What Turned Germans Into Nazis?

Andrew Stuttaford writes for the WSJ:

Mr. Fritzsche examines how, during the party’s years in opposition, the Nazis were able to broaden their support away from the original ideological core to voters who, for example, just thought that “something” had to be done to sort out a deeply unsettled country. And Mr. Fritzsche looks particularly closely at those who swung behind the party in early 1933 (an approach he also took in his 1998 book “Germans Into Nazis”).

What the author stresses is that, contrary to what is so often assumed, many Germans were seduced not by despair but by optimism. Mr. Fritzsche sets out the ways that the Nazis produced the impression that the party was creating a Volksgemeinschaft—a people’s community—through such methods as transforming the Left’s traditional celebration of the first of May into “The Day of National Labor,” a festival of national unity rather than class struggle. This appealed to a very human need to feel a sense of belonging, an inclusivity that was reinforced by exclusion: The people’s community was defined by a notion of nation as well as race. Germany’s Jews were not only ineligible to join the Volksgemeinschaft but were supposedly a threat to it. The myth of the enemy within impressed too many and bothered too few.

Mr. Fritzsche covers a longer period of time than his book’s title implies, but in the scholarly—and more comprehensive—“Hitler’s True Believers,” Robert Gellately, a distinguished historian of 20th-century totalitarianism, travels the whole length of the National Socialist arc—from grubby origins to miserable conclusion—in his attempt to explain how “ordinary people became Nazis.” Mr. Gellately differs from many in the weight he places on the appeal of the “socialist” element in an ideology that, almost from its earliest days, had combined nationalism and anti-Semitism with a distrust of capitalism. Crucially, however, this distrust did not entail the hostility to private property or the nationalizations that were central to the thinking of Hitler’s fellow totalitarians in the U.S.S.R. Quite what the Nazis meant by socialism was conveniently opaque, but it could clearly be differentiated from Soviet and other varieties.

In an intriguing passage, Mr. Gellately argues that the movement’s early followers were not “converted” by Hitler. Rather, his party was a vehicle for crystallizing what they, in large part, already thought. In many respects this anticipated the way that less politically conscious Germans would eventually succumb to Hitler. “He became a kind of representative figure for ideas, emotions, and aims that he shared with . . . millions of others, who were on the same wavelength,” Mr. Gellately writes, an incarnation made more credible by the vagueness of the Nazi platform. There were few specific policies, making it easier to tell different audiences what they wanted to hear…

That a “German” socialism could be fitted within the notion of the Volksgemeinschaft did the Nazis no harm, helping them first win power and then tighten their grip. The Nazis boasted, not inaccurately, of having “harnessed” capitalism. They made a show of breaking down class barriers and developed recreational, cultural, charitable and social programs for all—an approach that came, as Mr. Fritzsche points out, with the added advantage of squeezing out an older civil society. And so the Nazis secured the acquiescence and even the approval of some of their former opponents on the left. Economic recovery also helped.

It was probably the memory of that Volksgemeinschaft, however much it rested on illusion, that explains one of the most remarkable facts in Mr. Gellately’s book: When Germans in the country’s west and in West Berlin—a people still living amid the ruins of the Reich—were asked in 1948 whether National Socialism was a good idea, but poorly implemented, 57% of those polled replied “yes.”

National Socialism repels most Westerners today but the combination of nationalism and socialism is probably a winning electoral formula.

According to Wikipedia: “In the book Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, 1933–1945, Gellately argues that the Gestapo were not in fact all-pervasive and intrusive as they have been described. The Gestapo only numbered 32,000 for the entire population of Germany, and this clearly limited their impact. In the city of Hanover there were only 42 officers. Instead, Gellately says that the atmosphere of terror and fear was maintained by ‘denunciations’ from ordinary Germans, whereby they would inform any suspicious ‘anti-Nazi’ activity to the local Nazi authority. According to Gellately, these denunciations were the cause of most prosecutions, as in Saarbrücken 87.5 per cent of cases of ‘slander against the regime’ came from denunciations. This diminished the Gestapo’s role in maintaining fear and terror throughout the Third Reich, however they still proved to be a powerful instrument for Hitler and continued to provide the security apparatus needed for the Nazi Regime.”

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FASTER EVOLUTION MEANS MORE ETHNIC DIFFERENCES

Jonathan Haidt wrote in 2009:

The most offensive idea in all of science for the last 40 years is the possibility that behavioral differences between racial and ethnic groups have some genetic basis. Knowing nothing but the long-term offensiveness of this idea, a betting person would have to predict that as we decode the genomes of people around the world, we’re going to find deeper differences than most scientists now expect. Expectations, after all, are not based purely on current evidence; they are biased, even if only slightly, by the gut feelings of the researchers, and those gut feelings include disgust toward racism..

A wall has long protected respectable evolutionary inquiry from accusations of aiding and abetting racism. That wall is the belief that genetic change happens at such a glacial pace that there simply was not time, in the 50,000 years since humans spread out from Africa, for selection pressures to have altered the genome in anything but the most trivial way (e.g., changes in skin color and nose shape were adaptive responses to cold climates). Evolutionary psychology has therefore focused on the Pleistocene era – the period from about 1.8 million years ago to the dawn of agriculture — during which our common humanity was forged for the hunter-gatherer lifestyle.

But the writing is on the wall. Russian scientists showed in the 1990s that a strong selection pressure (picking out and breeding only the tamest fox pups in each generation) created what was — in behavior as well as body — essentially a new species in just 30 generations. That would correspond to about 750 years for humans. Humans may never have experienced such a strong selection pressure for such a long period, but they surely experienced many weaker selection pressures that lasted far longer, and for which some heritable personality traits were more adaptive than others. It stands to reason that local populations (not continent-wide “races”) adapted to local circumstances by a process known as “co-evolution” in which genes and cultural elements change over time and mutually influence each other. The best documented example of this process is the co-evolution of genetic mutations that maintain the ability to fully digest lactose in adulthood with the cultural innovation of keeping cattle and drinking their milk. This process has happened several times in the last 10,000 years, not to whole “races” but to tribes or larger groups that domesticated cattle.

Recent “sweeps” of the genome across human populations show that hundreds of genes have been changing during the last 5-10 millennia in response to local selection pressures. (See papers by Benjamin Voight, Scott Williamson, and Bruce Lahn). No new mental modules can be created from scratch in a few millennia, but slight tweaks to existing mechanisms can happen quickly, and small genetic changes can have big behavioral effects, as with those Russian foxes. We must therefore begin looking beyond the Pleistocene and turn our attention to the Holocene era as well – the last 10,000 years. This was the period after the spread of agriculture during which the pace of genetic change sped up in response to the enormous increase in the variety of ways that humans earned their living, formed larger coalitions, fought wars, and competed for resources and mates.

The protective “wall” is about to come crashing down, and all sorts of uncomfortable claims are going to pour in. Skin color has no moral significance, but traits that led to Darwinian success in one of the many new niches and occupations of Holocene life — traits such as collectivism, clannishness, aggressiveness, docility, or the ability to delay gratification — are often seen as virtues or vices. Virtues are acquired slowly, by practice within a cultural context, but the discovery that there might be ethnically-linked genetic variations in the ease with which people can acquire specific virtues is — and this is my prediction — going to be a “game changing” scientific event. (By “ethnic” I mean any group of people who believe they share common descent, actually do share common descent, and that descent involved at least 500 years of a sustained selection pressure, such as sheep herding, rice farming, exposure to malaria, or a caste-based social order, which favored some heritable behavioral predispositions and not others.)

I believe that the “Bell Curve” wars of the 1990s, over race differences in intelligence, will seem genteel and short-lived compared to the coming arguments over ethnic differences in moralized traits. I predict that this “war” will break out between 2012 and 2017.

There are reasons to hope that we’ll ultimately reach a consensus that does not aid and abet racism. I expect that dozens or hundreds of ethnic differences will be found, so that any group — like any person — can be said to have many strengths and a few weaknesses, all of which are context-dependent. Furthermore, these cross-group differences are likely to be small when compared to the enormous variation within ethnic groups and the enormous and obvious effects of cultural learning. But whatever consensus we ultimately reach, the ways in which we now think about genes, groups, evolution and ethnicity will be radically changed by the unstoppable progress of the human genome project.

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New History of the Peloponnesian War By Donald Kagan

Here are some highlights from this 2013 edition:

* That is not to say that early passages may not exist in the History; it is inconceivable that Thucydides did not take notes or that he failed to use them when he wrote his final work. It is merely to say that the work which we have should not be regarded as an agglomeration of passages written at widely different times and imperfectly blended together by reason of the author’s premature death, but rather as composed primarily at one time with the help of earlier notes and, if broken at the end, incomplete
perhaps in several places, yet possessing after all the unity which might be expected to result from a period of more or less sustained composition.

* The problem of the speeches is old and persistent. Opinions range from one extreme, that they are fictions completely invented by Thucydides, to the other, that they are close to verbatim reports of what the speakers said. The truth is clearly in between, but I am persuaded that it is far closer to the latter view.

* We are told, indeed, that, in composing his speeches, the historian kept as closely as possible to “the overall purport or purpose of what was actually said,” written in such a way as to coincide with his opinion of what the several speakers would most likely have presented to their hearers as being “what the situation required.” The reference to his own opinion represents a limiting factor in one way, as his reference to the “overall purport or purpose of what was actually said” is a limiting factor
in another way. Thus when the procedure has been applied, the reader will know something at least of what was actually said. Thucydides limits his knowledge in terms of the difficulty Cor even impossibility) of remembering precisely what was said.

* The Peloponnesian War was not fought by individual Greek states but by two great coalitions, the Peloponnesian League and the
Athenian Empire. In some important ways the two were similar, each providing an example of what has been called an “Alliance Under a Hegemon.”

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ADL Says Jewish Nationalism Is Inviolable

From the ADL:

Inaccuracy: The concept of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not feasible and is outdated. Instead, there should be one state, a “bi-national” state that would be comprised of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip that would protect the respective Jewish/Israeli and Palestinian identities and interests of its citizens.

Response
The proposal of a bi-national state, or a “one-state solution,” is nothing less than an indirect attempt to bring about an end to the State of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.

The State of Israel was established out of the nationalist aspirations of the Jewish people and an international recognition of the rights of Jews to a homeland following millennia of persecution. While a Jewish state, Israel’s founding principles guarantee equal treatment and protection for all its citizens’ – regardless of religion, ethnicity or color.

A bi-national state, in principle and in practice, would mean the ideological end of the Jewish State of Israel and lead to the forsaking of Jewish nationalism and identity, along with its special status as a refuge for Jews fleeing persecution.

Furthermore, bi-nationalism is unworkable given current realities and historic animosities. With historically high birth rates among the Palestinians, and a possible influx of Palestinian refugees and their descendants now living around the world, Jews would quickly be a minority within a bi-national state, thus likely ending any semblance of equal representation and protections. In this situation, the Jewish population would be increasingly politically – and potentially physically – vulnerable.

It is unrealistic and unacceptable to expect the State of Israel to voluntarily subvert its own sovereign existence and nationalist identity and become a vulnerable minority within what was once its own territory.

Moreover, as Israeli analyst Yossi Klein-Halevi has argued, “the notion that Palestinians and Jews, who can’t even negotiate a two-state solution, could coexist in one happy state is so ludicrous that only the naive or the malicious would fall for it.”

Within certain intellectual circles the call for a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state has gained traction. While couching their arguments in terms of egalitarianism and justice, proponents of a bi-national state are predominantly harsh critics of Israel, and use this proposal as a vehicle to further their advocacy against an independent Jewish state.

Some nationalist Israelis also call for a “one-state solution” whereby Israel would annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip and create one state incorporating this entire territory. Such a concept is equally unacceptable as Israel would then have to sacrifice its status as both a Jewish and democratic state. Were Israel to absorb these territories and make the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip full citizens of Israel, demographic realities would lead to the effective end of a Jewish State of Israel. Should Israel annex these territories yet deny the non-Jewish residents full citizenship, Israel would no longer be a democratic state. Either choice is inimical to Israel’s founding ideology.

Any just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be based on two states, living side by side in peace and security.

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Media Responsibility

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