Popular: Finding Happiness and Success in a World That Cares Too Much About the Wrong Kinds of Relationships

Psychologist Mitch Prinstein writes in 2017: …one of the strongest predictors of soldiers’ functioning in the military was how popular they were in primary school. In fact, childhood popularity predicted soldiers’ behavior even after accounting for every other factor that investigators considered. Within a decade or two, a number of other studies in nonmilitary populations yielded similar results about the power of popularity. More than childhood intellect, family background, prior psychological symptoms, and maternal relationships, popularity predicts how happy we grow up to be. Do we enjoy or dread leaving for work each morning? Are we in relationships that are fulfilling or conflicted? Do we regard parenting as a burden or a pleasure? Are we making important contributions in our lives? Do we feel as if we’re valued members of society? The answers to these questions can all be traced back to the playgrounds of our youth.

A worldwide study conducted in my own research lab revealed that adults who have memories of being popular in childhood are the most likely to report that their marriages are happier, their work relationships are stronger, and they believe they are flourishing as members of society. People who recall unpopular childhood experiences report just the opposite. Popular children grow up to have greater academic success and stronger interpersonal relationships, and to make more money in their jobs years later, while those who were not popular are at much greater risk for substance abuse, obesity, anxiety, depression, problems at work, criminal behavior, injury, illness, and even suicide. We now also understand that popularity changes the wiring of our brains in ways that affect our social perceptions, our emotions, and how our bodies respond to stress. As discussed in this book, our experiences with popularity can even alter our DNA.

* The first type of popularity is a reflection of status—whether someone is well known, widely emulated, and able to bend others to his or her will. In adolescence, we called these kids “cool,” but research suggests that they may be at high risk for a number of problems later in life. The other type of popularity is likability. It captures those we feel close to and trust, and the people who make us happy when we spend time with them.

* How often do we make decisions that we feel will help us gain power and influence without realizing that we are inadvertently undermining our own true chances for happiness? How much energy do we waste investing in image management because of our misperceptions about how best to achieve social approval? How much is our lingering desire to be popular affecting our behavior without our even realizing it?

* Wikipedia:

Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis (1 July 1818 – 13 August 1865) was a Hungarian physician and scientist, now known as an early pioneer of antiseptic procedures. Described as the “saviour of mothers”,[2] Semmelweis discovered that the incidence of puerperal fever (also known as “childbed fever”) could be drastically cut by the use of hand disinfection in obstetrical clinics. Puerperal fever was common in mid-19th-century hospitals and often fatal. Semmelweis proposed the practice of washing hands with chlorinated lime solutions in 1847 while working in Vienna General Hospital’s First Obstetrical Clinic, where doctors’ wards had three times the mortality of midwives’ wards.[3] He published a book of his findings in Etiology, Concept and Prophylaxis of Childbed Fever.

Despite various publications of results where hand washing reduced mortality to below 1%, Semmelweis’s observations conflicted with the established scientific and medical opinions of the time and his ideas were rejected by the medical community. Semmelweis could offer no acceptable scientific explanation for his findings, and some doctors were offended at the suggestion that they should wash their hands and mocked him for it. In 1865, the increasingly outspoken Semmelweis supposedly suffered a nervous breakdown and was treacherously committed to an asylum by his colleague. He died a mere 14 days later, at the age of 47, after being beaten by the guards, from a gangrenous wound on his right hand which might have been caused by the beating. Semmelweis’s practice earned widespread acceptance only years after his death, when Louis Pasteur confirmed the germ theory, and Joseph Lister, acting on the French microbiologist’s research, practised and operated using hygienic methods, with great success.

* Dr. Semmelweis had high status and influence. He was well respected, revered, and powerful. He was popular. But he was also a bully, and thus loathed by many of his peers.

* Like many Accepted people, Billy is likable because he has the ability to read the room—any room. His ideas aren’t always better than others’, but he knows exactly when in a meeting to offer them, and he often gets the credit. Just slightly faster than his colleagues, he recognizes when there is an emerging consensus or conflict. He’s good at tuning in to the emotional underpinnings of his coworkers’ statements. But perhaps most important, Billy is adept at using his social skills to help others feel connected to him. He does so in a number of ways. First, Billy is great at asking astute questions. Studies show that people who ask many questions of each other when they first meet—a highly effective way of scanning for an emotional connection—are more likely to have high-quality relationships even months later. When you first meet Billy, his questions clearly communicate that he wants to know more about you, and he finds most everything you say to be interesting, important, and relatable. Billy’s social behavior signals that he cares about the herd. People want to talk to him because they believe that Billy wants to talk to them. That makes him likable. Second, Billy has a terrific sense of humor. This trait also is a function of reading the room well, because a good joke requires understanding the current mood or sentiment, and exaggerating or twisting it for comic effect. More fundamentally, fundamentally, humor offers biological benefits. Laughter is associated with the release of dopamine and endorphins that promote euphoria and improved immune response—and people like others who help them feel good. Third, just like the Accepted children in Coie’s studies, Billy is described by others as someone who is trusted, has many friends, seems fair, happy, polite, patient, and knows how to share. And as research on Accepted children would predict, Billy generally has had a very successful life. Studies show that when Accepted children become adults, they have higher self-esteem, make more money, and have better-quality relationships with friends and romantic partners. They even grow up to be physically healthier than their less accepted peers. The power of likability persists above and beyond the effects of all kinds of factors that we usually think are most important, like intelligence, socioeconomic status, and healthy behavior.

* In childhood, the Neglecteds watch their peers play from afar, remaining behind a fence poking a worm with a stick, rather than joining the others. Or worse, they attempt to take part in a game of hide-and-seek, but no one tries to find them. Some Neglecteds are anxious—desperately eager to be a part of a group but rarely confident enough to initiate interactions with others. Studies show that as adults, Neglected people are a bit slower to begin dating or establish secure, committed relationships, and they usually choose professions that do not rely heavily on interactions with others. They are unlikely to become public speakers, salespeople, or recruiters.

* Research findings tell us that being rejected is one of the most consistent risk factors for a whole range of later psychological symptoms—depression, anxiety, substance use, even criminal behavior. Of course, not every Rejected individual experiences mental illness. But many such children do continue to feel shut out even as adults. Somewhere—at work, in their communities—there is a group that they try to avoid or feel uncomfortable being around. They may opt out of dinner parties or social events, for instance, if there’s a risk of being made to feel inferior again. Like Dan, they may find a spouse and have a few close friends, but they perpetually fear being marginalized. Alternatively, many find a vocation or a workplace populated by others who themselves were Rejected or Neglected. Some become so skilled at engineering their contacts with others that they report no longer feeling very rejected at all. But old feelings of insecurity continue to haunt them when they are thrust outside their comfort zone. Rejecteds also may feel innately unworthy, anxious, or angry. These feelings can manifest themselves subtly, through a continual need for reassurance from loved ones, a sensitivity to signals that they’re being teased or excluded, or fear when meeting people who remind them of their childhood tormentors. It’s common for Rejecteds to develop a push-pull relationship with the world around them, often judging others as a way to feel superior, yet all the while dependent on positive feedback to gird their own fragile self-esteem.

Frank, the social-climbing assistant who manages up so persistently, is a Controversial. In childhood, the Controversials are often the class clowns—everyone’s favorite peer when part of a large group, if not necessarily someone whom people are eager to invite into their circle of close friends. These individuals can be very adroit socially but are also quite aggressive. Many describe them as Machiavellian—strategically using their social skills when it serves them, but also willing to knock others down to get what they want. We don’t know a great deal about how Controversials fare over time. They are relatively difficult to find and as such are often excluded in research studies. But available evidence suggests that although they achieve short-term gain, they do not do well in the long term.

* Substantial evidence suggests that it is our likability that can predict our fate in so many domains of life. Likable people continue to have advantages, and dislikable people will almost always suffer.

* Findings reveal that only about 35 percent of those who are high in status are also highly likable. Many of the rest are Controversial.

* We typically look down on people who openly crave high status. Seeking this type of popularity is the kind of pursuit we associate with preteens and boy bands. We even use derogatory names for adults who seem to brazenly pursue status, like “status-seekers,” “wannabes,” or “fame-mongers.” But is it wrong to desire high status? It’s certainly more socially advantageous to have this type of popularity than not. Imagine attending a party where everyone is excited to talk with you, amused by what you say, and impressed by how great you look. Consider how gratifying it would feel if, at every work meeting, your ideas were heralded as the most inspired and influential. Think how special you would feel if people were excited just to meet you and talked favorably about you afterward. Who wouldn’t want to be venerated by all their peers?

* research shows that when we read about high-status people, talk about them, or even just look at them, those actions are sufficient to activate the social reward centers in our brains. In fact, we tend to gaze at high-status peers (of the same or opposite gender) much longer than we look at others around us. In other words, without our even realizing it, our brains habitually orient us toward status all day long. We also experience social rewards when we believe that someone we admire likes us in return. Anyone who has ever fantasized about meeting a celebrity and then becoming best friends can relate…

* Research also shows that when we are tempted by social rewards, we are particularly likely to act impulsively. This may explain why so many of us have done regrettable things when we are in the presence of high-status peers.

* …not only are we biologically primed to enjoy feeling that others agree with us but those of us who have the most dramatic social reward response are especially likely to conform to the views of others. This all takes place outside of our conscious awareness.

* In adolescence, our self-concept is not merely informed by how our peers treat us but is fully dictated by such experiences. Reflected appraisal continues into adulthood, too, but for some more than others. Many people’s sense of identity seems to be overly influenced by the last bit of positive or negative feedback they received. Hearing that someone likes them makes them feel like a good person, while exclusion turns them into total failures. Some are so invested in having high status (whether fame, beauty, power, or wealth) that it seems as if their entire identity is dependent on it.

* when we crave social rewards, we don’t feel casually about it but view it as the basis of our self-worth.

* Do you still long for status? Do you desire motivational magnets—things that you associate with high standing, like beauty or great wealth? How often is your behavior driven by a yearning for extrinsic reward, and to what degree do you allow your inner experience of happiness and self-worth to be influenced by your popularity among peers?

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #1: How Far Will We Go for Status?

Jane Goodall: Status therefore offers chimpanzees a survival advantage: the more they are attuned to status and driven toward the social rewards it offers, the better chance they have at meeting their basic needs.

* anthropology professor Don Merten was observing a group of cheerleaders in an American high school. In this school, the cheerleaders ruled. Others looked up to them, they had first access to the most popular boys, and they set the trends that many other girls followed. When an unpopular girl decided to join the cheerleading squad, Merten reports, the other girls reflexively behaved aggressively toward her. They teased her. They ostracized her. They made sure that her reputation was besmirched across the entire grade. The cheerleaders knew their treatment of her was mean, and even recognized that it would earn them reputations as stuck-up snobs. It didn’t matter. Merten’s research suggests that the function of aggression is to protect the exclusivity that defines status itself. It is a necessary evil to maintain dominance. The cheerleaders explained to Merten that allowing a lower-status girl to join their group would come with a cost—a decline in the squad’s status. His work subsequently demonstrated that each time a high-status teen acted aggressively in school, whether toward someone in his group or even someone similarly high in status, it was to preserve the social hierarchy. A punch in the face or the start of a nasty rumor was an act of dominance, letting victims and onlookers alike know the boundaries that defined status in that school. Threats to the social order are sanctioned by publically forcing submissiveness.

* Unlike other uses of aggression that are hot-blooded, impulsive, and uncontrolled reactions to anger or frustration—also known as “reactive aggression”—proactive aggression is cold-blooded, calculating, and targeted precisely toward those who threaten the perpetrators’ dominance. Proactive aggression is goal oriented, and the goal is to obtain or defend status. Bullying is the best-known expression of proactive aggression.

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #2: Have We Granted Some of Our Peers Too Much Status?

* Several years later, television star Jenny McCarthy began appearing on talk shows to discuss her new book, in which she claimed that a vast medical conspiracy was covering up a link between vaccines and her son’s autism. To be fair, a parent’s coping strategies and search for meaning in the face of a child’s devastating diagnosis is perfectly understandable. McCarthy never claimed to be a scientist and freely admitted that the evidence supporting her beliefs came only from her “mommy instincts.” Just as we cannot blame Tom Cruise for offering his strongly held opinions about postpartum depression, we cannot fault Jenny McCarthy for trying to help parents as earnestly as she knew how. But the fact that she was a celebrity did have an impact on the power of her opinions. In his book The Panic Virus, Seth Mnookin reports that Jenny McCarthy’s theories on autism “singlehandedly push[ed] vaccine skeptics into the mainstream.” She appeared on television for weeks—not on entertainment programs but on news shows. She sat on panels alongside physicians from the American Academy of Pediatrics, and journalists discussed her ideas as seriously as they did reports on scientific studies and a statement disputing the vaccine theory issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The public not only listened but even changed its opinions. The more McCarthy talked about her distrust of the medical community, the more parents began adopting the same skepticism, eventually making decisions against their own pediatricians’ advice. Mnookin reported that following McCarthy’s televised appearances, the number of parents declining vaccines for their children skyrocketed. It’s one thing to enjoy watching celebrities when they entertain us. It’s another entirely when our fascination with these high-status figures begins to affect our own behavior, even irrationally.

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #3: Is Our Desire for Status Excessive?

Fame is in. Power, influence, and prestige are hot. Character, kindness, and community? Not so much.

* there is no Mandarin word for “popularity” that has the same meaning among adolescents in Western nations

* In the United States, status and likability were very distinct attributes—there was only modest overlap between those teenagers high in one quality and those high in the other. But in China, adolescents who had high status were often also those who were judged to be the most likable. In fact, in the United States, our results revealed that high status was associated with those who were highly aggressive. But in China, we found exactly the opposite—highly aggressive teens were low in status. In a culture that values community, status may not be all that important.

* our increased desire for status reached a turning point in the 1980s, when the media became a peer that never slept. A society accustomed to interacting with a single daily newspaper and a few dozen radio and television programs suddenly found itself presented with thousands of options to receive content twenty-four hours a day. As the media’s power increased exponentially, it started to use every angle it could to make sure that its audience remained motivated to keep tuning in.

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #4: We Think Status Will Make Us Happy

Today we live in a Warholian world, where we all bid for our brief moment of highly visible status. In the United States alone, over $11 billion a year is spent on plastic surgery. Books about how to earn excessive wealth and prestige regularly appear on bestseller lists. Even in our private lives, in moments when we should be working or connecting with loved ones, we post and tweet, with the not-so-subtle hope that we will garner status. The mid-2010s saw the emergence of consulting firms whose sole purpose is to help individuals increase the number of their social media followers. Will all this time, energy, and expense dedicated to raising our status actually pay off? Will high status actually make us happier? The answer is no…

* No matter what their background, those with the highest status in our society all tell a very similar story, one that plays out in a series of stages. Stage 1: Elation. The attainment of high status is accompanied by a whirlwind of attention and adoration. “The first thing that happens is that everything and everybody around you changes . . . And you can feel it filter down to whatever your inner circle of friends is,” explained one subject. The attention also comes with perks: “The access is unbelievable.” “Suddenly, you’re worth something. You’re important.” “When you reach a stage financially when you don’t need freebies, that’s when freebies are thrown to you.”

The experience is variously described as a “guilty pleasure,” a “high,” and a “rush.” Stage 2: Overwhelmed. Most people find their sudden rise in popularity becomes almost too much to deal with. As another subject warned, “Fame 101 is needed to teach people what’s coming: the swell of people, the requests, the letters, the emails, the greetings on the street, the people in cars, the honking of the horns, the screaming of your name. A whole world comes to you that you have no idea is there. It just comes from nowhere. And it starts to build and build like a small tornado, and it’s coming at you, and coming at you, and by the time it gets to you, it’s huge and can sweep you off your feet and take you away.” Not surprisingly, this quickly leads to . . .

Stage 3: Resentment. The attention becomes irritating. “You are an animal in a cage,” the movie star said. “If you’re sitting at a sporting event in a seat and you’re on the aisle . . . all of a sudden you have someone on your left arm kneeling in the aisle [wanting to talk to you]. I want to push them down the stairs.”

Stage 4: Addiction. The ambivalence regarding popularity becomes almost too much to bear. If you’ve ever watched E! True Hollywood Story, you’ll recognize this stage as the moral of each episode. “I’ve been addicted to almost every substance known to man at one point or another, and the most addicting of them all is fame,” said one celebrity. As is true of any addiction, a number of people become dependent on their next hit, hating themselves for wanting it but desperate to have it anyway. Some high-status individuals never get beyond this phase, and their lives become an endless chase for an ever-greater high.

Stage 5: Splitting. The high-status individual realizes that his popularity is not based on his or her actual character at all. “You find out there are millions of people who like you for what you do. They couldn’t care less who you are,” acknowledges one well-known figure, while another says, “It’s not really me . . . it’s this working part of me, or the celebrity part of me . . . So, I am a toy in a shop window.” Some report that they are forced to form split personas to retain any real sense of a genuine self-concept—a version of themselves that is for the public, and a version they can maintain with family and friends, while their true self remains somewhere trapped in between. Over time it becomes harder and harder for them to even remember which is real. One subject reports he has “two different dialogues—the one that I’m thinking and the one I’m saying . . . [I can’t be] as authentic as I’d like to be . . . to show my true self.”

Stage 6: Loneliness and Depression. At this stage, there is no one who really knows the high-status individual at all. As one respondent explains, “I’ve lost friends . . . just by all this adoration that comes whenever you’re in public, [my friends] feel less. They feel inferior . . . You’re special and they aren’t. You’re extraordinary and they’re ordinary . . . and the next thing you know, they’d really rather not have anything to do with you. And you understand them. You have to.”

Stage 7: Wishing for Something Else. Celebrities have everything that many other people wish for, but lack the one thing they desire most.

In response, these high-status individuals decide to invest in something that feels authentic. For some, it’s humanitarian work or charity; for others, it’s stumping for a cause.

* What they discovered was that the pseudo-mature participants who seemed to have it all at thirteen were no longer doing as well. In fact, they seemed to be experiencing many more difficulties than their formerly low-status peers. Allen found that by their twenties, the high-status kids were significantly more likely to abuse alcohol and marijuana, and to have higher likelihoods of serious substance-related problems, like DUIs and drug-related arrests. Even after considering their socioeconomic status and adolescent use of alcohol and marijuana as possible predictors, it was their focus on high status as teens that was significantly related to these adult outcomes. Having high status at age thirteen also predicted poorer-quality friendships later in life.

* High-status teens also were less likely to be involved in satisfying romantic relationships as adults. When those relationships broke up, they were more likely to believe that it was because their partners did not find them to be “popular enough” or “part of the right crowd.” Caring about status at age thirteen seemed to be related to a lifetime of seeking more popularity. Similar results have been found in longitudinal studies of adults. In their studies on extrinsic goals—the kinds of wishes that focus on being well regarded by others—psychologists Richard Ryan and Tim Kasser found a curious link with life satisfaction and well-being.

* those who wish for intrinsic rewards, like those that come from close and caring relationships, personal growth, and helping others, report far greater happiness, vitality, self-esteem, and even physical health. But wishing for extrinsic goals—fame, power, excessive wealth, and beauty—is associated with discontent, anxiety, and depression. When Ryan and Kasser likewise followed their research participants over time, it was those who wished most strongly for status who were the most likely to be faring worse later in their lives.

* our ancient brain wiring has us yearning for status nevertheless, and over time we have created new and sophisticated ways to help satisfy those cravings every day. Society has fostered the illusion that by spending enough time, money, and energy, anyone can attain high status. But that’s not the kind of popularity that will make us happy. Perhaps it’s time for us to realize that status is no longer worth wishing for.

* despite all reason, we remain naturally tuned in to popularity. Yet this instinct doesn’t always help us. Sometimes our tendency to follow the herd can have serious consequences.

* What we found was that simply knowing that their popular peers would be likely to drink alcohol, smoke pot, or have unprotected sex was sufficient to change adolescents’ answers—and dramatically so. Suddenly our participants were far more apt to say they would engage in all these behaviors than they had been when they began our study. Even when they had logged off and were told that none of their peers were watching, our subjects continued to state that they would pursue those risky actions.

* The results revealed that being unpopular—isolated, disconnected, lonely—actually predicts mortality rates. But perhaps even more surprising is just how powerful these effects can be. People in the study who had larger networks of friends had a 50 percent increased chance of survival by the end of the study.

* One of the most common risk factors for suicide attempts is feeling lonely, like a burden to others, or like one doesn’t belong.

* Among adolescents in particular, ostracism from a peer group is an especially strong predictor of suicidal behavior.

* Have you ever noticed that when people talk about feeling lonely, rejected, or unpopular, they tend to use words typically associated with physical illness? Terms like “heartbreak” or “homesick,” emotional “scars,” and “hurt” feelings are common to many languages. Are these just expressions, or is there something about unpopularity that can actually do us physical harm?

* at least some regions of our brain experience unpopularity in the same way that they respond to physical distress—a phenomenon that she refers to as “social pain.” Subsequent research found that these same regions are activated during a whole host of social rejection experiences. As soon as we fear that we might get rejected from the group, our brain sends the most powerful signal at its disposal to warn us and motivate us back into the fold. Worrying about a breakup, seeing pictures of someone being teased, remembering a lost friend or loved one, or even just thinking about being negatively judged by others in the future all seem to implicate the same brain regions.

* research has found that those who have a low tolerance for physical pain also seem to be more sensitive to interpersonal interpersonal rejection, and vice versa. In one experiment, Eisenberger even found that taking a Tylenol can actually reduce the sensation of social pain. Our brains try to ease the pain of headaches and heartbreaks in the exact same way. Unpopularity also is felt in millions of other places in our bodies simultaneously and just as quickly: within our cells.

* At the first sign that we may be banished from the group, our DNA unravels and reorients. In fact, social rejection experiences activate a surprisingly large number of genes, while also deactivating many others. UCLA psychologists George Slavich and Steve Cole, experts in the field of human social genomics, have described DNA as being “exquisitely sensitive to social rejection.” They studied what happens immediately after we’ve been dumped by a romantic partner, excluded from a social event, rejected by a stranger, or even simply told that we may be socially evaluated by others we care about. Within forty minutes, they found, a wide array of changes in our DNA can be detected in the blood. Only a few dozen out of at least twenty thousand genes turn on or off in these moments, but even that small number seem to play a very significant role. According to Slavich and Cole, these activated genes have a radical effect on the immune system. Some are linked to the body’s inflammation response, which comes in handy when we need to heal wounds or fight off bacterial infections. Slavich and Cole suggest that this response to rejection may be nature’s mechanism to help those who were unpopular. Millennia ago individuals who had no peers to protect them faced a high risk of an untimely death due to injury or attack. Those whose bodies preemptively activated a “pro-inflammatory” response that would be ready to heal them from any impending wounds were the most likely to survive. Ultimately, evolution favored bodies that were quickest to respond, and thus most sensitive to rejection.

* despite all of our attempts to create ways to feel more connected than ever, we have never been more apart. Today, we are more likely to live alone, get married later in life, and move our families farther from our loved ones than ever before. In just the past twenty years, the number of people reporting that they feel they have no close confidant has tripled.

* there is one factor that has remarkable power to predict life trajectories. It predicts which children thrive. It predicts which employees succeed. It even predicts who enjoys more rewarding romantic relationships and better physical health. It was the one factor that Jeff had but Steve did not. That factor is likability.

* Likable people are not just perceived to be better at their jobs, more satisfied, happier, and more fulfilled. They actually are all those things. The reason is that likable people live in a different world from the one inhabited by their unlikable peers. It is a world of their own making, and it produces a chain reaction of experiences that molds their lives in dramatic ways.

* But the power of likability is not only evident among children—Accepteds can be identified at any age. Peer relationship dynamics are remarkably similar across the life span, from four-year-olds in preschool to senior citizens in retirement communities. Accepteds also can be found in any context—the classroom, the office, the softball team, places of worship, the PTA. All include some people who seem effortlessly, immensely likable.

* compared to the Rejecteds, Accepted children grew up far less likely to drop out of school, commit crimes, or experience mental illness as adults.

* The children initially picked as most likable by their peers grew up to be most likely to be employed and to have gotten promotions. The likable kids also had better odds of being in long-term, satisfying friendships and romantic partnerships.

* The most likable people are those who cooperate with others, are helpful, share, and follow the rules. Likable people are generally well adjusted. They are smart (but not too smart!). They are often in a good mood. They can hold up their end of a conversation. But they make sure to give others a turn to speak, too. They are creative, especially at solving awkward social dilemmas. And perhaps most important: they don’t disrupt the group.

* Researchers measured each subject’s IQ, aggressive and disruptive behavior, history of physical and mental illness, parents’ level of education and income, and even the child’s future goals. After accounting for all of these possible influences on adult outcomes, it was likability that predicted happiness, employment, and income decades later.

* Likable children even grew up less prone than others to be diagnosed with diabetes, obesity, high cholesterol, or high blood pressure.

* Students invariably write that they are shocked by how much their own behavior changed on T-shirt day. They are even more surprised to see how those changes created a cascade effect—their behaviors caused others to respond in unexpected ways, which prompted their own uncommon reactions, and so on, in an endless feedback loop. Shy students, for example, approached people they had hoped to talk to for weeks. During these conversations they felt more confident, happy, and optimistic. They were surprised to discover that their peers laughed at their jokes, seemed interested in what they had to say, and even invited them to hang out again. Angry students, who didn’t usually feel very connected with others on campus, couldn’t believe how often they smiled on the day they wore the T-shirt. To their surprise, others smiled back, and suddenly they didn’t feel as angry or lonely. Some reported that it was the first time in weeks that they had chosen to leave their dorms and go out to mingle with others on Franklin Street, Chapel Hill’s famous strip. Students who typically stared down at their phones as they walked across campus looked up on that day and offered friendly nods to others as they walked by. Their peers nodded back, and my students reported that they felt an increased sense of community, so much so that they were even more likely to raise their hands in other courses. Overall, the consensus of the members of the class each year is that when the world treated them differently, even just for a day, it changed their behavior and their feelings in surprising ways. One student wrote, “If I wore that T-shirt every day in my childhood, so to speak, I would be a different human being now.”

This experiment offers an opportunity to learn how much our own behavior and mood can be affected by altering how we approach the world even for just one day. It also helps explain the power of likability, because being likable changes not only how people treat us, but ultimately how we grow and develop over the course of our own lives. Stated simply, likable people are treated very well. And not just for a single day, but every day.

* Research demonstrates that likable children indeed develop advanced social skills faster than their peers. Among nine- to ten-year-olds, for instance, likable kids are the first to form emotionally intimate friendships while others are still engaged in juvenile play. When they are a few years older, likable youth are among the first to participate in monogamous romantic partnerships, while their peers are still experimenting with fleeting teen crushes. Of course, developing refined social skills makes these adolescents that much more likable, thus advancing the cycle even further. The same transactional model explains why being disliked can result in a lifetime of thwarted opportunities and disadvantage. Research reveals that there are many behaviors that lead to being disliked. We can alienate others by acting aggressively, breaking social norms egregiously and unapologetically, unapologetically, acting selfishly, or “oversharing” our own problems in a manner that places self-interest over the needs of the group. But as much as these behaviors can affect a disagreeable person in the moment, it is their impact on other people—the transactions they initiate—that are responsible for the enduring problems experienced by dislikable people.

* While likable people live in a world in which they are treated well, unlikable people are avoided, ridiculed, or victimized. In early childhood, Rejecteds are less likely to be invited to playdates and birthday parties, or even to take part in games. Each time this occurs, it represents a missed opportunity to learn new social skills. Of course, lacking social skills only makes them that much more unlikable, perpetuating a sad and damaging cycle. Not surprisingly, by middle school, Rejected children are less adept at following group rules, negotiating conflicts with friends, or knowing how to take turns in large conversations. By adolescence, they are among the last to begin dating and often have limited their friends only to others who were similarly rejected in childhood.

* social mimicry can also unconsciously affect our emotions, which helps explain why we prefer to spend time with likable people and avoid those who are awkward, mean, or sad. We’ve all had the experience of meeting a negative mood magnet—someone who radiates despair and pessimism wherever he or she goes. Even after they depart, we find ourselves feeling down, too, maybe wondering why we’re in a bad mood. After just a few moments interacting with sad, socially awkward confederates in experiments, participants commonly report feeling the same way themselves.

* after dates with an awkward, sad individual, participants themselves reported a decrease in their own happiness and energy, as well as far less interest in meeting for a second date. Results like these suggest that for gloomy, unlikable people, the world itself is truly quite dreary. Every interaction they have is a bit sadder than it has to be, without them realizing how their own behavior affected others’ moods and made it more likely they would be rejected again. Meanwhile, happy, likable people seem to be perpetually surrounded by positivity, cheerfulness, and acceptance. Their upbeat nature is so infectious that we feel they bring out the best in us, and we seek out opportunities to be in their presence—all the while unaware that their mysterious “positive energy” is simply the work of social mimicry. Even their laughter is contagious, which accounts for why TV shows have laugh tracks. Hearing others laugh makes us more likely to do so.

* the more likably I behaved, the kinder the agent was in return. When I was more socially aversive, however, the agent was equally curt. My behavior didn’t only affect how each agent acted toward me but also the quality of his support. In each instance when I acted in a dislikable manner, agents listened less intently and were more error-prone. When the agents liked me, I received more helpful suggestions. But there were also some results I did not expect. Being likable didn’t only affect the behavior of the agents I spoke with; ultimately, the transactions had a surprising impact on me as well.

* Being likable didn’t just change how others felt about me, it changed my happiness and success as well. Once I noticed this, it was amazing to witness how easily I could affect so many outcomes—at work or home, among strangers or friends—simply by acting in the ways that make people likable. In each instance, the snowball effects were remarkable. Every compliment bolstered my mood…

* “Excessive reassurance-seeking.” It often takes place in the context of a romantic relationship but can also occur in friendships or even between employee and supervisor. Experts in excessive reassurance-seeking, like Jim Coyne and Thomas Joiner, have proposed that this behavior sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure. The constant questioning and doubting of a reassurance-seeker can make an individual from whom reassurance is sought feel distrusted, stressed, and ineffective, wondering, “Why can’t I help this person that I care so much about? Why doesn’t he or she believe me?” Eventually, the pressure to continually reassure causes them to withdraw. They become slow to return messages, less convincing in their declarations of love. They become less comforting, and of course, this is exactly what the reassurance-seeker is hypervigilant to detect.

* who we were as teenagers may influence our lives even more than who we are today.

* “depressive realism,” suggests that vigilance toward negative cues actually can lead to a more objective and clearer view of social information, undistorted by a positive bias. For this reason, some research has shown that previously unpopular people are perceived by others as more empathetic and more sensitive in social situations.

* those high in status had a poorer ability to consider others’ perspective. Participants high in social status also score more poorly than those low in status on tests of emotional intelligence, empathy, the ability to detect sarcasm, and correctly noticing a variety of emotional expressions.

* “rejection sensitivity” bias, a tendency to expect and emotionally react to rejection that creates a cycle of lifelong unpopularity: we wish to be popular, assume we are not, and then in turn yearn for it all the more. Not surprisingly, this type of bias also predicts a host of related negative outcomes throughout our lives, including body dissatisfaction, burnout at work, depression, and loneliness. Adults with high levels of rejection sensitivity are even more likely to contract infectious illnesses and to develop heart disease.

* Prior social standing and resulting biases may cause changes in brain wiring that take some effort to override.

* A second common interpretation bias may also seem familiar: the tendency to assume that others are being hostile in an emotionally equivocal situation. Remember your tardy friend at the coffee shop? A person with a hostile attribution bias might feel intentionally stood up because their friend was being cruel. This type of bias is common among those who were unpopular adolescents… When they mature, children with hostile attribution bias turn into our paranoid neighbors and cynical coworkers, people who are at greater risk for problems at home and work.

* those who were popular chose to behave in ways that would allow them to mend relationships and even build friendships with the bully. In contrast, those who were unpopular were more interested in revenge, in appearing dominant, or in avoiding the situation entirely. In other words, unpopular children’s impulses were to be aggressive, rude, or passive.

* We have thousands of social interactions every day. For each event, we encode information from the world around us and interpret it. Finally, if the situation calls for a response, we act. While psychologists understand this reaction as a series of social information processing steps, we experience it in less than a millisecond, without contemplation or deliberation. Those milliseconds combine to fill our days, influence our relationships, define our identities, and ultimately determine our lives—who we are. These automatic reactions can make us seem as if we have terrific instincts or can get us into trouble. And the basis for what we see, how we act, and what we do all day every day is in large part a function of our high school popularity.

* the more we value status, the more our ability to distinguish between good and bad may be compromised. Popularity can become the only value that matters…

* One of the factors that most strongly predicts who will be popular and who will be rejected is whether they are raised in an aggressive social environment…

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Liberal Democracy

Paul Gottfried writes in this 2017 book:

* WHEN I WAS A YOUNG FACULTY MEMBER at Rockford College forty years ago, my divisional chairman, who was a devout disciple of Leo Strauss, once complained that a colleague he had just spoken to did not believe in liberal democracy. I’ve no idea how my superior came by this knowledge, but he was deeply upset that his colleague didn’t praise “liberal democracy as being better than other forms of government.” Our divisional chairman then shared with me a text he was working on that proved that Marx “rejected liberal democracy.” Up until that moment I had never encountered the term “liberal democracy,” and when I first heard it mentioned, I thought it was a reference to Democrats who endorsed Senator George McGovern.
I thereupon researched the operative term and learned that it was of fairly recent origin. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton didn’t apply it when they described the nascent American regime in The Federalist. Appeals to “democracy” by Presidents Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson were to a populist spirit, not to a hallowed form of government…

* Although the United States ultimately became a more ideologically infused political society as a result of the Civil War, as late as at the beginning of the last century, according to Robert Nisbet and Forrest McDonald, the major involvement of the federal government in our lives was the collection and delivery of mail. This was long after the southern states were prevented from seceding, with devastating force, and long after President Lincoln had proclaimed a “new birth” for a nation “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”¹

* A visit to Wikipedia indicates that the concept “liberal democracy” came into vogue during the Progressive Era, with the efforts of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to reconfigure American republican government according to the needs of an urban, industrial society.² In my book After Liberalism, I undertake to examine this fateful conjuncture and offer reasons for its emergence.³ But in researching my book, I couldn’t trace any widespread usage of the term “liberal democracy” even as far back as the early twentieth century. Except for some fleeting references to it by English Hegelian Thomas Hill Green around 1910, “liberal democracy” did not make an appearance during the early twentieth century.

* By 2009 “liberal democracy” had acquired such favorable connotations that it served as a generic compliment for a regime that was agreeable to the speaker.

* …Allan Bloom’s exhortations to Americans in The Closing of the American Mind to impose “democracy and human rights” on unreceptive societies as “an educational experience” if necessary by military force.

* “Liberal democracy” as a term or concept has gained currency primarily for two reasons. One is its vagueness; it can be made to mean what the speaker wants it to signify. Not surprisingly, one finds online numerous meanings given to “liberal democracy,” from freedom and equality combined with some kind of representative government protecting minority rights, to a government that redistributes income in accordance with the needs of the majority. We are further led to believe that democracy and liberalism fuse at a certain point, on the way to becoming social democracy. Sometimes “liberal democratic” government is linked to a linguistic, geographic context. It is made synonymous with the political practices of the Anglosphere, an appellation that embraces the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and other English-speaking regions. These regions are seen as blessed
with a shared political culture, which is styled “liberal democracy.”

This concept or term has geographical and ethnic reference points. It can mean the political practices that now prevail in certain regions of the Western world and in its cultural extensions elsewhere. Those who apply this term often gloss over the fact that political arrangements in England and the United States looked different hundreds of years ago from how these institutions later evolved. Fans of the Anglosphere sometimes apply the label “liberal democratic” to English-speaking peoples, no matter whether the regime being referred to was an aristocratic oligarchy, bourgeois liberal monarchy, or modern public administration. They thereby designate either our present political system or something that is thought to have led, however tortuously, in its direction.

There is a second reason that “liberal democracy” has caught on: it expresses a value judgment about what the speaker intends to praise. It suggests the political equivalent of the traditional Catholic idea of “no salvation outside the Church.” No one but a fool would imagine that the term is purely descriptive. It is a god term, on the altar of which the worshipper can never slay enough fattened calves. Although the term “liberal democratic” has been made to serve a number of political purposes, it has also, not incidentally, been raised to sacral significance. It is a concept or rallying cry that the neoconservatives bestowed on the Republican Party as they made their historic journey from the Left to become the American conservative establishment.

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Revisions and Dissents: Essays

Paul Gottfried writes in this 2017 book:

A classical or essentialist Right is hard to find in the contemporary Western world, where journalists and other assorted intellectuals rush to denounce its bearers—or even partial bearers—as “fascists.” That may be one reason that such types rarely come into public view, outside of certain European parties that have been able to survive in a multiparty electoral system. Being on the essentialist Right is deadly in an academic or journalistic milieu that features almost exclusively quintessential leftist values. There are some isolated intellectual groups in the United States that betray a right-wing gestalt. But these groups are usually cut off from the conservative mainstream lest they endanger “conservative” institutes or publications by expressing improper ideas. This is entirely understandable given the prevalence of leftist influences in Western societies and the extent to which the establishment non-Left has absorbed leftist values and attitudes that have come from a predominantly leftist culture and educational system.

Contrary to a widespread misconception, the Right is not that side that plays up “values” in opposition to a “relativistic” Left. It is truly remarkable how tenaciously the Left fights for its “values.” Leftists believe fervently in an overshadowing vision of universal equality. Though those of a different persuasion might differ with leftists over its highest value, it is evident that a moral vision infuses the Left’s political concerns. It also makes no sense to define the Right as the side that wishes to move mountains in order to confer “human rights” on the entire world. Both the notion of human rights and the mission to impose them universally are derived from the classical Left, going back to the French Revolution. The fact that such a global mission is now thought to characterize the Right underscores the utter confusion into which Right-Left distinctions have drifted. Finally, one does not join the essentialist Right by wishing to get off the train of progress just before the present moment.

* Each time I see an adolescent blogger or pubescent columnist introduced to the viewing public as a “leading conservative,” I crack the same joke to whoever is around: “Does this teenager follow Burke or Maistre?” By now, “conservative” signifies what certain journalists and certain news commentators decide to advocate. Journalists who take Republican policy positions are sometimes described as conservative theorists, although I am still struggling to find out what exactly makes such people “conservative” or “theo-rists.” Presumably by defending the last Republican chief executive, President George W. Bush, the speaker gains recognition as a “conservative” thinker.

* The range of our life choices is far more determined by culture, heredity, and geographic location than someone who is addicted to Ayn Rand mega-novels might wish to believe.

Even more relevant to my argument is that there is nothing right-wing or even vaguely conservative about the way Libertarians approach the question of liberty. Unlike the essentialist Right’s reading of Aristotle or Burke, Libertarians understand freedom as a universally shared good to which everyone everywhere is entitled by virtue of being an individual. Although I would not prohibit others, even if I were in the position to do so, from espousing such a view, it is not clear what renders this Libertarian understanding of social relations specifically right-wing. The classical conservative view of liberty flows from the legal implications of someone’s standing in a particular society, held together by shared custom and distributed duties.

* Libertarians are seen from the Right as promoting a leftist position, which presupposes the idea of universal equality and even universal citizenship. It is therefore no surprise that Russell Kirk, Eric von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Robert Nisbet, and other twentieth-century conservative thinkers eschewed Libertarians. The doctrinaires they scorned rejected the conservative notion of the social bond and were proclaiming principles that issued from the French Revolution.

* In Liberalism, Ancient and Modern, Leo Strauss sets out to define the essentialist conservative worldview circa 1960.¹ Its exponents “regard the universal and homogeneous state as either undesirable though possible, or as both undesirable and impossible.”² They do not like international bodies, which they identify with the Left, and “look with greater sympathy than liberals on the particular or particularist and the heterogeneous.”

* The Right affirms inherited hierarchy, favors the particularistic while being suspicious of what claims to be the universal, aims at preserving social traditions where possible, and opposes the Left by every means at its disposal. The Left takes the opposite positions on the first three points out of a sense of fairness, a passionate commitment to the advancement of equality, and a conception of human beings that stresses sameness or interchangeability. Whereas the Right believes in what Aristotle defined as the order of the household—in which elaborately defined distinctions are deemed “natural”—the Left recoils from nonegalitarian arrangements. Its advocates are delighted to have state managers and judges abolish the vestiges of inherited hierarchy.

* The Left is committed to removing, as far as humanly possible, social, racial, and gender inequalities. Furthermore, the more control it accumulates, the easier it is for the Left to reconstruct or recode those who resist its planning. German social theorist Arnold Gehlen was struck by how younger Germans in the 1960s exhibited what he called “hypermorality.”⁴ Contrary to the opinion that such youth, who frequently turned into militant antifascists, suffered from a lack of values, Gehlen noticed their hysterical moral zeal spilling over into their entire lives.⁵ This was partly due to a prolonged reaction to the Nazis, who were depicted by German educational institutions as conservatives. But Gehlen also linked the culture of moral indignation in his homeland to being cut off from any traditional communal association. In Germany, this process started with the Nazi revolution, was accelerated by a lost war, and then continued through a postwar occupation, which weakened even further any traditional German national identity.

* “Science” is to be advanced insofar as it discredits Christianity, which includes a dark side that sanctions gender distinctions and privileges heterosexual marriage. Science may also be pursued as a learning or discovery activity, providing it does not operate to the detriment of the Left’s highest good.

* Science, however, remains instrumental for the Left and is meant to serve the march toward equality. If, for example, someone cited research evidence substantiating socially significant genetic differences between genders or ethnic groups, that scientist and/or author would likely encounter considerable difficulty in academic life or as a government consultant. In the leftist universe biological science may be called on, but only as long as it does not conflict with the proper ideological ends, which is promoting approved egalitarian teachings. In the same way, the theory of evolution is fine for the Left if the information being gathered can be directed against religionists or social reactionaries.

The Darwinian hypothesis about nature hits a snag, however, as soon as someone brings up the social significance of deeply rooted gender differences that may have been necessary for the perpetuation of human and animal life. There may be no reason here to belabor the obvious, which is the selective character that evolutionary theory has assumed for the Left. The philosopher of science David Stove has addressed this topic in his instructive work Darwinian Fairytales, in which he deals with the mythic as opposed to scientific aspects that evolutionary theory has assumed for intellectuals and journalists.¹² Stove’s book highlights evolutionary theory’s continuing value as a polemical tool rather than scientific hypothesis.

* The Right has sanctified its own version of an instrumental good. Having sometimes defined itself as the political expression of the doctrine of original sin, the Right has invested heavily in certain aspects of Christianity, just as the Left has made an equal investment in its selective conception of science. Although there is no evidence that many of the great conservative theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, starting with Burke, were orthodox Christians, their political worldviews would have been unthinkable without some kind of Christian theological foundation.

The concept of hierarchy that conservatives defended went back to the Catholic Middle Ages, in which feudal relations were freighted with sacral significance. Temporal forms of command corresponded to the order of the church that was ultimately based on the structure of Roman authority. The notion of human fallenness was invoked in an empirical as well as theological fashion to drive home the point that human beings lack the capacity or right to reinvent themselves and their social contexts. Indeed, such experiments were sinful or hubristic and likely to result in disaster. Traditional conservatives were fond of quoting Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, which affirmed that all authority is from God.¹⁴ It is not for naught that God delivered the sword into the hand of the magistrate.¹⁵ Needless to say, the “arche” or authority here invoked by conservatives was one that was handed down from one generation to the next.

* The Left has also benefited from being rooted in a Christian heritage. Friedrich Nietzsche famously scorned Christian religion as the source of the “slave morality” that begat feminism and egalitarian democracy. While the Right saw in Christianity a justification for settled authorities, the Left drew from it the vision of a world in which “the first would be last” and “the meek would inherit the Earth.” Such ideas of “social justice” could be derived from the Hebrew prophets, the Gospels, and the sharing of worldly possessions in the primitive church. Unlike the Right, however, the Left worked studiously to hide its debt to the Western religious tradition, claiming that its teachings were scientifically grounded or came from immaculately secular sources. This denial of paternity has gone so far that Marxists and cultural Marxists have tried to root out any explicitly Christian influences in their societies. Rarely does one find a more dramatic illustration of the Oedipal complex. Christopher Dawson and Mircea Eliade have both observed that the modern Left would be unthinkable without its distinctly Christian, even more than Judaic, matrix.

* Right and Left have historical identities and essentialist definitions, and it may be necessary to go into each one’s characteristics in order to make sense of our reference points. It is usually brought up in a discussion of this type that the distinction between Right and Left was formalized during the French Revolution, in accordance with where political factions were seated in the French National Assembly. Those who favored further revolutionary change swelled the left side of the amphitheater; those who felt the ferment had raged too long and had to be quieted sat on the right side. In the (classically) liberal July Monarchy of King Louis Philippe I—set up in 1830 and overthrown to make way for the French Second Republic in 1848—there were two major parliamentary factions: a party of resistance and a party of movement. This distinction encapsulates what may be seen, in an oversimplified fashion, as the basic difference between Right and Left: one is the party of standing pat or making only necessary changes, while the other party is intent on pushing change further.

* The traditional Right stood for an agrarian way of life that reflected a traditional authority structure that was typically allied to the Catholic Church or to Protestant state churches and entrenched monarchies. This conservative Right turned to the
past for what the southern agrarian Richard Weaver called its “vision of order.”

* All political-ideological groupings in the nineteenth century had accompanying social foundations. Liberalism was the “idea of the bourgeoisie,” just as socialism attracted the working class and sympathetic intellectuals. Conservatism originated in modern European history as an aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution, while the Left defined itself initially as a defender of this revolutionary process—together with the rationalist thinking that supposedly fueled the engine of progress. The sides that were taken were both social and ideological, and the two characteristics traveled together. In an earlier age it would have been difficult to think of distinctive worldviews apart from the concrete interests of the groups to which they were attached. Ideologies, however, eventually assumed a life of their own.

* Universalism, equality, human rights, and managed democracy will likely remain the order of the day in first-world countries. Freedom will be allowed to survive to whatever extent it can be made compatible with equality. Christian institutions will be tolerated to whatever extent they teach the required values and instill obedience to a leftist state. This will happen—at least partly—because the modern state has expanded its power base at the expense of intermediate institutions, including churches and communities. But this success also stems from the now triumphant leftist vision, which encompasses every aspect of human life.

* The Right, that is, the authentic one, is far more splintered than the Left for a number of reasons. It controls few if any institutions in Western countries and, even worse for its future, possesses no identity that its current representatives would all recognize as their own. The Right is not only untethered but also burdened by the infighting of its constituent groups. Mainstream “conservatives” in the meantime have become an integral part of the public discussions in the national media. These designated “conservatives” enjoy journalistic acceptance as the respectable opposition and provide televised sound bites and political best
sellers in an age of mass communication.

The success of this artificial Right stems at least partly from the backing of moneyed interests, whether in the form of corporate donors or leaders of the Republican Party. Those who receive this largess are now the sole recognized occupants of the visible opposition, and they have been sedulous in keeping out of their political conversation unseemly reactionaries. This media-approved Right has nothing to fear from what lies outside the mainstream. The nonaligned or classical Right, call it what one will, cannot even agree on what defines its “Rightness.” Its competing representatives are all holding tight to fragments of what was once a pristine conservative worldview. But that may be where the common ground ends. The traditionalists are beset with quarrels about what exactly the “true teachings” are.

* The true or essentialist Right simply wants to stop what is generally viewed as the train of progress and, if possible, reverse its direction. Although there were once unifying visions of order among classical conservatives, these orientation points have disappeared and been replaced by pure desperation.

This continuing loss of ground is disheartening for those who are struggling against a hostile age, and comparable developments have overtaken the independent Right—or those groups that comprise one—in Western European countries. In Germany at the time of national reunification in the early 1990s, the national Right vibrated with excitement over the prospect of a unified country. Germans would at last be able to put off their sackcloth and ashes and would no longer have to view themselves as a pariah nation. Their reference point as a people would no longer be their humiliating defeat in 1945, nor would they would have to talk in a ritualized fashion any longer about the “burden” of their entire history, as a prelude to Auschwitz. Once again, Germans could be a proud nation, as they were at the time of their unification in 1871.
Never did national conservatives anywhere miscalculate so badly. Former Communist functionaries and agents of the Communist secret police streamed into government positions in the Federal Republic, exchanging their pro-Soviet Communist identities for cultural Marxist ones. A party of the Left became a major force in German politics, and it was made up of hastily disguised Communists like
the leader of the Party of Democratic Socialists, Gregor Gysi. Indeed, even the current chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, turns out to have been an obliging Communist, almost up until the moment when the Berlin Wall fell.
Hoping to protect themselves against the anxieties voiced by Western journalists and politicians about a resurgent German nationalism, German chancellors from Helmut Kohl down to Angela Merkel have put funds and energy into a government-organized “crusade against the Right.” This enterprise has turned out to be little more than a witch hunt against the opposition directed by embattled Leftists—including longtime Communists—but no significant outcry against this intimidation has been raised. Furthermore, no politician hoping to make a career in Germany would express patriotic sentiments too loudly or suggest that he or she is not eagerly awaiting Germany’s further absorption into the European Union (EU). German elites have been pushing their country dramatically toward the Left ever since reunification.

* The treatment of Bismarck, as illustrated by Steinberg’s work,¹⁸ points to a problem that I myself encountered as a young man writing about German history. The difficulty of my task was already evident when I was doing graduate work at Yale in the mid-1960s. No matter what aspect of German history was under consideration, we were expected to uncover a path leading to the Third Reich. All German history was considered “tragedy” or—as underlined in A. J. P. Taylor’s The Course of German History¹⁹ and William M. McGovern’s From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy²⁰—the prelude to a disaster inflicted on the world by an unusually nasty people who had been perpetually taken in by horrible leaders and diabolical intellectuals. From Bismarck to Hitler, a world historical catastrophe was always just around the corner between the Rhine and the Elbe. We were also urged to assume that the Germans and Austrians were exclusively responsible for the Great War.
According to Fritz Fischer, who pioneered studies stressing Germany’s premeditated plan to unleash a European-wide war on the way to becoming a world power, “Hitler was no operational accident.”²¹ From Fischer’s perspective, all of German history since Bismarck’s work of unification had been preparation for the Nazi catastrophe.²² As a graduate student I was treated to the less than friendly admonition that believing any other account of the outbreak of World War I was to belittle the German problem.²³ Such a move would send a dangerous message—or so the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has underlined for more than forty years—that the Germans were not required to abjure their national identity as a precondition for world peace. According to Habermas, nothing less than a repudiation of the German past would cleanse his country of its inherited evil ways and protect surrounding countries against further eruptions of Teutonic violence.²⁴
In my periodic discussions with teachers and later, colleagues, it seemed that veracity mattered less than moralizing. Stress was placed on the therapeutic effect of certain narratives…
[Harry Elmer] Barnes’s summary explanation for the outbreak of the Great War comes closest to my present view on the subject:

“The basic causes of the war were general ones such as nationalism, imperialism, militarism, for which no single country can be held either uniquely or primarily responsible. They were fanned and intensified by both future belligerent sides and sprang from German militarism, French revenge aspirations, British navalism and imperialism, the century-old Russian ambition to get control of Constantinople and the Straits. Whatever the case earlier, Germany was far less prepared for war in a military sense in 1914 than Russia and France. General Buat [a French commander] admits that in 1914 the French active army was 910,000 to 870,000 for Germany with nearly twice the population of France; and Repington, the English military critic, admits that the German army in regard to equipment, military manoeuvres, and leadership was inferior to the French. This was especially true in the artillery branch. The active Russian army [at the time] numbered 1,284,000.²⁹”

Although Barnes made regrettable statements after World War II that downplayed Nazi atrocities, these indiscretions do not detract from his understanding of World War I. All too often, his positions taken at different times about different events are dishonestly run together in a way that makes Barnes’s defensible views on World War I appear to be a prelude to his later depreciation of Nazi crimes.

* The more than a million Russian troops that appeared on the Austro-German border just before the outbreak of war were not placed there for decoration. The Russians were preparing for a conflict with the Central Powers, and with special vigor after French president Raymond Poincaré promised military assistance from his country during a visit to St. Petersburg during the third week of July.

* Noting shared responsibility for the war does not require us to defend the Schlieffen Plan—as modified by the chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke—in 1914.³⁵ Moltke’s success in getting the German government to move its armies through a neutral country, Belgium, in order to carry out a flanking motion around the bulk of the French forces, led to predictable disaster. Indeed it may have doomed the German side during the first week of the struggle.³⁶ This strategy required the occupation of an intensely hostile Belgian population, a reaction that might have been expected since the Germans were obliged to move
through a fervently Francophile region of Belgium.³⁷ Moltke’s military venture also provided the English war party with an excuse to declare war on the Central Powers.

* For example, history should not be practiced as a form of political advocacy; the area of study that the historian concentrates on should provide enough intellectual and emotional stimulation so that he does not have to yield to partisan enthusiasms; and someone doing history should aim at Sachlichkeit, objectivity, even if this ideal can never be more than distantly approximated in practice.

* Unlike “democratic” France and “liberal” England, the German Empire, we are told, was “autocratic” and “militaristic” and therefore had no scruples about unleashing World War I. But as Barnes reminds us, France had a much larger and better equipped army, with a much smaller population, than did Germany in 1914. Although there was an established principle of ministerial responsibility in relation to the National Assembly, and although France held direct elections for its exec-
utive head, this did not prevent the French government before World War I from behaving militaristically and belligerently. French president Poincaré, who tried to goad Russia into war against the Central Powers, was more given to saber rattling
than German chancellor Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg. Although Bethmann- Hollweg was technically only responsible to his sovereign, he tried in vain to conciliate the British—who viewed Germany as a dangerous rival—and even succeeded in scaling back the German naval program by 1912. Certainly the British had a better-developed parliamentary system than their German cousins, but this did
not prevent a minority of the Liberal cabinet after 1905 from engaging in adventurous continental diplomacy in order to isolate Germany. Moreover, these “conversations” were carried out behind the backs of the Commons, that is, behind the backs of seventeen members of the ruling cabinet who would have opposed the actions of the war party.⁶³
Nor should we assume, as Barnes and Walter Karp⁶⁴ point out, that the US government, which was supposed to be paradigmatically democratic and pacifistic, behaved in a restrained manner during World War I. Neither major party in the United States stayed neutral in the war; both were demonstratively pro-British. Nor did our leaders—except for the principled secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan—make serious efforts to stay out of the European strife or push peace initiatives when they were still possible. Although President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing—who took over for William Jennings Bryan after
he resigned in 1915—were effusively pro-British and turned a blind eye to the starvation blockade imposed by the British on the German civilian population, their opponents attacked them as insufficiently pugnacious. Republican leaders were furious that Wilson waited until April 1917 before plunging his country into the war. The subsequent suppression of civil liberties in “democratic” America went well beyond anything that occurred in “autocratic” Germany or Austria-Hungary, where opposition to the war did not result in the protestor’s immediate arrest and where enemy newspapers were still openly circulated.

* Another example of the victor’s history being given a Manichean twist has been the tendency of the recently deceased Harry V. Jaffa and his well-placed disciples to play off the “democratic statesmanship” of Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln against what was allegedly autocratic leadership. The heavies in this hagiography are predictably the Germans, the antebellum South, and the Muslim enemies of the state of Israel. Yet those who entered the democratic pantheon may have gotten there because of good fortune as much as for any other reason.

* The attempts in the nineteenth century to compare Bismarck and Lincoln were fully understandable. But we must also consider that one of these giants was obviously more successful than the other in gaining the admiration of a later generation. This may have been partly due to the vagaries of fortune rather than humanitarian behavior. Bismarck, who is now far less admired than Lincoln, shed far less blood in achieving his national goal. Let us say counterfactually that Lincoln saved the American Union at an enormous price, but did not free slaves after he sent armies to quell the southern rebellion. Would he still enjoy his present divine-like status?

* I used to gripe (and perhaps still do) about a lightweight book published by Republican Party journalist Jonah Goldberg, Liberal Fascism.⁸³ I was annoyed by the attention this work received in a field in which true researchers usually labor for a pittance. Unlike diligent but largely unrecognized scholars, Goldberg drew copious comments from the national press and parlayed his writing efforts into big bucks. I was especially turned off by the ludicrous comparisons of prominent Democratic politicians to Italian fascists and by the forced parallels between Hillary Clinton and German Nazi officials. Most horrifying of all, this screed remained on the New York Times best-seller list for nonfiction from February 2008 through April 2008 and even reached first place by March 8, 2008.⁸⁴
Since then it has dawned on me that there is nothing about this publishing coup that should have offended me. Goldberg produced propaganda for his party masked as historical analysis and sold his well-packaged product to FOX News junkies and Republican Party loyalists. Recently, Republican presidential candidate senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) paid homage to Goldberg’s interpretation by accusing the Democrats of being “the home of liberal fascism.”⁸⁵ It was as a Republican commentator, not as a scholar of fascism, that Goldberg achieved mass sales and obtained lucrative invitations to speak. The author achieved what he was hoping to
accomplish in a media culture. To paraphrase an old adage, nothing succeeds as thoroughly as success.

* The preface to the second edition might well be Bagehot’s most truly conservative commentary. There he insisted that there was nothing inherently just or moral about extending the vote, if it would weaken constitutional liberty and the quality of national leadership. Englishmen should not have been congratulating themselves on having a “newly enfranchised class.” As Bagehot put it:

We have not enfranchised a class less needing to be guided by their betters than the old class [of small property owners]; on the contrary, the new class needs it more than the old. The real question is, Will they submit to it, will they defer in the same way to wealth and rank, and to the higher qualities of which these are the rough symbols and the common accompaniments?²³

As a much younger person, I quoted these lines almost verbatim when the US Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.²⁴ Even while acknowledging that the black vote had been deliberately depressed for many decades in violation of the US Constitution, self-styled conservatives need not have rejoiced, which many of them did, that a massive black vote was being mobilized with federal assistance. One effect of that added vote was electoral support for laws and executive acts that reduced traditional restraints on the federal government. The Voting Rights Act also led to measures that increased government surveillance over what has be-come a greatly restricted liberty of association. Although Bagehot regarded the Reform Act of 1867 as almost unstoppable, he certainly didn’t believe that sanctified its passage.²⁵ Nor did Bagehot equate “justice” with extensions of the franchise,
particularly if the effect of the widened suffrage would be a leap into the dark. The Reform Act was something that he knew he and his allies could not hold back, but as an advocate of “rule by the best,” he was justified in questioning what he viewed as a falling away from his ideal.

Posted in Paul Gottfried | Comments Off on Revisions and Dissents: Essays

Maoism: A Global History

Julia Lovell writes in her 2019 book:

* After 1949, the book’s [Red Star Over China] message would come full circle. Even though Mao himself never showed any desire to go back to Yan’an, the symbolic birthplace of Maoism, he was so enamoured of his idealised vision – expressed in Red Star – of a cooperative, self-reliant Communist utopia in the north-west run on military lines that he tried to impose it across the whole of the country.80 Having originally been a polycentric phenomenon that was pragmatically adapted to suit each region of China in which it took root, Chinese Communism now became dangerously dogmatic. It was this loss of flexibility – the ‘one size fits all’ approach – that led to many of the tragedies from the 1950s onwards: the Great Leap Forward and its subsequent famine; and Mao’s attempt to resurrect this model in the Cultural Revolution. In designing his international PR, therefore, he also defined himself and his politics. Mao’s revolution ate many of those originally persuaded by Red Star’s Maoism: many of those seduced by the book’s rosy aura of democracy and patriotism would be persecuted and imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution.

And still Mao was not yet done with Snow: after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 and before his death in 1972, Snow would be permitted periodic, intensively regulated visits back to China, which in turn generated further influential books (one of which refuted reports of a famine that we now know killed tens of millions).82 These accounts had a disproportionate impact in a context of very limited world there? How were the people there planning and creating a model for a future China? Before Red Star Over China, we didn’t have a … vivid, concrete answer to this … Red Star was a shaft of fierce light, illuminating the way forward for young people struggling in the dark.’ Far beyond the Mao era, it evolved into a self-help manual: in 1989, one young man wrote an essay about how Red Star Over China had helped him through a diagnosis of colon cancer, and to realise his dream of becoming a writer.78

The depiction of strong women in Red Star was a particular inspiration to the second wave of Chinese feminism in the 1930s, encouraging young women to abandon their conventional domestic lives and head north-west. The younger daughter from a patriarchal Shanghai clan told of how she and her sisters – abandoned by feckless menfolk – were passed a copy of the book by a patriotic teacher. ‘I read it over and over; I couldn’t put it down. It told me about the Soviet area in China, where men and women lived equally; it opened new horizons for me … Because Snow was a foreign friend, we trusted that his reporting was the truth. Thanks to this, my and my sisters’ minds broke out of the apolitical prison of feudalism. We became patriots [and] CCP members.’79
After 1949, the book’s message would come full circle. Even though Mao himself never showed any desire to go back to Yan’an, the symbolic birthplace of Maoism, he was so enamoured of his idealised vision – expressed in Red Star – of a cooperative, self-reliant Communist utopia in the north-west run on military lines that he tried to impose it across the whole of the country.80 Having originally been a polycentric phenomenon that was pragmatically adapted to suit each region of China in which it took root, Chinese Communism now became dangerously dogmatic. It was this loss of flexibility – the ‘one size fits all’ approach – that led to many of the tragedies from the 1950s onwards: the Great Leap Forward and its subsequent famine; and Mao’s attempt to resurrect this model in the Cultural Revolution. In designing his international PR, therefore, he also defined himself and his politics. Mao’s revolution ate many of those originally persuaded by Red Star’s Maoism: many of those seduced by the book’s rosy aura of democracy and patriotism would be persecuted and imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution.81

And still Mao was not yet done with Snow: after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 and before his death in 1972, Snow would be permitted periodic, intensively regulated visits back to China, which in turn generated further influential books (one of which refuted reports of a famine that we now know killed tens of millions).82 These accounts had a disproportionate impact in a context of very limited foreign reporting on China, owing to the CCP’s stringent restrictions on access. In 1970, Mao deployed him (ineffectually, as it turned out) as intermediary to Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, while planning the sensational US–China détente of 1972 – a mere handful of years after the two countries had been on the brink of nuclear war. In public at least, Snow was the archetypal ‘friend of China’: a foreigner assiduously courted by the regime in the hope and expectation that, on his return home, he would speak for the merits of Mao’s revolution. On 15 February 1972, Snow died at the age of sixty-six, of pancreatic cancer, in Switzerland – the country in which he had taken refuge after McCarthyism made it impossible for him to earn a living in the US. Mao and Zhou had sent a delegation of doctors and officials – including his old friend Huang Hua – to stay with him, while he slipped into a coma and out of this world.

Given what we now know about the Chinese revolution, Snow and his book should perhaps have been treated more sceptically across the decades – Red Star’s significance as a document of a particular historical moment notwithstanding. Examined from a contemporary perspective, Snow is an awkward, compromised figure, both happy-go-lucky Boys’ Own adventurer and defender of implacable revolutionaries. Often read as a paean to simple, pure idealism, his most famous book was ensnared in murkier motivations: his own need to manufacture a global hit, his left-wing leanings, the ambitions and manipulations of his hosts. Nonetheless, he remains acclaimed by Chinese and Western commentators, as the ‘masterful’ author of ‘probably the greatest book of reporting by an American foreign correspondent in [the twentieth] century’.83

Red Star is a powerful emblem of the international Mao cult: of the translatability of Mao and his ideas, both within, on the periphery of and far beyond China. To those suffering violent occupation by militarily superior foes (Soviet partisans, for example, or Malayan Chinese during the Second World War), it offered a populist military and political strategy, and the inspiring example of a self-made man (Mao). Young European, American and Indian students and subversives of the 1960s fell in love with Mao the rebel – earthy, poetic, statesmanlike. The book and its afterlives exemplify the way that Maoism has always been defined by its global travels.

* In 1951, Edward Hunter, a foreign correspondent and sometime CIA stringer, published Brain-washing in Red China: The Calculated Destruction of Men’s Minds.1 The book promised to expose the ‘new and horrifying extremes in … psychological warfare being waged against the free world and against the very concept of freedom’. Hunter claimed that he had discovered an entirely new form of thought control unleashed on the world by the Chinese Communist Party after taking power in 1949. It was anti-American, fiercely coercive and ambitious for a total change in mental state – menticide, as it was sometimes termed; mind murder.2 The Chinese, Hunter declared, had achieved ‘psychological warfare on a scale incalculably more immense than any militarist of the past has ever envisaged’.3 In 1956, he made another bid for royalties with a follow-up tome, Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who Defied It.

Hunter had found his vocation: propagating the idea of a global conspiracy by the Chinese Communists to ‘brainwash’ anyone who fell into their power. Through the 1950s, he would repackage his ideas in books, lectures, articles and testimonies to Congress. By the end of the decade, the US government and intelligence agencies would be devoting billions of dollars and myriads of hours into researching these techniques of mind control and reverse-engineering them for use by the US military-industrial complex.
Outwardly, Hunter enjoyed a successful career in American journalism. But with hindsight his life’s work represents calamitous failure – the ability of rank amateurism and ignorance to sway opinion at the highest levels of Cold War policymaking in a nervy US. Hunter was neither psychiatrist nor psychologist, and he did not speak or read Chinese. His position as journalist-spook raised – to put it mildly – some ethical issues. And yet in only a handful of years, his views on China and its psy-war against the ‘free world’ helped mould perceptions of Chinese Communism under Mao as an irresistibly expansionist doctrine. With the help of government officials, some opportunistic psychiatrists and a suggestible media, Hunter’s ideas about brainwashing became orthodoxy. The United States might possess – for the time being at least – the most advanced military weapons, but Mao’s China had something more menacing: the ability to bend the human mind to its will. And after China’s involvement in two hot conflicts of the early Cold War – the Korean War and the Malayan Emergency – had brought Mao’s revolution into overt and covert conflict with the United States and Britain, these suppositions appeared eminently plausible.

Bemusement, fear, loathing, and at times an alarmed respect – these were the emotions that Communist China generated in 1950s America. For much of the previous decade the US government had poured billions into China’s Nationalist, Guomindang, government. A political and military debacle had resulted.

* By 1956, psychologists given special access to military files on the US POWs in Korea had concluded that brainwashing did not exist, or at least that there was nothing particularly new in the thought reform that American prisoners had undergone: it was just repetitive persuasive coercion, under conditions of extreme physical stress (bitter cold and hunger).

* In the search for ways to understand and counter Communist interrogation, MK-Ultra experimented with truth drugs (mostly LSD, but also a speculative toxin extracted from the gall bladder of the Tanganyikan crocodile), hypnosis, brain concussion, lip-reading, jolting monkey brains with radio waves, and a remote-controlled cat.24 The fear of Chinese brainwashing thus provided a justification for MK-Ultra’s years of peak crazy, during which the CIA – according to two of the sharpest historians of the US brainwashing terror – threw ‘untold excrescences’ of cash at ‘black psychiatry’.25 In the early 1950s, the CIA bought up the world’s supply of LSD, in order to carry out clinical experiments concerning its effects on a variety of human and non-human subjects. It placed stockpiles of the drug in hospitals attached to America’s top universities, and once word got around about the trials, swarms of students volunteered as guinea pigs. Researchers began taking the drug home to give to friends or sell on the black market. The CIA’s open-handedness with the drug also had far more tragic consequences. In late November 1953, Frank Olson – a microbiologist in the CIA – killed himself ten days after his boss secretly spiked his glass of Cointreau with LSD, triggering psychosis and a nervous breakdown.26
None of this would have been possible without the conviction, sunk deep into the intelligence professions, that brainwashing – total mind control – was possible.

The perceived threat of Chinese ‘thought reform’ thus empowered one of the more powerful and anti-democratic institutions of post-war American government and society: counter-intelligence. By the 2010s, the machinery of America’s covert state was costing $75 billion, spread between sixteen intelligence agencies, all devoted to ‘the state of exception’: ‘the paradoxical suspension of democracy as a means of saving democracy’.

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The Varieties Of The Orthodox Experience

* Those Orthodox Jews who burn with passion. These amount to no fewer than 25% of the frum Jews I know.
* Those who have never experienced any other way of living. All of their friends and family are Orthodox. They likely feel they have no choice (because of God or social sanction). They may have invested so much in living frum they won’t consider changing.
* Those who wanted to slough off an unwanted self and begin again. These are converts and baalei teshuva and are frequently high in neuroticism. These are the type of Orthodox Jews who are most likely to leave, about half of them do in my experience. Many of those who stay have never succeeded at anything until they found Orthodoxy and so they stay Orthodox because it gives them self-esteem.
* Those who like the Orthodox way of life.
* Professional Jews aka Jews who make their living from Orthodox Judaism.
* Pragmatic Jews who stay Orthodox for the sake of their marriage, their business, their friendships, their family relationships.
* Those who are temperamentally Orthodox, they live best under its strictures. They may have OCD.

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American Social Class Markers

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How Do You Spot Toxic People?

Here are some highlights from the excellent Jackson MacKenzie book, Psychopath Free (Expanded Edition): Recovering from Emotionally Abusive Relationships With Narcissists, Sociopaths, and Other Toxic People:

1. Gaslighting and crazy-making. They blatantly deny their own manipulative behavior and ignore evidence when confronted with it. They become dismissive and critical if you attempt to disprove their fabrications with facts. Instead of them actually addressing their inappropriate behavior, somehow it always becomes your fault for being “sensitive” and “crazy.” Toxic people condition you to believe that the problem problem isn’t the abuse itself, but instead your reactions to their abuse.

2. Cannot put themselves in your shoes, or anyone else’s, for that matter. You find yourself desperately trying to explain how they might feel if you were treating them this way, and they just stare at you blankly. You slowly learn not to communicate your feelings with them, because you’re usually met with silence or annoyance.

3. The ultimate hypocrite. “Do as I say, not as I do.” They have extremely high expectations for fidelity, respect, and adoration. After the idealization phase, they will give none of this back to you. They will cheat, lie, criticize, and manipulate. But you are expected to remain perfect, otherwise you will promptly be replaced and deemed unstable.

4. Pathological lying and excuses. There is always an excuse for everything, even things that don’t require excusing. They make up lies faster than you can question them. They constantly blame others—it is never their fault. They spend more time rationalizing their behavior than improving it. Even when caught in a lie, they express no remorse or embarrassment. Oftentimes, it almost seems as if they wanted you to catch them.

5. Focuses on your mistakes and ignores their own. If they’re two hours late, don’t forget that you were once five minutes late to your first date. If you point out their inappropriate behavior, they will always be quick to turn the conversation back on you. You might begin to adopt perfectionist qualities, very aware that any mistake can and will be used against you.

6. You find yourself explaining the basic elements of human respect to a full-grown man or woman. Normal people understand fundamental concepts like honesty and kindness. Psychopaths often appear to be childlike and innocent, but don’t let this mask fool you. No adult should need to be told how he or she is making other people feel.

7. Selfishness and a crippling thirst for attention. They drain the energy from you and consume your entire life. Their demand for adoration is insatiable. You thought you were the only one who could make them happy, but now you feel that anyone with a beating pulse could fit the role. However, the truth is: no one can fill the void of a psychopath’s soul.

8. Accuses you of feeling emotions that they are intentionally provoking. They call you jealous after blatantly flirting with an ex—often done over social networking for the entire world to see. They call you needy after intentionally ignoring you for days on end. They use your manufactured reactions to garner sympathy from other targets, trying to prove how “hysterical” you’ve become. You probably once considered yourself to be an exceptionally easygoing person, but an encounter with a psychopath will (temporarily) turn that notion upside down.

9. You find yourself playing detective. It’s never happened in any other relationship, but suddenly you’re investigating the person you once trusted unconditionally. If they’re active on Facebook, you start scrolling back years on their posts and albums. Same with their ex. You’re seeking answers to a feeling you can’t quite explain.

10. You are the only one who sees their true colors. No matter what they do, they always seem to have a fan club cheering for them. The psychopath uses these people for money, resources, and attention—but the fan club won’t notice, because this person strategically distracts them with shallow praise. Psychopaths are able to maintain superficial friendships far longer than relationships.

11. You fear that any fight could be your last. Normal couples argue to resolve issues, but psychopaths make it clear that negative conversations will jeopardize the relationship, especially ones regarding their behavior. Any of your attempts to improve communication will typically result in the silent treatment. You apologize and forgive quickly, otherwise you know they’ll lose interest in you.

12. Slowly and steadily erodes your boundaries. They criticize you with a condescending, joking sort of attitude. They smirk when you try to express yourself. Teasing becomes the primary mode of communication in your relationship. They subtly belittle your intelligence and abilities. If you point this out, they call you sensitive and crazy. You might begin to feel resentful and upset, but you learn to push away those feelings in favor of maintaining the peace.

13. They withhold attention and undermine your self-esteem. After once showering you with nonstop attention and admiration, they suddenly seem completely bored by you. They treat you with silence and become very annoyed that you’re interested in continuing the passionate relationship that they created. You begin to feel like a chore to them.

14. They expect you to read their mind. If they stop communicating with you for several days, it’s your fault for not knowing about the plans they never told you about. There will always be an excuse that makes them out to be the victim to go along with this. They make important decisions about the relationship and they inform everyone except you.

15. You feel on edge around this person, but you still want them to like you. You find yourself writing off most of their questionable behavior as accidental or insensitive, because you’re in constant competition with others for their attention and praise. They don’t seem to care when you leave their side—they can just as easily move on to the next source of energy.

16. An unusual number of “crazy” people in their past. Any ex-partner or friend who did not come crawling back to them will likely be labeled jealous, bipolar, an alcoholic, or some other nasty smear. Make no mistake: they will speak about you the same way to their next target.

17. Provokes jealousy and rivalries while maintaining their cover of innocence. They once directed all of their attention to you, which makes it especially confusing when they begin to withdraw and focus on other people. They do things that constantly make you doubt your place in their heart. If they’re active on social media, they’ll bait previously denounced exes with old songs, photos, and inside jokes. They attend to the “competition’s” activity and ignore yours.

18. Idealization, love-bombing, and flattery. When you first meet, things move extremely fast. They tell you how much they have in common with you—how perfect you are for them. Like a chameleon, they mirror your hopes, dreams, and insecurities in order to form an immediate bond of trust and excitement. They constantly initiate communication and seem to be fascinated with you on every level. If you have a Facebook page, they might plaster it with songs, compliments, poems, and inside jokes.

19. Compares you to everyone else in their life. They compare you to ex-lovers, friends, family members, and your eventual replacement. When idealizing, they make you feel special by telling you how much better you are than these people. When devaluing, they use these comparisons to make you feel jealous and inferior.

20. The qualities they once claimed to admire about you suddenly become glaring faults. At first, they appeal to your deepest vanities and vulnerabilities, observing and mimicking exactly what they think you want to hear. But after you’re hooked, they start to use these things against you. You spend more and more time trying to prove yourself worthy to the very same person who once said you were perfect.

21. Cracks in their mask. There are fleeting moments when the charming, cute, innocent persona is replaced by something else entirely. You see a side to them that never came out during the idealization phase, and it is a side that’s cold, inconsiderate, and manipulative. You start to notice that their personality just doesn’t add up—that the person you fell in love with doesn’t actually seem to exist.

22. Easily bored. They are constantly surrounded by other people, stimulated and praised at all times. They can’t tolerate being alone for an extended period of time. They become quickly uninterested by anything that doesn’t directly impact them in a positive or thrilling way. At first, you might think they’re exciting and worldly, and you feel inferior for preferring familiarity and consistency.

23. Triangulation. They surround themselves with former lovers, potential mates, and anyone else who provides them with added attention. This includes people that the psychopath may have previously denounced and declared you superior to. This makes you feel confused and creates the perception that the psychopath is in high demand at all times.

24. Covert abuse. From an early age, most of us were taught to identify physical mistreatment and blatant verbal insults, but with psychopaths, the abuse is not so obvious. You likely won’t even understand that you were in an abusive relationship until long after it’s over. Through personalized idealization and subtle devaluation, a psychopath can effectively erode the identity of any chosen target. From an outsider’s perspective, you will appear to have “lost it,” while the psychopath calmly walks away, completely unscathed.

25. Pity plays and sympathy stories. Their bad behavior always has sob-story roots. They claim to behave this way because of an abusive ex, an abusive parent, or an abusive cat. They say that all they’ve ever wanted is some peace and quiet. They say they hate drama—and yet there’s more drama surrounding them than anyone you’ve ever known.

26. The mean and sweet cycle. Sometimes they shower you with attention, sometimes they ignore you, sometimes they criticize you. They treat you differently in public than they do behind closed doors. They could be talking about marriage one day and breaking up the next. You never know where you stand with them. As my morning-coffee friend Rydia wrote: “They put forth as little effort as possible and then step it up when you try to disengage.”

27. This person becomes your entire life. You’re spending more of your time with them and their friends, and less time with your own support network. They’re all you think and talk about anymore. You isolate yourself in order to make sure you’re available for them. You cancel plans and eagerly wait by the phone for their next communication. For some reason, the relationship seems to involve a lot of sacrifices on your end, but very few on theirs.

28. Arrogance. Despite the humble, sweet image they presented in the early stages, you start to notice an unmistakable air of superiority about them. They talk down to you as if you are intellectually deficient and emotionally unstable. They have no shame when it comes to flaunting new targets after the breakup, ensuring that you see how happy they are without you.

29. Backstabbing gossip that changes on a whim. They plant little seeds of poison, whispering about everyone, idealizing them to their face, and then complaining about them behind their backs. You find yourself disliking or resenting people you’ve never even met. For some reason, you might even feel special for being the one he or she complains to. But once the relationship turns sour, they’ll run back to everyone they once insulted to you, lamenting about how crazy you’ve become.

30. Your feelings. Your natural love and compassion has transformed into overwhelming panic and anxiety. You apologize and cry more than you ever have in your life. You barely sleep, and you wake up every morning feeling anxious and unhinged. You have no idea what happened to your old relaxed, fun, easygoing self. After a run-in with a psychopath, you will feel insane, exhausted, drained, shocked, and empty. You tear apart your entire life—spending money, ending friendships, and searching for some sort of reason behind it all.

Related links:

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/romance-redux/201306/5-early-warning-signs-youre-narcissist
https://openpsychometrics.org/tests/NPI/ (I got 15 out of 40)
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/romance-redux/201309/can-narcissists-change
My posts on narcissism: https://lukeford.net/blog/?cat=2311
My NPD diagnosis: https://www.lukeford.net/luke_ford/bio/l17.htm
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/romance-redux/201309/can-narcissists-change
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/in-practice/201506/5-ways-dial-down-narcissism
https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/qa/what-are-treatments-for-narcissistic-personality-disorder

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Fascism: The Career Of A Concept

Here are some highlights from this 2016 book by Paul Gottfried:

* I should mention an irritant without which this book would not have been conceived. While listening to TV and reading newspapers from both here and western Europe, I noticed that news reporter and news interpreter referred to what displeased them as “fascist” or “playing with fascism.” Most of these references had nothing to do with
the historic phenomenon known as fascism and were instead attempts to excite the audience by linking the speaker’s or the writer’s current peeve to some long-ago unpleasantness. This semantic abuse seemed to be so widespread that when a friend (who is now, unfortunately, deceased) suggested that I write about it, I proceeded to do exactly that. Although I doubt the appearance of this book will have any effect in lessening the abuse in question, my reaction to the misuse of the term fascism caused me to undertake an ambitious task that would not likely have been begun without the stimulant described.

* This study will examine the semantic twists and turns undergone by the word fascism since the 1930s. Like other terms that have changed their meaning, such as conservatism and liberalism, fascism has been applied so arbitrarily that it may be difficult to deduce what it means without knowing the mindset of the speaker. Fascism now stands for a host of iniquities that progressives, multiculturalists, and libertarians all oppose, even if they offer no single, coherent account of what they’re condemning. Some intellectuals and publicists may be demonstratively antifascist but feel no obligation to provide a historically and conceptually delimited definition of their object of hate.

Certain factors have contributed to this imprecision, perhaps most of all the equation of all fascisms with Nazism and Adolf Hitler’s efforts to exterminate European Jewry, subjugate Slavs, and conquer the Eurasian landmass. This equation has come from serious historians as well as partisan publicists. German intellectual and cultural historian Ernst Nolte famously characterized Nazism as “radical fascism” while insisting that German National Socialism resembled conceptually more generic forms of fascism. All fascisms, according to Nolte, have the same characteristics, which can be uncovered by selectively adapting the Marxist analysis of the revolutionary Right. Fascist movements were “counterrevolutionary imitations of leftist revolution” that developed as reactions to the danger of leftist upheavals.¹ In the German case, this counterrevolutionary development became particularly nasty since it was a reaction to Stalinist communism that took over the murderous policies of its adversary. It was the physical proximity of the Soviet communist experiment, the detailed knowledge of Stalin’s crimes in interwar Germany, and the disproportionate role of Jews in advancing the Soviet cause that contributed to the virulence of German “radical fascism.”²

Nolte, however, became a moving target for the academic and journalistic establishment in Germany when he denied the “uniqueness” (Einzigartigkeit) of Nazi tyranny. In his writings he compared Hitlerism to other brutal anticommunist dictatorships.

* I think the term fascist has a specific historical meaning and should not be hurled at anyone who holds what are now unpopular opinions. As a historic phenomenon, fascism has nothing to do with advocating an isolationist foreign policy, trying to restrict Third World immigration, or favoring significant income redistribution in order to achieve greater social equality. I mention these associations because all of them are characteristic of recent, divergent attempts to identify fascism with whatever the speaker happens to dislike—and then belaboring his or
her target with the accusation of sympathizing with Nazi atrocities. I also deny that I am trying to exculpate Muslim terrorists or European politicians who offend the media simply because I decline to call them fascists. Rather, I refuse to mislabel political actors as representing an ideology that has mostly come and gone.

* Examinations of fascism operate on two levels: a scholarly one that remains isolated from partisan causes, and a journalistic one that is less refined but may be gaining ground.

* Nazism was at least as murderous as Soviet communism but not as economically and culturally controlling.

* Christian Democratic German Chancellor Angela Merkel traveled to Moscow several years ago on the occasion of a celebration of Russia’s victory in the Second World War to thank the Red Army for “liberating my country from fascism.”¹²

Although Merkel had supported the German Democratic Republic until shortly before its collapse, she later became the head of what is considered to be the center-right party in Germany. Her obeisance to East Germany’s former Soviet masters caused her no noticeable problems in gaining control over her party and rising to the political top
in the German Federal Republic. Merkel represents the now-dominant view in Germany that fascism equals Nazism and that Stalin “liberated” Germany in the Second World War. The mass rapes and murders committed by the Red Army and the subsequent despotism imposed on the eastern and central parts of Germany by the Soviets are no longer relevant. They have been airbrushed out of the anti­fascist account of modern history.

* According to Critical Theorists who, in interwar Germany, set out to combine a Marxist revolutionary alternative to bourgeois capitalist culture with a Freudian understanding of sexual repression, fascism was the outgrowth of an unreconstructed repressive society based on “authoritarianism.” In the anthology The Authoritarian Personality (1950), put together by two leading representatives of the Frankfurt School in exile in the United States, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, there is both a far-reaching commentary on American life and sweeping proposals for
addressing the fascist peril.¹³ It was not enough, according to these social theorists, to have parliamentary forms of government in order to avert psychic and political tyranny. It was also necessary to enact sweeping socioeconomic change, together with a reconstruction of family and gender relations, to stave off a fascist triumph. Wherever sexual repression, gender inequities, homophobia, and inequitable distribution of income are allowed to endure, there supposedly exists a fertile ground for fascism. This evil must be understood, or so the
Frankfurt School argued, as a planned reaction to the Left’s attempt to erect an erotically fulfilled, socialist society.

* The polar opposite view was expressed by Nolte, namely, that fascists were “escaping transcendence” as the form of history preached by the Left. In place of this secularized millenarianism, fascists offered the prospect of struggle that would culminate in a hardened human type and, in the near term, the defeat of an internationalist leftist adversary.²⁰ Fascism proposed a naturalistic explanation of human nature and politics, which was dictated by the historical situation that the fascists faced.²¹ They were opposing an ideology that was predicated on global transformation, and so fascists countered it with an anti-utopian anthropology that was intended to depict people as they actually were—that is, combative and in need of authority, as opposed to how the Left might have wished to see the human race.

* One perceptive reader of this text has noticed that my illustrations of fascism in political practice are extremely limited and center almost entirely on Mussolini’s regime. This was not an oversight. There are just no other examples of generic fascism in practice that this author and other researchers on my subject have been able to come up with. If one discounts clerical fascist regimes, such as the ones briefly tried by Engelbert Dollfuss in Austria during the interwar years and Antonio Salazar’s New Order in Portugal, which were essentially Catholic authoritarian governments, and the puppet governments imposed on conquered countries by Nazi Germany, it is hard to think of real examples of fascism in practice beyond interwar Italy.

The Nazis ran a highly eclectic totalitarian operation, which borrowed from fascism as well as Stalinism and, perhaps most of all, from Hitler’s feverish imagination. Although experiments such as Juan Peron’s rule in Argentina borrowed features of European fascist movements when fascism seemed in season, they also drew from other anti-American forces, often for decorative effect. Authoritarian military leaders like Francisco Franco and Ion Antonescu made expedient pacts with homegrown fascist movements but were delighted to dump these allies at the first opportunity. Nor should readers be swayed by efforts to tar governments that journalists disapprove of as “fascist.” Although certain regimes may not enjoy media approval, this hardly attests to their fascist pedigree.

As a young, impressionable person, I was told by a family friend that an opera singer whose voice I greatly admired had become a “fascist.” When I asked whether this singer was a devotee of Mussolini or José Antonio, I was told that the opera singer had recently converted to Catholicism. Our family friend, who was a militant atheist, equated a singer’s religious conversion with an affirmation of the most extreme form of fascist enthusiasm.

* The most prominent German historian of fascism, Ernst Nolte, has characterized the fascist movements of the interwar years as a “counterrevolutionary imitation of the revolutionary Left.” …According to this view, fascism had no autonomous existence apart from the critical situation that gave rise to it. It was inseparably related to the interwar period and to the threat to the bourgeois order that then existed… Unlike Marxism and Christianity, fascism was an essentially reactive movement, and its oppositional nature could be grasped most clearly by looking at its “escape from transcendence.”³

* [James] Gregor thought that fascism endangered liberal institutions precisely because it offered persuasive arguments about human nature, the economy, international relations, and the corruptness of parliamentary institutions. A prolific historian of fascism, Gregor has been criticized by the Left because he makes fascists look more reasonable and more ethically motivated than most intellectuals would like to believe… Gregor treats fascism as an infectious variation of Marxism. It is a revolutionary socialist movement in which the nation is substituted for the working class and in which socialist collectivism is preserved without the dream of an economically liberated humankind.

* This leads readers back to the question of whether we can determine a fascist essence in interwar Europe. If there is such an essence, then neither racism nor anti-Semitism necessarily belonged to it. There were fascist movements in which these characteristics were secondary or nonexistent. Moreover, not all fascists were Christian traditionalists or neo-pagans or secularists. The same movements sometimes contained all three. Nor would it be correct to say that all fascist movements admired Hitler or that all governments that cooperated with Hitler fit the fascist grid.

* Habsburg monarchist Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn viewed the Left as lurching from the French Revolution and Robespierre to Hitler and the Third Reich. According to Kuehnelt-Leddihn, modern democracy teems with totalitarian dangers, and only to the extent that we accept a traditional ruling order and nineteenth-century constitutional limits on popular rule can we avoid the Left’s assault on authority.

* From this perspective all attacks on traditional authorities are necessarily leftist because the true Right is coterminous with responsible, hereditary sovereigns and a nineteenth-century parliamentary system. The scholar of international relations George F. Kennan made the same distinction and viewed revolutionary governments, no matter what they called themselves, as belonging on
the Left.

* From the standpoint of the pre–World War I ruling class, Fascists, Nazis, Social Democrats, and Bolsheviks all came out of the Left.

* Fascists rose to prominence and often power as the adversaries of leftist internationalism, equality, and any form of capitalism that worked against the organic unity of the nation. If fascists were against the free flow of capital and unregulated economic growth, they took these positions as anticapitalists of the Right.

* The Catholic authoritarian Carl Schmitt considered democratic constitutions to “represent the dynamic emergence of political unity and the ever renewable development of this unity springing from an underlying source of energy. The state should be regarded not as something enduring or static but as an entity that remained in a situation of becoming. Out of conflicting interests, opinions, and aspiration, political unity must constitute itself daily.

Schmitt’s association of popular rule with “homogeneity” and a “unified will” is not a call for social engineering from the Left. It is a veiled plea for a plebiscitary reconstruction of an organic community led, preferably, by a dynamic executive embodying the will and energy of a unified people. Schmitt sets apart this regime from a monarchy, in which the popular will is incidental to rule, and from a “nineteenth century liberal order,” in which legal norms, not cohesive peoples, hold sway. Schmitt, whose authoritarian ideas often leaned toward Latin fascism, regarded the continuity of national communities as the “existential ground” for democratic constitutions. This kind of state would not likely favor a free market economy or be primarily concerned with individual rights. But it would value service and solidarity and reflect an already formed nation, as opposed to an aggregation of individuals or the international proletariat.

* fascists did not carry out, or in most cases even try to incite, a socioeconomic revolution.

* Hitler was a revolutionary modernizer, but it is significant that he appointed as his first economic minister the very pro-capitalist economist Hjalmar Schacht (1877–1970). Schacht warned against the policy of subsidizing farms and business enterprises that other countries hit by the Depression were pursuing. Because of Schacht’s advice, the Nazi state eschewed the payment of such staples of the American New Deal as farm subsidies. Schacht, who mocked Nazi ideology and leaned
heavily toward the free market, would have been inconceivable in Stalin’s Russia.⁷² The reason is certainly not that the Nazis were nice people. They were simply not as concerned as Stalin or Mao with collectivizing the economy and, although equally murderous, were less ideologically programmed.

* Fascism and the revolutionary Left that it faced between the two wars are not eternally present forces but came to oppose each other in a particular time and place.

* Treating any Right or any nationalism as identical to the one that engaged in the ideological battle of interwar Europe opens the door to methodological abuses. Among these abuses, and indeed the most conspicuous one, has been the supposed discovery of a ubiquitous fascist danger. Emotional predispositions are imagined to furnish a sufficient cause for why fascist movements arise and flourish.

* An incisive article by two representatives of the New Left, Les K. Adler and T. G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism (1930s to 1950s),” documents how the view of fascism established in the United States during the Second World War was later transferred to the Soviets.¹³ A preconstructed image of an anti-American, or anti-Western, adversary was made to apply to a former ally that, contrary to wartime propaganda, proved to be far less benevolent than the Western powers had once chosen to view it.

* Perhaps Arendt’s most original perception, beyond her description of how totalitarian states function, is found in her comments about how totalitarians approach “science” and “factualness.” They feel no compunctions about distorting reality, because making their subjects believe in what is patently false increases the state’s power. The Nazi and Soviet governments cynically presented lies as scholarship, and they mixed partial truths with glaring falsehoods (about class enemies or about those who were racially compatible or incompatible) in order to establish total power over their subjects’ minds. Here all ideological distinctions broke down before the exercise of might and terror without regard for truth or traditional authority.

[Luke: All societies sanction the open stating of truths, not just totalitarian societies.]

* People sometimes equate the ghastly mass murders and territorial aggressiveness of the Nazi regime with a high degree of internal control. But the two conditions did not necessarily go together. Hitler killed tens of millions of people and overran other countries, but internally his government was nowhere as controlling as Stalin’s Russia. Up until World War II, Germans, including German Jews, were allowed to leave the Third Reich. The economy, if we exclude such crimes as the confiscation of Jewish property and property and assets belonging to opponents of the Nazi state, was far more open than the economy in Soviet Russia. Equally noteworthy is that the Nazi government became increasingly indifferent to what went on in German universities.²⁷ The earlier enthusiasm displayed by Nazi officials who were hoping to make academic centers into showcases of party propaganda eventually fizzled out.

* At least at the journalistic and hortatory level, fascism is further defined with reference to its most vicious (but not particularly mainstream) manifestation. All fascism is now habitually explained with reference to its Nazi embodiment, which combined mass murder with ethnic cleansing and a stubborn resistance to human progress. This identification of all varieties of fascism and, finally, all rightist or non- leftist authoritarian governments with Nazism came less from critical assessments than from other, less scholarly considerations. As the political culture began to change drastically in the 1960s, older
interpretive perspectives were replaced by an approach to the recent past that focused exclusively on victims of the Right.

This sea change was aided by the rise of the New Left, which interpreted fascism as anything that opposed social transformation. The New Left drew support from another development that was occurring simultaneously—the elevation of the Holocaust to the most decisive event in all of Jewish history. The memory of Nazi persecution served to unify Jews at a time when their religious cohesion was eroding. Although those who expressed this overriding concern with fascism both past and present might not have agreed on other issues, e.g., Middle Eastern politics, they did share an interest in combating fascism, which became, in their minds, indistinguishable from Nazi atrocities and the fear that such outrages could be repeated.

It was thereafter widely assumed that fascism, however one might define it, was a far worse threat to humanity than communism, and certain changes on the international scene hastened the acceptance of this belief. Soviet tyranny had already begun to thaw, and although there were other communist regimes that were engaging in mass murder, they were mostly in the Third World. The failings of these oppressive governments were blamed either on the birth pangs of postcolonial governments trying to shake off the effects of Western imperialism or else on supposedly right wing American administrations that pursued a neocolonial war in what had been Indochina. The birthing hour had struck for a new form of antifascism, and the largely post-Marxist Left from whence this antifascism came was correct about one critical detail: historical fascism was indeed a creation of the Right, although, contrary to what the New Left believed, a Right that had once existed but which now only survived in vestigial form.

* Rather than following Freud by acknowledging that the repression and redirection of primal urges was necessary for human civilization, some members of the Frankfurt School, most famously Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), and Erich Fromm (1900–1980), imagined that there could be a future in which sexual fantasies and social needs were both satisfied. This erotically and materially satisfying world could only be achieved, however, by putting an end to advanced capitalism. According to the Frankfurt School, this “irrational” economy perpetuated unfair human inequalities and forced its victims to repress and pervert their natural desires in order to survive in a system of domination over which they had no control.

* Adorno’s longtime preoccupation with twelve-tone music and his war on what was merely “beautiful” reflected his quest for art forms that nurtured the revolutionary spirit. Adorno regarded culture as an instrument for radical change, and those antiquarian forms of it that soothed or carried snob value he judged to be, in the customary Marxist phrase, objectively reactionary. Adorno, who founded the original Frankfurt School with his lifetime collaborator Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), not only commented on music from his iconoclastic stance but also produced what he deemed suitably atonal compositions for piano.

* The main ideas of TAP [The Authoritarian Personality] had an equally dramatic effect on Germans, who were then being reeducated by their conquerors. In postwar Germany a linkage between antifascism and antinationalism would be established that endures down to the present… This German preoccupation with ridding society of the historic Right, compounded with the need to apologize for the German past, including phases of that past going back well before the Nazi takeover, testifies to the success story of postwar German reeducation. In the Allied occupation zones, particularly in the American and British ones, persistent, organized efforts were made to identify not only hard-core Nazis and Nazi collaborators but those who were thought to be predisposed to fascist thinking. Germans were required to answer detailed questionnaires (Fragebogen) in order to determine not only their possible association with the defeated regime but their social and political attitudes.²³ Licenses to publish newspapers and books were issued on the basis of the same considerations, and those who were suspected of being anticommunist or harboring nationalist sentiments usually had their requests summarily turned down. The Allied authorities heavily censored teaching materials and scheduled public lessons about the evils of the recent German past. Thus the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals were staged to advance public reeducation inside and outside of Germany. This process of changing German minds through foreign control went on longer than is usually recognized. Although the non–Soviet-controlled parts of what remained of Germany were allowed to form a constitutional state under Allied supervision by 1949, the Allied High Commission oversaw the Germans until 1955.²⁴ And even after this point, full sovereignty was not internationally recognized until after the unification of Germany in 1991.

Beginning with the occupation and with increasing diligence since the late 1960s, an extensive plan has been put into effect in Germany for helping its population “overcome their past.” This process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung has assumed different forms, from critically reassessing German national heroes and cultural achievements to finding Hitler’s tyranny and murders foreshadowed in the national past. Integral to this ritualized self-examination has been a concern with the psychic aspects of fascism and any disposition that might betray a fascist mentality.

Social psychologists entered wartime discussions by explaining how Germans and others could be relieved of their fascist psychic burden. The father of Gestalt psychology, Kurt Lewin, who came to the United States as a Jewish refugee, went about lecturing on how the Germans had to be psychically recoded in order to overcome their fascist-prone dispositions. In 1943 New York psychology professor Richard Brickner published a best-selling book introduced by anthropologist Margaret Mead in response to the question “Can the Germans be cured?” If healing was possible, Brickner told his readers, it would take massive effort on the part of the eventually victorious democratic side to make it happen.²⁵ The political activist and poet Archibald MacLeish prevailed on the Organization of Strategic Services (OSS), then still in its early stages, to allow him and a team of experts that MacLeish had assembled to come up with a plan to reeducate the Germans once the Allies won the war.²⁶
The ones who came to lead this psychic crusade against fascism were the Frankfurt School exiles who were already in the United States.

* As an interpreter of German history, Habermas has stressed what is “pedagogically helpful” in enabling Germans to reconstruct their society. He is less concerned with the factual content of what should be studied than with providing moral edification. It was in this spirit that Habermas approached his widely publicized dispute with Nolte in the late 1980s about “comparing the unique evil of [the] Nazi regime” to Stalin’s tyranny.³⁰ Habermas’s assault on Nolte and his later unwillingness to debate his opponent underscored his single-minded dedication to “democratic instruction.” Germany’s self-appointed preceptor was indignant that Nolte was ignoring “democratic” concerns by placing recent German history in a broader European context. In his rejoinder to Nolte, Habermas deals only peripherally with the factual or structural validity of his adversary’s comparisons. For him and other Germans who share his outlook, history is a behavioral tool—and only secondarily about trying to understand the past objectively.

Habermas has also undertaken to arrange for “nonhegemonic” discourse around rules that he provides without reference to a German, Christian, or classical cultural inheritance. In this discourse the best argument is supposed to win, and all participants should be given an equal chance to test their assertions. According to one canny German commentator, however, “the leftist reality in Habermas’s real world turns out to be exactly the opposite. Nowhere as under the current German Left is an open discussion so severely hindered. Particularly through censorship that rages in leftist forums. Dissenting opinions and those who hold them are excoriated with charges of racism and fascism at the drop of a hat. Participants are allowed into the arranged discourse only if they hold the right opinion. Any heretic is unceremoniously banned.”

* Well-funded sociology departments in German universities were seen as tools for combating the reactionary tendencies of an older German society that had supposedly contributed to the Nazi disaster. A study by German historian Stefan Scheil documents the extent to which this development came out of the recommendations of refugee advisors who were attached to the American military command and, later, to the Allied High Commission.
The reestablishment of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in 1950 was not an isolated happening, as Scheil proves. It fit into a plan for German reeducation that was vigorously promoted by the American occupation, which privileged a particular concept of sociology.³⁶ A concerted effort was made to redefine the discipline, which had once been dominated in Germany by conservative nationalists like Hans Freyer or by Austrian defender of organic social relations Othmar Spann. The Allied occupational forces planned to place sociology into the hands of those who shared their goal of social transformation.

* Jean Marie Le Pen was no more of a Nazi for characterizing the killing or deporting of Jews in France during the German occupation as “a detail” of the war than Lionel Jospin was a Stalinist for refusing to acknowledge Stalin’s crime in the French Assembly when asked about them there in November 1998. Indeed, Le Pen never denied the Nazi genocide but tried to minimize its importance for French history. As even his journalistic adversaries admit, this eighty-five-year-old senior citizen who is perpetually trying to grab headlines in retirement after handing over his party to his daughter, Marine, has no documentable Nazi past. His family supported the Resistance, and until the general’s abandonment of the Algerian French, Le Pen was an admirer of de Gaulle.

* The publication of the The Black Book of Communism in 1997 by Stéphan Courtois was a well-calculated attempt to call the Left’s bluff. This exposé made it appear that it was the Left that suffered from amnesia about genocide if the crimes in question were committed by Marxist-Leninists. Indeed the “war against fascism” was a diversion from the Left’s unwillingness to “overcome its past” as apologists for Stalin, Mao, and other murderous dictators. This challenge set off a row, but given the
greater firepower of the antifascist Left, the outcome may have been foreordained. The offensive against neofascism would continue to advance.

* The NDP’s understating of Nazi atrocities understandably offends those who were the victims of Nazi tyranny (my own family included). And this practice has reinforced the party’s negative image while turning off potential voters. But measured analysis is different from antifascist grandstanding. Despite the harping of the German press and the official German parties on the dangers posed by the NDP, the party’s rhetorical disasters should not be equated with an attempt to resurrect the Third
Reich.⁵⁰ Nolte was right when he underlined the absurdity of comparing a party that is trying to rid Germany of American military bases and limit immigration to the aggressively expansionist, genocidal politics of the Third Reich.

* The famed legal theorist Carl Schmitt also stressed the advantage to the Germans and other Europeans of maintaining the Soviet-American “bipolarity” for as long as possible. Schmitt underlined the danger to a weakened Europe posed by American hegemony, and he lost no opportunity to point out the imperialist nature of American claims to represent “democratic ideas” thoughout the world.⁶⁰ Anti-Americanism was once more common within the postwar European Right than is now generally believed. It contributed to a growing skepticism about the concept of totalitarianism, which was seen as justifying an unwanted American military presence in Europe.
On the Left, however, there was also a third and even more compelling reason to reject the moral equation of Nazi and Soviet tyrannies. Already in the 1970s one found what Helmut Schelsky characterized as “the politics of moral indignation.” In his critical responses to Habermas as a social philosopher, Schelsky underscored the danger of privileging subjective conscience. It would lead to academic and constitutional suicide, according to Schelsky, if Habermas’s selective anger against thinking what he considered potentially fascistic or insufficiently critical of the German past were allowed to “didactically” shape our concepts of legality and social scientific inquiry.⁶¹
What Schelsky feared eventually came to pass, but the antifascism that dominated German political culture was based on guilt as well as moral anger.

* Having been present at the Nuremberg Trials, the authors [ German psychologists, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich] were permanently marked by this experience and devoted much of the remainder of their lives to combating the unresolved fascistic pathology that they ascribed to their people. Alexander would rage at any mention of the fate of those ethnic Germans who had been brutally expelled from eastern Europe after the war. Although the number of these refugees may have numbered as many as fifteen million, the Mitscherlichs deemed it “obscene” and “morally perverted” to bring up their ordeal.

* Even without quoting the remark attributed to Adorno that “writing poetry after the Holocaust is barbaric,” it is clear that both the fury directed against neofascism and the benign neglect of communist atrocities have some connection to the murder of approximately six million Jews by the Nazi regime. This is not even to take into account the slaying of Polish and Russian prisoners and other victims of the Third Reich, atrocities that have often been neglected in order to focus on Hitler’s “war against the Jews.” All these crimes are real enough but do not obviate the need to raise certain questions, which antifascists
willfully ignore. Do Nazi crimes make any less real the crimes committed by other totalitarian regimes, say Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China? Why are Germans not allowed to “mourn” their co-ethnics who were murdered or brutalized by postwar communist regimes or indiscriminately vengeful eastern Europeans?⁶⁴ Is it reprehensible for Germans to notice the firebombing of German civilian targets and the laying waste of entire inner cities by the Royal Air Force during the last year of World War II, when close to 600,000 mostly defenseless German civilians were incinerated?⁶⁵

German antifascists and kindred spirits in neighboring countries do not wish to call attention to such atrocities primarily for two reasons: they divert attention from German responsibility for the Holocaust, and even noticing inhumanities that should be overlooked, according to the arbiters of political culture, betokens “moral perversion.” It is therefore essential for analytic purposes to look at the Holocaust less as a grim historical event (although it was that) than as a flexible ideological symbol.⁶⁶

An insightful analyst of this subject, Peter Novick, dwells on the changing perception of the Holocaust among American Jews and
American Christians in The Holocaust in American Life.⁶⁷ After the Second World War, American Jews found no reason to dwell on Hitler’s genocidal policies. Those who had suffered under the Nazis generally avoided discussing their agonizing experiences, and Jewish nationalists were generally ashamed that Hitler’s victims had not resisted their enemies more forcefully. By the 1960s, however, interest in the Holocaust was growing perceptibly among both Jews and Christians. Jews began looking at their suffering as a kind of cement that could be used to hold together their already assimilating community. Zionists treated the
Holocaust as a justification of Israel’s existence and a bitter memory of persecution that might solidify support for Israel among American Jews. Moreover, while most historians previously (and rightly) viewed the Nazis as anti-Christian as well as anti-Jewish, since the 1960s the public has been awash in polemics blaming Christianity for the Holocaust.

* the belief that any rejection of the antifascist consensus indicates mental illness. The two often go together—that is, by
highlighting the historic guilt of one’s nation for Nazi crimes, one exhibits mental and emotional well-being. Mounting plaques
commémoratives on buildings in Paris, from whence Jews were rounded up under the Vichy regime, is seen to serve two purposes: making French mindful of a past that should not be psychologically repressed while highlighting the still polluting guilt of the historic French people for being entangled in Nazi misdeeds.

* antifascists have also shifted the burden of fascist guilt from the persecution of Jews under the Third Reich to more up-to-date
causes. Both the despisers and representatives of Muslim culture have been denounced as fascists, depending on the accuser’s purpose. Both Zionists and anti-Zionists have readily accused their antagonists of reviving Nazi programs and Nazi tactics in order to destroy newer and newer stand-ins for Hitler’s victims. In such exchanges for propagandistic effect, older distinctions and analyses have been thrown to the wind.

Terms like “totalitarianism” and “fascism,” for example, have no meaning at the political and journalistic level. They function as charges rather than as attempts to make sense of the history of Europe in the twentieth century. In this widening crusade against neofascism, all “insensitive” or unprogressive positions have been indiscriminately branded as fascistic. Be it opposition to Third World immigration, complaints about the high rate of crime among Muslim residents in European cities, or the drawing of cognitive distinctions among ethnic or social groups, anything deemed as politically offensive indicates a fascist recrudescence.

* Fascist movements could not move far enough away from their organic nationalist origins to become fundamentally different from how they began.

* Fascists were on the Right by virtue of having opposed the Left in theory and practice, but that was not the same as standing for a past that was already in decline. Fascists were not linked to any one social class and moved back and forth, as in Italy, when they tried to satisfy followers from varied social backgrounds. Finally, fascism was a situational rather than a theoretical movement. Unlike the Marxists, fascists did not claim to be teaching a scientific form of socialism held together by historical and economic laws.

* Fascists vigorously defended particularity and hierarchy, which rendered them theoretically and in practice the Left’s opponents.

* Common to all forms of fascism is a rejection of progress, or, more particularly, the kind of progress associated with the spread of equality and cultural and social homogenization. This does not mean that fascists shunned all change and wished to apply Luddite principles to industrial or medical developments. But they resisted the vision of human improvability preached by liberal democrats and revolutionary socialists and tried to put in its place an existential and social alternative.

* Nolte privileges… the vision of a biologically driven, continuing struggle among races and ethnicities. Although this vision took a disastrous turn under the Nazi regime, when used to justify genocidal policies, it assumed a more reflective, nonviolent form in such nineteenth-century writers as Count Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882) and Heinrich Gumplowicz (1838–1909). History, according to these thinkers, would lead not to a final happy age but to continuing ethnic struggle. The only interruption in this strife would come when one group won a decisive victory over another and could prolong its period of dominance. No victory was permanent, and each would give way in the end to a resumption of conflict.

What has been described as class war, noted Gumplowicz, typically reflected the hostility felt by warring sides who viewed themselves as ethnically opposed.²⁸ Gobineau had reached a similar conclusion when he interpreted the strife between the French aristocracy and the French Third Estate as masking an ethnic conflict between the noble descendants of Germanic warriors and the Celto-Roman population they had subdued… Without denying that the social conflicts stressed by the socialists were real, Gumplowicz subordinated them methodologically to the struggle between groups who viewed themselves as culturally and/or ethnically distinct. Although there is a journalistic and even academic tendency to draw straight lines between Gobineau and Gumplowicz and Nazi ideology, the distance between them is far greater. Focusing on ethnic conflict as the key to human history is not the same as advocating the mass murder of undesirable ethnic groups. Still, the view of history as determined by ethnic strife does mark a tradition of thought that influenced what Nolte defines as “radical fascism.”

* Fascism should interest readers not because it characterizes the present or is likely to dominate the future but because of what it once exemplified. It was a movement of the revolutionary Right, a force that now exists in the West as an isolated or only remotely approximated curiosity. The revolutionary Right does not belong in any way to conventional political discourse in Western countries. Today’s mainstream parties do not look like anything that could be described as “fascist” in any historic sense. Although this distancing from the fascist or quasi-fascist past may be ascribed to multiple causes, among these causes is undoubtedly a widespread horror of something that once bestrode the continental European stage. As a past to be avoided,
fascism still casts a long shadow, even if that term has been recklessly applied and even if it is increasingly hard to figure out how the current usages are related to the real past. But behind this bugaboo lies a semblance of reality in the sense that what is condemned once belonged to the Right in a way that the GOP or the German Christian Democrats definitely do not.

Fascism was not the only Right that existed in its time, and it is quite possible to recognize in someone like Charles de Gaulle, who fought the Nazi German invaders of his homeland, a truer conservative nationalist than those who rushed to collaborate with the Vichy government. Moreover, interwar political leaders like Horthy, Dollfuss, and Franco all came out of the non-fascist Right, and, as Payne observes, the authoritarian Right that claimed these personalities should not be confused with fascism. Although when push came to shove, authoritarian figures took on fascist trappings, they abandoned these
with relief as soon as the occasion presented itself.

* not all fascists or fascisants everywhere in Europe found themselves fighting on Hitler’s side. Some Poles, Belgians, French, and other Europeans who had been sympathetic to Italian or Spanish fascism fought Hitler’s armies when they invaded their countries. Those German rightists who wished to emulate Mussolini but distrusted Hitler were killed or scared into submission in 1934. But this did not help their reputations as nationalist enemies of the Third Reich. Anti-Nazi and non-Nazi fascists ended up in the same rogues’ gallery with Hitler and Himmler, just as the communists who had once served the Nazis during the period of the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact were rehabilitated as the world’s most reliable antifascists.

* Nolte has asked, somewhat waggishly, whether Western readers would think differently about Nazism if readers ceased to believe in present values. It is doubtful that most Western peoples would. First of all, the Nazis were too unappetizing to come back as a popular rage (although this defect has not kept Western intellectuals from apologizing for murderous communist regimes), and, secondly, the ethnic mixing in Western countries would make the acceptance of Nazi ideology as a public philosophy unthinkable as well as unworkable. There may be no alternative to the ideology of diversity given the way Western societies have evolved or been pushed in the last seventy years.

* Finally, there is no reason to believe that people would abandon deeply ingrained patterns of thought or myth, even if they came into conflict with empirical reality. One obvious reason that Nazism lost its appeal so rapidly after the defeat of the Nazi government was its fundamental incompatibility with what were then widely held beliefs in the Western world.

* First, one should define the Right contextually. Although the Right is always opposed to the Left, the enemy it is resisting may differ depending on time and circumstance. In Italy after the First World War or in Spain in the 1930s, fascists fought revolutionary socialists or anarchists (of the Left); in American society the Right (to whatever extent such an entity operates) defends the rights of citizens to arm themselves against a leftist state or else it insists on dismantling a welfare state, which
advances leftist social policies.

The current Right no longer defends the “State” for a very simple reason. Unlike its associations in certain interwar European countries with traditional authorities and inherited hierarchies, the present form of public administration is no longer associated with the Right. Politicians and journalists now talk about expanding equality and even creating a universal nation while celebrating Third World immigration and “cultural diversity.” The administrative state that is intended to further these
purposes is a modern democratic creation. It has little or nothing to do with what Gentile apostrophized as a spiritualized “ethical will.” Neither Gentile nor Friedrich Stahl was acting as a forerunner of George W. Bush or Barack Obama when he spoke about “the State.”

Secondly, there is nothing inherently right-wing about glorifying individual rights and certainly not human appetites. European
conservatives have traditionally identified individualism with the Left, which is at war with inherited community. Since the early twentieth century, however, critics of the welfare state have turned to the language of individual rights as a remedy against the overreach of the centralized state. This is a weapon that is found in the American Bill of Rights and one that social traditionalists in the United States have tried to use to stave off undesirable change. Driven to desperation, they appeal defensively to what they don’t entirely believe in principle. Although used as a final recourse, the appeal to constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights does not belong to the historic Right.

* The history of fascism illustrates, among other things, the difficulties faced by a rightist movement in opposing the ascendancy of the modern Left. This remains the case even when taking into account the ineptitude and occasional brutality shown by fascist leaders. The sharp ideological disparity between fascism and a more successful modernity is also part of the reason that fascism faded so ignominiously. Its ideas stand in stark contrast to today’s dominant values, and it was entirely predictable that in an already rapidly changing European society, fascists failed to build significant mass movements outside of certain unevenly modernized countries. (Here again one must exclude the Nazi totalitarian outliers who were not, for the most part, generic fascists.) Fascism’s chances for becoming an overpowering historical force were, in fact, never very promising.

Even if the Nazis had not contributed to their destruction, fascists would not have attained the international power they tried
desperately to project in the interwar years. In the best of circumstances, they might have survived a bit longer among second- or third-rate powers, as an exotic authoritarian movement, before becoming a footnote in modern history. Fascism’s greatest recognition value since its high-water mark has been as a slur—or as an indiscriminately used synonym for Nazi genocide.

The great contest in the West during the second half of the twentieth century was waged without reference to a failed fascist experiment. The overshadowing confrontation featured two internationalist contenders: communism, which was identified with the Soviet Empire, and liberal democracy, which was championed by the United States. This is the way politics played out in the last century in what became the dominant power centers of the age. Even if some fascist enthusiasts had gone on ruling somewhere in Europe, this would not have put them in the same league with the United States or the Soviets. The existence of a fascist homeland would not have changed the major power alignments in the West extending from the end of the Second World War down to the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is also unlikely that the survival of a fascist presence would have prevented a world culture that is distinctly American from becoming a cosmic force.

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Watching The English By Kate Fox

Here are some highlights:

Any discussion of English conversation, like any English conversation, must begin with The Weather. And in this spirit of observing traditional protocol, I shall, like every other writer on Englishness, quote Dr Johnson’s famous comment that ‘When two Englishmen meet, their first talk is of the weather’, and point out that this observation is as accurate now as it was over two hundred years ago.

English weather-speak is a form of code, evolved to help us overcome our natural reserve and actually talk to each other. Everyone knows, for example, that ‘Nice day, isn’t it?’, ‘Ooh, isn’t it cold?’, ‘Still raining, eh?’ and other variations on the theme are not requests for meteorological data: they are ritual greetings, conversation-starters or default ‘fillers’. In other words, English weather-speak is a form of ‘grooming talk’ – the human equivalent of what is known as ‘social grooming’ among our primate cousins, where they spend hours grooming each other’s fur, even when they are perfectly clean, as a means of social bonding.

Jeremy Paxman cannot understand why a ‘middle-aged blonde’ he encounters outside the Met Office in Bracknell says ‘Ooh, isn’t it cold?’, and he puts this irrational behaviour down to a distinctively English ‘capacity for infinite surprise at the weather’. In fact, ‘Ooh, isn’t it cold?’ – like ‘Nice day, isn’t it?’ and all the others – is English code for ‘I’d like to talk to you – will you talk to me?’, or, if you like, simply another way of saying ‘hello’. The hapless female was just trying to strike up a conversation with Mr Paxman. Not necessarily a long conversation – just a mutual acknowledgement, an exchange of greetings. Under the rules of weather-speak, all he was required to say was ‘Mm, yes, isn’t it?’ or some other equally meaningless ritual response, which is code for ‘Yes, I’ll talk to you/greet you’. By failing to respond at all, Paxman committed a minor breach of etiquette, effectively conveying the rather discourteous message ‘No, I will not exchange greetings with you’. (This was not a serious transgression, however, as the rules of privacy and reserve override those of sociability: talking to strangers is never compulsory.)

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Watching The English By Kate Fox

Here are some highlights:

* ‘How’s the Englishness book going? What chapter are you working on?’
‘The one about sex.’
‘So, that’ll be twenty blank pages, then?’
THE KNEE-JERK HUMOUR RULE
I’ve lost count of the number of times I heard this response – or others like it, such as: ‘That’ll be a short chapter!’ ‘Oh, that won’t take long, then!’ ‘Oh, that’s easy: “No Sex Please, We’re British!”’ ‘But we don’t have sex, we have hot water bottles!’ ‘Lie back and think of England, you mean?’ ‘Will you explain the mystery of how the English manage to reproduce?’. And these were all from English friends and informants. Foreigners occasionally made similar jokes, but the English almost invariably did so. Clearly, the notion that the English do not have much sex, or have a laughably low sex-drive, is widely accepted as fact – even, indeed especially, among the English themselves.
Or is it? Do we really believe in the popular international stereotype of the passionless, reserved, sexually naïve, amorously challenged English? The bloke who would really rather be watching football, and his wife who would prefer a nice cup of tea? And, moving up the social scale, the awkward, tongue-tied, timid, public schoolboy character, and his equally clueless horsey female counterpart who cannot stop giggling? Is this really how we see ourselves? Is this really how we are?
In purely factual, quantitative terms, our sexless image is inaccurate. The English are human, and sex is naturally as important to us as to any other members of the species. Our sexually incompetent reputation is not borne out by the facts and figures, which suggest that we manage to copulate and reproduce just like the rest of the world. If anything, we start younger: the English have the highest rates of teenage sexual activity in the industrialized world, with 86 per cent of unmarried girls sexually active by the age of nineteen (the US comes a poor second, with 75 per cent). There are also plenty of other nations that are far more prudish and repressive about sex than the English, and where the English are regarded as dangerously permissive. Our censorship laws may be stricter than many other European countries’, and our politicians more likely to be forced to resign over what the French, say, would consider minor sexual peccadilloes, but in most respects, by international standards, we are fairly liberal.
Stereotypes do not come out of thin air, however, and one as widely recognized and acknowledged as the unsexy English must surely have at least some basis in reality. Sex may be a natural, instinctive, universal human activity, which the English must perform like everyone else – but it is also a social activity, involving emotional engagement with other humans, contact, intimacy and so on, which we have already established are not exactly our strong points. Still, our apparent readiness to accept this decidedly unflattering stereotype (we are much more patriotically defensive about our weather than about our sexual prowess) could be seen as somewhat bizarre, and requires explanation.
Looking back at my research notes, I find that I was continually struck by the difficulty of having any sort of sensible conversation about sex with English informants. ‘The English simply cannot talk about sex without making a joke of it,’ I complained in my notebook, ‘usually the same joke: If one more person offers to “help me with my research” for the sex chapter, I’m going to scream.’ The mere mention of the word ‘sex’ seems automatically to trigger a quip or witticism or, among the less articulate, a crude nudge-nudge remark, a bit of Carry-On-style ooh-ing and face-pulling, or at the very least a snigger. This is more than a rule: it is an involuntary, unthinking reflex – a knee-jerk response. Mention sex, and the English humour reflex kicks in. And we all know that self deprecating jokes are the most effective, the most widely appreciated form of humour. The ‘blank pages’ quips about my sex chapter were thus not necessarily a sign that we fully accept the sexually-challenged-English stereotype, but just a typically English reaction to the word ‘sex’.
Why do we find sex so funny? We don’t, not really: it’s just that humour is our standard way of dealing with anything that makes us feel uncomfortable or embarrassed. This is surely one of the Ten Commandments of Englishness: when in doubt, joke. Yes, other nations joke about sex, but none, in my experience or to my knowledge, does so with the same tedious knee-jerk predictability as the English. In other parts of the world, sex may be regarded as a sin, an art form, a healthy leisure activity, a commodity, a political issue and/or a problem requiring years of therapy and umpteen self-help ‘relationship’ books. In England, it is a joke.
If some evolutionary psychologists are to be believed, flirting may even be the foundation of civilization as we know it. They argue that the large human brain – our complex language, superior intelligence, culture, everything that distinguishes us from animals – is the equivalent of the peacock’s tail: a courtship device evolved to attract and retain sexual partners. If this theory – jokingly known as the ‘chat-up theory of evolution’ – is correct, human achievements in everything from art to literature to rocket science may be merely a side-effect of the essential ability to charm.
The idea of NASA, Hamlet and the Mona Lisa as accidental by-products of primeval chat-ups might seem somewhat far-fetched, but it is clear that evolution favours flirts. The most skillful charmers among our distant ancestors were the most likely to attract mates and pass on their charming genes. We are descended from a long line of successful flirts, and the flirting instinct is hard-wired into our brains. Even when modern humans are not engaged in mate-selection, we still flirt – all of us practise two types of flirting, which for shorthand I call ‘flirting with intent’ (flirting designed to lead to mating, and possibly pair-bonding) and ‘recreational flirting’ (flirting for fun, for other social reasons, or perhaps just for practice). Homo sapiens is, by nature, a compulsive flirt.
So, the English are genetically programmed to flirt, just like everyone else, and we probably do about as much of it as everyone else. It’s just that we do not do it with the same degree of skill, ease or assurance. Or rather, about fifty percent of us are noticeably deficient in these qualities. If you look more closely at the stereotype of the sexually challenged English, it is the English male who is most often singled out for criticism and ridicule in this department. A few of the standard jokes and quips allude to the supposed frigidity or ignorance of the English female, but the vast majority are about the alleged impotence, indifference or incompetence of English males. These failings of English men are often assumed to account for any sexual inadequacies or shortcomings among their frustrated womenfolk. In the early eighteenth century, a Swiss commentator described English women as ‘little spoilt by the attentions of men who give but a small part of their time to them. Indeed most men
prefer wine and gaming to women, in this they are more to blame as women are much better than the wine in England’. Many of my own foreign informants made much the same kind of remarks, although they substituted beer for wine, and did not complain about the quality of English beer.
The first two of these charges against English males – impotence and indifference – are unfounded and unfair; they are not based on fact or direct observation, but mainly on an impression created by the third defect of which English men stand accused: incompetence in the art of seduction. ‘Englishmen seem little made for gallantry,’ observed our Swiss critic, ‘they know no mean between complete familiarity and respectful silence.’
The average English male may be highly sexed, but he is not, it must be said, an accomplished flirt. He is not at his best when confronted with what one of my male informants called ‘a female person of the opposite species’. He is usually either reticent, tongue-tied and awkward, or, at worst, boorish, crass and clumsy61. In the belief that it will help him to shed his inhibitions, he tends to consume large quantities of alcohol: this merely results in a shift from awkward, tongue-tied reticence to crass, clumsy boorishness. From the perspective of the unfortunate English female, this is not much of an improvement – unless her own judgement is severely impaired, as it often is, by a similar quantity of alcohol, in which case chat-up lines such as ‘Er, fancy a shag?’ may seem like the height of wit and eloquence. And there, in a nutshell, or rather a bottle, is the answer to the mystery of how the English manage to reproduce. All right, I’m exaggerating – but only a little. The role of alcohol in the passing on of English DNA should not be underestimated.

With very high scores on Sociability and Alcohol, night-clubs should in theory be near the top of my English flirt-zone league table but there is a curious and apparently perverse new unwritten rule among a significant proportion of young English clubbers, whereby dancing – and by extension clubbing in general – is regarded as an asexual activity. Their focus is on group bonding, and the euphoric, almost transcendental experience of becoming one with the music and the crowd (which sounds like a version of what the anthropologist Victor Turner called ‘communitas’ – an intense, intimate, liberating kind of group bonding, experienced only in ‘liminal’ states). They take great exception to any suggestion that they might be there for the vulgar, crass purpose of ‘pulling’. In a national survey, for example, only six per cent of clubbers admitted that ‘meeting prospective sexual partners’ was an important part of these ‘dance events’ for them.

…among young English clubbers, particularly those who regard themselves and their musical tastes as ‘nonmainstream’, there is an unspoken ‘no sex please, we’re too cool’ rule. It is considered deeply ‘uncool’ to go clubbing to meet prospective partners, so clubbers will naturally be reluctant to admit to this motive. If they should happen to end up in bed with someone they met while out clubbing, this is a fortuitous by-product of the evening’s entertainment, not something they set out to achieve. The ‘no sex please’ rule seems to be honoured more in speech than in observance. We pretend not to be too interested in sex, but we still manage accidentally on- purpose to have quite a lot of sex. More of that lovely English hypocrisy. I found that gay clubbers tend to be rather more open and honest than straight clubbers about their interest in sex: although some subscribe to the ‘no sex please, we’re too cool’ rule, the majority candidly admit that flirtation, mate-selection and sex are important elements of clubbing for them.

Both ‘flirting with intent’ and ‘recreational flirting’ are common in most English offices and other workplaces. Surveys have found that up to 40 percent of us now meet our spouses or current sexual partners at the workplace, and some recent research findings show that flirting is good for relieving workplace anxiety and stress: the playful atmosphere created by flirtatious banter helps to reduce friction, and exchanges of compliments boost self-esteem.

We knew that, of course, but it needs saying, as workplace flirting may be under threat from puritanical influences imported from America, where flirting has been officially banned in many offices and other workplaces (an ‘unsustainable’ move on the part of the political-correctness lobby, as attempts to forbid behaviours that are as deeply ingrained in the human psyche as flirting are doomed to failure). At the moment, workplaces are still among the better flirting zones in England. Technically, they only pass two elements of the SAS test, as alcohol is not commonly available in offices or factories, but in practice work colleagues tend to find opportunities to drink together – and workplaces score very highly on the Sociability and Shared-interest factors. Training courses, sales conferences, academic conferences and other such work-related excursions and gatherings were highlighted by my focus-group participants as particularly conducive to flirting, combining all the benefits of common interests and ease of sociable communication with the added lubricant of celebratory drinking.

In the English workplace itself, however, flirting is usually acceptable only in certain areas, with certain people and at specific times or occasions. Each workplace has its own unwritten etiquette governing flirtatious behaviour. In some companies, I found that the coffee machine, photocopier or cafeteria was the unofficial ‘designated flirting zone’. In one it was a balcony mainly used by smokers, who often tend to be more sociable than non-smokers, or at least have a sense of defiant solidarity (one woman told me that she was a non-smoker, but pretended to smoke, because the smokers were ‘more fun to hang out with’).

Almost all educational establishments are hot-beds of flirting. This is mainly because they are full of young single people making their first attempts at mate selection, but they also pass all three elements of the SAS test – schools, colleges and universities score very high on the Sociability and Shared-interest factors, and while alcohol is not usually served in classrooms, students have plenty of opportunities for drinking together.

The Shared-interest factor is particularly important to English adolescents. Adolescents everywhere tend to be self-conscious, but English ones tend to be especially awkward, lacking the social skills necessary to strike up conversations without an obvious point of contact. The shared lifestyle and concerns of students, and the informal atmosphere, make it easier for them to initiate conversation with each other. Simply by being students, prospective partners automatically have a great deal in common, and do not need to struggle to find topics of mutual interest.

I found that the level of flirtatious behaviour among members of amateur English sports teams or hobby-clubs tends to be inversely related to the standards achieved by participants and their enthusiasm for the activity. With some exceptions, one tends to find a lot of flirting among incompetent tennis players, unfit hill-walkers, cack-handed painters and tangle-footed dancers, but somewhat less among more proficient, serious, competitive participants in the same activities. Even the most blatantly incompetent will usually pretend that they are really there for the sport or activity to which the club is ostensibly dedicated. They may even genuinely believe this – the English are masters of self-delusion – but the truth is that their tennis racquets, Ordnance Survey maps and paintbrushes are all primarily props and facilitators of sociability, and often come in very handy as flirting tools.

Even in non-sexual contexts, the English need to pretend that they are gathering for some reason other than just gathering, and the need for another ostensible motive is even greater when something as personal and intimate as mate-seeking is the real purpose of the event. Even when we are on a ‘date’, the English do not like to use this term; English males are particularly squeamish about the idea of ‘dating’ – it makes the whole thing too embarrassingly open and official. And too earnest. We don’t like being forced to take the whole courtship process too seriously: the very word ‘date’ seems to contravene the spirit of English humour rules.

There is also still an element of stigma attached to ‘organized match-making’. Singles’ events and dating agencies are regarded as somehow unnatural, too contrived, too artificial, lacking in the serendipity and spontaneity that ought to characterise romantic encounters. Many people are ashamed to admit to ‘resorting’ to dating agencies or organized singles’ parties: they feel it is undignified, an admission of failure. The truth is, of course, that there is nothing at all unnatural or undignified about organized matchmaking. It is a practice that has been the norm throughout human history, and is still customary in most cultures around the world. But the English obsession with privacy makes us even more reluctant than other modern Western nations to accept the need for such practices.

One of my English informants observed that: ‘You can have a sort of platonic flirting with people who are married or attached. In some situations it is almost expected – almost like you have to flirt to be polite’. This comment refers to an unwritten rule prescribing a special form of ‘safe’, ‘recreational’ flirting that I call ‘courtesy flirting’. This is mainly practised by men, who engage in mild flirtation with women as a form of politeness. (Women do it to some extent as well, but tend to be more cautious, knowing that men are a bit inclined to misread the signals.) Courtesy flirting is common throughout Continental Europe as well as in England, but there are some subtle differences: English men tend more towards playful teasing, Continental Europeans
towards gallant compliments. Both forms can be confusing for Americans, who often mistake courtesy flirting for the real thing.

Even when English males are genuinely interested in a female, they may often be reluctant to convey their interest in any obvious or straightforward fashion. We have already established that the English male is: (a) not an accomplished flirt, tending to be either awkward and tongue-tied or crass and boorish, and (b) somewhat uncomfortable with the whole concept of ‘dating’. Defining an encounter with a female as a ‘date’ is a bit too explicit, too official, too clear-cut and unambiguous – the sort of embarrassing ‘cards on the table’ declaration of intent that the naturally cautious, indirect English male prefers to avoid.
Even when full of Dutch courage, he is unlikely to use the word ‘date’ in his drunken amorous advances, generally opting for ‘shag’ (or some equivalent expression) instead. This may seem strange, as ‘shag’ might be regarded as rather more explicit than ‘date’, but it makes sense in the context of beer-sodden English male logic, where asking a female to have sex with you is somehow less personal, intimate and embarrassing than inviting her out to dinner.

Ideally, the English male would rather not issue any definite invitation at all, sexual or social, preferring to achieve his goal through a series of subtle hints and oblique manoeuvres, often so understated as to be almost undetectable. This ‘uncertainty principle’ has a number of advantages: the English male is not required to exhibit any emotions; he avoids entangling himself too soon in anything that could possibly be described as a ‘relationship’ (a term he detests even more than ‘date’); he does not have to do or say anything ‘soppy’, so he maintains his stiff-upper-lipped masculine dignity; and, above all, by never making any direct, unequivocal request, he avoids the humiliation of a direct, unequivocal rejection.

English females are accustomed to this rather vague, ambivalent form of courtship – although even we sometimes find it hard to read the signals accurately, and may spend inordinate amounts of time discussing the possible ‘meaning’ of some obscure hint or ambiguous gesture with our female friends. The uncertainty principle has its advantages for English females as well: although less emotionally guarded than our menfolk, we are easily embarrassed, and prefer to avoid precipitate declarations of amorous attraction. The uncertainty principle allows us time to gauge the suitability of a prospective mate before expressing any interest in him, and we can ‘reject’ unwanted suitors without having to tell them out loud that we are not interested.

Foreign females, however, tend to be confused or even seriously irritated by the elusive, uncertain nature of English courtship practices. My non-English female friends and informants constantly complain about English men, whose Protean behaviour they attribute to shyness, arrogance or repressed homosexuality, depending on their degree of exasperation. What they fail to understand is that English courtship is essentially an elaborate facesaving game, in which the primary object is not so much to find a sexual partner as to avoid offence and embarrassment.

The offence-avoidance element of this game is yet another example of English ‘negative politeness’ – politeness that addresses other people’s need not to be intruded or imposed upon, as opposed to ‘positive politeness’, which is concerned with their need for inclusion and approval. Many of the seemingly bizarre courtship practices of English males – the cautiousness, reserve and apparent stand-offishness that foreign females complain about – are characteristic features of ‘negative politeness’. The embarrassment-avoidance aspect of our courtship game may seem rather more selfish, but it is also to some extent a matter of courtesy. The uncertainty principle, whereby neither attraction nor rejection is ever made explicit, and advances and retreats are a matter of subtle hints rather than direct invitations and refusals, allows both parties to save face. The courtship game is governed by the fair-play principle just like other sports.

In most other cultures, flirtation and courtship involve exchanges of compliments: among the English, you are more likely to hear exchanges of insults. Well, mock-insults, to be precise. ‘Banter’, we call it, and it is one of our most popular forms of verbal interaction generally (on a par with moaning), as well as our main flirting method.

The key ingredients of flirtatious banter are all very English: humour, particularly irony; wordplay; argument; cynicism; mock-aggression; teasing; indirectness – all our favourite things. And banter specifically excludes all the things we don’t like and that make us uncomfortable: emotion, soppiness, earnestness and clarity. The rules of flirtatious banter allow courting couples to communicate their feelings for each other without ever saying what they really mean, which would be embarrassing. In fact, the banter rules require them to say the opposite of what they mean – something at which the English excel. Here is a verbatim extract from a typical flirtatious encounter, recorded on a bus, between two teenagers. The exchange was conducted in full view and
hearing of a group of their friends.

‘You gotta licence for that shirt? Or are you wearing it for a bet?’
‘Huh! Look who’s talking – I can see your knickers, you slag!’
‘It’s a thong, you nerd – not that you’d know the difference. And that’s the closest you’ll ever get to it.’
‘Who says I’d want to? What makes you think I fancy you? You’re such a slag!’
‘Better than being a sad geek!’
‘Bitch!’
‘Geek!’
‘Sla – Oh, that’s my stop – you coming out later?’
‘Yeah – come round about eight.’
‘Right.’
‘Bye.’

From the conversation among their friends afterwards, it was clear that this pair had been attracted to each other for some time, had just started ‘sort of going out’ together (in that rather vague, non-dating way the English do these things), and were expected to become ‘an item’ in the near future. Even if I had not heard this subsequent discussion, I would have recognized the exchange of insults as a typical flirtation – perhaps not the wittiest or most articulate flirtatious banter I’ve come across, but a normal, unremarkable, everyday English courtship sequence. I only recorded it in my notebook because I happened to be doing a study on flirting at the time, and was collecting examples of real-life chat-up routines.

I also noted that English teenagers sometimes conduct a special form of ‘group courtship’, in which a small group of males will exchange banter – consisting mainly of sexually charged insults – with a small group of females. This group-courtship banter is most common among working-class youth, particularly in the northern part of the country, where I have even seen male and female groups hurling flirtatious abuse at each other from opposite sides of a street. English teens and twenty-somethings can also be seen indulging in this peculiar form of collective courtship at holiday resorts abroad, where bemused local inhabitants must wonder how such raucous taunting and heckling can possibly be a prelude to love and marriage. (Although I can confirm that it is, I have some sneaking admiration for shrewd local males in Spanish and Greek holiday resorts, who rightly suspect that young English females might be susceptible to more conventionally flattering approaches, and often succeed in poaching them from their loutish English suitors.)

Among older adults, I found that flirtatious banter is less overtly abusive than in these teenage examples, but that the same basic rules of irony, teasing, mock-insults and so on still apply. English females of all ages might very well prefer a more chivalrous, less perversely oblique form of courtship – but the banter rules, like the uncertainty principle, are tuned more to the sensibilities of the emotionally inhibited and socially challenged English male than to those of his somewhat less inhibited and more socially skilled female counterpart. We females are, however, accustomed to complying with these rules, and generally do so unconsciously. We know that arguing is the English male’s primary means of bonding with other males, and that banter is thus a form of intimacy with which he is familiar and comfortable. We know that when a man persistently taunts and teases us,
it usually means he likes us, and that if the sentiment is reciprocated, taunting and teasing back is the best way to express this.

As with the uncertainty principle, foreign females do not have this instinctive, in-built understanding of English male peculiarities, and so tend to be baffled and sometimes offended by the banter rules. I find myself having to explain to them that ‘silly cow’ really can be a term of endearment, and ‘You’re just not my type’, uttered in the right tones and in the context of banter, can be tantamount to a proposal of marriage. I’m not saying that English men never pay straightforward compliments or formally ask women out on dates. They often do both of these things, albeit rather awkwardly, and they even propose marriage; it’s just that if they can possibly find a more circuitous way of achieving the same end, they will.
MALE-BONDING RULES – AND THE GIRLWATCHING RITUAL
The English male may not be an accomplished flirt, or adept at the finer points of pair bonding, but when it comes to bonding with other males, he’s in his element. I’m not talking about homosexuality, repressed or otherwise, but about the universal human practice of male bonding, of men forming close friendships and alliances with other men. Every known human society has some form of male-bonding practices, usually including clubs, organisations or institutions (such as the London ‘gentlemen’s clubs’ for which the English are famous), or at least special rituals, from which women are excluded.
It has been said that men’s need for such bonding is as strong as their need for sex with women. In the average Englishman’s case, it may be stronger. There is nothing wrong with the heterosexual English male’s sex drive, but he does seem to show a marked preference for the company of other men. This is not about the alleged closet homosexuality of English males: if anything, gay Englishmen tend to be more at ease in female company, and to enjoy it more. But it must be said that many of the English man’s male-bonding rituals appear to be devoted to proving his masculinity and heterosexuality.
Foremost among these is the ‘girlwatching’ ritual – the English version of that time-honoured and probably universal male pastime of exchanging comments on the physical attributes of passing females. You can – if you are interested in such things – watch variations on this ritual in pretty much any pub, bar, café, night-club or street-corner on the planet. The English variant is, as you might by now expect, conducted in code. Very few of the set phrases used are intelligible without some interpretation. The code is not, however, difficult to decipher, and most of the stock phrases fall into one of two simple categories: approval (that female is attractive) and disapproval (that female is not attractive).
The most quintessentially and convolutedly English of these stock girlwatching remarks is my favourite: ‘Don’t fancy yours much!’ This is a standard comment on any pair of females, one of whom the speaker considers to be less attractive than the other. As well as demonstrating that he can tell the difference (and has a healthy, redblooded interest in attractive females) the speaker is ‘laying claim’ to the more desirable of the pair, by designating the less pretty one as ‘yours’. Although technically reserved for commenting on a pair of women, ‘Don’t fancy yours much!’ is often used to draw a male companion’s attention to the unattractiveness of any passing female, whether or not she is accompanied by a more fanciable alternative. On one occasion, in a pub in Birmingham, I recorded the following exchange:
Male 1, glancing up as a group of 4 women enters the pub: ‘Don’t fancy yours much!’
Male 2, turning to look at the women, then frowning in puzzlement: ‘Er, which?’
Male 1, laughing: ‘Don’t care, mate – take your pick: they’re all yours!’
Male 2 laughs, but somewhat grudgingly, looking a bit put-out, as a point has been scored against him.

Another somewhat cryptic English girlwatching phrase, this time of the ‘approving’ variety, is ‘Not many of those to the pound!’ This comment refers to the size of the observed female’s breasts, implying that they are rather larger than average. The ‘pound’ means a pound in weight, not in sterling – so the phrase literally means that you would not get many of those breasts balanced like fruit on a grocer’s weighing-scale against a pound weight. In fact it is an understatement, as large breasts would probably each weigh more than a pound, but let’s not get too technical. In any case, it is a favourable judgement: large breasts are officially A Good Thing among English males; even those who secretly prefer small ones usually feel obliged to express approval. The ‘Not many of those to the pound!’ comment is often accompanied by a gesture suggesting the weighing of heavy objects in the hands: the hands are held out just in front of the chest – with palms upturned and fingers slightly curled in – then bounced up and down. Here is another overheard exchange, this time from a pub in London. It sounds like a comedy sketch, but I swear it is real:
Male 1, commenting on a very well-endowed nearby female: ‘Cor! Not many of those to the pound, eh?’
Male 2: ‘Sssh! You can’t say that any more, mate. ’Snot allowed any more.’
Male 1: ‘What? Don’t give me that PC feminist crap! I can talk about a girl’s tits if I like!’
Male 2: ‘Nah – it’s not the feminists’ll get you, it’s the Weights and Measures lot. We can’t use pounds any more,
it’s all metric now. You gotta say “kilos”!’

‘I would!’ is a rather more obvious generic expression of approval, the message being that the speaker would be willing to have sex with the observed female. ‘Definitely a ten-pinter!’ is a derogatory remark, meaning that the speaker would have to consume ten pints of beer – that is, be very drunk – even to consider having sexual relations with the female in question. When you overhear a pair or group of English men saying ‘six’, ‘four’, ‘two’, ‘seven’ and so on, while surreptitiously scrutinizing nearby or passing females, they may not be awarding the women ‘marks out of ten’, but referring to the number of pints they would have to drink in order to contemplate having sex with them. The fact that none of the women would be likely to give these self-appointed beauty contest judges a second glance is immaterial. The girlwatching ritual is a display of masculine bravado, performed entirely for the benefit of male companions. By reciting the stock phrases, participants in this ritual affirm their
status as macho, active heterosexuals. By tacit agreement, the assumption that they are in a position to pick and choose among the observed females is never questioned – and conspiring to promote this collective delusion reinforces the social bonds between the girlwatchers.

Posted in English, Sex | Comments Off on Watching The English By Kate Fox