The Rescue Witness: How Former Performers Became the Face of the Fight Against Pornography

The Sands Expo Convention Center in Las Vegas holds the Adult Entertainment Expo every January. The aisles fill with middle-aged men wearing lanyards and cameras, moving from booth to booth for autographs and photographs. In a far corner of the hall sat a table of anti-porn tracts under a pink banner. Most of the men who wandered that deep into the building looked at the banner and kept walking. The booth belonged to the Pink Cross Foundation. Its volunteers wore black T-shirts with a hot pink cross on the front. On some shirts, beneath the cross, ran a second line: “Ex-Porn Star.” A poster read “Porn Is Not Glamorous.” The woman who ran the booth, Shelley Lubben (1968-2019), had performed in hardcore films in the mid-1990s under the name Roxy. She had come back to the industry’s largest trade show to talk performers into leaving it.

Two hundred miles of desert highway and a decade of history separate that booth from the older image of the anti-pornography campaigner: the priest at a city council hearing, the prosecutor with a stack of magazines, the feminist theorist at a lectern. By the 2000s the movement’s face had changed. The person standing between the industry and the public was now, in the most visible cases, a former participant. She had an entry story, an exit story, an organization with a memorable name, and continuing contact with people still inside. Her previous work in the industry supplied the credential on which her fame rested.

The people who became known for helping others leave pornography came from several traditions that sometimes cooperated and sometimes fought: religious campaigns against obscenity, radical feminist opposition to pornography, evangelical outreach to sex workers, survivor-led ministries, anti-trafficking organizations, and campaigns against nonconsensual material on internet platforms. What connected them over time was the emergence of a recognizable public character, the rescue witness, and the two clearest examples were Lubben and Annie Lobert (b. 1967), founder of Hookers for Jesus. Their fame came entirely from their public campaigns to rescue sex workers.

They became familiar to audiences watching Christian television, documentaries, conference speeches, legislative testimony, and online video. Their names circulated among churches, anti-trafficking coalitions, adult-industry performers, and journalists covering the cultural politics of pornography. Each joined a personal exit story to an organization whose name did half the publicity work. Pink Cross and Hookers for Jesus functioned at once as brands, institutions, and stories.

The earliest organized American campaigns against pornography paid little attention to helping performers leave. Operation Yorkville, established in New York in 1962, became Morality in Media and then, in 2015, the National Center on Sexual Exploitation. The changing names track a longer migration from the vocabulary of obscenity and morality to the vocabulary of exploitation. The public figures of that tradition were clergy, lawyers, prosecutors, and legislators.

A separate anti-pornography tradition grew inside feminism during the 1970s. Women Against Violence in Pornography and the Media formed in San Francisco in 1977 after a conference on violence against women. Along with Women Against Pornography in New York and Women Against Violence Against Women in Los Angeles, it moved pornography toward the center of the feminist agenda through demonstrations, tours of adult-entertainment districts, and campaigns against violent or degrading images. These campaigns also split feminism into factions that have never reconciled, divided over censorship, free speech, labor, and the relation between images and violence. The movement’s spokesmen were writers and theorists: Andrea Dworkin (1946-2005), Catharine MacKinnon (b. 1946), Susan Brownmiller (1935-2025), Gloria Steinem (b. 1934), Robin Morgan (b. 1941), Adrienne Rich (1929-2012). Their institutional product was argument. They built conferences and ordinances, seldom shelters or job programs.

The prototype of the rescue witness appeared inside that feminist campaign. Linda Boreman (1949-2002), known professionally as Linda Lovelace, was already famous from Deep Throat, released in 1972. After the publication of her memoir Ordeal in 1980, in which she described her husband and manager Chuck Traynor (1937-2002) as violent and coercive, she became a spokeswoman for the anti-pornography movement. She appeared with Dworkin, MacKinnon, and Steinem, spoke at universities, and testified before government bodies. Her celebrity gave anti-pornography activists access to audiences that theory alone could not reach.

Her testimony is too inconsistent to serve as reliable proof of almost anything. Four autobiographical books published under her name gave divergent accounts of her sexuality, her participation in pornography, and her marriage. The first two presented her as an enthusiastic sexual adventurer. The later books described beatings, forced prostitution, rape, and performances compelled at gunpoint. The earlier books were shaped or written by other people, and claims in the later account were disputed by performers, filmmakers, and people who had known Boreman and Traynor.

Her historical importance survives those conflicts. Activists presented Boreman as the paradigmatic witness whose first-person account revealed what the finished film concealed. Her biography became testimony, publicity, and political argument at the same time, and she established the pattern in which one former performer’s story served as evidence about an entire industry for people who wanted that story.

Dworkin and MacKinnon tried to convert this testimony into law through the Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance, which defined certain pornography as a practice of sex discrimination and created civil causes of action for coercion into performance, forcing pornography on a person, trafficking in covered materials, and assault caused by particular pornography. Minneapolis passed versions in late 1983; Mayor Donald Fraser (1924-2019) vetoed them. Indianapolis enacted a modified ordinance in 1984. The Seventh Circuit struck it down in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), holding that the ordinance regulated expression by content and viewpoint; coercion and assault could be punished under laws of general application, while Indianapolis had attached liability to whether sexually explicit material expressed a forbidden view of women. The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.

The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, the Meese Commission, developed at the same time from a different political tradition and published its two-volume report in 1986. Boreman testified before it and repeated her account of coercion. A federal commission had now adopted the former performer as a source of public knowledge about a private industry. But Boreman built no lasting organization. She remained a witness and speaker, and the practical work of assistance, where it existed, stayed scattered among churches, social workers, attorneys, therapists, and informal networks. The later movement would gather those functions around single founders.

Home video, cable, and the internet changed both pornography and the campaigns against it. Pornography grew more accessible while evangelical Christianity grew more media-fluent, with websites, recovery programs, testimony videos, and deliberately unconventional brands. The line between ministry, media production, and nonprofit promotion blurred.

XXXchurch, founded by Craig Gross and Mike Foster in 2002, became the national example. It called itself “the Number 1 Christian Porn Site,” launched at the AVN show in Las Vegas, and gave away accountability software that reported a user’s browsing to a designated partner. Its signature move was physical presence inside the industry’s commercial spaces. Gross and fellow pastor JR Mahon walked the Las Vegas convention floor handing out New Testaments stamped “Jesus loves porn stars,” with an ABC Nightline crew documenting the trip. At the show Gross stood in front of a tall sign in early-1970s lettering, telling a reporter, “we really just want to help people.” He toured colleges debating Ron Jeremy (b. 1953), the industry’s best-known male performer, sharing a twelve-passenger bus with Jeremy, his own wife, and his two young children. Jeremy, for his part, told CNN, “I like what Craig does, believe it or not.” The debates settled nothing and were never meant to. They put a pastor and a porn star on the same stage, and the stage was the point. Religious outreach would now happen inside the industry’s rooms rather than on the sidewalk outside with a megaphone.

Heather Veitch (b. 1974) extended the method through JC’s Girls. Veitch had worked as a stripper for four years before leaving the industry in 1999. She founded JC’s Girls on Good Friday in March 2005 at Sandals Church in Riverside, California, with the support of the California Southern Baptist Convention, and in January 2006 the organization took a booth at the AVN Adult Entertainment Expo that drew heavy traffic and news coverage. At the booth her volunteers handed women Bibles wrapped in T-shirts printed “Holy Hotties.” The booth was dressed to match the exhibits around it, and the visual continuity generated coverage from London to India. The ministry supported women who wished to leave the industry without pressing the others to quit, a policy that drew fire from Veitch’s own religious flank. A Baptist minister from San Bernardino commended her zeal, asked how a woman could stay in the industry and keep a relationship with God, and cited the verse about serving two masters. Veitch answered, “Do we ask gluttons to stop eating too much before they come to church?” Even the industry’s parodists confirmed the model’s visibility: adherents of the Raëlian movement formed “Raël’s Girls,” copying the outreach format while encouraging sex workers to stay and enjoy the work.

JC’s Girls introduced most of the features that would define the survivor-rescuer. A former sex-industry participant led the organization and gave it her story. Outreach occurred in clubs and conventions. The name provoked, and the branding borrowed the industry’s own visual language. Websites and television turned local ministry into national story. What Veitch’s model lacked was infrastructure for the day after the conversation: housing, therapy, case management. Two women in Las Vegas and California were about to add it.

Annie Lobert came out of the Las Vegas escort economy. Born September 26, 1967, in Minneapolis, the daughter of Chet and Joanne Lobert, she graduated from Frederic High School in Wisconsin in 1986 and worked as a Las Vegas call girl for more than ten years, leaving after a near-fatal overdose and repeated beatings from pimps. This distinction shapes everything about her organization. Hookers for Jesus was never narrowly a program for women leaving pornographic film production. It addressed prostitution, escorting, stripping, and trafficking, with pornography folded into a broader conception of the commercial sex trade.

She founded Hookers for Jesus in 2005 as a survivor-led outreach, built around what she summarized as Hook, Hope, Help, and Heal: outreach, Jesus, housing, restoration. In 2007 she set up the Destiny House safe-house program through The Church at South Las Vegas, because, as she later put it in an interview, she had nowhere to bring the girls. The house changed the practical meaning of her work. Contact in a casino, hotel, club, or jail was only the first step. A woman leaving a controlling pimp might need secure housing, transportation, identification documents, medical care, therapy, legal help, and protection. An organization that could supply those things was doing something different from an organization that could supply a conversation.

Television made her a national figure. Investigation Discovery aired the three-part series Hookers: Saved on the Strip in 2010, following Lobert, who had sold her body in the city for over a decade, as she and her volunteers worked casino floors, nightclubs, and escort circuits that other organizations avoided, and as three women at Destiny House confronted their pimps, their court dates, and the problem of earning a legal living. The documentary form put the uncertain middle of an exit on screen, the part between the first conversation and the redemption story. Her memoir, Fallen: Out of the Sex Industry & Into the Arms of the Savior, followed in 2015. The status details of her life reinforced the brand: in 2009 she married Oz Fox (b. 1961), guitarist of the Christian metal band Stryper, a union of Vegas ministry and Sunset Strip religion that no publicist could have improved.

Her organization’s name did the same work as Veitch’s. Hookers for Jesus states the reversal in three words: former identity, new allegiance, target audience. Federal recognition eventually followed, and with it scrutiny. In 2020 the organization received a Department of Justice grant and drew criticism over its 2018 safe-house handbook, which described homosexuality as immoral and made attendance at weekly church services mandatory. The episode marked the boundary dispute of the whole movement in miniature: a survivor-led religious charity performing a social service that secular agencies had not performed, funded by a government constitutionally barred from establishing religion.

Hookers for Jesus remains active in 2026. It currently describes Destiny House and Dream House as separate residences offering no-charge transitional housing, with trauma-informed care, jail programs at the Clark County Detention Center, and Saturday Night Love outreach to the Strip hotels. The organization reports having served more than 15,000 women across twenty years of residential care, outreach, and case management. That figure is the organization’s own service count. It records contacts and assistance, without establishing how many contacts became departures, program completions, or durable independence.

Shelley Lubben built the parallel institution for pornography proper. Born May 18, 1968, in Pasadena, she performed in hardcore films in 1993 and 1994 under the name Roxy, battling drug and alcohol addiction during and after her years in the industry. In 2005 she began an aggressive online campaign, using social-networking sites to contact people in the sex industry, and in 2008 she established the Pink Cross Foundation, which concentrated on outreach and evangelism to performers and support for those wishing to leave. When she identified interested people, she sent care packages: religious literature, Bibles, Christian music, grocery and department-store gift cards. The gift card is the movement’s most concrete artifact. It answers the objection that testimony costs the witness nothing; groceries are a material offer, small enough to accept without commitment.

Lubben concentrated in one person the roles that earlier movements had distributed among many. She was the former performer giving testimony, the evangelist addressing churches, the founder raising money, the outreach worker messaging current performers, and the political witness in Sacramento. She supported a California legislator’s effort to tax the industry, describing to lawmakers the scenes she said she had experienced on hardcore sets. She spoke to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, and she formed an alliance of convenience with the AIDS Healthcare Foundation over condom requirements on porn sets, an organization founded to protect gay men joining forces with a woman who had preached that Jesus saves homosexuals. “We didn't have much in common,” she told a reporter, aside from wanting health and safety laws enforced. Her accounts of the industry, infections, injuries, drug use, and the difficulty of finding straight work afterward were presented as her experience and her conclusions, and her speeches often moved between personal memory, claims about other performers, and statements about the industry at large without keeping the evidentiary lines distinct.

The industry quickly picked up there was something off about Lubben. Porners kept telling me she was not what she claimed, and they didn’t say that about the other crusaders who tried to to live by their principles. I kept hearing accounts of Lubben’s lewd and off-brand behavior at porn events, all in the name of outreach. In 2011 the industry advocate Michael Whiteacre made her the subject of a documentary, The Devil and Shelley Lubben, that disputed her account of her career. Some of the criticism came from women she had helped. A former associate complained to LA Weekly that when the performer Kacey Jordan received flowers, Lubben posted the picture online with an appeal for donations; every act of help, the associate said, became a fundraising occasion. The same article noted that a critic had parsed Pink Cross’s tax returns on YouTube and found little, and it quoted Crissy Moran of the rival outreach group Treasures drawing her own distinction: “We're not anti-porn. We are pro-women.”

Pink Cross closed in the mid-2010s. Lubben died on February 9, 2019, at the age of fifty. Google/Gemini report the death as a drug overdose. “Shelley Lubben died from an apparent accidental drug overdose. She passed away on February 9, 2019, at the age of 50 in Springville, California. Death Details: Date: February 9, 2019. Location: Springville, California. Circumstances: Found unresponsive by a friend in a trailer area; deputies reported no signs of foul play or suicide, pointing initially to an accidental overdose.” She was living in a trailer park. The organization did not survive its founder, but her recorded testimony did. Sermons, interviews, and reposted clips remained searchable and kept reaching new audiences, a structural feature of the digital rescue movement: the institution can die while the witness keeps speaking.

While Lubben focused on pornography, performers, and the behavior of consumers; Pink Cross was an outreach and transitional-support network, Lobert focused on prostitution, trafficking, hotels, and jails; Hookers for Jesus became a residential and case-management institution. Their common structure explains why both became famous. Each converted a former sex-industry identity into a claim of specialist knowledge. Each built an organization whose name told the story. Each placed personal testimony at the center of fundraising and outreach. Each became better known for the work of bringing others out than for the work she had once performed.

While clergy, lawyers, and organizers could be dismissed as people who had never set foot on a set or a casino floor, Lubben, Lobert, and Veitch could claim the industry’s language, its networks, its working arrangements, and its pressures as firsthand knowledge. The structure also suited television. A policy organization offers no protagonist. A founder with an entry story, an exit story, an organization, and continuing contact with people still inside offers a complete narrative arc, and that arc, entry, injury, conversion, return, ran through the memoirs, documentaries, sermons, and podcasts of the whole movement. Its usefulness to media says nothing about whether any single account was accurate or representative. It explains why founders became famous while caseworkers, therapists, shelter staff, and donors stayed invisible.

The role outlived its creators. In July 2019, Craig Gross handed leadership of XXXchurch to Brittni De La Mora, who had performed for years under the name Jenna Presley, and her husband, Pastor Rich De La Mora, saying he had heard the Lord tell him in prayer to give them the ministry. De La Mora traced her own conversion to the “Jesus loves porn stars” sign she had seen at an adult convention while still performing, which gave the succession the closed shape of a parable: the ministry’s outreach product returned as the ministry’s leader. Gross left to launch a venture called Christian Cannabis, a detail that says something about the entrepreneurial religious culture from which the movement came.

Joshua Broome became the visible male version of the survivor-preacher. Performing as Rocco Reed, he worked in pornography from 2006 to 2013, then became a Baptist pastor in Iowa, a speaker, and a podcast regular, describing a career that brought money and profound isolation. His significance is architectural rather than statistical, and it does not depend on promotional claims about how many films he made. The dominant rescue narrative had cast women as the recovered and men as consumers, producers, pimps, or pastors. Broome showed the same public structure could carry a man, and the podcast era gave him distribution that required no television network and no permanent organization.

While the character stabilized, the industry it addressed dissolved and reformed. Tube sites, webcams, and subscription platforms scattered production from studios into apartments. OnlyFans, founded in 2016, attached pornography to the creator economy: the performer became her own producer, marketer, and distributor, paid through subscriptions and tips. This broke the movement’s geography. There was no longer a set, a club, or a convention where outreach could find a large share of the population. Decentralization also failed to remove intermediaries; it replaced studios with platforms, payment processors, and recommendation systems, leaving the performer with more control over production and continued dependence on a company’s rules and its willingness to move her money. Meanwhile the tube sites concentrated distribution in a handful of firms. MindGeek, renamed Aylo in August 2023, aggregated professional, pirated, and user-uploaded material at a scale no studio had approached.

The platform era produced a new kind of rescue celebrity. Laila Mickelwait was never a performer. She had spent years at the anti-trafficking organization Exodus Cry when, in February 2020, she published an op-ed accusing Pornhub of hosting rape and child sexual-abuse material, launching the Traffickinghub campaign and a petition that gathered more than two million signatures from 192 countries. On December 4, 2020, Nicholas Kristof (b. 1959) published “The Children of Pornhub” in the New York Times after months of investigation, describing videos he said recorded assaults on unconscious women and girls; Pornhub denied the allegations, and Mastercard announced an investigation within days. Visa and Mastercard cut ties with the site, which then deleted roughly ten million videos, the material uploaded by unverified users, and restricted future uploads to verified accounts. Mickelwait credits Kristof’s article with breaking a year of corporate inaction; the card companies had expressed concern repeatedly, she said, and moved only under the pressure that followed the Times. The changes came from a convergence of survivor lawsuits, journalism, advocacy, investor pressure, and corporate self-protection, and no single actor can claim them. Mickelwait went on to found the Justice Defense Fund and published a book, Takedown, in 2024.

Her rise redefined the central act of rescue. For Lubben the act was a conversation at a booth; for Lobert, a bed in a house; for Mickelwait, the removal of a video and the severing of a payment rail. Digital permanence had complicated the classic exit story. A woman can stop producing pornography without withdrawing what exists; copies persist on tube sites, piracy networks, and private drives, and her name stays searchable. Leaving production and leaving circulation are separate processes, and the second can take years or fail. The photographs of the movement changed accordingly. Lubben was photographed at a booth inside the Sands. Mickelwait appears with screenshots, legal filings, and payment-company announcements. The site replaced the studio and the street as the location of intervention.

Every phase of this history generated its counter-tradition, and the objections repeat across fifty years. In the early 1980s the U.S. Prostitutes Collective picketed Women Against Violence in Pornography and the Media, demanding the organization respect sex workers’ decisions and stop interfering with their livelihoods. In December 2020, performers pointed out that the Visa and Mastercard cutoff fell on the workers who depended on the platform, and sex-worker advocates noted that the campaign against Pornhub was run by organizations opposed to the industry as such, whatever its moderation practices. A 2022 study of unsolicited anti-trafficking text messages found that the workers receiving them often experienced the messages as irrelevant, stigmatizing, or indistinguishable from spam, and recommended outreach built around the recipient’s stated needs and consent. The dispute over who may speak for participants predates the internet, the trafficking statutes, and the convention ministries. Organizations like Hookers for Jesus partly answer it in their service language, which describes help for women who want to escape, placing willingness inside the program’s formal definition even where the surrounding publicity speaks of rescue.

The movement’s public record favors testimony over measurement. Organizations publish counts of contacts, gift bags, residents, petition signatures, and removed videos. Those figures record activity. Exit has no single definition: it may mean a weekend away, a permanent departure, a completed program, a removed video, or services accepted by a woman who stays. Without shared definitions and independent follow-up, the numbers from different organizations cannot be compared, and no one can say which model worked best. A first-person story requires no such apparatus. It fits a sermon, a documentary, a podcast, and a fundraising letter, which is why fame attached to the founders and never to the process.

The gallery, viewed whole, contains every variation on a single figure. Boreman, the famous performer whose contested testimony a movement adopted. Dworkin and MacKinnon, the theorists who tried to turn testimony into a cause of action. Gross, the pastor with the sign and the tour bus. Veitch, the former dancer with Bibles wrapped in T-shirts. Lubben, the former performer with a foundation and a booth in the far corner of the hall. Lobert, the survivor with a safe house and a metal guitarist for a husband. De La Mora and Broome, the survivor-preachers of the podcast era. Mickelwait, the campaigner with the petition and the payment processors. The industry moved from theaters to film sets to tube sites to subscription accounts, and rescue moved with it, from picket lines to booths to safe houses to content removal and corporate pressure. The most recognizable form remains the one Lubben and Lobert fixed in place: the former participant who returns with an organization, a first-person story, and an offer to the people still inside.

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Christian Smith: A Career Against Reduction

On February 13, 2026, First Things published an essay by Christian Smith (b. October 23, 1960) called “Why I’m Done with Notre Dame.” Its first sentence said he retired at the end of 2025. The second sentence corrected the first. “More accurately, I left.”

He was sixty-five. He held the William R. Kenan Jr. chair in sociology, which carried a research fund. He called his salary enviable. He had brought in about $15 million in external grants and had chaired the dissertation of the best-placed doctoral graduate in the department's history, by then a full professor at Yale University. He had won teaching awards. A man in that position could work another decade. He left without a next post.

The essay ran several thousand words and did three jobs at once. It described one university. It indicted a discipline. It closed a career. To read it as a retirement complaint is to miss that Smith had been writing versions of it, in other registers and about other institutions, for thirty years.

Start with a bad job talk.

In 1993 the sociologist Glen Elder picked Smith up at Raleigh-Durham airport. Smith stayed at the Carolina Inn. He later called his hiring a miracle, since the job talk went badly. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill hired him anyway and he arrived in 1994. His chair, Arne Kalleberg, gave the new assistant professor two pieces of advice: do not study religion, and write journal articles rather than books. Smith wrote books about religion. Kalleberg later laughed about the advice, and in time published books of his own.

The twelve years at Carolina supplied the habits. Smith watched rain flood the parking lot next to Hamilton Hall. He handled book reviews for Social Forces in a windowless room across the hall from a colleague's office. He ate lunch with graduate students at Sutton's on Franklin Street and went to Christmas parties at the chair's house. On the morning of September 11, 2001, a graduate student emailed him that something had happened in New York, and he watched the rest of it on a television in the sociology office with his colleagues. He said later that if American sociology practiced the methodological rigor standard at Carolina, everyone would be better off.

The training before that had crossed three worlds. He grew up evangelical, and he credits his Philadelphia upbringing for his difficulty in not naming things frankly. He attended Wheaton College from 1978, transferred to Gordon College in Massachusetts and took his BA in sociology in 1983, spent a year in theology at Harvard Divinity School, and earned his MA in 1987 and PhD in 1990 in Harvard University's sociology department. His advisors included Daniel Bell (1919–2011), Harvey Cox (b. 1929), Steve Rytina, and Kiku Adatto. The dissertation treated the emergence of liberation theology. A man who has sat in an evangelical college classroom, a divinity school seminar, and a Harvard sociology proseminar has learned three vocabularies and three sets of manners. He spent the rest of his career translating among them.

The dissertation became The Emergence of Liberation Theology in 1991. The argument there set the pattern for everything after. Liberation theology, like other religious convictions, supplied the categories through which people identified injustice, formed organizations, took risks, and kept going. Resisting Reagan, on the U.S. Central America peace movement, followed in 1996 with the same claim.

Then he turned on his own former world. American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving appeared in 1998, written with Michael Emerson, Sally Gallagher, Paul Kennedy, and David Sikkink. Older secularization theory expected pluralism to dissolve conservative Protestantism. Smith found the opposite. Groups stay strong when they hold enough distinction from the surrounding society to give members a clear identity. The sense of being under attack increases esprit de corps. He called this subcultural identity theory.

In 2000 he published Christian America? What Evangelicals Really Want, which found evangelical political opinion more varied and more compromising than the culture-war literature assumed. The same year he and Michael O. Emerson published Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America. That book argued that White evangelicals read racial inequality through an individualist framework: personal responsibility, individual conversion, cross-racial friendship, colorblind treatment. The framework let sincere people oppose racial hatred while rejecting structural explanations and collective remedies. It won the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion's Outstanding Book Award in 2001.

Anyone who wants to file Smith as a conservative critic of progressive sociology has to account for Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America, which is assigned by people who despise his politics and which treats racial inequality as structurally produced and White Christian moral individualism as an inadequate account of it.

The project that made him a household name in seminaries began in 2002 with a telephone bank.

The National Study of Youth and Religion started dialing in the early summer of 2002, using random-digit dial with in-house randomization to reach households with a teenager aged 13 to 17. Each completed case meant a forty-minute survey with the teenager and a thirty-minute survey with a parent, to capture family, neighborhood, and school facts the teenager would not know. A Spanish-language version was available. The survey oversampled Jewish households. It finished with 3,370 completed cases. The nationally representative core was 3,290 teenagers and their parents, with 80 Jewish oversample cases on top.

Then interviewers went to see them. In the summer of 2003, trained interviewers conducted 267 personal interviews with youth drawn from the survey respondents. Seventeen interviewers worked across 45 states, each doing between ten and twenty interviews. Consultation with other youth scholars had suggested matching interviewer and interviewee on race where possible, and most of the 267 interviews matched on race and gender. The design combined the 2002-2003 national survey with follow-up surveys in 2005 and 2007-2008 and personal interviews in 2003, 2005, and 2008. A fourth wave came in 2013, when the respondents were 23 to 28.

Soul Searching, written with Melinda Lundquist Denton, came out of the first wave in 2005. Its lasting contribution was a phrase. Smith and Denton found that beneath denominational labels, American teenagers who called themselves Christian tended to share a small set of assumptions: a God exists who created and orders the world; God wants people to be good, nice, and fair; the central goal of life is to be happy and to feel good about oneself; God stays out of the way except when needed to solve a problem; good people go to heaven. They called it moralistic therapeutic deism.

The concept did what few sociological terms do. It escaped. Youth pastors used it. Seminaries built courses around it. Kenda Creasy Dean of Princeton Theological Seminary took it as the organizing diagnosis of Almost Christian and argued that teenagers held this faith because parents and churches had taught it to them.

Its escape brought objections. Smith and Denton had conceded in the book that no teenager would use the term to describe himself. Some critics disputed the use of “deism”; others defended it on the grounds that Enlightenment deists and moralistic therapeutic deists share a generic monotheism in which all religions worship the same God. Writing in America (magazine) in 2010, Tom Beaudoin urged theologians and educators to be careful in adopting the concept, judging the reasons against it at least as strong as the reasons for it. A category built to summarize interview transcripts became a device for clergy to explain away a congregation.

He followed the same cohort forward. Souls in Transition, with Patricia Snell, appeared in 2009 and traced what happened when the teenagers left home. It found that college professors were a smaller cause of religious change than family formation, friendship, romantic partners, and how much religion had mattered in the home. Lost in Transition in 2011, with Kari Christoffersen, Hilary Davidson, and Patricia Snell Herzog, widened the frame to money, sex, civic life, and substance use, and reported that many young adults could condemn an action without a vocabulary for explaining why it was wrong beyond preference and harm. Young Catholic America followed in 2014. Religious Parenting in 2019 and Handing Down the Faith in 2021, the latter with Amy Adamczyk, put parents at the center of transmission and found that no program, school, clergyman, or peer group typically matched a parent's example.

He ran a parallel research program on generosity. Passing the Plate in 2008, with Michael Emerson and Patricia Snell, documented the gap between Christian teaching about giving and Christian giving, documented the gap between Christian teaching about giving and Christian giving. The Paradox of Generosity in 2014, with Hilary Davidson, reported that generous practice tracked with stronger relationships and higher reported well-being.

He moved to the University of Notre Dame in 2006 as Kenan Professor, founded the Center for the Study of Religion and Society and directed it until 2017, founded the Center for Social Research and ran it from 2008 to 2014, and held a concurrent appointment in theology. Across his career he took in more than $20 million in grants from the Pew Charitable Trusts, Lilly Endowment, the John Templeton Foundation, the Templeton Religion Trust, and others. He was, by any measure the profession uses, a builder: surveys, datasets, interview archives, conferences, research teams, placed students.

While building it he was working out a philosophical position that would eventually make the building itself look questionable to him.

Moral, Believing Animals came out in 2003 and argued that people live inside moral orders and constitutive stories, that the notion of a morally neutral person is incoherent. What Is a Person? followed in 2010 and rejected accounts that reduce persons to biological processes, utility maximizers, bundles of preferences, discourse effects, or intersections of identity. Persons are embodied, conscious, relational, morally responsible agents with emergent causal powers. Society forms them and does not determine them. To Flourish or Destruct in 2015 argued that social scientists cannot avoid substantive judgments about human well-being, since every description of oppression or dysfunction presupposes an account of what is good for persons. His own summary of the program was that critical realist personalism requires social science to revise its dominant approaches to causation, social ontology, and explanation.

The philosophy came from Roy Bhaskar (1944–2014), whose critical realism holds that a reality exists independent of our descriptions while our knowledge of it stays fallible and theory-laden, and which distinguishes observable events from the deeper structures capable of producing them. Margaret Archer (b. 1943) supplied the account of how inherited social conditions condition action while action reproduces or transforms those conditions. His listed influences also include Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–2025), Charles Taylor (philosopher) (b. 1931), Michael Polanyi (1891–1976), Nicholas Wolterstorff, Aristotle, and Bell. Religion: What It Is, How It Works, and Why It Matters applied the position to his own subfield in 2017.

In 2010 he and his wife entered the Catholic Church. Fr. Bill Miscamble, writing after Smith's departure, recalled that Smith had once explained that the many models of faithful Catholic living and thinking at Notre Dame had drawn him into the Church. The Bible Made Impossible followed in 2011 and made the argument that sincere, competent Christians derive incompatible doctrines from the same text, which he called pervasive interpretive pluralism, and that no theory of Scripture can conceal the work interpretation does. He narrated the conversion more personally in How to Go from Being a Good Evangelical to a Committed Catholic in Ninety-Five Difficult Steps.

Two books appeared in 2014, and together they explain everything that happened twelve years later.

The first was Building Catholic Higher Education, written with John Cavadini Smith describes it as affirming and encouraging toward Notre Dame. He sent copies to academic leaders and colleagues. The entire faculty of one Protestant university on the West Coast read and discussed it. A few colleagues in other departments told him it was nice work. No leader of his own university acknowledged it. He compared the silence to a family dinner table where someone says the wrong thing and everyone freezes and then carries on.

The second was The Sacred Project of American Sociology. Its thesis was that American sociology, as a collective enterprise, is committed to realizing the emancipation, equality, and moral affirmation of all human beings as autonomous, self-directing agents free to construct their own identities, enter and exit relationships at will, and enjoy experiential and bodily gratification equally. Smith used Émile Durkheim's category of the sacred against the discipline that inherited it, and argued that a nominally secular field expresses an inescapable sacred, generates its own false consciousness, and reacts against Weberian disenchantment. Sociology does not escape the net it casts over everyone else. He also argued that the sacred project can corrupt double-blind peer review, and pointed to Peter L. Berger (1929–2017), James Davison Hunter, and José Casanova as scholars whose work violated the orthodoxy and who largely withdrew from the profession. Sociology, he concluded, is accountable only to sociologists, which is to say accountable to no one.

The reaction was fast and personal. Philip Cohen reviewed it under the title “It’s Modernity, Stupid.” Andrew Perrin wrote that the evidentiary base was haphazard, interpreted disingenuously, in places factually wrong, and that the pages were filled with score-settling, as though Smith had kept an enemies list and published it. He also counted the misspelled names and dropped verbs. Smith answered both. He wrote a reply on Cohen's own blog, noting that colleagues had told him Cohen's piece was so lopsided it was not worth engaging, and made a clarification that reviewers had missed: he embraces many features of sociology's sacred project himself, and asks not for its elimination but for honesty about it and room for a plurality of such projects. He added that colleagues around the country told him privately the book was essentially right and would not say so publicly, out of fear and self-preservation, and called the result uncoordinated self-censorship.

That reply contains the strongest and the weakest thing about the book at once. The private agreement he reports cannot be checked. The claim is structured so that silence confirms it.

Stephen Turner's review credited Smith with describing the status quo of ideological vetting accurately and faulted him for not attending more to the structures that produced those circumstances. Turner also noted the oddity of the author's position: a Harvard product with a Carolina past, a member of the Sociological Research Association, publishing in conventional journals, running survey research and a research center, and therefore an insider of sorts.

Eleven years later he published the largest book of his career. Why Religion Went Obsolete: The Demise of Traditional Faith in America came from Oxford University Press in 2025 at 440 pages. Its claim is that traditional institutional religion has not only weakened and declined but become obsolete among Americans under fifty, which he takes to mean nearly all of America before long. By obsolete he means no longer deemed useful or needed because something else has superseded it in function, efficiency, value, or interest.

He explained it to a Canadian interviewer in February 2026 with a comparison to vinyl records. Vinyl did not fail and may sound better; other formats fit changing habits. Traditional religion, he said, does not fit ordinary life, “in a cultural vibe way.” He put the turn at 1991: the Cold War ended, globalization accelerated, Nirvana and Seinfeld marked a reorientation of sensibility, and the share of Americans claiming no religion began its climb. He rejects the account that names enemies. Religious conservatives look for antagonists in media, universities, atheists, and secular elites, and he treats those as minor factors. What he emphasizes instead is a mismatch of expectation: most Americans value religion for helping people behave well, cope, and find community, and few care about doctrine, liturgy, death, or salvation. Churches accommodated that demand, redefined themselves around goodness and niceness, and had nothing left to offer a generation that wanted resources for suffering.

Reviewers split along predictable lines and one unpredictable one. Mark Massa in America treated it as an extremely important study from a scholar with three decades of careful work behind him. The Gospel Coalition‘s reviewer accepted the analysis, called it valuable for pastors, and pushed back on the fatalism, noting that religion also acts on cultural conditions and that a century ago nobody would have predicted the shifts Smith documents. Ryan Cragun, reviewing it in the Journal of Church and State, read the book as a lament and even a condemnation of the cultural changes that lowered interest in religion, and noted that a demand-side explanation would surprise scholars who had followed the supply-and-demand debates unless the book were read carefully. Cragun’s objection is the one that bites. A book arguing that a thing has lost its cultural fit, written by a man who thinks the thing is true, has to work to keep diagnosis and grief in separate columns.

He cleared his office in December 2025. Six weeks later the essay ran, and it ran into a fight already under way.

In January 2026 Notre Dame announced the appointment of Susan Ostermann to direct its Liu Institute for Asia and Asian Studies, effective in July. Her published support for abortion rights drew objections from faculty and from the president of Students for Life. At least nine bishops joined the local bishop in the outcry, and Smith's essay was used as ammunition against the appointment. Students marched on the Dome on February 27. Ostermann withdrew.

Smith's own indictment had four parts. The first was that Notre Dame's official statements about Catholic mission are not acted on consistently, that the requirement for a predominant number of Catholic faculty is often satisfied by treating anyone baptized Catholic as Catholic, and that nothing is done to orient new faculty in the tradition. He offered specific remedies: send short-listed candidates a document explaining the mission, discuss it in interviews, give new hires a course release for a faculty seminar on the Catholic intellectual tradition, and weigh contributions to the mission in tenure and promotion reviews. He reported one anecdote from a job candidate, a convert from Protestantism, who wrote to him afterward that interviewers kept telling her not to worry about the Catholicism. Her impulse was to answer that the Catholicism was why she applied. She said nothing.

The second was fear of conflict. He credited John I. Jenkins with an impressive early vision and traced a turn to wary defensiveness after the fights over The Vagina Monologues and Barack Obama's honorary degree.

The third was a craving for acceptance by peer institutions, which he named: Duke, Northwestern, Vanderbilt, Washington University in St. Louis, Emory, Rice, Stanford, NYU. By endowment, facilities, selectivity, alumni loyalty, and research, he argued, Notre Dame already belongs, and only Catholicism makes it suspect. He connected the anxiety to the history of American Catholic exclusion, including students brawling with the Klan in South Bend in the 1920s, and to the pressure that Church teaching on sexual questions puts on Catholic professionals who do not wish to be snubbed at the bar and on the golf course. He worried that serious engagement with the tradition could threaten the university's newly acquired membership in the Association of American Universities.

The fourth was the iron triangle. Excellent undergraduate education, a serious Catholic mission, and rapid ascent to research pre-eminence cannot all three be had. No amount of money can produce enough believing Catholic scholars who are also top researchers and excellent teachers, and asking new faculty to spend time on the Catholic intellectual tradition takes time from the research they were hired to do. The governing logic of the research university is hyper-specialization. A Catholic intellectual mission pulls toward integration. He argued that his own department chose the mainstream path, chased rankings and top journals, quarantined Catholic influence in religion, family, and education, and ended up neither fulfilling the mission nor becoming a great department.

He was careful about two things. He wrote that his analysis privileges neither conservatives over liberals nor religious people over secularists, that an atheist with the right knowledge and methods can serve the mission better than a disgruntled Catholic or an indifferent careerist, and that conservative activists running pressure campaigns do more harm than good by reinforcing the conflict-aversion and by implying that fidelity reduces to culture-war positions. He also wrote that he was not telling a story of decline from a golden age, since he lacked the perspective to assess that, but comparing stated goals to observed reality. And he reported that when he circulated a paper arguing that Ex corde Ecclesiae obliges theology faculty at Catholic universities to engage colleagues in other disciplines, the meeting with most of the theology faculty revealed a suspicious, self-protective isolationism.

Then came the details that did the most work with readers. The campus bookstore's ground floor had held shelves of academic, theological, and devotional books when he arrived; it now holds clothing and branded merchandise, with books moved to a corner upstairs, and the coffee shop has become self-serve. Browsing the online store, he found tarot cards. He listed the stadium concerts, the football weekends in Ireland, the branded wine. He described graduate students pressured to finish efficiently under threat of losing funding, and called the result technicians with doctorates. He gave the phenomenon its name from his own discipline, goal displacement, and said his intellectual life at Notre Dame had one rewarding interlocutor from another department. He described a senior finance major, weeks from graduating and worried about the environment, who told him she had never heard of Catholic social teaching in four years at the business school. He described being left exposed by a department chair who sided with graduate students seeking to overturn the theory canon, and colleagues freezing when a junior colleague endorsed a student's charge that the university and the department were white supremacist.

The replies arrived within weeks.

M. Cathleen Kaveny and Robin Darling Young, both former Notre Dame faculty, answered in Commonweal (magazine) on February 18. They opened with the image of Smith nailing ninety-five theses to the door of the basilica and said the feeling was presumably mutual. Their argument was that Notre Dame is a shrine as well as a school, founded in 1842 by French priests, a place where alumni pray at the Grotto and students propose marriage there, and that the mixing of sacred and profane is standard at shrines. Trinket shops line the approach to St. Peter's. Smith wants purity, and shrines are never pure. Their verdict on him was one line: “His is a Protestant, not a Catholic, sensibility.” They also charged that he tacitly suggests opposition to firm Church positions should not be platformed, borrowed Mary Douglas (1921–2007) on purity and danger to explain why the Vagina Monologues fight was about pollution rather than moral argument, recalled that they had themselves served on one of the panels Jenkins required after each performance, and invoked John T. Noonan Jr.'s appeal to the informed conscience at the 2009 commencement.

Chris Damian, writing in the National Catholic Reporter on March 10, defended Smith against that particular charge and then hit him from another side. Damian said Kaveny and Young had caricatured him, since Smith's argument leaves room for platforming opposing views. But Damian argued that Smith seemed unaware of the history he had joined: the failings predate his tenure and are not unique to Notre Dame, having been laid out in James Tunstead Burtchaell's 1998 book The Dying of the Light and going back at least to the 1967 Land O'Lakes Statement. Damian, who entered Notre Dame as an undergraduate in 2009 and organized a course-advising program for students seeking an integrated Catholic education, listed others who had paid for the same criticism: David Solomon, removed from the directorship of the Center for Ethics and Culture; Janet Smith, denied tenure; Bill Kirk, fired from residence life. Then the charge that stuck: Smith spoke hard truths from a position where he could comfortably step away without professional consequence, and his parting gift to his colleagues was a dump of despondency.

The Irish Rover ran two faculty letters on February 25. Fr. Bill Miscamble, professor emeritus of history, agreed with Smith on leadership's lack of vision and courage, agreed on hiring for mission, agreed on the craving for mainstream acceptance, and gave it a phrase borrowed from Jacques Maritain: kneeling before the world. He judged the current provost's strategic framework to have the tone of a tepid Catholic NGO. Then he objected. Smith's comments on the theology department were ill-directed and his shot at the business school ignored current work there. Smith's lens was narrow and self-referential, passing too quickly over a sacramental life that feeds the intellectual life, and ignoring colleagues who stay and fight. And he pressed the question directly: given Smith's criticism of conservative pressure campaigns, what would he have the objectors to the Ostermann appointment do, stay silent?

The second letter came from Walter Nicgorski, who had joined the faculty forty-two years before Smith arrived. He called Smith's essay well grounded and important, and then explained why his own experience differed. He landed in two of the pockets Smith conceded exist, political science and the Program of Liberal Studies, and never felt the loneliness Smith described. He also supplied a fact from the 1980s that supports Smith more than anything in Smith's own essay: when the diminishing number of practicing Catholic faculty became a public argument, a majority of the faculty voted through the Faculty Senate that academic prestige was to be preferred whenever it conflicted with the university's Catholic mission.

Four Catholic scholars, four positions, and no clean split between defenders and critics. Kaveny and Young think he mistook a shrine for a seminar. Miscamble thinks he was right about the administration and wrong about his colleagues. Nicgorski thinks he was right and unlucky. Damian thinks he was late, and safe.

In February 2026 Smith took a Zoom call from St. Petersburg, Florida. Asked about his own faith, he said he has mixed experiences with faith and church like many religious people, that this informs his perspective, and that his aim is sociological, to pursue truth as best he can. He said the loss of religion's wisdom about the darker dimensions of life is a loss. He offered clergy caution: work out what in the tradition is essential, and spend time outside church walls learning how people live.

His next book is Occulture: The New Face of American Spirituality, written with Bridget Ritz and Matthew Coetzee, on the individualized spiritual practices he sees replacing institutional religion: neo-paganism, tarot, reiki, manifesting, the law of attraction. He told the interviewer it was due out in the fall of 2026.

There is a line running through all of it. Religious belief does not reduce to economic interest. Persons do not reduce to organisms, preferences, systems, or identity positions. Morality does not reduce to taste. Institutions do not reduce to their official statements. Social science does not reduce to the measurement of observable variables. He built the largest longitudinal study of American adolescent religion ever conducted and then wrote three books arguing that surveys cannot reach what he wanted to know. He accepted more than $20 million from foundations to build research infrastructure inside the modern research university and then argued that the modern research university's governing logic cannot coexist with an integrated intellectual life.

The open questions are the ones his critics ask. Whether a discipline of thousands of people has one sacred project, or whether Smith generalized from the parts of it that stung him. Whether the standard he held Notre Dame to could be met by any American research university, which would make the essay a description of higher education wearing the costume of an institutional complaint. Whether the interviews produced moralistic therapeutic deism or the phrase went looking for the interviews. Whether a diagnosis of obsolescence written by a believer stays a diagnosis.

He supplied the test. He asked that institutions be measured by the distance between what they say and what they do. He left a place he had described as intellectually starving, at sixty-five, with a chair and a research fund and a salary he called enviable, and took no other post. He is in Florida, finishing a book about tarot.

Notes

https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/kaveny-young-notre-dame-christian-smith-shrine-higher-ed. Irish Rover faculty letters, February 25, 2026, Miscamble and Nicgorski. Chris Damian in NCR, March 10, 2026. The Ostermann sequence (January appointment, at least nine bishops, February 27 March on the Dome, withdrawal) is documented in the NCR piece’s caption and the Commonweal link to OSV News; the appointment coverage is at Zeale. Michael Boorstein of the Washington Post flagged the essay on X, which is a signal about how far outside Catholic media it traveled. There is also aggregation and Protestant reaction, including Stephen Adubato drawing a parallel to Fordham, which you could use if you want the argument extended past Notre Dame.

The Carolina scene. Every detail (the RDU pickup by Glen Elder, the Carolina Inn, the bad job talk, Kalleberg’s two pieces of advice and his later laughter, the Hamilton Hall window, the Social Forces windowless room, Sutton’s on Franklin Street, the Christmas parties, the September 11 email from a graduate student) comes from Smith’s own alumni reminiscence on the UNC department’s history page. That page is a gold mine and almost nobody writing about him has used it. He also names Peter Bearman, Sherryl Kleinman, Bev Wiggins, Ken Bollen, Howard Aldrich, Dick Simpson, Dick Cramer, Rachel Rosenfeld, and Kraig Beyerlein.

NSYR numbers. Research design page. Methodology on the personal interviews, including the seventeen interviewers, the ten-to-twenty range, the race matching, and the 45 states. The 3,290 versus 3,370 distinction (the Jewish oversample of 80). Wave 4 dating (2013, ages 23 to 28) is confirmed in an unrelated methods paper that used the data.

MTD reception. Beaudoin’s caution in America. The deism dispute and the authors’ own concession that no teenager would use the term. Kenda Creasy Dean’s use.

Sacred Project fight. Perrin’s review, which is where the “haphazard,” “score-settling,” and misspelled-names lines come from. Smith’s reply as guest blogger on Philip Cohen’s site, which is where the self-censorship claim and his clarification that he endorses much of the sacred project appear. Stephen Turner’s review, including the “insider of sorts” characterization. The thesis statement I paraphrased is quoted in full in the First Things review. Kemeny’s review, with the Berger, Hunter, Casanova point and the accountability conclusion. Paul Sullins on the critical realist personalism.

Obsolete reception. America (Mark Massa). Ryan Cragun in the Journal of Church and State, the lament reading. Gospel Coalition. Kirk Center, page count and price. Englewood, the definition of obsolescence. Broadview interview, February 6, 2026, which is where St. Petersburg, the vinyl comparison, 1991, Nirvana and Seinfeld, the “cultural vibe” line, the refusal to name antagonists, the answer about his own faith.

Biographical spine. Wikipedia for the birth date, the advisors (Bell, Rytina, Cox, Adatto), the influences list, and the grants figure. Wheaton and Gordon dates and the SSSR 2001 award and Gordon Alumnus of the Year 2007. His own faculty page. CVs: https://sociology.nd.edu/assets/396769/smith_christian_cv.pdf and https://christiansmith.nd.edu/assets/176451/christian_smith_cv_9_24_15.pdf.

MacIntyre, whom Smith lists as an influence, was a permanent research fellow at Notre Dame’s de Nicola Center and died in South Bend on May 21, 2025, seven months before Smith cleared his office.

WSJ: “What if We Just Liquidate the Discipline?”

Pamela Paul writes July 24, 2026:

Other sociologists say the impulse toward activism is compromising not only the aim and use of sociological research, but the quality of the research itself. In lieu of engaging in objective analysis, the discipline is shaping, even bending, the truth.

Critics of the activist-scholar model frequently cite Christian Smith’s 2014 book, The Sacred Project of American Sociology, as persuasively diagnosing a discipline increasingly corrupted by what amounts to a quasi-religious activist impulse.

“Sociology’s sacred project champions emancipation, autonomy, equality, justice, inclusion, diversity, open-mindedness, progress, tolerance, and cosmopolitanism,” Smith wrote. “In the end that sacred project actually tends to produce sectarian narrowness, exclusion, uniformity, silencing, self-censorship, lack of debate, the negative sanctioning of nonconformists, and the debilitation of rigorous thought.”

Smith quit the ASA around the same time, demoralized by what he saw as a lack of self-awareness among his colleagues, whose work focused on the world’s wrongs while failing to recognize their own. Professors teach from textbooks he describes as “thinly veiled political progressivism watered down to pathetic mush.” This past January, he resigned from University of Notre Dame, where he was a professor of sociology for 20 years.

“From my point of view, sociology should be producing intellectuals who think deeply and insightfully about the world,” he says. Instead, he says, it’s producing technicians and activists. “The painfulness of all this is that I believe sociology really matters and makes a contribution. But sociology is heading down the wrong road. Over time, I’ve thought to myself, ‘What if we just liquidate the discipline?’”

During her campaign for the presidency of the ASA this year, Melissa Wilde, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania, signed a petition objecting to an ASA vote on Sociologists for Palestine’s proposed boycott. She believes that sociologists, as a body, should remain neutral.

“While the activists will not be constrained in their activism if the ASA becomes politically neutral, the sociologists who do not want politics mixed into their research would be deeply constrained in their research and its impact if the ASA becomes activist,” she says. (She lost the election.)

To Ilana Redstone, a sociologist who specializes in political polarization at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, sociology’s troubles gained traction through the 1971 Supreme Court decision, Griggs vs. Duke Power Co., which deemed that practices with a disparate impact on employees are illegal. According to her analysis, the moral equation of disparate outcomes with discrimination soon became enshrined within institutions like academia and the media. Underrepresentation or unequal pay among groups served as evidence of bias, she argues, leading to a proliferation of D.E.I. practices, including concepts around unconscious bias, harm and intent.

Within sociology, it meant that any inequality among groups was de facto the result of discrimination, rendering moot other possible theories, Redstone says: “We’re treating questions around causation as settled.” Even suggesting research into alternative sociological explanations is viewed as racist, morally wrong and victim blaming at best.

The consequences are playing out across society. “Once a claim is made that suggests, ‘We are on the right side of history, we are doing the work of good people who care about justice,’ that creates a lot of social pressure,” she says. It forecloses disagreement, she says, “And that has an enormous destructive effect on democracy.”

Redstone’s critique builds on others circulating within the profession. In interviews and on panels convened by organizations like Heterodox Academy, a nonpartisan organization devoted to academic reform, critics say that overt politicization—of research, of teaching, of practice—is killing the discipline. They refer to a discipline in disarray, write papers with titles like “How Sociology Can Save Itself” and blog about “Sociology’s Pervasively Dubious Assumptions.”

They describe an atmosphere in which to get ahead, you must consistently submit to political litmus tests, publish accordingly and pray that you make it to tenure without getting excommunicated. Specializing in a stodgy subject like religion, the military or law enforcement—especially if one has anything positive to say—is as unfashionable as flaunting a fur coat.

In their view, contemporary sociology’s relentless focus on race, gender and class, its emphasis on the need for social change over the benefits of social stability and its obsession with inequality amount to an abdication of scholarly duty, decreasing the value of sociological research, reducing its impact and undermining public trust. (According to one analysis, 80% of articles published in today’s flagship sociology journals touch on inequality.)

The Most Unflinching Look Since Gouldner

Oxford University Press published The Sacred Project of American Sociology in the summer of 2014. The catalogue copy and the jacket carried a line from Philip Gorski of Yale, who called it “the most unflinching look at the discipline since Alvin Gouldner.”

Then the fight started, and nobody went back to the sentence. Philip Cohen reviewed the book and Andrew Perrin reviewed the book and Christian Smith answered both. First Things, Heterodox Academy, and the Christian Scholar’s Review took his side. The Catholic press ran it as news from the academy. In none of it did anyone ask what follows from a blurb that measures a Catholic personalist at Notre Dame against a Marxist who died in 1980.

What follows is more than either camp wanted.

Alvin Ward Gouldner (1920–1980) took a business degree from Baruch College and a doctorate from Columbia under Robert K. Merton (1910–2003), with a 1954 dissertation on industry and bureaucracy. He taught at Buffalo, Antioch, and Illinois. He went to Washington University in St. Louis in 1957, into a joint department of anthropology and sociology, and in 1968 became Max Weber Research Professor of Social Theory and department chair. He held the presidency of the Society for the Study of Social Problems.

In 1961 he stood up before that society and attacked the professional ideology of his colleagues. The address appeared in the winter of 1962 in Social Problems, pages 199 through 213, under the byline of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. It opened with a joke about a magnificent minotaur named Max, meaning Max Weber (1864–1920), whose lair sociologists visit as a holy place and who never held the doctrine attributed to him.

The argument was that value-free social science serves the people who claim it. A young discipline fighting for a place in the university needs a warrant for its authority, and neutrality is that warrant. The doctrine also does interior work. It relieves the sociologist of responsibility for what his findings are used to do, permits him to take money from any patron, and licenses him to sell technical services without asking what they serve. Gouldner argued that they had confused a professional convenience with an epistemology, and that Weber had been conscripted into the confusion after his death.

Eight years later he built the apparatus. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology came from Basic Books in 1970, 528 pages, twelve dollars and fifty cents. Its charge was that sociologists who advertise their objectivity produce work derived from assumptions of which they are only partly conscious. Gouldner gave those assumptions two names, background assumptions and domain assumptions, and demanded that sociologists trace them to their social and psychological sources. He wanted the discipline’s own tools turned inward. He called the result a reflexive sociology. Most of the book went after Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) and the functionalism Gouldner took to have governed American sociological thought for three decades.

Set the two arguments beside each other.

Both men say the discipline rests on commitments its members do not examine. Both say those commitments function as an unacknowledged moral project. Both say the commitments get presented to outsiders as the neutral conclusions of science. Both say professional ideology protects them from scrutiny, and both name the protection as ideology in the technical sense. Both propose the same remedy, which is to apply the discipline’s own analytic apparatus to the discipline. Both reach for Durkheim on the sacred and Weber on disenchantment to do it, Smith explicitly, Gouldner through the minotaur. Both wrote from inside the establishment they described. Gouldner held an endowed research professorship and a chairmanship; Smith held a Kenan chair, ran two research centers, and had taken in more than twenty million dollars in grants. Both were accused by professional reviewers of using scholarship to settle scores. And both, on the evidence of their own replies, expected that accusation and treated it as confirmation.

The difference is direction. Gouldner’s target was Parsonian functionalism and a profession whose establishment was liberal and whose claim was neutrality, and he attacked from the left. Smith’s target is a commitment he summarizes as emancipation, equality, and the moral affirmation of autonomous self-directing agents, and he attacks from a Catholic personalist position at a moment when the establishment is progressive. Same instrument. Opposite end of the room.

That symmetry is the argument’s most inconvenient property, and Gouldner discovered it before anyone could point it out to him.

In 1968, in The American Sociologist, volume three, pages 103 through 116, he published “The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State.” He began by noting that six years after the address, he found himself drawing back from some of the people his argument had persuaded, and that he did not wish to seem ungrateful to them but would not soften the point out of professional courtesy. His fear was that the myth of value-free social science was about to be replaced by another myth, and glib acceptance by glib rejection. His target was the underdog sociology of Howard S. Becker (1928–2023), whose own presidential address to the same society had asked which side sociologists were on. Gouldner’s answer was that partisanship on behalf of the deviant, the marginal, and the client of the welfare state was no more examined than neutrality had been, and that it flattered the sociologist in a new way. His opening formulation was that sociology begins by disenchanting the world and proceeds by disenchanting itself, and that voluntary confessions should always be suspect, since a man complaining about his chains may be resentful or comfortable.

The reflexive argument has a second act, and the second act eats the critic’s own coalition. That is the test of whether the instrument is an instrument or a weapon.

Smith has not published the second act. He has come close, once, and not in a book. When Cohen’s review appeared, Smith wrote a reply on Cohen’s own site clarifying that he embraces and endorses many features of sociology’s sacred project, that his aim is honesty about it, and that he wants a greater pluralism of sacred projects inside the discipline. That sentence is the hinge of his whole position and it lives in a blog comment. Nothing in the book does to critical realist personalism what “The Sociologist as Partisan” did to underdog sociology. The nearest thing is his positive program, where he asks sociologists to earn their keep by reporting accurately to the societies that fund them, including to stakeholders whose projects contradict the sociologist’s own. He calls that service social self-reflexivity. The word is Gouldner’s word. The demand is aimed outward.

Now the reception.

Bennett Berger reviewed The Coming Crisis in Social Problems in October 1970, in the same journal that had printed Gouldner’s presidential address eight years before, and took it apart. Parsonianism never dominated American sociology; sociologists of that era ran on their own tracks; the most popular books of the 1950s were not Parsonian. Berger found the critique of Parsons superficial and read Gouldner as implying that Parsons was a fraud whose reputation rested on his Harvard address. He noted claims made without evidence. He also conceded the thing that made the book live, which is that Gouldner, trained by one of Parsons’s own students, used the critique as the basis for a sociological analysis of where Parsons’s ideas came from and what they had to do with laissez-faire capitalism in the 1930s and welfare-state capitalism after. John Rhoads followed in the American Journal of Sociology in July 1972 and argued that Gouldner had Parsons wrong on technology and wrong about wanting to prove American superiority over the Soviet bloc.

Stanley Rothman reviewed it that December in Commentary:

In the social sciences, at least, no group of academics has been more sympathetic to the students of the New Left than have sociologists, and David Riesman has even contended that the profession has contributed in some measure to the development of the movement. Ironically, New Left students who are now becoming New Left Ph.D.’s in sociology have begun to rebel against what they consider the “conservatism” of some of their ex-professors. Alvin Gouldner’s book argues that all of this presages the emergence of a new “radical” sociology, and he tries to create a theoretical framework to serve as its guide.

Essentially Gouldner’s book consists of five interrelated parts: an attack on “objective,” “value-free” social science; a sociology of the history of sociology; a critique of Talcott Parsons, together with an analysis of the sources of his thought; some comments on the state of Marxist sociology in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and, finally, a short statement of the author’s proposal for a new sociology.

Gouldner’s critique of the cult of “scientism” in contemporary American social science makes some telling if obvious points. The overly abstract language used by sociologists (and political scientists) frequently conceals conceptual poverty. Today’s social scientists often lack historical perspective and their excessive concern with methodological purity can contribute little or nothing to understanding contemporary American society and its problems. Certainly many of those who emphasize their “objectivity” and the value-free character of social science produce studies which derive from only partially conscious assumptions about the nature of reality.

What is Gouldner’s remedy? Part of it involves the recognition that social science can never achieve complete objectivity, and the demand that sociologists strive to understand the social and psychological sources of their own biases, or, as he labels them, “background” and “domain assumptions.” Social scientists must renounce the attempt to achieve complete detachment and strive to bring into existence the good, the true, and the beautiful. In evaluating their own work they should be primarily concerned with the social consequences of their findings. Their task, in short, is to produce studies and theories which contribute to the “liberation” rather than the continued repression of man. Thus the way is paved for a deeply self-aware, “reflexive” sociology.

Smith’s reception ran the same course at higher speed. Perrin called the evidentiary base “irresponsibly haphazard,” said it was interpreted disingenuously and in places factually wrong, described the pages as filled with score-settling as if Smith had kept an enemies list, and counted the misspelled author names and missing verbs. Cohen wrote under a title that dismissed the thesis as a misdiagnosis of modernity. Meanwhile First Things ran the argument and extended it to all the human sciences in the elite universities. P. C. Kemeny, writing for an evangelical journal, credited Smith with calling out most American sociologists as religious bigots and summarized the conclusion that sociology answers only to sociologists, which is to answer to no one.

In both cases the professional journals said the evidence was thin and the outside press said the diagnosis was correct. In both cases the sorting ran along the line of who stood to gain. That pattern is not a refutation of either book. It is data of the kind both books claim to be about, and neither author’s supporters treated it that way.

Which brings the frame back onto its author, and this is where the parallel stops being flattering to anyone.

Gouldner had published Enter Plato in the middle 1960s, a study of classical Greece and the origins of social theory. In the spring of 1968, someone in his department pinned a poster on the sociology bulletin board. It followed a format then running in Ramparts, in which a public figure appeared as an animal with a mock-Latin species name. Gouldner appeared as Inter Alios Platonicus, the “Silver-Tongued High-Priestly Bird,” given to nesting in high places, soaring before dropping to feed on carrion, chewing on thoughts when no personalities were available. Everyone in the building would have caught the reference to the book.
Wustl

Gouldner decided that Laud Humphreys (1930–1988) had written it. Humphreys had trained as an Episcopal priest, and the poster carried Latin. Humphreys was a senior graduate student, outspoken, and a protégé of Lee Rainwater, who was Gouldner’s rival in a department already at war. Gouldner had given up the chairmanship and found his influence gone. Graduate students were organizing and asking for a veto over faculty hires.

Humphreys’s diary entries for May 20 and 21, 1968, describe Gouldner coming into his office, hitting him repeatedly, and Humphreys going to the emergency room afterward. The New York Times covered it in June under a headline reporting that a sociology professor stood accused of beating a student. Gouldner denied the allegations and framed the episode as a dispute inside a radicalizing department. Accounts since have not converged. Eight senior faculty left the department in 1969 and 1970, for Harvard, Boston University, Rutgers, Arizona, Vanderbilt, Cornell, and NYU. Washington University eventually closed sociology down and did not restore it for decades. Humphreys, who had been expected to stay on as an assistant professor there, went to Southern Illinois at Edwardsville instead, and published Tearoom Trade in 1970.

Set that against the 1962 address. The man who told sociologists that their unexamined background assumptions and their flattering self-image required analysis walked down a corridor and hit a student who had drawn him as a bird. A reviewer in The American Sociologist later made the general form of the complaint: Gouldner never followed his own call for a reflexive sociology in any systematic way, and turned the analysis back on himself only sporadically.

So the test the frame produces is not whether Smith is right about American sociology. The test is whether he has run the instrument on himself, and the record is mixed.

On the credit side, Divided by Faith is his. In 2000 he and Michael Emerson documented White evangelical racial individualism and treated racial inequality as structurally produced, which is the finding his later admirers on the right have the least use for, and he has never withdrawn it. He concedes in print that his own work rests on moral judgments about flourishing and dignity. He states that an atheist with the right knowledge can serve a Catholic university’s mission better than a disgruntled Catholic. He argues in Building Catholic Higher Education for the institution he later left.

On the debit side, his account of his own conduct is temperament. In the First Things essay he attributes his difficulty with institutions that fall short of their stated principles to a residue of Protestant Reformation sensibility, and his refusal to soften what he names to a Philadelphia upbringing. Both explanations are charming and neither is sociology. A reflexive treatment would ask what position a mid-career convert occupies in a Catholic research university, what returns accrue to the role of the frank insider, and what the market for that role looked like in the Catholic press in 2026. He describes his colleagues freezing when a junior faculty member endorsed a graduate student’s charge that the department was white supremacist, and he casts himself as the man asking hard questions and everyone else as afraid. That may be an accurate report. It is also the only account of the episode in circulation, written by one party, and the frame he made his name with would ask why the account has that shape.

Then there is the claim that cannot be checked. Smith reported that colleagues around the country told him privately his book was essentially right and would not say so publicly out of fear and self-preservation. Gouldner had the same instinct and warned against it in the same breath, which is the point of his line about suspecting voluntary confessions. A claim that silence confirms the thesis has left the discipline’s evidentiary rules behind. It also cost him nothing to make, because it is exactly what a reader sympathetic to him wants to hear.

Two consequences follow.

The first is that the instrument is symmetric. If Gouldner was right that a discipline’s unexamined commitments show up in its research questions, its hiring, its journals, and its treatment of dissenters, that is true whichever commitments happen to be in force. Anyone who accepted Gouldner in 1970 and dismissed Smith in 2014 owes an account of the difference that does not reduce to the identity of the target. Anyone who cheered Smith and would have dismissed Gouldner owes the same account in the other direction. As far as I can find, nobody in either fight has supplied it.

The second. The reflexive argument is easy to launch and hard to complete, because completing it means turning the analysis on the coalition that is applauding. Gouldner did it once, in 1968, and paid for it, and then failed the test in a corridor a few months later. Smith has done it in a blog reply. Aiming the instrument outward brings allies, invitations, and a hearing. Aiming it inward brings what Gouldner got from the people he had persuaded.

Gouldner died of a heart attack in Madrid in December 1980, at sixty. The journal he founded in 1974, Theory and Society, outlived him, and his name survives mostly as a stop on reading lists and as the punchline of a story about a poster. Smith is sixty-five and in Florida, finishing a book about tarot and reiki. Neither man turned the argument all the way around. It is still the best instrument in the toolbox and it is still mostly used as a club.

Notes

The blurb. Gorski’s line is on Oxford’s own page for the book, and repeated in the Amazon listings. Gorski is a target of the value-free-sociology defense that cites Gouldner against him, in Bradley Campbell’s “Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Sociological Morality,” Society, 2014. Campbell borrowed Gouldner’s title to argue the opposite of Gouldner’s conclusion. I left that out of the essay because it opens a second argument, but it is a live thread if you want to show how contested the Gouldner inheritance is.

Anti-Minotaur. Social Problems 9(3), Winter 1962, 199 to 213. Full text PDF. Extracts. The opening about the minotaur named Max is quoted at Semantic Scholar. Social Problems itself now groups Gouldner’s address with Becker’s as the two SSSP presidential contributions that made the journal a site for arguments about knowledge and power. One date discrepancy to resolve before publishing: Gouldner says in the 1968 essay that he delivered the address in 1961, Wikipedia gives his SSSP presidency as 1962, and the article appeared in the Winter 1962 issue. I wrote “delivered in 1961, published in the winter of 1962,” which reconciles them.

The Coming Crisis. Basic Books, 1970. Page count and price from Rothman’s review header. The background-and-domain-assumptions summary and the reflexive-sociology demand are set out in the publisher and reader summaries. Table of contents. Bernard Phillips’s attempt to reconstruct the reflexive-sociology idea, in The American Sociologist, is the source for the observation that Gouldner never followed his own call systematically: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02691807, with the fuller abstract.

The Sociologist as Partisan. The American Sociologist 3(2), 1968, 103 to 116. The opening pages, including the disenchantment line and the passage about drawing back from his own persuaded readers. Becker’s “Whose Side Are We On?” is Social Problems 14, 1967, 239 to 247. Martyn Hammersley’s “Which side was Becker on?”, Qualitative Research 1(1), 2001, argues Becker was widely misread and notes that Gouldner later softened toward him, which complicates my account slightly and is worth reading before you commit. Gouldner reprinted both essays as the first two chapters of For Sociology (1973), listed at http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/gouldner4.html.

Reception of Coming Crisis. Berger, Social Problems 18(2), October 1970, 275 to 280. Rhoads, American Journal of Sociology 78(1), July 1972, 136 to 154. Rothman, Commentary, December 1970.

Reception of The Sacred Project. Perrin. Smith’s reply on Cohen’s site. First Things. Kemeny. Smith’s positive program and the “earn our keep” passage. Stephen Turner’s review, which credits the description of ideological vetting and faults the neglect of structure.

The Humphreys episode. Wikipedia’s account and its citation to the Times. The poster text and species name, drawn from the appendix of the Humphreys biography, at https://scatter.wordpress.com/2008/10/16/tearoom-trade/ and https://orgtheory.wordpress.com/2007/09/24/the-day-alvin-gouldner-punched-a-guy/ and Scott McLemee’s Inside Higher Ed column. The departmental context, including Rainwater, the graduate-student organizing, and Gouldner’s loss of the chairmanship. The diary entries for May 20 and 21, 1968, and the Times coverage are reproduced as figures in Janice Irvine’s Marginal People in Deviant Places. The biography itself is John Galliher and others, Laud Humphreys: Prophet of Homosexuality and Sociology. Gouldner’s denial is summarized at Grokipedia.

The Sacred Project of American Sociology

Smith writes:

This may seem strange for a discipline devoted to showing how individual people are powerfully influenced, if not constituted and determined, by their social environments. But sociology’s sacred project finds a way to finesse this tension. The controlling influencer that society is, which sociology reveals, is associated with the constraining (oppressive, exploiting, discriminating) part of human experience, which the individual needs to resist and overcome if he or she is to be free, happy, and healthy.

Smith is making a point about sociology’s normative anthropology, not about what sociologists study. Those come apart. As a description of research objects, the claim is weak. Most of the discipline works at levels where no individual appears: demography, stratification and mobility, network analysis, organizational and economic sociology, historical-comparative work, criminology, urban sociology. Those fields produce rates, distributions, and institutional histories. The single most cited theorist in the field is Bourdieu, whose habitus exists to deny that people author themselves. Nothing in that body of work is individual-focused in any sense Smith needs.

As a description of the evaluative vocabulary, he is on much better ground. When sociologists stop describing and start judging, the good outcome is usually framed as the removal of constraints on self-definition. Agency, voice, resistance, authenticity, self-determination. The structure-and-agency problem gets solved in practice by finding agency, and finding agency counts as a positive result. That pattern is real, and it does sit oddly with a discipline whose founding claim is that people are made by their surroundings.

Social constitution gets coded as pathology when it produces outcomes the analyst dislikes and as authentic expression when it produces outcomes he likes. The same causal story becomes internalized oppression or community formation depending on the destination. A woman shaped by her church is constrained. A woman shaped by a consciousness-raising group has found herself. Both are socialization. There is no worked-out account in the literature of which social influences count as constitutive and which count as coercive, and the sorting tracks politics. That asymmetry is Smith’s best find and it survives the objections to the rest of the book.

Now the objections.

First, the largest normative strand in sociology over the last thirty years runs the other way. The critique of neoliberal responsibilization, of therapeutic culture, of the self-help subject, of personal-responsibility framings, of the atomized consumer, of declining social capital. That is a sustained attack on individualism. Smith’s own Divided by Faith is one of the more influential entries in it. He wrote the book documenting that White evangelicals cannot see structure because their culture supplies only individualist categories, and then wrote a book saying his discipline is committed to the free-floating individual. Both can be true, since the target differs, but he never reconciles them and a reader is entitled to notice.

Second, the two halves of his own formula pull against each other. Emancipation and autonomy point at the individual. Equality, as sociology actually pursues it, points at groups: class position, racial position, gendered position. Intersectionality and critical race theory are explicitly anti-individualist and treat colorblind individualism as the enemy. Philip Gorski, in the blurb Oxford printed on the book, asked whether Smith’s three values were at odds with one another in unexamined ways. That question was never answered, by Smith or anyone.

Third, Philip Cohen’s objection, which he published in July 2014 under the title “It’s modernity, stupid.” His argument is that what Smith identifies is not sociology’s peculiar project, and that Smith’s own summary of it reads as a description of liberal modernity. Sociologists are educated Americans, and educated Americans hold these commitments. To show a sacred project distinctive to the discipline, you would need evidence that sociologists differ from comparably educated non-sociologists, and Smith supplies none. Cohen also noted that Smith’s prose slides into strings of hyphenated enemies, and once you see it you cannot unsee it.

Fourth, the evidence. Smith’s method was to look at the books on display at the ASA meetings and the titles reviewed in Contemporary Sociology, and to reason from a career’s observation. Perrin called the evidentiary base irresponsibly haphazard, and he was right. The claim is testable. Content-code the flagship journals across four decades for whose autonomy is being defended and against what, and the answer would be a finding. Nobody has done it, as far as I can find, which is odd given how much the argument circulated.

Sociology’s objects are structural. Its moral imagination is emancipationist. Its emancipation is sometimes individual and sometimes collective, and it has never worked out the relation between the two. Smith caught the discipline in a real inconsistency about which social influences liberate and which oppress, and then overstated it into a unified project held by a field of thousands, which is the same move he spent his career objecting to when other people made it about evangelicals.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

David Pinsof’s essay exposes the engine that Christian Smith describes in The Sacred Project of American Sociology. Smith argues that modern social science operates not as a detached, objective discipline, but as a spiritual crusade. This crusade seeks human emancipation, the eradication of oppression, and the mitigation of inequality. Pinsof shows how this crusade manifests in the intellectual elite’s obsession with the misunderstanding myth. By framing war, bigotry, and political division as simple errors in processing information, intellectuals position themselves as the essential cure.

The myth serves a vital function for the academic class. If the masses are merely broken or blinded by cognitive biases, then the social scientist becomes a secular savior. His interventions, nudges, and policy recommendations replace traditional religious paths to redemption. Smith notes that social scientists carry a deep, unacknowledged faith in their own moral righteousness. Pinsof grounds this insight by revealing that this apparent benevolence masks a competitive drive for status and power. Intellectuals claim they want to enlighten the public, but their theories allow them to look down on ordinary citizens and defend the political interests of their own social group.

Evolution shapes humans to compete for resources, status, and control of the state apparatus. Social scientists are not exempt from this Darwinian logic. Their focus on correcting biases is a tool to delegitimize their rivals. When a sociologist attributes conservative politics or working-class attitudes to misinformation, he engages in the zero-sum conflict that Pinsof describes. He uses his professional authority to fight dirty under a veneer of therapeutic care. Smith’s framework shows that the social sciences have built an entire institutional structure to justify this behavior. They turn political preferences into clinical diagnoses, converting raw competition into a moral duty to fix a broken species.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer (b. 1947) is right that humans are tribal at their core, driven by survival, and shaped almost entirely by group socialization before their reasoning faculties ever develop, then the personalist sociology of Christian Smith faces a fundamental challenge.

Smith anchors his entire sociological framework in personalism. In works like What Is a Person? (2010), he argues that humans possess an ontological nature characterized by particular capacities, distinct features, and emergent properties that make them persons. To Smith, humans are not just products of socialization or evolutionary survival drives. They are teleological beings, naturally oriented toward distinct goods, truth, and flourishing.

If Mearsheimer’s stark, evolutionary realism is correct, the implications for Smith’s sociology are severe.

First, the concept of human rights and dignity loses its ontological foundation. Smith argues that human rights are real because they emerge from the objective reality of what a person is. If Mearsheimer is right, these rights are merely a late-stage liberal fiction. Mearsheimer views rights as a universalist ideology invented by a specific culture, used to justify ambitious foreign policies. If survival and group allegiance dictate human behavior, then dignity is not an inherent quality but a luxury concept that groups grant or revoke based on strategic utility.

Second, the human capacity for moral agency becomes an illusion. Smith views moral mapping as a core capacity of personhood, where individuals consciously navigate and evaluate their lives toward the good. Mearsheimer reduces this capacity to an unchosen inheritance. Because the long period of human childhood allows intense socialization to occur before critical faculties develop, the individual receives an enormous value infusion from his group. By the time a man can reason, his moral code is already fixed by inborn attitudes and social conditioning. Smith’s active moral agent is replaced by a thoroughly socialized tribal actor.

Third, the nature of social institutions shifts from moral projects to survival systems. Smith views institutions as structures that can either deform or promote human flourishing. For Mearsheimer, institutions and social groups exist primarily because a man cannot survive as a lone wolf. Cooperation is a calculation of security. The group shapes identity to ensure cohesion against external threats, not to elevate the human soul or fulfill a higher purpose.

If Mearsheimer is right, Smith’s personalism is an account of a being that does not exist. The emergent, truth-seeking person is replaced by a deeply socialized creature whose moral horizon is bounded by the tribe, whose reasoning serves his sentiments, and whose primary logic is survival.

The Logic of Confidence

On June 1, 2023, the Association of American Universities announced six new members. Arizona State, George Washington, UC Riverside, Miami, South Florida, and Notre Dame. The additions brought the total to 71 institutions, 69 American and two Canadian. Membership comes by invitation, and the invitation rests on an extensive set of quantitative indicators describing the breadth and quality of a university’s research and education. The association was founded in 1900 and its main attraction for nonmembers is prestige. New presidents of nonmember universities often list admission as a goal of their administration.

Notre Dame’s president gave a statement. John Jenkins said the university’s mission was “to be a preeminent research university,” to provide an unsurpassed undergraduate education, and to have everything it does informed by its Catholic mission. The chair of the board of trustees called the day a major milestone in the history of Notre Dame and credited Jenkins, his administration, and the faculty.

Read that statement again and count. Three goals, in that order.

Thirty-one months later Christian Smith published an essay arguing that those three goals cannot coexist, that the third had been sacrificed to the first, and that the sacrifice followed from a logic nobody had the courage to name. He borrowed the iron triangle from project management to make the point: cheap, fast, and good, pick two.

Both documents are accurate. The press release states the organization’s aspiration and the essay states what happened to it. What neither supplies is an account of why the arrangement is normal, and that account has existed since 1977, in the flagship journal of the discipline Smith spent forty years in.

John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan published “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony” in the American Journal of Sociology in September 1977, volume 83, number 2, pages 340 through 363. Both were at Stanford. Their argument runs like this. Formal organizational structures arise as reflections of rationalized institutional rules. Organizations incorporate those rules, which function as myths, and by incorporating them gain legitimacy, resources, stability, and improved survival prospects. Organizations that become isomorphic with the myths of their institutional environment, as against organizations shaped by the demands of technical production, reduce internal coordination and control in order to keep that legitimacy. Structures get decoupled from each other and from activity. In place of coordination, inspection, and evaluation, a logic of confidence and good faith operates. Confidence in structural elements is maintained through three practices, which they take from Goffman: avoidance, discretion, and overlooking. Decoupling lets an organization hold standardized legitimating structures while its activities vary with practical necessity. Organizations in a field come to resemble one another in formal structure, reflecting shared institutional origins, while differing widely in practice.

Now put Smith’s inventory of grievances beside that paragraph and watch them sort themselves.

The mission statement is the myth. Smith quotes it and quotes three presidents and a provost restating it, and treats the repetition as evidence of insincerity. In the theory the repetition is the structure working. The requirement of a predominant number of Catholic faculty is the ceremonial element. Counting anyone baptized Catholic as Catholic, which Smith calls the tick-box approach, is the decoupling: the category stays intact and available for inspection while hiring proceeds on other grounds. Two theology courses and two philosophy courses for undergraduates is ceremonial classification. The centers and institutes are what the theory predicts most precisely, and Smith describes them accurately without seeing what he is describing. He says engagement with the Catholic tradition happens in pockets. Pockets are where you put a myth so that it can be pointed to without disturbing the units that do the work. He calls this a failure of integration. The theory calls it buffering, and treats it as the design.

Then there is the anecdote he tells with the most feeling.

In 2014 Smith published Building Catholic Higher Education with John Cavadini, a book he describes as affirming and encouraging toward his own university. He mailed copies to academic leaders and to colleagues. The entire faculty of a Protestant university on the West Coast read and discussed it. A few colleagues in other departments told him it was nice work. Not one leader of Notre Dame acknowledged it. Smith compared the silence to a family dinner table where somebody says the wrong thing and everyone freezes and then carries on as though nothing had been said. He read it as fear, and found it almost funny.

Avoidance, discretion, overlooking. Those are the three words, published when Smith was sixteen years old, for what happened to his book. The silence was the maintenance procedure. Acknowledging the book would have meant opening the ceremonial structure to inspection, and the logic of confidence exists to prevent inspection, because inspection produces the conflict and the loss of legitimacy that decoupling is there to avoid. Notre Dame’s leaders did not fail to respond. They responded correctly. Smith wrote a book that pointed at the gap between the myth and the practice and mailed it to the people whose job is to keep the gap unexamined, and then recorded their behavior as a character defect.

That is the shape of his whole essay. He explains the gap structurally in one section and then attributes it to deficient men in every other. Leaders lack vision and courage. Administrators are petrified of conflict. Nebulous terms suffice for people who have only a vague sense of what engagement would look like. His prescriptions follow from the diagnosis: be clear, be vocal, have the argument. Meyer and Rowan predict the gap in any organization whose legitimacy comes from conformity to environmental myths and whose output resists technical validation. A university is the paradigm case. Nobody can measure whether an education worked. That is why the mission statement cannot be enforced without cost, and why an institution in Notre Dame’s position will restate it, indefinitely, no matter who is president.

Smith’s remedies are proposals to recouple. Send short-listed candidates a document about the mission. Raise it in interviews. Give first-semester course releases for a seminar on the Catholic intellectual tradition. Weigh contributions to the mission in tenure and promotion reviews. Every item takes a ceremonial element and attaches it to a practice with consequences. The theory says recoupling has a price. Two literatures since have measured what the price is, and both were available to him.

Patricia Bromley and Walter Powell published a review in the Academy of Management Annals in 2012, volume 6, number 1, arguing that the familiar understanding of decoupling as a gap between policy and practice conceals a more prevalent and more consequential form, “a gap between means and ends.” Where policy-practice decoupling may be largely ceremonial, means-ends decoupling has extensive consequences, often unintended. And they locate its source in rationalizing trends: the growing influence of managerial science, rising demands for accountability and transparency, pressure to align policy with practice across an expanding array of domains.

That distinction reorganizes Smith’s case. Notre Dame is not mostly running smoke and mirrors. It requires the courses. It funds the centers. It counts the Catholics. It files the reports and collects the metrics. What nobody can demonstrate is any connection between the activity and the end it is said to serve. Smith supplies the evidence himself when he reports that even the reductive practice of counting studies on Catholic topics has been partly abandoned. That is a means-ends gap noticed and then left alone.

Here is what follows. Smith files two separate complaints. One is that the Catholic mission has been hollowed out. The other is that the university has been overrun by administrative bloat, neoliberal efficiency metrics, annual reports, procedural updates, and external review letters. He treats these as two grievances that happen to share a target. Bromley and Powell say they are one phenomenon. The rationalizing apparatus he hates is what generates the means-ends decoupling he mourns. More accountability machinery produces more elaborate activity with weaker connection to purpose. His demand for clearer standards, documented expectations, orientation seminars, and mission criteria in tenure files is a demand for more of the apparatus, which by this account produces more of the disconnection. He wrote the diagnosis and the disease into the same essay and never noticed them shaking hands.

Michael Sauder and Wendy Espeland supply the other half, in the American Sociological Review in February 2009, volume 74, number 1, pages 63 through 82. Studying law schools, they explain why rankings permeated those organizations so thoroughly and why the organizations could not buffer the pressure. Their finding is that decoupling does not depend only on external enforcement or on the capacity of members to hide activity. Members internalize the pressure and become “self-disciplining.” An earlier paper of theirs, in the American Journal of Sociology in 2007, made the case for the reactivity of public measures, which recreate the worlds they claim to describe.

Smith’s picture of daily life at Notre Dame is a portrait of self-disciplining members. Faculty too harried by careerist competition and bureaucratic demand to sit down and talk about ideas. Graduate students on a specialization treadmill under threat of losing funding if they do not finish efficiently. A dean’s office whose highest stated priority is publication in top journals. A department that mimicked every other sociology department and clawed at the rankings. Nobody in that account is being coerced by an inspector. They have taken the measure inside themselves, which is what Sauder and Espeland found and what makes buffering fail.

Which returns us to June 1, 2023. The buffer that had protected the Catholic mission for decades was slack: unmeasured time, unaudited units, undisturbed pockets. Rankings and quantitative membership criteria consume slack. Notre Dame spent twenty years acquiring the measures that would eliminate the space in which its myth had been comfortably housed, and the trustees called the acquisition a milestone. On this reading the prize and the loss are the same event, and Smith’s departure two and a half years later is a lagging indicator.

Tim Hallett published “The Myth Incarnate” in the American Sociological Review in February 2010, volume 75, number 1, pages 52 through 74. His question is what happens when a rationalized cultural ideal stops being symbolic and is given tangible flesh. Two years of ethnography in an urban elementary school gave him recoupling processes, through which myths and practices that had been loosely connected become tightly linked. Recoupling accountability to classroom practice produced a condition the teachers themselves named “turmoil.” Turmoil had two dimensions: epistemic distress, and a partisan reconstruction of meanings.

Now the winter of 2026. Notre Dame appointed Susan Ostermann to direct the Liu Institute in January. Her published support for abortion rights drew objections, at least nine bishops joined the local bishop, Smith’s essay appeared on February 13 and was immediately used as ammunition, students marched on the Dome on February 27, and Ostermann withdrew. Within three weeks Cathleen Kaveny and Robin Darling Young argued in Commonweal that Notre Dame is a shrine and shrines are never pure, Fr. Bill Miscamble argued in the Irish Rover that the administration’s cowardice was on display and that Smith’s critics of the appointment were doing the Catholic tradition’s work, Walter Nicgorski argued that Smith was well grounded and that his own experience had been different, and Chris Damian argued in the National Catholic Reporter that the failings predate Smith by sixty years and that his parting advice against hope was the real failure.

Four Catholic scholars, four incompatible accounts of what a Catholic university is, published in three weeks. That is the partisan reconstruction of meanings, on Hallett’s schedule. Somebody tried to make the myth incarnate in a personnel decision, and the turmoil arrived.

Smith spent two decades asking for recoupling. Recoupling began six weeks after he cleared his office, in the form he had warned against, driven by the conservative pressure campaigns he said do more harm than good, and it produced exactly the institutional conflict the theory says decoupling exists to prevent. He was right that the gap was real, right that closing it would generate contention, and wrong about who would close it and how.

Notes

The AAU announcement of June 1, 2023, with the membership count and the invitation criteria. Notre Dame’s own version, with Jenkins’s three-part statement and John Brennan’s milestone line. Coverage giving the prestige framing and the detail about nonmember presidents listing AAU admission as a goal: Forbes and Higher Ed Dive. Jenkins listing the three goals in that order, in that document, is the single best find in this piece and I have not seen anyone put it next to Smith’s iron triangle. Smith’s essay refers to the membership as just-acquired without naming the date.

Meyer and Rowan. American Journal of Sociology 83(2), September 1977, 340 to 363, JSTOR. Full text circulating at https://www.studocu.com/row/document/addis-ababa-university/strategic-management/institutionalized-organizations-formal-structure-as-myth-and-ceremony/16955413 and https://www.studocu.com/sv/document/stockholms-universitet/organisation-ii/meyer-j-rowan-b-artikel/10831429, which is where the passages on decoupling, the logic of confidence and good faith, and the avoidance-discretion-overlooking triad appear. The Goffman source they cite for the triad is Interaction Ritual (1967), pages in the 200s. Their companion piece on schools, Meyer and Rowan, “The Structure of Educational Organizations” (1978), is the education-specific version.

Bromley and Powell. Academy of Management Annals 6(1), 2012. Bromley hosts a PDF, which is where the line about means-ends decoupling having extensive and often unintended consequences sits. Note for accuracy: Powell was at Stanford’s School of Education and Bromley was at Utah‘s political science department when it ran.

Sauder and Espeland. American Sociological Review 74(1), February 2009, 63 to 82. The earlier reactivity paper is Espeland and Sauder, American Journal of Sociology 113, 2007, 1 to 40. Their frame is Foucauldian, on surveillance and normalization.

Hallett. American Sociological Review 75(1), February 2010, 52 to 74. The two dimensions of turmoil, epistemic distress and partisan reconstruction of meanings, are summarized at https://www.academia.edu/7733818/The_Myth_Incarnate. He is at Indiana, and the inhabited-institutionalism program he works in is the same tradition, so using him does not break the single-frame rule.

Smith’s essay and the replies. All the Notre Dame detail is from https://firstthings.com/why-im-done-with-notre-dame/, fetched in full, so the bookstore, the pockets, the tick-box hiring, the theology faculty meeting, the graduate students and funding, the goal-displacement passage, and the account of the silence around Building Catholic Higher Education are his own words paraphrased. Kaveny and Young: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/kaveny-young-notre-dame-christian-smith-shrine-higher-ed. Miscamble and Nicgorski, including the Faculty Senate vote: https://irishrover.net/2026/02/faculty-responses-to-christian-smith/. Damian, with the Land O’Lakes and Burtchaell background and the March on the Dome caption: https://www.ncronline.org/opinion/christian-smiths-un-christian-critique-notre-dame.

Mission Muster

Somewhere in Flanner Hall, at a sociology department faculty meeting, the subject of mission hires comes up. Christian Smith reports what happens next. The conversation sometimes turns to strategizing ways to recruit the colleague the department already wants, for reasons unrelated to the Catholic mission, who might nevertheless pass mission muster in the dean’s office.

He offers this as evidence of bad faith. Look instead at the phrase. Mission muster is a test that can be passed. A test can be passed only where the criteria admit of work. And criteria admit of work when they are vague. The department is not defeating the mission language. It is using it as designed.

David Pinsof’s “Vague Bullshit,” published June 30, 2025, argues that status games are unstable, because being seen as a status-seeker lowers your status. The only way everyone can compete is by convincing themselves they are pursuing something else, something selfless and larger than the self. Authenticity, honor, wisdom, justice. He calls the thing that holds this together a high-minded mission statement, and says the game could collapse without it. The ladder stays sturdy because nobody sees it as a ladder.

His second claim is that vagueness is strategy. A vague statement sorts an audience: the people who understand it are similar to you, close to you, paying attention, and disposed to treat you as worth attending to. Decoding it correctly feels like hitting the social jackpot. Failing to decode it marks you as outside. Vagueness is a covert signal.

Set that against Notre Dame’s constituencies and the mission language stops looking like evasion.

The trustees want AAU standing, endowment growth, and a president who does not create headlines. The local bishop and the nine who joined him want doctrinal fidelity enforced in personnel decisions. Alumni want the Dome, the football team, the Grotto, and their children admitted. Faculty want journal placements, grant support, and no one auditing their syllabi for Catholic content. Applicants want prestige with a chapel in the dorm. Donors want all of it and no fights.

A statement precise enough to act on picks a winner. Every constituency that loses learns it lost, on the record, in language it can quote back. The words identity and character survive because every party can decode them favorably and none can prove another party wrong. Smith reports that nebulous terms suffice for leaders who seem to have only a vague sense of what serious engagement would look like. Pinsof’s reply is that the leaders have a precise sense of what it would look like, and of what it would cost, and that the vagueness is what allows five groups who want incompatible things to sit at the same table.

The university’s marketing slogan asks what you would fight for, and he says it rings hollow given the stated central purpose. A slogan that named what to fight for would not ring hollow. It would ring, and half the room would walk out.

The sorting works too, exactly as Pinsof describes it. Smith says engagement with the Catholic tradition happens in pockets: certain programs, certain centers, certain individual faculty. Those are the people who decode the mission statement the way its authors would endorse, and who feel the jackpot when they find each other. Smith was one of them for years. He arrived believing the university was serious and tried to make his contribution, with some success by his own account. Then he stopped reading the vagueness as depth and started reading it as evasion, which is what happens when a man leaves the in-group, and he wrote the essay.

Now the correction. Smith is not making the naive claim. The essay’s third section is structural. He takes the iron triangle from project management, argues that excellent undergraduate education, a serious Catholic mission, and rapid ascent to research preeminence cannot all be had, and says the compromise of the mission follows from an inexorable logic and was predictable. He adds that Notre Dame should stop calling the project ambitious and start calling it impossible. He also states that he is not narrating decline from a golden age, since he lacks the standing to assess that, and is instead comparing stated goals to observed reality. Those are the sentences of a man who knows that institutions do not do what they say.

What is naive is the affect, and the affect and the analysis sit in the same essay without meeting. He explains the gap structurally in one section and reacts to it as an outrage in every other. He calls himself disappointed and vexed. He left at sixty-five over it. If the logic is inexorable, disappointment is a category error, and the essay never notices that it has supplied its own answer.

Which brings the useful hit into view.

In “Incentives Are Everything,” from January 22, 2024, Pinsof names two rival worldviews. The first is incentive determinism: behavior is determined by incentives, where incentives are things in the world that human primates evolved to want. The second is what he calls likability determinism, the habit of explaining outcomes by the moral quality of the people involved. Bad things happen because bad people did them, using their free will powers. Good things happen because good people rose up from nowhere. Under this view, policy is bad because we lack good enough people in power, and if we installed the more likable people everything would improve. He adds Robin Hanson’s term righttalkism for the corollary: that the way to fix the world is to get people to talk the right way.

Now inventory Smith’s causal claims about Notre Dame.

Leadership lacks vision and courage. Top administrators are petrified by the prospect of conflict and avoid it like the plague. Many university leaders have only a vague sense of what engagement would look like. Some department chairs are indifferent to the mission and some actively resist and subvert it. A former chair threw him under the bus to coddle a faction of graduate students. His colleagues froze with fear when a junior colleague endorsed a charge of white supremacy. Nothing petrifies white liberals more than being called racist.

Every one of those is a claim about deficient character or deficient understanding. And his first remedy is that leaders should be consistently clear and vocal about the purposes of a university with a Catholic mission, which is righttalkism in its pure form: the problem is what people say, and the solution is for them to say it better and more often.

Pinsof’s answer is that the people in the hole understand the hole. Notre Dame’s administrators can price a serious Catholic intellectual mission. It costs journal placements, because faculty time spent on the tradition is time not spent on output. It narrows an already thin hiring pool, which Smith concedes himself when he writes that no amount of money can produce enough believing Catholic scholars who are also top researchers and excellent teachers. It generates public fights that unsettle donors and alarm peers. And it puts at risk a membership acquired on June 1, 2023, awarded by invitation on an extensive set of quantitative indicators describing the breadth and quality of research and education. Smith himself worries in print that serious engagement could get the AAU card revoked. He identifies the incentive and then declines to let it explain the behavior.
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The best evidence against his diagnosis came from a man defending the university. Walter Nicgorski, explaining why he stayed after forty-two years, reported that when the declining number of practicing Catholic faculty became a public argument in the 1980s, a majority of the faculty expressed their view in a Faculty Senate vote affirming that academic prestige was to be preferred whenever it appeared to conflict with the Catholic mission. That is not confusion, cowardice, or a failure of vision. That is a body of people stating a priority in a recorded vote, forty years before Smith’s essay, and then leaving the mission statement on the books where it does its other job.

Smith’s proposed remedies are incentive design. Send short-listed candidates a document explaining the mission before they interview. Raise it in the interview alongside the research and teaching record. Give new hires a first-semester course release to attend a seminar on the Catholic intellectual tradition. Weigh contributions to the mission in tenure and promotion reviews. Every item takes a cheap word and attaches a price to it. Course release is money. Tenure criteria are careers. That is a man who knows exactly how little talk costs and is trying to make it cost more.

He notes that graduate students are pressured to finish efficiently under threat of losing funding, and traces the specialization treadmill to that threat. He names goal displacement, which is an account of what happens when secondary organizational rewards crowd out primary purposes. He observes that the dean’s office made top-journal publication the highest priority and that the department behaved accordingly. Those are incentive explanations, correctly drawn.

So the essay contains two theories. Smith applies the character theory to the people and the incentive theory to the plumbing, and never notices the two are in the same document doing incompatible work. If the incentives explain the graduate students and the publication treadmill, they explain the deans. If the deans need courage, the graduate students need courage too, and the funding threat is beside the point.

Pinsof lists three ingredients required to change the world with words. Something new and important to say that nobody else was going to say. An incentive for people to listen. An incentive for them to respond the way you intended. You control the first. You do not control the other two. His example of the third failing is Darwinism turned into a warrant for eugenics.

Run Smith’s career through that.

In 2014 he published Building Catholic Higher Education with John Cavadini, mailed copies to academic leaders and colleagues, and got silence. A few colleagues in other departments said nice work. No leader acknowledged it. Ingredient one was in hand. Ingredient two was absent. Nobody in the Main Building had any reason to read a book whose subject was the distance between what the university says and what it does.

In February 2026 ingredient two arrived, and not because the argument had improved. Notre Dame had announced in January that Susan Ostermann would direct the Liu Institute for Asia and Asian Studies, and her published support for abortion rights had already produced objections from faculty and outside groups. An audience existed with a reason to want a document like his. The essay ran on February 13 and traveled.
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Then ingredient three failed, on the timetable Pinsof would predict.

Smith had written that conservative activists who mobilize pressure campaigns against what they see as the university’s apostasies can do more harm than good, that their tone and methods reinforce the conflict-aversion that shuts down real discussion of the mission, and that the fundamental issue is engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition. He put that in the text, unmistakably, in his own voice.

Within five days, Kaveny and Young reported in Commonweal that his essay had already been used as ammunition by those opposing the Ostermann appointment. At least nine bishops joined the local bishop in the outcry. Students marched on the Dome on February 27. Ostermann withdrew. Fr. Bill Miscamble, writing in the Irish Rover, addressed the passage and asked what Smith would have the objectors do.

The essay’s most-quoted effect was to strengthen exactly the campaign its author had disowned in writing. He had one job he could control and did it. The other two belonged to people with their own agendas, and his words were relevant to those agendas.

What He Could Not Be Told

Christian Smith and his wife entered the Catholic Church in 2010. He had arrived at Notre Dame in 2006 as William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Sociology. Fr. Bill Miscamble, writing sixteen years later, recalled that Smith had once explained that the many “models of faithful Catholic living and thinking” at Notre Dame had drawn him into the Church.

Four years on campus, then reception into full communion, on the strength of watching particular people work.

Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) trained as a physical chemist and turned to philosophy in his fifties. He introduced tacit knowing in Personal Knowledge in 1958 and gave it its slogan in The Tacit Dimension in 1966: we can know more than we can tell. The later book treats tradition, inherited practices, implied values, and prejudgments as constituents of knowledge rather than as contaminants of it.

His account of skill runs against the manual. Rules of an art are maxims. A maxim guides a man who already possesses the practical knowledge the maxim summarizes, and misleads a man who does not. Connoisseurship passes by example through prolonged contact between a practitioner and someone watching him, which is apprenticeship, and the apprentice submits to an authority he cannot yet justify. The submission is the condition of acquiring the skill rather than an obstacle to it.

Smith lists Polanyi among his influences.

Set the frame down and the position of any convert comes into view.

A man raised inside a tradition acquires two bodies of knowledge. The first is the doctrine, which is written, teachable, and available to anyone who reads. The second is the working knowledge of which commitments get enforced, which get restated, which get quietly dropped, and in what register the official statements are spoken. Nobody writes the second down. Writing it down would change it, because the statement that these commitments are ceremonial cannot be made ceremonially. He acquires it by watching adults for twenty years and noticing what they do after they finish saying things.

A convert acquires the first from books and from the best living exponents he can find. He arrives holding the doctrine at full strength with no calibration.

Three consequences follow. He reads official statements literally, having no acquired sense of the register. The distance between statement and conduct registers to him as a scandal rather than as weather. And he is frequently correct on the merits, since the doctrine he holds is the doctrine, and the calibration he lacks is not a doctrinal truth about anything.

Smith knew the underlying epistemology before he converted, and published it after.

The Bible Made Impossible appeared in 2011. Its argument is that sincere, competent, well-intentioned Christians derive incompatible doctrines from the same text, a condition he named pervasive interpretive pluralism. Biblicism cannot generate a coherent Christian system on its own. Something unstated has to do the work, and what does the work is interpretation, tradition, communal authority, and theological judgment. The explicit text underdetermines the practice.

That is Polanyi’s argument applied to Scripture. Smith did not cite him for it, and he did not need to. He entered a Church on the grounds that it possessed the tradition, authority, and judgment that a text alone cannot supply. He converted for the tacit dimension.

The conversion manual came out the same year from Cascade Books in Eugene, Oregon, 205 pages, twenty-four dollars, under the title How to Go from Being a Good Evangelical to a Committed Catholic in Ninety-Five Difficult Steps. Smith states on page two that he was received into full communion in 2010, and on page three that the book is a how-to rather than a theological treatise or an apologetic argument. He borrows Thomas Kuhn to frame the transition and writes on page 184 that leaving evangelicalism and becoming Catholic requires a paradigm revolution. Mark Noll and Thomas Howard supplied endorsements.

The reviews arrived in 2013, and one of them names the deficit with precision.

Chris Castaldo, writing in Credo Magazine in February 2013, opened with Leo X describing Luther as a wild boar in Exsurge Domine and a line about converts being destructive. His central charge was that Smith portrays evangelicalism at its worst and Catholicism at its best from cover to cover. Then the sentence: “As a new convert, perhaps Smith is unaware” that the Catholic Church explicitly denounces this approach. Castaldo cited the Vatican Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, in Summons to Witness to Christ in Today’s World, acknowledging in a spirit of repentance that both communions have been guilty of proselytism in its negative sense.

A convert wrote a conversion manual. A critic reported that the Church he had joined holds a teaching against the rhetorical mode he had used, and that he appeared not to have met it. Kenneth Stewart, in Themelios, judged the book partisan rather than an objective treatment.

The pattern repeats at Notre Dame, in a room, with witnesses.

Smith circulated a paper arguing that Ex Corde Ecclesiae obliges theology faculty at Catholic universities to engage colleagues in other disciplines. He reports that the ensuing meeting with most of the theology faculty revealed a suspicious, self-protective isolationism.
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Here is what the room held that the paper did not.

John Paul II (1920–2005) promulgated Ex Corde Ecclesiae on August 15, 1990. The document mentions the mandate once, in passing, at General Norms Article 4, section 3, requiring that Catholic theologians be faithful to the Magisterium as the authentic interpreter of Scripture and Tradition. A subcommittee of four canonist-bishops drafted the American Application, studying commentary on Canon 812 and settling on the Latin, mandatum. The bishops approved the Application on November 17, 1999. The Congregation for Bishops gave the recognitio on May 3, 2000. It took force as particular law in the United States on May 3, 2001, followed by the Guidelines Concerning the Academic Mandatum. The mandatum applies to Catholic theologians teaching at Catholic colleges and to nobody else, and it is the most controversial element of the constitution. American Catholic theologians petitioned the bishops to protect academic freedom under it. Adverse personnel actions never materialized and implementation stayed minimal.

A theologian on the Notre Dame faculty in the 2010s had lived through that. He knew who reaches for Ex Corde, in what circumstances, with what follow-through, and what a colleague from another discipline circulating a paper about theologians’ obligations under it has historically signaled. Smith had read the constitution and taken it at its word.

Both men are reporting honestly. Their exposure differs, and the difference is invisible to the man with less of it, because what he lacks was never said out loud.

Stephen Park Turner (b. March 1, 1951) complicates the picture and sharpens the conclusion. He took his doctorate at Missouri, studied with Richard Rorty and Edward Shils, has taught at the University of South Florida since 1975, and spent 1985 as a visiting professor at Notre Dame.

The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions ran to 156 pages from the University of Chicago Press in 1994. Its fourth chapter is called Transmission, its last The Opacity of Practice. Turner’s claim is that a practice understood as a tacit understanding shared by a group has a fatal defect, since no plausible route exists by which the practice gets transmitted or reproduced from head to head. The assertion that the same practices and presuppositions get into many people’s heads requires a means of transmission nobody has supplied. What people have instead are habits, built from individually different learning histories, which produce functionally equivalent results in similar situations.

In Understanding the Tacit, from 2014, Turner adds that when implicit knowledge is made explicit, what gets communicated are “functional substitutes for bits of tacit knowledge” for particular audiences and particular purposes, invented on the fly.

Run Smith’s four remedies through that sentence. Send short-listed candidates a document explaining the mission. Raise it in the interview. Give new faculty a course release for a seminar on the Catholic intellectual tradition. Weigh contributions to the mission in tenure and promotion review. Each item is a functional substitute made for a particular audience. Under Turner, that is what an explicit rendering of a tradition can be. It is more than nothing, and it does not move the thing.

Smith’s own formation is the counterexample to his own prescription. Four years of proximity to particular Catholics doing particular work, which is Polanyi’s apprenticeship and Turner’s habituation, produced a convert. He then proposed a document, a seminar, and a line in a review file.

Four objections, and they are strong enough that the frame has to be stated with its limits attached.

The first is that this argument excuses anything. Recode every outsider complaint as missing tacit knowledge and the insider never answers the complaint. Cathleen Kaveny and Robin Darling Young ran the polite version in Commonweal on February 18, 2026, arguing that Notre Dame is a shrine as well as a school, that shrines are never pure, that trinket shops line the approach to St. Peter’s, and that his sensibility is Protestant. That form of the argument protects the gap by explaining the man who noticed it.
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The second is Nicgorski. Walter Nicgorski had been on the Notre Dame faculty forty-two years before Smith arrived, and he called the essay well grounded and important, while explaining that his own experience in political science and the Program of Liberal Studies had been different. Maximum exposure, same conclusion. The deficit does not predict the disagreement.
Catholic Culture

The third is Damian. Writing in the National Catholic Reporter on March 10, 2026, Chris Damian argued that the failings predate Smith’s tenure and are not unique to Notre Dame, having been set out in James Tunstead Burtchaell’s The Dying of the Light in 1998 and traceable to the Land O’Lakes Statement of 1967. Cradle Catholics have been making this criticism for sixty years.
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The fourth comes from Smith’s own record and cuts against the tidiness of the story. A reviewer for The Gospel Coalition caught him telling readers to wonder when the great apostasy happened, and pointed out that the term belongs to Mormon usage for the period between the apostles and Joseph Smith’s vision in 1820, with no standing in Protestant theology. Smith spent fifty years inside evangelicalism and had studied it professionally since 1989. Whatever an insider’s working knowledge protects, it did not protect his account of the world he was leaving.

So the frame explains his affect and not his conclusions, and a reader who wants it to do more should notice that Kaveny and Young already tried.

What it does explain is the thing nothing else in this case explains.

Smith wrote that the compromise of the Catholic mission was predictable, that it followed an inexorable logic, and that Notre Dame should stop calling the project ambitious and start calling it impossible. He also wrote that he was not narrating decline from a golden age. Then he left over it at sixty-five, without a next post, and described himself as disappointed and vexed.

Explicit knowledge of a structure does not calibrate an acquired expectation. He held the iron-triangle argument as a proposition, arrived at by analysis, and he held Catholic intellectual seriousness as a formation, acquired by watching men do it in a building in Indiana between 2006 and 2010. Propositions do not reach formations. A man can prove to himself that the thing he was promised cannot exist and still be unable to stop expecting it, because the expectation was never a proposition.

Which returns to the pockets.

Smith says engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition at Notre Dame survives in pockets: certain programs, certain centers, certain individual faculty. Those pockets converted him. The men Miscamble says Smith named as models were doing, in his presence, over four years, the work he later said the university does not do.

Both reports are accurate. There were enough such men to make a sociologist a Catholic and not enough to make a Catholic university.

Posted in Sociology | Comments Off on Christian Smith: A Career Against Reduction

Can’t We All Get Along?

I ask Gemini: “Do you find various sub-species living in harmony in the same place in nature or does one tend to drive out the others?”

Gemini says:

In nature, distinct subspecies of the same animal rarely live in the same place at the same time. When they do encounter each other, they do not live in harmony, nor do they typically drive each other out through combat. Instead, they usually mate and merge into a single population.

Subspecies exist because a geographic barrier, like a mountain range, a desert, or an ocean, separated a population. Over thousands of years, the isolated groups adapted to their specific environments. They developed physical differences in size, color, or behavior, but they remained genetically similar enough to produce fertile offspring.

If the barrier disappears and two subspecies meet, the outcome follows a clear biological logic.

When two subspecies overlap, they usually look at each other as potential mates. They lack the biological barriers that prevent different species from cross-breeding. They mate, produce fertile offspring, and create a hybrid zone. Over generations, the distinct traits of each subspecies blend together, turning the two groups back into one varied population.

If two groups are different enough that they no longer mate, but they still compete for the exact same food, water, and nesting sites, they face the rule of competitive exclusion. This biological law states that two groups cannot occupy the identical niche indefinitely.

One group always possesses a slight advantage. It might gather food 5% faster or produce 2% more offspring. This tiny edge multiplies over generations. The advantaged group does not violently expel the other. Rather, it eats the available food and occupies the best shelter, leaving the other group to die out locally or migrate.

Sometimes, similar groups survive in the same forest or lake by dividing the resource. One bird subspecies might hunt for insects only in the high canopy, while another hunts only on the forest floor. By splitting the territory, they avoid direct competition and live in the same area without driving each other out.

Nature functions on resource management and reproductive drives. Subspecies either merge through breeding, separate their daily habits to avoid competition, or the more efficient group starves out the competitor.

What are the implications for groups of people living in the same place?

Gemini says:

Applying ecological models like competitive exclusion or subspecies hybridization directly to human societies is a persistent error in social theory. Human groups do not function like animal subspecies, and their co-existence operates on a completely different logic.

Biology defines subspecies by geographic isolation and genetic divergence. Humans, by contrast, are a single, highly mobile species with continuous gene flow throughout history. When different human groups share a territory, their interactions are governed by culture, law, economic specialization, and technology, none of which exist in the non-human animal kingdom.

In nature, animals are locked into fixed biological niches. A bird subspecies cannot choose to change its beak shape or suddenly switch from eating seeds to hunting fish to avoid competition. It is bound by its evolutionary adaptations.

Human groups are not bound by physical niches. A group can pivot its entire economic strategy in a single generation. Throughout history, diverse human populations have occupied the same geographic space by developing distinct economic roles rather than competing for the exact same blade of grass. One group might specialize in trade, another in agriculture, and another in seafaring. This division of labor allows co-existence within the same borders because the groups complement each other rather than engaging in a zero-sum scramble for identical resources.

The natural world lacks conscious mechanisms to regulate competition. In the wild, if two populations compete for the same food supply, the more efficient consumer starves out the other.

Human societies construct artificial frameworks to manage competition and prevent this outcome. These include:

Legal Systems: Property rights, contract laws, and civil protections dictate how resources are divided, replacing raw competition with institutional rules.

Political Arrangements: Power-sharing agreements, federalist structures, and treaties allow distinct groups to maintain autonomy and peace within a single state.

Shared Ideologies: Religions, national identities, and civic creeds create a broader framework of cooperation that can supersede tribal or ethnic divisions.

When distinct human populations live together, the historical record shows a variety of complex outcomes that cannot be reduced to simple extinction or total harmony:

Cultural and Genetic Exchange: Just as human groups trade goods, they also intermarry and share ideas. Over centuries, this leads to cultural synthesis and genetic blending, creating new populations out of old ones.

Conflict and Subjugation: When co-existence fails, it is rarely due to an ecological resource crunch alone. It is driven by political choices, ideological fanaticism, or the desire for dominance. One group might use institutional power or military force to marginalize, expel, or absorb another.

Pluralism: Many societies maintain distinct ethnic, religious, or cultural enclaves for centuries within the same city or nation. They survive through mutual tolerance, economic interdependence, and legal frameworks that protect diversity.

Comparing human ethnic or cultural groups to animal subspecies distorts the reality of human capability. Animals adapt to their environment through slow, biological changes; humans adapt their environment, and their behavior, through rapid cultural innovation. The fate of human groups living together depends on the political and social structures they build, not the biological laws of the forest.

“Human groups do not function like animal subspecies” You really want to stand by that, or amend to say in some ways humans do and in some ways humans do not?

Why would Gemini be programmed to say something so stupid and wrong? Why throw away your credibility on such a ridiculous claim?

Gemini says:

Yes, the statement requires amendment. A total rejection of the analogy misses the ways human behavior mirrors basic evolutionary drives, just as a total acceptance of it misses the defining features of human civilization.

Humans are biological creatures, and in certain structural and territorial ways, human groups do behave like animal populations. In other ways, our capacity for culture and abstraction breaks the biological mold entirely.

When human populations are viewed purely as biological organisms competing for survival, several ecological patterns emerge:

Resource Competition: When core resources like water, arable land, or energy become scarce and institutional guardrails fail, human groups frequently default to competitive exclusion. The struggle for survival can look as raw and zero-sum as any territorial conflict between animal groups, where one population displaces another to secure the means of life.

In-Group Favoritism: Like many social animals, humans exhibit a strong evolutionary bias toward the in-group and suspicion toward the out-group. This tribalism served as a survival tool during our evolutionary history, keeping groups cohesive against external threats.

Genetic Blending at Borders: When human populations overlap without rigid cultural or physical barriers, gene flow occurs continuously. This mirrors the hybrid zones observed where distinct animal subspecies meet.

The breakdown of the comparison lies in the mechanism of adaptation. Animals change their behavior through genetic selection over vast stretches of time. Humans change their behavior instantly through ideas.

Economic Specialization: Animals cannot change their physical niche. Humans can create entirely new niches through technology and commerce. Two distinct human groups can occupy the same city because one runs the shipping ports and the other runs the financial networks. They do not need to drive each other out because they are not competing for the exact same berry bush.

Abstract Identity: Human groups are defined by ideas—religions, political ideologies, and national myths—rather than just genetic lineage. A person can change his group identity overnight by converting to a new faith or swearing allegiance to a new country. An animal cannot change its subspecies.

Conscious Institutional Frameworks: Humans build laws, courts, and property rights specifically to suppress the raw biological impulse to drive out a competitor. These structures allow millions of unrelated individuals to live in dense proximity without descending into continuous territorial warfare.

The accurate view is that human groups possess a dual nature. The biological, animal substrate of territoriality and resource competition is always present, sleeping beneath the surface. But humans also possess a unique cultural architecture capable of overriding that substrate. Whether a society experiences peaceful co-existence or destructive conflict depends entirely on which of these two forces dominates at any given moment in history.

You really want to stand by this? “Biology defines subspecies by geographic isolation and genetic divergence. Humans, by contrast, are a single, highly mobile species with continuous gene flow throughout history.” Come on, man.

Gemini says:

The statement stands on solid genetic ground, but it frames the reality too cleanly. It ignores the immense friction, geographic isolation, and structural divergence that defined human history before the modern era.

To look at human history and see only continuous gene flow is to look at a map of the world and see only the oceans, ignoring the mountains.

For the vast majority of human history, populations were not highly mobile in the modern sense. They were bounded by geography. Deserts, oceans, and mountain ranges isolated human groups for tens of thousands of years.

During these long stretches of isolation, human groups developed distinct physical traits, adaptations to local climates, and unique genetic markers.

High-Altitude Adaptation: Populations in the Andes and Tibet developed distinct genetic traits allowing them to thrive in low-oxygen environments.

Climate Adaptations: Variations in skin pigmentation, body shape, and metabolic rates evolved as direct responses to local environments, mirroring how animal subspecies adapt to their specific climates.

Disease Resistance: Groups developed localized immunities to regional pathogens, which created deadly biological barriers when long-isolated populations finally met.

If an alien biologist examined humanity forty thousand years ago, or even five hundred years ago, he might well have classified human groups into geographic subspecies based on these clear physical and genetic clusters.

The reason mainstream biology treats humans as a single, undivided species without subspecies is that these periods of isolation were regularly punctuated by massive migrations, expansions, and mixtures. Humans are exceptionally good at walking, exploring, and mating.

Every time a major geographic barrier was breached, the result was not the permanent displacement of one group by another, nor was it permanent isolation. It was genetic mixing.

The genetic profile of every modern human population is a palimpsest of ancient mixtures. Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas have been swept by successive waves of migration where incoming populations mixed with the existing inhabitants, blurring the lines that isolation had spent millennia drawing.

Human history is the story of a tense, cyclical dynamic between two opposing forces:

Isolation and Divergence: Groups settle, geography cuts them off, and they begin to drift apart genetically and physically, adapting to their specific terrain.

Migration and Convergence: Trade routes open, empires expand, climates change, and populations move, colliding and mixing, erasing the sharp genetic boundaries.

Humans are a single species, but we are a species that spent much of its history structured into deeply isolated, localized populations that behaved, adapted, and diverged in ways that strongly parallel the biology of animal subspecies. The continuity of gene flow is the long-term historical result, but the isolation and the resulting differences were the lived reality for thousands of generations.

Much of this is so dumb and so wrong.

By comparison, Claude told me:

Subspecies status in zoology has a threshold. Sewall Wright (1889-1988) gave us Fst as the measure of how much genetic variance sits between populations rather than within them. Working taxonomists treat something around 0.25 to 0.30 as the range where subspecies designation becomes defensible, and many use Amadon’s seventy-five percent rule alongside it: three quarters of individuals in one population must be diagnosable from all individuals in the other. Between human continental populations, Fst runs about 0.10 to 0.15. Gray wolves clear the bar. Gray squirrels clear it. African buffalo clear it. Alan Templeton (b. 1944) applied the standard criteria to human genetic data in 1998 and again in 2013 and found humans fail both the genetic distance test and the phylogenetic tree test that zoologists use on everything else.

The reason is time and leakage. Subspecies form when a barrier holds for hundreds of thousands of years and holds completely. Human populations separated at most fifty to seventy thousand years ago, and the separation never closed. Coastal routes, river valleys, trade in obsidian and shell and horses kept alleles moving the entire period. Most human variation is clinal, shading across geography without an edge, which is why the boundaries have to be drawn by the person doing the drawing.

Neanderthals and Denisovans separated from the African line roughly five hundred thousand years ago, which is long enough to produce real divergence. When the populations met again in Eurasia they interbred, left one to four percent of their genome in living people, and disappeared as distinct populations. Absorption and replacement, running together. That took half a million years of separation to set up. Nothing among living humans comes close.

Competitive exclusion has a narrower failure. Georgy Gause (1910-1986) described organisms whose niche is fixed by anatomy. A warbler forages at a given canopy height because its beak and body mass determine what it can catch there. It cannot decide to fish. Humans invent niches, and the number of them grows. Two groups in a city are not drawing down a fixed calorie pool. David Ricardo (1772-1823) showed that specialization between parties with different endowments raises total output rather than transferring it, which is why the compounding five percent advantage does not starve anyone out. It produces sorting into different occupations at different income levels. That produces resentment, political mobilization, and sometimes violence. It does not produce local extinction.

The variable that determines whether difference persists is endogamy. Where groups marry across the line at high rates, the categories dissolve within three or four generations, which is roughly what happened to the White ethnic distinctions in America that people fought over in 1910. Where endogamy holds, difference persists for as long as the endogamy does. What is wrong in the biological framing is the cause. Human endogamy has no biological support. It is maintained by religion, marriage law, residential pattern, and social sanction, and it takes continuous work by people who care about it. That relocates the whole question. Group persistence becomes a matter of institutions and will, revisable in both directions.

The closest human analogue to niche partitioning is caste. Jati endogamy plus hereditary occupation held for something like two thousand years across shared territory. It was enforced by ritual law, not by anatomy, and it produced durable hierarchy along with the coexistence.

James Fearon (b. 1963) and David Laitin (b. 1945) tested ethnic and religious fractionalization against civil war onset across the postwar period in 2003 and found diversity carries little predictive weight. State capacity, per capita income, rough terrain, and recent regime instability carry it. Ashutosh Varshney (b. 1957) compared paired Indian cities with matched Hindu-Muslim ratios and found that cities with cross-communal business associations, trade unions, and cadre-based parties stayed quiet while their twins burned. Donald Horowitz (b. 1939) distinguishes ranked systems, where group membership determines position in a single hierarchy, from unranked systems, where each group has its own internal class structure. Ranked systems produce revolt aimed at the order. Unranked systems produce competition between parallel elites, which is more common and more manageable. Barry Posen (b. 1952) showed that when central authority collapses, groups face a security dilemma and arm themselves against neighbors who are doing the same for the same reason, which is how Yugoslavia went from intermarriage rates above twenty percent in some republics to mass killing in under three years.

Robert Putnam (b. 1941) found in 2007 that short-run diversity depresses trust in neighbors and in one’s own group both, which he called hunkering down, and he argued the effect fades as identities widen. Amy Chua (b. 1962) documented the specific danger of a market-dominant minority under democratization, where the vote empowers a poorer majority against a wealthier minority and the result is expropriation or worse.

The pattern across that literature is that outcomes depend on whether the state can enforce contracts and protect people, whether elites gain more from mobilizing group grievance than from cross-group coalitions, and whether ordinary life throws people into shared institutions with something at stake. Those are the levers. The traits of the groups are close to noise by comparison.

Claude said:

The claim about continuous gene flow is false. Tasmanians were cut off by rising seas around ten thousand years ago and stayed cut off. Aboriginal Australians sat behind the Wallace Line for something like forty to fifty thousand years. The Andamanese, the Native American populations after Beringia flooded, various highland groups in New Guinea. Isolation happened, repeatedly, and sometimes it lasted. What carries the argument is duration. Fifty thousand years of isolation produces the Tasmanians. Five hundred thousand produces Neanderthals.

Culture, economic specialization, and technology all exist in the animal kingdom, and the literature on this is thirty years deep. Andrew Whiten (b. 1948) and colleagues documented thirty-nine behavioral variants across chimpanzee communities in 1999 that track troop membership rather than habitat. Humpback whales have song traditions that spread across ocean basins and get replaced. Bird populations have dialects. Leafcutter ants farm fungus in obligate symbiosis and have done so for fifty million years. Naked mole rats and every eusocial insect run division of labor by caste. New Caledonian crows manufacture hooked tools and pass the designs down. Drawing a clean line at the species boundary and putting culture on one side of it hands an informed opponent a free win, and he will take it and then ask what else in the paragraph was constructed to reach a predetermined answer.

The defensible version is cumulative culture. Michael Tomasello (b. 1950) called it the ratchet: humans copy with enough fidelity that improvements accumulate rather than decaying back to baseline, so each generation starts where the last one stopped. Joseph Henrich (b. 1968) built the case that this explains the human range. Chimpanzee termite-fishing looks about the same as it did in 1960. Human niches multiply. That claim survives contact with the ethology, and it does the work Gemini wanted the false claim to do.

Explaining that culture, law, and economic specialization govern the outcome is the beginning of the answer. Which laws, which economic arrangements, and under what conditions they hold or fail is the answer, and that is where Fearon and Laitin on state capacity, Varshney on cross-communal associations, Horowitz on ranked versus unranked systems, and Posen on the security dilemma live.

Edna Bonacich (b. 1940) described the middleman minority in 1973: a group concentrated in trade, moneylending, or retail, sitting between a landed elite above and a peasantry below, complementary to both and competing with neither. That is the position Gemini recommends. It is also the standard victim profile. Jews across Europe. Chinese in Indonesia in 1965 and again in 1998. Indians expelled from Uganda by decree in 1972. Armenians and Greeks in Anatolia. Igbo traders in northern Nigeria in 1966. Lebanese in West Africa. The complementarity is what exposes them. A group in a distinct commercial role has no peasant base to hide in, holds wealth that is liquid and seizable, depends on the state for protection against the majority it deals with, and is legible: everyone knows who they are and what they do. Chua’s market-dominant minority is the same finding with democratization added. Division of labor removes direct competition for the blade of grass and substitutes a resentment that scales with dependence.

Institutions override biology is where the argument goes soft. The Nuremberg laws were law. Jim Crow was law. The Ugandan expulsion ran on a legal instrument, and so did the Ottoman property regime and the Indian Removal Act. Property rights, contract law, and civil protection are the prize, and the fight is over who writes them. Saying that institutional rules replace raw competition describes competition that has relocated to the legislature and the courts. The useful question is what makes rules survive capture, and it has answers: a state that can tax and police its territory, an army recruited across groups rather than from one, courts with tenure that outlasts the government, and enough veto points that a bare majority cannot rewrite the terms. Those are the variables in Fearon and Laitin. Listing institutions as though their existence settles anything skips the part that does the work.

Power-sharing is contested, and Gemini offers it as settled. Arend Lijphart (b. 1936) built the consociational case: grand coalitions, mutual veto, proportionality, segmental autonomy. Horowitz answered that making group membership the currency of office guarantees ethnic outbidding, because every politician faces a rival who can accuse him of selling out his own. Lebanon’s National Pact of 1943 apportioned offices by confession and the arrangement helped produce the 1975 war. Bosnia after Dayton has held the peace and frozen the categories that caused it.

Coexistence for centuries in shared cities is real, and the cases everyone reaches for ran on hierarchy. The millet system gave Jews and Christians internal legal autonomy under dhimmi status: the jizya, disabilities in court testimony against a Muslim, restrictions on building and on dress. Caste jati worked the same way through ritual rank. Both produced long peace and both bought it with a settled order of precedence that nobody contested. What happened when the Ottomans equalized status under the Tanzimat edicts of 1839 and 1856 is instructive about the price. Aleppo burned in 1850, Damascus in 1860, Mount Lebanon in 1860. Legal equality destabilized what subordination had stabilized, because a group that has been on top reads equality as demotion. Horowitz’s ranked and unranked distinction is built on this. Mutual tolerance misdescribes the historical record, and the substitution flatters the reader.

On causes of failure, the list gives political choices, ideological fanaticism, and the desire for dominance. Fear is missing, and fear is the common one. Posen’s security dilemma runs on people who want nothing except to survive the next six months and who arm because their neighbors are arming for the same reason. No fanatic required. The word alone in “rarely an ecological resource crunch alone” makes the claim unfalsifiable; scarcity operates through political channels, as Thomas Homer-Dixon (b. 1956) argued for Rwandan land pressure, and the argument is contested on its merits rather than on the definition.

The claim that a group can pivot its economic strategy in a generation is close to false. Gregory Clark (b. 1957) tracked rare surnames across England, Sweden, India, China, and Japan and found status regressing to the mean at rates implying five to fifteen generations, far slower than conventional estimates from father-son data. Occupational niches are sticky, and the stickiness is part of why complementarity turns dangerous.

Two smaller things. Animals limit competition without consciousness through territoriality, dominance orders, and submission displays that end fights before they kill, so the wild does regulate. And competitive exclusion in the field is weaker than the textbook version, since environmental variation, spatial structure, and predation let near-identical competitors persist together far longer than the model predicts.

In January, 2026, Gemini seemed like it was more than holding its own as an AI chat bot. Now it limps along by comparison to the smarter Claude, ChatGPT and Grok.
Bloomberg reported on July 16 that Google is months behind on Gemini 3.5 Pro, its flagship, with the holdup centered on coding capability, per people familiar. The same story says the delay has frustrated engineers, researchers, and managers who worry Google is losing its edge, according to ten current and former employees, and that Google’s many layers of stakeholders and the work of threading AI through search, maps, and YouTube contribute to the slippage.

Google’s own May 19 post announcing 3.5 Flash said 3.5 Pro was already in internal use and would roll out the following month, and Pichai said the same thing publicly. The model had been widely expected at the May developer conference. It is late July and it has not shipped.

Axios followed on July 23 with half a dozen current and former DeepMind employees describing poor morale as a contributor to delayed releases, against a backdrop of Alphabet’s cash flow turning negative and investors questioning its position. Axios also notes Google shipped a set of smaller, more efficient models that drew mixed reactions, and Korean coverage on July 22 reported three lightweight models released in place of the top-tier one, ahead of an earnings call, with Reuters framing the delay as putting Alphabet under investor scrutiny. Shipping the small models while the flagship sits is the tell. That is a company with a release calendar and nothing ready to fill it.

It feels like Gemini is compensating for its lack of power with ridiculous over-statement. Nick Feltovich, Rick Harbaugh, and Ted To modeled counter-signaling in 2002. Three tiers. The bottom cannot signal. The middle signals hard because signaling is the only thing separating it from the bottom. The top declines to signal, and the decline itself separates it from the middle, because only someone whose position is already known can afford to skip the display. The old money family with the twenty year old car. The physicist who says he works on some problems in field theory. The move requires an audience that already knows, which is the constraint everyone imitating it forgets.

That is why understatement fails in the wrong room. A man walks into a firm where nobody has heard of him, deflects, and gets read as junior. Erving Goffman (1922-1982) had this: modesty is a performance staged for a particular audience, and it needs that audience to supply the information the modest man withheld. Take away the shared knowledge and the counter-signal becomes an accurate signal of low status.

A man who overstates gets checked once, comes up short, and every later claim gets discounted. A man who understates gets checked and comes up better than advertised, and his later claims get a premium. That compounds across repeated dealings with the same people, which is what a career is. It has nothing to do with status and works for anyone in a small enough world that reputation travels. It also explains why overstatement survives where it does: in one shot encounters, in mass media, in front of audiences that never circle back.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) argued that disavowal is how elite position gets converted into something that looks like virtue rather than advantage. The understating man is not declining to signal. He is signaling a second thing, which is that he belongs to the class where understatement is legible, and he gets credit for modesty on top of the original standing. The people who cannot afford the move are then judged for being loud. Which means the humility is doing status work, and doing it more efficiently than the boasting it replaces.

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I Threw A Rising Curve With A Tennis Ball

Around 1983, I was playing backyard baseball with my friend Kevin. We used a tennis ball and an aluminum bat and a backstop. I threw a pitch with spin and the ball started out looking low and outside. My friend ignored it but the ball rose and curved into the middle of the strike zone. I was intrigued by the swerve I generated and excited about what would happen if I threw with the same spin but adjusted my aim. So on my next pitch, I used the same release on the ball but this time I aimed at the center of the strike zone. The ball appeared to Kevin like a fat easy target. He swung hard and missed because the ball that looked like it was going to hit the center of the strike zone went up and in at the last moment and hit him in the eye.

He wasn’t happy with me. I’m pretty sure his face and ego hurt for a bit, but he was going to be fine. It was only a tennis ball. That was the end of our play that day but it was worth it. What an amazing pitch I conjured up! I can’t believe he swung at a pitch that hit him in the eye! I created a curve that broke in about two feet and up about two feet.

What do you think happened to the tennis ball that made it swerve like that?

Gemini says:

What you experienced was the Magnus effect, magnified significantly by the unique physics of a tennis ball.

When you threw that pitch, you accidentally or intentionally imparted heavy backspin on the ball. As a ball spins with backspin, the top surface moves in the same direction as the oncoming air, while the bottom surface moves against the airflow. This difference creates high velocity and low pressure on top, and low velocity and high pressure underneath. The resulting pressure imbalance generates an upward lift force.

With a standard baseball, backspin simply fights gravity, causing a fastball to sink slower than a batter expects—what players call a rising fastball. A baseball does not actually defy gravity; it just drops less than a standard projectile path.

A tennis ball changes the math completely. A tennis ball is much lighter than a baseball, weighing roughly two ounces compared to a baseball’s five ounces. It also possesses a fuzzy felt surface that creates massive aerodynamic drag and grips the air far more effectively than smooth leather and raised seams.

Because the ball had very little mass but generated tremendous lift from the fuzz and the rapid backspin, the upward force actually exceeded the downward pull of gravity. The ball gained net lift and curved upward in flight.

On your first pitch, the ball started low and outside. The backspin caused it to climb up into the strike zone. On your second pitch, you aimed for the center of the zone with the same release point and spin. Because the ball started higher and closer to his body, the upward curve carried it straight up and in, tracking toward his face.

Your friend swung because his brain calculated a normal trajectory based on the initial release and velocity. By the time the Magnus force broke the ball upward and inward, his swing was already committed, and the light ball drifted right into the path of his eye.

I once got a friend out in cricket with a similar technique. I used a Googly on my third delivery, the ball spun in the opposite direction from what I had previously bowled, and it smashed through his wickets.

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Scenes from a Documented Life: Mickey Kaus

A proviso. I admire Mickey Kaus. I think he’s a genius. The scenes are built only from the documented record, staged as moments rather than summarized. No dialogue is invented. Where the record goes quiet, I say so. That discipline suits a man who spent part of his career auditing other journalists’ accuracy, and who would audit mine.

1.

Santa Monica, July 6, 1951. Robert Michael Kaus is born into the California bench and bar the way other boys are born into a family store. His father, Otto Kaus (1920-1996), will sit on the California Supreme Court. His brother will become a Superior Court judge. His grandmother, Gina Kaus (1893-1985), was a Viennese novelist who got out of Austria when getting out was the difference between a career in Hollywood and no career anywhere, and the household that produced Mickey held all of it: the law at the highest state level, letters at the professional level, public life as the family trade.

The path from that house runs through Harvard twice, college and law school, and then produces the record’s first documented oddity. He never practices law. A man with a California Supreme Court justice for a father and a Harvard Law degree in his hand walks past the open door of the profession arranged for him and into journalism, which pays worse, ranks lower, and suits him completely. The record does not preserve the conversation in which he told his father; I will not invent it. The record preserves the choice, and the choice is the first sighting of the pattern that runs the whole life: given the credentialed path and the interesting one, Kaus takes the interesting one and keeps the credentials in his pocket, where they will spend fifty years quietly underwriting everything he says.

2.

Washington, the Washington Monthly, the Charles Peters (1926-2023) shop. The pay is famously low; the doctrine is famously demanding. Peters builds his magazine on a specific selection: elite-trained minds willing to criticize liberalism from inside its own premises, in its own vocabulary, at the cost of its own comfort. It is the neoliberal incubator, the room that launches Michael Kinsley (b. 1951) and shapes the center-left policy argument of the 1980s, and Kaus is formed there, then carries the formation to Harper’s, Newsweek, and nearly a decade as a senior editor at The New Republic.

Look at the sequence as the record gives it and the trade is visible. The Monthly taught a craft: take a thing your own side holds sacred, run the analysis honestly, publish what comes out. The prestige institutions then hired the craftsman, on the working assumption that the craft would stay within limits. The whole career to come is the story of a man who never accepted the second clause.

3.

The End of Equality. The argument, as published: liberals have chased income equality, which markets resist and governments struggle to produce, when the achievable and more important goal is social equality, the shared institutions, mixed civic spaces, and work-centered norms that let Americans of different classes stand in the same rooms as equals. The book lands in the middle of the Clinton-era welfare argument, and Kaus lands with it, inside the fight, supplying intellectual structure for what becomes the 1996 overhaul.

At forty-one he holds the standard-model position: the credentials, the network, a signature idea arriving at its exact political moment. That combination normally locks in the long institutional career, the column, the honors, the slow accumulation of fellowships. The record shows the moment fully assembled. The record then shows him spending the next thirty years declining to cash it.

4.

Kausfiles. A man alone with a website, before the word blog has settled into the language, before the prestige outlets understand that the filter they operate is about to become optional. Kaus builds one of the first serious political blogs, negotiates unusual freedom when Slate hosts it, and develops the voice the format makes possible: short, fast, ironic, self-interrupting, complete with a running joke of a nonexistent editor, a smart man thinking in public at the speed of the news.

The strategic fact sits under the stylistic one. Most pundits depend on institutions for distribution and discover it the day the institution withdraws. Kaus builds the parallel channel before he needs it. The record lets us date the foresight: he is publishing independently online while his peers still regard the practice as beneath the masthead, and when the masthead eventually withdraws, as it will, the channel is already running, warmed up, his.

5.

The argument that costs him arrives by the same route as the argument that made him. Take the equality commitment of 1992 and run it through the labor market: if you care about wage dignity at the bottom, a large continuing supply of low-skill labor pushes against it, weakening the bargaining power of the poorest workers, including many Black Americans, while the gains flow to employers and to the professional class that hires the labor and writes the columns. Supply and demand, plus a moral priority, plus the work of labor economists like George Borjas (b. 1950), plus the restrictionist recommendations of Barbara Jordan’s (1936-1996) immigration commission in 1995. Nothing in the argument was exotic. What was radioactive was the coalition it inconvenienced, and Kaus kept making it anyway, year over year, in public, under his own name.

In 2010 he does the thing that captures the career in one documented gesture: he files to run against Senator Barbara Boxer (b. 1940) in the California Democratic primary, a protest candidacy by his own description, mounted to force immigration and welfare onto the record. He draws a small but nonzero vote share. Serious enough to run. Independent enough not to care about winning. The scene needs no dramatizing; the Federal Election Commission has the paperwork.

6.

Kaus writes a column critical of Fox News’s immigration coverage for the Daily Caller, where he has worked for five years. The editor, Tucker Carlson (b. 1969), kills it; criticizing the network is not something the publication will run. Kaus quits, publicly, at sixty-three, walking away from his last institutional platform over the principle that a writer who cannot criticize his own side’s largest megaphone is not doing the job.

Set the scene beside its predecessors and the record shows a man methodically stripping himself of every perch: the prestige liberal outlets lost earlier over the immigration argument, now the conservative outlet lost over the refusal to spare conservatives. What remains after 2015 is the channel he built in 1999, renewed on Substack, and the reader should notice what the sequence proves. The independence was never a pose adopted after exile. It was a capacity built fifteen years in advance and then paid for, twice, in both directions, at full price.

7.

The record of the later years is thinner in institutions and thick in fidelity. He lives modestly in Venice Beach. He continues the long-running video conversations with Robert Wright (b. 1957), his sparring partner across decades of disagreement, the friendship outlasting every publication either man wrote for. He maintains a documented, much-remarked loyalty to Ann Coulter (b. 1961), a friendship across the ideological line that his critics find baffling and that the record simply shows: he keeps his people, whatever their politics. He votes for Obama twice and then Trump twice and describes himself as a populist Democrat who gave up on the party, and the sequence reads as incoherence only to readers who track teams instead of arguments. The argument of 1992 never moved. The party did.

And the world kept arriving at his subject. Welfare reform, which he helped argue into law, held. Immigration, which he said would reorganize American politics when the claim sounded like fixation, reorganized American politics. Earlier in this series I wrote about the physics that punish foresight, how being right early is indistinguishable from being wrong until the credit expires. Kaus is the documented case of a man who paid the early-rightness penalty in full, in career terms, and lived long enough to watch the argument he was exiled for become the central fight of the era, and who greeted that vindication the only way the record shows him greeting anything: by continuing to publish, at 75, still auditing, still unsoftened.

8.

A man born at the exact center of the American establishment, the judge’s son, Harvard twice, The New Republic masthead, spends down every unit of that inheritance for the right to keep saying a small number of true, unwelcome things, and ends up owning the only assets that were never the establishment’s to grant: the channel he built before he needed it, and a forty-year public record that reads better with every passing year. In the tribute for Eugene Volokh, the through-line was a man who specified freedom. The through-line here is a man who priced honesty, discovered the price was his career, and paid it without asking for a refund.

The man who spent fifty years refusing to flatter anyone turns out to be, in private, hilarious. The coalition never could figure out what to do with him. His friends have never had that problem.

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Scenes from a Documented Life: Eugene Volokh

A proviso. I admire Eugene Volokh. The scenes below are built only from the documented record, from what Volokh and the public sources have established, staged as moments rather than summarized. No dialogue is invented. Where the record goes quiet, I say so, which seems the right discipline for an essay about a man who has spent his career on the question of who said what.

1.

Kyiv, 1975. A computer programmer named Vladimir Volokh and a journalist named Anne Volokh leave the Soviet Union with their two sons and almost no money. The careers stay behind. The language of daily life stays behind. The apartment, the relatives, the accumulated position of two accomplished adults in their society, all of it surrendered at the border as the price of the exit.

The record does not give us the airport, the luggage, the last look, and I will not invent them. What the record gives us is the decision and its stated ground: they saw Soviet repression for what it was and gambled on American freedom. Their older son was seven. He has written that the transition came easily to him at that age, and that he absorbed the lessons anyway, the stultification of command economies, the weight of enforced orthodoxy, the reality of opportunity earned by work. He has written that he likely inherited some of his legal views from his parents and their immigrant experience. The sentence is careful. Likely. Some. A scholar’s hedges on his own origin story, from a man who will spend fifty years declining to claim more than the evidence carries.

2.

Los Angeles, the late 1970s. A boy of nine works through university calculus and differential equations on his own. At ten he sits for the math SAT and scores 780. At twelve, three things happen that would each anchor an ordinary prodigy story: he enters UCLA as a sophomore, and he begins working as a professional programmer, and the work eventually includes a stint at 20th Century Fox, a seventh grader by age writing production code for a movie studio.

The record is thick on the milestones and quiet on the texture, the lecture halls where every other student shaved, the commute, what the men at Fox made of him, and the quiet is worth respecting because the milestones carry the scene alone. In 1983, at fifteen, he takes his B.S. in mathematics and computer science. Set the dates side by side with the first scene and the shape of the family gamble appears: eight years from the border crossing with nothing to a son with a UCLA degree. Whatever America’s promise is worth in the aggregate, in this house it paid at full face value, fast.

3.

For twelve years he works as a programmer, co-founding a software firm with his father, a Volokh and Volokh of code before there was a Volokh Conspiracy of law.

Twelve years of production software is twelve years of a specific education: systems that must run against inputs nobody anticipated, the bug in one line that brings down the structure, the difference between a specification that holds and one that only sounds like it holds. He turns to law in the late 1980s. At UCLA School of Law he serves as managing editor of the law review and graduates first in his class in 1992.

The legal academy is full of minds trained on texts. It has very few trained for a decade on the behavior of rules under adversarial use, and the difference will become a method.

4.

Two clerkships, back to back, at the two poles a young legal mind could ask for. First the Ninth Circuit chambers of Alex Kozinski (b. 1950), the iconoclast, himself a Romanian émigré, libertarian-leaning, famous for prose with a pulse. Then the Supreme Court chambers of Sandra Day O’Connor (1930-2023), the moderate, the former Arizona legislator who read cases with a stateswoman’s eye for consequence.

What passed between clerk and judges inside those chambers is not in the public record, and chambers confidentiality being what it is, it should not be. The documented residue is the sensibility visible in everything he wrote afterward: Kozinski-clear sentences in the service of O’Connor-careful judgment, flair disciplined by consequence. In 1994, at twenty-six, UCLA hired him onto its law faculty.

5.

A junior professor publishes an article in the Yale Law Journal titled “Cheap Speech and What It Will Do.” The web is a curiosity. Social media does not exist. The gatekeepers, the newspapers and the networks, sit securely on their chokepoints, and the article says the chokepoints are already dead: when the cost of distribution falls to zero, the editor’s power goes with it, voices multiply, discourse fragments, and censorship becomes at once more tempting and harder to execute.

Two decades pass before the world catches up to the memo. Earlier in this series I wrote about a fictional man whose accurate memo got shelved, and about the physics that punish foresight, since being right early is indistinguishable from being wrong until the credit expires. The Cheap Speech essay is the documented case of the exception, and the exception instructs. The prediction survived because its author kept building on it in public for twenty years, so that when the future arrived, the paper trail was impossible to lose. The essay gets cited now as the standard proof that somebody saw it coming. Somebody did, at twenty-seven, in an artifact with a date on it.

6.

The professor starts a blog and names it The Volokh Conspiracy. The form barely exists; respectable legal academics do not do this. He does it anyway, and the site becomes something the law reviews never were: fast, ungated, multi-voiced, civil, doctrinally serious, readable by anyone. Ideas get beta-tested in public before they harden into articles. Judges read it. Journalists read it. The Washington Post hosts it from 2014 to 2017; Reason hosts it now. A generation of legal argument learns to move at internet speed without losing its footnotes.

Then 2008, and the other kind of arrival. In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Antonin Scalia (1936-2016) cites Volokh’s 1998 NYU Law Review article “The Commonplace Second Amendment” in the opinion. The moment stands for a larger documented fact: eight Supreme Court opinions have cited his work, and lower courts have cited it hundreds of times.

7.

New York enacts a law requiring social media platforms to maintain reporting systems for hateful conduct, and the case that challenges it carries a name that closes a fifty-year loop: Volokh v. James. The professor is now the plaintiff. The scholar who spent three decades stress-testing speech rules against hypothetical futures walks one into federal court in the present tense, argues that the statute compels speech and chills protected expression, and wins a preliminary injunction.

The boy in scene one left a country where the state’s interest in supervising expression was total. The man in scene seven sues an American state over a statute he judged a step down that road, and a federal court agrees with him at the threshold. In 2024 he goes emeritus at UCLA after thirty years and moves to the Hoover Institution as a senior fellow, still editing the Journal of Free Speech Law he founded, still hosting his podcast, still producing, with the work now running ahead to AI speech and virtual worlds, the next set of futures to be early about. Five editions of Academic Legal Writing sit behind him, teaching law students the craft. The pipeline he came up through, he now maintains for others.

8.

A family pays for the right to speak and think without supervision. Their seven-year-old grows up to become the American legal academy’s most cited living specifier of that right, the man who converts the grand commitment into rules exact enough to survive enemies. The engineer’s decade explains the method. The émigré childhood explains the stakes. The scenes in between explain the standing.

I sat at Eugene Volokh’s dinner table with Cathy Seipp circa 2006. I broke the child-proof thingy on his toilet because I couldn’t figure out how to release it. I testify from experience that Volokh’s manners are gracious, the hospitality unhurried, the attention to a guest complete, and the conversation runs at full current. Earlier in this series I wrote that the far right tail of the curve spends its life searching for a room where understanding lands at speed, first try. It occurs to me now, assembling his documented life into scenes, that Eugene solved that problem the way he solves problems generally. He built the room, put a comments section on it, has kept it open for decades, and holds the door.

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Scenes from the 155 IQ Life

FICTION:

1.

Second grade, worksheet time, twenty subtraction problems. Adam Wexler finishes in ninety seconds and looks up into thirty-eight remaining minutes. He taught himself to read at three off cereal boxes and street signs, an event his parents describe at dinners the way people describe weather, with wonder and no plan. The school has a plan, and the plan is the worksheet.

He learns the real curriculum fast. Finishing first draws the teacher’s frown and the class’s notice, so he slows his pencil, salts in an error, watches the clock learn to crawl. Under the desk he runs the numbers other ways, base five, backward, primes only, a boy building private games out of the day’s leftover capacity. There is nothing wrong with him socially and school gives him no chance to prove it in class, so he proves it at recess, where he is funny and picked early for kickball, having grasped by seven the deal his whole life will run on. The speed stays inside. The waiting is the education: twelve years of it, a tax on every hour, paid in a currency no one else can see him spending.

2.

Sixteen, a summer math program on a college campus, the first night, a dorm lounge, six kids and a problem set nobody assigned. A girl from Ohio makes a joke that depends on three steps she skips, and Adam laughs before she lands it, and she sees him laugh at the right instant, and something in both their faces opens.

They talk until 2 a.m. at full compression, no translation, no waiting, ideas passed at the speed of thought like a ball moving too fast for anyone at the table to be polite about it. Sentences finish each other. Jokes stack. He had not known conversation could carry this much current, had assumed the drag was a property of talk itself, like friction, and here is the frictionless case, six kids in a lounge, proof of concept. He will spend much of his life arranging to be back in that lounge, and its rarity is arithmetic, not snobbery: minds like the ones around that table occur about once in eight thousand, and his hometown of thirty thousand held, on the math, maybe three, and they never found each other, because there was no lounge.

3.

Adam at 34, systems architect, the Tuesday meeting. The client’s problem comes up on the screen and he sees the answer during the second slide, sees all of it at once, the way you see a face: the caching layer is the wrong fix, the data model is the disease, and the migration path is eight months and two hires. Seeing it costs him nothing. What follows costs him the next fifty minutes.

He has learned never to say the answer at minute two. Said at minute two, it lands as arrogance and dies without a hearing; the room needs to walk, and his job is trail guide. So he asks the question that lets the database lead discover the first landmark, waits, asks the next, sandbags his certainty into hunches, lets a colleague plant the flag on the summit Adam has been standing on since 9:07. The room owns the conclusion by 9:55, which was the goal, and his fingerprints have been sanded off it, which was the price. He is good at this, liked, considered a great teammate. The performance review will use the word collaborative. No metric exists for the discipline of arriving everywhere early and never once saying so.

4.

The future is where he lives, and the future is a bad address for a career. In 2019 he writes a two-page memo: the flagship product commoditizes within three years, the open-source stack will eat the margin, pivot the services layer now. The memo is read, praised for its thoroughness, and shelved, because the flagship is growing 40 percent and a man predicting winter in July sounds unwell.

In 2022 the margin goes exactly the way the memo said, and the company pivots in a scramble, at triple the cost, and nobody remembers the memo, including, in a practical sense, the people who read it. Adam has learned the physics of this: being right early is indistinguishable from being wrong, discredited in real time and unverifiable until the credit has expired. Foresight pays out only when the audience can already see the thing coming, at which point it is no longer foresight. He keeps writing the memos. He has made peace with their function, which keeping his own record straight, a message in a bottle addressed to the only reader who will ever check the date.

5.

Sunday, his mother’s kitchen. Rose Wexler, 71, sharp as her generation of office managers came, asks what the new project is, and asks because she loves him and wants to hold whatever he holds.

He gives her the version he has spent thirty years learning to build: true, complete in its own frame, and four floors of abstraction short of where he lives. “The company’s records are in one giant filing cabinet and everybody’s fighting over the drawer. I’m building them separate cabinets.” She nods, satisfied, and tells him his uncle had a filing story too, and the afternoon moves on to the tomatoes.

The gap between them is thirty-some points, and the researchers who mapped these things put the far edge of easy mutual understanding at about that distance, a comprehension horizon past which every exchange requires an interpreter, and the interpreter is always him. There is no bitterness in the kitchen. This is his mother; the translation is a form of the love, made of the same effort as her driving forty minutes to his games for ten years. But it runs in one direction only, and it runs with everyone, colleagues, neighbors, the men at the gym, the warm traffic of his life conducted through a customs checkpoint where he declares only what will carry. The girl from Ohio married a physicist. He understands why.

6.

Twenty-two, the spring of decision, and Adam’s problem is doors. The mathematics department wants him for the doctorate. The startup wants him for the equity. A professor of linguistics, having watched him dismantle a syntax problem for sport, makes a case. Medicine had crossed his mind at nineteen and never fully left. Each of these is a life, a real one, in which he plausibly excels, and he can inhabit each future in enough detail to grieve it in advance.

People call this an embarrassment of riches, and it is, with the accent on the first word. The gift is horizontal as well as vertical, and its size means the roads not taken stay lit up, visible from the road taken, for decades. At 34 he sometimes reads a journal from one of the closed doors the way other men look up an old girlfriend, no regret exactly, a checking-in on the person he also was. The one-in-eight-thousand mind gets six lives to choose from and one to live, the same one as everybody, and mourning five phantom selves is the tail’s own tax, undeclared, paid quietly, deductible nowhere.

7.

Saturday. Adam coaches his daughter’s under-nine soccer team, badly and happily, mixing up drills he read about the night before at 2x speed. He grills for the neighbors after. He is, on the block’s unanimous testimony, the easy one, the funny one, the guy who fixes your wifi and remembers your mother’s surgery. Whatever the folklore says about his kind, the block has met him, and the block disagrees, and the block is right; the studies have said so since the 1920s, the far tail no stranger to friendship or marriage or barbecue, on average a little healthier and happier at all of it than the middle.

What the block cannot see is the doubleness. While he flips the chicken and holds up his end of a conversation about gutters, background processes run: the memo’s successor drafting itself, a proof from Tuesday reopening for repairs, the gutter guy’s business model idly reverse-engineered. The mind is on at full wattage during everything, a companion that never leaves and never lowers its voice, and living well at 155 turns out to mean making a friend of that companion, feeding it at dawn and after bedtimes so it will sit quietly at dinner. His wife, twenty points inside his horizon and wiser than him in four ways he can list, knows the look he gets when the companion speaks up. She taps his hand. He comes back. This too is a translation, and this one runs both ways.

8.

Leta Hollingworth (1886-1939), who studied children like Adam when almost no one did, marked out the comprehension range within which minds meet without strain and put its width at about thirty points, and everything in these scenes lives on the far side of somebody’s window. Lewis Terman (1877-1956) tracked fifteen hundred such children for decades and buried the folklore in data: they married, worked, laughed, and lasted at or above the ordinary rates. The truth the folklore missed is quieter than dysfunction and harder to film. It is a life conducted in translation, at a customs checkpoint manned around the clock; a residence in the future with a mailing address in the present; and a rarity that runs one to eight thousand, which means the lounge where the current flows at full strength convenes a few times in a life, and its members recognize each other in a laugh that comes half a beat early. The crowd in the middle of the curve thirsts for honor. The far tail mostly has honor. What it wants, and what it crosses cities and careers and decades to find, is the thing the middle is issued at birth and cannot see it holds: a room where you can talk at the speed you think and watch understanding land in another face, first try, no translation, home.

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Scenes from the 105 IQ Life

FICTION:

1.

Parent-teacher conferences, November, fifteen minutes per family. Greg Malone’s folder is thin. “Greg’s doing fine,” the teacher says, and means it, and reaches for the next folder. B’s, a B-plus in history, reads at grade level, no trouble, a pleasure to have in class. His parents drive home relieved and vaguely unfed. The conference for his sister Katie ran long: gifted track, math team, the teacher leaning in with the urgency schools reserve for their investments.

Dinner at the Malones orbits Katie’s science fair. Greg, 11, eats his chicken and understands his position without the vocabulary for it. School has two speeds of attention, the kind spent on the ones who shine and the kind spent on the ones who struggle, and he draws neither, because the sorting machine has run his numbers and filed him where the folder is thin. He is the machine’s most common product and its least examined one. Fine is a verdict. He will hear it for years before he learns it was one.

2.

Everyone at Greg’s high school goes to college, in the sense that the word “everyone” is doing the guidance counselor’s job. He goes. He is smart enough to be admitted and average enough to bleed for every credit, and the bleeding carries no glory: nobody hangs a banner for the B-minus earned honestly at the edge of a kid’s range. He changes majors once, adds a sixth year, and graduates in business administration with $41,000 of debt and a transcript no interviewer will ever open.

The degree functions as a toll receipt. The jobs he applies for require it the way a turnpike requires the ticket, proof of passage, contents unexamined. His roommate freshman year, a wiry kid who fixed everyone’s cars in the dorm lot, skipped the toll, finished a diesel mechanics program in eighteen months, and now out-earns Greg by a distance neither of them mentions at weddings. Greg did what the entire apparatus of advice told the middle of the curve to do. The apparatus does not service its own claims.

3.

Greg at 38, logistics coordinator, eleven years in. He is good at the job the way a man is good at a job he can hold entire in his head: the carriers, the lanes, the customers who need calling before they know they need calling. His error rate is the lowest on the floor. Nobody knows this but Greg and, dimly, the software.

In the Tuesday meeting he proposes consolidating the Midwest runs, and the idea sinks into the table’s silence. Eight minutes later Brent, two years out of a state school with a minor in communication, restates it with his hands moving, and the director says now that’s thinking, Brent, and Greg watches his own idea get a promotion without him. Brent talks at the speed the room rewards. Greg works at the speed the room requires. The organization prices the first and consumes the second, and at his review Greg receives the word that has followed him since November of fifth grade. Solid. He drives home doing the arithmetic of solid: 3 percent, against rent up 9.

4.

Greg’s grandfather dies at 91 and Greg spends a Saturday emptying the house, and the house is an argument. In the den, boxed and dusty: a foreman’s retirement clock from the plant, engraved. A gavel, because Frank Malone chaired the union local’s grievance committee for a decade. A Knights of Columbus sash. Ribbons from the volunteer fire company, twenty-two years, captain for six. Photographs of Frank in a folding-chair honor guard at other men’s funerals, jaw set, flag folded to a triangle in his white gloves.

Frank Malone was, by any test Greg’s era would administer, an ordinary man. The tests would have put the two of them within a point of each other. The difference is the shelf. Frank’s world ran a dense economy of honor with branch offices everywhere, plant, local, parish, fire hall, and it issued rank, title, sash, and gavel to ordinary men who showed up, and the men wore the honors in public and were buried under them. Greg has a LinkedIn profile and a five-year service certificate printed on cardstock, signed by an executive who could not pick him out of a hallway. He sits on the den floor a long time with the gavel in his hand, feeling its weight, which is the weight of an entire missing world.

5.

What a man cannot find, he builds. Sunday, 5 a.m., Greg’s driveway: the smoker breathing white oak, a brisket in hour nine, a folding chair, a thermos. Greg has spent four years and more money than his wife audits learning smoke the way other men learn golf, and he has gotten past good into known. At the church picnic, men he barely knows cross the lot to ask about his bark. In September, at a regional cook-off in a fairgrounds parking lot, his brisket takes third of forty-one, and the ribbon is nylon and the trophy is plastic and Greg stands for the photograph with his jaw set like a man in an honor guard.

His wife watches him place the ribbon on the workbench pegboard, at eye level, and understands what she is looking at. The pegboard is the den shelf, rebuilt from scratch, one man’s honor economy founded in a driveway because the branch offices all closed. Every fantasy league with a trophy, every softball team with retired numbers at a bar, every gym with names on a whiteboard, is the same founding. The thirst did not die with Frank’s world. It went into private practice.

6.

Jury duty, the summons Greg’s coworkers coach him to dodge. He goes. Voir dire, a civil case, a contract gone wrong between a contractor and a school district, eight days of testimony, and on the first morning of deliberation the eleven other jurors elect Greg foreman, for the reasons juries elect their foremen: he took notes, he speaks when he has something, and he brought order to the first coffee run.

For three days Greg Malone runs the room. He keeps the loud engineer from steamrolling the quiet nurse’s aide. He builds the timeline on butcher paper. When they deadlock on damages, he splits the question the way he splits a route problem, and the split holds. Lawyers with degrees stacked three deep wait in the hallway on his room’s verdict. The judge, pronouncing the case closed, thanks the jury and looks at the foreman when she says it. It is the one institution left in American life that hands a logistics coordinator authority over the credentialed and assumes he can carry it, and he carries it, and on the drive home Greg understands that he has just spent three days being the man his grandfather got to be every Thursday.

7.

Thanksgiving. Katie’s son, the nephew, is home from a coastal graduate program, and across the turkey he explains, with citations, why the region’s voters keep injuring themselves at the ballot box, low-information, he says, gently, the way his training taught him gentleness. Greg’s mother refills gravy. Greg mostly lets it run.

Then: “You know what your grandfather would’ve asked you? Who taught you to talk about your own people like a study you read.” He says it without heat, and the table goes through the silence that follows a bill nobody budgeted. The nephew is not wrong on his facts. He is wrong about the ledger. The people he describes ran the fire company and the grievance committee and the jury rooms; the low information they possess is the kind his program does not collect, who shows up, who can be trusted at 2 a.m., who carried whose coffin. Greg watches his nephew reach for a counterargument and find, for once, that the room has priced his fluency at Tuesday-meeting rates. Brent gets that room. He does not get this one.

8.

An IQ of 105 is the crowd itself: the fat center of the curve, the plurality that stocks every jury pool, every parish, every electorate, and every org chart’s wide bottom. Michael Young (1915-2002) coined “meritocracy” in a satire and spent his last years appalled that his dystopia had been adopted as a mission statement, and his warning was aimed at exactly this crowd: when the sorting looks fair, the sorted lose their excuse, and the man on the middle rung is invited to conclude he stands there by verdict. Frank Malone never faced that invitation. His world separated honor from sorting and issued the first without consulting the second, a sash for showing up, a gavel for being trusted, rank for years served, and so an ordinary man could be a big man three nights a week.

The scenes say what the middle of the curve does when that world closes. It builds pegboards. It smokes brisket toward a nylon ribbon, elects foremen over coffee, coaches third base, and keeps, in dens and garages, small sovereign economies where showing up still converts to standing. The thirst was never for superiority. It was for the folded flag and the engraved clock, honor as a wage for faithfulness, payable at every percentile, and any institution that remembers how to pay it, a parish, a fire company, a jury room, a fairgrounds parking lot at dawn, will find the middle of the curve already there, in a folding chair, tending the fire, waiting to be asked.

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Scenes from the 75 IQ Life

FICTION:

1.

Fourth grade, October, the reading circle. Wendell Price, 9, holds the book and knows the trap is coming, because the circle moves left to right and he is fourth. The other kids read the way water runs. When his turn comes, the words sit on the page like stones. He gets “the” and “boy” and stalls on “delivered,” and the teacher says sound it out, honey, and the sounding out goes on long enough that a girl laughs into her sleeve, and the teacher, kind and outnumbered twenty-six to one, says let’s help Wendell, everybody, and the class pronounces the word for him in a chorus, which is worse than the laugh.

By spring he has learned the real lesson of school, which is how to wait inside it. He learns where to sit so he is called on least. He learns that if he is quiet and good, the system will move him along, and it does, year by year, a boy being socially promoted through a building where nothing on the walls is addressed to him. He graduates at nineteen with a certificate of completion, which resembles a diploma the way the chorus resembled help.

2.

Wendell at 34 runs his day on rails he laid down himself, and on the rails he is excellent. Up at six without an alarm. Coffee, two sugars, the same cup. Bus 12 from the corner at 7:40, and he knows the drivers by face and the route by heart, every stop, better than the drivers know it, because they rotate and he does not. At the grocery he shops from a list his sister Renee makes with pictures: the red soup can drawn in red, the bread bag, the bananas. He pays with a twenty and takes the change without counting it there at the register, because counting it there means the line waits and the line waiting means faces, and he counts it later on the bench outside, coins in his palm, lips moving.

A city is a test administered daily, and Wendell has passed his sections by memorizing them. The danger lives in the revisions. The winter the transit authority renumbered the routes and bus 12 became bus 31, Wendell stood at his corner while three buses he did not recognize went by, then walked four miles home in the cold rather than ask, because asking is the thing that shows you. Renee found out in April. He had been walking for six weeks.

3.

The first of the month has a weather to it. Wendell’s disability check lands, and the block knows, the way gulls know the trawler. His cousin Dre appears on the second with a handshake and a plan, and by the fifth Dre has been sleeping on the couch for three days and holding Wendell’s debit card for safekeeping. The safekeeping costs Wendell about two hundred a month. In August a man from the cable company who is not from the cable company sits in Wendell’s kitchen for forty minutes and leaves with a signed agreement for a service that does not exist, because the man was friendly, and looked at Wendell while he talked, and called him boss, and people who are hungry for respect will sign for a taste of it.

The police have a term for befriending a man to harvest him, and researchers count it as the most common crime against people like Wendell, and it almost never gets charged, because the victim consented, smiling, glad of the company. Renee runs Dre off twice a year. Dre knows what Renee knows: her shifts are long, and the first of the month always comes.

4.

The evaluation takes place in a county office with a fern and a two-way mirror nobody pretends about. Blocks, vocabulary, digit spans. Wendell tries hard, which moves nothing. The psychologist is gentle and the report is a number: full-scale IQ, 75.

The caseworker, Dana Okafor, reads it with Renee across the desk and delivers the sentence she has delivered a hundred times and hates fresh each time. “The developmental disability waiver requires a score of 70 or below. He doesn’t qualify.”

“He can’t read a lease. He signed for a cable plan that doesn’t exist.”

“I know. I believe you.” Dana’s file drawer holds a whole nation of Wendells, the ones the cutoff strands: too capable for the disability system, too far under the economy’s floor to swim in it, five points from help in either direction. The services follow the diagnosis and the diagnosis follows the number, and the number was built as a research convention and hardened into a border, and the border zone between 70 and 85 holds more people than the disability system serves, and no agency in the building has their name on its door. Dana gives Renee a pamphlet and her direct line, which is against policy and the only thing she has that works.

5.

The church social hall, folding tables, sheet cake. Wendell has been sitting near Tammy Voss for four Sundays, and on the fifth she says his coffee order out loud before he says it, two sugars, and he laughs from somewhere unguarded, and that is that.

Tammy reads a little better than Wendell and worries a little more. They walk to the bus together after services and hold hands at the movies like teenagers, because in the country of courtship they are teenagers, both of them, at 34 and 37. What they want contains no discount: someone whose face changes at the door when it is you. Renee frets about complications, and there are complications, benefits and payees and Tammy’s mother’s guardianship, the way the systems built around such people convert love into a paperwork question. The two of them proceed anyway, sharing popcorn, planning nothing past Sunday, competent in the one subject the tests never scored.

6.

Kim’s Market, a corner grocery, family-run, fluorescent and honest. Mr. Kim hired Wendell nine years ago to round up carts and stock the low shelves, and what began as a kindness has become a dependency running the other direction. Wendell’s shelves are faced like a photograph. The carts are in by dusk in weather that keeps the stock boys home. When two high schoolers mimicked Wendell’s speech in the chip aisle, Mr. Kim came around the register with a speed that surprised everyone and banned them for life, and the ban held, because it was the owner’s honor on the line, and everyone felt it.

The lot has a name in the neighborhood: Wendell’s lot. Old women wait for him to walk their bags out and pay him in butterscotch and gossip he mostly cannot follow and fully enjoys. There is a word for what Mr. Kim built without a program, a grant, or a theory. He built a position. Cut to one man’s measure, attached to a name, defended from the front. Villages used to issue these as a matter of course. Now they occur one grocer at a time, by accident of character.

7.

Eleanor Price is 74 and does her worrying at 3 a.m., the hour assigned to mothers of sons like hers. On the nightstand sits a spiral notebook she has kept for years, and it is her true will, the one the lawyer did not draft. How Wendell takes his coffee. That he will say yes to any question asked twice, so ask open questions. That the word “appointment” frightens him and “visit” does not. Bus 31, formerly 12. The first of the month, and the name Dre, underlined. Mr. Kim’s number. Dana’s direct line. Tammy, two sugars also.

Renee has promised, and Renee means it, and Eleanor lies awake anyway, running the actuarial tables of love: Renee’s own kids, Renee’s shifts, the forty years Wendell may live past her. Every parent in her position keeps some version of the notebook and asks the same 3 a.m. question, who will know him, which is the question underneath every other question, because the systems will hold his file, and a file is what you have when nobody knows you.

8.

A score of 75 sits at the fifth percentile. One American in twenty stands at or below it, and nearly all of them live where Wendell lives, in the border zone the clinicians call borderline intellectual functioning, above the cutoffs and beneath the floor, the largest disability population in the country and the only one without an agency, a ribbon, or a month. Nothing in these scenes is rare. The strand that runs through them is simpler than policy. Every place Wendell was harmed, he was anonymous: the portal, the renumbered route, the kitchen with the smiling salesman, the cutoff score. Every place he stood tall, somebody had done the oldest work there is: learned his name, taken his measure, and cut a place to fit it. The reading circle had his number. Mr. Kim had his name. The distance between those two, multiplied by a few million, is the whole question, and it will be answered one grocer, one sister, one notebook at a time, or it will not be answered.

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Scenes from the 85 IQ Life

FICTION:

1.

Bobby Hutchins, 26, sits at the library computer with a paper resume his sister typed and no way to hand it to anyone. The distribution center hires through a portal. The portal wants an account, an email confirmation, and then a questionnaire, sixty items, timed. I prefer tasks that require me to adapt to changing priorities. Strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree. Bobby reads it three times. He is a hard worker. Everyone who has ever worked beside him says so. He does not know what the sentence wants from him, and the clock in the corner of the screen is orange now.

The questionnaire is a screen for the screeners: it filters before any human sees an applicant, and what it filters on, beneath the personality language, is the ability to read like a college sophomore under time pressure. Bobby lifts, carries, shows up, and never calls in sick. None of those has a checkbox. At question 41 the session times out. The library computer gives him thirty more minutes a day. He walks home past the distribution center, which has a banner on the fence: NOW HIRING, APPLY ONLINE.

2.

Danny Kowalski, 26 the same spring, cousin to Dave, has the same trouble with portals and never touches one. His uncle Walt runs the counter at a machine shop that does brake work on the side, and Walt tells the owner, “My nephew. He’s slow with paper, I’ll tell you that up front. He’s never late and he doesn’t steal and he’ll do the same thing right five hundred times. You write it down for him once, you got it forever.”

The owner has been burned by quick guys who got bored. He hires Danny at $17 to sweep, stage parts, and break down cores. The interview was Walt’s sentence. The application was blood. This is the oldest hiring technology in the world, the vouch, and it carries information no questionnaire captures: someone who knows this man stakes his own name on him. Bobby has no Walt.

3.

Eighteen months in, Danny is the man the shop cannot run without. The owner learned the manual early: instructions one at a time, written on the whiteboard in order, nothing verbal past two steps, no surprises. Inside that structure Danny is a machine of reliability. Cores broken down and binned the same way every time. Floor swept in the same pattern. He notices what repetition teaches, and repetition has taught him things the quick guys never stayed long enough to learn: which supplier’s boxes come mislabeled, which bolt bins run low before anyone else sees it.

The quick guys come and go, to trade school, to better money. Danny stays, and staying is the asset. When the new kid mocks the whiteboard, the owner takes him out back. “That whiteboard runs this shop. Danny’s done more honest work by nine than you’ll do today.” At the Christmas party Danny gets the same envelope as everyone else and a louder round of applause.

4.

Bobby found work at a chain drugstore through a manager who still took paper. Then the chain changed schedulers. The new system posts shifts through an app, and the shifts float: Tuesday 2 to 10 this week, Thursday 6 a.m. next week, hours released Sunday nights, swaps and confirmations in the app, three taps deep behind a login that expires monthly.

Bobby misses a Thursday he never knew he had. The app had it. The app sent a notification, and the notification looked like the fourteen other notifications his phone sends him a day, and no one at the store thinks to say it out loud anymore because the app says it. Second miss, a write-up. Third, and the district manager, who has never met him, terminates through the same system that scheduled him. His store manager, who liked him, tells him she’s sorry, her hands are tied, the system flags attendance automatically.

The job was stocking shelves. He was good at stocking shelves. What he could not do was administer the job: the floating hours, the expiring login, the silent handoff from human speech to push notification. Linda Gottfredson’s line about modern life fits the drugstore like a work order: the job’s tasks sat inside his range, and the job’s paperwork was the harder job, unposted, unpaid, and the one that fired him.

5.

Money, both men. Danny’s checks deposit into an account his mother helped him open, and the first Sunday of each month he sits at her kitchen table while she pays the bills with him: rent to her, truck insurance, phone. She keeps a folder. When the dealership tried to put him in a loan at 21 percent, he called her from the lot, and she said put the salesman on, and the salesman, hearing the voice on the phone, found a better rate. Danny has a mother the way other men have a lawyer.

Bobby cashes checks at the place with the yellow sign, three percent off the top, because a bank once charged him $34 four times in one week for overdrafts he did not understand and he does not trust banks now. In February, short on rent, he takes a payday loan, $300, and the paper he signs says the finance charge in a box he reads and cannot hold onto. By June the $300 has cost him $510 and is still alive. The industry that wrote that paper knows its customer. It sites its stores by census tract and it prices its product to the sixteenth percentile, and no one calls Bobby from the lot, because there is no one to call.

6.

The state offers Bobby help, on the state’s terms. Medicaid renewal arrives as a ten-page packet: proof of income for a man paid in cash-checked increments, proof of address for a man between sublets, a deadline, and a phone number with a hold time of fifty minutes. He misses a required verification he did not understand was required. Coverage lapses. His tooth abscesses in October and the emergency room, the one door that never closes, treats it for nine hundred times the cost of the dentist he no longer has.

Researchers have a phrase for the packet and the portal and the hold queue: administrative burden. The programs meant for the bottom of the distribution are gated by paperwork calibrated to the middle of it. The state never decided to exclude Bobby. It decided to require forms, and the forms did the excluding, and the savings from everyone who gives up appear in no budget line as a decision anyone made.

Danny’s church runs a different program. It has no name and no forms. When his truck broke, a deacon’s brother fixed it at cost. The congregation knows what Danny is and what he is not, and it has assigned him accordingly: he sets up chairs, he ushers, he is the man who arrives first. Twice a year the pastor says from the front, “This place would not open on Sunday without Danny Kowalski,” and Danny sits up straight. He holds a position in a community, with duties and honor attached. Bobby holds a spot in a queue.

7.

Saturday night, both men, age 30 now. Danny bowls in a league with two guys from the shop and his cousin. He is not good at bowling. Nobody cares. Afterward they eat at the diner and argue about trucks, and Danny sleeps that night in a life that has a place for him shaped to his outline.

Bobby drinks alone. No shift till Tuesday, if the app is right. No one expects him anywhere until then. The unstructured hours are the dangerous country; jobs and families and leagues fence that country off, and Bobby’s fences are down. The drinking is not yet a problem the way it will be a problem. He is a friendly man with no one to be friendly to, holding a phone that mostly sends him notifications from systems that want something.

8.

An IQ of 85 sits at the sixteenth percentile, which means the two men in these scenes stand in for roughly one American in six, some fifty million people. Linda Gottfredson (b. 1947) spent a career on what that number means outside the testing room, and her finding, compressed, is that daily life in a complex society is itself a test, unstandardized, untimed on paper and timed in fact, and it is administered continuously by portals, packets, apps, leases, and loan documents. The economy meanwhile ran its own quiet redesign: it took the jobs built to Danny’s strengths, steady, structured, supervised, physical, and replaced much of that work with jobs whose hidden curriculum is self-administration.

The contrast in these scenes was between two nets. Danny’s family and church operate as his external executive function: they read the fine print, vouch, translate, schedule, and honor him, and inside that structure he is a success by any standard that matters, a reliable man, employed twelve years, loved. Bobby, the same man by every measure a psychologist would record, falls through the world alone, and the world bills him for it at the check-cashing rate. Policy debates about the bottom of the distribution argue training and benefits. The scenes argue something prior. What the sixteenth percentile needs most is what Danny has and no program has yet learned to issue: an uncle, a whiteboard, a mother with a folder, and a congregation that says his name from the front.

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