that Denton had been deeply depressed and acting erratically, and that Denton had run off after going to retrieve a purse from Kalonji’s apartment in the same building.
After Denton’s death, Kalonji filed a lawsuit against the estate for $2.25 million, arguing that Denton had promised to provide for her but never updated her will. The final ruling granted Kalonji some property benefit but far less than she sought.
The story is tragic in every direction. Denton was ambitious and accomplished, but she stepped into a role that offered prestige on paper and unrelenting pressure in practice. She entered an institution navigating budget cuts, political fights and exploding expectations around identity and representation. Once the controversies hit the press, she became a symbol rather than a person. The job consumed her, the scrutiny escalated and the system that had celebrated her had no real way to absorb her collapse.
What remains is the uncomfortable truth: universities project a myth of enlightened, orderly leadership. The reality is often human, fragile and overwhelmed. Denton’s life showed how thin the line is between public authority and private strain, and how unforgiving a prestige system becomes once the curtain slips.

People are reacting to Summers without proportion because he sits at the intersection of three volatile forces: prestige politics, progressive moralism, and long-stored resentment toward elite technocrats. When someone like that stumbles, the fall becomes symbolic. That’s why the reaction feels gleeful, inflated and out of scale.

Here’s what’s really happening.

I. Summers is not being judged as a man. He’s being judged as a symbol
People aren’t reacting to “Larry Summers, flawed individual.” They’re reacting to everything he represented for decades:
the hyper-confident technocrat, the brilliant-but-bulldozing economist, the guy who always told everyone else what the frontier of knowledge was. When someone with that posture slips, people don’t see a personal mistake. They see a crack in the whole technocratic architecture. Symbols don’t get graded on proportion. They get used as venting points.

II. There’s long-standing resentment toward the “Harvard Brahmin” persona
Summers embodied a certain elite vibe that rubs a lot of people the wrong way.
He was sharp, dismissive, overbearing and absolutely certain he was right. He created enemies across academia, government and finance. People who felt steamrolled now feel vindicated. Glee comes from a sense that the scoreboard finally reflects something they experienced privately for years.

III. He violated progressive moral taboos
This part matters more than people want to admit. The emails expose:
• a power imbalance with a female mentee
• an extramarital situation
• asking a sex offender for personal advice

In today’s progressive-leaning institutions, that’s a trifecta of moral violations. The response is harsher than it would have been 20 years ago because the moral code changed. Summers didn’t. That mismatch is fatal.

IV. Progressive elites see him as someone who challenged their orthodoxy before
He criticized:
• campus illiberalism
• DEI excess
• certain feminist claims
• sacred cows in progressive economics

They tolerated him because he was brilliant and useful. But the grudges remained. The Epstein emails became the pretext for a long-desired purge. It’s not purely political, but politics helped load the spring.

V. The expert class punishes hypocrisy harder than wrongdoing
This is key.
If Summers were a showman like Trump, nobody would care.
But he built his power on seriousness, judgment, stewardship and gravitas.
When someone whose authority rests on “I am rational, I am responsible, I see clearly” shows deeply irrational and irresponsible behavior, the punishment exceeds the crime.
The system reacts as if a priest disgraced himself at the altar.

VI. People love seeing the mighty crumble
There’s a basic human thrill in watching the most insulated figure in the room suddenly become vulnerable. The more bulletproof someone looked, the more satisfying the downfall seems. Summers looked like a man who never feared consequences. That makes him irresistible downfall-bait.

VII. The punishment is collective, not individual
Institutions are not punishing Summers for personal mistakes alone.
They’re protecting themselves.
Harvard, Brookings, OpenAI — they’re scrubbing risk.
The glee is the public version of this: “One less arrogant elite pretending to be above the rest of us.”

VIII. The reaction hides a deeper anxiety
Summers’ downfall terrifies people inside elite worlds. They see how quickly it can happen, how little grace there is, how fast prestige evaporates. Glee is the mask for fear. If he can be undone, anyone can.

So why is there no proportion?

Because Summers wasn’t toppled for the act.
He was toppled for twenty years of accumulated tension.
The scandal was the spark, not the fuel.

And yes, progressive pieties played a role — but mostly as the moral language that made his fall legible and justified inside elite institutions.

“I’m going to have to cut you, old boy” is the polite British way of saying: you’ve become reputationally radioactive and I can’t afford to be seen standing next to you.

It’s not personal in the emotional sense.
It’s personal in the status calculus sense.

A few layers to the phrase:

• It’s genteel language masking ruthlessness.
• It preserves the speaker’s dignity and the target’s dignity while ending the relationship.
• It signals that the real issue isn’t morality but optics.
• It’s the soft, aristocratic version of cancelation.
• It’s reversible if the winds shift.
• It keeps the door cracked open while removing you from the room.

Elites rarely shout “you’re done.” They withdraw quietly. They stop taking calls. They leave you off the guest list. They compliment you as they sever you. That’s the entire British upper-class style: maximum civility, maximum coldness.

In Summers’ world, this is exactly what’s happening.
No screaming, no denunciations.
Just the institutional equivalent of:
“Terribly sorry, Larry… I’m going to have to cut you, old boy.”

Posted in Elites, Status | Comments Off on Elites Are Vulnerable

Spellbound: How Charisma Shaped American History from the Puritans to Donald Trump

I wonder where Nick Fuentes might figure in this story?

I just read the spellbinding 2025 book by historian Molly Worthen.

ChatGPT says: Nick fits the book’s frame as a minor but revealing case of outsider charisma in a fragmented era. He isn’t a national political force, but he is a perfect example of how charisma operates now that institutions have lost authority, platforms have replaced pulpits, and moral legitimacy is contested rather than granted.

Here’s where he fits.

I. Charisma without institutions
Earlier American charismatic figures drew power through churches, parties, unions, and mass movements. They had a base. They had a role. Nick is what happens when institutional scaffolding collapses. His charisma is free-floating. It’s digital. It’s algorithmic. It’s built on parasocial intensities rather than thick communities. This is charisma in its rawest and least disciplined form. Weber would call it routinized only through livestream ritual and fan culture, not through any tradition.

II. Charisma through transgression
Charismatic authority in the book is often tied to a claim that “the rules don’t apply to me because I stand outside the corrupt order.” Nick is a pure transgressive type. His appeal rests almost entirely on breaking taboos and treating moral disapproval as proof of authenticity. That fits the late stage of American charismatic politics, where scandal and exile don’t end careers. They create micro-careers.

III. Charisma in a splintered moral landscape
The book’s core point is that America has cycled through moral frameworks that grant or deny charismatic authority. Nick’s relevance is that he shows what charisma looks like when the country has no shared moral center. His charisma is unintelligible to the mainstream because it’s only legible inside his niche. He is a creature of micro-publics and fractured moral universes.

IV. Charisma that thrives on opposition
One theme in the book is that many charismatic figures needed enemies. Nick is the purest example of this dynamic today. He pulls energy from denunciation. The more he’s shunned by elites, the more his followers feel they are witnessing proof of his specialness. This is charisma inverted. It doesn’t rely on broad admiration. It relies on intense minority identification.

V. Charisma as identity-production
Puritan preachers, revivalists, abolitionists, populists, and televangelists all built identities that let followers feel chosen. Nick’s audience gets a different but structurally similar experience. He offers a sense of being on the inside of forbidden knowledge and being part of a persecuted elect. That’s a charismatic pattern that goes straight back to early American revivalism, only with the theology stripped out.

VI. Charisma post-Trump
The book’s endpoint is Trump as a master of media-driven charismatic performance. Nick is a downstream imitator operating in a smaller pond. He represents the diffusion of Trump-style charisma into the niches. Trump nationalized it. Nick localizes it. He is what charismatic politics looks like when the barrier to entry falls and the culture rewards outrage, risk, and extremity.

VII. Charisma without a destiny
Classic American charismatic figures typically claimed a national mission. Nick claims no national destiny. He’s not building a movement that can survive him. That’s important. It shows charisma in a degraded key. It’s charisma as content production rather than destiny shaping. In that sense he marks the exhaustion of the American charismatic tradition the book traces.

Where he fits in one sentence:
He’s a small but telling sign that charismatic authority in America has left the realm of prophets and presidents and migrated into algorithmic niches where intensity matters more than scale.

Nick maps onto earlier figures in two ways. First as a faint echo of old charismatic types. Second as a preview of something new and more splintered.
Echoes of earlier eras
He resembles the revivalists who fed off moral boundary breaking. He fits the populist mold where the outsider claims special sight because he isn’t tainted by elites. He mirrors the radio and TV demagogues who built parasocial warmth while attacking enemies. His live audience behaves like revival crowds in miniature. The emotional logic is similar. A chosen few see what the world refuses to see.
What breaks with the past
His charisma is thinner. It’s not tied to a shared national frame. He has no theology. No party. No destiny. Earlier charismatic figures always linked the crowd to a larger story of America. Nick links his crowd only to him. That’s a sign of erosion. It shows charisma detaching from any institutional or national project. It becomes spectacle. It becomes lifestyle.
A signal of an ending
In this angle he’s the tail end of a tradition the book is tracking. The country used to produce charismatic leaders who reshaped consensus. By the time you get to Nick you’re looking at post-consensus charisma. He has heat but no consequence. He is what happens when the charismatic tradition loses scale and loses seriousness. It’s charisma trapped in a cul-de-sac.
A signal of a beginning
On the other angle he’s an early type of the influencer-prophet. Charisma now grows out of platforms rather than pulpits. It spreads through clips rather than sermons. It creates micro-publics that feel like movements even though they are only audiences. Nick is one of the first to weaponize that fully. Others will be smoother, more strategic, and more connected to real political or cultural infrastructure.
Why this matters for the book
If you’re reading the story of American charisma as a long arc, he stands at a pivot point. Earlier figures had mass audiences. He has an intense minority. Earlier figures promised national renewal. He promises forbidden truth. Earlier figures built institutions. He resists any structure. That shows how charisma has shifted from the center to the periphery.
The optimistic read
Nick represents the burnout phase. After enough fragmentation the culture tires of spectacle. The appetite for someone who can unite rather than splinter returns. In that sense he’s a sign the cycle is about to flip.
The pessimistic read
He represents the new normal. Hundreds of niche charismatic figures each with their own audience, each feeding a sense of grievance and chosen-ness. Politics becomes a swarm of micro-charismas. No single figure can coordinate them and no institution can contain them.
Taken together
Nick can be read as the last gasp of the old charismatic script or the seed of a new fragmented landscape where charisma never scales but always multiplies. The next decade will tell which direction wins.

Charisma in “collapsed contexts,” in plain English

Old world: Charisma used to be performed inside relatively contained spaces (a church, a party meeting, a TV slot) with shared norms and predictable audiences.

Now: Digital platforms collapse contexts—one performance reaches wildly different groups at once (fans, haters, journalists, regulators, employers, opposing tribes). The same clip is sermon, scandal, and spectacle—simultaneously.

Result: Charisma gets amplified and polarized. Devotion intensifies (community, ritual, “we few, we happy few”), and disgust intensifies (moral alarms, deplatform calls). The middle thins out.

What makes online charisma “work”

Algorithmic mirroring: Platforms reward engagement, not agreement. Outrage and adoration both lift a charismatic brand.

Meme-compressibility: The most shareable figures reduce complex identities to sticky symbols (hats, hand signs, catchphrases), letting followers “wear” the leader with minimal cognitive cost.

Live improvisation: Streams/Spaces reward risk, speed, and transgression over careful argument. The charismatic “edge” is the product.

Para‑social loops: Constant, intimate access makes audiences feel recruited and personally recognized (“he speaks directly to me”).

Why it’s more volatile than before

Exposure without buffers: Gatekeepers can’t stage‑manage. A stray 10 seconds can redefine a persona for millions outside the core audience.

Context re-framing: Opponents can clip, caption, redeploy the same moment to invert its meaning.

Status cascades: Backlash can raise status inside the in‑group (“if they fear him, he’s powerful”). Attempts to suppress = proof of potency.

Where Fuentes and Trump fit

Trump: Classic mass‑media charisma ported to platforms—showman instincts, dominance displays, real‑time calibration to crowd reaction. He thrives on cross‑audience friction: every denunciation is also distribution.

Fuentes: Niche‑to‑network charisma—built in tight digital subcultures, optimized for identity‑thick signals (insider language, loyalist rituals). In collapsed contexts, those signals read as community to some, as contamination to others—fueling both growth and cordon‑sanitaire responses.

Practical implications (for analysts, journalists, organizers)

Assume multi‑audience exposure. Every message is entering friend, foe, and fence‑sitter feeds at once.

Expect backlash benefits. Suppression attempts can harden commitment and boost reach.

Track the rituals, not just the takes. Emotes, chants, call‑and‑response, raid behaviors—these are the glue of charismatic followings online.

Map the remix. The afterlife of a clip (edits, captions, stitches) often matters more than the original.

Quick diagnostic: spotting “collapsed‑context charisma”

Ask of any rising figure:

Is their message meme‑ready?

Do critics circulate them as much as fans?

Are there portable rituals or signals for belonging?

Does censure increase, not decrease, their in‑group status?
If “yes” to 3–4, you’re in high‑volatility charisma territory.

Here’s a book excerpt:

[Charisma] describes an ongoing exchange between leader and crowd, mutually created and sustained. Followers accept from their leader the feeling of status and strength. He may offer a bullhorn, a bribe, or a sense of fellowship and recognition. The more important thing, however, is that he draws back the veil on an alternative world in which followers find that they have secret knowledge, supernatural promise, and special status as heroes. Even in contexts that seem to have nothing to do with religion, charisma describes something almost like a liturgical act, a drama performed together, in which the parties join to consecrate a new reality that all, for their own reasons, prefer to the old one.

Charisma today shows up in places that don’t look religious but function like little liturgies. If you take the Spellbound lens seriously, here are a few current examples that make the pattern easy to see.
Trump’s rallies
They are the clearest modern ritual. The crowd arrives already primed. He gives them the sense that they see through the lies others fall for. They walk out feeling they belong to a chosen group that understands the real game. The bond isn’t built on policy. It’s built on the emotional lift of being part of a dramatic counter-world where they are insiders. That shared performance keeps the attachment strong even when the facts wobble.
Campus protest movements
Many of these encampments operate like charismatic subcultures. A leader or a small inner circle turns a grievance into a story of higher insight. Participants feel like they have stepped out of the compromised old world into a morally purified one. Inside the tents people speak in liturgical rhythms about justice, solidarity, liberation. The ritual isn’t religious but it functions that way. You get meaning, identity, and the glow of secret knowledge about how the world “really” works.
Elon Musk’s online following
His people don’t just admire him. They treat him as someone who reveals hidden truths. Every post becomes a kind of signal that the insiders decode. They feel like they’re part of an elite vanguard building a future that only they can see. It’s the same charisma loop. Musk offers a vision of alternative realities where bureaucrats and critics are irrelevant and the doers inherit the earth. Followers supply adoration, engagement, and the feeling that they’re part of something world-shifting.
RFK Jr.’s appeal
He gives his audience a counter-epistemology. He takes an anxious public and says, you’re not crazy, the institutions are lying. You are the ones who see clearly. He gives a sense of heroic status to people who feel shut out or dismissed. That sense of being a persecuted but enlightened remnant is classic charismatic formation.
The influencer economy
Influencers build mini-liturgies every day. A creator turns a camera on, crafts an emotional world, and the audience joins the ritual. You get language, signals, insider jokes. Followers feel noticed even when they aren’t. The creator lifts them into a story where they belong and where they have a role as supporters, believers, or co-travelers. The exchange is constant: attention for meaning.
The political pundit wars
People talk about Nick Fuentes or Ben Shapiro or Tucker Carlson as if they’re arguing about ideas, but the deeper draw is charismatic. These figures give their followers a sense of embattled clarity. They tell them that they are the ones who haven’t been fooled. Every broadcast becomes a kind of consecration of the alternative world where the tribe’s instincts are right and the elites are blind.
Why this shows up everywhere
Traditional sources of meaning have weakened. So people step into these micro-dramas because they deliver what churches and civic institutions used to. Shared emotion. Recognition. A sense that your struggles fit into a bigger story. Spellbound’s point is that charisma isn’t just a property of leaders. It’s a joint construction. That’s why you see it across the spectrum right now. The crowd is hungry, the leaders supply the story, and a new world gets conjured for as long as both sides need it.

Fuentes, Shapiro, Carlson, and the rest don’t just trade in arguments. They trade in felt experience. Their real product is the sensation of clarity at a time when most people feel disoriented. Spellbound helps you see that what looks like debate is actually a ritual that binds a community through shared emotion.
When a pundit says the elites are hiding something or gaslighting you, the audience gets two things at once. First, the thrill of inside knowledge. Second, the reassurance that their frustrations are legitimate. That combination creates a strong reciprocal bond. The host needs an audience that feels besieged. The audience needs a host who tells them their instincts are not only valid but heroic. Each side completes the other.
The cadence of the shows reinforces the dynamic. There’s usually a villain. There’s a reveal. There’s a moment where the host pauses and delivers the verdict with a tone of weary authority, as if he’s letting you in on a truth he had to fight to uncover. The audience experiences that as initiation. They’re not just hearing a take. They’re stepping into a different reality, one that flatters their sense of independence while also giving them a tribe.
Fuentes leans into martyr energy. His charisma is the promise that you can be despised by the mainstream and still be part of a righteous remnant. That’s a classic charismatic script. People join him not because he has compelling policy proposals but because he offers the emotional high of belonging to a persecuted elect.
Shapiro builds a different version. He packages procedural rationality as a badge of superiority. His followers enjoy the feeling that they are thinking clearly in a fog of cultural confusion. The argumentative style is less important than the status signal. He turns fast speech and confidence into a spectacle of mastery. The crowd absorbs that as personal elevation. If he’s sharp, then by listening to him, you’re sharp. That’s the exchange.
Carlson works through intimacy and doubt. He invites his viewers into his living room, then destabilizes them just enough to make his interpretation feel necessary. His raised eyebrow, his baffled tone, the slow reveal of hidden motives. The ritual is the shared moment of suspicion where he guides you toward the “real story.” That shared suspicion binds people more tightly than agreement on any policy.
None of this is unique to the right. But the current ecosystem there is especially saturated with this charismatic mode because so many followers feel culturally defeated and politically disrespected. Charisma thrives in that environment. It offers a world where your losses become proof of your virtue, where your marginalization becomes a sign of your deeper insight.
So the pundit wars aren’t just content battles. They’re competing liturgies. Each figure builds a small but intense charismatic micro-world where the audience feels recognized, elevated, and initiated. That’s why people stick around even when the arguments get repetitive. They aren’t tuning in for new facts. They’re tuning in to reenter the world where they matter.

Charisma plays a bigger role in America than in most places, and it’s baked into the culture, the history, and the national psychology.

America prizes the self-made individual. It’s a country built on the idea that one person can reinvent themselves, rise from nothing, and change the world. When a culture leans that way, it naturally elevates figures who look larger than life. It treats them as proof that the system still works.

America has weak formal hierarchies. No monarchy. No aristocracy. No long-standing political parties with deep internal control. That vacuum pushes Americans toward charismatic figures who can create their own authority through personality rather than inherited structure.

Americans want transformation, not just administration. They want leaders who promise renewal, rebirth, destiny. Other nations are more comfortable with dull managers. Americans lean toward prophets, warriors, healers, or disruptors. It shows up from Lincoln to FDR to Reagan to Obama to Trump.

Self-help culture amplifies this. When people believe change comes from inner awakening, they’re primed to respond to leaders who present themselves as catalysts for awakening. It makes charisma feel like a legitimate form of power rather than a suspicious one.

US media supercharges the effect. A huge, unified national media market gives charismatic figures an outsized stage. A country of 330 million people will generate more large-scale parasocial bonds than a country of 5 or 10 million. America exports its charismatic figures the way other countries export commodities.

American religion also plays a part. The US has a long tradition of revivalism and charismatic preaching. The pattern is familiar to the national psyche. A charismatic figure stands up, interprets the unseen forces of the moment, and offers a way to feel connected to something larger. American politics borrows this rhythm constantly.

Immigration shapes it too. A country of people who left their homelands for a chance at renewal is a country primed to respond to powerful personalities. Rooted societies lean on tradition. Mobile societies lean on magnetic leaders.

You can see the difference by looking at where charisma dominates. US presidential elections. Civil rights movements. Populist waves. Tech founders. Megachurch pastors. Activist influencers. It’s a landscape built for big personalities.

America is wide open to charismatic pull because the soil is right for it. A few things line up at the same time and create a perfect environment.

Individualism weakens everyday belonging. When a culture expects people to build their own identity without much help from family, tradition, or community, people feel exposed. They want someone who gives direction and emotional clarity. Charisma fills that hole fast.

Loneliness lowers resistance. Large parts of American life run on isolation. Long work hours. High mobility. Weak neighborhood ties. Shallow friendships. When people feel unseen, they respond strongly to anyone who makes them feel recognized or lifted. Charisma works best on people who lack steady social mirrors.

Weak cohesion breaks the guardrails. Many countries have strong party machines or thick civic networks that blunt the impact of big personalities. America has thin structures. Parties are loose. Churches are fading. Local journalism collapsed. When the social fabric thins, more depends on the emotional temperature of the moment. That is when charismatic figures can surge.

A culture of reinvention rewards the vivid outsider. Americans love stories of people who appear out of nowhere and reshape the landscape. That mindset makes it easier for a charismatic figure to leap over institutions. The country does not require leaders to rise slowly through stable channels.

Americans crave emotional energy. The emphasis on personal fulfillment pushes people toward experiences that feel intense or transformative. Charisma gives that sensation. It promises meaning you can feel in your chest rather than ideas you can write in a notebook.

The decline of shared stories increases the demand. When a country loses a common narrative about what it stands for, people scan for voices that supply a vivid story. Charismatic figures often fill that gap with simple explanations and a sense of destiny.

The result. America produces charismatic politics on a scale other nations rarely see. Not because Americans are foolish. Because the structure of American life makes people hungry for connection, belonging, and emotional clarity.

Posted in Nick Fuentes | Comments Off on Spellbound: How Charisma Shaped American History from the Puritans to Donald Trump

There’s No Mitzvah To Fight Anti-Semitism

Orthodoxy never turned fighting antisemitism into a commandment. The system is inward. The priorities are Torah, mitzvot, family, community, and keeping the group intact. Survival is achieved through boundary maintenance, not moral crusades.
When an Orthodox Jew fights antisemitism today, it usually comes from one of three places.
First, it can be a job. There is an industry built around advocacy, media work, legal action, and communal security. Some people plug into it because it pays and because it grants a public role that Orthodoxy itself does not usually grant to laypeople.
Second, it can be a path to prestige. In secular America, “fighting hate” raises your profile. It gives a person status in elite or semi-elite circles that don’t reward deep piety or scholarship.
Third, some Orthodox Jews absorb the surrounding civil rights ethos. America runs on moral narratives about victimhood, rights, and social justice. These ideas seep in, even in communities that try to stand apart. You get people who pick up those frames and fuse them with Jewish identity.
Traditional Judaism focuses on reducing sin, not reducing gentile hostility. Hostility is treated as part of the texture of exile. The job is to build strong internal life, not to fix the outside world. Modern activism flips that. It says the world should change and Jews should help change it.
Orthodoxy allows that, but it doesn’t require it. The difference matters. The more someone relies on activism for income or social standing or moral identity, the more they leave the gravitational pull of Orthodoxy and drift toward the secular frameworks that define success in modern America.
That isn’t a moral judgment. It’s just what’s happening.
There is a hard lesson in the Orthodox approach that wider America avoids because it feels unsentimental.
The Orthodox view is that you cannot “fix” other people’s hostility by moral messaging. You can only build strength, cohesion, competence, and clarity inside your own group. Everything else is noise. The world will ebb and flow. People will like you or dislike you for reasons far outside your control. The job is not to manage their feelings. The job is to shore up your own house.
There are a few takeaways for America.

Stop treating hate as a solvable engineering problem
America talks as if prejudice can be eliminated with better education, more public statements, more awareness campaigns. It has not worked for any group. The Orthodox assumption is that human nature has bright and dark currents and you can’t educate them away. So invest less in symbolic battles and more in concrete self-strengthening.

Identity is safest when it is lived, not advertised
Orthodox Jews don’t spend their days trying to convince outsiders to respect them. They build thick communities with clear expectations, strong schools, stable families, and competent leadership. The American instinct is to demand validation from the outside. The Orthodox instinct is to generate confidence from the inside.

A cohesive group projects quiet power
When a community is disciplined, functional, and internally loyal, it becomes hard to push around. You don’t get that through advocacy campaigns. You get it through shared norms, shared rituals, and internal accountability. America can learn that strength is generated internally before it is recognized externally.

Don’t confuse safety with applause
American advocacy culture tells people they will be safe when everyone celebrates them. That is backward. Safety comes from competence, boundaries, savvy situational awareness, and strong social networks. You don’t need the world to like you. You need your community to be functional.

Separate moral grandstanding from actual risk management
A lot of the “fight hate” rhetoric is a form of self-branding. It rarely changes behavior on the street. The Orthodox mindset distinguishes symbolic wins from practical wins. Practical wins are things like physical security, financial stability, social cohesion, and clear norms. Everything else is PR.

If wider America adopted even a fraction of that approach, it would produce sturdier communities and less moral panic. It would shift the focus from performative outrage toward real resilience. It would also relieve people of the fantasy that human hostility can be erased. You don’t need to erase it. You need to build enough internal strength that it never defines you.

Traditional Orthodox Jewish communities don’t treat antisemitism as a moral crusade to “defeat,” but as background weather—unpleasant, real, and sometimes dangerous, yet not the core of identity. That stance can be psychologically freeing: you refuse to let hostility tell you who you are.

Why this approach emerged (briefly):

Thick identity: Daily law (halacha), family, prayer, learning, and community obligations leave little bandwidth for organizing life around enemies.

Stability over spectacle: Priority goes to rituals, schools, livelihoods, and mutual aid—low‑drama, high‑continuity behaviors that protect dignity without constant public combat.

Selective responsiveness: When safety or livelihoods are at stake, act (security, legal channels, political engagement). Otherwise, don’t let outrage set the agenda.

Upsides:

Resilience: Less emotional whiplash from the news cycle; fewer identity swings driven by haters.

Agency: Energy goes to building institutions, marriages, parnassah (livelihood), and Torah—things you control.

Status hygiene: Refusal to amplify provocateurs who feed on opposition.

Limits & cautions:

Under‑response risk: Treating everything as “weather” can miss inflection points where coordinated action is necessary.

Privilege of strong networks: Detachment works best when community infrastructure (schools, shuls, tzedakah funds) is already strong.

What wider America might borrow (secular or religious):

Build-first mindset: Invest in thick local institutions (schools, churches/synagogues, clubs, trades associations) before culture war combat.

Outrage budgeting: Decide in advance which threats merit organized pushback vs. disciplined non‑amplification.

Identity anchored in duties: Let daily obligations (work, family, community rules) define you more than your opponents do.

Quiet competence: Prefer boring reliability (security protocols, legal preparedness, insurance) over viral indignation.

Practical template (adaptable anywhere):

Clarify red lines (what triggers action).

Pre‑plan responses (who calls whom; legal/police steps; PR silence or statement).

Invest 90% of energy in internal goods (education, savings, health, worship/community).

Review quarterly: did we overreact, underreact, or stay the course?

Posted in Anti-Semitism, Orthodoxy | Comments Off on There’s No Mitzvah To Fight Anti-Semitism

What Is Post-Liberalism? Why Is This Topic So Hot Now?

LF: Here’s what I mean by post-liberalism: A recognition of the fictional nature of the buffered identity, and of liberalism with its focus on the individual and its rights, which constrains democracy, creates pluralism, which allows for elite rule, as opposed to a united people (populism).

ChatGPT says: Post-liberalism is hot because the ground under liberalism is shifting. The buffered, self-creating individual that liberalism treats as real feels more like a shrinking fiction in a world defined by entanglement, dependency, precarity, and runaway elites. People sense that the liberal operating system is losing legitimacy and that the old tools no longer describe their lives or protect their interests.

Why it’s burning up the discourse right now

The buffered self is collapsing
People feel less autonomous than ever. Economic precarity, algorithmic nudging, institutional capture, and social-media identity churn all reveal how porous we actually are. Liberalism needs the myth of the bounded individual to work. That myth is fraying.

Elite rule is glaring
Liberal pluralism promised a peaceful marketplace of ideas. In practice it often enables a highly credentialed class to dominate culture, media, and administration. Populists read this as oligarchy with a smiley face.

Democratic majorities feel handcuffed
Liberal rights frameworks often override majority desires. Courts, agencies, treaties, and norms constrain what a “united people” can do. Many citizens now see this as an anti-democratic check on their will rather than a noble safeguard.

Cultural fragmentation feels existential
Liberalism assumes disagreement can be managed. But when people have incompatible moral worlds, pluralism becomes a pressure cooker. Many want a thicker communal identity because the thin identity offered by liberalism feels brittle.

The rise of meaning-seeking politics
People want belonging, purpose, and hierarchy. Liberalism treats these as private matters. Post-liberal thinkers argue that humans need shared narrative, shared authority, and shared obligations to feel whole.

State capacity anxiety
Liberalism often ties the hands of the state. But crises like immigration, pandemics, and geopolitical stress make populations hungry for a capable state that can act decisively. Post-liberalism promises decisiveness and cohesion.

Post-liberalism will keep rising because it speaks directly to the lived contradiction of our time. We are told we are sovereign individuals even as every part of our life feels shaped by forces we don’t control. People are hunting for a more honest anthropology and a thicker political identity.

Liberalism earned its standing because it solved real human problems. The buffered identity had a historic purpose. You don’t need to buy the whole package to appreciate what it accomplished. The trick is to hold its achievements in one hand and its limits in the other.

What liberalism got right

It protected people from intrusive communities
For much of history, the danger wasn’t atomization. It was the suffocating weight of clan, caste, and creed. Liberalism created breathing room. It let misfits, minorities, and dissenters survive.

It reduced the cruelty of power
By tying authority to rules rather than to persons, liberalism lowered the temperature of political life. The buffered identity made it possible to say that each person had a boundary the state and the mob could not cross.

It allowed plural people to live together without constant war
When societies became too diverse for a single sacred order, liberalism stepped in as a peace treaty. It let people disagree about ultimate things without immediately reaching for the sword.

It created space for creativity
The buffered self let individuals experiment. It encouraged science, art, entrepreneurship, and religious innovation. It said the world is large enough for many ways of being.

Where it runs thin

The buffered identity can become a fiction
Humans aren’t self-created islands. We are porous, social, tribal, and shaped by forces we barely see. Liberalism asks us to pretend otherwise. Over time the gap between the theory of the self and the experience of the self becomes impossible to ignore.

Liberal neutrality is not actually neutral
Every order has a moral center. Liberalism smuggles in its own: proceduralism, autonomy, expressive individualism, managerial mediation. These can stabilize a polity, but they also marginalize people who want thicker forms of life.

Pluralism can decay into fragmentation
Liberalism manages diversity when the underlying culture is cohesive. Once that cohesion erodes, pluralism becomes centrifugal. People don’t just disagree. They inhabit rival moral universes.

Liberal rights can constrict democracy
A rights-heavy model places key decisions in courts, agencies, and credentialed elites. It buffers the individual but also buffers the elite from the majority. People eventually feel locked out of their own country.

The real value of liberalism
It gave us tools to limit cruelty, tame power, cool fanaticism, and allow room for growth. That is no small thing. Post-liberal critiques that ignore this history end up fantasizing about a return to an organic unity that never existed.

The real limits of liberalism
It offers a thin picture of the human being and an even thinner picture of community. It can’t sustain moral cohesion. It struggles with rising inequality. It leaves people hungry for belonging.

How to hold both truths

Liberalism is a floor, not a ceiling.
It’s the minimum you want in any decent society. Good protections for dissent. Limits on arbitrary power. A sense of personal dignity. A common rulebook.

Liberal anthropology must be supplemented by thicker truths.
Humans need identity, loyalty, ritual, and hierarchy. They need embeddedness. Liberalism can’t supply those things, so they must come from community, tradition, or shared projects.

Liberal governance works best when anchored by a unified culture.
The more fractured the society, the more incoherent liberalism becomes. Post-liberalism is really about rebuilding a moral and civic center that liberalism alone cannot produce.

The goal isn’t to overthrow liberalism.
It’s to steady it by acknowledging where it’s weak. When people pretend liberalism can solve everything, it collapses under its own overreach. When you slot it into its proper domain, it becomes defensible again.

Liberalism plus nationalisms works. There’s a good reason: each tradition supplies what the other lacks. Liberalism is good at protecting individuals from coercion and fanaticism. Nationalism is good at binding people together in a shared story so they don’t drift into alienation. When you put them together in the right proportions, you get a workable operating system.

What nationalism adds to liberalism
It gives people a sense of we. Liberalism by itself produces a landscape of consumers, voters, and private selves. That makes for peace but not for solidarity. Nationalism builds loyalty, duty, memory, and emotional glue. Without that glue, the liberal order feels like an empty shopping mall.

It provides meaning and inheritance. The nationalist frame reminds people they belong to something older and larger than themselves. Liberalism is mostly forward-facing. Nationalism connects living citizens to the dead and the unborn. That makes sacrifice and patience possible.

It reins in elite drift. A cohesive national identity can force elites to stay tethered to the actual public. Liberalism’s procedural structures make it easy for elites to float above the people. Nationalism reminds them they are stewards of a real body, not managers of an abstraction.

What liberalism adds to nationalism
It protects minorities and dissenters from majoritarian zeal. National solidarity is powerful but can turn ugly. Liberal norms keep it from hardening into persecution.

It limits the totalizing impulse. Nationalism likes unity. Liberalism keeps unity from swallowing pluralism. It ensures that loyalty to the nation doesn’t cancel the dignity of the person.

It handles complexity. Modern societies are vast and diverse. Liberal processes absorb disagreement without civil war. Without those circuits, nationalist energy can blow past the fuse box.

Why the combination works in practice
Countries that have managed both traditions tend to be stable. Think of places where a strong national identity pairs with reliable rule of law and real personal freedoms. They feel both solid and breathable. People feel like citizens, not strangers. The nation feels like a home, not a holding pen.

The trick is proportionality
Too much liberalism and you get fragmentation, elite insulation, and loss of common purpose. Too much nationalism and you get conformity, repression, and brittle politics.

The sweet spot is a national community thick enough to matter but a liberal constitution thin enough to stop the worst temptations.

This combination speaks directly to the mood of the moment. People are tired of the myth of the self-made atom and tired of the managerial elite that hides behind liberal neutrality. At the same time, most people don’t want the crush of ideological nationalism. They want rooted freedom. They want community without coercion. They want a home that leaves room to breathe.

This book by Rony Guldmann, Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression, drops right into the heart of your liberalism vs post-liberalism question. Its entire argument is that liberalism isn’t a neutral referee but a culturally specific ethos built around the buffered identity, and that conservatives increasingly experience that ethos as a form of soft domination. The author makes that case in a precise, almost anthropological way, and that’s what it adds to your conversation.

Here’s the core contribution.

It exposes liberalism’s hidden anthropology
The book shows that liberalism isn’t a thin procedural system. It carries a specific self-conception: the disengaged, self-controlled, buffered individual with “dispassionate scientist” moral taste buds. This identity isn’t universal. It’s a subcultural formation. Liberals think they’ve transcended thick identities. The author says they’ve just built their own.

That’s a major addition to your post-liberal frame. It backs your point that the buffered identity is fictionally universalized and deployed as a cultural project.

It shows how liberalism becomes a hero-system
The book argues that liberalism offers its own moral narrative: the enlightened exposing and reforming the benighted. The author calls these liberal “folk stories” and argues they function as a hero system for the liberal class. This is almost one-to-one with your interest in hero systems. Liberalism isn’t neutral. It’s a status-granting identity structure.

It reframes conservative backlash as a recognition struggle
Rather than treating the right’s grievances as paranoia, the book claims conservatives experience liberal cultural dominance as a kind of unacknowledged hierarchy. They feel culturally devalued and politically pathologized. The book calls this “conservative claims of cultural oppression” and describes it as conservatives placing themselves in roles historically reserved for oppressed minorities.

That dovetails with your observation that liberal pluralism often masks elite rule. The book gives that feeling a conceptual backbone.

It explains how conservatives appropriate the progressive critique
The author argues conservatives now use the left’s own critical tools. They borrow the progressive critique of hidden power and turn it against liberal elites, accusing them of subtle coercion in culture, media, academia, and norms. This “political judo” is explicitly described: redirecting liberalism’s prestige against itself.

This is a crucial insight for post-liberalism. It shows why the right sounds more like critical theorists than Burkeans. It explains the ideological mutation happening right now.

It highlights the fragility of liberalism without a shared culture
The book aligns with your point that liberalism works only when it is culturally anchored. It quotes conservative thinkers who argue that liberalism isolates individuals from history, culture, and unchosen identity, leaving them alienated and socially weightless. The book treats this as a structural externality of liberalism, not a side complaint.

That reinforces your claim that liberalism plus nationalism might be the stable formula.

What this book ultimately adds
It gives you a deep, rigorous account of how the buffered identity functions as a cultural mechanism that produces resentment, backlash, and claims of oppression from the right. It treats this as a sociological pattern, not a partisan talking point. It enriches the post-liberal conversation by showing how liberalism’s own commitments generate counter-identities that eventually destabilize its legitimacy.

LF: “As soon as talk shifts to post-liberalism, people want to yell fascist.”

People jump to “fascist” because it’s the fastest moral veto in the liberal vocabulary. You’re not imagining it. As soon as you question liberalism’s anthropology or its institutional supremacy, people feel like you’re prying loose the guardrails that protect them from domination or tribal conflict. The word becomes a panic button.

Why the reflex kicks in

Liberalism treats itself as the neutral baseline
If liberalism is the only legitimate political operating system, then any talk of moving beyond it reads like dismantling the referee. People hear “post-liberal” as “anti-liberal.” Anti-liberal gets translated to “illiberal.” And illiberal gets translated to “fascist.” It’s a chain reaction of moral shorthand.

Liberalism links itself to anti-fascism
The “Never Again” frame is built into the moral memory of the modern West. Liberalism understands itself as the worldview that defeated fascism. So any challenge to its core assumptions reads like reopening the door. It doesn’t matter if the challenge is actually moderate nationalism or a call for thicker community. The immune system reacts anyway.

The buffered identity feels endangered
People who rely on the buffered identity for moral orientation feel that post-liberal talk threatens the psychological structure that keeps politics humane. When you hint that the self isn’t autonomous or that communities need more cohesion, people hear “collectivism” and “absorption of the individual.” That triggers fascism alarms.

The conversation has been shaped by decades of frame-setting
For fifty years, the worst thing a public figure could be accused of was fascism. Political culture built reflexive pathways. Anything that challenges liberal individualism now gets sorted into that box: nationalism, populism, communitarianism, strong democracy, thick identity, even religious politics.

What gets lost in that panic

Not all criticism of liberalism is authoritarian
MacIntyre, Lasch, Taylor, Deneen, Vermeule, Lind, Pappin, Hazony, even parts of Arendt all critique liberal anthropology or institutions without endorsing dictatorship. But once the F-word is thrown, nuance dies.

Most post-liberal projects want democratic cohesion, not dictatorship
They’re trying to solve problems liberalism itself can’t handle: alienation, meaning collapse, elite drift, demographic strain, civic dissolution.

Nationalism is not inherently fascist
Liberal nationalism built most of the stable democracies we admire. The people yelling fascist often can’t distinguish between ethnic chauvinism and civic solidarity.

The conservative cultural oppression book you uploaded shows this dynamic clearly
It explains how liberal elites universalize their own ethos and then treat any dissent from that ethos as pathological, dangerous, or morally illegitimate. The book argues this is built into the liberal hero-system itself, where liberals imagine themselves as guardians against oppressive traditions. Questioning that self-image triggers maximum moral alarm.

So how do you keep the conversation sane?

Name the fear directly
The fear is that abandoning liberalism’s individualism will unleash coercion. If you assure people you’re not after hierarchy-for-its-own-sake, they relax a little.

Frame post-liberalism as supplementation, not replacement
Say: liberalism needs a thicker civic culture to survive. Not: liberalism must be overthrown.

Use historical examples where liberalism and nationalism coexist peacefully
Show that belonging and freedom aren’t opposites. Canada. Finland. Israel. Ireland. Japan. France. Not fascist.

Remind people that liberalism has its own exclusions
Every order has boundaries and winners. Liberalism isn’t a magical free zone. It has gatekeepers. It has elites. It shapes identity. People become more receptive when you point out this isn’t about abolishing boundaries, just rebuilding honest ones.

Alliance Theory fits this post-liberal debate hand-in-glove because it reframes the whole conversation from “ideas vs ideas” to “alliances vs alliances.” Once you take that shift seriously, a lot of the heat around post-liberalism starts to make sense. And a lot of the misunderstandings melt away.

Post-liberalism is not primarily an argument about ideas
Post-liberalism sounds like a philosophical movement. But Alliance Theory treats philosophical talk as a late-stage rationalization of alliance structure. The question is not “What’s the best anthropology of the person?” It’s “Which groups see liberalism as serving their interests, and which groups see it as a threat?” The doctrine forms around those fault lines.

Liberalism looks like the natural home of one super-alliance
Liberalism is currently the ideological language that harmonizes a loose coalition of highly educated professionals, cultural institutions, bureaucratic elites, and certain minority groups. Alliance Theory predicts: that coalition will describe its own worldview not as “our tribal narrative,” but as “neutral,” “universal,” “values-based,” “anti-fascist,” and “protective.” The paper calls this a strategic moral presentation, not a metaphysical discovery.

Post-liberalism looks like the narrative of the opposing super-alliance
The rival coalition is made up of groups feeling squeezed by globalization, loss of status, loss of cultural capital, and demographic change. Alliance Theory predicts that this coalition will produce narratives casting itself as victims and liberals as oppressors. That is exactly what Rony’s book is about, and exactly the pattern the paper finds across domains. Both sides run victim and perpetrator biases to mobilize support.

Why post-liberal talk gets instantly labeled “fascist”
Alliance Theory predicts this too. If liberalism is the binding ideology of one super-alliance, anything that challenges its claims to neutrality or supremacy threatens the narrative glue of that alliance. The natural propagandistic move is to frame the rival coalition as dangerous, irrational, authoritarian, or hateful. The authors’ language about “propagandistic biases” explains the reflex perfectly: each coalition exaggerates the danger of the other to rally its own side.

The liberal picture of the buffered individual is itself an alliance marker
The paper’s description of political belief systems as ad-hoc justifications explains why liberals treat the buffered identity as morally sacred. It’s not just an idea. It’s a social marker of the professional-managerial alliance: individualism, voluntarism, expressive choice, self-authorship, abstraction from tribe. The rival coalition experiences that ethos as a status move, or as an attempt to dissolve thick identities. That’s exactly what post-liberalism pushes back against.

Post-liberalism as counter-elite rebellion
From an Alliance Theory perspective, post-liberalism is simply the ideological face of a growing coalition that sees itself as punched down on by elite institutions. It’s not a metaphysical argument about selves. It’s a structural conflict over who gets to define the moral center.

Why “liberal + nationalism” resonates in this framework
Alliance Theory helps explain this too. Nationalism is a strategy for increasing similarity, transitivity, and interdependence within a coalition—the three alliance-building mechanisms in the paper. Liberalism dissolves those mechanisms. Nationalism thickens them. The hybrid appeals to groups that feel the coalition they belong to is too fragmented to defend them.

Why post-liberalism can’t be understood as a coherent philosophy
Alliance Theory argues that political belief systems are patchwork narratives arising from alliance needs. Post-liberalism looks exactly like that in real life. It’s not a consistent doctrine. It’s a coalition-based reaction to elite liberal dominance, wrapped in the language of anthropology and political order.

What Alliance Theory finally adds to your post-liberal landscape

It treats post-liberalism not as an intellectual eruption, but as the predictable outcome of alliance realignment.

It explains why the fight is moralized even when the underlying conflict is coalitional.

It reframes “liberalism vs post-liberalism” as “two super-alliances responding to structural changes.”

It predicts the rhetorical escalation both sides use.

It undercuts the idea that liberalism is neutral and post-liberalism is ideological. Both are alliance languages.

A Post-Liberal Manifesto (in Alliance-Theory terms)

I. What’s breaking
Liberalism worked as long as the alliance that carried it was dominant: professionals, cultural institutions, higher ed, media, NGOs, and the subsets of minorities aligned with them. That coalition could impose a moral center and call it neutral. As long as the rival coalition was fragmented, liberalism functioned as the “default.”

That’s no longer the case. The rival alliance is no longer fragmented. Rural, working-class, religious, and culturally traditional groups now see themselves as transitive allies, not scattered stragglers. They share enough similarity, transitivity, and interdependence to form a real counter-coalition. Liberalism’s moral dominance is contested.

II. What people actually feel
People don’t experience this shift in abstract terms. They feel two things:

Their group is losing.

The institutions favor someone else’s allies.

This isn’t paranoia. Institutions are staffed by humans, and humans carry their alliances with them. Every side uses victim and perpetrator biases to narrate the conflict. The liberal alliance narrates itself as protective and rational. The post-liberal alliance narrates itself as culturally oppressed.

III. Why liberalism alone can’t stabilize the landscape
Liberalism dissolves strong ties. It treats thick identities as suspect. That worked when one coalition’s worldview controlled the center. But once that center cracks, dissolving ties no longer produces peace. It produces chaos. Coalitions need cohesion. People need a shared story. The buffered identity is too thin to bind a complex society.

IV. What nationalism offers
Not blood-and-soil nonsense. Just a shared frame strong enough to coordinate allies. Nationalism increases similarity, strengthens transitivity, and deepens interdependence. In other words, it restores the basic cues humans use to decide whom to trust and whom to fight for.

Liberals already do this inside their own alliance—shared language, shared norms, shared moral signals. Post-liberalism says extend that logic outward to the nation. Give everyone a home team, not just one coalition.

V. What liberalism still provides
Limits on cruelty. Protection for dissent. A floor of individual dignity that keeps the majority from crushing the minority. Post-liberalism keeps these guardrails. It doesn’t advocate authoritarianism. It advocates realism. Coalitions need a common project or they spiral into mutual delegitimization.

VI. The actual proposal
Strengthen the national “we” so that rival coalitions aren’t fighting a zero-sum tribal war. Keep liberal protections, but don’t pretend liberalism can conjure community. Use the nation—its memory, its institutions, its democratic identity—as the shared container.

Protect individual rights.

Rebuild civic solidarity.

Expect elites to serve the whole people, not their subculture.

Re-anchor institutions in national rather than subcultural moral codes.

Tell the truth about group conflict instead of pretending it’s philosophy.

VII. Why this isn’t fascism
Alliance Theory clarifies that every coalition moralizes its interests. Calling the outgroup “fascist” is a propagandistic reflex. Post-liberalism isn’t a rejection of liberal freedoms. It’s a recognition that freedoms require a cultural framework thick enough to sustain trust between coalitions.

VIII. The closing vision
A nation where alliances don’t need to be total enemies. A political order where the people have a shared center of gravity. A society where liberal rights protect you, and national identity binds you.

Not liberalism abolished. Not nationalism unleashed. Liberalism plus nationalism. Rights plus belonging. A coalition-aware realism that understands what humans are and what they need.

Posted in Liberal, Nationalism | Comments Off on What Is Post-Liberalism? Why Is This Topic So Hot Now?

NYT: ‘The Three G.O.P. Women Who Broke Trump’s Grip on Congress’

LF: “The MSM loves this idea that Trump is fading. They forget that power is always situational, the situation changes, and one’s power changes.”

Gemini: Here are a few ways to think about your statement regarding the situational nature of power in this context:

The Power of Narrative: The media’s portrayal is a power situation. If a narrative of “fading influence” gains traction, it can influence donor behavior, primary challenges, and public perception, thereby actually eroding some power, regardless of the former President’s core support.

The Power of Position: For the representatives, their power to challenge Trump was situational—it relied on their specific legislative roles (impeachment votes, committee assignments) and their secure (or formerly secure) political bases. When the situation changed (e.g., Liz Cheney’s primary election), her power to influence the party’s direction from within Congress ended.

The Power of the Base: The former President’s power is heavily situational, derived from the unwavering loyalty of his base. As long as he can mobilize that base, his power over the party apparatus, and especially in primary contests, remains formidable. Challenges to his influence in Congress often end when the representatives face their voters, underscoring the shift in power from Washington D.C. to the grassroots.

The perceived reluctance of elites and certain segments of academia to engage in explicit and critical decoding of power often stems from a complex interplay of institutional constraints, rhetorical necessity, and self-preservation.

The tendency to use platitudes about “service,” “public interest,” and “science” can function as a powerful form of strategic obfuscation—it frames the actions of the powerful in morally neutral or benevolent terms.

Institutional and Self-Preservation Factors

Several intertwined reasons explain this observed reluctance:

1. Access and Cooperation
Academics who study elites often need access to them (for interviews, documents, or data). Directly and critically decoding the subject’s power—especially its less visible, self-serving, or coercive aspects—risks losing access. Elites can impose restrictions, refuse to cooperate, or retaliate against researchers they deem hostile. This creates an incentive for scholars to adopt a more neutral or palatable vocabulary.

2. Funding and Legitimacy
Much academic research is funded by government grants, corporate interests, or major foundations, all of which are part of the larger power structure. Research that is too critical or explicitly anti-establishment can face difficulties securing funding, being published in prestigious journals, or being taken seriously by policymakers. The language of “public interest” and “service” offers a safer, more legitimizing umbrella for research.

3. Maintaining the Status Quo
Many individuals within academia and elite institutions are themselves beneficiaries of the existing power structure. Explicitly decoding and challenging that structure would mean questioning their own privilege, career path, and institutional authority. It’s often easier and more comfortable to operate under the assumption that the system is fundamentally sound, requiring only incremental improvements guided by “science” or “expertise.”

The Power of Platitudes and Discourse

The use of seemingly neutral or positive terms acts as a crucial political tool in the exercise of power:

Obscuring Self-Interest: The term “public interest” is often vague and contested. As critics point out, invoking it allows powerful groups to advance their specific, often self-serving, agendas while claiming the moral high ground of serving the greater good. This is a form of ideological legitimation.

Neutralizing Politics: Invoking “science” or “expertise” attempts to remove decisions from the realm of messy, democratic politics and place them in the hands of technocrats. This suggests that decisions are based on objective truth, not on a contest of interests and power—which subtly reinforces the power of those who control the “expertise.”

The Power/Knowledge Nexus (Foucault): Philosophers like Michel Foucault argued that power and knowledge are inseparable. What a society accepts as “knowledge” or “truth” (science, expertise) is fundamentally produced and reinforced by power structures (institutions, universities, government agencies). When elites speak in terms of “truth” and “science,” they are deploying a form of power that defines what is considered legitimate discourse, thus actively suppressing alternative, power-challenging narratives (subjugated knowledges).

In essence, the “queasiness” isn’t about an inability to decode power (critical theories like Marxism, Foucault, and Elite Theory have been doing this for decades in academia), but a situational decision by certain institutions and individuals to use a rhetoric of neutrality and service to maintain their position and influence.

LF: “If Machiavelli were alive today, which prestige outlets would publish him? And how would the New York Times write about him? I feel like the NYT would focus on how immoral he is.”

If Niccolò Machiavelli were alive today, his works would likely be published across a spectrum of prestigious outlets, appealing to different contemporary power centers, but he would certainly be met with the moralistic critique you predict from publications like The New York Times.

Prestige Outlets That Would Publish Machiavelli

Machiavelli’s brilliance was in the cold, clear-eyed analysis of power as it is, not as it ought to be. This realism, divorced from morality, makes him a fit for several distinct modern “prestige” audiences:

1. Political/Geopolitical Realism: Foreign Affairs & The Economist

The Content: These outlets focus on Realpolitik—the practical, self-interested, amoral decisions states make to maximize their power. Machiavelli’s essays (modern equivalents of The Prince or Discourses on Livy) would be published here under a title like “The New Necessity: Why the Liberal Order Must Wield a Lion’s Force and a Fox’s Cunning” or “Adapting to Anarchy: How the Modern State Survives in a Post-Moral World.”

The Angle: He would analyze U.S.-China relations, cyber warfare strategy, or international sanctions, focusing on efficacy and the maintenance of national power (virtù), not idealism or international law. His work would be treated as essential, if cynical, reading for diplomats and strategists.

2. Elite Business/Leadership: Harvard Business Review (HBR) & The Wall Street Journal

The Content: The Prince is often treated today as a manual for corporate strategy, leadership, and management. He’d publish a feature in HBR or a series in the WSJ titled “How to Command Loyalty: The CEO’s Guide to Being Feared and Respected” or “When to Be Merciful: The Strategic Use of Cruelty in Corporate Turnarounds.”

The Angle: His advice would be framed for navigating competitive markets, hostile takeovers, and managing employee loyalty, translating political power to organizational power. This is where his “ends justify the means” argument is most easily monetized and laundered into acceptable business jargon.

3. Highbrow Intellectual/Academic: The London Review of Books (LRB) & The New York Review of Books (NYRB)

The Content: These literary journals would carry his most thoughtful, historical-comparative work (in the vein of his Discourses), comparing the tactics of ancient Roman republics with modern democracies, or discussing the umori (the conflicting humors) of the elite and the people in contemporary politics.

The Angle: Here, he would be published as a critical political scientist—a “founding father” of modern political thought—whose realism is necessary for understanding the mechanics of populist movements and the inevitable decay of republics.

How The New York Times Would Write About Him

You are absolutely right. The New York Times (NYT) would likely treat Machiavelli as a moral scandal, focusing heavily on the ethical implications of his counsel, especially in its news and opinion sections. The paper’s dominant narrative would be one of immoral realism versus democratic ideals.

1. The News Report: The “Teacher of Evil”

A profile would be framed with a headline like: “The Merciless Modern Prince: Niccolò Machiavelli Stirs Debate with Handbook for Amoral Power.”

The Tone: Objective but implicitly critical. It would quote academics (often Leo Strauss, who called him a “teacher of evil”) and political opponents who decry his methods.

The Focus: It would detail his most controversial advice: the strategic use of cruelty, the need to break promises, and the prioritizing of the state’s survival over individual rights. It would draw parallels to contemporary figures and movements accused of ruthless tactics, using him as a shorthand for cynicism in politics.

2. The Opinion Piece: The Moral Rebuke

An Op-Ed would likely run with a headline such as: “We Do Not Need Machiavelli’s Brutality to Save Democracy” or “The False Virtue of Vice: Why Political Realism Undermines the Public Trust.”

The Argument: An NYT columnist would argue that while his analysis might be descriptive of some dark corners of politics, it is profoundly prescriptive and dangerous. They would contrast his amoral pragmatism with the paper’s emphasis on institutional norms, transparency, democratic accountability, and moral leadership.

The Conclusion: The piece would ultimately reject his philosophy as an existential threat to liberal democracy, affirming the need for morality and public service—the very platitudes he sought to set aside.

In short, Machiavelli would be a publishing phenomenon, lauded by realists and strategists, but widely condemned by the liberal media establishment for the lack of a moral framework in his political science.

Posted in Power | Comments Off on NYT: ‘The Three G.O.P. Women Who Broke Trump’s Grip on Congress’