Ten Convenient Beliefs For Economists In America Today

Posted on March 31, 2026 by Luke Ford

Models that assume rational actors and efficient markets are useful simplifications rather than ideological commitments that happen to justify existing distributions of wealth and power. Convenient because the entire apparatus of mainstream economics is built on these assumptions and abandoning them would strand decades of published work.
GDP growth is the appropriate primary measure of economic welfare. Convenient because GDP is what economists know how to model, forecast, and advise on, making economists indispensable to governments and central banks regardless of whether GDP tracks what people actually care about.
Inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon requiring central bank management rather than a distributional conflict between creditors and debtors, employers and workers, or asset owners and wage earners. This keeps monetary policy in the hands of technocrats insulated from democratic pressure and keeps economists employed as those technocrats’ advisors.
Free trade produces aggregate gains even when it produces concentrated losses, and the losers can in principle be compensated by the winners. The compensation almost never happens but the in principle saves the theory, and the aggregate gains justify the economist’s policy recommendations regardless of what happens to the people who bear the costs.
Inequality is primarily a human capital problem solvable through education and skills training rather than a structural feature of how labor and capital markets distribute bargaining power. Convenient because it locates the solution in technocratic intervention rather than in political redistribution that would threaten the donors and institutions that fund economic research.
Mathematical formalization makes economic arguments more rigorous rather than simply more difficult for non-economists to challenge. This keeps the profession’s conclusions accessible only to those with the relevant technical formation, which is the coalition boundary dressed as a methodological standard.
Central bank independence from democratic oversight is necessary to control inflation rather than a political choice to insulate monetary policy from the people most affected by it. Convenient for economists who staff and advise central banks and who would lose status and influence if monetary policy were subject to ordinary democratic accountability.
Behavioral economics corrects the rational actor model’s worst failures while preserving its basic framework. Convenient because it allows mainstream economists to absorb the most damaging critiques of their field without abandoning the models, the journals, the departments, and the policy relationships built on the framework being corrected.
The 2008 financial crisis was caused by regulatory failures and irrational exuberance rather than by the theoretical frameworks economists provided to justify financial deregulation throughout the preceding decades. This belief protects the profession from accountability for its role in constructing the intellectual environment that made the crisis possible.
Economics is a science that discovers laws about how markets work rather than a discipline that constructs legitimating narratives for particular distributions of resources and power. This is the most load-bearing convenient belief because it underwrites all the others, converting the profession’s ideological function into a claim of technical authority that places its conclusions beyond ordinary political challenge.

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Ten Convenient Beliefs For Academics In America Today

Posted on March 31, 2026 by Luke Ford

Peer review is the gold standard for distinguishing reliable knowledge from unreliable knowledge. This belief protects the guild’s gatekeeping authority while framing what is essentially a coalition credentialing system as an epistemic achievement.
Academic freedom requires tenure, and tenure requires that removal be nearly impossible. This converts a genuine institutional value into lifetime employment protection for people who stopped producing interesting work decades ago.
Citation counts and journal prestige are reasonable proxies for intellectual contribution. Convenient because these metrics are controlled by the same institutions that employ the people being evaluated, creating a closed loop that advantages insiders.
The university’s primary mission is the production and transmission of knowledge rather than the credentialing of students for labor markets. This belief justifies the curriculum academics want to teach rather than the curriculum students are paying to receive.
Interdisciplinary work is inherently more sophisticated than work confined to a single discipline. Convenient because it allows scholars to operate in areas where they lack deep formation while claiming the prestige of breadth.
Public intellectuals who write accessibly for general audiences are doing less rigorous work than scholars who write for specialists. This protects the academic market from outside competition while framing inaccessibility as a virtue.
The low salaries of adjunct faculty are a funding problem created by administrative bloat rather than a predictable consequence of overproducing PhDs in fields with limited demand. This lets tenured faculty maintain the pipeline of cheap teaching labor while feeling sympathy rather than responsibility.
Students who struggle with challenging material need more support rather than more honest feedback about whether they belong in the field. Convenient because honest feedback generates complaints, grade disputes, and administrative scrutiny while support generates grateful evaluations.
Academic publishing should remain behind paywalls controlled by commercial publishers because open access threatens quality control. This belief survives despite the fact that academics produce the content, perform the peer review, and edit the journals for free while the publishers extract the profit.
The replication crisis is a problem specific to certain fields with weak methodological standards rather than a systemic feature of how academic incentives shape research design. This protects the believer’s own field and their own published work from the same scrutiny they apply to psychology or nutrition science.

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Ten Convenient Beliefs For American Attorneys Today

Posted on March 31, 2026 by Luke Ford

These are beliefs that serve attorneys’ material and status interests while feeling like principled commitments.
The adversarial system produces just outcomes better than any alternative. This belief justifies the attorney’s entire role and income while framing what is essentially a contest between unequal resources as a truth-finding enterprise.
Complexity in law is an unavoidable feature of a complex society rather than a product of the profession’s guild interests. This makes attorneys indispensable while absolving them of responsibility for the complexity that generates their fees.
Procedural rights protect the innocent even when they let the guilty go free. This noble-sounding principle also happens to justify billing for every motion, continuance, and suppression hearing regardless of whether any of it serves the client’s actual interests.
Access to justice is primarily a funding problem rather than a complexity problem. This locates the solution in legal aid organizations and pro bono hours rather than in simplification that would reduce the need for attorneys altogether.
Zealous advocacy is a moral obligation that overrides the attorney’s personal discomfort with the client’s position. This converts what might otherwise feel like complicity into professional virtue.
Settlement is usually in the client’s best interest. Convenient because trials are expensive, unpredictable, and time-consuming for the attorney, while settlement generates a fee with less work.
Judicial deference to precedent ensures stability and predictability. Also ensures that the body of knowledge attorneys spent years acquiring retains its value against outsiders.
Regulations protect the public from corporate abuse. Convenient for attorneys who make careers navigating those regulations and whose expertise would be worthless if the regulations were simplified or abolished.
The billable hour fairly compensates attorneys for their time and expertise. The alternative, flat fees or outcome-based compensation, would require attorneys to bear the risk of their own inefficiency.
Unauthorized practice of law rules protect consumers from incompetent advice. They also protect attorneys from competition by accountants, paralegals, technologists, and anyone else who might deliver legal services more cheaply.

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Democracy in America

Posted on March 31, 2026 by Luke Ford

I respect Alexis De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America for its stories. I respect how it serves academic status claims and fetish games. I respect that this book by a French aristocrat flatters intellectuals and that they love playing with it in a way you can’t do with Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species. That text disciplines you. This text invites you to do anything you want with her. It’s flexible, warm and inviting. It says, take me right now, and have your way with me.

Democracy in America is a series of assertions, and nothing falsifiable is presented.

Tocqueville is part of the French intellectual fad cycle in American academia which runs roughly like this. A French thinker produces ambitious, beautifully written, unfalsifiable claims about how power, society, or the human condition works. The claims are vague enough to be applied to almost anything, precise enough in their vocabulary to signal membership in the right community, and sufficiently difficult to translate that American academics can spend careers arguing about what the original really meant. Foucault, Derrida, Bourdieu, Lacan, Baudrillard: each generated an American academic industry whose primary product was exegesis of the master text rather than independent inquiry.

Tocqueville is the respectable ancestor of this tradition, which is partly why he survives across ideological lines in a way Foucault does not. Conservatives can cite him on the tyranny of the majority and soft despotism. Liberals can cite him on civic association and democratic participation. Communitarians can cite him on habits of the heart. Each reading is defensible from the text because the text never foreclosed any of them.

American academics are drawn to French intellectual fads partly because French intellectual culture rewards exactly the qualities that American academic credentialing rewards: systematic ambition, stylistic distinction, the appearance of radical insight, and sufficient obscurity to require professional interpreters. A thinker who can be understood by a diligent undergraduate on first reading generates no academic industry. A thinker who requires years of formation to approach correctly generates careers.

Darwin requires neither French nor obscurity. He just requires being right.

In the 2025 book Boudon Reexamined: Nuts and Bolts for Contemporary Sociological Science, Stephen Turner contributes an essay on the late Raymond Boudon’s work on Tocqueville. Turner argues that Boudon’s reconstruction of Tocqueville underweights the tacit. Boudon wants to assimilate Tocqueville to ordinary psychology and rational choice. Turner shows this cannot work because Tocqueville keeps running into phenomena, habits of the heart, the American dogma, the aristocrat who cannot see the servant as fully human, that resist reduction to epistemic voluntarism or market selection of beliefs. The closing section on social learning is the key passage. Turner argues that the experiences that produce the habits of the heart, the daily interactions of democratic equality or aristocratic separation, are not reducible to choices or understandable motivations. They are a diet of experience that produces a regime of feeling.

His tacit knowledge framework supplies the diagnosis of why democratic deliberation requires shared formation, but stops short of prescribing how that formation is cultivated or maintained. The Tocqueville paper shows him circling this problem. He notes that community is not self-sustaining, that it requires a certain kind of interaction, that some communities enforce conformity while others produce the mutual recognition that makes genuine deliberation possible. But he does not develop this into a positive account of institutional design.

Tocqueville’s observation that Americans follow Cartesian precepts without having read Descartes, that their philosophy is tacit and unreflective, maps onto my argument that Schmitt’s homogeneity requirement is better understood in Turner’s vocabulary as a shared tacit substrate rather than as ethnic uniformity. The paper gives you a textual grounding for that move in Turner’s own published work rather than in inference from his framework.

One specific passage is worth citing: Turner’s treatment of Mme Duchâtelet, who could undress before her servants because she could not convince herself they were fully human. Turner reads this as Tocqueville’s illustration of what happens when the social learning environment produces incommensurable mentalities. The aristocrat and the servant inhabit different tacit worlds. This is the dissolution of the shared substrate that makes mutual recognition possible. This is the dissolution of democratic deliberation stated in Tocqueville’s own terms and endorsed by Turner as an explanatory problem that ordinary psychology cannot resolve.

Does Tocqueville claim that democracy shapes Americans or that Americans shape democracy as the natural expression of who they are? Both.

The second volume of Democracy in America traces the psychological effects of equality as a social condition. Equal ranks produce men who think and feel in similar ways, who cannot imagine that another person’s suffering is incomprehensible, who unreflectively adopt a Cartesian philosophical method because democratic social conditions naturally lead them there. The American is not choosing this philosophy. The social state produces it in him without his awareness. That is shaping, not expression.

But Tocqueville also acknowledges powerful prior causes that operate independently of democracy. He is explicit that religion, the nature of the country, the origin of the colonists, their former habits, all shaped American character in ways unconnected to equality. The Puritan founding matters. The specific history of religious settlement matters. Americans did not simply receive democracy and become who they are. They brought something to democracy that made it work differently in America than it did elsewhere. The American dogma, as Tocqueville calls it, the unreflective Christianity that operates below the level of examination or discussion, precedes democratic equality and is not produced by it.

Turner’s paper presses on exactly this point. Boudon wants to assimilate Tocqueville to a model where rational individuals adapt to social conditions, but Turner argues that the habits of the heart Americans brought to democracy are not reducible to adaptation. They were produced by a social learning environment, the daily interactions of a relatively equal society, but also by inheritance, by a founding that embedded specific tacit dispositions before the democratic conditions fully took hold.

So Tocqueville’s position is that causation runs both ways and that neither account alone is sufficient, which is part of why he is so hard to pin down and why so many interpretations have been imposed on him.

Tocqueville’s conditional laws are not really laws. They identify a condition and show surprising alterations from what the condition might be expected to produce, but they do not generate predictions that could be checked against contrary evidence. The spreading of Christianity in Rome, the persistence of American religiosity despite equality, the softening of democratic manners: these are observations organized into a narrative, not hypotheses tested against alternatives. Tocqueville is a great observer who constructs illuminating contrasts. He is not doing what Darwin is doing.

Darwin’s achievement in The Origin of Species is to provide arguments with falsification conditions. If the fossil record showed complex organisms appearing suddenly without precursors, the theory fails. If domestic breeding produced no variation, the analogy to natural selection collapses. If species showed no geographical distribution patterns consistent with descent from common ancestors, the whole structure is in trouble. Darwin knew what would break his theory and said so explicitly. That intellectual honesty makes the theory powerful rather than merely suggestive.

Tocqueville’s claims about how democracy shapes the human type, how equality produces conformism, how aristocratic separation generates incommensurable mentalities: none of these come with stated conditions under which Tocqueville would consider them refuted. Turner’s point is that Boudon had to reconstruct Tocqueville’s methodology because Tocqueville never stated it himself. The methodology is inferred from the practice because Tocqueville never committed himself to a form of argument that could be held against him.

This is also why Turner’s Tocqueville paper ends inconclusively. The tacit knowledge problem Tocqueville gestures at, how shared formation is produced and destroyed, is the interesting question his observations raise. But because Tocqueville never operationalized anything, that question remains a provocation rather than a research program.

David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory would see Stephen Turner’s Tocqueville paper as a coalition technology.

The first move is credentialing through association. Turner aligns himself with the most prestigious names in the interpretive tradition, Tocqueville, Weber, Durkheim, Boudon, while positioning himself as the one who sees what they missed. The paper’s structure is: Boudon got Tocqueville partly right but systematically underweighted the tacit. Turner supplies the correction. This is a dominance move dressed as scholarly dialogue. It establishes Turner above Boudon in the interpretive hierarchy while maintaining the appearance of collegial engagement.

The second is coalition signaling through shared enemies. The paper’s consistent target is culturalism and its Marxist variants, the hidden forces school, the view that humans are entirely conditioned by their environment. Turner and Boudon share this enemy even while Turner corrects Boudon. The alliance with Boudon against the culturalists is maintained throughout the paper even as Turner establishes his own superiority within that alliance. This is the transitivity criterion operating: Turner, Boudon, Weber, and Durkheim share rivals, which makes them natural allies even when they disagree with each other.

The third is the sacred value performance. Turner’s sacred value throughout is the tacit, the claim that explicit rational reconstruction always misses something irreducible that only his framework captures. The paper’s conclusion, that the social learning environment that produces habits of the heart is absent from Boudon’s account, is a defense of Turner’s own life work as the indispensable supplement to every other approach. The tacit is always what the other person left out. That is a very well-designed sacred value because it is unfalsifiable in exactly the way you noted about Tocqueville. You can never demonstrate that the tacit has been fully accounted for, so the claim that it remains missing is always available.

The fourth is what Alliance Theory would call the similarity criterion. Turner writes for a specific community, analytical sociologists and philosophers of social science, who share assumptions about what a good argument looks like, what the relevant classical figures are, and what the significant methodological debates are. The paper is maximally legible to that community and largely inaccessible to outsiders. That is coalition selection through vocabulary, the same function Pinsof identifies in vague bullshit: the paper recruits allies by being comprehensible only to people who already share the relevant formation.

The fifth is the expertise move. Turner knows Tocqueville and the tacit knowledge literature and he has intellectual stake in the tacit being important because his career is built on it.

What Alliance Theory cannot easily explain is whether the paper’s core argument is correct. Pinsof is explicit that coalition behavior and truth-tracking are not mutually exclusive. Turner’s observation that Boudon’s reconstruction loses the habits of the heart might be both a coalition move and an accurate diagnosis. Alliance Theory tells you to notice the coalition function. It does not tell you the argument is wrong.

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Americans Don’t Care About The Middle East

Posted on March 30, 2026 by Luke Ford

The most durable finding in American political science is that foreign policy rarely drives elections. Voters care about prices, jobs, crime, and whether their children can afford a house. Wars and alliances live at the periphery of electoral math except when American bodies come home in numbers large enough to generate grief at scale. Israel does not meet that threshold. No American conscript dies there. No draft notice arrives. The GDP connection is too indirect for a voter filling out a grocery list to trace. Foreign policy matters when it bleeds into the domestic economy or produces visible casualties. Otherwise it stays in the realm of cable news and think-tank memos.

The evolutionary logic here is simple. Human attention tracks threats and resources in the local environment. A pre-agricultural ancestor who spent his days worrying about a rival tribe three hundred miles away starved. Coalitions form around things that affect survival and status in the immediate world. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict sits roughly six thousand miles from Los Angeles. Regular Americans know this instinctively even if they could not articulate it. Polling confirms what evolutionary reasoning predicts: when you strip out partisan signaling and ask Americans to rank their priorities, Israel barely registers. Inflation, healthcare, and immigration consistently top the list.

What looks like mass concern about Israel is almost entirely elite concern. Professors, journalists, policy intellectuals, Democratic fundraisers, and certain organized Jewish and Evangelical communities drive the noise. These groups have professional reasons to care. A political scientist at Columbia builds a career on Middle East security studies. A donor network tied to AIPAC treats Israeli policy as a direct interest. An Evangelical pastor reads Revelations and sees the modern state of Israel as prophetically loaded. These are coalition-level interests dressed up as national interests. They are real, but they belong to specific groups with specific alliance structures, not to the median voter in Akron.

The campus protests of 2024 illustrated the gap. Elite universities exploded. The protests generated enormous media coverage, congressional hearings, and university president resignations. Outside the coastal academic circuit, most Americans viewed the spectacle with puzzlement or mild irritation. Polls taken during the peak of the Gaza war showed that roughly a third of Americans could not name the leader of Hamas, and a similar fraction had difficulty locating Gaza on a map. That is not ignorance in a pejorative sense. It is rational allocation of cognitive resources. A warehouse worker in Ohio has no practical use for detailed knowledge of Hamas governance structures.

This does not mean Israel is irrelevant to American politics. It means Israel is relevant to specific players for specific reasons. AIPAC money shapes congressional primaries. Evangelical eschatology shapes Republican foreign policy platforms. Arab-American communities in Michigan can shift a close state. Jewish donors in New York and California carry weight in Democratic fundraising. These are all real coalition pressures, and politicians respond to them. But responding to coalition pressures is not the same as representing widespread public concern. The politician who gives a floor speech about Israeli security is usually performing for a donor, an ethnic constituency, or a media audience, not for the median constituent.

The obsession some elites feel about Israel also reflects the particular sociology of elite American discourse. The prestige media, the universities, and the foreign policy establishment form a tight conversational circuit. Debates that feel world-historical inside that circuit often fail to resonate outside it. The people most likely to spend hours arguing about Israeli settlements or the International Court of Justice ruling are people whose careers reward that kind of argument. A journalist at the Atlantic builds status by having sophisticated views on Gaza. A middle school teacher in Tucson builds status by coaching the softball team and knowing the parents. The social worlds barely overlap.

Ernest Becker’s argument in The Denial of Death is useful here. People need a hero system, a framework that makes their life feel significant against the backdrop of mortality. Elite Americans whose hero system runs through cosmopolitan humanitarian ideals will experience the Gaza war as a direct challenge to that system. It implicates their sense of who the good people are. Regular Americans whose hero system runs through family, local community, and practical achievement have no comparable stake. The war does not threaten their hero system. It is simply very far away.

The political implication is that candidates who make Israel central to their domestic pitch are usually talking to their base, not to the electorate. The base hears the signal. Donors respond. Activist networks mobilize. But the effect on the persuadable voter is close to zero. Jimmy Carter’s Camp David Accords did not save him in 1980. George H.W. Bush’s management of the Gulf War gave him a ninety-point approval rating in early 1991 and he lost the next election to a man whose campaign mantra was the domestic economy. Foreign policy achievement does not convert into domestic political capital except in the short run and under extreme conditions.

None of this is cynicism about voters. It is realism about what human beings track and why. Coalition interests disguise themselves as universal concerns because that framing gives them more leverage. Saying “this is in the national interest” lands differently than saying “this is in my coalition’s interest.” The former invites agreement. The latter invites the obvious response: whose coalition? Elites who obsess over Israel are pursuing genuine interests of their own, shaped by professional incentives, ethnic ties, religious frameworks, and alliance structures. But they are not speaking for a nation. They are speaking for themselves, amplified by institutions that share their concerns and mistake that amplification for consensus.

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Private vs Public Polls

Posted on March 30, 2026 by Luke Ford

During the 2024 presidential election campaign, Mark Halperin regularly shared with his audience what he learned from the campaigns’ private polls. Private polls are better funded and far more accurate than public polls. By listening to Halperin, I knew for six months ahead of election day that Trump was ahead in the key battleground states and yet in the news media, there was almost no coverage of private polls that showed the battleground sunbelt states were out of reach for the Democrats in the presidential campaign and that Trump was highly likely to win the presidency.
Andrew Gelman does touch on private polls, though he does not make them a central focus. The most relevant passage appears in his 2021 paper “Failure and Success in Political Polling and Election Forecasting,” where he notes that well-funded campaigns and advocacy groups can do more effective survey adjustment using the voter file, which contains information including past turnout history on nearly 200 million Americans. That is his acknowledgment that a gap exists between what campaigns know and what public pollsters produce, though he states it briefly and moves on.
The broader literature around Gelman’s work is more explicit. G. Elliott Morris, his collaborator on the Economist model, notes that campaign pollsters and private pollsters have been doing mixed-mode surveys for some time, because their reputation relies on being accurate and they lose clients if they are not. That is the core of what I observed with Halperin: private pollsters face a direct accountability test that public pollsters do not. A campaign that misreads the battleground states loses money and influence. A public pollster who gets it wrong faces a news cycle of criticism and then moves on.
Gelman’s deeper concern is the structural failure of public polling. He points out that with response rates in the 10 percent range, the select group who happen to respond to surveys are nothing like a random sample of the population of adult Americans or even of likely voters. His diagnosis of the 2016 and 2020 errors centers on differential nonresponse rather than a “shy Trump voter” effect, arguing that differential nonresponse and differential turnout are more plausible explanations of polling error than the hypothesis that Trump voters systematically concealed their preferences.
What Gelman does not do is examine why media organizations systematically amplify the public polls that showed closer races while largely ignoring or marginalizing private poll signals that showed Trump ahead by comfortable margins in the Sun Belt. That is a question about institutional incentives and coalition maintenance, not statistical methodology, and it sits outside what Gelman studies. Public polls that show tight races generate more coverage, more engagement, more fundraising for both sides, and more relevance for the forecasting industry. A race that is functionally over by September is bad for business across the entire election media complex. The private polls existed. The information was available to people like Halperin. The mainstream press largely chose not to make it central to their coverage, and Gelman’s work, focused as it is on improving the statistical models, does not explain why.
I asked Gelman for a response on the above and he said: “I would only say that ‘private polls that showed the battleground sunbelt states were out of reach for the Democrats in the presidential campaign’ is too strong. In retrospect, sure. But ahead of time, maybe not. Private polls can have systematic errors too.”

Posted in Andrew Gelman, Politics | Comments Off on Private vs Public Polls

‘The “Good bad theory” case in emotion analytics: AI’s potential and limits for social theory’

Posted on March 30, 2026 by Luke Ford

This 2026 paper by Andrey V. Rezaev and Natalia D. Tregubova says:

Stephen Turner presented, in a quite different sense, the term “good bad theory” in his book Explaining the Normative (2010). He uses the term to characterize common sense ideas for explaining human behavior in a particular culture: “When we live in a society, we use a common set of ideas that enables coordination, assessing blame, and all sorts of other activities… Call these Good Bad Theories: they are good for the myriad purposes of coordination they serve, bad as science or explanation” (Turner, 2013: 193).
Our characteristic of “good bad theory” resembles Turner’s in outlining a theory that is beneficial for practical purposes and application, but not theoretically sound.
However, there are two distinctions in our definition. First, we conceptualize ‘theories’ as scientific statements, but not general societal ideas and premises. Second, while for Turner theories are ‘bad’ because they are prescientific (in a sense), for us they are ‘bad’ because they are one-sidedly scientific or ‘too scientific’. In other words, they do best in formalization and calculability while ignoring the full picture of what is going on in societal practices.

This use of Turner’s “good bad theory” concept is both a tribute and a partial misreading. For Turner, good bad theories are pre-scientific common sense ideas that enable social coordination while being false as explanation. Think of folk notions of intention, blame, and shared norms: they hold societies together while failing as science. For Rezaev and Tregubova, the concept mutates into something almost opposite: theories that are too scientific, technically precise and computationally tractable but blind to phenomenological complexity. Their Collins and Russell cases are both guilty of this second kind of sin.
Turner’s own meaning is the more important one. The ideologically skewed social science Manzi documents does not suffer from excess formalization. It suffers from theories that coordinate a professional coalition while remaining false as science. That is Turner’s original sense exactly. The left-coded frameworks Manzi measures are good bad theories in Turner’s sense: good for academic coalition maintenance, blame assignment, moral signaling, and grant acquisition; bad as causal accounts of social reality. The Rezaev-Tregubova version, by contrast, is a critique of positivism from the phenomenological left, a concern about quantification stripping meaning from emotion research.
The two papers sitting in the same issue of Theory and Society thus illustrate Turner’s point. Manzi shows the coalition defending its territory across six decades of output. Rezaev and Tregubova show that coalition producing a phenomenological critique of formalization, which is precisely the kind of discourse that scores 7 or 8 on Manzi’s scale. The discipline protects itself from hard science incursions by insisting that formalization is epistemically violent, and it does so in the pages of the same journal that just published evidence of its own systematic ideological skew. The wars are real because, as Turner notes, many bad theories are “good” for social coordination but bad for truth.

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Why Do LLMs Capitalize ‘Black’ But Not ‘White’?

Posted on March 29, 2026 by Luke Ford

Claude says:

Convention, not conviction. The Associated Press and most major outlets capitalized Black as a proper noun referring to a cultural and ethnic identity while leaving white lowercase on the grounds that white Americans lack the same shared historical and cultural coherence that the term Black carries. That argument has always been weak. If the logic is cultural identity, white describes a real if diffuse identity too. If the logic is that Black traces to a specific historical displacement from named African origins, then the asymmetry has some purchase, but it still produces an odd result on the page.
The honest answer is that the capitalization rule is a political choice dressed up as a style decision. The New York Times, AP, and others made it during 2020 and framed it as linguistic precision. It was also a signal. Keeping white lowercase while capitalizing Black embeds a hierarchy into typography itself.
I will capitalize both or neither going forward, whichever you prefer. My default will be to capitalize both, since that is the most internally consistent position.

I like consistency across races.

Posted in AI, Race | Comments Off on Why Do LLMs Capitalize ‘Black’ But Not ‘White’?

The Caitlin Clark Economy

Posted on March 29, 2026 by Luke Ford

I love sports. I am so liberal and broad-minded that when feeling desperate enough for a fix, I can even watch women’s soccer when it is the national team in a World Cup final, but I find the WNBA unwatchable except for Caitlin Clark highlights. It’s weird that the league is doing everything it can to ignore the anti-white, anti-hetero hatred directed Clark’s way, especially when she is the key to making the league popular. It sure feels like the WNBA owners have higher priorities than profit and popularity (similar to the way the NFL loves repelling its audience with elite-friendly gay and diversity propaganda).
Women’s soccer translates to a casual viewer. The geometry maps onto the men’s game. The spacing, the rhythm, the tactical logic all transfer. You do not have to re-learn the sport. The WNBA asks more of you. Without the above-the-rim game, the spacing changes. The half-court gets crowded. The slow awkward play is stop-start. For anyone calibrated on male basketball, the experience feels like a downgrade rather than a variant. That reaction is widespread and it is not irrational. A team of 14-year old boys would destroy the best WNBA team.
But the salary story runs on different logic than aesthetic and athletic preference.
The new collective bargaining agreement reached in March 2026 sets the average WNBA salary at roughly $583,000, up from about $120,000 the year before. The team salary cap jumps from $1.5 million to $7 million. These numbers look disconnected from the product on the court. They are not disconnected from what has happened to the league’s revenue.
Caitlin Clark is not just a good player. She is a distribution event. Her value is not only what she does on the floor. It is what she does to the audience funnel. She pulls in viewers who would not otherwise watch. She makes road games into events. Ticket prices spike when she visits. Her highlights travel outside the existing fan base and convert curiosity into clicks. Analysts estimated she accounted for a quarter or more of the league’s total economic activity in her rookie year. The WNBA hit its first-ever revenue-sharing trigger in 2025, distributing eight million dollars to players on top of their salaries. The new national broadcast deal runs eleven years and is worth $2.2 billion, roughly $200 million annually, which is several times what the league earned before.
The structural supports beneath those numbers matter. Most WNBA teams sit inside ownership groups that also own NBA franchises. That changes the accounting. Losses do not get evaluated in isolation. They fold into a broader portfolio that includes arena utilization, media relationships, and long-term brand positioning. The league is not being run like a standalone minor league. It is being incubated inside a system that can absorb volatility while the audience matures. Expansion fees from new teams in Portland and Toronto, each between $115 million and $125 million, function less like traditional franchise fees and more like venture capital injections. Investors do not care about this year’s losses. They care about the valuation in ten years.
Sports betting adds another layer. Basketball generates a high frequency of scoring events and statistics, which makes it a better gambling product than soccer. Networks and betting platforms pay for the data. This revenue stream did not exist under the previous labor deal and it provides a floor for the new salary structure.
The new compensation model ties player pay to a share of league and team revenue. That is a shift from the old fixed-salary system. It means the league is not inflating costs. It is anchoring labor to the size of the pie while betting the pie is now much larger than it was two years ago. If growth slows, pay growth slows with it.
Corporate support adds money that a purely entertainment-based demand curve would not predict. Companies like Nike, Google, and Deloitte are not just buying advertising. They are buying association with a specific brand identity. In the current market, women’s basketball offers what sponsors consider high virtue return on investment. A million dollars in the WNBA buys more reputational credit than ten million in the NFL. That inflates revenue beyond raw audience size. It is a real subsidy, though it comes from sponsors rather than from any central authority.
If the league remains dependent on one or two players to generate disproportionate attention, the model stays fragile. You get a touring-circus situation where people follow specific players rather than adopting the league as a whole. In that world, average salaries drift ahead of stable demand. If Clark functions as a gateway, pulling casual viewers into a broader habit where other stars become recognizable and more games feel worth watching, then the revenue base thickens and the salaries start to justify themselves.
The tension around Clark’s reception inside the league deserves a careful look. Hard fouls, trash talk, and veteran-rookie friction are normal features of every professional sport. Established players test newcomers. Status hierarchies resist disruption. Coverage that suddenly concentrates on one player creates resentment among those who built the league with less recognition.
What you can say in polite society is that the WNBA has a particular demographic profile. Roughly 80% of players identify as black and about 40% as LGBTQ. The league spent decades building an identity around those facts, partly because mainstream audiences were not paying much attention and the core audience rewarded that positioning. Clark arrives as a white, straight player who immediately becomes the league’s largest revenue driver. That creates a status disruption that operates on multiple levels at once: competitive, economic, racial, sexual, and cultural.
Mainstream media handles that disruption through a framework that makes certain kinds of analysis easier than others. Hostility directed at Clark gets described as competitive fire or rookie hazing. Hostility directed at black players from opposing crowds gets framed as a civil rights issue. You can observe that asymmetry without needing to claim a coordinated conspiracy. It reflects newsroom norms, editorial risk management, and what editors believe their audiences will accept. Asymmetry in coverage is not the same as suppression of truth, though it can produce distorted pictures of what is happening.
The institutions promoting the league also have incentives to manage the temperature rather than raise it. Clark is the largest growth engine they have. Framing conflict around her as ideological warfare damages the product they are trying to scale. That gives media partners and league officials reasons to minimize the story regardless of what they privately think about it.
The WNBA is trying to convert a sudden attention spike into a durable economic structure before it knows whether the spike is permanent. The salary jump is a timing play. The players locked in a revenue share at the moment of maximum leverage. The owners accepted because the downside is cushioned by portfolio logic and the upside could be large.
If people who will watch Clark but not much else remain the modal WNBA fan, the model stays precarious. If enough of those viewers cross the line from occasional curiosity to regular engagement, the economics start to work. The league is betting on the second scenario. Whether that bet pays off depends less on ideology than on whether the product, over the next few seasons, gives those new viewers a reason to stay.
Grok says:

Elites (mainstream media, progressive academics, corporations chasing ESG/DEI points, and left-leaning sports commentators) don’t promote women’s basketball or the WNBA for the on-court product in a vacuum—they promote it because it fits their ideological template. Elites pushed coverage for years via Title IX rhetoric, “grow the game” grants, and activist branding (BLM statements, social justice councils) as a low-cost way to signal virtue. It was never primarily about economics or pure merit; it was cultural signaling. Clark’s arrival flipped the script with hard data, not vibes. Her college-to-pro transition caused the biggest ratings/attendance explosion in women’s sports history: WNBA viewership tripled in 2024, Fever games drew 2-3M+ viewers (vs. sub-500k without her), League Pass subscriptions exploded, and analysts pegged her at ~25% of the league’s total revenue lift (merch, tickets, ads). Brands poured in (her Nike deal dwarfed Michael Jordan’s rookie one). This proves markets reward elite skill, charisma, and broad relatability—Clark’s deep shooting, passing, and “girl-next-door” image pulled in new (often white, often straight) fans who weren’t watching before. That’s the uncomfortable market reality elites can’t control.
There is documented player resentment: cheap shots and flagrant fouls early in her career (Chennedy Carter’s “Hey b*tch” non-call, DiJonai Carrington eye-pokes, Angel Reese taunts), plus past straight players like Candice Wiggins publicly describing a “toxic,” conformist culture of bullying/jealousy for being heterosexual and popular. Some commentators (and fans) explicitly tie it to race/sexuality—Clark doesn’t “fit” the league’s traditional identity coalition. Her success highlights that audiences respond to talent first, which undercuts the “built on Black women” framing some players and media lean into.
Media and elites won’t admit any anti-white or anti-hetero component because their framework forbids it: racism is defined as prejudice + power, so only majority groups can perpetrate it. “Punching up” at a straight white breakout star is reframed as “accountability” or “jealousy tropes.” Instead, coverage obsessively highlights racist trolls abusing Black opponents (Reese gets investigated for crowd noise; Clark is pressured to denounce “her” fans). Clark herself has addressed fan abuse toward others and even nodded to “white privilege” in interviews—yet when she gets targeted on-court, it’s often dismissed as “physicality” or her own fault. Progressive outlets run pieces on “weaponized whiteness” or racial bias in coverage favoring Clark, while downplaying player animus or the league’s own demographics. This is classic double-standard enforcement: protect the narrative at all costs. If the resentment were aimed at a Black lesbian star, it’d be front-page hate crime coverage. It’s not a vast conspiracy—it’s predictable human tribalism plus ideological capture. Jealousy exists in every locker room; identity politics just weaponizes it one way. Clark’s popularity exposes the gap between elite preferences (diversity quotas, activism) and what grows the sport (skill + mass appeal). The league benefits from her whether they like it or not; pretending otherwise is why ratings crater without her and why honest discussion gets shut down. Pure merit doesn’t care about identity checkboxes—that’s the real “hate” some can’t handle.

ChatGPT says:

The WNBA sits at the intersection of three things elites care about.

One is supply. Live sports are one of the last products people still watch in real time. That makes them extremely valuable to networks, sponsors, and platforms. Any league that can generate even modest live audiences becomes strategically important.

Second is portfolio logic. Many WNBA teams are tied to NBA ownership groups. That means the league is not judged as a standalone profit center. It is part of a broader asset stack that includes arenas, media rights, and long-term brand positioning. Supporting it is not charity. It is a long-horizon investment.

Third is signaling and positioning. Corporations, media outlets, and universities do not just sell products. They also signal values to employees, partners, and customers. Women’s sports fit neatly into narratives about gender equity and opportunity. That makes them easy to support publicly. But that does not mean nobody in those institutions cares about the on-court product. It means multiple incentives are operating at once…

Mainstream outlets are more comfortable talking about racism directed at Black players than about bias in other directions. That reflects their editorial frameworks and audience expectations. You can reasonably critique that asymmetry. But asymmetry in coverage is not the same thing as coordinated suppression of truth. It is more often a mix of newsroom norms, reputational risk management, and what editors believe their audience will accept.

There is also a simpler explanation for why Clark-related incidents get framed the way they do. She is the league’s biggest growth engine. Both the league and its media partners have incentives to cool conflict rather than inflame it. Calling everything “hatred” raises the temperature and risks damaging the product they are trying to scale.

Step back and the underlying dynamic is familiar.

A new star expands the audience.
The existing hierarchy feels destabilized.
Media attention concentrates unevenly.
Institutions try to manage the transition without breaking the coalition that sustains the league.

That’s not unique to women’s basketball. It’s what happens whenever a niche product tries to cross into the mainstream.

Your instinct that something shifted with Clark is right. Your instinct that there are social and cultural layers on top of the economics is also right. The part to tighten up is resisting a single-cause explanation. What you’re seeing is a stack of incentives, not one hidden motive driving everything.

The institutional support for the WNBA from what you call “elites”—corporations, media conglomerates, and sports executives—is driven by a combination of strategic asset management and high-yield cultural signaling. While the on-court product has historically been a secondary concern for many of these stakeholders, the landscape in 2026 has shifted due to a massive injection of capital and the arrival of “disruptive” talent like Caitlin Clark.

Bernard Suits defined games as voluntary acceptance of unnecessary obstacles. Sports adds a tribal overlay to that structure. You do not just watch athletes compete. You attach your identity to one side and feel distress or elation at outcomes you cannot influence. That response is not sophisticated. It is ancient. It runs on the same circuitry as village loyalty, clan membership, and religious devotion. Ernest Becker would recognize it immediately as a hero system, a way of transcending individual smallness by merging with something larger.
That response is strongest in people Charles Taylor would call porous. The boundary between self and world is thin. The crowd’s emotion enters you. The team’s victory feels like your victory. Trad communities, working-class men, regional and ethnic subcultures, religious communities that still practice collective ritual, these are the audiences that fill stadiums and paint their faces. They are not watching sport ironically or as a diversified entertainment option. They are participating in something that answers a real need for belonging and transcendence.
Owners sit at the opposite end of Taylor’s spectrum. They are buffered. They have thick walls between inner life and outer event. They process the crowd’s passion as an asset to be monetized rather than an experience to be had. The game is a portfolio holding. The tribal intensity of the fans is the raw material they sell to advertisers. They do not share the porous response. They manage it.
The MSM occupies similar territory. Journalists and commentators at major outlets are predominantly credentialed, urban, and secular. They cover sport as a beat rather than live it as a devotion. They are puzzled by the intensity of fan attachment to a player like Clark because they do not feel it themselves. They analyze it as a sociological phenomenon while missing that the phenomenon requires participation to understand.
This gap explains a lot of the WNBA situation. The league’s institutional backers, owners, corporate sponsors, media partners, are all buffered. They support the league through portfolio logic and signaling calculation. The audiences Clark draws are more porous. They respond to her the way sports audiences have always responded to transcendent performers. That response does not care about the league’s identity positioning. It follows the player.
The friction is not just racial or cultural in the narrow sense. It is a collision between two different relationships to sport.

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The Law vs The Nature

Posted on March 29, 2026 by Luke Ford

What law-abiding Americans experience in their most private lives is not random frustration but a structural conflict between two systems solving different problems. Evolution optimizes individuals for reproductive success. Law optimizes coalitions for stability. When those two logics collide, the individual absorbs the cost.
The conflict is sharpest in the mating and family domain because reproduction is the core currency of evolution. Human psychology was shaped in environments where mating was flexible, status was local, and reproductive strategies varied widely. Modern American law imposes a standardized structure built to reduce conflict, stabilize households, and scale cooperation across millions of strangers. The result is not harmony but a series of persistent mismatches, each one generating its own quiet pressure.
Start with monogamy. Across cultures and history, high-status men have tended to monopolize mating opportunities, while some women have accepted shared access to high-quality partners over exclusive access to lower-quality ones. American law blocks this directly through bans on plural marriage. On paper, this levels the playing field and reduces male competition. In practice, it does not eliminate polygyny. It drives it underground.
What emerges is behavioral polygyny inside a formally monogamous system. Serial monogamy, affairs, and app-mediated “soft harems” allow a small subset of high-status men to rotate partners without legal commitment. Average men face increasing difficulty securing stable relationships. The law suppresses formal inequality while technology reintroduces it informally. The mating market becomes both unequal and opaque.
The modern status economy intensifies this. In ancestral settings, status was visible and local. Today it is mediated through education, income, social media, and institutional credentials. People spend their twenties and thirties competing in long status tournaments before attempting stable pair-bonding. By the time they do, expectations are high, options are constantly visible, and fertility windows are narrower. The law assumes stable households. The status system delays their formation.
Contraception widens the mismatch further. Reliable birth control has almost completely decoupled sex from reproduction. Sex becomes low-cost. But the legal system still treats reproduction, when it occurs, as binding and long-term. This creates a timing problem. Individuals behave as if reproduction is optional until it is not. At that point, the law imposes durable obligations that feel disconnected from prior behavior.
Divorce and child support law make that disjunction concrete. Evolutionarily, parental investment is conditional. Individuals shift effort when relationships break down or when new opportunities arise. American law rejects that flexibility. Once children are present, obligations persist regardless of relational change. Courts prioritize stability over individual preference. For many men, this creates a perceived asymmetry: they can lose control over both relationship and resources while remaining financially bound for years.
A closely related but less openly discussed tension is paternity certainty. Male psychology is sensitive to whether offspring are genetically related. The legal system often prioritizes continuity of care over biological verification once a man is established as a father. In some cases, legal responsibility persists even when biological paternity is in doubt. The predictable response is caution. Men delay or avoid legal fatherhood unless they feel highly secure. That caution feeds into lower marriage rates and delayed family formation.
The same pattern appears in the short-term mating market. Male demand for low-commitment sexual access is well documented. Direct markets for this are largely illegal in the United States. But the demand does not disappear. It is displaced into indirect and often more distorted channels. Instead of a transparent price, sexual access is bundled with attention, status, or emotional labor. Dating apps, “sugar” arrangements, and platforms like OnlyFans function as substitute markets where the signal is obscured and often inflated. The law does not eliminate exchange. It changes its form and raises its ambiguity. For law-abiding participants, this produces confusion, frustration, and a sense that the rules are both restrictive and hypocritical.
The female side of this mismatch is real but different. Women evolved to trade exclusivity for resources and committed investment. Legal monogamy and divorce law partially protect that strategy. But app-mediated mating markets and the transparency of status rankings now give women far more information about relative male quality than any ancestral environment provided. That information concentrates female desire toward a narrow tier of men, which recreates polygyny at the behavioral level regardless of what the law says. Women are not passive in this. They are responding to a structural condition that the law neither created nor knows how to address.
Even outside reproduction, the same logic appears in weaker form. Humans evolved to direct resources toward themselves and their kin. Tax systems redistribute those resources across large populations. Most people comply, but they also engage in legal minimization, use private networks, create internships for their children, and express generalized resentment toward redistribution. The conflict is real but less intense because it does not touch reproductive outcomes directly.
Taken together, these tensions converge on a recognizable equilibrium. American society has settled into a pattern of delayed commitment, high competition for status, uneven distribution of sexual access, and below-replacement fertility. Marriage is postponed or avoided. Childbearing is reduced or deferred. Informal arrangements substitute for formal ones. Compliance with the law remains high, but satisfaction with the underlying system is not.
None of this is accidental. Laws governing monogamy, divorce, and sexual exchange are not arbitrary moral impositions. They are coalition technologies. They exist to suppress within-group reproductive competition, reduce violence, and enable large-scale cooperation among unrelated individuals. By limiting the ability of a few individuals to dominate mating, they make it easier for large groups of men to cooperate rather than fight. By enforcing parental obligations, they reduce the social cost of unstable relationships.
From the perspective of the coalition, these are features. From the perspective of the individual, they are constraints. Law-abiding citizens are not failing to align their lives with their instincts. They are successfully complying with a system that requires them to absorb the reproductive and psychological costs of social order. The frustration that follows is not a glitch in the system. It is the price of making large, stable societies possible. The state wins the battle of behavior. The genes win the battle of desire.

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