Sexual Excitement: Dynamics of Erotic Life

Here are some highlights from this 1986 book:

* My theory makes sexual excitement just one more example of what others have said for millennia: that humans are not a very loving species –especially when they make love. Too bad.

* people in general have a paradigmatic erotic scenario-played in a daydream, or in choice of pornography, or in object choice, or simply in actions (such as styles of intercourse tthe understanding of which will enable us to understand the person.

* Most of us, most of the time, feel of one piece. We do not notice the seams, though artists and analysts-by nature and profession-are more alert than many others… to the fact that the whole cloth is nonetheless made up of well-joined parts.

* our mental life is experienced in the form of fantasies. These fantasies are present as scripts -stories-whose content and function can be determined. And I want to emphasize that what we call thinking or experiencing or knowing, whether it be conscious, preconscious, or unconscious, is a tightly compacted but nonetheless separable-analyzable-weave of fantasies. What we consciously think or feel is actually the algebraic summing of many simultaneous fantasies.

* IT HAS SURPRISED ME recently to find almost no professional literature discussing why a person becomes sexually excited.

* The following, then, are the mental factors present in perversions that I believe contribute to sexual excitement in general: hostility, mystery, risk, illusion, revenge, reversal of trauma or frustration to triumph, safety factors, and dehumanization (fetishization). And all of these are stitched together into a whole-the surge of sexual excitement -by secrets. (Two unpleasant thoughts: First, when one tabulates the factors that produce sexual excitement, exuberance-pure joyous pleasure-is for most people at the bottom of the list, rarely found outside fiction. Second, I would guess that only in the rare people who can indefinitely contain sexual excitement and love within the same relationship do hostility and secrecy play insignificant parts in producing excitement.)

* The pervert himself cannot surrender to the experience and retains a split-off, dissociated manipulative ego-control of the situation. This is both his achievement and failure in the intimate situation. It is this failure that supplies the compulsion to repeat the process again and again. The nearest that the pervert can come to experiencing surrender is through visual, tactile and sensory identifications with the other object in the intimate situation in a state of surrender. Hence, though the pervert arranges and motivates the idealization of instinct which the technique of intimacy aims to fulfill, he himself remains outside the experiential climax. Hence, instead of instinctual gratification or object- cathexis, the pervert remains a deprived person whose only satisfaction has been of pleasurable discharge and intensified ego-interest.

* To the extent that, in its earliest relation- ships to its parents, a child feels it is debased, it will, in creating its sexual excitement throughout life, reverse this process of debasement in fantasy so that the sexual objects are now-in disguised or open form -its victims. One of my theses, for which this book is an illustration, is that the exact details of the script underlying the excitement are meant to reproduce and repair the precise traumas and frustrations- debasements-of childhood; and so we can expect to find hidden in the script the history of a person’s psychic life.13

* I have just noted two kinds of secrets related to erotic behavior. The first, the less important for our present purpose, is the need to keep secrets from others. When this is the case, the secret is usually used less to enhance sexual excitement than to keep it safe. The second, close to the heart of excitement, is the game in which we pretend to keep secrets from ourselves.

* Men’s fear of femininity-defensive masculinity-is kept a secret but is not wholly unconscious. The tough young man who beats up a homosexual is not without conscious knowledge of his fear that he is not masculine enough. The man who drinks for courage is aware that he feels himself to be weak; the idea is not unconscious. People who need pornography know they are perverse; they are quite conscious of their specific needs when they choose the pornography that excites them and disregard the rest. The process is secretive, not unconscious, though the roots of the excitement are unconscious.

* Excitement, then, is a defense against anxiety, a transformation of anxiety into something more bearable, a melodrama. The ultimate danger that I believe lies at the heart of sexual excitement is that one’s sense of existence, especially in the form of one’s sense of maleness or femaleness, can be threatened (what Freud called “castration anxiety”). To dissolve that threat, I suggest, one calls forth the mechanisms of hostility being described, such as dehumanizing others, and then decks the scripts out with mystery, illusion, and safety factors. When mystery and its inherent risk diminish, boredom or indifference intervenes. Normative examples: the capacity of a particular piece of pornography to hold an audience’s attention drops off precipitously with a second exposure; Peeping Toms do not stare at their wives; a square inch of thigh in a drawing room is vaster than an acre on the beach; stage managers at strip joints read the sports page while the show unfolds; most couples-heterosexual, homosexual, a fetishist and his latest panty hose-get bored.

* To repeat, sexual excitement depends on a scenario. The person to be aroused is the “writer,” who has been at work on the story line since childhood. The story is an adventure in which the hero/heroine runs risks that must be escaped. Disguised as fiction, it is autobiography in which are hidden crucial intrapsychic conflicts, screen memories of actual events, and the resolution of all these elements into a happy ending, best celebrated by orgasm. The characters are chosen because they resemble (though are usually not identical in appearance with) important people of childhood such as oneself, one’s parents, and one’s siblings. Most often, the writer becomes director, moving the action out into the world of real people or other objects. These are chosen because they are perceived by the writer-director as filling the criteria already written into the role. (Prostitutes, for instance, are available to those without better resources for casting.) If the chosen characters pretty much fit the part, they work. They should, however, have just a touch of unpredictability in their behavior; that introduces the illusion of risk. If unvaryingly predictable, they are boring. On the other hand, if they do not stick close enough to their assigned role, too much anxiety results and they are traded in. Every detail counts for increasing excitement and avoiding true danger or boredom. For many people, sexual excitement is like threading a minefield.

* The idea that hostility can be a central feature in a benign, inevitable part of human experience is illustrated also in humor and its physical gratification, laughter. As Freud long ago observed, humor and hostility are closely linked.” Take, for instance, slapstick, at which we all can laugh; transform the same amusing act into a real event in the street and one sees the hostility that must be there to generate humor.

* SADOMASOCHISM IS, I think, a central feature of most sexual excitement. My hunch is that the desire to hurt others in retaliation for having been hurt is essential for most people’s sexual excitement all the time but not for all people’s excitement all the time.

* During World War 11, the Nazis devised a system for hiding messages: the microdot, “a photograph the size of a printed period that reproduced with perfect clarity a standard-sized typewritten letter.”* Most human behavior-the functioning of the mind-works the same way… In a process comparable to the miniaturization that allows stupendous amounts of information to be stored, arranged, rearranged, and transmitted within so small an apparatus as the brain, we–our minds-use psychic mechanisms that work at high speed to compress great masses of data into amazingly small “space” in a purposeful, organized way.

* Microdotting is great. Why, then, have the slower, lumbering, conscious, problem-solving thinking? Probably because we need both for survival, though too much reliance on either may be dangerous.

* The more meanings crammed into a small space (such as a word), the more impact-acute tension followed by acute release-on the recipient (such as a reader), so long as his “apparatus” picks up, as instantaneously and subliminally as the sender created the microdot, awareness of its thickly packed meanings. That impact is not com- municated if the message (density of meanings) is beyond the capacity of the receiver to comprehend (as when he is from a different culture, or does not have artistic training or sensibility, or is too young or otherwise inexperienced). Sometimes-always in a creative act-the sender and the receiver are inside the same person, as in the “eureka” experience of discovery or instantaneous dislike for another person. Every word in a sentence is a microdot; the excess meanings slop over so much it is a miracle we even begin to understand each other. How differently you will understand the writing in this book from what I think I am saying. The problem is how to make my script, each word and sentence, overlap yours with enough shared that the communica- ting is worth the effort. What is the right word to be chosen at this very point, so that, if used just here and in just this context, you will under- stand me?

* One can describe moods in terms of objects. They can be personified. The patient described above, for example, would not become angry, but would become his angry father. It seems to me that with moods, this is usually the case. Patients do not just become de- pressed, but they become the rejected little boy they once were in childhood. The anxious patient is not just a frightened adult but the scared little child of the past. Moods are not only derived from the internal representatives of external objects, but are often the representatives of one’s own past state of mind; one’s conception of oneself in the past. All of these considerations lead me to conclude that there is a very close connection between alternations in the cathexis of internal objects and moods. One’s outlook on the world and one’s conception of oneself are determined by the status of the various internalized objects.

* Microdotting-the metaphor for the process of creating the present instant by sorting many memories of real events, past fantasies, and affects, putting these all together so rapidly, and making them fit so exactly-is a way of naming the process that constructs a dream: that instant just before the manifest dream is dreamed.

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Jewish Tradition and the Challenge of Darwinism (2008)

Here are some highlights from this 2008 book:

* The theory of evolution has provided a profound intellectual challenge to religion over the past century and a half. Yet most studies of the impact and significance of evolution for religion have focused on just one religion, Christianity, and more specifically on Protestantism.

* What was so novel about Darwin’s book? First, Darwin possessed an impressive reputation as a naturalist and, far from offering a hasty speculation, he underpinned his case for evolution with a wealth of research and information gleaned from many naturalists all over the world. He also applied his theory to help explain observations in such diverse fields as taxonomy, morphology, embryology, animal behavior, geology, palaeontology, and biogeography. Second, he proposed an innovative and controversial mechanism for evolution-the evolution of species by natural selection. Put simply, Darwin postulated that individuals in any species exhibit diversity in a range of characteristics, many of which are inherited, and that these individuals compete with each other for the scarce resources needed to survive and reproduce. If certain characteristics provide individuals with an advantage in that competition, then those characteristics are more likely to be passed to the next generation, and the species will evolve. For example, if there is insufficient food for all the members of a population of sparrows, they will compete over this limited resource. If some sparrows possess an advantage over others-perhaps the faster-flying sparrows have greater access to food then the faster are more likely to survive than the slower. And if the biological basis for the characteristic of speed is passed on to successive generations, we can envisage the speed of our hypothetical population increasing over a number of generations. Thus the species is transformed.

* While Darwin’s theory was not the first to postulate evolution, it needs to be distinguished from the view that evolution is teleological-that species develop linearly towards a predetermined, final form. Rather, Darwin envisaged evolution like a branching tree, with some branches splitting and others terminating. These correspond respectively to the diversification of species and to extinction. Moreover, how an actual species evolves depends on contingent local factors, such as the availability of food and the presence of predators. This dimension of Darwin’s theory had important theological implications, for it was understood by Darwin and many theologians to challenge notions of a providential God whose care and benevolence extended to each individual in creation. Darwin’s theory also challenged the argument from design, especially widespread in the writings of British and American Christian clergy in the nineteenth century. If we look at any part of the natural world, impressive evidence for its design can usually be found. A flower, for example, displays design in the symmetry of its petals and in the functioning of its reproductive cycle. Such signs of design, it was argued, must be the result of a divine designer. The physical world thus justifies the notion not just of a Creator, but of a super intelligent Creator who made every species for a purpose and fitted each species into an overall plan. Then came Darwin’s theory. As some commentators noted, evolution evokes an even more impressive image of God, since he did not have to create each species separately but rather possessed the intelligence to create a system in which species progressively evolved. However, others viewed evolution very differently since if species evolve unaided, then the notion of a designer God was undermined. Indeed, Darwin’s theory was widely understood as being conducive to atheism, as it appears to dispense with a providential God.6

The centrality of competition in the process of natural selection also raised a host of problems. Nature was a battleground: nature “red in tooth and claw:’ to use Tennyson’s famous phrase.? The need for many members of a species population to die so that the most fit could survive might seem to naturalize death and destruction. How could the evil at the heart of the natural world be reconciled with the traditional view ofa benevolent God? The ethical implications of evolution also entered political thought, since if competition is natural, then the domination of the weak by the strong is implicitly justified. Darwin’s theory could thus be seen to rationalize cruelty and-by implication-such systems as exploitative capitalism. But, argued some, it could equally legitimate the necessity for all classes to work together in order to maximize the fitness, and therefore the survival, of society as a whole. Thus social Darwinism-the application of evolution to society as theory and/or policy-has been deployed by writers from across the political spectrum to provide “scientific” justification for their views about human society.

* Darwin’s theory was generally warmly welcomed in Germany, where its main popularizer in the late 1860s was Ernst Haeckel. Although socialists and communists were quick to exploit the theory in their antireligious polemics, it also attracted more conservative and nationalistic writers. Particularly after Germany’s defeat in the First World War, provoking a rising tide of nationalism, Darwin’s theory became increasingly aligned with reactionary groups, like the Nazis, who argued the superiority of the Aryan race-being the most highly evolved-and the inferiority of other races, including Jews, blacks, and Gypsies. This transposition of evolution to the politics of race helped to justify anti-Semitism, and by the 1920S and ’30S many scientists and doctors used their authority to advocate the racial and eugenicist policies of the Nazis. After Hitler came to power in 1933 a law was passed that led to the sterilization of some 400,000 people who possessed various (allegedly) heritable diseases: that they could not reproduce would, it was thought, result in the genetic improvement of the German population. A few years later the same rationale led to the institutionally sanctioned killing of large numbers of the physically and mentally disabled. The way was paved for the mass murder of Jews, Gypsies, and other “undesirables” in the extermination camps.

* Given the ostensible link between Darwinism, genetics, and the Holocaust, many present-day evolutionists publicly distance themselves from eugenics and from any attempt to recruit evolutionary science for political purposes. Yet mention of Darwin’s theory sometimes evokes its association in the public mind-especially the Jewish mind-with the Holocaust. Moreover, although it is widely known that the German racial hygienists deployed sterilization, it should be remembered that similar programs were pursued elsewhere, including most of the Eastern European countries, three provinces in Canada, and thirty states in the U.S. 11

The other significant shadow that lies across the recent history of Darwinism is the determined opposition by fundamentalist Christians. Although many committed Christians had earlier rejected evolution on religious grounds, antievolutionism became a major religious and political movement in America only in the 192os. The First World War raised uncomfortable moral issues about the nature of humankind and increased the sense in Southern states that they were being eclipsed socially, economically, and intellectually by the North. Antievolution became a rallying point for conservative Christians, especially those associated with the fundamentalist movement. At the same time William Jennings Bryan grasped the potential of antievolutionism as a populist political platform, becoming the central figure in the 1925 Scopes trial that focused on the freedom of a community with strong religious commitments to choose whether Darwinian evolution should be taught in its schools. Although many of the arguments went against Bryan, Scopes was found guilty of teaching evolution in violation of legislation recently passed by the state of Tennessee.12

* Recently the scientific credentials of creationism have been extended by a resurgence of the argument that Darwin’s theory is inadequate for explaining the full diversity and complexity of life, which can be understood only as the outcome of an intelligent design. Much discussion has focused on such complex biological systems as the flagella that propel bacterial cells. In this instance the proponents of Intelligent Design, such as Michael Behe, have argued that the flagellum could not have evolved by numerous slight modifications to the system, since if any of its component parts had been completely formed the whole system would not have functioned properly. Opponents have been quick to argue that the flagellum is not an”irreducibly complex” system and that the analogies exploited by Behe are false. While this may appear to be a disagreement among biologists, it is attracting a vast amount o fpublic attention, especially in America, since Intelligent Design is portrayed as opposed to evolutionary naturalism and is widely perceived as supporting creationism. As with creationism, increasingly vigorous voices are now calling for Intelligent Design to be taught in schools.13 The significance of the above developments is twofold for appreciating Jewish attitudes to evolution. First, Christian opposition to evolution, especially visible in America, has been used as a rhetorical target by both Orthodox and progressive Jews who argue for Judaism’s greater openness to evolutionary ideas. At the same time, there has been a resurgence of fundamentalism not only within Christianity, but also within both Judaism and Islam.14 This development has certainly influenced attitudes towards evolution among certain Jewish communities, although the extent to which these Jews share the antievolutionary attitudes of Christian fundamentalists remains to be fully explored.

* Throughout the early modern period, Jews lived primarily in closed, self governing communities and their intellectual life revolved primarily around the study of halakhah (Jewish law) and kabbalah (Jewish mysticism). There were important exceptions, such as Spinoza and a small number ofJews who studied at European universities, especially at the medical school at the University of Padua. In addition, historians have demonstrated thatduring this period Jews were more aware of and interested in secular learning than has previously been acknowledged. While most Jews had little interaction with nonJews and with non-Jewish cultures, several leading rabbinic authorities in halakhah and kabbalah exhibited a keen interest in the natural sciences.18

The impetus for Jews to engage with science is typically traced to two factors, although there are debates about their relationship and relative importance. The first is the haskalah, a movement begun by Jewish intellectuals in mid-eighteenth century Europe inspired by Enlightenment ideals. Maskilim (the followers of the haskalah, the most famous being the German philosopher Moses Mendelssohn [1729-86]) advocated secular studies both as a way to modernize Judaism and as a way to enter mainstream European society. For example, in England a few maskilim avidly accepted the Newtonian system of ideas, while Emanuel Mendes da Costa (1717-91), who served as clerk of the Royal Society of London, became a leading authority on shells and fossils. 19 The second factor was the emancipation of Jews, which started in France in 1791, when they were granted virtually the full rights of citizenship. This created new opportunities for study and work, including participation in fields of science that required university-level education.

* In the German-speaking countries, three movements emerged by the mid-nineteenth century that had a profound impact on modern Jewish life: Reform, neo-Orthodoxy (precursor of today’s Modern Orthodoxy), and Positive-Historical Judaism (precursor of today’s Conservative Jewish movement in America).All three sought an accommodation with modern life, and all valued secular learning-in education, as career choices, and as resources for furthering Jewish life and thought-but in different ways. Reform was the most accommodating, neo-Orthodoxy the least.

* By the time Darwin’s Origin of Species was published in 1859, Jewish religious life had diversified greatly. Intra-Jewish rivalry, while always a factor in Jewish communal life, intensified, and new concerns about assimilation and conversion to Christianity grew rapidly as emancipation spread throughout Europe. In this context, evolution was one among many secular ideas that Jewish thinkers needed to address, but it does not appear to have been among the most pressing.

* The rise of the Nazis in Germany and the ensuing destruction of European Jewry had a profound impact both directly and indirectly on Jewish life and thought and on discussions about evolution. The concept of “race” became discredited among biologists and social scientists-Jews playing leading roles in that effort-and social and cultural explanations became prominent in the social sciences, where Jews continued to work in large numbers. Interest in human heredity continued, using new tools in human and population genetics. In Israel this research was part of an ongoing public debate, stimulated by the influx of immigrants from many countries, about the origin of the Jewish people.26 The Holocaust also transformed the demography of world Jewry. The United States and Israel became leading centers for Jewish life and thought. Immigrant rabbis, philosophers, and theologians brought with them new ideas about religion, shaped by existentialism and phenomenology, which challenged the Enlightenment legacy of the primacy of reason and science. The increasing awareness of the enormous challenge that the Holocaust posed to Enlightenment ideas, and the increasing role that the State of Israel played in Jewish thought, provided fertile ground for the growth of these new intellectual currents. With these predominant foci, most rabbis and theologians paid little attention to science, including evolution, except for the issues raised by biomedical ethics. Only in the last decade of the twentieth century did some rabbis and Jewish intellectuals rekindle an interest in Judaism’s relationship to science, including evolution, fueled in large part by a renewed interest in kabbalah throughout the Jewish world.27

* recent attempts by Christian fundamentalists to introduce Intelligent Design into public school science curricula have focused the wider American Jewish community’s attention on evolution. Particularly significant was the high-profile case in Dover, Pennsylvania, held in the autumn of 2005, at which parents successfully challenged the requirement that a statement be read in biology classes informing students to avoid committing themselves to Darwin’s theory and advising them to read up on Intelligent Design. This case attracted much publicity in the American Jewish press and motivated dozens of rabbis to deliver sermons, many given on Rosh Hashanah, on the issues it raised. Most rabbis and Jewish commentators applauded the judge’s subsequent decision that the school district’s actions violated the separation of church and state, and they reaffirmed the view that a naturalistic scientific explanation for the evolution of life is compatible with Jewish faith. Yet these views have not gone unchallenged. Because of growing diversity of opinion within American Jewry over government support for religion, an increasing number of rabbis and community leaders have expressed support for the teaching of Intelligent Design in public schools. Moreover, rabbis ranging from ultra-Orthodox through to Renewal are becoming progressively more concerned that the naturalistic assumptions underpinning evolutionary theory, and modern science more broadly, are conducive to secularism and so threaten Jewish faith. Thus the current controversies over evolution are exposing the broader social, political, and theological divisions within the Jewish community.31

* a relative absence of social barriers enabled eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English Jews to achieve a high degree of assimilation, compared with their coreligionists in most European countries.6 While a small and prosperous Jewish social elite existed, other sections of the mid-Victorian Anglo-Jewish community were becoming increasingly prosperous, and many upwardly mobile Jews were entering the middle classes. They manifested a growing sense of social integration, often sending their sons to such traditional public schools as St. Paul’s or to academically innovative establishments like University College School. An increasing number of Jewish students attended universities, especially University College London and the University of Cambridge. More Jews moved into the professions, resulting in 1891 in the formation of a society for Jewish professionals, the Maccabreans, which soon attracted over two hundred members. English Jews manifested a profound sense of Englishness and participated increasingly in the social and political life of the nation, sharing in its prosperity and sense of progress as technology and the British empire flourished. Modeling themselves on their Christian neighbors, they were-to use Englander’s phrase-Anglicized, but not Anglican.

* Yet despite its alignment with English mores, Anglo-Jewry experienced many social tensions. Although vituperation in England was far less intense than in most other European countries, Anglo-Jewry was nevertheless subjected to a stream of anti-Semitic propaganda and to the blandishments of the conversion societies.9 In popular literature Jews were often portrayed as morally and intellectually inferior to Christians. The Jew was caricatured as greedy and obsessed with making money; as one visitor to Houndsditch (the main Jewish area) in 1867 noted: the “organs of vision” of the Jew were thought to be “directed mammonward.” The Jew, he continued, was “but a low-flying and lumbering, albeit an industrious and copiously perspiring, bird, … satisfied to burrow in muck and grow smugly sleek on such scraps and offal as the world and his wife overlooked, or, knowing the existence of, despised:’Io Jews were frequently portrayed as uneducated and therefore incapable of pursuing demanding subjects such as science and medicine. Indeed, as one earlier writer noted, the Jew was the antithesis of the cultured Englishman who, among other attributes, appreciated the natural world.II This anti-Semite thus portrayed the pursuit of science as alien to Jews.

Until the mid-186os or possibly later, the community’s contribution to science and literature was indeed minimal. Moreover, although a handful of Jewish scholars, mostly trained in Germany, had contributed to Hebrew and Jewish studies, the general level of religious learning was shamefully low. Jews’ College (founded 1853), which trained students for the rabbinate, attracted little support from the community, and the number of students was small. A Jewish day school associated with the college was opened in 1855 but was forced to close in 1879 owing to low enrollment. Faced with the community’s poor showing in both secular and religious studies its leaders strove to challenge anti-Semitic claims that Jews were intellectually deficient by amply demonstrating any success achieved by Jews in literature and science. Thus while chastising the community for its general failure to excel in secular subjects, the Jewish press publicized the achievements of those who had gained distinction in science, medicine, and other areas.

* Prior to midcentury, the majority of Christian writers had unequivocally proclaimed that science was not only compatible with Christianity but also strengthened religious belief.

* Victorian Jewish writers did not criticize science-or, more specifically, the theory of evolution for encouraging the philosophy of materialism. For these Victorian Jews, the material world was God’s creation, as specified in Torah, and there was no compelling reason to consider the world as anything other than material. Rarely was the soul or its immortality discussed in the Jewish press.

* Another indicator ofAnglo-Jewry’s lack of reflection on the soul is the brevity of Michael Friedlander’s discussion of the subject in his The Jewish Religion (1891).

* This book, he claimed, provided an explication of traditional religious principles. While the second half of this five-hundred-page work was devoted to the duties of the observant Jew, the first half contained Friedlander’s commentary on Maimonides’ thirteen principles of faith. The thirteenth-((The belief in the revival of the dead, or the immortality of the soul”-was the only place where he addressed the existence of the soul. Although Friedlander cited Saadia Gaon, Maimonides, and Judah Halevi in support of the soul’s immortality, he pointed out that this doctrine was notto be found in the Torah. Indeed, he seemed rather uncomfortable in discussing the topic, which he passed over quickly, admitting that we can form only a hazy notion of the resurrection of the dead.22 In contrast to Friedlander’s cursory examination, the soul and its immortality underpinned the doctrines of salvation and the afterlife that were central for nineteenth-century Christians, especially evangelicals. Contemporary Christian periodicals overflowed with references to the soul. Materialism was seen as heretical and a profound threat to Christianity, whereas Anglo-Jewish writers appear not to have been disturbed by a materialistic view of the world.

* The second topic concerns design arguments, which featured prominently in Christian works of natural theology, most famously in Paley’s Natural Theology (1802) and in several of the Bridgewater Treatises. Although evangelicals and High Churchmen tended to accord design arguments less centrality than did other Christians, such arguments were very frequently deployed in nineteenth-century Christian periodicals, in sermons, and in a wide array of scientific books. By contrast, Jewish writers of the period very rarely utilized arguments from design.

* The very noticeable contrast between the prevalence of design arguments in writings by Christians and their absence in works by English Jews invites analysis. There are several possible causes. First, for Jews the Torah and other sacred books take precedence over any other theological source. Thus nineteenth century Jews, like many evangelical Christians, would have felt no need to deploy design arguments in order to justify the existence and attributes of God. Moreover, such biblical passages as “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork” (Psalm 19:2) assert that the world is designed, and therefore Jews need not look to nature for signs of design.25 Second, while British Christians frequently appealed to the two book analogy-which views nature as God’s other”book” and thereby legitimates design arguments-this analogy and the associated way of thinking about nature were almost totally absent from Jewish works.26 Finally, the Anglo-Jewish community was principally urban and had no tradition of nature study; hence appeals to natural phenomena were unlikely to prove attractive to most readers whose experience of natural history and of other observational sciences was severely limited.27

* Although Christians continued to use design arguments after the Origin of Species was published, their apologetic functions were severely compromised. As John Hedley Brooke has noted, after the Origin, the “image of God as artisan or mechanic … took a beating:’

* This strategy of arguing for the coherence between Judaism and science, especially evolution, forms the central plank of what I shall call the standard Anglo-Jewish response, since it was articulated by the majority of Jewish writers from about the mid 1860s until at least the early 1890s. They emphasized that Jews experienced no difficulty encompassing recent developments in science, since science and Judaism are compatible. “Judaism;’ wrote one commentator, “has nothing to fear from the advancement of Science, but everything to gain:’3

* the assurance that science and Judaism were aligned was laced with criticism of Christianity.

* In 1992, Rabbi Arthur Green, then president of the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College, lamented that Jews were now convinced that the ((origin of species-and of the universe itself” is to be “explained by scientists rather than theologians.” Reflecting upon Jewish thought in the twentieth century, Green wrote that Jewish theologians had “largely abandoned Creation as a theological issue” and saw “no value” in defending «ancient Jewish views on Creation:’ While he dismissed literal interpretations of Genesis, Green forcefully maintained that God was involved in the origin of the universe and of species. And he urged Jewish thinkers to once again make the ongoing creation of the cosmos and of life a central theological concern and to explore how science and religion could be made relevant to one another.

* The legal, cultural, and theological debates generated by William Jennings Bryan and Protestant fundamentalists in the early 1920s, culminating in the 1925 Scopes trial, attracted the serious attention of leading Reform rabbis, both in sermons and as leaders of the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR). These rabbis viewed the controversy over evolution in the context of their broader concern that Protestant fundamentalists intended to crush freedom of thought, stifle scientific inquiry, and undermine liberal political and social values. President Abram Simon proclaimed at the 1925 CCAR annual convention that his agenda was to preserve the “progressive spirit of all departments of human culture.”

* In the late 1920S and ’30s, Reform rabbis continued to discuss evolution, but now with new concerns about growing secularism, both inside and outside the Jewish community. Some claimed that the synagogue was “being invaded by secularism.” Secular Yiddish and Hebrew organizations expanded, while religious education and practice declined. Throughout America, Marxism and socialism expanded their Jewish following.8 Reform rabbis were also disturbed to find that Clarence Darrow, a staunch defender of progressive social and political values, had taken to the lecture circuit proclaiming that evolution and religion were incompatible.

* Conservative rabbis in the 1920S and ’30S engaged evolution less frequently than did their Reform contemporaries. They focused on topics related to Jewish law, while virtually ignoring general theological issues.

* According to Kaplan, Friedrich Nietzsche was responsible for transforming Darwin’s theory into the social “doctrine of natural selection” that ultimately led to the emergence of Nazi ideology and the destruction that followed.

* Gordis was concerned about the growing explanatory power of natural selection and the materialist view of evolution that had been popularized by Simpson. To weaken the explanatory power of natural selection Gordis gleaned from scientific sources several features of life’s evolution that he believed could not be explained by natural selection: for example, evolution involves an immense amount of change in a relatively short geological time; the emergence of “something new and unexpected” at each evolutionary stage; the “simultaneous change” of many parts as humans became bipedal; and, according to fossil evidence, «a steady progress in one direction” or «orthogenesis” in many lineages.

* Despite the apparent divorce between science and religion in the 1980s, evolutionary ideas again reentered Jewish theology as part ofa renewed interest in Jewish mysticism, especially kabbalah.

* In the summer of 1925, the world’s attention was focused on the so-called Monkey Trial in Tennessee, which debated the truth as well as the propriety of teaching the theory of evolution. In Montreal, an immigrant Orthodox rabbi, Hirsh Cohen, wrote to his daughter and son-in-law voicing his opinion: “[Regarding] the Darrow-Bryan dispute, as long as it is in theory, one can agree with whatever position one thinks right and still remain a believer in the divinity of the Bible. It is the power of the Torah that all theories can be included. When Alexander von Humboldt and other natural scientists discovered that in the earth there are rock formations that were much, much older than our Torah’s chronology allows for, the sages of the Torah were not shocked, and they realized that this way of thinking was long known to the sages of the Talmud and the kabbalists … that our present world is not the first.2 ••• However, as I said, this is only in theory. Practically, I am a fundamentalist. Our great rabbi, Maimonides, philosophized in his Guide of the Perplexed in many matters theoretically. But when in his Yad ha-lJazakah3 he dealt with practical things, he was altogether different.”

* Here Rabbi Cohen underscored the idea that the halakhic (legal) aspects of Judaism were to be taken literally, whereas aggadic (nonlegal) opinions of the rabbis were open to interpretation. As we will see, Cohen’s use of this distinction foreshadows some of the problems and strategies adopted by Orthodox Jews in the twentieth century as they contended with the theory of evolution and its implications. Cohen may have encountered “fundamentalist” in popular media presentations of the contemporary public debate over evolution, but he then used the word idiosyncratically in applying the term “practical fundamentalist” to someone who accepts the Torah’s legal system as true and valid, whether or not that person also accepts literally the Torah’s account of Creation. Many of the Orthodox Jews discussed in this chapter share this “practical fundamentalism” while distancing themselves from Christian fundamentalism.

* four basic strategies adopted by Jewish thinkers [regarding Greek philosophy]. Faced by what they considered to be an irreconcilable conflict, some Jews remained loyal to Torah and rejected outright Aristotelian philosophy as subversive and dangerous. This first stance might be termed the “rejection of science.” Thus, while the Torah asserted that God had created the universe, Aristotelian philosophers claimed that the universe was eternal and they thus dispensed with a Creator. Rejectionists simply dismissed such claims and cautioned other Jews to avoid the secular sciences.8 Other Jews sought to reconcile the truth of Torah with that of science. This second strategy was founded on the belief that the Torah, when correctly understood and interpreted, makes identical claims to science.

* However, there were occasions when integration could not be accomplished and medieval Jewish thinkers then adopted a third strategy. This was to insist that Greek science and philosophy were fallible.

* The fourth strategy was to approach-and transcend-science by means of kabbalah.

* In confronting the clash between Torah Judaism and the theory of evolution, many twentieth-century Orthodox Jews are primarily concerned that if evolution were accepted uncritically, Torah would be deemed not only irrelevant but false. Orthodox Jews perceived three critical issues. Their primary concern has been to refute the view that the theory of evolution makes God irrelevant. As the Israeli microbiologist Morris Goldman stated, “God is irrelevant in the Darwinian evolutionary scheme and that is what is wrong with it for a Jew.”16 Likewise, Rabbi David Gottlieb, who abandoned the pursuit of academic philosophy to teach at the Ohr Somayach Yeshiva, argued that by accepting the theory of evolution Jews are conceding to atheism and “are giving up the whole of life as evidence for God:’ The second issue was morality, because the theory of evolution is seen as “an egregious blueprint for secular humanism [a] blueprint [that] dismantles social order by tacitly approving a) the abandonment of the Almighty as a moral authority, and b) the intentionally inevitable pursuit of cutthroat behavior:’18 Finally, the theory of evolution challenges the concept of man as a “qualitatively different creation.”19 With these significant issues at stake, Orthodox rabbis, scientists, and laypeople have responded to the theory of evolution by employing exegetical and apologetic strategies very similar to those used by medieval Jewish thinkers who confronted the challenge of Greek philosophy and science.

Orthodox Jews can be classified on the basis of their accommodation to secular education and culture. Among those who reluctantly accept the secular education of their children only because of state or national standards and requirements, the “rejection of science” strategy is particularly evident when it comes to those aspects of science that are viewed as incompatible with Torah. Thus one of the most prominent Orthodox rabbinical figures of the past generation, Moshe Feinstein, suggested the following solution when addressing the problem of the presentation of the theory of evolution and the related issue ofthe age ofthe universe in secular textbooks:

“Textbooks of secular studies that contain matters of heresy [kefirah] with respect to the creation ofthe world are certainly books of sectarianism [minut] that are forbidden to be taught. It is necessary to see to it that the secular studies teachers do not teach from them to students. Ifit is not possible to obtain other books, it is necessary to tear out those pages from the textbooks.”21

Indeed, some Jewish schools, particularly ultra-Orthodox ones, follow this advice and tear out textbook pages dealing with the theory of evolution.22 Twentieth-century Orthodox attitudes to education are summarized by Gerald Schroeder, an Orthodox Jewish scientist whose writings will be discussed below:

“My son … had been taught to relate to the Bible in its most literal sense, and so for him, and for many of his teachers, the age of the universe is exactly the age derived from the generations as they are listed in the Bible. For them, the cosmological estimate of the age of the universe, some 15 billion years, is a preposterous fiction.”23

This rejectionist strategy also has implications outside the realm of education. For example, there have been protests by ultra-Orthodox Jews against an Israeli company, Tara Dairy, for its use of images of dinosaurs in an advertising campaign.

* Although those who reject evolution because of its incompatibility with Torah appear to be adopting a position identical to that of many Christian fundamentalists, it is important to note that Orthodox Jews, whether or not they treat the theory of evolution or the related issue of the age of the universe as “a preposterous fiction;’ are united in their opposition to Christian creationism. Although there are some points that Orthodox Jews and Christian creationists might agree upon-for example, that the Hebrew Bible was revealed by God-these Jews clearly want to distance themselves from the Christian fundamentalists.26 The main reason for this attitude is that creationism is based on the King James Bible and not on traditional Jewish texts, which incorporate the cumulative perspectives obtained from traditional Torah commentaries.27 Fundamentalism and creationism have been decried by Orthodox Jews as “nonsense”28 and “a grave error:’29 Another Orthodox writer described as “frightening” any suggestion that Orthodox Judaism might be aligned with Christian fundamentalism.30 Orthodox critics of creationism would agree with American Jewish philosopher Norbert Samuelson’s opinion that “even when read literally, these revered [biblical] texts do not say what Christian ‘creationists’ say that they mean.”31 The antagonism of the Orthodox toward fundamentalists may also be attributed in part to the specifically Christian nature of the Creation Research Society, which, after some debate, required its members to acknowledge Jesus Christ as their savior.

* Unlike Feinstein, some Orthodox Jews do not wish to ignore or suppress discussion of the theory of evolution within their community, bur rather seek to engage evolution with arguments. Moreover, in having to contest the theory at a time when it is generally accepted by the scientific community, they also have to respond to critics like author A. N. Wilson who claim that they are crackpots.33 Thus Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, a leading thinker in the contemporary Modern Orthodox camp, states that:

“confronted by evident contradiction [between Torah and science], one would …initially strive to ascertain whether it is apparent or real …whether indeed the methodology of madda [science] does inevitably lead to a given conclusion, and … whether … Torah can be interpreted … so as to avert a collision.”34

Following Lichtenstein’s advice to test the conclusions of science, a number of writers have sought to demonstrate defects in the scientific argument for evolution. Some of the arguments against the scientific basis of the theory of evolution are fairly technical in nature, while others are more popular and rhetorical. This strategy is likely to appeal to a wide public, for critics of evolution are riding a wave of skepticism…

* A related concern of many Orthodox thinkers is that science is constantly in flux and offers an incomplete understanding of reality, whereas the Torah is unchangeable and perfect. Thus Elliot Pines has stated that the Torah

“is written by G-d, and as such it is a complete description of reality. Science[‘s] … subject matter is … not reality but a man-made model of reality…. The Torah, though packaged in a finite form, is Reality in all its infinity. Science is a model of Reality, and as such, despite delusions of grandeur, is as finite as the brain of Man. No matter how far it progresses, even if perfected within its limitations, it reflects an approximation to an infinitesimal speck of reality . . . all objective conflicts between Torah and Science, arise from this intrinsic fact.”42

Finally, some Orthodox critics have accused science of being unscientific because it is subjective and dogmatic.43 These criticisms have been applied specifically to evolution, which is widely portrayed as deviating from the standards of”objective” science.44 Orthodox critics have charged evolution with not being “rigorous science:’45 and lacking a”well-formulated hypothesis:’ Likewise the theory has been characterized as “an example of unrestrained speculation…’46

Schroeder claims that the theory of evolution in its current form is not a true scientific theory, but “merely a description of the (punctuated’ jumps in the fossil record:’47 He also attempts to discredit the theory on the grounds that “all calculations of probability say no to the assumption of randomness being the driving force behind life’s development:’48 Such technical critiques of evolution are read and digested by rabbis, who disseminate these views to Orthodox audiences in their sermons and publications. A good example of a popular, rhetorical treatment of these themes, informed by a reading of some of the Orthodox scientists mentioned above, is that of Rabbi Avigdor Miller, prolific author, public speaker, and past director of a yeshiva in Flatbush:

“We see the yad Hashem [hand of God] in nature In a book of molecular biology, there are six thousand entries in the index two entries on evolution’ and the writer said in his preface, one of the purposes of biology is to teach people the principle of evolution, and in the entire book nothing is mentioned. Two places! In these two places it doesn’t say any proof for evolution.49 It just said it evolved. How could it evolve? It’s so complicated, and if one of the elements is missing, and there are hundreds of elements, precise arrangements that had to be mathematically exactly correct.”

* In contrast to those Orthodox Jewish scientists and rabbis who oppose evolution, a few have adopted integrationist strategies. While they do not closely follow the medieval rationalist project as exemplified by Saadia, they do subscribe to the medieval notion that the Torah can be integrated with science. One example is Judah Landa, whose Torah and Science! contains a sustained polemic against Orthodox Jews who “motivated by considerations other than science … persist in a stubborn refusal to accept the tower of “scientific evidence.”52 He argues that scientific research is an activity suitable for Orthodox Jews and that its conclusions cannot be contradicted by Torah. According to Landa, those Orthodox fundamentalists who oppose science are mistaken in their adamant refusal to admit that traditional rabbinic interpretations could possibly be wrong. In adopting this attitude they continue to search for baseless objections to the powerful evidence:’53 By contrast, Landa accepts the findings of science and assumes that if the medieval rabbis were alive today, they “would see fit to reconcile their interpretation of the six days and the entire story of creation with the evidence…”

* Less radical in tone, but equally opposed to those Orthodox Jews who reject the scientific consensus on the theory of evolution is the electrical engineer and physicist Baruch Sterman, who decries the “lack of willingness within the Jewish intellectual community to face Darwinism in an open minded fashion”56 and criticizes the antievolutionist views of such prominent Orthodox scientists as electrical engineer Leo Levi and physicists Herman Branover and Nathan Aviezer. Finally, in an article published in 1990, Yeshiva University biology professor Carl Feit agreed that evolution is “central to the whole enterprise of biology today:’ having withstood “one hundred years of the most intense analysis:’ There is, he wrote, “no alternative … theory to explain the phenomena with which it deals:’57 Feit has adopted a nonfundamentalist, nonliteral interpretation of Torah,58 similar to that formulated by medieval scholars such as Maimonides. The Torah, he claims, may allow for the existence of several, even mutually exclusive truths:’ just as halakhah (Jewish law) allows for the notion of multiple truths, each truth being judged according to its own criteria.

* The majority of Orthodox Jews who have sought to avoid a direct confrontation with science have not, however, pursued an integrationist strategy. Rather, they have sought to transcend the problem by using concepts derived from rabbinic aggadah (nonlegal arguments) in general and kabbalah in particular.60 This stance can be readily seen in the argument of Susan Schneider, who is associated with the Torah Science Foundation:
Tradition teaches that the entire creation chapter did actually happen and in a physical sense, but on an entirely different level than what we now know as the physical plane.61
Pursuing a similar line of thought, Rabbi Dovid Brown has written: “Our point … is not, however, to refute the theory of evolution in order to justify our belief in the divine creation of the universe. As the descendants of those who stood at Har [Mount] Sinai and accepted the Torah, we do not need the assent of secular intellectuals to maintain our faith….However Chazal [the ancient rabbinic authorities] tell us … “Falsehood cannot exist without some admixture of truth. What element of truth is there in this falsehood?”62
Similarly, Elliot Pines, drawing on kabbalistic concepts, asserts that “our universe is a simulation.”

* The controversial “zoo rabbi;’ Nosson Slifkin, likewise grounds his model of evolution, as of Torah and the universe in general, on the kabbalistically tinged Hebrew term hishtalshelut-“the sense of the gradual unfolding of fundamental patterns from simple unity to complex multiplicity.”72

* In 1978 the AOJS Students’ Questions Panel expressed the conviction that “the conflict between ‘religion’ and’evolution’ has outlived its usefulness and it was high time it was allowed a quiet demise.”73 Nonetheless, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the argument among people who consider themselves Orthodox Jews over the validity of the theory of evolution continues with no sign of closure. All the strategies for dealing with the issue described above have contemporary advocates. In large measure, this is due to a combination of the diversity of opinion among Orthodox Jews with respect to the validity of “secular” science with the absence of a generally accepted process within Orthodox Jewry to resolve ideological or doctrinal issues. It is, however, possible to identify some significant changes in attitudes towards evolution during the last half of the twentieth century.

First of all, one can detect a shift of opinion away from a focus on scientific arguments against the theory of evolution. In a 1998 article about the AOJS, journalist Judy Siegel-Itzkovich quoted the founder of AOJS, Elmer Offenbacher, who stated that”in the old days, the matter of evolution vs. religion was a hot topic; some people were obsessed by it.” He added that religious scientists had gradually accepted that there was no real conflict between the two.74 This perceived relative decline in the intensity of the issue among Orthodox Jewish scientists parallels the decline in the AOJS itself, from a membership of nearly two thousand in the early 1960s to about eight hundred in the late 1990S. In part this decline reflects the security felt by the increasing number of Orthodox Jews who pursue scientific careers, while at the same time assigning their scientific and religious activities to separate domains.

* Another change is the significant growth of interest in the”transcendence of science” strategy grounded in kabbala. One key factor is the increasing level of “haredization”-the tendency towards ultra-Orthodox ideologies-within contemporary Orthodox Jewry.76 Most Haredim tend to ignore science, but those who do take it seriously often opt for a mystical reconciliation of Torah and science. Moreover, in recent decades, kabbalistic explanations of the world have become ubiquitous, enthusiastically accepted by many Jews and non-Jews alike.

* Finally, it is important to place Orthodox discussions of evolution in the context of outreach activities aimed at non-Orthodox Jews, which has been an important dynamic element within the Orthodox community.79 For those firmly within the ultra-Orthodox camp, where any conflict between Torah and science is decided in favor of Torah, arguments about evolution are not that important. Similarly, arguments about evolution are not important for those Orthodox Jews who accept modern science and reinterpret Torah to various degrees to accommodate scientific results. Rather, the audience for those refutations and explanations of evolution detailed in this article consists principally of ba’alei teshuvah (Jews from non-Orthodox backgrounds who have recently become Orthodox)80 and those who are seeking to draw non-Orthodox Jews into the Orthodoxfold.81 Thus many of the publications cited in this paper aimed at ba’alei teshuvah or potential ba’alei teshuvah who might find Orthodoxy more attractive if the seeming contradictions between their conception of Judaic belief and scientific theory could be resolved. As Slitkin states when discussing the age of the universe, “[T]he scientific evidence for an old universe is …so vast and overwhelming that it is rather unwise to simply wave it away (and the effects on Jewish outreach efforts are disastrous):’82 Thus, ultimately, the issue of the relationship between Torah and the theory of evolution within Orthodox Judaism is connected to the way Orthodoxy is presented to those Jews who are not born Orthodox but are in the process of coming to accept the ideas and ideology of Orthodox Judaism.

* Many scholars have explained how social Darwinism underpinned Hitler’s militarism and racism by showing that Hitler’s doctrine of racial struggle and his policy of racial extermination were largely shaped by social Darwinist racial thought, which was prominent among early twentieth-century German scientists and physicians.! In their analyses of the period historians have generally defined “social Darwinism” as the program to apply Darwinian principles to human society, while insisting that humans are subject to an inexorable struggle for existence. Indeed, social Darwinists exulted in the beneficence arising from human rivalry, even when it resulted in the death of the losers, since it would promote biological progress for the human species. By the term “social Darwinist racism” is meant the struggle for existence between human races that yields biological advance, while ultimately resulting in the extermination of the “inferior” races. This does not mean that all social Darwinist racists promoted the extermination of inferior races, although most conceived of the European imperialists as biologically, culturally, and intellectually superior to the aboriginal peoples being decimated by them. We should also remember that not all Darwinists embraced social Darwinism or racism, since neither was a necessary concomitant of the scientific theory of evolution. However, like the vast majority of their European contemporaries, most leading Darwinists in the late nineteenth century maintained ideas of inequality between the races and believed that racial struggle resulting in the extermination of some races played an integral role in the progressive selectionist process leading to biological improvement.

The social Darwinist influence on Hitler’s-and other Germans’-antiSemitism is not straightforward, since Darwinism and anti-Semitism are not necessarily connected. No necessary inference can be drawn from Darwinism to the status of Jews, and some Darwinian biologists, such as Arnold Dodel, a botanist at the University of Zurich in the late nineteenth century, staunchly opposed anti-Semitism on biological grounds.3 Many Jewish scientists and thinkers, especially those with secular leanings, adopted Darwinism with alacrity. The prominent Zionist author Max Nordau, for example, considered Darwinism an integral component of his scientific worldview, and he constructed an ethical philosophy based on Darwinian theory.4

* Jews in Germany and elsewhere in Europe endured centuries of hostility and persecution from the Christian majority-including stereotyping, discrimination, and pogroms. Yet Christian anti-Semites generally accorded Jews a limited amount of toleration; usually their goal was conversion, which would give Jews the same social and legal status as Christians. Many scholars have noted the late nineteenth century shift from traditional forms of Christian anti-Semitism to secular racial anti-Semitism.6 Although the new racial anti-Semitism of the nineteenth century retained many of the longstanding Jewish stereotypes, such as their alleged immorality, it closed the door to assimilation, since Jews could not discard their immoral character, which was now grounded in their biological essence. The only solution was to get rid of the Jews.

* Darwin himself believed that human races were unequal and were locked in a human struggle for existence. Even though he opposed slavery and at times expressed sympathy for those of other races in his Beagle journal, he also expressed the view that the “varieties of man act on each other, in the same way as different species of animals-the stronger always extirpate the weaker.”l0 Later in life he wrote to a colleague that the “more civilised so called Caucasian races have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle for existence. Looking to the world at no very distant date, what an endless number of the lower races will have been eliminated by the higher civilised races throughout the world.” He articulated this same principle in The Descent of Man, claiming, “At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilised races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace throughout the world the savage races.”

* Another leading Darwinist to emphasize the sharp racial distinction between Germans and Jews was the physician Ludwig Buchner, a famous scientific materialist who did more than anyone except Haeckel to popularize Darwinian theory in late nineteenth-century Germany. Buchner, like Darwin and Haeckel, believed that a wide variety of character traits-such as loyalty, diligence, thrift, laziness, greed, and deceit-were hereditary. In Die Macht der Vererbung (1882, The Power of Heredity), he argued that the moral character of nations and races is primarily hereditary, not cultural. Education and training cannot make a significant change in such character, and Buchner claimed that the constancy of the Jewish race proves the slow nature of such change. When Buchner specifically discussed the hereditary character of the Jews, he asserted that they were disposed to be merchants.

* Neither Jews nor Germans were morally responsible for the struggle between them, since it was a product of inescapable biological laws. Further, he advised his fellow Germans not to hate the Jews, just as they do not hate individual enemy soldiers in wars: “The struggle between peoples (Volkerkampj) must be fought without hatred against the individuals, who are compelled to attack, as well as to defend themselves.”

* Not all eugenicists embraced anti-Semitism. Some leading figures in the eugenics movement, such as Alfred Grotjahn and Felix von Luschan, were philo-Semitic. I have found no evidence that Schallmayer, a leading figure in the eugenics movement, was anti-Semitic, and he certainly opposed Nordic racism. Further, quite a few Jewish physicians, feminists, and sexual reformers embraced eugenics. As John Efron has demonstrated, leading Jewish anthropologists even embraced scientific racism in various guises in the early twentieth century, though they tried to use it to combat anti-Semitism.43 In examining the prevalence of biological racism among Zionists, J. Doron has even surprisingly suggested that there “can be no doubt that many German speaking Zionists esteemed as ‘authorities’ race ideologists like Gobineau, Chamberlain, Schemann, Wilser, Woltmann, Driesmans, Fischer, and Gunther.”44

* the highest criterion for morality was the extent to which an action contributed to the preservation of the species. Whatever promoted the health and vitality of the highest members of the species was thus moral. He explained: “Morality and ethics arise from the law of preservation of the species, of the race. Whatever ensures the future of the species, whatever is suitable to elevate the race (Geschlecht) to ever higher stages of physical and mental perfection, that is moral.”

* By [1938] British officialdom had liberalized the admission of refugees, much to the consternation of the Anglo-Jewish establishment, which advocated restrictive admissions policies.

* at a press conference at the Hebrew University in 1934, the poet Chaim Nachman Bialik (1873-1934) bluntly asserted his Jewish identity: “I too, like Hitler, believe in the power of the blood idea.”

Posted in Evolution, Jews, Judaism | Comments Off on Jewish Tradition and the Challenge of Darwinism (2008)

Jews, Nationalism & Hypocrisy

Posted in Jews | Comments Off on Jews, Nationalism & Hypocrisy

Lovemaps: Sexual/Erotic Health and Pathology, Paraphilia, and Gender Transposition In Childhood, Adolescence and Maturity by John Money

* “Dr. John Money is the Duke of Dysfunction, a man who writes about “unspeakable” human sexual problems with such dignity and care that his case histories make me feel almost normal.”
John Waters, jacket endorsement for John Money, Gendermaps: Social Constructionism, Feminism, and Sexosophical History

* Fuckology: Critical Essays on John Money’s Diagnostic Concepts:

* [Robert] Stoller’s most famous work, Perversion: The Erotic Form of Hatred (1975), posits that the defining feature of “perversion,” by which “one can recognize [it] when it appears,” is “hostility.”52 Stoller explains: “Perversion, the erotic
form of hatred, is a fantasy, usually acted out but occasionally restricted to a daydream. . . . It is a habitual, preferred aberration necessary for one’s full satisfaction, primarily motivated by hostility. . . . The hostility in perversion is a fantasy of revenge hidden in the actions that make up the perversion and serves to convert childhood trauma to adult triumph”53 and “in the perverse act the past is rubbed out. This time trauma is turned into pleasure, orgasm, victory.”54 We can see a similarity here between Money’s formulation discussed above—“The negative becomes positive. Tragedy becomes triumph. Aversion becomes addiction”—and Stoller’s pronouncement. Given that Stoller’s canonical text was fi rst published in 1975, while Money’s major
works on paraphilia date from about ten years later, it is likely that Money has borrowed Stoller’s logic…

* Stoller’s Perversion is replete with language that, to the critical contemporary reader, appears freighted with ideology that we might term both homophobic and “kinkphobic.” A prime example is his formulation “such obvious perversions as rape, exhibitionism, sadism, or homosexuality.”

* Religion, indeed, is the prime target for both Money and Stoller. Stoller describes the idea that perversion is merely sinful sexuality as “the product of a Judeo- Christian heritage, fortifi ed in each diff erent generation and place by local conditions in the service of bigots. . . . When one changes the beliefs of society, the sense of sin will dissipate”;63 while Money opines in 1988 in a letter to a colleague with whom he has a correspondence on pornography: “I have come to the conclusion that everything about pornography is so religious, moral, political, legislative, and judicial, and so epistemologically chaotic, that it is beyond science. It’s like trying to argue against the death sentence while the prisoner is already in the death chair.”64 Religious authority thus serves as an irrational, outmoded benchmark against which to assert the progressive, rational, modern neutrality of science. As in the case of Money’s expressed desire to obliterate American religiosity, which he claims in Vandalized Lovemaps is “on another crusade . . . against the heresies of the sexual revolution,”65 Stoller’s book has an apparently radical, social reformist conclusion. Stoller argues that the nuclear family itself produces perversion, and that doing away with the family would decrease the frequency of the condition: “Not knowing
what will come if the family disappears, we cannot know how human sexuality will, in adapting, be modifi ed. My guess is that if all goes well for our race, perversion will die down and variance increase. Perhaps some day perversion will not be necessary.”

* “Professor Money . . . discounted the view that rape is about power not sex. [He] said rape was a specific medical syndrome. He believes 90 per cent of rapists genuinely ‘can’t help themselves.’” (Money has coined a term for this “specific medical syndrome.” Raptophilia is the name he gives to paraphilic rape.) Further, Money is quoted as stating, “They don’t know why they do it, they hate themselves afterward and you can’t help these men till you give them a rest from the sexual drives.”

* Professor Money concluded they were raised in an atmosphere of sexual taboo ‘which is just as strong in New Zealand as it is in Baltimore.’” The article tells us that Money claimed that rapists were likely to have been boys whose healthy sexual rehearsal play between the ages of five and eight had been punished, such that they grew up believing that sexuality was bad. Money is
quoted as saying, “Rapists were never able to believe that sex could be had under normal caring circumstances. It could only be had if it was wicked and naughty and never with a virgin. The woman had to be kicking, fighting, biting and screaming and, more importantly, terrified.”

The New York Times wrote in 1990:

THE derailed sexuality of child molesters, exhibitionists, rapists and deviant murderers, as well as others with peculiar erotic interests that are less repugnant, has its roots in early childhood when the first links between love and sex are forged, a pioneering researcher has demonstrated.

The researcher, Dr. John Money, has traced the development of sexual perversions in scores of people and is the first to track their development from childhood origins to adult expression. He has coined the word lovemap to represent the seemingly indelible brain traces that ultimately help determine what arouses people sexually and enables them to fall in love. A lovemap, as Dr. Money defines it, depicts an idealized lover, love scene and program of erotic activities. Lovemap patterns develop similarly in both heterosexuals and homosexuals, he said.

Through interviews and treatment of adults and children with distorted lovemaps, Dr. Money has concluded that the relevant brain connections are formulated between ages 5 and 8. In fact, a child psychologist in Oslo, Thore Langfeldt, has identified the first indications of sexual perversions in children as young as 3 to 5.

Aberrant erotic development is often fostered by traumatic family and social experiences, and becomes solidified in fantasy, dreams and sometimes sex acts, during adolescence when a floodtide of sexual feelings naturally emerges, said Dr. Money.

The distortions that result, long called sexual perversions, are now known medically as paraphilias. There are no statistics on how many people have paraphilias. While they are believed to be far more common among men than women, Dr. Money suggests they may simply be less violent and better hidden in women, sometimes under the guise of sexual unresponsiveness. …

Paraphilias result when the natural link between romantic love and sexual lust is severed, blocked or distorted. Dr. Money said that the majority of patients with paraphilias he has interviewed have described a strict antisexual upbringing in which sex was either never mentioned or was actively repressed or defiled. Based on reports from adults with paraphilias, Dr. Money predicted that current repressive attitudes toward sex will breed an ever-widening epidemic of aberrant sexual behavior.

Actions that can distort a child’s lovemap include incest, physical abuse or neglect, emotional indifference and seduction by a much older or younger person.

While many, if not most, people emerge from such influences with their lovemaps relatively unwarped, others are severely and permanently traumatized, he said.

”Some children apparently have an inherent vulnerability to develop a vandalized lovemap,” Dr. Money said. But it is not yet known if that vulnerability is determined by genetics, anatomy, hormones, brain development or a combination of factors.

Dr. Money explained that because of experiences or messages received in childhood, some susceptible adolescents are unable to unite ”defiling lust” with ”purifying love” and instead develop a warped or distorted lust-love connection. The resulting sexual pathology represents an unconscious move to preserve lust by separating it from love or, in some cases, to maintain the purity of love by repressing lust, he said.

In one case, for example, a 40-year-old man who was born with a thyroid deficiency had been overwhelmed as a boy by an alternatingly seductive and tempestuous mother who was preoccupied with his lagging physical and mental development. The mother had obvious disdain for her acquiescent husband, and the marriage ended in divorce during the boy’s teens.

A Traumatic Experience

The child was further traumatized by one of his first sexual experiences just before adolescence, a masturbation episode with other boys and one young girl. When the girl was killed by a car a week later, the boy interpreted the tragedy as God’s punishment for his sin. In his early 20’s he recognized his attraction to young girls. Even though he was able to perform sexually with women his own age, he had evolved a pedophilic lovemap that precluded his falling in love with anyone but early adolescents like the girl who died.

Even though the events precipitating a paraphilia may be initially terrifying and painful, they can ultimately emerge as a compelling source of pleasure through a twist in the brain that converts aversion to addiction.

In the development of a paraphilia, Dr. Money explained, lust becomes merged with a ritual or act that not only negates love but may also invite punishment. After the merger, what was once repugnant or forbidden is sought in an addictive fashion, despite the risks and threats of reprisal.

According to Dr. Money, a learning theory known as opponent-process describes this unconscious mental switch of negative to positive as a kind of psychological survival mechanism. Rather than caving in under the negative stress, the person turns it into an advantage, a desirable end.

As for malignant social influences, he and other researchers found no evidence that pornography causes or fosters the development or expression of paraphilias. Rather, he explained, a person with a particular pattern of erotic arousal seeks out pornographic material that ”turns him on” because it meshes with that pattern.

Categories

From Fetishes To Predation

To obtain a clearer perspective on the nature and origin of paraphilias, Dr. Money has grouped the 40 or so of them that are known into six major categories, or strategies, which are described in detail in his 1986 book ”Lovemaps” (paperback, Prometheus Books, $15.95).

* Sacrifice and expiation. These allow for the expression of ”sinful lust” on condition that the person atone for its irrevocable defilement of ”saintly love.” Attempts at atonement may take the form of penance, for example, by self-administered asphyxiation or electrical shock, or the form of sacrifice of the partner through sadistic acts or lust murder.

* Marauding and predation. Sinful lust is permitted into the lovemap on the condition that it be stolen, abducted or imposed by force. A person with a predatory lovemap may be either predator or prey. Examples include rape and stealing to induce erotic arousal. Dr. Money pointed out that a rape paraphilia demands that the victim be terrified and struggle against the rapist; a victim who does not resist may incite the rapist to deadly threats or violent assault to induce the resistance needed to maintain his sexual arousal.

* Mercantile and venal strategies. Here lust is granted expression on the condition that it is traded, bartered or purchased, not freely exchanged, for example, by buying sex from a prostitute or hustler or by exchanging play money with a spouse.

* Fetishes and talismans. Lust is given expression through a token, fetish or talisman that is a substitute for the lover, such as certain odors or tactile sensations, as in fetishes involving rubber, leather, fur or silk fabrics or garments.

* Stigmata and eligibility strategies. Lust can be expressed without defiling the lover by having a partner who is not part of the person’s social set and would evoke disapproval from the family. Such partners include children, people with missing limbs and those of another race or religion. A well-known example, Dr. Money noted, is Peter Pan, who as the boy who never grew up was the erotic self of his creator, Sir James Barrie, known to have had intense attachments to sexually immature boys.

* Solicitation and allure. Exhibitionism, voyeurism and the dependence on pornography for sexual excitement are the best known examples of this paraphilic strategy, in which a kind of foreplay is substituted for the actual act of copulation. Dr. Money explained that a flasher’s excitement depends on a reaction of fear, disgust or surprise from the victim. If she shows indifference, this may prompt him to come closer or try harder to frighten her. The most effective deterrent, he said, would be a matter-of-fact comment that is sexually defusing, such as ”Don’t you know you should keep your pants zipped in public?”

Here are some excerpts from this 1986 book:

* Lovemaps! They’re as common as faces, bodies and brains. Each of us has one. Without it there would be no falling in love, no mating, and no breeding of the species.

* There is a rather sophisticated riddle about what a boyfriend (or girlfriend) and a Rorschach inkblot have in common. The answer is that you project an image of your own onto each. In many instances, a person does not fall in love with a partner, per se, but with a partner as a Rorschach love-blot. That is to say, the person projects onto the partner an idealized and highly idiosyncratic image that diverges from the image of that partner as perceived by other people. Hence the popular idiom that love is blind, for a lover projects onto a partner, or love-blot, his/her unique love image, as unique as his/her own face or finger print.

* a lovemap is not present at birth. Like a native language, it differentiates within a few years thereafter. It is a developmental developmental representation or template in your mind/brain, and is dependent on input through the special senses, it depicts your idealized lover and what, as a pair, you do together in the idealized, romantic, erotic, and sexualized relationship. A lovemap exists in mental imagery first, in dreams and fantasies, and then maybe translated into action with a partner or partners. Under optimum conditions, prenatally and postnatally, a lovemap differentiates as heterosexual without complexities. Age-concordant, gender-different, sexuoerotic rehearsal play in infancy and childhood is prerequisite to healthy heterosexual lovemap formation. Deprivation and neglect of such play may induce pathology of lovemap formation, as also may prohibition, prevention, and abusive punishment and discipline. Conversely, exposure too abruptly to socially tabooed expressions of sexuoeroticism may traumatize lovemap formation.

* Lovemap pathology, whereas it has its genesis early in life, manifests itself in full after puberty. The three categories of pathology are hypophilia (also referred to as sexual dysfunction), hyperphilia (erotomania), and paraphilia (legally known as perversion). In all three, there is a cleavage between love and lust in the design of the lovemap. In hypophilia, the cleavage is such that lust is dysfunctional and infrequently used, whereas love and lovebonding are intact. In hyperphilia, lust displaces love and lovebonding, and the genitalia function in the service of lust alone, typically with a plurality of partners, and with compulsive frequency. In paraphilia, love and lovebonding are compromised because the genitalia continue to function in the service of lust, but according to the specifications of a vandalized and redesigned lovemap, and often with compulsive frequency, also. The redesigned lovemap manifests itself in fantasy, and in the staging of that fantasy in an actual performance. A paraphilia typically has a dual existence, one in fantasy, and one as fantasy carried out in practice. On the criterion of its mental imagery, a paraphilia is a mental template or lovemap that, in response to the neglect, suppression, or traumatization of its normophilic formation, has developed with distortions, namely, omissions, displacements, and inclusions that would otherwise have no place in it. A paraphilia permits sexuoerotic arousal, genital performance, and orgasm to take place, but only under the aegis, in fantasy or live performance, of the special substitute imagery of the paraphilia. A paraphilia is a strategy for turning tragedy into triumph according to the principles of opponent-process theory. This strategy preserves sinful lust in the lovemap by dissociating it from saintly love.

* Sexosophy, the philosophy of sex characteristic of each major religion, influences the childhood development of lovemaps and their paraphilias. The definitive characteristic of the sexosophy of Christendom is the doctrine of the split between saintly love and sinful lust. This doctrine is all-pervasive. It penetrates all the institutions of contemporary Christendom. One way or another, usually quite deviously, it penetrates all of our child-rearing practices. Inevitably, therefore, it penetrates the formation of lovemaps in the early years of childhood. That is why, in this book, the pathological lovemaps of the paraphilias are developmentally explained in saint and sinner terms.

* Paraphilias are not generated at random. They belong to one of six categories: sacrificial/expiatory; marauding/predatory; mercantile/venal; fetishistic/talismanic; stigmatie/eligibilie; and solicitational/allurative.

* Paraphilias are not socially contagious.

* Kinky and bizarre are the popular words for paraphilic sexual fantasies and practices. Legally, they are called perverted and deviant. Medicine and science only recently gave up using the legal terms and adopted for full-time use the formerly neglected biomedical term, paraphilic, and its noun paraphilia.

* The word, paraphilia, is constructed from two Greek roots. Philia means love, as in Philadelphia, the city of brotherly love. Para-, the prefix that precedes it, means that the love goes beyond what is ordinarily expected or is apart from it. Thus, in medical usage it also means abnormal. Paranoid, by analogy, refers to abnormal thinking that goes beyond, or is apart from the usual by being delusional.

* Lifelong lovebonding that begins at age eight and continues through marriage into adulthood demonstrates that the imagery of erotic attraction and genital arousal can, like native language, be well established at an early age.

* An eight year old’s lovemap of the standard, heterosexual boy-meets-girl, girl-meets-boy design may be carelessly vandalized by adults.

* On the basis of what can be ascertained ethnographically from societies that do not blanket their children’s sexuoerotic development under such a taboo, it is reasonable to infer that the lovemaps of the majority, if not all of the children, turn out to be heterosexual.

* Vandalism of the developing lovemap under the aforesaid circumstances is effected because the experience constitutes entrapment in a catch-22. That is to say, the children are damned if they do, and damned if they don’t disclose what has happened. The penalty of nondisclosure is continued entrapment with no escape possible.

* As in the case of any wound, a vandalized lovemap tries to heal itself. In the process it gets scarred, skewed, and misshapen. Some of its features get omitted, some get displaced, and some get replaced by substitutes that would not otherwise be included. Omissions transform an ordinary heterosexual lovemap into a hypophilic one. Displacements and inclusions transform it into a paraphilic one. The paraphilic transformation seems at the time to be a satisfactory compromise. It disassociates lust from its vandalized place in the heterosexual lovemap, and relocates it. In the long run, however, the relocation proves to be a compromise that is too costly. In a paraphilic lovemap, lust is attached to fantasies and practices that are socially forbidden, disapproved, ridiculed or penalized. The penalty may be very severe. It may be the death penalty.

* Conjecturally, the most vulnerable years for lovemap vandalism are likely to be between ages five and eight.

* Major erotosexual traumas during this period may disrupt the consolidation of the lovemap that would otherwise be taking place. Further disruption may take place during the peripubertal years; but after puberty, the lovemap, if it changes, does so chiefly by decoding what has already been encoded into it. Once a lovemap has been formed it is, like native language, extremely resistant to change. Like native language, a person’s lovemap also bears the mark of his own unique individuality, or accent. Even though it be a conventionally heterosexual one, it is usually quite specific as to details of the physiognomy, build, race and color of the ideal lover, not to mention temperament, manner, and so on.

* As paradoxical as it appears, corporal punishment may affect the genitals and their sensations. In boys the evidence is visible, for they get a panic erection. The best explanation of this reaction is in terms of a spread of autonomic nervous-
system activity governing the response to bodily injury into that which governs the sexuoerotic response. Such a spread or overflow is acknowledged in the vernacular of a former era in which sadomasochism was known as the English or the German perversion. This was in recognition of the harshness of repetitious corporal punishment of young boys in the elite schools of those two countries. The effect may have been supplemented by repetitious homosexual submission enforced by older boys.

* Even detailed peculiarities of the lovemap may be traced to early origins, as in the case of an exhibitionist who exposed his penis to elderly ladies in church, and then urinated on the floor. He had a history of being an abused foster child. One foster mother, a devoutly religious and church-going lady, punished him for being a bed wetter by requiring him to sleep on urine-stenched straw in the basement and to wear his urine soaked underclothing to school. In his next foster home, he had a positive relationship with younger parents. There he underwent the development of puberty. Proud of his first ejaculation, he showed his erected penis to his foster mother, for which he was expelled from the home by her husband. Thenceforth, he was permanently addicted to exhibiting in church, more frequently during periods of work or marital stress than at other times. A lovemap may develop to replicate a juvenile sexual experience, but with the ages of the participants reversed.

* The sexuoerotic relationship of his parents together, when it is subject to disharmony and feuding, may have a paraphilic effect on a child’s developing lovemap. The child is caught in the crossfire, so that his allegiance cannot be shared equally with both parents. In a case of somnophilia, or the sleeping princess syndrome, the juvenile history illustrates the subtlety of this dilemma. The boy would see his mother, in the aftermath of marital strife over the husband’s infidelity, sleeping alone on the couch in the living room, clad only in a negligee. He was a favorite son, and he could imagine her pose being a solicitation. In recall, he cannot distinguish whether it was in actuality or in vivid fantasy that he performed cunnilingus on her. From adolescence onward, his paraphilia was to intrude illicitly on a sleeping woman and offer her the gift of cunnilingus. If asked to leave, he would. Eventually he was arrested, charged with rape, and imprisoned. It is quite possible that in actual paraphilic rape, as in this case of somnophilia, there is a high prevalence of incest, in fact and fantasy, in the history.

* There are some cases in which a paraphilic lovemap has its genesis in a lonely struggle in which other people are involved by default, not by direct participation. This type of struggle goes on in children who grow up stigmatized by a deformity that threatens their future eligibility as a romantic romantic and sexuoerotic partner. Birth defects of the sexual organs exemplify this threat explicitly. One type of birth defect is micropenis (Money, Lehne and Pierre-Jerome, 1984). One youth with this defect discovered in himself at adolescence a paraphilic. gothic fantasy of bondage and death: after a wild sexual fling, he tied the woman to an ivy vine. By daybreak it had entwined her and so luxuriantly overgrown the wall of the house that her fate was never discovered Nor was the secret of his small penis.

* a child who enters adolescence with an eccentrically developed lovemap will not readily find a partner whose lovemap reciprocally matches his/her own. In the absence of a sufficient degree of mutual lovemap matching, the first culmination of a sexuoerotic relationship in intromission is likely to be experienced as perfunctory, crass, exploitative, defiling, or traumatic. The dual buildup of sensual excitement that belongs to the limerent (Tennov, 1979) or love-smitten couple will be deficient or missing. The experience will have, rather, an aversive quality. In a comparison of college men who sought sex therapy and those who did not, Sarrell and Sarrell (1983) reported that both groups could remember equally well the situation in which their first ejaculation, or semenarche, occurred. The sex-therapy group recalled the situation as predominantly negative, and the control group as positive. Situational components of women’s first experience of intercourse (Weis, 1983) influenced also its negative or positive aftermath, according to their own affective ratings.

* Not only at college age, but also during the developmental years of childhood, sexuoerotic rehearsal play, matching of the lovemaps for age synchrony and image reciprocity has a more healthy developmental outcome than does mismatching.

* that the male’s threshold for visual erotic arousal is set lower than the female’s, prenatally. Conversely, the human female’s threshold for tactile erotic arousal is set lower than the male’s.

* One source of evidence is that explicit erotic pictures, movies and videotapes appeal more to males than to females, whereas women turn more to tales of romance and soap operas of yielding and being taken. Another source of evidence is that boys at puberty are greeted with very explicit visual images of eroticism in their wet dreams, for which there is no exact pubertal counterpart in girls.

* The mental content of a boy’s wet dreams, or his masturbation fantasies, does not appear out of the blue, but has its history in the development of his lovemap. In fact, it is a vivid presentation of his lovemap. His first wet dream may, in fact, be the first full unveiling of the design of the lovemap.

* the greater paraphilic vulnerability of the male is somehow based on his greater dependency on the visual image for the arousal of erotic initiative.

* Just as boys are more vulnerable than girls to developmental developmental speech and reading disabilities, so also are they more vulnerable to developmental lovemap disabilities. The imagery of their predominantly visual lovemaps is subject to a wider variety of paraphilic disruptions than is the predominantly tactual imagery of the lovemaps of girls.

* It goes without saying that girls are developmentally exposed to vandalism of their lovemaps, just as are boys. Their response to such vandalism is in keeping with their lesser dependence on visual imagery than on tactual imagery and the skin senses for erotic arousal and initiative. Vandalism destroys or distorts their future potential to respond not to the romantic strategies and initial approach of the male, but to the follow-through in naked body contact, especially contact of the sex organs, and orgasm.

* Vandalism of the lovemap in girls is more likely to issue in hypophilia than paraphilia. The canon of hypophilia includes erotic apathy or inertia, erotic revulsion, genital penetration phobia, lubrication failure, vaginal spasm (vaginismus), failure to climax (anorgasmia), and coital or postcoital pain (dyspareunia).

* The distinguishing mark of a paraphilia is the imagery of its lovemap, which appears as dream or fantasy and gets translated into practice. Thus it is feasible to designate paraphilic disorders as disorders of proception, by contract with hypophilias, which are disorders of acception. The distinction is often fuzzy for, behind many a disorder of acception there lurks, covertly, a paraphilic proceptive fantasy. It may remain covert, even in the course of sex therapy, unless subject to explicit inquiry. Being disorders of proception, paraphilias are also disorders of pairbonding and, therefore, of falling in love. It is actually a misnomer to call them sexual disorders. They are disorders of love, not lust.

* In mythology and folklore, there are many versions of woman as the madonna and woman as the whore. Man is, correspondingly, the provider and the profligate. Female or male, one is the saint, and the other is the sinner. One typifies love. The other typifies lust. The cleft between saintly love and sinful lust is omnipresent in the sexuoerotic heritage of our culture. Love is undefiled and saintly. Lust is defiling and sinful. Love exists above the belt, lust below. Love is lyrical. Lust is lewd. Love is heralded in public. Lust is hidden in private. Love displayed is championed, but championships for lust are condemned. Love is candid, and speaks its name. Lust is clandestine and euphemizes its name. In some degree or other, the cleavage between love and lust gets programed into the design of the lovemaps of all developing boys and girls. In mild degree, it is accommodated in the lovemap by means of evasiveness or joking. In serious degree, it defaces the lovemap and leaves residual hypophilia, hyperphilia, or paraphilia in which the irreconcilability of love and lust is perpetuated.

* For some paraphiles, there is a two-step, or split solution. It lies in carrying out the paraphilic lust ritual on different occasions than when engaging in sexual activity with the regular partner. Then, while having sexual intercourse with the regular partner, the imagery of the paraphilic ritual is replayed in memory, in order to achieve genital response and orgasm. It is just such a disjunction that astonishes the neighbors, the wife, and the family of the model husband and father when he is arrested as a Jack-the-Ripper lust murderer.

* Disjunction between a paraphilic fantasy and the bodily performance of copulation includes the regular partner only as copulatory vessel. He/she is spared from the defilement of lust enacted in the paraphilia. Excluded from the dramatis personae in the replay of the paraphilia in fantasy, the partner has, albeit inchoately, a sense of being superfluous—an escort, maybe, wanted as a body, but not as a lover.

When there is no such disjunction between two people having a sexuoerotic encounter together, the conjunction of the erotic imagery of their matching lovemaps serves its arousal purpose during the proceptive phase. Then, as the proceptive phase assimilates into the acceptive one, lovemap imagery yields to the sensuousness and sensuality of bodily contact, especially the voluptuous feeling of approaching orgasm. The two partners become oblivious of all else as they correspond bodily with one another, and feel metaphorically merged as one. As compared with such a complete matching of two lovemaps a partial match is like two chimeras, each pressurizing the other to fit its own image. There are three possible outcomes. One is to separate, either amicably or acrimoniously. Another is to stay together, feuding. The third is to stay together, one partner yielding to the other in what amounts to a collusion or complicity.

* For the average person it is an enigma that a wife would stay married for 25 years to a husband whose paraphilic sadism was always injuriously abusive; or that an abducted ten year old boy would pass up many opportunities for escape from his pedophilic abductor and stay with him after witnessing the lust murder of another boy his own age; or even that the girlfriend of a paraphilic transvestite would advise him on fashions and cosmetics, help him cross-dress and then escort him in public, and eventually marry him, and get pregnant by him.

* The collusional type of marriage may be maintained also when a husband, after revealing himself as a paraphilic masochist, becomes relegated to a role like that of a family dog, chained and locked in the house by his wife, totally dispossessed of all his savings and investments. After escaping with the help of friends, he then escapes from them and returns back to his domestic prison.

* The postmantal collusion of a marital partner in paraphilia that was previously kept hidden suggests that there were some premonitory signs of temperament or personality by which the couple recognized themselves as mutually matched, before the details were spelled out. The premonition may be something as nonspecific as a recognition of who would be the domineering.

domineering partner, and who the submissive one. The premonition may be reciprocal, or it may be one-sided. If one-sided, then the recruitment of the one partner into the other’s paraphilia may be a by-product of falling in love. It could be that the love affair marks the onset of a new phase of development in which partners assimilate each other’s quirks and foibles, as well as the principles they live by They may do it reciprocally, or it may be one-sided, with one partner being more dictatorial than the other. To understand better the power that one person may have in shaping the destiny of another, it is necessary to think in terms of the phenomenon known as brainwashing.

* In the course of the genesis of paraphilia in childhood development, there are two principles according to which a regular, heterosexual lovemap gets redesigned into becoming paraphilic. One is the principle of inclusion: something or someone not expected to be in a lovemap becomes incorporated into it. The other is the principle of displacement: one of the proceptive features of the lovemap becomes dislocated or displaced into the acceptive phase.

* A shared principle of all paraphilic lovemaps is that they represent tragedy turned into triumph. The tragedy is the defacement of an ordinarily developing heterosexual lovemap. The triumph is the rescue of lust from total wreckage and obliteration and its attachment to a redesigned lovemap. The new map gives lust a second chance, but at a price. The price is that the new map dissociates the saint from lust, and the sinner from love. The madonna and whore are forever sundered, and likewise the provider and the profligate. Lust belongs only to the whore and the profligate, love to the madonna and the provider. The madonna and the provider are, like Dr. Jekyll, dissociated from the whore and the profligate, their equivalents, respectively, of Mr. Hyde. A paraphilic lovemap is a ruse of sorts—a circuitous or behind-the-scenes way of getting a certificate of admission to the theater of lust. Paraphilia is almost always imbued with some degree of furtiveness, deviousness, and deceit. At the same time, it is histrionic, flamboyant, and self-incriminatory. The paraphile whose lovemap is the means of his sexuoerotic survival is like the survivor of torture or catastrophe—or even surgery—who reiteratively dreams and tells, over and over, the story of how he/she turned the tragedy of suffering into the triumph of survival. This pride of survival is careless about self-incrimination. Paraphilia notoriously leaves incriminating evidence by which it may be traced.

* The paraphilic triumph over tragedy has many affinities with addiction. In the language of common sense, an addiction always has a predicate: one is addicted to something, as in being addicted to alcohol, heroin, or other chemical substance.

* Eating addiction has a parallel specificity. The obese binge eater is addicted not to eating in general, but to specific foods, such as chocolates or other sweets, carbohydrates, and fatty dishes. The same type of specificity applies also to sex. It is, however, currently fashionable to use the term, sexual addiction (Carnes, 1983), as though the addiction were to practicing anything and everything sexual, if not now, then progressively in a downhill slide. This doctrine of progression is a recrudescence of degeneracy theory—a leftover from antisexualism of last century (Chapter 20). It is just plain wrong. Sexual addictions, like drinking and eating addictions, are extremely particular. The sexual addict is always addicted to something sexually specific. Thus a woman who sought therapeutic help because she despised herself as a nymphomaniac was, in fact, addicted to men whom she could pick up in a singles’ bar. They were good for a one night stand, and then no more. She would resolve to quit her compulsive cruising, but the addiction proved stronger than her resolve, and she repeated it over and over.

* The recipient person or thing of the paraphilia is what defines the addiction, and is its predicate. Another illustration, from one of the fetishistic/talismanic paraphilias, is that of the male transvestite or transvestophile who can perform sexual intercourse with a partner, female usually, but in some cases male, only when he wears female garments, usually underclothes. He is addicted to women’s clothing—the transvestophilic addiction does not, it would appear, occur in women.

* Becoming positively addicted to what initially was negatively aversive is a manifestation of what the psychologist, Richard L. Solomon (1980), has formulated as the opponent-process theory of learning. Opponent-process is seen at work when daredevil stuntmen overcome their initial panic and terror and become addicted to their daredeviltry. Joggers and marathon runners transcend the bodily pain and exhaustion of their exertion and, becoming addicted, get euphoric and high from it. As aforesaid, even the victims of cruel child abuse become addicted to abuse so that, having been rescued, they maneuver to become abused again, as perpetual martyrs. Opponent-process learning takes place quite rapidly. Like all addiction, it is remarkably resistant to change.

* It is possible that the resistance of paraphilic addiction to change lies also in the fact that a paraphilic attraction is the equivalent of the normophilic attraction of falling in love. Love is blind, according to popular wisdom. Criticism of the beloved falls on deaf ears, no matter how rational and logical it may appear to the critics. Family interference meets with resistance and intensification of the bond with the beloved. So strong is the bond that the lover may, indeed, be said to be addicted to the beloved. Being love-smitten may even be the prototype of all addiction. The opponent process can be discerned in all the paraphilias, insofar as they all predicate orgasm on an activity that only the paraphile appreciates as erotic. Others regard the erotization of that acitivty as completely inappropriate, and react with outrage, contempt, or ridicule. For them it would prevent orgasm, not build up to it.

The paraphilic opponent-process strategy for turning tragedy into triumph appears at first glance to generate a motley array of paraphilias, more or less at random. Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that the paraphilias are not generated at random, but that they subdivide into six classes or strategies. Each strategy is a means of triumphing over tragedy. The six are: sacrificial/expiatory; marauding/predatory; mercantile/venal; fetishistic/talismanic; stigmatic/eligibilic; and solicitational/ allurative. In each of the six strategies, a paraphilia is a substitute for normophilia—heterosexual or homosexual, according to the sex of the partner. By definition, a paraphilia has a dual existence, one in fantasy, and one as fantasy carried out in practice. On the criterion of its mental imagery, a paraphilia is a mental template or lovemap (Money, 1983b) that, in response to the neglect, suppression, or traumatization of its normophilic formation, has developed with distortions, namely, omissions, displacements, and inclusions that would otherwise have no place in it. A paraphilia permits sexuoerotic arousal, genital performance, and orgasm to take place, but only under the aegis, in fantasy or live performance, of the special substitute imagery of the paraphilia.

* The sacrificial and expiatory paraphilias are those in which sexuoerotic triumph is wrested from tragedy by means of a strategy that incorporates sinful lust into the lovemap, though only on the condition that it requires reparation or atonement, by way of penance or sacrifice, since it irrevocably defiles saintly love. One or both of the partners may perform the atonement. The penalty ranges from humiliation and hurt to blood sacrifice and death. Self-imposed atonement is masochistic. Performed by the partner, it is sadistic.

* In the irrational syllogism of extreme paraphilic sadism, the transgression is postulated as the heinous and criminal pleasure of sexual orgasm. It requires atonement, and it is the partner who must be afflicted on behalf of the sadist.

* Lust as ordinary sexual intercourse seldom takes place only once in a person’s lifetime. So also the enactment of a paraphilic ritual seldom takes place only once. The occasion when paraphilic murder is discovered is not necessarily the paraphile’s first murder. Self-incrimination is not atypical in the paraphilias. Thus, once traced, a paraphilic murderer may disclose the history and details of his killings—with a virtual vanity of achievement, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, relief that external intervention will, at last, do what internal forces failed to do, namely prevent further recurrences.

* There is no hard-edged dividing line between the abusive and the playful sadomasochistic paraphilias. Nonetheless, many S/M people appear to be permanently anchored on the playful side. With a partner appropriately attuned, it may be possible for the fantasy to be staged as a piece of personal, sexuoerotic theater. Otherwise, it may remain forever coded in the lovemap as fantasy, exclusively. The expiatory and sacrificial paraphilias are not invariably malignant. For some they are benign. Statistically, those may rate as abnormal, but ideologically they are acceptable.

* The marauding and predatory paraphilias are those in which sexuoerotic triumph is wrested from tragedy by means of a strategy that incorporates sinful lust into the lovemap, though only on the condition that it be stolen, abducted, or imposed by force, since it irrevocably defiles saintly love. The person with a predatory lovemap may be either the predator or the prey. Predator and prey may set themselves up as actors in a prearranged paraphilic drama or they may be strangers, the prey being completely unprepared for the imposed role of victim. There are two classes of marauding and predatory paraphilia. One is characterized by attack, assault, and seizure; and the other by stealth, theft, and abduction. Together, they are characterized by taking something without consent.

* The lovemap of a paraphilic rapist excludes the possibility that lust can be expressed by mutual consent. Typically, the partner is a stranger, ambushed and captured by force. Compliancy implies consent, and evokes an escalation of paraphilic intimidation and violence. The victim may, therefore, fare better by an escalation of panic and aversion.

* The obverse of paraphilic marauding and predation is being sexu-oerotically turned on only by a partner who has a predatory history of outrages perpetrated on others.

* The paraphilic appeal of the lover as criminal may entail that he/she be a convicted criminal who has been convicted and spent time in prison. The relationship between the hybristophile and the criminal may actually begin in the prison where the offender is serving time, and the partner is a visitor.

* There is a variant of the syndrome in which the hybristophile taunts and provokes a lover or spouse to commit a criminal act, so as to fulfil the requirements of the paraphilia. The offender is then reported to the police and arrested, or a warrant is put out for his/her arrest. If the next step is imprisonment, then the hybristophilic role is to visit the prisoner, to incite sexual arousal, and then to thwart it, unfulfilled, when the visiting hour terminates. If the prisoner is finally released, and if reconciliation is consummated in sexual intercourse, then the experience of the reconciliation orgasm is one of extravagant intensity and ecstasy. It is the ultimate fulfillment of the imagery in the hybristophile’s lovemap.

* The hybristophilic lovemap excludes the possibility of oneself as the victim of an outrage successfully effected.

* The mercantile and venal paraphilias are those in which sexuoerotic triumph is wrested from tragedy by means of a strategy that incorporates sinful lust into the lovemap, though only on the condition that it be traded, bartered, or purchased and paid for, not freely exchanged, since lust irrevocably defiles saintly love.

* Paraphilic buying and selling may be engaged in not as an actual business contract, but as a form of play acting in a prearranged drama of an as-if contract.

* The prearranged drama may be one of as-if prostitution, without exchange of actual money. Thus, a pair of lovers or spouses may play act a vernacular script of a prostitute and her trick, liberally using dirty words, so-called, that would at all other times be forbidden. A related version of this drama requires that a boyfriend or husband play the role of pimp who picks up a trick to have sex with his own partner.

* There are some people whose sexuoerotic relationship is satisfactory when they live together before the official contract of marriage, whereas after they are legally wed it degenerates. The explanation rests on the familiar sinner/saint principle, for marrige legally transforms a disreputable and lusty sinner relationship into a respectably chaste and saintly one. In this circumstance, the survival of lust may be at the cost of adultery.

* The fetishistic and talismanic paraphilias are those in which sexuoerotic triumph is wrested from tragedy by means of a strategy that incorporates sinful lust into the lovemap, though only on the condition that a token, fetish, or talisman be substituted for the lover, since lust irrevocably defiles saintly love.

* Brassieres, garter belts, hose, and high heels are standard paraphernalia in the visual turn-on of millions of American males, for whom they may be regarded as fetishes, but not to the degree of constituting a complete paraphilic pathology. They are not absolutely prerequisite to most men’s erotic arousal to orgasm, but are rather an extra option. Their absence does not preclude ordinary sexual participation with a partner, nor are they a substitute for the partner. Wearing these garments is also not essential to the woman’s sexuoerotic arousal and climax. They are worn as a concession to the man’s sexuoerotic fixation on them. It is rare to hear of women with a fetishistic fixation on men’s underwear.

* The stigmatic and eligibilic paraphilias are those in which sexuoerotic triumph is wrested from tragedy by means of a strategy that incorporates sinful lust into the lovemap, though only on the condition that the partner be, like a pagan infidel, ineligible to be a saint defiled.

* To be ineligible as a saintly partner, in these paraphilias a person must be socially stigmatized or ostracized as an outsider not suitable for kinship by marriage. The criterion of exclusion may be age, race, nationality, language, religion, social class, occupation, wealth, health, physique, physiognomy, or some insignia of group membership such as the right to wear a uniform.

By shaping an idealized lovemap, a social tradition serves also to ensure assortative mating within its own particular social, tribal, racial, or regional group. Assortative mating preserves group cohesiveness by preventing changes brought about by miscegenation and the hybridization of group values. Historically, the tradition of the arranged marriage has served the same purpose.

* In childhood, to be respected as an equal by an adult is rare, and greatly appreciated. Conversely, the pedophile greatly appreciates being given equal status as a juvenile by his young friend.

* Failure of the idealized image of the lover in a person’s lovemap to advance in age goes hand in hand with failure of the sexuoerotic age of the person to advance in synchrony with his/her chronological age.

* The solicitational and allurative paraphilias are those in which triumph is wrested from tragedy by means of a strategy that incorporates sinful lust into the lovemap, though only on the condition that a solicitational/allurative act belonging to the prelimary or proceptive phase be substituted for the copulatory act of the central or acceptive phase, thus ensuring that saintly love be not defiled by sinful lust.

* The converse of compulsive cruising is unilateral limerence (Tennov, 1979) and compulsive fixation on an unattainable lover, despite desolate failure to lure a reciprocal response. This autistic form of lovesickness goes by the little known name of Clérambault-Kandinsky syndrome (Chapter 16), and may lead to suicide or homicide.

* Ordinary people who are consumers of commercial erotica do not become addicted to it. On the contrary, they become rather rapidly satiated. Thereafter, it occupies a peripheral place in their sex lives, to be called upon when the occasion and the circumstances are fitting.

* On the basis of subjective report, self-mutilation has a paradoxical effect of reducing tenseness and agitation. The calmness that ensues may expand into euphoria and even reach a peak of mystical ecstasy.

* The Hinckley pathology of love goes by the name of the Clérambault-Kandinsky syndrome (Jordan and Howe, 1980). in this syndrome, the more ordinary vicissitudes of love unrequited or unfulfilled are greatly magnified. Similarly, the extremes of paraphilic fugue state are also magnifications of less extremely altered states of consciousness. There are many instances in which the transition from the nonaroused to the aroused, fugue-like paraphilic state escapes attention, or is more or less equated with what ordinarily happens in the transition from being sexuoerotically quiescent to aroused, in response to a present or potential partner.

* The paraphilic fugue or fugue-like state constitutes a dissociation or splitting of the personality so that the sexuoerotic component that constitutes the paraphilia is on one side of the divide, and not the other. The extent to which other components are also split varies. Thus, the personality on the paraphilic side of the split may not only have its own name, but may also dress differently, speak differently, and have different body language than the personality on the non-paraphilic side of the split. It may also have a different social age, and even a different social sexual status. It may have a different balance of traits of temperament—violence versus martyrdom, for instance, in association with the expiatory paraphilias.

* Overall, the paraphilic personality may be more antisocial on the criteria of lying, stealing, gambling, breaking contracts and appointments, failing to carry through on promises, duties, and obligations. All told, the personality on the paraphilic side of the split is more likely to be unorthodox than orthodox with respect to conventional criteria of morality. It could hardly be otherwise. Sexuoerotic dissociation or splitting has its childhood genesis in persona! inability, for whatever reason, to conform to the interventions imposed on sexuoerotic development in the name of obedience to someone else’s moral authoritarianism which is unjustly imposed. The devious ruse of the paraphilia is the childhood solution to this otherwise unnegotiable imposition.

* Exposes of some of the most morally self-righteous crusaders, preachers, and legislators of antisexualism have revealed that their secret personality practiced in private what their public personality crusaded against in the media and elsewhere. In the aftermath of exposure, it is quite possible for the tables to be turned, so that a person crusades in favor of that which he formerly crusaded against. This turning of the tables may also occur in the aftermath of treatment, as when a former paraphilic rapist becomes an advocate of women’s sexual rights; or when a former pedophile becomes an advocate of sexual age-matching. Such a turnabout may, or may not be accompanied by religious conversion, extreme self-righteousness, and not only an altered, but an exalted state of consciousness resembling that of the paraphilic fugue state itself.

* To be able to live with a paraphile over an extended period of time, married or not, the partner needs to have a lovemap that reciprocally matches his/hers, either because they started out that way, or because her/his lovemap adaptively accommodated to his/hers. A girl with a childhood history of sexual abuse, for example, developed a lovemap in which she is an abused martyr. As a young woman, she married an older man newly released from serving time in prison as a pedophile. He was potentially more attracted to her young daughter than to her. The woman was thus exempted from coitus which, in her lovemap was equated with further victimization, as in childhood. At the same time, her abused-martyr role was not threatened, for his syndrome daily threatened her with martydom as a potential prisoner’s widow. This relationship held together until he went on antiandrogen treatment, and was relieved of the threat of a pedophilic relapse.

* Kellogg’s medical hobby was dietary health. He processed cereals and nuts as substitutes for meat, to suppress carnal desire induced by the eating of meat. Few of today’s eaters of Kellogg’s Com Flakes know that he invented them, almost literally, as antimasturbation food.

Kellogg was degeneracy theory’s most ardent antimasturbation advocate. For intractable cases of masturbation in boys he recommended sewing up the foreskin with silver wire; or, if that failed, circumcision without anesthesia. For girls, he recommended burning out the clitoris with carbolic acid. For fathers, he wrote detailed instructions of how they should silently encroach upon their sleeping sons and rapidly pull back the blankets. An erect penis was prima facie evidence of the sleeping sinner caught in secret vice. Kellogg knew nothing of nocturnal penile tumescence. Whatever his wife might have told him about his own erection during sleep was forever unknown to him, because he saved his semen by sleeping alone and never consummating his marriage. Instead, he was a klismaphiliac who had his senior medical assistant give him an enema every morning, after breakfast.

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Forward: America’s Jewish institutions were failing. Coronavirus hastened their demise.

Joel Swanson writes:

I’m talking about Jewish establishment organizations like the Jewish Federation, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Jewish community centers, lobbying groups like the American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress, and explicitly political groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. According to Harold Weisberg of B’nai Brith, many of these organizations explicitly saw their mission in the United States as a substitute for “the great religious discipline which in the past permeated every aspect of individual and communal life” in the Old Country.

And now we may be facing the end of this organizational life…

The development of the post-World War II American Jewish establishment was a process of consolidating a fractious and diverse community into a limited number of organized groups. But it was also a matter of defining a particular set of consensus politics for that community. Historian Arthur Goren has defined it as the “functional consensus” of postwar American Jewish politics, focused first and foremost around two particular political commitments: “assuring Israel’s security and striving for a liberal America.” This “consensus of support for Israel, coupled with a liberal domestic agenda,” would define American Jewish politics for two generations.

Of course, there was a certain amount of tension built into this political consensus from the beginning. American political liberalism defines itself in explicitly non-sectarian terms, as an ideology of civil equality that applies equally to all Americans, regardless of race, ethnicity, or creed. For this reason, Jewish interests in the United States were, in the words of Jack Wertheimer, expressed in explicitly universal terms, “as part of a larger campaign of social action, rather than solely as a parochial cause, to insure that no group in America suffered unfair treatment.”

In other words, American Jews were domestic political liberals because, as a small minority community with a long history of persecution and ethnic oppression, we had an explicit interest in promoting equality for all, in assuring that the white Christian majority did not impose its will over minority communities in the United States.

For this reason, the American Jewish Committee defended its decision to work on behalf of the Black civil rights movement on the grounds that “there is the closest relation between the protection of the civil rights of all citizens and the protection of the civil rights of the members of particular groups.”

The state of Israel, meanwhile, was explicitly founded as a state designed to promote the interests of the Jewish people above those of other communities.

As Daniel Gordis has explained, the state of Israel was never intended to be “an ethnicity-blind, religiously-neutral liberal democracy,” as was the United States, but rather “was always intended to be an ethnic democracy, meaning that one people would be at the center of the country’s commitments.” While the Israeli Declaration of Independence did include a clause insisting the new nation would “ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex,” this clause only came after the clause declaring that the state of Israel would “be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles,” defining the safeguarding of one particular ethno-religious community as the state’s reason for being.

So there was a certain amount of conflict built into the postwar American Jewish consensus of supporting liberal democracy at home and ethnic democracy abroad from the start.

Going forward, American Jews are going to have to choose: We can either support a political liberalism of equal rights for all, here in the US, in Israel, and all over the world — or we can support ethnic nationalism. But we can’t have it both ways.

The United States was not founded as a racially blind country. Until the 1960s, Americans saw themselves as dominantly white with a 10-20% black minority. Jared Taylor writes:

Today, the United States officially takes the position that all races are equal. Our country is also committed―legally and morally―to the view that race is not a fit criterion for decision-making of any kind, except for promoting “diversity” or for the purpose of redressing past wrongs done by Whites to non-Whites.

Many Americans cite the “all men are created equal” phrase from the Declaration of Independence to support the claim that this view of race was not only inevitable but was anticipated by the Founders. Interestingly, prominent conservatives and Tea Party favorites like Michele Bachman and Glenn Beck have taken this notion a step further and asserted that today’s racial egalitarianism was the nation’s goal from its very first days.[1]

They are badly mistaken.

Since early colonial times, and until just a few decades ago, virtually all Whites believed race was a fundamental aspect of individual and group identity. They believed people of different races had different temperaments and abilities, and built markedly different societies. They believed that only people of European stock could maintain a society in which they would wish to live, and they strongly opposed miscegenation. For more than 300 years, therefore, American policy reflected a consensus on race that was the very opposite of what prevails today.

Those who would impute egalitarianism to the Founders should recall that in 1776, the year of the Declaration, race slavery was already more than 150 years old in North America and was practiced throughout the New World, from Canada to Chile.[2] In 1770, 40 percent of White households in Manhattan owned Black slaves, and there were more slaves in the colony of New York than in Georgia.[3] It was true that many of the Founders considered slavery a terrible injustice and hoped to abolish it, but they meant to expel the freed slaves from the United States, not to live with them in equality.

Thomas Jefferson’s views were typical of his generation. Despite what he wrote in the Declaration, he did not think Blacks were equal to Whites, noting that “in general, their existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection.”[4] He hoped slavery would be abolished some day, but “when freed, he [the Negro] is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture.”[5] Jefferson also expected whites eventually to displace all of the Indians of the New World. The United States, he wrote, was to be “the nest from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled,”[6] and the hemisphere was to be entirely European: “… nor can we contemplate with satisfaction either blot or mixture on that surface.”[7]

Jefferson opposed miscegenation for a number of reasons, but one was his preference for the physical traits of Whites. He wrote of their “flowing hair” and their “more elegant symmetry of form,” but emphasized the importance of color itself[8]:

Are not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of every passion by greater or less suffusions of colour in the one [whites], preferable to that eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that immovable veil of black, which covers all the emotions of the other race?

Like George Washington, Jefferson was a slave owner. In fact, nine of the first 11 Presidents owned slaves, the only exceptions being the two Adamses. Despite Jefferson’s hope for eventual abolition, he made no provision to free his slaves after his death.

James Madison agreed with Jefferson that the only solution to the race problem was to free the slaves and expel them: “To be consistent with existing and probably unalterable prejudices in the U.S. freed blacks ought to be permanently removed beyond the region occupied by or allotted to a White population.”[9] He proposed that the federal government buy up the entire slave population and transport it overseas. After two terms in office, he served as chief executive of the American Colonization Society, which was established to repatriate Blacks. Read on.

Posted in America, Blacks, Jews | Comments Off on Forward: America’s Jewish institutions were failing. Coronavirus hastened their demise.

The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy

Here are some highlights from this 1992 book by Seymour Hersh:

* America’s most important military secret in 1979 was in orbit, whirling effortlessly around the world every ninety six minutes, taking uncanny and invaluable reconnaissance photographs of all that lay hundreds of miles below. The satellite, known as KH-11, was an astonishing leap in technology: its images were capable of being digitally relayed to ground stations where they were picked up–in “real time”-for instant analysis by the intelligence community. There would be no more Pearl Harbors.

The first KH-11 had been launched on December 19, 1976, after Jimmy Carter’s defeat of President Gerald R. Ford in the November elections. The Carter administration followed Ford’s precedent by tightly restricting access to the high-quality imagery: even Great Britain, America’s closest ally in the intelligence world, was limited to seeing photographs on a
case-by-case basis. The intensive security system was given a jolt in March 1979, when President Carter decided to provide Israel with KH-11 photographs.

* Through the 1960s, for example, one of the most sensitive operations in the Agency was code-named KK MOUNTAIN (KK being the CIA’s internal digraph, or designation, for messages and documents dealing with Israel) and provided for untold millions in annual cash payments to Mossad. In return, Mossad authorized its agents to act, in essence, as American surrogates throughout North Africa and in such countries as Kenya, Tanzania, and the Congo. Other intelligence agreements with Mossad revolved around the most sensitive of Israeli activities in the Middle East, where American dollars were being used to finance operations in Syria, and inside the Soviet Union, where the CIA’s men and women found it difficult to spy. Some of the Soviet activities apparently were financed by regular Agency disbursements and thus cleared through the appropriate CIA congressional oversight committees-but the complex amalgamation of American financing and Israeli operations remains one of the great secrets of the Cold War.

The Israelis had responded to Admiral Turner’s 1977 cutback in liaison-in essence, his refusal to pay for the continuing operations in Africa and elsewhere-by sharply reducing their flow of intelligence back to Washington. In the Israeli view, the KH-11 agreement in March 1979 was made inevitable not by the success of Camp David but by the CIA’s failure to anticipate the steadily increasing Soviet pressure on Afghanistan in 1978 and the continuing upheavals in Iran. There were large Jewish communities in both nations-many shopkeepers in Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, were Jewish-and Mossad’s information was far superior to the CIA’s. Most galling to the President and his top aides was the CIA’s embarrassingly inept reporting on Iran, where Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, a U.S. ally of long standing, had been overthrown in February 1979 in a popular uprising–despite a year-long series of upbeat CIA predictions that he would manage to cling to power: The CIA had rejected the Israeli view, provided in a trenchant analysis in 1978 by Uri Lubrani, a former Israeli ambassador to Iran, that the shah would not survive. The CIA had failed the President and forced the American leadership to turn once again to Israeli help in trying to anticipate world events. It was no accident that Lubrani was attached to the Israeli delegation that negotiated the March 1979 KH-11 agreement in Washington.

* French officials reciprocated the Israeli trust: Israeli scientists were the only foreigners allowed access throughout the secret French nuclear complex at Marcoule. Israelis were said to be able to roam “at will.” One obvious reason for the carte blanche was the sheer brilliance of the Israeli scientists and their expertise, even then, in computer technology. The French would remain dependent for the next decade-the first French nuclear test took place in 196~n Israeli computer skills. A second reason for the Israeli presence at Marcoule was emotional: many French officials and scientists had served in the resistance and maintained intense feelings about the Holocaust. And many of France’s leading nuclear scientists were Jewish and strong supporters of the new Jewish state, which was emerging-to the delight of these men-as France’s closest ally in the Middle East.

* Ben-Gurion was treating the Knesset as he always did when it came to issues of state security: as a useless deliberative body that debated and talked instead of taking action. He and his colleagues simply did not believe that the talkative Knesset had a prominent role to play when it came to security issues.

* Like many Jews, Strauss remained hostile to Zionism all of his life, but he won the confidence of his colleagues in the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission by publicly joining them in prayer in Geneva during the 1955 United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, at the time the largest international scientific conference ever held.

[LF: I’m sure this prayer was deeply heartfelt.]

* One Jew who served decades later in a high position in the CIA angrily acknowledged that when he arrived, “every fucking Jew in the CIA was in accounting or legal.” The official wasn’t quite right, but even those few Jews who did get to the top, such as Edward W. Proctor, who served as deputy director for intelligence in the mid-197os, were not given access to all of the sensitive files in connection with Israel. Jews also were excluded from Hebrew language training (at one time called “special Arabic”) in the National Security Agency; such training, of course, is a prerequisite for being assigned to NSA field stations that intercept Israeli communications. There was a flat ban in the Navy communications intelligence agency (known as the Naval Security Group) on the assignment of a Jew to a Middle East issue. There was-and still is-a widespread belief among American foreign service officers that any diplomatic reporting critical of Israel would somehow be delivered within days to the Israeli embassy in Washington. In 1963 the Kennedy administration informally agreed with Israel that neither country would spy on or conduct espionage activities against the other. The agreement was sought by American officials, a former Kennedy aide recalled, in an attempt to limit the extent of Israeli penetration of America. The truth is that Jews and non-Jews alike looked the other way when it came to Israel’s nuclear capability.

* Many American Jews, perhaps understandably, believe the question of “dual loyalty” is an issue that should never be raised in public. They fear that any discussion of Jewish support for Israel at the expense of the United States would feed anti-Semitism; the fear seems to be that non-Jews are convinced that any Jewish support for Israel precludes primary loyalty to the United States. A second issue, in terms of American Jewish support for Israel, is that any public accounting of Israel’s nuclear capacity would trigger renewed fears among Arab nations of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy and a redoubling of Arab efforts to get the bomb.

* “As an American citizen he was outraged,” Bartlett recalled, “to have a Zionist group come to him and say: ‘We know your campaign is in trouble. We’re willing to pay your bills if you’ll let us have control of your Middle East policy.'” Kennedy, as a presidential candidate, also resented the crudity with which he’d been approached. “They wanted control,” he angrily told Bartlett.

* One factor obviously was political: a higher percentage of Jews (81 percent) voted for Kennedy in 1960 than did Roman Catholics (73 percent); it was the Jewish vote that provided Kennedy’s narrow plurality of 114,563 votes over Nixon.

* Kennedy’s complicated feelings about Jewish political power and the Israeli issue were summarized in his appointment of former campaign aide Myer (Mike) Feldman as the presidential point man for Jewish and Israeli affairs. The President viewed Feldman, whose strong support for Israel was widely known, as a necessary evil whose highly visible White House position was a political debt that had to be paid.

* Dayan got a boost in his lobbying sometime in the last few months of 1967 when the Israelis learned from American intelligence that the Soviet Union had added four major Israeli cities -Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheba, and Ashdod-to its nuclear targeting list. This most sensitive information was apparently obtained unofficially, according to a former member of Prime Minister Eshkol’s staff: “We got it in a nonkosher way,” the Israeli explained, without amplification.

A second boost was supplied by Henry Kissinger, then New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller’s foreign policy adviser in the campaign for the Republican nomination. Kissinger met privately in February 1968 with a group of Israeli scholars at the Jerusalem home of Major General Elad Peled, director of Israel’s Defense College, where Kissinger had taught the year before. His message, according to Shlomo Aronson, an academic who has written on Israeli nuclear policy, was electrifying: the United States would not “lift a finger for Israel” if the Soviets chose directly to intervene by, “say, a Soviet missile attack against the Israeli Air Force bases in Sinai.” Aronson, who attended the meeting, quoted Kissinger as making three declarations: “The main aim of any American President is to prevent World War III. Second, that no American President would risk World War III because of territories occupied by Israel. Three, the Russians know this.”

* Yet for Dayan and many of his supporters at Dimona and elsewhere, America had proved its basic unreliability as an ally a month before the Six Day War when it failed to respond to Nasser’s closing of the Strait of Tiran and blockade of Elat. Israeli foreign ministry documents showed that Dwight Eisenhower had promised in writing after the Suez debacle in 1956 that the United States would use force, if necessary, to keep the strait open. Israel called on Johnson to keep that commitment after Nasser’s blockade and felt betrayed upon learning that the State Department considered Eisenhower’s commitment to have expired when Eisenhower left office in early 1961. Only a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate was binding on subsequent administrations, the Israelis were told. Washington, without knowing it, was playing into the hands of Moshe Dayan and his nuclear ambitions.

* After the Six-Day War, and despite Israeli complaints about the increased Soviet threat in the Middle East, the Johnson administration turned out once again to be a fitful ally in Israel’s eyes, as the President-anxious to avoid a break with the Arab world-joined de Gaulle and embargoed all arms deliveries to Israel for 135 days. America did so, bitter Israelis noted, while the Soviets continued to resupply their allies. Johnson also publicly eschewed any firm commitment to defend Israel in a crisis. He was asked by CBS newsman Dan Rather at an end-of-the-year press conference whether the United States had “the same kind of unwavering commitment to defend Israel against invasion as we have in South Vietnam.” His answer satisfied few Israelis: “We have made clear our very definite interest in Israel, and our desire to preserve peace in that area of the world by many means. But we do not have a mutual security treaty with them, as we do in Southeast Asia.”

* By 1973, according to former Israeli government officials, the Israeli nuclear arsenal totaled at least twenty warheads, with three or more missile launchers in place and operational at Hirbat Zachariah; Israel also had an unknown number of mobile Jericho I missile launchers that had been manufactured as part of Project 700. The missiles had been capable since 1971 of hitting targets in southern Russia, including Tbilisi, near the Soviet oil fields, and Baku, off the coast of the Caspian Sea, as well as Arab capitals. There also was a squadron of nuclear capable F-4 fighters on twenty-four-hour alert in underground revetments at the Tel Nof air base near Rehovot. The specially trained F-4 pilots were the elite of the Israeli Air Force and were forbidden to discuss their mission with any outsider. The long-range F-4s were capable of flying one-way to Moscow with a nuclear bomb; the daring pilots would have to be resupplied by an airborne tanker to make it home.

* The increased security of the early 1970s had one immediate casualty: Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan. Dayan’s standing among his peers in the military and the upper echelons of the Israeli government was far lower than among the public; he was considered overrated as a military leader and suspect because of his incessant womanizing and his financial wheeling and dealing-there was categorical evidence, never officially acted upon, of his appropriation of excavated antiquities for personal use, in direct violation of Israeli law: The main complaint about Dayan, however, was over his propensity to talk: one close army associate declared that “he had the biggest mouth in the world.” The Israeli added: “The feeling was that he was a loose cannon at a time when Israel was in a very precarious situation. We wanted the Arabs to know what we had”-without explicitly saying too much. Dayan, with his public statements and leaks to the press, blurred that tactic. There was another problem, the Israeli added: “Dayan went to bed with everything that moved”-not that unusual a trait among aggressive Israeli military men-“but he was totally capable of meeting a good-looking woman and telling her about Dimona. He and Peres felt like they were almost parents” of the nuclear complex. While Dayan lost no authority, it was eventually made clear to him, the Israeli said, that he was no longer welcome at Dimona; he no longer had a military need to know anything about the Israeli nuclear program, which was being managed out of the prime minister’s office.

* By 1973, Dimona’s success in miniaturization enabled its technicians to build warheads small enough to fit into a suitcase; word of the bomb in a suitcase was relayed to the Soviet Union, according to a former Israeli intelligence official, during one of what apparently was a regular series of meetings in Europe between representatives of Mossad and the KGB. The Soviets understood that no amount of surveillance could prevent Israeli agents from smuggling nuclear bombs across the border in automobiles, aircraft, or commercial ships.

Israel’s leadership, especially Moshe Dayan, had nothing but contempt for the Arab combat ability in the early 1970s. In their view, Israel’s main antagonist in the Middle East was and would continue to be the Soviet Union. Dimona’s arsenal, known by the Kremlin to be targeted as much as possible at Soviet cities, theoretically would deter the Soviets from supporting an all-out Arab attack on Israel; the bombs also would give pause to any Egyptian or Syrian invasion plans.

Israel wasn’t ready when Sadat attacked across the Sinai and Syria invaded the Golan Heights on Saturday, October 6, 1973 -Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the holiest day of the year for a Jew. The first days were a stunning rout. Israeli soldiers were being killed as never before; some units simply fled in disarray from battle. Five hundred tanks and forty-nine aircraft, including fourteen F-4 Phantoms, were lost in the first three days. In the Sinai, Egyptian forces, equipped with missiles and electronic defenses, blasted through the Bar-Lev defense line along the eastern bank of the canal and soon had two large armies on the eastern bank. The initial Israeli counterattacks by three tank divisions were beaten off. On the Golan Heights, Syrian forces, bolstered by fourteen hundred tanks, rolled through Israeli defenses and moved to the edge of Galilee. Only a few Israeli tanks stood between the Syrians and the heavily populated Hulla Valley. Haifa was just hours away. Many Israelis thought it was all over-that, as Moshe Dayan said, “this is the end of the Third Temple.”

The extent of Dayan’s panic on Monday, October 8, has never been fully reported, but it is widely known among Israelis. One of Dayan’s functions as defense minister was to provide the censored media and their editors-in-chief with a daily briefing on the warin essence, to control what they wrote. One journalist, a retired army general, who attended the Monday session, recalled Dayan’s assessment: “The situation is desperate. Everything is lost. We must withdraw.” There was talk in a later meeting of appeals to world Jewry, distribution of antitank weapons to every citizen, and last-ditch resistance in the civilian population centers. It was Israel’s darkest hour, but no withdrawal was ordered. Instead, Israel called its first nuclear alert and began arming its nuclear arsenal. And it used that alert to blackmail Washington into a major policy change.

* One Israeli assumption was that the Soviets, who would learn-as they had learned other secrets inside Israel in recent years–of the nuclear arming, would then be compelled to urge their allies in Egypt and Syria to limit their offensive and not attempt to advance beyond the pre-1967 borders. And a Soviet warning was given, according to Mohammed Heikal, editor of Al-Ahram, the leading Egyptian newspaper, and eminence grise to Nasser and Sadat. In an interview, Heikal revealed that the Soviet Union had told the senior leadership of Egypt early in the war that the “Israelis had three warheads assembled and ready.”

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Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics

Here are some highlights from this 2011 book by John J. Mearsheimer:

* I argue that there are sometimes good strategic reasons for leaders to lie to other countries as well as to their own people. International lying, in other words, is not necessarily misconduct; in fact, it is often thought to be clever, necessary, and maybe even virtuous in some circumstances.

* statesmen and diplomats do not lie to each other very often.

* It is important to emphasize that in none of those cases were the president or his lieutenants lying for narrow personal gain. They thought that they were acting in the American national interest, which is not to say they acted wisely in every case. But the fact is that there are good strategic reasons for leaders to lie to their publics as well as to other countries. These practical logics almost always override well-known and widely accepted moral strictures against lying. Indeed, leaders sometimes think that they have a moral duty to lie to protect their country.

* In contrast to the international system, the structure of a state is hierarchic, not anarchic. In a well-ordered state, there is a higher authority—the state itself—to which individuals can turn for protection. Consequently, the incentives to cheat and lie that apply when states are dealing with each other usually do not apply to individuals within a state.

* In domestic politics, however, lying is generally considered wrong, save for some special circumstances, such as when individuals are bargaining over the price at which they would buy or sell a house, or when protecting an innocent person from wrongful harm.

* There is a simple explanation for these different attitudes toward domestic and international lying. A leader has no higher
obligation than to ensure the survival of his country. Yet states operate in an anarchic system where there is no higher authority that they can turn to if they are seriously threatened by another state.

* One can also make a moral case against lying within the confines of a state, because a well-defined community usually exists there, which is not the case in international politics. Thomas Hobbes put the point succinctly in Leviathan: “Before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants…. Where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust.”

* Absolutists like Immanuel Kant and Augustine maintain that lying is always wrong and that it has hardly any positive effects. Lying, according to Kant, is “the greatest violation of man’s duty to himself.” Utilitarians, on the other hand, believe that lying sometimes makes sense, because it serves a useful social purpose; but other times it does not. The key is to determine when and why lying has positive utility.

* Lying is obviously a form of deception, but not all deception is lying. There are two other kinds of deception: concealment and spinning. Unlike lying, neither involves making a false statement or telling a story with a false bottom line. Concealment and spinning, however, are not the same as telling the truth. These two kinds of deception are pervasive in every realm of daily life, and they cause hardly a word of protest.

* Statesmen and diplomats are rarely punished for lying, especially if they were telling lies to other countries. Probably the only exception to this rule involves cases where it becomes known that a leader lied to his fellow citizens about a policy that
failed in ways that obviously damage the national interest.

* British statesman Henry Taylor: a “falsehood ceases to be a falsehood when it is understood on all sides that the truth is not expected to be spoken.”

* Sir Henry Wotton, the seventeenth-century British diplomat, once remarked that an ambassador is “an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.”

* Israel lied to the United States in the 1960s about its nascent nuclear weapons program because it feared that Washington would force the Jewish state to shut down the project if it acknowledged what was really going on at the Dimona nuclear complex. “This is one program,” Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969, “on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us.” Another case in point was when the Soviets placed offensive missiles in Cuba in 1963 after they had repeatedly assured the Kennedy administration that they would not take that dangerous step. Their hope was to present the president “with a fait accompli.”

* Anarchy pushes states to be vigilant in their dealings with each other, especially when national security issues are at play. But that is not the case inside most states, where large numbers of people, including educated elites, are predisposed to trust their government, whose most important job, after all, is to protect them.

* Irving Kristol: “There are different kinds of truth for different kinds of people. There are truths appropriate for children; truths that are appropriate for students; truths that are appropriate for educated adults; and truths that are appropriate for highly educated adults, and the notion that there should be one set of truths available to everyone is a modern democratic fallacy. It doesn’t work.”

* Hitler, for example, closely monitored the German people’s thinking about all kinds of issues, and went to great lengths to ensure that his policies enjoyed widespread public support. His regime, as Ian Kershaw reminds us, was “acutely aware of the need to manufacture consensus.”

* Comparing the amount of threat inflation in each of the major powers during World War I illustrates how geography influences the rhetoric that leaders employ to describe their adversaries. There was much less fearmongering about the German threat in France and Russia than there was in Britain and the United States. This is hardly surprising, since the two Anglo-Saxon countries are offshore balancers; in contrast, France and Russia not only shared a border with the Kaiserreich, but they were also fighting the German army on their own territory.

* With the rise of nationalism over the past two centuries, numerous ethnic or national groups around the world have established or have tried to establish their own state, or what is commonly called a nation-state. In the process, each group has created its own sacred myths about the past that portray it in a favorable way and portray rival national groups in a negative light. MIT political scientist Stephen Van Evera argues that these chauvinist myths “come in three principal varieties: self-glorifying, self-whitewashing, and other-maligning.” Inventing these myths and purveying them widely invariably requires lying about the historical record as well as contemporary political events. “Historical error,” as the French political theorist Ernest Renan succinctly put it, “is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.”

The elites who dominate a nation’s discourse are largely responsible for inventing its myths, and they do so for two main reasons. These false stories help fuel group solidarity; they help create a powerful sense of nationhood, which is essential for building and maintaining a viable nation-state. In particular, these fictions help give members of a national group the sense that they are part of a noble enterprise, which they should not only be proud of, but for which they should be willing to endure significant hardships, including fighting and dying if necessary.

* The creation of national myths, however, is not simply a case of elites concocting false stories and transmitting them to their publics. In fact, the common people invariably hunger for these myths; they want to be told stories about the past in which
they are portrayed as the white hats and opposing nations as the black hats. In effect, nationalist mythmaking is driven from
below as well as from above.

* In the wake of World War II, for example, German elites created the myth that their military—the Wehrmacht—had little to do with the mass killings of innocent civilians on the Eastern Front during that brutal war. It was said that the SS—which represented a much narrower slice of German society and was closely identified with Hitler—was largely responsible for those vast horrors. The Wehrmacht, according to this legend, had “clean hands.”

The United States largely bought into this false story during the early years of the Cold War, because it was then working closely with former Nazis, Nazi collaborators, and former members of the Wehrmacht, and also because it was committed to rehabilitating the German army and making it an integral part of NATO. Not surprisingly, as Christopher Simpson notes in his book about Washington’s recruitment of Nazis after Word War II, “a review of the more popular histories of the war published in the West during those years, with a few lonely exceptions, leaves the distinct impression that the savageries of the Holocaust were strictly the SS’s responsibility…”

* It is also sometimes feasible for a state with an influential diaspora to export its myths to the countries where the diaspora is located. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon involves Israel and the American Jewish community. There was no way that the Zionists could create a Jewish state in Palestine without doing large-scale ethnic cleansing of the Arab population that had been living there for centuries. This point was widely recognized by the Zionist leadership well before Israel was created. The opportunity to expel the Palestinians came in early 1948 when fighting broke out between the Palestinians and the Zionists in the wake of the UN decision to partition Palestine into two states. The Zionists cleansed roughly 700,000 Palestinians from the land that became Israel, and adamantly refused to let them return to their homes once the fighting stopped. Of course, this was a story that cast Israel in the role of the victimizer and would make it difficult for the fledgling state to win friends and influence people around the world, especially in the United States.

Not surprisingly, Israel and its American friends went to great lengths after the events of 1948 to blame the expulsion of the Palestinians on the victims themselves. According to the myth that was invented, the Palestinians were not cleansed by the Zionists; instead, they were said to have fled their homes because the surrounding Arab countries told them to move out so that their armies could move in and drive the Jews into the sea. The Palestinians could then return home after the Jews had been cleansed from the land. This story was widely accepted not only in Israel but also in the United States for about four decades, and it played a key role in convincing many Americans to look favorably upon Israel in its ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. Israeli scholars, however, have demolished that myth and others over the past two decades, and the new history has slowly begun to affect the discourse in the United States about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in ways that make at least some Americans less sympathetic to Israel’s past and present actions toward the Palestinians.

Posted in John J. Mearsheimer | Comments Off on Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics

Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design

Here are some highlights from a 2010 paper in the Minnesota Law Review by two Yale University law professors, Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin:

“I’m the commander-see, I don’t need to explain-I do not need to explain why I say things. That’s the interesting thing about being the president. Maybe somebody needs to explain to me why they say something, but I don’t feel like I owe anybody an explanation.” – George W. Bush

If Americans know one thing about their system of government, it is that they live in a democracy and that other, less fortunate people, live in dictatorships. Dictatorships are what democracies are not, the very opposite of representative government under a constitution.

The opposition between democracy and dictatorship, however, is greatly overstated. The term “dictatorship,” after all, began as a special constitutional office of the Roman Republic, granting a single person extraordinary emergency powers for a limited period of time. “Every man the least conversant in Roman story,” remarked Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 70, “knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator” to confront emergencies caused by insurrection, sedition, and external enemies. No political constitution was well designed, Hamilton believed, unless it could confront emergencies and provide for energetic executive powers to handle them. (Footnote (FT): Hamilton’s point was that Rome did not lose its “republican” character because it used dictatorships in emergencies.)

Under this view, dictatorship-the power of government officials to act on important matters free of accountability or timely legal checks-is not the opposite of democracy-or what our Constitution calls a “Republican Form of Government.” It is an institutional feature within constitutional democracies that can and should be employed to perform valuable civic functions. From this perspective, “dictatorship” becomes-as it was in the early Roman Republic-a term of description rather than a term of opprobrium.8 It refers to institutions and powers of emergency government that constitution makers might establish to serve the public interest. Indeed, if the institutions are properly designed, “dictatorship” might even have positive connotations-think only of the praise heaped on the legendary Cincinnatus.

* For the Framers, democracy was not the antithesis of dictatorship, either as a logical or an empirical matter. Democracy was a force that always had to be checked, and its passions cooled, in order to realize the benefits of republican government. Every republic known to the Framers—many of whom were steeped in ancient history—had eventually broken down and led to government by a strongman such as Julius Caesar. The lesson of the past seemed to be that the natural progression of popular governments was toward demagoguery and eventually tyranny; the most obvious example to the founding generation was the ill-fated English Revolution in 1640 and the rise of Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector.

* in the liberal democracy of Great Britain, Winston Churchill would replace Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister in May of 1940, and Britain’s political parties would agree to suspend the (unwritten) constitutional norms of parliamentary elections until the end of the war. Although still officially a democracy, there was no election in Great Britain between 1935 and 1945.

* A sovereign dictator uses a political crisis to overthrow the existing constitutional order and found a new one. A commissarial dictator, by contrast, is constituted by and given power by the existing political order; the dictator exercises power temporarily in a crisis in order to save the regime and return to the status quo as soon as practicably possible.

* Clinton Rossiter’s brilliant and troubling book, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, studied the responses of France, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and ancient Rome to emergencies, real and perceived, including those generated by the Great Depression and World War II. Some of these emergencies involved problems of national security, and some were economic crises, including, of course, economic dislocations generated by war and its aftermath. Rossiter concluded that one constant in all the examples of emergency government he studied was the decision to adopt some form of dictatorship, validly legal or otherwise.

* Although we often oppose emergency to normal times, emergency and the problems of emergency government are always with us.

* if we assumed (which, thankfully, is not the case) that the American President has the power to initiate war, commandeer funds and resources for war, and conduct war at any time for any reason in any manner he pleases, he would be a constitutional dictator with respect to war and all matters related to war. That is because he would combine the
right to assess the need for military action with the power to carry it out and with the sole right to judge whether what he did was lawful. (He would not be a dictator with respect to a wide range of other matters, including, for example, environmental protection.) To the extent that the President may create rules in a certain area, apply them, and execute them on his own without the ability of anyone else in the system to check him, he is a law unto himself.

* Carl Schmitt offers perhaps the most chilling analysis of all. Although he recognizes the possibility of commissarial dictatorships, where the ultimate goal of dictatorship is restoring the status quo, he assumes that elements of the sovereign dictatorship always lurk in the background, waiting to emerge and to transform any existing political order. No matter how well designed a constitutional system might be, the true sovereign will always be able to escape the confines of that design and make exceptions to it.

* Emergency, or at least claims of emergency, are the standard cause and the standard justification for creating dictatorships.

* Machiavelli argued that republics should plan for emergency allocations of power in advance. Does the American constitution meet Machiavelli’s test? Does it adequately build the possibilities of emergency into its design, to avoid the dangers of inertia, impotence, and deadlock yet still preserve republican government? Recall Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous statement in M’Culloch v. Maryland that “[the] constitution [is] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” 95 Notably, the word “crises” is italicized in the original opinion. Nevertheless, the text of the American Constitution is remarkably devoid of specific clauses that give government officials emergency powers. The most relevant example is the Suspension Clause, which allocates to Congress (contra the views of Abraham Lincoln) the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety may require it.” Moreover, the Suspension Clause says nothing about other kinds of dangers, for example economic meltdowns, fires, floods and hurricanes, or even the invasion of a drug resistant virus. Nevertheless, constitutional emergencies may arise from many different sources.

* The first decade of the twenty-first century has made us all too aware of the various dangers that can plague our social orders; even the cost of terrorist attacks may pale in comparison to the damage wrought by tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, or dangerous viruses. Thus in 2009, the President of Mexico, Felipe Calderon, placed the entire country under a “state of emergency” because of the potential swine flu pandemic. As John Ackerman, chief editor of the Mexican Law Review has explained, this serves to: “concentrate political power in his hands…. [President Calderon] has authorized his health secretary to inspect and seize any person or possessions, set up check points, enter any building or house, ignore procurement rules, break up public gatherings, and close down entertainment venues. The decree states that this situation will continue ‘for as long as the emergency lasts.’. . . This action violates the Mexican Constitution, which normally requires the government to obtain a formal judicial order before violating citizens’ civil liberties. Even when combating a ‘grave threat’ to society, the president is constitutionally required to get congressional approval for any suspension of basic rights. There are no exceptions to this requirement.”

Ackerman notes that Latin America has a “long history of using states of emergency as ploys to … return to authoritarianism.”

* The most important place we might find elements of constitutional dictatorship in the United States is in the construction of the modern presidency and the executive branch more generally. The Constitution says that the President is vested with “the executive Power” of the United States105 and is “Commander in Chief” of the armed forces. It also says, notably, that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The modern President is far more powerful, and has far more resources at his disposal, than the Framers could possibly have imagined. To give only one example, the President is now commander-in-chief of a standing army of over a million people, with forces stationed all over the world, armed with weapons that no one in the eighteenth century could have envisioned. As the United States has become a global power, and as government has taken on increasing responsibilities—to meet the increasing expectations of its citizens—the presidency has gained ever greater power and discretion. Both the administrative and
regulatory state on the one hand, and the National Security State, on the other, offer plenty of opportunities for decisive action, whether it be bailing out financial institutions, announcing bank holidays, imposing quarantines, seizing contraband merchandise, intercepting communications, engaging in covert operations, bombing overseas targets, or moving American troops into harm’s way.

* Effective accountability may be lacking even if the President’s actions are public. Accountability is particularly problematic, however, if a President can keep his most controversial actions secret using the excuse of national security, if he enjoys multiple constitutional privileges against suit, if courts regularly defer to his
judgments about national security, and if Congress lacks effective oversight mechanisms to check his adventures.

* A President can be a constitutional dictator, then, to the extent that he is effectively insulated from hindrance and accountability with respect to a certain set of issues. The most obvious examples concern war, foreign policy, intelligence, and covert operations, but, as we shall see later on, the modern administrative state offers a number of opportunities in the domestic sphere to deal with economic meltdowns, health crises, floods, fires, and other domestic disasters.

* By the time Lincoln took the oath of office on March 4, 1861, several states had already seceded, joined by several more after the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12. Nevertheless, Lincoln delayed calling Congress into session until July 4. “The eleven weeks between the fall of Sumter and July 4, 1861,” Rossiter wrote, “constitute the most interesting single episode in the history of constitutional dictatorship. The simple fact that one man was the government of the United States . . . makes this the paragon of all democratic, constitutional dictatorships.”

Lincoln was quite busy during this period. He goaded the South into beginning the war by resupplying Fort Sumter; he unilaterally decided to initiate a legally debatable blockade of all Southern ports; and then, most (in)famously, he suspended habeas corpus,119 claiming that since Congress was away, somebody had to make the decision, and he was just the person to do it. Like any commissarial dictator, Lincoln argued that he acted only to save the republic, not to found a new regime, and that his actions, even if they appeared illegal, were all calculated to that end… Lord Bryce wrote that Lincoln was “almost a dictator . . . who wielded more authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell,” and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. recounts Lincoln’s Secretary of State William H. Seward “exuberant[ly]” telling a correspondent for the London Times that “[w]e elect a king every four years and give him absolute power within certain limits, which after all he can interpret for himself.”

* the Framers recognized the danger that the emergence of tyrants posed to republics and adapted the impeachment process in part as an alternative to the traditional remedy of assassination.

* Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. Each of them received advice from high-ranking military officers and other advisors that the United States should use its nuclear
monopoly (in the case of Truman131) or its advantage in arms (in the case of Eisenhower and Kennedy) to launch a preemptive attack on the Soviet Union and bring an end to what would then be a not-so-Cold War. (FT: Eisenhower’s advisors, who believed that the Soviets would soon develop a hydrogen bomb, advocated a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union while the United States still enjoyed a preponderance of atomic power, even if a few million Americans might be killed in the process.)

* Whether or not the 9/11 terrorist attacks “changed everything,” they certainly provided everything that a would-be constitutional dictator might wish for. Congress readily ceded broad new powers to the President, in the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),135 the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,136 the Military Commissions Act of 2006,137 the Protect America Act of 2007,138 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.139 Indeed, every time the President asked for broad new authorities from Congress, he received them.140 What is remarkable is that given this record of acquiescence, the Bush Administration tried to grab still more discretionary power, through secret programs that violated existing law, and through theories of the President’s Article II powers that, it claimed, allowed the President to disregard any congressional regulations of his powers as commander-in-chief.

* Congress has been willing to delegate increasing amounts of power to the President in both domestic and foreign affairs over the years; and it is well worth asking whether the Constitution imposes any significant limits on this delegation.

* FDR’s successor, Harry Truman, began the use of atomic weapons in warfare;149 more important for the development of constitutional law, he unilaterally ordered the American military to resist the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950.150 This was the first major war that the United States fought that did not receive the imprimatur of a congressional declaration. Historians and constitutional analysts increasingly view the Truman presidency as a crossing of the Rubicon toward the President’s unilateral power to order military force anytime and anywhere in the world. Truman also oversaw the creation of the modern National Security State, featuring permanent standing armies strewn around the globe and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its secret budgets, covert operations, and often tenuous relationship to human rights and the rule of law.

* The privilege to hide government operations from courts and from the general public as state secrets is an essential tool in the kit of any would-be dictator, and there is no reason to believe that the Obama Administration has repudiated it.156 It is perhaps even more valuable than the suspension of habeas corpus, which only allows the President to detain specific individuals.157 A broad state-secrets privilege ensures immunity from judicial scrutiny in a wide swathe of cases where the President may plausibly claim that national security requires complete judicial abstention. Usually he does not even have to support the claim with evidence, for that might undermine the security he seeks to
maintain.

* Kennedy’s acolyte Theodore Sorenson reports that at the time Kennedy estimated the odds of nuclear war at one in three. Interestingly enough, Abram Chayes, in his flattering portrayal of Kennedy’s conduct during the Crisis, did not suggest that there was anything amiss in Kennedy’s risking nuclear annihilation. Kennedy’s behavior seems even more potentially reckless if one accepts the argument made at the time—in secret, of course—by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that the Cuban missiles in fact posed little or no
threat to actual American security. After all, the United States had an overwhelming nuclear stockpile and Soviet leaders surely believed that the United States would use it in response to any missiles fired from Cuba…

One of the reasons that Kennedy found himself in such a delicate situation was the fact that constitutionally required elections were about to take place for Congress, and Republican New York Senator Kenneth Keating, among others, was denouncing him for being soft on Soviet penetration of Cuba. Kennedy needed to retain healthy Democratic
majorities in both the House and Senate because he could not always depend on Southern Democrats to support his “New Frontier” agenda. Kennedy was also concerned about
his prospects for reelection in 1964.

* The central idea of constitutional dictatorship, after all, is that the President does not seize power.192 Rather, his power is bestowed on him, either by the Constitution directly, or, more likely, by framework statutes and authorizations passed by Congress. Presidents (or more correctly, the Presidents’ lawyers) tend to read these statutes and authorizations as broadly as possible, so that the President can have as free a hand as possible to save the nation. In fulfilling these authorizations, the President creates new institutions and mechanisms that, in turn, bestow new kinds of authority and new kinds of power. Thus, the great mistake of the Bush Administration was the assumption that presidents should go out of their way to claim power unilaterally. It is far more effective to ask for power and have it given. Then one can proliferate the powers of the office
through making broad constructions, through building institutions, and through issuing regulations.

* Nikita Khrushchev paid for his commendable caution [regarding the Cuban Missile crisis] with his job, which suggests a degree of accountability that made the Soviet leader significantly less of a full-scale dictator than most Americans assumed.

* John Yoo, the author of the notorious “torture memos,” has argued that, despite American objections to King George III, the President still enjoys the powers possessed by the English monarch at the time of the American Revolution. Although Parliament retained the powers of the purse, Yoo explains, the King possessed unbounded discretion over the use of military force.

* The most obvious elements of presidential dictatorship tend to be concentrated in areas of foreign policy, intelligence gathering, covert operations, and warfare. Presidents exercise far less unilateral control in domestic politics.

* President Bush began to lose political momentum precisely because he failed to act swiftly or deftly in the face of a domestic disaster, Hurricane Katrina. Since the Calling Forth Act of 1792, Congress has repeatedly created framework statutes that authorize presidents to respond to domestic emergencies.

[LF: Trump lost momentum in 2020 when he failed to act swiftly and deftly in reaction to Covid.]

* one thing dictators must do in emergencies is detain people who pose threats to public safety. The Public Health Service Act gives the Surgeon General, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the authority “to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.” Accordingly, the Surgeon General may order “inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.” The grant of authority may even provide for “apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals” if necessary “for the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of such communicable diseases as may be specified from time to time in Executive Orders of the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary, in consultation with the Surgeon General.” Or consider the steps the executive may take to meet the threat of imminent economic collapse.

* Bush’s actions match the traditional pattern. First, the President declares a crisis or emergency, then he asks for new powers, and, finally, Congress grants the request. However, Bush also sought to obtain additional emergency powers without asking for congressional approval in three areas: his policy on detentions and interrogation practices, his creation of military commissions, and his secret domestic surveillance programs. This was his great mistake, and the source of some of the most ardent (and well-deserved) criticism. Bush received pushback from the public and from the courts because he deviated from the traditional script for American Presidents seeking emergency authority. Instead of asking Congress for emergency powers, he simply asserted that he already possessed all the constitutional and legal authority he needed.

* Dictatorial power is almost inevitably dispersed in the modern administrative state. Policy questions in the modern state increasingly require specialized expertise. Even the
most able of presidents likely lack the detailed knowledge necessary for quick and decisive action. Consider this New York Times article, entitled Fed Chief Shifts Path, Inventing Policy in Crisis:

“As chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben S. Bernanke has long argued that a central bank should base its policies as much as possible on consistent principles rather than seat-of-the-pants judgment. But now, as the meltdown in credit markets threatens major institutions on Wall Street and a recession appears inevitable, Mr. Bernanke is inventing policy on the fly.

“Modern monetary policy-making puts a lot of weight on rules, but there is no rule book for an economic crisis,” said Douglas W. Elmendorf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former Fed economist.

On Friday, the Federal Reserve seemed to toss out the rule book altogether when it assumed the role of white knight, temporarily bailing out Bear Stearns, one of Wall Street’s biggest firms, with a shortterm loan to help avoid a collapse that might send other dominoes falling.

At first glance, this seems like a remarkably Schmittian description of the role played by the Federal Reserve Board—and, more particularly, its Chair, Ben Bernanke. Schmitt’s “sovereign” is the person who can successfully define something as a “crisis” and then basically do whatever he or she thinks necessary to meet the crisis.263 But Ben Bernanke is not a sovereign dictator. He is a commissarial, or constitutional, dictator. He enjoys his power courtesy of congressional statute, the residue of a previous Administration’s demand for discretionary power in the face of a perceived emergency.

* The modern administrative state features a distributed dictatorship, spreading unreviewable power among a variety of different agencies, czars, and bureaucrats. In the economic crisis of 2008, President Bush was largely a figurehead, whether by choice or by circumstance. The Treasury Secretary and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
made the key executive decisions.

The constitutional theory of the unitary executive, which was much touted during the Reagan Administration, is designed to preserve the President’s formal ability to control,
oversee, and hold accountable all members of the executive branch. It is no accident that this theory began to gain currency after the work of the executive branch became so variegated and specialized, and following the most dramatic ideological shift in the White House since Roosevelt’s replacement of Hoover in 1933. President Reagan’s lawyers were attracted to the theory of the unitary executive precisely because they felt, perhaps for good reason, that the administrative state was beyond their control, particularly with regard to civil service protected holdovers from previous administrations might not have shared the Reaganites’ ideological preferences. Moreover,
Stephen Skowronek has pointed out that the unitary executive theory arose during a period when the President and Congress were usually controlled by opposite parties: defenders
of a strong presidency viewed increased control over the bureaucracy as the best way to promote their policy goals without interference from opponents of the President. The theory of the unitary executive is a convenient fiction offered by lawyers to allow presidents to consolidate power within increasingly complex administrations that necessarily feature multiple centers of power and sources of authority. Asserting that the President actually has control over the entire Administration is a bit like the courtiers of King Canute who tried to flatter him by claiming that he could direct even the progress of the ocean’s tides.

In practice, of course, the President cannot effectively control many of the discretionary decisions made by lower level officials. And in other circumstances, independent federal agencies and civil service protections prevent the President from immediately firing people who exercise discretion. The theory—or rather, the theoretical fiction—of the unitary executive tries to deal with these realities in three ways. First, it denies that some of these realities exist. Second, it uses the theory to try to consolidate power and avoid oversight in certain circumstances. Third, when pressed, it claims that still other features—like independent agencies—are unconstitutional. Behind the rhetoric of the unitary executive, however, is the reality of increasingly disaggregated forms of power and expertise in the modern executive branch. In the modern administrative state, unilateral decisionmaking power is distributed as often as it is concentrated in a single individual.

* Barack Obama, like George W. Bush before him, began his presidency by taking advantage of the opportunities presented by emergency; he pushed for a sizeable economic stimulus package to deal with an economic crisis. Or, more correctly, he took advantage of the President’s ability to define the situation before him as an emergency and assert that bold, decisive action was necessary to avert the particular sort of crisis that he claimed the nation faced. This feature of the characteristic pattern—the President’s characterization of the situation— is quite important. As President Obama’s incoming Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, famously put it: “[y]ou never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before.”

* the President, because of his preeminent political position, has a unique power in the American system of government to define the nature of political reality. This makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to refute his analysis of the situation as involving an emergency; and this, in turn, greatly reduces Congress’s ability to refuse his requests for additional authority.

The 9/11 attacks, for example, allowed George W. Bush to define the situation before the nation in existential terms as a war of national survival (rather than as part of a continuing problem of terrorist attacks) and to define himself as a war president, thus purporting to activate all of the powers that a president enjoys in time of war. His greatest achievement was convincing Americans to believe in the existence of a war on terror, a war with no defined battlefield and no defined enemy. Since both of these elements were lacking, the President could define the war as taking place literally everywhere, including within the United States.288 And since the enemy was a shadowy network of loosely connected terrorist organizations, the President could plausibly assert (or imply) that almost any country and any (foreign) organization was connected to Al
Qaeda or contained Al Qaeda operatives.289 Having framed the situation as an existential crisis, Bush insisted that he needed vast powers to detain, interrogate, and make war;290 he pointed to Iraq and insisted that it was a continuation of the war against Al Qaeda and that invasion was necessary to keep the country safe from nuclear weapons.291 Thus armed, the President’s choice of tactics (secret domestic surveillance, detention without habeas corpus, and torture) and his choice of targets (Iraq) reflected his structuring of the situation, and thus of his own powers. The President presented the situation to the country as an all-out war against the United States; the country
would respond to this existential threat with courage and with determination, led by a commander-in-chief over affairs both foreign and domestic.

* The more severe the crisis, the greater the need for bold, decisive action, and the greater the need for the country to rally around its leader, to whom the public looks to resolve the crisis.

* One’s view about the legitimacy of a particular use of the presidential politics of emergency depends on one’s belief about whether presidents have accurately described the nature and the scope of the situation before the country. If they have, of course, their solution, tailored to that description, makes correspondingly more sense, and so does following their leadership. If there really is an emergency along the lines described by the President, then of course, it is very different than if there is no emergency, or if it is not as severe as the President says it is, or if the nature of the problem is different than the President describes, for then the President’s solutions are the
wrong solutions, and they will lead the country in the wrong direction.

* Presidents seek to gain popular support for a political program (and their Administration generally) through describing reality as involving emergency and describing the program in terms of how it deals with the emergency so described. What the President seeks to do, he seeks to do because of the emergency; what he has done has been justified
because the emergency demands it.

* We emphasize that governing through emergency is not the same thing as constitutional dictatorship. The former is a political strategy of characterizing a situation to gain political support and realize political reforms; the latter is a set of powers enjoyed by particular persons in the government.

* One reason the Bush Administration failed in its ambitions to build a new, long-term Republican majority was that it lost the ability to maintain the public’s focus on the threats that it claimed faced the nation. It lost the public’s attention partly because of its success in preventing subsequent terrorist attacks, partly through its incompetence in dealing with other foreign policy (Iraq) and domestic problems (Hurricane Katrina), and partly because other issues, like the economy, came to rival the “war on terror” as the focus of public concern.

This last point is worth emphasizing: even if the President has a first-mover advantage to redefine the political situation temporarily to his advantage, he cannot do so indefinitely. Reality (and a resurgence of political opposition) will continually intrude on the Administration’s plans. Political opponents will deny the President’s claims about reality and assert that they understand the real emergencies the nation faces.

* If the members of the Bush Administration had been more flexible and less ideologically blinkered, they might well have achieved a new political majority that would last for decades.

* Almost a century ago, Max Weber offered a dark portrait of the likely evolution of parliamentary democracies over time. Viewing matters from the perspective of the early twentieth century, he foresaw an almost inevitable slide toward Caesarism: a plebiscitarian dictatorship in which rulers claim authority through acclamation by the people and then proceed to rule with little oversight from the democratic process. In Weber’s account, the legislature becomes increasingly impotent, irrelevant, or both. More and more government functions are concentrated in the executive. The executive, in turn, gains authority from charismatic appeals to the people for the right to rule. Gerhard Casper forcefully drew on Weber’s analysis in a 2006 analysis of the contemporary American presidency, which focused on—but was not limited to—the example of the Bush presidency.309 One could find a complementary analysis in the work of another great Weimar Era theorist of emergency and executive power, Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s support for Hitler’s
rise to power in 1933 was due in part to his deep skepticism of parliamentary democracy and his belief that a strong and charismatic authority figure was needed to break through the political paralysis generated by the Weimar Constitution.

* The need for an inspiring figure, freed from the old politics, who would lead the country toward transformative change was a theme of both parties’ campaigns…

* the legislature is the least respected branch of the federal government.

* Aided by every possible technological innovation, the President, now more than ever, can appeal directly to the public. In the twentieth century the mass media were an important bulwark against presidential overreach, but they have become increasingly toothless, in part because of the rise of access journalism and in part because professional journalism itself is being undermined by the slow and steady destruction of its business models. Indeed, the President can now route around the traditional mass media and take his case to the public directly through the blogosphere or through YouTube.

* the modern presidency is inevitably a cult of personality, and especially so if the President is personally charismatic, like Barack Obama. Even if he is less so, his party
and his handlers assiduously work to create such a cult, as they did for George W. Bush. Some of us may be tempted to look back at the steady stream of toadying books and articles written about President Bush’s genius, moral clarity, and connection with ordinary Americans as examples of mass delusion.

* Presidents now not only set legislative agendas, they also are the chief spokespersons for the meaning of America, its values, its hopes, and its aspirations. They are not only commander-in-chief, they are also comforter-in-chief (able to “feel [our] pain”), preacher-in-chief, educator-in-chief, and role model-in-chief all rolled into one larger than life persona. The American President, unlike most parliamentary leaders, has always been both head of government and head of state; increasingly, however, the President embodies the virtues of the country, and he becomes a vessel into which are projected the hopes of the nation and the virtues of the country (as well as its vices).

* there is a long-term trend of disconnection between the plebiscitarian presidency, with its cult of personality and identification of value and action with a single
individual, and the actual practices of constitutional dictatorship, which distribute decisionmaking among many comparatively faceless and anonymous institutions and individuals. The result of these two opposed elements of the modern American presidency is the schizophrenic nature of American constitutional dictatorship. Distributed expertise and secrecy on the inside combine with a plebiscitarian cult of personality on the outside. As a result, the outward manifestation of American
power increasingly has little to do with the actual processes of government.

* laws are the enemy of discretion; increased legalization means increased bureaucracy that will hamper the President’s ability to make effective policy and take effective action.

* Determined lawyers set upon a course of finding ways around legal restraints are likely to do so, even if the arguments are very poor.

* parliamentary systems may have some modest advantages over presidential systems in heading off the dangers of constitutional dictatorship, if only because the Prime Minister has to maintain—and answer to—a parliamentary majority coalition. Presidents, by definition, are able to create their own political base separate from the legislature.

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NYT: CARL J. FRIEDRICH DIES AT 83; INFLUENTIAL HARVARD PROFESSOR

Joseph Berger wrote in 1983 for the New York Times:

Having lived in an era which saw the rise of Nazism and the spread of Communism, Dr. Friedrich sometimes took a dour view of the human inclination for freedom.

In his 1967 book ”An Introduction to Political Theory,” he wrote that while the liberal tradition believed people wanted freedom maximized, ”experience in the last hundred years has shown this to be quite in error.” He added, ”Actually I think it is much more nearly true to say that people want a minimum of freedom, rather than a maximum. Most people are very glad to leave a lot of things to other people.”

Stephen Turner wrote in 2015:

Encountering Carl Schmitt for the first time is a shock, especially if one is raised to respect what Jeremy Rabkin, in his Liberty Forum essay, correctly describes as the liberal pieties. But if one cares about liberalism it would be a mistake to write Schmitt off as a Nazi, a nihilist, or a promoter of anachronistic theological irrelevancies. Schmitt was a prophet of doom, and doom did not arrive on schedule, and his solution was worse than the disease. But it is important to take a longer perspective: the problems he identified in liberalism have not gone away. Indeed they flare up repeatedly, and may well be arriving on a slower schedule, in different but related forms.

The risk of dismissing Schmitt is significant: to fail to see how fragile liberalism is, what its preservation requires, why the liberal bromides seem to much of the world to be cynical and empty justifications for the self-interested exercise of power, and, finally, why the skeptics might, quite reasonably, think differently. With the world convulsed by radical Islam, which overtly rejects liberalism and takes a theological form that cannot be fit into the painfully worked-out compromises that resolved the European wars of religion, one can hardly pretend that liberalism, especially of the kind derived from Wilsonian internationalism, has all the political answers for current world problems.

There are other reasons as well. One cannot really understand the Frankfurt School, or Leo Strauss, or Hans Kelsen, or Hans Morgenthau, without understanding what they both absorbed and rejected from Schmitt. Herbert Marcuse’s essay “Repressive Tolerance” (1965) is a perfect example of Schmittian reasoning, and the basic form of argument reappears in feminism and the various constructions of racism that dominate contemporary academia. And one cannot understand the kind of authoritarian liberalism promoted at Harvard by the Kantian Carl Friedrich, which influenced so many American political scientists, including his student Henry Kissinger, and also many of his Harvard colleagues in other fields, and consequently the conduct of American government, without understanding Schmitt as his hidden interlocutor.

Clinton Rossiter’s dissertation, Constitutional Dictatorship (1948), conveyed the same message as Schmitt’s Dictatorship (1921): that we had something to learn from the Roman institution of dictatorship about how to deal with political crisis. It was a small step to Rossiter’s fawning praise of the executive in The American Presidency (1956), his widely used textbook pointing out that the vaunted legislative checks on presidential power in the U.S. Constitution, such as the power of the purse, were largely meaningless and unusable. Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s The Imperial Presidency (1973) affirmed that this is indeed what had transpired: the executive had become unfettered and dangerous. In an age of presidential assertions of prosecutorial discretion that amount to rule by decree, these are live issues.

From the Wikipedia entry on Clinton Rossiter:

In particular, following the events of 9/11, Rossiter’s first book, the 1948 Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (reissued in 1963 with a new preface), was reprinted for the first time in nearly forty years. In that germinal study, Rossiter argued that constitutional democracies had to learn the lesson of the Roman Republic to adopt and use emergency procedures that would empower governments to deal with crises beyond the ordinary capacities of democratic constitutional governance but to ensure that such crisis procedures were themselves subject to constitutional controls and codified temporal limits.

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The End of Law: Carl Schmitt in the Twenty-First Century Second Edition

Here are some highlights from this 2019 book by William E. Scheuerman:

* When I penned this volume’s first edition over twenty years ago, the Carl Schmitt “bug” had just hit the Anglophone intellectual world, with many political theorists, jurists, and others suddenly paying close attention to Schmitt’s ideas and their possible significance. In part by highlighting the ways in which Schmitt’s theoretical agenda opened the door to his disastrous flirtation with National Socialism, I hoped to push back against the emerging Schmitt renaissance.

By any standard, those efforts were a failure: Schmitt is now a household name in the English-speaking academic world, and his work is more popular than ever. Elsewhere as well (e.g., China) Schmitt has since garnered a significant collection of disciples. The worldwide rise of right-wing populism means that he is very much in the news, with many far-right intellectuals energetically advising would-be rightist demagogues about Schmitt’s lessons.

* Schmitt has no close relations in legal theory in the United States today, and no influential American legal theory even remotely resembles Schmitt’s heinous Nazi-era ideas.

* Schmitt very early endorsed ideas about legal indeterminacy that clearly took him well beyond traditional notions of the
limited determinacy of law. In some contrast to contemporary North American defenders of both the underdeterminacy and radical indeterminacy theses, however, he believed that the critique of formalist jurisprudence necessarily pointed the way toward an assault on liberal models of deliberative parliamentarism (chapter 2), constitutionalism (chapter 3), the state/society divide
(chapter 4), and international law (chapter 6). Schmitt exploited what he took to be the Achilles’ heel of liberalism—formalist jurisprudence—in order to discredit liberalism altogether. Pace liberalism, legal decision making inevitably rests on untrammeled discretion: the inevitability of a constitutive “pure decision” at the basis of every legal act demonstrates the bankruptcy of
“normativistic” liberalism as a whole. From Schmitt’s perspective, the enigma of legal indeterminacy provided an effective intellectual weapon in the right-wing authoritarian assault on liberal democracy.

* Schmitt’s influence on some important voices within postwar American political and legal theory has been widely documented.34 Yet the story of Schmitt’s impact on postwar political thought in the United States remains incomplete. Take Joseph A. Schumpeter’s enormously influential democratic theory (chapter 7) or Friedrich A. Hayek’s free-market critique of the welfare state (chapter 8): each was shaped by a more or less hidden debate with Carl Schmitt. Neither was a principled “Schmittian” in any sense of the term, and each opposed Schmitt’s own political preferences and significant parts of his theory. Nevertheless, each author was ultimately influenced by Schmitt: Schmitt was more than a parochial “German thinker” lacking in significance
for American political and legal thought.

* Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and many subsequent attacks elsewhere, legal scholars quickly turned to Schmitt’s ideas about emergency powers to begin rethinking how liberal states might best respond. Even more recently, Schmitt’s ideas have loomed large in thinking about the 2008 financial and other “global” crises. Schmitt’s theory of emergency powers, more than any other intellectual contribution he made, has ignited a massive political and legal debate; we need to pay careful attention to it.

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