You have high-church theorists writing about “the common good,” technolibertarians who decided democracy is a bug, Trumpist nationalists who want tariffs and vengance, and online paranoids who think the CIA flew the planes into the towers. They all claim liberalism has failed, but they want very different things from whatever comes next.
The Dispatch roundtable and the ISI piece you linked trace how that jumble is now fighting to control the institutions that used to form “respectable” American conservatism. I’ll use that as the through-line: not just “what are the varieties of post-liberalism,” but how they are competing inside the right’s existing elite pipeline, and why it feels like rot rather than mere intellectual evolution.
I. What “post-liberal” means in this context
In the podcast, John McCormack gives the cleanest definition around minute 5. “Post-liberal” here does not just mean “anti-progressive.” It means people who fault the American founding itself, the whole classical-liberal package of individual rights, limited government, and procedural neutrality.
On their telling, the trouble is not just left-liberalism since the 1960s. It is the liberal part of the American experiment going back to Madison and Locke.
So the shared moves are:
Treat “liberalism” as a comprehensive, corrosive order, not just a set of rules.
Blame liberalism for atomization, loneliness, cultural decay, and weak national will.
Call for a thicker, more directive state that can actively promote substantive goods (religion, family, nation, order), not just referee private choices.
Once you see that common frame, the varieties of American post-liberalism sort themselves into a few main families.
II. Catholic integralists and “common-good” conservatives
This is the most self-consciously intellectual variety, and the one that got ISI’s board to start talking about a “post-liberal hijacking.”
Rough sketch:
• Patrick Deneen’s “Why Liberalism Failed” argues that liberalism didn’t just go off the rails recently; it succeeded on its own terms. Emancipated individuals, uprooted communities, managed by faceless technocrats, is the logical endpoint.
• Adrian Vermeule’s “common-good constitutionalism” explicitly rejects originalism and rights-talk in favor of reading the Constitution as a mandate for the state to promote objective moral goods.
• Integralists more broadly want an avowedly Christian (usually Catholic) state that uses law to buttress religious truth, restrict blasphemy and pornography, and subordinate markets to a thick moral order.
On the Dispatch pod they mention a professor who has openly endorsed blasphemy laws in the United States and who has been given pride of place at ISI conferences. That is integralism in miniature: the problem is not just drag queen story hour; it is the First Amendment as Americans have understood it since the Warren Court, and arguably since the Founding.
This camp generally:
• Is bookish, footnote heavy, and thinks in terms of regimes and teleology.
• Is skeptical of free markets and global capitalism.
• Wants real coercive power, not just “cultural influence.”
Its weak spot is sellability. You can fill an ISI conference with it; it is a lot harder to build a majority coalition for “American blasphemy laws.” So it tends to piggy-back on more populist energies.
III. National conservatism and economic populists
A step down from integralism in theological intensity, but closer to mass politics, you get national conservatism and economic populists.
Think of:
• The Buchanan tradition of tariffs, immigration restriction, and non-intervention abroad.
• “Industrial policy” conservatives who want to break with Reagan’s free-trade consensus.
• The NatCon network and magazines like The American Conservative, which Johnny Burtka ran before taking over ISI. The Dispatch
On the podcast they distinguish this “national populism” from the more academic post-liberals, but the overlap is obvious. Both treat Reagan-Bush fusionism as exhausted. Both think a neutral, procedural state is a fantasy. Both want government to side openly with some groups and values against others.
In practice this looks like:
• Economic nationalism: tariffs, buy-American, hostility to multinational corporations and Wall Street.
• Civilizational rhetoric: “defend Western civilization,” “secure the border,” “fight woke capital.”
• Strong leader politics: a taste for executives who “get things done” without agonizing over norms.
At ISI and Heritage, this is the faction that sells itself as “relevant.” Burtka reportedly told donors he wanted to speak for “the Tucker Carlson wing of the GOP,” which is basically this tendency with a TV face. The Dispatch+1
This camp is more electorally viable than integralism, but less coherent. Some of its people still like the founding; others talk as if the Constitution is a neoliberal psy-op. That fuzziness is a feature not a bug. It lets a lot of different grievances fly under the “post-liberal nationalist” flag.
IV. Tech-adjacent neo-reaction and the “CEO of America” fantasy
Then there is the neo-reactionary or “NRx” stream around Curtis Yarvin, whom the Dispatch folks mention around minute 6 as the guy who tells Americans to get over their “dictator phobia.”
Yarvin’s basic pitch:
• Liberal democracy is inefficient, chaotic, and captured by a progressive “Cathedral” of media, academia, and NGOs.
• The solution is something closer to a high-tech monarchy or corporate state, with a single sovereign CEO in charge of the country.
• Rights, elections, and egalitarian rhetoric are mostly propaganda that keeps the real oligarchy unaccountable.
This is post-liberalism stripped of both Christianity and civic piety. It is attractive to a certain tech-bro who has concluded that democracy is stupid and that Singapore is nicer than San Francisco.
The striking thing, as the Dispatch pod notes, is that ISI invited Yarvin for a friendly talk at a time when its own trustees were complaining of a “post-liberal hijacking.” So you had a once-Buckleyite institution giving a platform to a man who openly talks about relaxing into dictatorship. The Dispatch+1
That tells you something about the current mood: contempt for liberal democracy is no longer disqualifying in the way it would have been for the old fusionist right.
V. The conspiracist post-liberalism of Alex Jones, Fuentes and friends
At the outer edge you get the Fuentes / Alex Jones / “groyper” ecosystem. Here post-liberalism is less a philosophy and more an affect: nihilistic, paranoid, contemptuous of procedural norms, and comfortable with explicit bigotry.
Nick Fuentes gives you the incel-Catholic blend: talk of Christian nationalism, open antisemitism, misogyny, and a performative rejection of liberal taboos. Jones gives you the full paranoid style: 9/11 was an inside job, Sandy Hook was staged, the “globalists” are poisoning the population. Wikipedia+1
In theory, a respectable right could say: look, there are legitimate post-liberal critiques, and then there are deranged people we will not touch. In practice, that line is exactly what has blurred:
• Tucker Carlson brings Fuentes on for a chummy conversation.
• Heritage’s president rushes out a video defending Carlson, which triggers resignations and crisis. The Dispatch+1
• ISI flies its top student journalists to Carlson’s Florida home for a “journalism 101” retreat whose surprise guest is Alex Jones, fresh off losing nearly a billion dollars in defamation judgments for lying about dead schoolchildren. Mediaite+1
The symbolism is not subtle. You are telling the next generation of right-leaning elites: these men are your models. Learn from them. Emulate their style, not the old-fashioned bore who cares about fact checks and constitutional norms.
At that point “post-liberalism” becomes a marketing label for a general stance of anti-institutional hostility and gleeful norm-breaking, glued together by internet clout and ressentiment.
VI. Protestant and evangelical post-liberalism
There is also a more Protestant, often non-Catholic version that shows up in Christian nationalism, parts of the MAGA church world, and some segments of “post-woke” evangelicalism.
Features:
• Less interest in Aquinas, more in reclaiming “Christian America.”
• Talk of America as a covenant nation that must honor God or face judgment.
• Calls for a more muscular use of state power on abortion, LGBT issues, school curricula, and immigration.
Some of these figures avoid the “post-liberal” label, but the substance overlaps. Liberal neutrality is seen as a myth that always favored secular progressives, so it is time to drop the mask and fight for our side’s dominance.
This stream often blends into the Trumpist one in practice. The theology is fuzzier than integralism, but the political imperative is similar: stop pretending the Constitution is a neutral umpire, and start using power to advance substantive Christian goods.
VII. The institutional story: from convening debate to picking winners
The Dispatch team’s ISI reporting is basically a case study in what happens when these post-liberal tendencies begin to capture gatekeeping institutions.
Historically, ISI’s brand was:
• Give smart right-leaning students a canon (Burke, Kirk, Hayek, Tocqueville).
• Convene debates among different conservative schools: libertarians vs traditionalists vs neocons, etc.
• Keep some distance from day-to-day Republican politics and from obvious cranks.
On the podcast they describe ISI as the place where you might see a traditionalist, a neocon, and a libertarian argue about the Iraq War or the size of the welfare state, under the assumption that everyone shares some basic liberal-constitutional framework. The institute’s role was referee and convenor, not cheerleader for one faction.
The new pattern, as they document:
• The president, Burtka, explicitly orients ISI toward the “Tucker Carlson wing” while assuring the board he will keep a “big tent.” The Dispatch+1
• “Serious” post-liberals like Deneen get pride of place at marquee conferences.
• Neo-reactionaries like Yarvin get invited for uncritical conversations.
• Student journalists are flown to Carlson’s house, where Alex Jones shows up as a surprise inspirational guest.
• At the same time, mainstream conservatives who are anti-populist, like Kevin Williamson, are blackballed by leadership for their “contempt for the working class.”
As McCormack puts it around minute 17, everyone gatekeeps. The question is which direction. At ISI, the dial has been moved so that Fuentes-adjacent energies are now “inside,” while old-guard Reagan-Bush conservatives are increasingly “outside.”
Something similar has been happening at Heritage, Hillsdale, and parts of the NatCon network. Shared board members, donor overlap, and a common fear of “irrelevance” in the Turning Point / Charlie Kirk era all push them toward embracing the hottest post-liberal brands, even when those brands are marinated in conspiracy and antisemitism. The Dispatch+1
So the varieties of post-liberalism are not just academic categories. They map onto very concrete institutional bets: Do we align with Carlson despite Fuentes and Jones, because that’s where the kids and the clicks are? Do we give the integralists the plenary session? Do we tell the old Kirk-style people to get over their “dictator phobia”?
VIII. Why this is happening now
A few drivers, many of which the Dispatch conversation hints at:
Liberal exhaustion and broken promises
Post-liberals are not wrong that the liberal order is under strain. Housing is unaffordable, family formation is down, addiction and loneliness are up. The old “free markets plus family values” formula looks fake to a lot of people under 40. That creates a real demand for alternatives.
Attention economics and the charisma premium
The institutions chasing “relevance” are reacting to a media ecosystem that rewards outrage and certainty. Tucker, Jones, Fuentes, Yarvin, and some integralists are all, in very different registers, good at performance. They feel transgressive and high-energy next to a panel on Edmund Burke’s conception of prudence. If you are a struggling think tank or student outfit, the temptation to ride that energy is obvious.
Donor incentives
Big right-wing donors are frustrated that they funded white papers for decades and still got gay marriage, abortion liberalization (before Dobbs), and ESG. They want fighters, not scholars. Aligning with post-liberal brands signals that you are in the fight, not stuck in 1985.
The collapse of confidence in neutral institutions
Once you believe “the regime” is fundamentally hostile and that mainstream media, universities, and even corporations are captured by the left, it becomes easier to rationalize your own turn to illiberal methods. If the other side is waging total culture war, why are you still talking about process?
Generational resentment and elite overproduction
The Dispatch folks touch on this indirectly when they talk about ISI as a “self-selecting elite.” The post-liberal moment is partly a revolt of younger, ambitious right-wing strivers who feel blocked by old gatekeepers. Carlson’s platforming of Fuentes had exactly that flavor: the rebel prince bringing the banned heretic into the palace and humiliating the old guard.
IX. Possible trajectories
In rough outline, I think you can see three paths American post-liberalism might take from here.
Responsible post-liberalism that accepts guardrails
In theory there could be a post-liberal conservatism that keeps its critique of atomized liberalism, pushes for a thicker common good, and still draws bright red lines at conspiracy mongers and racists. That would mean:
• No more dinners where Alex Jones is introduced to student journalists as a career inspiration.
• No more “dictator phobia” jokes from your flagship speakers.
• A clear distinction between hard-edged policy fights (tariffs, immigration restriction, industrial strategy) and open contempt for constitutional constraints.
Right now, that line is extremely blurry. But it is conceptually possible.
A full illiberal turn on the right
If current incentives continue, you get a consolidated “post-liberal right” that is openly hostile to liberal democracy and comfortable with using state power to reward friends and punish enemies. The varieties I’ve described congeal into a kind of Catholic-NatCon-NRx stew with a Tuckerish media style and a Jones-ish relationship to truth.
The institutional story you brought in is the early stage of that: once the elite pipeline is retooled to treat Fuentes-adjacent figures as edgy but acceptable and Carlson as the north star, the next generation of staffers, judges, and candidates is going to look very different.
A re-liberalization or splintering
The Dispatch world is betting on a different outcome: that the overt antisemitism, the 9/11 truther nonsense, and the open praise of autocracy will eventually discredit this post-liberal wave and create demand for a renewed liberal-conservative synthesis. That could be a revived Reagan-style right, or some new center-right that keeps parts of the populist economic critique but re-embraces basic liberal norms.
The problem is time and personnel. As they say near the end of the podcast, ISI’s alumni already include a Supreme Court justice and a raft of major journalists. The kids going to those Carlson/Jones dinners and hearing Yarvin explain dictatorship phobia will be the ones running things in 20 years.
So the “varieties of post-liberalism” question doubles as a pipeline question: which of these strands will be normal for the 2040 right, and which will be remembered as a fever?
If you wanted to turn this into a more formal paper you could hang it on ISI as the central case and treat each post-liberal variety as a different faction trying to capture the same gatekeeping machinery. But even at the essay level, the main thing is clear enough. There is no single American post-liberalism. There is a loose coalition of people who think liberalism has failed so badly that it is worth gambling on various forms of authority, hierarchy, or rage. Right now the institutions that once existed to discipline that impulse are busy chasing it instead.

