The Science of Likability: 27 Studies to Master Charisma, Attract Friends, Captivate People, and Take Advantage of Human Psychology

Patrick King writes:

* Memories have long been found to be context-dependent, first by Godden and Baddeley in 1975 in their breakthrough publication “Context-Dependent Memory in Two Natural Environments: On Land and Underwater,” which means memories are heavily linked to the environment, events, sounds, feelings, and even smells that were present during the formation of the memory. The researchers found that either being on land or underwater led subjects to recall different sets of memories.

We can see this in our everyday lives. For instance, this is why so many of us fall into bouts of nostalgia when we hear certain songs—the song is information that is linked to much more than the song itself.

* memories were also mood-dependent. In other words, the mood we had when the memory was formed is also part of the memory. The information is in there somewhere, and Eich and his associates found that appealing to those hidden aspects of memories allows you to influence people’s moods for the better.

* Participants who were in good moods typically recalled positive memories while participants who were in bad moods typically recalled negative memories. And of course, the subsequent memories recalled served to further increase the moods they were in—misery and happiness both grew.

* This is the first step in becoming a presence that people start to crave; if you either (1) directly talk about positive memories or (2) indirectly evoke elements that were present at the time of that positive memory (recall how holistic and three-dimensional memory is), people will slip into the mood they were in during that
memory.

* Talk to people in terms of what makes them happy, and it will make them happier.

* No one is drawn to the person that reminds them of the last funeral they went to.

* You’d be surprised how effective staying in a good mood, putting on a happy face, praising others, and acting positive is. In fact, there is a term for the contagious power of positivity: emotional contagion.

* Finally, the stimulus-value-role model of social interaction states that to get to someone’s inner circle, you have to show three levels of compatibility: stimulus, value, and role. To use this model, you have to first
understand which stage you are currently at with someone, and then you can understand what you need to do before moving into the next stage. The deepest level is role: working together, collaborating, and resolving
conflict.

* Often, we treat people like strangers when we meet them. This sounds natural, but it is actually detrimental to building rapport and being likable. Treat them like a friend and they will treat you like a friend. This is backed
up by the theory of transference, which states that people transfer their emotions of someone else to those they see acting in a familiar way or role.

•We don’t realize it, but we have the ability to set the tone of our relationships, and you might be causing the very source of your unhappiness by not acting the part of a friend.

•Another aspect of treating people like a friend right off the bat is to understand how the Pygmalion effect works. People live up to the expectations we give them. If we treat them like strangers, they will remain strangers. If we expect that they are interesting, we will treat them in a way that allows them to demonstrate this. All of this requires more effort on your part, but you have the ability to set the tone, so use it.

•Next, we come to self-verification theory. This states that we naturally gravitate toward and like people who confirm our self-perception—they see us as we like and want to be seen. This makes people feel understood, seen, and heard. It’s not manipulation or fakery so much as the act of validating people and letting them know they are, again, understood, seen, and heard.

•Finally, we arrive at friendship chemistry—this is typically what we think of when we think of hitting it off with someone. But just like everything that you’ve read so far, there is far more intentionality than you might
assume, even if it is largely unconscious on your part. Exactly what instantly draws us to someone, and vice versa, is generally categorized into five elements: reciprocal candor, mutual interests, personableness, simi-
larity, and physical attraction. What is perhaps most illuminating and encouraging is that these are elements that we mostly have control over, most of the time.

* Trust has been shown to work in a linear fashion. The more you see someone, the more you trust them, regardless of interaction or depth. This is known as the propinquity effect, and it is similar to how studies have shown that customers only purchase after seeing a product seven times. It is also similar to the mere exposure effect, where feelings of preference and affection show a linear relationship with the frequency of interactions we have with something/someone rather than the quality of those interactions.

•Credibility is a notch above trust; trust is about people feeling that they can believe you, and credibility is where people also feel that they can rely on you. There are also proven ways to create an aura of credibility around yourself. These include highlighting qualifications, showing your caring and empathy, showing similarity, being assertive, showing social proof, not contradicting yourself, and avoiding being overly polite.

* Not being perfect is endearing to people. Vulnerability is attractive and relatable, and it ensures that you
aren’t intimidating to others. Don’t pretend you’re perfect—you’re not, anyway—because it will probably backfire on you.

* One of the easiest ways to make people lower their guards is to stop trying to be perfect and impressive. Instead, try to be relatable and harmless to a degree. Nothing epitomizes that better than the pratfall effect, which shows the attractiveness of imperfection and vulnerability. This also works because you are catering to people’s insecurities and allowing them to feel that are you not a source of judgment.

•Another method of lowering people’s guards is to make rough times better, which is possible through using the Losada ratio. This ratio should govern the amount of positive and negative remarks you use—roughly 2.9 positive statements will generally make up for one negative statement and can be the difference between a stressed and “languishing” mind versus a happy and “flourishing” mind. Who would have thought that being nice and positive to others could increase our likability?

•Asking people for advice is a powerful element of lowering people’s guards. When we ask questions, especially on topics that they feel specially equipped to answer, they will open up and can’t wait to share. In
fact, they won’t be able to shut up, usually. In addition, asking for advice shows respect and belief in someone’s intelligence and abilities.

•The Benjamin Franklin effect is where you ask someone else to perform a favor for you, and surprisingly, this makes them like you more. This goes against the conventional view that doing things for others is what creates
goodwill and affection. The psychological component behind this is known as cognitive dissonance, which is when the brain is trying to make two conflicting thoughts exist with each other. Thus, “I don’t like him” plus “I did this for him” equals “I suppose I like him enough.” Asking for favors also closes the psychological distance and shows vulnerability.

* The more information about you that is out there, the less readily people can judge and stereotype you,
simply because you can’t fit into singular stereotypes anymore.

* Thus, we come to a 2015 study by William von Hippel called “Quick Thinkers Are Smooth Talkers: Mental Speed Facilitates Charisma,” which provides a clear and instructive lesson that will make an impact on how others perceive you. As you might gather from the name of the study, his discovery was that speed of thought and dialogue was more related to people’s ratings of charisma than many other traits, including being correct or accurate. In fact, if you were to prioritize one aspect of interaction, quickness would be highest rated.

* If someone appears to have a speedy answer for everything, especially in a confident and assertive manner, then we find it appealing for some reason. Why might this be? Humans place incredible weight on perception.

Speed is associated with intelligence and social acumen. Think about how we perceive people who are slow to answer, who make us wait, and need a joke explained more than once. Now contrast that to someone who has snappy and witty comebacks and can rattle off jokes that we can barely keep up with. Indeed, we use speed as a proxy for intelligence and charm, and we tend to become enamored with those who speak quickly and confidently.

* The first theory on humor is called the superiority theory of humor and was mentioned as early as Aristotle and Plato in roughly 300 BC. It is finding humor in the misfortune of others and, therefore, our own superiority that we would not fall victim to said misfortune. We laugh at others because we see the differences illus-
trated between us. This is also related to schadenfreude, which is a German word roughly translating to “enjoying the misfortune of others.” This theory is easy to see in action; you can reliably find it in your local ice-skating rink as you watch people flail about and try to keep themselves upright.

The second theory is known as the relief theory of humor, which states that humor comes as a result of the release of psychological tension. Herbert Spencer in The Physiology of Laughter in 1860 postulated that we are always in a sort of nervous state, and laughter is the constant feeling of relief at feeling safe and having a pleasant outcome. It was later expounded on by Sigmund Freud, who of course saw it through a sexual and unconscious perspective. But on a more daily level, we might see this play out by mistakenly being told that your restaurant bill is double what it should be and then having the error corrected. At first, tension would grow,
but upon correcting the bill, you might laugh in a release of tension. The third theory is what the top joke in the world played on—a sense of surprise and subverted expectations. It is called the incongruity theory, and it states that we find humor in the incongruity, or gap, between our expectations and reality. If we hear X and Y, then we find an incongruity when we actually hear Z instead.

* there are no comedy movies that have consistently struck gold in international box offices because
humor is rooted in language and cultural and contextual norms. However, action and adventure movies routinely break box office records because there’s no cultural translation required for an explosion or flying car.

* Whatever traits you describe in others, people will transfer to you. If you talk about someone being lazy, people will more likely think you’re lazy. If you describe others as engaging and cheerful, they will also think that about you.

* bad gossip is bad for people’s perceptions of you and your likability. You see it with spontaneous trait trans-
ference, and you also see it in “Is Gossip Power? The Inverse Relationships Between Gossip, Power, and Likability” from 2011, where Sally Farley explored and ex-panded on Dunbar’s findings on social grooming. She found that what she deemed “prolific” gossipers were much less liked than non-gossipers, and those who were negative gossipers were liked the least of all. Out of a scale of 117, negative gossipers scored an average of 37 for likability while non-gossipers scored an average of 47. In addition, prolific gossipers were seen as socially weaker and with
less influence.

This seems to contradict Dunbar’s earlier findings on the essentiality of gossip and idle chit-chat, but on the topic, Farley stated, “Perhaps high gossipers are individuals who we welcome into our social networks for fear of losing the opportunity to learn information, but we tend to keep them at arm’s length.”

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Normal Marital Sadism

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/experts/david-schnarch-phd
https://crucibletherapy.com/about/david-schnarch
https://passionatemarriage.com/

David Schnarch writes in his book Passionate Marriage:

* When we talk about developing a fuller, deeper understanding of marriage, many people automatically think of unconscious feelings or repressed experiences. We’ve grown accustomed to looking at life’s struggles as a reflection of unconscious processes. When we’re unhappy, we look within ourselves for past traumas that incapacitate us in the present. The notion of uncovering repressed feelings has become synonymous with mental health, as if progressively stripping away façades and unearthing unconscious anxieties will liberate our innate vitality and creativity. In this view, therapy is a method of peeling away the layers of your character like an onion. Often, however, the problem is not a matter of peeling away layers but of developing them—growing ourselves up to be mature and resourceful adults who can solve our current problems. Many marital therapists believe childhood wounds drive marriage, leading us to reenact our family problems with our adult partners. I do not. While I don’t ignore unpleasant childhood experiences, I also don’t believe they are the only or even the strongest factor shaping a marriage. Childhood wounds have their impact, just like parental modeling and social conditioning. I believe other aspects have at least as much—if not more—impact on marriage than our childhood or unconscious processes. These involve how sex and intimacy operate within marriage as a system with rules of its own. (I’ll discuss these shortly.) Misguided emphasis on childhood wounds does more than send couples off in the wrong direction. The resulting “trauma model of life” ignores everything outstanding about our species’ determination to grow and thrive. When Pulitzer Prize winner Ernest Becker said our social “maps” trivialize life and destroy any opportunity to feel heroic, this is an example of what he meant. Likewise, in Care of the Soul, Thomas Moore observes “we like to think that emotional problems have to do with the family, childhood, and trauma —with personal life—but not with spirituality.” Passionate Marriage is about resilience rather than damage, health rather than old wounds, and human potential rather than trauma.

* What’s an example of a crucible in marriage? How about the fact that your spouse can always force you to choose between keeping your integrity and staying married, between “holding onto yourself” and holding onto your partner. These integrity issues often surface around sex and intimacy—about what the two of you will and won’t do together. They can just as easily arise over issues about money, parenting, in-laws, and lifestyle. The more emotionally enmeshed you and your spouse are—fused in my lingo—the more you will push this choice right down to the wire. Stay in the marriage or get divorced. The key is not to lose your nerve or get overreactive or locked into an inflexible position. I know that’s tough when you think your marriage is about to explode—or you’re about to sell out your beliefs, preferences, or dreams. But it’s actually part of the people-growing process in marriage. When you’re oblivious to ways marriage can operate as a people-growing process, all you see are problems and pathology—and the challenges of marriage will probably defeat you. Your pain will have no meaning except failure and disappointment; no richness, no soul. Spirituality is an attitude that reveals life’s meaning through everyday experience; however, don’t bother looking for sanctuary in your marriage. Seeking protection from its pains and pleasures misses its purpose: marriage prepares us to live and love on life’s terms. Facing relationship realities like these produces the personal integrity necessary for intimacy, eroticism, and a lifetime loving marriage. How is integrity relevant to marriage? Integrity is the ability to face the realities I just mentioned. It’s living according to your own values and beliefs in the face of opposition.

Differentiation involves balancing two basic life forces: the drive for individuality and the drive for togetherness. Individuality propels us to follow our own directives, to be on our own, to create a unique identity. Togetherness pushes us to follow the directives of others, to be part of the group. When these two life forces for individuality and togetherness are expressed in balanced, healthy ways, the result is a meaningful relationship that doesn’t deteriorate into emotional fusion. Giving up your individuality to be together is as defeating in the long run as giving up your relationship to maintain your individuality. Either way, you end up being less of a person with less of a relationship. In this chapter I’ll discuss several ways differentiation dramatically affects relationships. Here’s the first and most important one: differentiation is your ability to maintain your sense of self when you are emotionally and/or physically close to others—especially as they become increasingly important to you. Differentiation permits you to maintain your own course when lovers, friends, and family pressure you to agree and conform. Well-differentiated people can agree without feeling like they’re “losing themselves,” and can disagree without feeling alienated and embittered. They can stay connected with people who disagree with them and still “know who they are.” They don’t have to leave the situation to hold onto their sense of self.

* Think of differentiation as a “higher order” process that involves balancing both connection and autonomy… Then you can see that emotional fusion is connection without individuality. Lack of differentiation alienates us from those we love. Emotional fusion deceives us into thinking that we’re not connected and we move away in defense. But the deeper truth is that we have to move away to counterbalance the tremendous impact we feel our spouse has on us. Or, unable to turn away, we turn ourselves over to the connection, but it feels engulfing.

* Let me tell you a little more about differentiation… the term actually comes from biology, referring to the ways cells develop. All cells in your body start from essentially the same material, but as they begin to differentiate they take on unique properties and perform separate yet related functions. The greater the differentiation, the more sophisticated and adaptive the life form. More highly evolved forms of life display greater variability in response. Mammals show more variable reactions than amoebae or earthworms. Your fingerprints, voiceprint, and handwriting are examples of highly evolved uniqueness. Biologically and socially, humans represent the most sophisticated differentiation in the world. When you have a wide repertoire of possible responses, you, your family, your business, and our species have increased versatility and adaptability. Fewer resources in well-differentiated families and marriages have to be rigidly devoted to compensate for the inability of any one member to take care of himself/herself. Conversely, there is less need for anyone to sacrifice growth or self-direction to maintain the stability of the family or marriage. Differentiation allows each person to function more independently and interdependently. Families are like multicelled living entities, just as your body is composed of many different cells. Families gain or lose differentiation over generations according to the successful struggles of their members to develop.

* …your level of differentiation, and that of your marriage and family, results from how well you and your parents and grandparents succeeded in becoming well-developed individuals while maintaining emotional contact with the family. Differentiation transcends generations because it is partly about intergenerational boundaries. How strong is the emotional umbilical cord between parents and children, particularly during adolescence and adulthood? Have you had to “run away” to other parts of the country to buffer your parents’ impact on you (like Joan’s brother)? Have family members cut off from each other instead of separating emotionally but staying in touch? Do emotional bonds in your family choke its members development? Joan’s comment that “blood is thicker than water” actually describes emotional fusion rather than loyalty. Meaningful sacrifice involves free choices rather than emotional entanglements and guilt. When families (and marriages) have the use of us, there’s no choice involved.

* When people pick marriage partners, it’s not uncommon to pick someone whose family tried the opposite way of dealing with emotional fusion—but who was no more successful.

* Bill and Joan also illustrate why emotional fusion is so tenacious: borrowed functioning. Basically differentiation refers to your core “solid self,” the level of development you can maintain independent of shifting circumstances in your relationship. However, you can appear more (or less) differentiated than you really are, depending on your marriage’s current state. Borrowed functioning artificially inflates (or deflates) your functioning. Your “pseudo self” can be pumped up through emotional fusion, which makes poorly differentiated people doggedly hang onto each other. Two people in different relationships can appear to function at the same level although they have achieved different levels of differentiation. The difference is that the better differentiated one will more consistently function well even when the partner isn’t being supportive or encouraging.

* When we need to be needed and can’t settle for being wanted, we perpetuate poor functioning in our partner to maintain borrowed functioning. Superficially we may look like we’re encouraging our partner’s autonomous functioning, but in truth we suppress it on a daily basis. Borrowed functioning differs from “mutual support” because it artificially suppresses the functioning of one partner while it enhances functioning in the other. It feels good—as long as you’re on the side that is inflated by the borrowed functioning. We all experience a difference between our level of functioning when we support ourselves versus when we are emotionally supported by someone else. The wider this difference is, the more our elevated functioning is not a reflection of our “real” self—not without a partner serving as a booster rocket. We latch onto people with whom we function better. Often we call this “finding someone who brings out the best in us”—but it’s still borrowed functioning. Since differentiation is a complex process that is easily misunderstood, let me offer several important clarifications:

People screaming, “I got to be me!” “Don’t fence me in!” and “I need space!” are not highly differentiated. Just the opposite. They are fearful of “disappearing” in a relationship and do things to avoid their partner’s emotional engulfment. Some create distance; others keep their relationship in constant upheaval. Declaring your boundaries is an important early step in the differentiation process, but it’s done in the context of staying in relationship (that is, close proximity and restricted space). This is quite different from poorly differentiated people who attempt to always “keep the door open” and who bolt as increasing importance of the relationship makes them feel like they’re being locked up. The process of holding onto your sense of self in an intense emotional relationship is what develops your differentiation. Differentiation is the ability to maintain your sense of self when your partner is away or when you are not in a primary love relationship. You value contact, but you don’t fall apart when you’re alone. Differentiation is different from similar sounding concepts. It’s entirely different from “individualism,” which is an egocentric attempt to set ourselves apart from others. Unlike “rugged individualists” who can’t sustain a relationship, differentiated folks welcome and maintain intimate connection. Highly differentiated people also behave differently than the terms autonomy or independence suggest. They can be heedful of their impact on others and take their partners’ needs and priorities into account. As we discussed earlier, differentiation is the ability to balance individuality and togetherness. The differentiated self is solid but permeable, allowing you to remain close even when your partner tries to mold or manipulate you. When you have a solid core of values and beliefs, you can change without losing your identity. You can permit yourself to be influenced by others, changing as new information and shifting circumstances warrant. Realize, however, that this flexible sense of identity develops slowly, out of soul-searching deliberation—not by simply adapting to situations or the wishes of others. Differentiation doesn’t involve any lack of feelings or emotions. You can connect with your partner without fear of being swept up in his or her emotions. You can evaluate your emotions (and your partner’s) both subjectively and objectively. You have feelings, but they don’t control you or define your sense of self. The self-determination of differentiation doesn’t imply selfishness. Differentiation is not about always putting yourself ahead of everyone else. You can choose to be guided by your partner’s best interests, even at the price of your individual agenda. But it doesn’t leave you feeling like you’re being ruled by others’ needs. As you become more differentiated, you recognize those you love are separate people—just like you. What they want for themselves becomes as important to you as what you want for yourself. You value their interests on a par with yours. You can see merit in their positions, even when they contradict or interfere with your own. What I’m describing is called mutuality. Differentiation is the key to mutuality; as a perspective, a mind-set, it offers a solution to the central struggle of any long-term relationship: going forward with your own self-development while being concerned with your partner’s happiness and well-being. When you’ve reached a high level of differentiation, your view of conflict in relationships shifts dramatically. “What I want for myself versus what you want for you” shifts to “What I want for myself versus my wanting for you what you want for yourself.” If you talk your partner out of what he or she wants so you can have your way, you lose. When you participate in the agendas of those you love and sacrifice out of your own differentiation, it enhances your sense of self rather than leaving you feeling like you have sold yourself out.

* First, we emerge from our family of origin at about the highest level of differentiation our parents achieved. Our basic level of differentiation is pretty much established by adolescence and can remain at that level for life. In the process of regulating their own emotions, poorly differentiated parents pressure their children for togetherness or distance, which stops children from developing their ability to think, feel, and act for themselves. They learn to conduct themselves only in reaction to others. Raising our level of differentiation is not easy. We can raise it through concentrated effort (like therapy) or crisis (as commonly occurs in the course
of marriage, family, friendship, and career). In general, though, the level of differentiation in a family tends to stay relatively the same from one generation to the next. It changes only when a family member is motivated to differentiate him- or herself enough to rewrite the family’s legacy. This reality differs from the popular belief that your spouse is supposed to pull you out of your family’s grasp. Eventually, your partner’s grasp seems most important to loosen!

Second, we always pick a marital partner who’s at the same level of differentiation as we are. If partners are not at the same level of differentiation, the relationship usually breaks up early. Sometimes one partner is a half-step farther along than the other—but it’s only a half-step. The fantasy that you’re “much farther along” than your spouse is just that—a fantasy. If you and your partner argue over who’s healthier or more evolved, you’ll be interested in three important implications: You have about the same tolerance for intimacy, although you may express it differently. You and your spouse make splendid sparring partners because you have roughly the same level of differentiation. Assume you are emotional “equals” even if you’d like to believe otherwise. If you want to discover important but difficult truths hidden in your marriage, stop assuming you’re more differentiated than your partner. Look at things from the view that you’re at the same level and you’ll soon see the trade-offs in your relationship.

* The many small steps toward core transformation involve more than a self-indulgent search to “find yourself.” Solitary pilgrimages can lead to discoveries, but so can staying with your partner. The end result can bring you the best of what life offers, but that doesn’t mean the process feels good. No one ever wants to differentiate. You’ll probably do it for the same reasons most people do: differentiating eventually becomes less painful than other alternatives. It’s what Gloria Steinem referred to as outrageous acts of heroism in everyday life. So although becoming more differentiated makes your life less painful, it will not be pain-free. The very process of differentiation can be excruciating at times. Loving is both beautiful and painful. Differentiation offers the ability to tolerate it, enjoy it, and see its meaning. Psychotherapy can do many things. It can aid poorly functioning people and assist those who seek self-knowledge. It can help us affirm ourselves, raise our self-esteem, and remove constricting guilt, doubt, and despair. We function more effectively and efficiently when we’re less fragmented and bottled up. But there are many things psychotherapy cannot do. Psychotherapy can “free you up” but it can’t give you joy—something Freud well understood, but which we rarely understand about Freud. We’ve promised ourselves paradise through self-knowledge: love, sex, and transcendence will be easy once we know ourselves and our partner. But that’s often when you need to soothe your own heart and calm your own anxieties to take care of yourself. That’s what differentiation offers. By now the paradoxes of differentiation should be clear: while differentiation allows us to set ourselves apart from others and determines how far apart we sit, it also opens the space for true togetherness. It’s about getting closer and more distinct—rather than more distant.

* How can you tell the married couples in a restaurant? I’ve posed this question to audiences in different cultures and the response is always the same: there’s a long pause for introspection, then the sudden realization, “They don’t talk to each other!” “And how do you know the couples who are dating?” The universal answers come quick, now that they’ve got a frame of reference. “They talk to each other!” “They look into each other’s eyes!” Some responses sound wistful. “They touch!!” “They still drink beer together!” (That last one rang a bell with many Australians, although it was new to me.) Too often new couples talk nonstop while long-married couples sit in silence. As we discussed in Chapter 2, when you haven’t achieved much differentiation, you depend on validation from others and you look in their eyes for your sense of self. When you’re dating, conversation is designed to reduce anxieties about being rejected and keep open the possibility of a lasting relationship. You search for commonalities and things you agree about. Discussing differences can create awkward silences—not a great strategy if you want a second date. Young couples gab like magpies because they’re stroking and reinforcing each other in their quest for commonality and union. The next question I ask audiences is “Why aren’t the married couples talking?” Responses are usually slow again. Audience members seem to be thinking, “Why don’t we talk?!” The answers trickle in. “They have nothing to say to each other.” “They’ve said it all.” Some are more idealistic: “They know each other so well, nothing needs to be said.” Then I point out that the silence is more often icy cold than warm and relaxed. This is not the quiet of long-term intimates. Immediately, people see what I’m driving at: we experience this marital silence as alienation and failed communication. Ask yourself the same question: “Why aren’t the married couples talking?” If you’re married, you know from personal experience that “they’ve said it all” isn’t true. Important things are yet to be said—so why do they remain silent? When I ask this question a second time, a few in every audience eventually call out a difficult truth: “They don’t want to hear what the partner has to say!” Now here’s the million-dollar question: “How do you know you don’t want to hear what your partner has to say?” The answer is: “Because you already know!” What we call “lack of communication” is often just the opposite: if you truly “can’t communicate,” you wouldn’t know that you don’t want to hear what your partner has to say. The silence of married couples is testimony to their good communication: each spouse knows the other doesn’t want to hear what’s on his or her mind!

* We all have a nasty side. Not the “dirty sex” type of nasty (which so many cannot harness). Nasty, as in “You’re not a very good person.” There’s a side to all of us that’s bad—evil. All of us have a touch of it; some have more. We all torment those we love while feigning unawareness. Marriage is perhaps the place we do it most frequently—and with impunity. We withhold the sweetness of sex and intimacy while acting like we want to please—and in the course of this deceit, we pervert our sexual potential. Early American philosopher Thomas Paine said that infidelity (as in “religious infidel”) is not about what we do or don’t believe—it’s professing to believe what we do not. Jokes about marriage and masochism abound, but we rarely acknowledge marital sadism. “Snorgasms” (“I’ve had my orgasm; good luck getting yours!”) and lousy oral sex may originate in ignorance, but they are perfected within marriage. The long-term marital relationship is where you learn to screw your partner two ways at once—withholding the erotic gratification he craves while having sex with him. J. P. McEvoy said, “The Japanese have a word for it. It’s judo—the art of conquering by yielding. The Western equivalent of judo is, ‘Yes, dear.’”

The American Psychiatric Association glossary defines sadism as “pleasure derived from inflicting physical or psychological pain or abuse on others. The sexual significance of sadistic wishes or behavior may be conscious or unconscious. When necessary for sexual gratification, [it is] classifiable as a sexual deviation.” The Association also considered (and then dropped) a diagnostic category of “sadistic personality disorder.” The criteria included (a) humiliating and demeaning others, (b) lying to inflict pain, (c) restricting the autonomy of people in close relationships, and (d) getting others to comply through intimidation. Apparently, the psychiatrists favoring this diagnostic category considered marital sadism to be normal: the diagnosis wasn’t applicable if sadistic behavior was directed toward one person, such as your spouse.

If given the chance, spouses (hesitantly) acknowledge hating their partner. They seem relieved to admit it—as long as they’re not sitting next to their spouse when they do. But exactly this kind of difficult face-to-face acknowledgment enhances differentiation and reduces normal marital sadism. Author Stella Gibbons has written, “There must be a dumb, dark, dull, bitter belly-tension between a man and a woman. How else could this be achieved save in the long monotony of marriage?” In my workshops and public lectures I discuss marital hatred. Audience members laugh nervously, realizing they are in a sea of nervous smiles.

Most of us feel it’s okay to be angry, angry, angry at our partner—as long as we don’t hate him or her. Labeling what we feel as hatred can seem like crossing a line beyond which love cannot exist. Hating is to anger as fucking is to sex. It makes us nervous to do either one. Lots of people act like they’re ignorant of both. More of us know more about hating than fucking. Sometimes we hate our spouses because we love them. Our love makes us vulnerable to what they can do to us, what they can do to themselves, and what can befall them (and, indirectly, us). We deny our hatred because it hurts our narcissism and makes us feel unlovable (but it’s apparently okay as long we’re “blind”—that’s normal marital sadism). Why do we attempt to deny when we feel hatred? The superficial reason is that most of us are taught that it’s bad, bad, bad to hate. But there’s something deeper: children (and immature adults) can’t tolerate the powerful tension of ambivalence towards those they love. Many people believe, “You can’t love and hate the same person at the same time.” They believe: “If you love me, you can’t hate me.” “If you hate me, you can’t love me.” “If I hate you, I must not love you.” “If I love you, then I can’t hate you.”

The fact is, people who cannot acknowledge their hatred are most pernicious to those they “love.” One cannot control what one won’t acknowledge exists. Mature adults have the strength to recognize and own their ambivalent feelings towards their partner. They self-soothe the tension of loving and hating the same person at the same time—and the fact that their partner feels similarly. Marriage invites the necessary differentiation: it’s hard tolerating hatred when your marriage is rancorous. But it’s tougher seeing it when everything is going fine. It makes you respect couples who are friends. Marriage helps you realize you’re living with an out-and-out sadist! And then there’s your partner to deal with . . . Normal sadism is observable in every family.

At some point every parent, for one reason or another, withholds the emotional gratification his or her child wants. And at some point, spouses are bound to use torture to achieve their ends. (One husband tortured his family by making them all whine about his procrastination; then he wouldn’t fulfill his commitments because they had complained.)

Emotional fusion fuels and shapes normal marital sadism. You see it when a spouse attacks the partner’s reflected sense of self. Statements like, “If you were good enough, I’d have orgasms . . . or no sexual difficulties . . . or desire for you” are invitations for the partner to feel bad. Or when women fake orgasms and then have contempt for their partner, who feels proud. One variant involves faking not having an orgasm! Women who practice this kind of sadism want the pleasure but don’t want their partner feeling good about it, so when they reach orgasm they hide it. Some husbands do it by blatantly ogling younger women, or sending sexual vibes to their wife’s best friend. Disparate sexual desire is inevitable, but emotional Siamese twins interpret any disparity as sexual incompatibility. It’s better to think of sexual compatibility as having the willingness to use divergent preferences.

Properly managed, you picked the right partner. As commonly managed, disparate desire is a playground for normal marital sadism. Monogamy operates differently at different levels of differentiation. I didn’t know this until I saw it with my clients. We think of monogamy as an ironclad agreement containing no ifs, ands, or buts. But it is really a complex system with rules and dynamics of its own. Differentiation changes monogamy by returning genital ownership to each partner. Emotional Siamese twins act as if their partner’s genitals are communal property. Monogamy is a prison when it’s based on emotional fusion, for fusion shackles desire and prompts withholding as a means of reaffirming emotional boundaries (Chapter 5). But monogamy per se is not the problem. The problem arises when we lack the differentiation necessary for the kind of monogamy we want.

Monogamy between undifferentiated partners creates a sexual monopoly: the partner with the lower desire controls the supply and the price of sex. Deprivation and extortion flourish at low levels of differentiation in ways that dating and open marriage “free markets” won’t allow. Poorly differentiated couples approach monogamy as a promise to each other—and later blame their spouse for their mutual deprivation pact. Some inflict the effects of personal (sexual) difficulties on their spouse. They justify this by citing their partner’s shortcomings or saying, “Look, it’s happening to me, too!” They get so good at inflicting their problems on their partner that they overlook the fact that they enjoy the act of inflicting per se. Some spouses wield monogamy like a bludgeon, battering their partner with their commitment in ways never intended by marriage vows. They say, “You promised to love me for better and for worse—and that includes my (sexual) limitations!” Yes, we all marry “for better and for worse,” but the assumption is that spouses will do everything possible to overcome their limitations—not simply demand their partner put up with them!

Although many of us lack sufficient differentiation for the kind of monogamy we want, the monogamy we have often provides the crucible in which we can develop it. Like a pressure cooker, monogamy harnesses pressures and tensions that produce differentiation. Absence of other sex partners, along with disparate sexual desire and styles, drives spouses toward gridlock. This forces the two-choice dilemma of self-confrontation/self-validation vs. normal marital sadism. This is the process Audrey and Peter were going through—although they hardly appreciated the elegance of it at the time.

Monogamy operates differently in highly differentiated couples: it stops being a ponderous commitment to one’s partner (or “the relationship”) and becomes a commitment to oneself. The relationship is driven more by personal integrity and mutual respect than by reciprocal deprivation or bludgeoning. It’s no longer your partner’s fault you don’t have sex with other people; it’s part of your decision to be monogamous. And the pressures of disparate sexual desire come with your decision, too. Having an affair becomes more a self-betrayal than a betrayal of your partner (since you promised yourself and not him). That same integrity supports the self-validated intimacy necessary to keep your sexual relationship alive and growing. You feel less controlled by your spouse, and less motivated to have an affair. That’s fortunate, because it’s also not safe to have affairs or withold from a partner whose integrity runs his monogamy: if he won’t tolerate adultery or sexual laziness from himself, he’s not likely to tolerate either one from you. There is less room to offer mercy fucks—and no reason to believe they’d be accepted.

I first learned the term mercy fuck from a client. Couples intuitively recognize that it refers to, “I’ll do you a BIG favor. I really don’t want sex or you. But if you insist, I’ll accommodate you. You can use my body—and you’d better appreciate it!” Normal marital sadism surfaces in gifts given or received that are never quite right. Mercy fucking withholds the sweetness of sex, breaks your partner’s heart (if he or she catches on), and leaves little recourse. You let your partner climb on top of you to get him off your back. The goal isn’t doing your partner—it’s getting done with it so you don’t have to do it tomorrow

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Popular: Finding Happiness and Success in a World That Cares Too Much About the Wrong Kinds of Relationships

Psychologist Mitch Prinstein writes in 2017: …one of the strongest predictors of soldiers’ functioning in the military was how popular they were in primary school. In fact, childhood popularity predicted soldiers’ behavior even after accounting for every other factor that investigators considered. Within a decade or two, a number of other studies in nonmilitary populations yielded similar results about the power of popularity. More than childhood intellect, family background, prior psychological symptoms, and maternal relationships, popularity predicts how happy we grow up to be. Do we enjoy or dread leaving for work each morning? Are we in relationships that are fulfilling or conflicted? Do we regard parenting as a burden or a pleasure? Are we making important contributions in our lives? Do we feel as if we’re valued members of society? The answers to these questions can all be traced back to the playgrounds of our youth.

A worldwide study conducted in my own research lab revealed that adults who have memories of being popular in childhood are the most likely to report that their marriages are happier, their work relationships are stronger, and they believe they are flourishing as members of society. People who recall unpopular childhood experiences report just the opposite. Popular children grow up to have greater academic success and stronger interpersonal relationships, and to make more money in their jobs years later, while those who were not popular are at much greater risk for substance abuse, obesity, anxiety, depression, problems at work, criminal behavior, injury, illness, and even suicide. We now also understand that popularity changes the wiring of our brains in ways that affect our social perceptions, our emotions, and how our bodies respond to stress. As discussed in this book, our experiences with popularity can even alter our DNA.

* The first type of popularity is a reflection of status—whether someone is well known, widely emulated, and able to bend others to his or her will. In adolescence, we called these kids “cool,” but research suggests that they may be at high risk for a number of problems later in life. The other type of popularity is likability. It captures those we feel close to and trust, and the people who make us happy when we spend time with them.

* How often do we make decisions that we feel will help us gain power and influence without realizing that we are inadvertently undermining our own true chances for happiness? How much energy do we waste investing in image management because of our misperceptions about how best to achieve social approval? How much is our lingering desire to be popular affecting our behavior without our even realizing it?

* Wikipedia:

Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis (1 July 1818 – 13 August 1865) was a Hungarian physician and scientist, now known as an early pioneer of antiseptic procedures. Described as the “saviour of mothers”,[2] Semmelweis discovered that the incidence of puerperal fever (also known as “childbed fever”) could be drastically cut by the use of hand disinfection in obstetrical clinics. Puerperal fever was common in mid-19th-century hospitals and often fatal. Semmelweis proposed the practice of washing hands with chlorinated lime solutions in 1847 while working in Vienna General Hospital’s First Obstetrical Clinic, where doctors’ wards had three times the mortality of midwives’ wards.[3] He published a book of his findings in Etiology, Concept and Prophylaxis of Childbed Fever.

Despite various publications of results where hand washing reduced mortality to below 1%, Semmelweis’s observations conflicted with the established scientific and medical opinions of the time and his ideas were rejected by the medical community. Semmelweis could offer no acceptable scientific explanation for his findings, and some doctors were offended at the suggestion that they should wash their hands and mocked him for it. In 1865, the increasingly outspoken Semmelweis supposedly suffered a nervous breakdown and was treacherously committed to an asylum by his colleague. He died a mere 14 days later, at the age of 47, after being beaten by the guards, from a gangrenous wound on his right hand which might have been caused by the beating. Semmelweis’s practice earned widespread acceptance only years after his death, when Louis Pasteur confirmed the germ theory, and Joseph Lister, acting on the French microbiologist’s research, practised and operated using hygienic methods, with great success.

* Dr. Semmelweis had high status and influence. He was well respected, revered, and powerful. He was popular. But he was also a bully, and thus loathed by many of his peers.

* Like many Accepted people, Billy is likable because he has the ability to read the room—any room. His ideas aren’t always better than others’, but he knows exactly when in a meeting to offer them, and he often gets the credit. Just slightly faster than his colleagues, he recognizes when there is an emerging consensus or conflict. He’s good at tuning in to the emotional underpinnings of his coworkers’ statements. But perhaps most important, Billy is adept at using his social skills to help others feel connected to him. He does so in a number of ways. First, Billy is great at asking astute questions. Studies show that people who ask many questions of each other when they first meet—a highly effective way of scanning for an emotional connection—are more likely to have high-quality relationships even months later. When you first meet Billy, his questions clearly communicate that he wants to know more about you, and he finds most everything you say to be interesting, important, and relatable. Billy’s social behavior signals that he cares about the herd. People want to talk to him because they believe that Billy wants to talk to them. That makes him likable. Second, Billy has a terrific sense of humor. This trait also is a function of reading the room well, because a good joke requires understanding the current mood or sentiment, and exaggerating or twisting it for comic effect. More fundamentally, fundamentally, humor offers biological benefits. Laughter is associated with the release of dopamine and endorphins that promote euphoria and improved immune response—and people like others who help them feel good. Third, just like the Accepted children in Coie’s studies, Billy is described by others as someone who is trusted, has many friends, seems fair, happy, polite, patient, and knows how to share. And as research on Accepted children would predict, Billy generally has had a very successful life. Studies show that when Accepted children become adults, they have higher self-esteem, make more money, and have better-quality relationships with friends and romantic partners. They even grow up to be physically healthier than their less accepted peers. The power of likability persists above and beyond the effects of all kinds of factors that we usually think are most important, like intelligence, socioeconomic status, and healthy behavior.

* In childhood, the Neglecteds watch their peers play from afar, remaining behind a fence poking a worm with a stick, rather than joining the others. Or worse, they attempt to take part in a game of hide-and-seek, but no one tries to find them. Some Neglecteds are anxious—desperately eager to be a part of a group but rarely confident enough to initiate interactions with others. Studies show that as adults, Neglected people are a bit slower to begin dating or establish secure, committed relationships, and they usually choose professions that do not rely heavily on interactions with others. They are unlikely to become public speakers, salespeople, or recruiters.

* Research findings tell us that being rejected is one of the most consistent risk factors for a whole range of later psychological symptoms—depression, anxiety, substance use, even criminal behavior. Of course, not every Rejected individual experiences mental illness. But many such children do continue to feel shut out even as adults. Somewhere—at work, in their communities—there is a group that they try to avoid or feel uncomfortable being around. They may opt out of dinner parties or social events, for instance, if there’s a risk of being made to feel inferior again. Like Dan, they may find a spouse and have a few close friends, but they perpetually fear being marginalized. Alternatively, many find a vocation or a workplace populated by others who themselves were Rejected or Neglected. Some become so skilled at engineering their contacts with others that they report no longer feeling very rejected at all. But old feelings of insecurity continue to haunt them when they are thrust outside their comfort zone. Rejecteds also may feel innately unworthy, anxious, or angry. These feelings can manifest themselves subtly, through a continual need for reassurance from loved ones, a sensitivity to signals that they’re being teased or excluded, or fear when meeting people who remind them of their childhood tormentors. It’s common for Rejecteds to develop a push-pull relationship with the world around them, often judging others as a way to feel superior, yet all the while dependent on positive feedback to gird their own fragile self-esteem.

Frank, the social-climbing assistant who manages up so persistently, is a Controversial. In childhood, the Controversials are often the class clowns—everyone’s favorite peer when part of a large group, if not necessarily someone whom people are eager to invite into their circle of close friends. These individuals can be very adroit socially but are also quite aggressive. Many describe them as Machiavellian—strategically using their social skills when it serves them, but also willing to knock others down to get what they want. We don’t know a great deal about how Controversials fare over time. They are relatively difficult to find and as such are often excluded in research studies. But available evidence suggests that although they achieve short-term gain, they do not do well in the long term.

* Substantial evidence suggests that it is our likability that can predict our fate in so many domains of life. Likable people continue to have advantages, and dislikable people will almost always suffer.

* Findings reveal that only about 35 percent of those who are high in status are also highly likable. Many of the rest are Controversial.

* We typically look down on people who openly crave high status. Seeking this type of popularity is the kind of pursuit we associate with preteens and boy bands. We even use derogatory names for adults who seem to brazenly pursue status, like “status-seekers,” “wannabes,” or “fame-mongers.” But is it wrong to desire high status? It’s certainly more socially advantageous to have this type of popularity than not. Imagine attending a party where everyone is excited to talk with you, amused by what you say, and impressed by how great you look. Consider how gratifying it would feel if, at every work meeting, your ideas were heralded as the most inspired and influential. Think how special you would feel if people were excited just to meet you and talked favorably about you afterward. Who wouldn’t want to be venerated by all their peers?

* research shows that when we read about high-status people, talk about them, or even just look at them, those actions are sufficient to activate the social reward centers in our brains. In fact, we tend to gaze at high-status peers (of the same or opposite gender) much longer than we look at others around us. In other words, without our even realizing it, our brains habitually orient us toward status all day long. We also experience social rewards when we believe that someone we admire likes us in return. Anyone who has ever fantasized about meeting a celebrity and then becoming best friends can relate…

* Research also shows that when we are tempted by social rewards, we are particularly likely to act impulsively. This may explain why so many of us have done regrettable things when we are in the presence of high-status peers.

* …not only are we biologically primed to enjoy feeling that others agree with us but those of us who have the most dramatic social reward response are especially likely to conform to the views of others. This all takes place outside of our conscious awareness.

* In adolescence, our self-concept is not merely informed by how our peers treat us but is fully dictated by such experiences. Reflected appraisal continues into adulthood, too, but for some more than others. Many people’s sense of identity seems to be overly influenced by the last bit of positive or negative feedback they received. Hearing that someone likes them makes them feel like a good person, while exclusion turns them into total failures. Some are so invested in having high status (whether fame, beauty, power, or wealth) that it seems as if their entire identity is dependent on it.

* when we crave social rewards, we don’t feel casually about it but view it as the basis of our self-worth.

* Do you still long for status? Do you desire motivational magnets—things that you associate with high standing, like beauty or great wealth? How often is your behavior driven by a yearning for extrinsic reward, and to what degree do you allow your inner experience of happiness and self-worth to be influenced by your popularity among peers?

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #1: How Far Will We Go for Status?

Jane Goodall: Status therefore offers chimpanzees a survival advantage: the more they are attuned to status and driven toward the social rewards it offers, the better chance they have at meeting their basic needs.

* anthropology professor Don Merten was observing a group of cheerleaders in an American high school. In this school, the cheerleaders ruled. Others looked up to them, they had first access to the most popular boys, and they set the trends that many other girls followed. When an unpopular girl decided to join the cheerleading squad, Merten reports, the other girls reflexively behaved aggressively toward her. They teased her. They ostracized her. They made sure that her reputation was besmirched across the entire grade. The cheerleaders knew their treatment of her was mean, and even recognized that it would earn them reputations as stuck-up snobs. It didn’t matter. Merten’s research suggests that the function of aggression is to protect the exclusivity that defines status itself. It is a necessary evil to maintain dominance. The cheerleaders explained to Merten that allowing a lower-status girl to join their group would come with a cost—a decline in the squad’s status. His work subsequently demonstrated that each time a high-status teen acted aggressively in school, whether toward someone in his group or even someone similarly high in status, it was to preserve the social hierarchy. A punch in the face or the start of a nasty rumor was an act of dominance, letting victims and onlookers alike know the boundaries that defined status in that school. Threats to the social order are sanctioned by publically forcing submissiveness.

* Unlike other uses of aggression that are hot-blooded, impulsive, and uncontrolled reactions to anger or frustration—also known as “reactive aggression”—proactive aggression is cold-blooded, calculating, and targeted precisely toward those who threaten the perpetrators’ dominance. Proactive aggression is goal oriented, and the goal is to obtain or defend status. Bullying is the best-known expression of proactive aggression.

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #2: Have We Granted Some of Our Peers Too Much Status?

* Several years later, television star Jenny McCarthy began appearing on talk shows to discuss her new book, in which she claimed that a vast medical conspiracy was covering up a link between vaccines and her son’s autism. To be fair, a parent’s coping strategies and search for meaning in the face of a child’s devastating diagnosis is perfectly understandable. McCarthy never claimed to be a scientist and freely admitted that the evidence supporting her beliefs came only from her “mommy instincts.” Just as we cannot blame Tom Cruise for offering his strongly held opinions about postpartum depression, we cannot fault Jenny McCarthy for trying to help parents as earnestly as she knew how. But the fact that she was a celebrity did have an impact on the power of her opinions. In his book The Panic Virus, Seth Mnookin reports that Jenny McCarthy’s theories on autism “singlehandedly push[ed] vaccine skeptics into the mainstream.” She appeared on television for weeks—not on entertainment programs but on news shows. She sat on panels alongside physicians from the American Academy of Pediatrics, and journalists discussed her ideas as seriously as they did reports on scientific studies and a statement disputing the vaccine theory issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The public not only listened but even changed its opinions. The more McCarthy talked about her distrust of the medical community, the more parents began adopting the same skepticism, eventually making decisions against their own pediatricians’ advice. Mnookin reported that following McCarthy’s televised appearances, the number of parents declining vaccines for their children skyrocketed. It’s one thing to enjoy watching celebrities when they entertain us. It’s another entirely when our fascination with these high-status figures begins to affect our own behavior, even irrationally.

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #3: Is Our Desire for Status Excessive?

Fame is in. Power, influence, and prestige are hot. Character, kindness, and community? Not so much.

* there is no Mandarin word for “popularity” that has the same meaning among adolescents in Western nations

* In the United States, status and likability were very distinct attributes—there was only modest overlap between those teenagers high in one quality and those high in the other. But in China, adolescents who had high status were often also those who were judged to be the most likable. In fact, in the United States, our results revealed that high status was associated with those who were highly aggressive. But in China, we found exactly the opposite—highly aggressive teens were low in status. In a culture that values community, status may not be all that important.

* our increased desire for status reached a turning point in the 1980s, when the media became a peer that never slept. A society accustomed to interacting with a single daily newspaper and a few dozen radio and television programs suddenly found itself presented with thousands of options to receive content twenty-four hours a day. As the media’s power increased exponentially, it started to use every angle it could to make sure that its audience remained motivated to keep tuning in.

* POPULARITY PROBLEM #4: We Think Status Will Make Us Happy

Today we live in a Warholian world, where we all bid for our brief moment of highly visible status. In the United States alone, over $11 billion a year is spent on plastic surgery. Books about how to earn excessive wealth and prestige regularly appear on bestseller lists. Even in our private lives, in moments when we should be working or connecting with loved ones, we post and tweet, with the not-so-subtle hope that we will garner status. The mid-2010s saw the emergence of consulting firms whose sole purpose is to help individuals increase the number of their social media followers. Will all this time, energy, and expense dedicated to raising our status actually pay off? Will high status actually make us happier? The answer is no…

* No matter what their background, those with the highest status in our society all tell a very similar story, one that plays out in a series of stages. Stage 1: Elation. The attainment of high status is accompanied by a whirlwind of attention and adoration. “The first thing that happens is that everything and everybody around you changes . . . And you can feel it filter down to whatever your inner circle of friends is,” explained one subject. The attention also comes with perks: “The access is unbelievable.” “Suddenly, you’re worth something. You’re important.” “When you reach a stage financially when you don’t need freebies, that’s when freebies are thrown to you.”

The experience is variously described as a “guilty pleasure,” a “high,” and a “rush.” Stage 2: Overwhelmed. Most people find their sudden rise in popularity becomes almost too much to deal with. As another subject warned, “Fame 101 is needed to teach people what’s coming: the swell of people, the requests, the letters, the emails, the greetings on the street, the people in cars, the honking of the horns, the screaming of your name. A whole world comes to you that you have no idea is there. It just comes from nowhere. And it starts to build and build like a small tornado, and it’s coming at you, and coming at you, and by the time it gets to you, it’s huge and can sweep you off your feet and take you away.” Not surprisingly, this quickly leads to . . .

Stage 3: Resentment. The attention becomes irritating. “You are an animal in a cage,” the movie star said. “If you’re sitting at a sporting event in a seat and you’re on the aisle . . . all of a sudden you have someone on your left arm kneeling in the aisle [wanting to talk to you]. I want to push them down the stairs.”

Stage 4: Addiction. The ambivalence regarding popularity becomes almost too much to bear. If you’ve ever watched E! True Hollywood Story, you’ll recognize this stage as the moral of each episode. “I’ve been addicted to almost every substance known to man at one point or another, and the most addicting of them all is fame,” said one celebrity. As is true of any addiction, a number of people become dependent on their next hit, hating themselves for wanting it but desperate to have it anyway. Some high-status individuals never get beyond this phase, and their lives become an endless chase for an ever-greater high.

Stage 5: Splitting. The high-status individual realizes that his popularity is not based on his or her actual character at all. “You find out there are millions of people who like you for what you do. They couldn’t care less who you are,” acknowledges one well-known figure, while another says, “It’s not really me . . . it’s this working part of me, or the celebrity part of me . . . So, I am a toy in a shop window.” Some report that they are forced to form split personas to retain any real sense of a genuine self-concept—a version of themselves that is for the public, and a version they can maintain with family and friends, while their true self remains somewhere trapped in between. Over time it becomes harder and harder for them to even remember which is real. One subject reports he has “two different dialogues—the one that I’m thinking and the one I’m saying . . . [I can’t be] as authentic as I’d like to be . . . to show my true self.”

Stage 6: Loneliness and Depression. At this stage, there is no one who really knows the high-status individual at all. As one respondent explains, “I’ve lost friends . . . just by all this adoration that comes whenever you’re in public, [my friends] feel less. They feel inferior . . . You’re special and they aren’t. You’re extraordinary and they’re ordinary . . . and the next thing you know, they’d really rather not have anything to do with you. And you understand them. You have to.”

Stage 7: Wishing for Something Else. Celebrities have everything that many other people wish for, but lack the one thing they desire most.

In response, these high-status individuals decide to invest in something that feels authentic. For some, it’s humanitarian work or charity; for others, it’s stumping for a cause.

* What they discovered was that the pseudo-mature participants who seemed to have it all at thirteen were no longer doing as well. In fact, they seemed to be experiencing many more difficulties than their formerly low-status peers. Allen found that by their twenties, the high-status kids were significantly more likely to abuse alcohol and marijuana, and to have higher likelihoods of serious substance-related problems, like DUIs and drug-related arrests. Even after considering their socioeconomic status and adolescent use of alcohol and marijuana as possible predictors, it was their focus on high status as teens that was significantly related to these adult outcomes. Having high status at age thirteen also predicted poorer-quality friendships later in life.

* High-status teens also were less likely to be involved in satisfying romantic relationships as adults. When those relationships broke up, they were more likely to believe that it was because their partners did not find them to be “popular enough” or “part of the right crowd.” Caring about status at age thirteen seemed to be related to a lifetime of seeking more popularity. Similar results have been found in longitudinal studies of adults. In their studies on extrinsic goals—the kinds of wishes that focus on being well regarded by others—psychologists Richard Ryan and Tim Kasser found a curious link with life satisfaction and well-being.

* those who wish for intrinsic rewards, like those that come from close and caring relationships, personal growth, and helping others, report far greater happiness, vitality, self-esteem, and even physical health. But wishing for extrinsic goals—fame, power, excessive wealth, and beauty—is associated with discontent, anxiety, and depression. When Ryan and Kasser likewise followed their research participants over time, it was those who wished most strongly for status who were the most likely to be faring worse later in their lives.

* our ancient brain wiring has us yearning for status nevertheless, and over time we have created new and sophisticated ways to help satisfy those cravings every day. Society has fostered the illusion that by spending enough time, money, and energy, anyone can attain high status. But that’s not the kind of popularity that will make us happy. Perhaps it’s time for us to realize that status is no longer worth wishing for.

* despite all reason, we remain naturally tuned in to popularity. Yet this instinct doesn’t always help us. Sometimes our tendency to follow the herd can have serious consequences.

* What we found was that simply knowing that their popular peers would be likely to drink alcohol, smoke pot, or have unprotected sex was sufficient to change adolescents’ answers—and dramatically so. Suddenly our participants were far more apt to say they would engage in all these behaviors than they had been when they began our study. Even when they had logged off and were told that none of their peers were watching, our subjects continued to state that they would pursue those risky actions.

* The results revealed that being unpopular—isolated, disconnected, lonely—actually predicts mortality rates. But perhaps even more surprising is just how powerful these effects can be. People in the study who had larger networks of friends had a 50 percent increased chance of survival by the end of the study.

* One of the most common risk factors for suicide attempts is feeling lonely, like a burden to others, or like one doesn’t belong.

* Among adolescents in particular, ostracism from a peer group is an especially strong predictor of suicidal behavior.

* Have you ever noticed that when people talk about feeling lonely, rejected, or unpopular, they tend to use words typically associated with physical illness? Terms like “heartbreak” or “homesick,” emotional “scars,” and “hurt” feelings are common to many languages. Are these just expressions, or is there something about unpopularity that can actually do us physical harm?

* at least some regions of our brain experience unpopularity in the same way that they respond to physical distress—a phenomenon that she refers to as “social pain.” Subsequent research found that these same regions are activated during a whole host of social rejection experiences. As soon as we fear that we might get rejected from the group, our brain sends the most powerful signal at its disposal to warn us and motivate us back into the fold. Worrying about a breakup, seeing pictures of someone being teased, remembering a lost friend or loved one, or even just thinking about being negatively judged by others in the future all seem to implicate the same brain regions.

* research has found that those who have a low tolerance for physical pain also seem to be more sensitive to interpersonal interpersonal rejection, and vice versa. In one experiment, Eisenberger even found that taking a Tylenol can actually reduce the sensation of social pain. Our brains try to ease the pain of headaches and heartbreaks in the exact same way. Unpopularity also is felt in millions of other places in our bodies simultaneously and just as quickly: within our cells.

* At the first sign that we may be banished from the group, our DNA unravels and reorients. In fact, social rejection experiences activate a surprisingly large number of genes, while also deactivating many others. UCLA psychologists George Slavich and Steve Cole, experts in the field of human social genomics, have described DNA as being “exquisitely sensitive to social rejection.” They studied what happens immediately after we’ve been dumped by a romantic partner, excluded from a social event, rejected by a stranger, or even simply told that we may be socially evaluated by others we care about. Within forty minutes, they found, a wide array of changes in our DNA can be detected in the blood. Only a few dozen out of at least twenty thousand genes turn on or off in these moments, but even that small number seem to play a very significant role. According to Slavich and Cole, these activated genes have a radical effect on the immune system. Some are linked to the body’s inflammation response, which comes in handy when we need to heal wounds or fight off bacterial infections. Slavich and Cole suggest that this response to rejection may be nature’s mechanism to help those who were unpopular. Millennia ago individuals who had no peers to protect them faced a high risk of an untimely death due to injury or attack. Those whose bodies preemptively activated a “pro-inflammatory” response that would be ready to heal them from any impending wounds were the most likely to survive. Ultimately, evolution favored bodies that were quickest to respond, and thus most sensitive to rejection.

* despite all of our attempts to create ways to feel more connected than ever, we have never been more apart. Today, we are more likely to live alone, get married later in life, and move our families farther from our loved ones than ever before. In just the past twenty years, the number of people reporting that they feel they have no close confidant has tripled.

* there is one factor that has remarkable power to predict life trajectories. It predicts which children thrive. It predicts which employees succeed. It even predicts who enjoys more rewarding romantic relationships and better physical health. It was the one factor that Jeff had but Steve did not. That factor is likability.

* Likable people are not just perceived to be better at their jobs, more satisfied, happier, and more fulfilled. They actually are all those things. The reason is that likable people live in a different world from the one inhabited by their unlikable peers. It is a world of their own making, and it produces a chain reaction of experiences that molds their lives in dramatic ways.

* But the power of likability is not only evident among children—Accepteds can be identified at any age. Peer relationship dynamics are remarkably similar across the life span, from four-year-olds in preschool to senior citizens in retirement communities. Accepteds also can be found in any context—the classroom, the office, the softball team, places of worship, the PTA. All include some people who seem effortlessly, immensely likable.

* compared to the Rejecteds, Accepted children grew up far less likely to drop out of school, commit crimes, or experience mental illness as adults.

* The children initially picked as most likable by their peers grew up to be most likely to be employed and to have gotten promotions. The likable kids also had better odds of being in long-term, satisfying friendships and romantic partnerships.

* The most likable people are those who cooperate with others, are helpful, share, and follow the rules. Likable people are generally well adjusted. They are smart (but not too smart!). They are often in a good mood. They can hold up their end of a conversation. But they make sure to give others a turn to speak, too. They are creative, especially at solving awkward social dilemmas. And perhaps most important: they don’t disrupt the group.

* Researchers measured each subject’s IQ, aggressive and disruptive behavior, history of physical and mental illness, parents’ level of education and income, and even the child’s future goals. After accounting for all of these possible influences on adult outcomes, it was likability that predicted happiness, employment, and income decades later.

* Likable children even grew up less prone than others to be diagnosed with diabetes, obesity, high cholesterol, or high blood pressure.

* Students invariably write that they are shocked by how much their own behavior changed on T-shirt day. They are even more surprised to see how those changes created a cascade effect—their behaviors caused others to respond in unexpected ways, which prompted their own uncommon reactions, and so on, in an endless feedback loop. Shy students, for example, approached people they had hoped to talk to for weeks. During these conversations they felt more confident, happy, and optimistic. They were surprised to discover that their peers laughed at their jokes, seemed interested in what they had to say, and even invited them to hang out again. Angry students, who didn’t usually feel very connected with others on campus, couldn’t believe how often they smiled on the day they wore the T-shirt. To their surprise, others smiled back, and suddenly they didn’t feel as angry or lonely. Some reported that it was the first time in weeks that they had chosen to leave their dorms and go out to mingle with others on Franklin Street, Chapel Hill’s famous strip. Students who typically stared down at their phones as they walked across campus looked up on that day and offered friendly nods to others as they walked by. Their peers nodded back, and my students reported that they felt an increased sense of community, so much so that they were even more likely to raise their hands in other courses. Overall, the consensus of the members of the class each year is that when the world treated them differently, even just for a day, it changed their behavior and their feelings in surprising ways. One student wrote, “If I wore that T-shirt every day in my childhood, so to speak, I would be a different human being now.”

This experiment offers an opportunity to learn how much our own behavior and mood can be affected by altering how we approach the world even for just one day. It also helps explain the power of likability, because being likable changes not only how people treat us, but ultimately how we grow and develop over the course of our own lives. Stated simply, likable people are treated very well. And not just for a single day, but every day.

* Research demonstrates that likable children indeed develop advanced social skills faster than their peers. Among nine- to ten-year-olds, for instance, likable kids are the first to form emotionally intimate friendships while others are still engaged in juvenile play. When they are a few years older, likable youth are among the first to participate in monogamous romantic partnerships, while their peers are still experimenting with fleeting teen crushes. Of course, developing refined social skills makes these adolescents that much more likable, thus advancing the cycle even further. The same transactional model explains why being disliked can result in a lifetime of thwarted opportunities and disadvantage. Research reveals that there are many behaviors that lead to being disliked. We can alienate others by acting aggressively, breaking social norms egregiously and unapologetically, unapologetically, acting selfishly, or “oversharing” our own problems in a manner that places self-interest over the needs of the group. But as much as these behaviors can affect a disagreeable person in the moment, it is their impact on other people—the transactions they initiate—that are responsible for the enduring problems experienced by dislikable people.

* While likable people live in a world in which they are treated well, unlikable people are avoided, ridiculed, or victimized. In early childhood, Rejecteds are less likely to be invited to playdates and birthday parties, or even to take part in games. Each time this occurs, it represents a missed opportunity to learn new social skills. Of course, lacking social skills only makes them that much more unlikable, perpetuating a sad and damaging cycle. Not surprisingly, by middle school, Rejected children are less adept at following group rules, negotiating conflicts with friends, or knowing how to take turns in large conversations. By adolescence, they are among the last to begin dating and often have limited their friends only to others who were similarly rejected in childhood.

* social mimicry can also unconsciously affect our emotions, which helps explain why we prefer to spend time with likable people and avoid those who are awkward, mean, or sad. We’ve all had the experience of meeting a negative mood magnet—someone who radiates despair and pessimism wherever he or she goes. Even after they depart, we find ourselves feeling down, too, maybe wondering why we’re in a bad mood. After just a few moments interacting with sad, socially awkward confederates in experiments, participants commonly report feeling the same way themselves.

* after dates with an awkward, sad individual, participants themselves reported a decrease in their own happiness and energy, as well as far less interest in meeting for a second date. Results like these suggest that for gloomy, unlikable people, the world itself is truly quite dreary. Every interaction they have is a bit sadder than it has to be, without them realizing how their own behavior affected others’ moods and made it more likely they would be rejected again. Meanwhile, happy, likable people seem to be perpetually surrounded by positivity, cheerfulness, and acceptance. Their upbeat nature is so infectious that we feel they bring out the best in us, and we seek out opportunities to be in their presence—all the while unaware that their mysterious “positive energy” is simply the work of social mimicry. Even their laughter is contagious, which accounts for why TV shows have laugh tracks. Hearing others laugh makes us more likely to do so.

* the more likably I behaved, the kinder the agent was in return. When I was more socially aversive, however, the agent was equally curt. My behavior didn’t only affect how each agent acted toward me but also the quality of his support. In each instance when I acted in a dislikable manner, agents listened less intently and were more error-prone. When the agents liked me, I received more helpful suggestions. But there were also some results I did not expect. Being likable didn’t only affect the behavior of the agents I spoke with; ultimately, the transactions had a surprising impact on me as well.

* Being likable didn’t just change how others felt about me, it changed my happiness and success as well. Once I noticed this, it was amazing to witness how easily I could affect so many outcomes—at work or home, among strangers or friends—simply by acting in the ways that make people likable. In each instance, the snowball effects were remarkable. Every compliment bolstered my mood…

* “Excessive reassurance-seeking.” It often takes place in the context of a romantic relationship but can also occur in friendships or even between employee and supervisor. Experts in excessive reassurance-seeking, like Jim Coyne and Thomas Joiner, have proposed that this behavior sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure. The constant questioning and doubting of a reassurance-seeker can make an individual from whom reassurance is sought feel distrusted, stressed, and ineffective, wondering, “Why can’t I help this person that I care so much about? Why doesn’t he or she believe me?” Eventually, the pressure to continually reassure causes them to withdraw. They become slow to return messages, less convincing in their declarations of love. They become less comforting, and of course, this is exactly what the reassurance-seeker is hypervigilant to detect.

* who we were as teenagers may influence our lives even more than who we are today.

* “depressive realism,” suggests that vigilance toward negative cues actually can lead to a more objective and clearer view of social information, undistorted by a positive bias. For this reason, some research has shown that previously unpopular people are perceived by others as more empathetic and more sensitive in social situations.

* those high in status had a poorer ability to consider others’ perspective. Participants high in social status also score more poorly than those low in status on tests of emotional intelligence, empathy, the ability to detect sarcasm, and correctly noticing a variety of emotional expressions.

* “rejection sensitivity” bias, a tendency to expect and emotionally react to rejection that creates a cycle of lifelong unpopularity: we wish to be popular, assume we are not, and then in turn yearn for it all the more. Not surprisingly, this type of bias also predicts a host of related negative outcomes throughout our lives, including body dissatisfaction, burnout at work, depression, and loneliness. Adults with high levels of rejection sensitivity are even more likely to contract infectious illnesses and to develop heart disease.

* Prior social standing and resulting biases may cause changes in brain wiring that take some effort to override.

* A second common interpretation bias may also seem familiar: the tendency to assume that others are being hostile in an emotionally equivocal situation. Remember your tardy friend at the coffee shop? A person with a hostile attribution bias might feel intentionally stood up because their friend was being cruel. This type of bias is common among those who were unpopular adolescents… When they mature, children with hostile attribution bias turn into our paranoid neighbors and cynical coworkers, people who are at greater risk for problems at home and work.

* those who were popular chose to behave in ways that would allow them to mend relationships and even build friendships with the bully. In contrast, those who were unpopular were more interested in revenge, in appearing dominant, or in avoiding the situation entirely. In other words, unpopular children’s impulses were to be aggressive, rude, or passive.

* We have thousands of social interactions every day. For each event, we encode information from the world around us and interpret it. Finally, if the situation calls for a response, we act. While psychologists understand this reaction as a series of social information processing steps, we experience it in less than a millisecond, without contemplation or deliberation. Those milliseconds combine to fill our days, influence our relationships, define our identities, and ultimately determine our lives—who we are. These automatic reactions can make us seem as if we have terrific instincts or can get us into trouble. And the basis for what we see, how we act, and what we do all day every day is in large part a function of our high school popularity.

* the more we value status, the more our ability to distinguish between good and bad may be compromised. Popularity can become the only value that matters…

* One of the factors that most strongly predicts who will be popular and who will be rejected is whether they are raised in an aggressive social environment…

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Liberal Democracy

Paul Gottfried writes in this 2017 book:

* WHEN I WAS A YOUNG FACULTY MEMBER at Rockford College forty years ago, my divisional chairman, who was a devout disciple of Leo Strauss, once complained that a colleague he had just spoken to did not believe in liberal democracy. I’ve no idea how my superior came by this knowledge, but he was deeply upset that his colleague didn’t praise “liberal democracy as being better than other forms of government.” Our divisional chairman then shared with me a text he was working on that proved that Marx “rejected liberal democracy.” Up until that moment I had never encountered the term “liberal democracy,” and when I first heard it mentioned, I thought it was a reference to Democrats who endorsed Senator George McGovern.
I thereupon researched the operative term and learned that it was of fairly recent origin. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton didn’t apply it when they described the nascent American regime in The Federalist. Appeals to “democracy” by Presidents Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson were to a populist spirit, not to a hallowed form of government…

* Although the United States ultimately became a more ideologically infused political society as a result of the Civil War, as late as at the beginning of the last century, according to Robert Nisbet and Forrest McDonald, the major involvement of the federal government in our lives was the collection and delivery of mail. This was long after the southern states were prevented from seceding, with devastating force, and long after President Lincoln had proclaimed a “new birth” for a nation “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”¹

* A visit to Wikipedia indicates that the concept “liberal democracy” came into vogue during the Progressive Era, with the efforts of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to reconfigure American republican government according to the needs of an urban, industrial society.² In my book After Liberalism, I undertake to examine this fateful conjuncture and offer reasons for its emergence.³ But in researching my book, I couldn’t trace any widespread usage of the term “liberal democracy” even as far back as the early twentieth century. Except for some fleeting references to it by English Hegelian Thomas Hill Green around 1910, “liberal democracy” did not make an appearance during the early twentieth century.

* By 2009 “liberal democracy” had acquired such favorable connotations that it served as a generic compliment for a regime that was agreeable to the speaker.

* …Allan Bloom’s exhortations to Americans in The Closing of the American Mind to impose “democracy and human rights” on unreceptive societies as “an educational experience” if necessary by military force.

* “Liberal democracy” as a term or concept has gained currency primarily for two reasons. One is its vagueness; it can be made to mean what the speaker wants it to signify. Not surprisingly, one finds online numerous meanings given to “liberal democracy,” from freedom and equality combined with some kind of representative government protecting minority rights, to a government that redistributes income in accordance with the needs of the majority. We are further led to believe that democracy and liberalism fuse at a certain point, on the way to becoming social democracy. Sometimes “liberal democratic” government is linked to a linguistic, geographic context. It is made synonymous with the political practices of the Anglosphere, an appellation that embraces the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and other English-speaking regions. These regions are seen as blessed
with a shared political culture, which is styled “liberal democracy.”

This concept or term has geographical and ethnic reference points. It can mean the political practices that now prevail in certain regions of the Western world and in its cultural extensions elsewhere. Those who apply this term often gloss over the fact that political arrangements in England and the United States looked different hundreds of years ago from how these institutions later evolved. Fans of the Anglosphere sometimes apply the label “liberal democratic” to English-speaking peoples, no matter whether the regime being referred to was an aristocratic oligarchy, bourgeois liberal monarchy, or modern public administration. They thereby designate either our present political system or something that is thought to have led, however tortuously, in its direction.

There is a second reason that “liberal democracy” has caught on: it expresses a value judgment about what the speaker intends to praise. It suggests the political equivalent of the traditional Catholic idea of “no salvation outside the Church.” No one but a fool would imagine that the term is purely descriptive. It is a god term, on the altar of which the worshipper can never slay enough fattened calves. Although the term “liberal democratic” has been made to serve a number of political purposes, it has also, not incidentally, been raised to sacral significance. It is a concept or rallying cry that the neoconservatives bestowed on the Republican Party as they made their historic journey from the Left to become the American conservative establishment.

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Revisions and Dissents: Essays

Paul Gottfried writes in this 2017 book:

A classical or essentialist Right is hard to find in the contemporary Western world, where journalists and other assorted intellectuals rush to denounce its bearers—or even partial bearers—as “fascists.” That may be one reason that such types rarely come into public view, outside of certain European parties that have been able to survive in a multiparty electoral system. Being on the essentialist Right is deadly in an academic or journalistic milieu that features almost exclusively quintessential leftist values. There are some isolated intellectual groups in the United States that betray a right-wing gestalt. But these groups are usually cut off from the conservative mainstream lest they endanger “conservative” institutes or publications by expressing improper ideas. This is entirely understandable given the prevalence of leftist influences in Western societies and the extent to which the establishment non-Left has absorbed leftist values and attitudes that have come from a predominantly leftist culture and educational system.

Contrary to a widespread misconception, the Right is not that side that plays up “values” in opposition to a “relativistic” Left. It is truly remarkable how tenaciously the Left fights for its “values.” Leftists believe fervently in an overshadowing vision of universal equality. Though those of a different persuasion might differ with leftists over its highest value, it is evident that a moral vision infuses the Left’s political concerns. It also makes no sense to define the Right as the side that wishes to move mountains in order to confer “human rights” on the entire world. Both the notion of human rights and the mission to impose them universally are derived from the classical Left, going back to the French Revolution. The fact that such a global mission is now thought to characterize the Right underscores the utter confusion into which Right-Left distinctions have drifted. Finally, one does not join the essentialist Right by wishing to get off the train of progress just before the present moment.

* Each time I see an adolescent blogger or pubescent columnist introduced to the viewing public as a “leading conservative,” I crack the same joke to whoever is around: “Does this teenager follow Burke or Maistre?” By now, “conservative” signifies what certain journalists and certain news commentators decide to advocate. Journalists who take Republican policy positions are sometimes described as conservative theorists, although I am still struggling to find out what exactly makes such people “conservative” or “theo-rists.” Presumably by defending the last Republican chief executive, President George W. Bush, the speaker gains recognition as a “conservative” thinker.

* The range of our life choices is far more determined by culture, heredity, and geographic location than someone who is addicted to Ayn Rand mega-novels might wish to believe.

Even more relevant to my argument is that there is nothing right-wing or even vaguely conservative about the way Libertarians approach the question of liberty. Unlike the essentialist Right’s reading of Aristotle or Burke, Libertarians understand freedom as a universally shared good to which everyone everywhere is entitled by virtue of being an individual. Although I would not prohibit others, even if I were in the position to do so, from espousing such a view, it is not clear what renders this Libertarian understanding of social relations specifically right-wing. The classical conservative view of liberty flows from the legal implications of someone’s standing in a particular society, held together by shared custom and distributed duties.

* Libertarians are seen from the Right as promoting a leftist position, which presupposes the idea of universal equality and even universal citizenship. It is therefore no surprise that Russell Kirk, Eric von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Robert Nisbet, and other twentieth-century conservative thinkers eschewed Libertarians. The doctrinaires they scorned rejected the conservative notion of the social bond and were proclaiming principles that issued from the French Revolution.

* In Liberalism, Ancient and Modern, Leo Strauss sets out to define the essentialist conservative worldview circa 1960.¹ Its exponents “regard the universal and homogeneous state as either undesirable though possible, or as both undesirable and impossible.”² They do not like international bodies, which they identify with the Left, and “look with greater sympathy than liberals on the particular or particularist and the heterogeneous.”

* The Right affirms inherited hierarchy, favors the particularistic while being suspicious of what claims to be the universal, aims at preserving social traditions where possible, and opposes the Left by every means at its disposal. The Left takes the opposite positions on the first three points out of a sense of fairness, a passionate commitment to the advancement of equality, and a conception of human beings that stresses sameness or interchangeability. Whereas the Right believes in what Aristotle defined as the order of the household—in which elaborately defined distinctions are deemed “natural”—the Left recoils from nonegalitarian arrangements. Its advocates are delighted to have state managers and judges abolish the vestiges of inherited hierarchy.

* The Left is committed to removing, as far as humanly possible, social, racial, and gender inequalities. Furthermore, the more control it accumulates, the easier it is for the Left to reconstruct or recode those who resist its planning. German social theorist Arnold Gehlen was struck by how younger Germans in the 1960s exhibited what he called “hypermorality.”⁴ Contrary to the opinion that such youth, who frequently turned into militant antifascists, suffered from a lack of values, Gehlen noticed their hysterical moral zeal spilling over into their entire lives.⁵ This was partly due to a prolonged reaction to the Nazis, who were depicted by German educational institutions as conservatives. But Gehlen also linked the culture of moral indignation in his homeland to being cut off from any traditional communal association. In Germany, this process started with the Nazi revolution, was accelerated by a lost war, and then continued through a postwar occupation, which weakened even further any traditional German national identity.

* “Science” is to be advanced insofar as it discredits Christianity, which includes a dark side that sanctions gender distinctions and privileges heterosexual marriage. Science may also be pursued as a learning or discovery activity, providing it does not operate to the detriment of the Left’s highest good.

* Science, however, remains instrumental for the Left and is meant to serve the march toward equality. If, for example, someone cited research evidence substantiating socially significant genetic differences between genders or ethnic groups, that scientist and/or author would likely encounter considerable difficulty in academic life or as a government consultant. In the leftist universe biological science may be called on, but only as long as it does not conflict with the proper ideological ends, which is promoting approved egalitarian teachings. In the same way, the theory of evolution is fine for the Left if the information being gathered can be directed against religionists or social reactionaries.

The Darwinian hypothesis about nature hits a snag, however, as soon as someone brings up the social significance of deeply rooted gender differences that may have been necessary for the perpetuation of human and animal life. There may be no reason here to belabor the obvious, which is the selective character that evolutionary theory has assumed for the Left. The philosopher of science David Stove has addressed this topic in his instructive work Darwinian Fairytales, in which he deals with the mythic as opposed to scientific aspects that evolutionary theory has assumed for intellectuals and journalists.¹² Stove’s book highlights evolutionary theory’s continuing value as a polemical tool rather than scientific hypothesis.

* The Right has sanctified its own version of an instrumental good. Having sometimes defined itself as the political expression of the doctrine of original sin, the Right has invested heavily in certain aspects of Christianity, just as the Left has made an equal investment in its selective conception of science. Although there is no evidence that many of the great conservative theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, starting with Burke, were orthodox Christians, their political worldviews would have been unthinkable without some kind of Christian theological foundation.

The concept of hierarchy that conservatives defended went back to the Catholic Middle Ages, in which feudal relations were freighted with sacral significance. Temporal forms of command corresponded to the order of the church that was ultimately based on the structure of Roman authority. The notion of human fallenness was invoked in an empirical as well as theological fashion to drive home the point that human beings lack the capacity or right to reinvent themselves and their social contexts. Indeed, such experiments were sinful or hubristic and likely to result in disaster. Traditional conservatives were fond of quoting Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, which affirmed that all authority is from God.¹⁴ It is not for naught that God delivered the sword into the hand of the magistrate.¹⁵ Needless to say, the “arche” or authority here invoked by conservatives was one that was handed down from one generation to the next.

* The Left has also benefited from being rooted in a Christian heritage. Friedrich Nietzsche famously scorned Christian religion as the source of the “slave morality” that begat feminism and egalitarian democracy. While the Right saw in Christianity a justification for settled authorities, the Left drew from it the vision of a world in which “the first would be last” and “the meek would inherit the Earth.” Such ideas of “social justice” could be derived from the Hebrew prophets, the Gospels, and the sharing of worldly possessions in the primitive church. Unlike the Right, however, the Left worked studiously to hide its debt to the Western religious tradition, claiming that its teachings were scientifically grounded or came from immaculately secular sources. This denial of paternity has gone so far that Marxists and cultural Marxists have tried to root out any explicitly Christian influences in their societies. Rarely does one find a more dramatic illustration of the Oedipal complex. Christopher Dawson and Mircea Eliade have both observed that the modern Left would be unthinkable without its distinctly Christian, even more than Judaic, matrix.

* Right and Left have historical identities and essentialist definitions, and it may be necessary to go into each one’s characteristics in order to make sense of our reference points. It is usually brought up in a discussion of this type that the distinction between Right and Left was formalized during the French Revolution, in accordance with where political factions were seated in the French National Assembly. Those who favored further revolutionary change swelled the left side of the amphitheater; those who felt the ferment had raged too long and had to be quieted sat on the right side. In the (classically) liberal July Monarchy of King Louis Philippe I—set up in 1830 and overthrown to make way for the French Second Republic in 1848—there were two major parliamentary factions: a party of resistance and a party of movement. This distinction encapsulates what may be seen, in an oversimplified fashion, as the basic difference between Right and Left: one is the party of standing pat or making only necessary changes, while the other party is intent on pushing change further.

* The traditional Right stood for an agrarian way of life that reflected a traditional authority structure that was typically allied to the Catholic Church or to Protestant state churches and entrenched monarchies. This conservative Right turned to the
past for what the southern agrarian Richard Weaver called its “vision of order.”

* All political-ideological groupings in the nineteenth century had accompanying social foundations. Liberalism was the “idea of the bourgeoisie,” just as socialism attracted the working class and sympathetic intellectuals. Conservatism originated in modern European history as an aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution, while the Left defined itself initially as a defender of this revolutionary process—together with the rationalist thinking that supposedly fueled the engine of progress. The sides that were taken were both social and ideological, and the two characteristics traveled together. In an earlier age it would have been difficult to think of distinctive worldviews apart from the concrete interests of the groups to which they were attached. Ideologies, however, eventually assumed a life of their own.

* Universalism, equality, human rights, and managed democracy will likely remain the order of the day in first-world countries. Freedom will be allowed to survive to whatever extent it can be made compatible with equality. Christian institutions will be tolerated to whatever extent they teach the required values and instill obedience to a leftist state. This will happen—at least partly—because the modern state has expanded its power base at the expense of intermediate institutions, including churches and communities. But this success also stems from the now triumphant leftist vision, which encompasses every aspect of human life.

* The Right, that is, the authentic one, is far more splintered than the Left for a number of reasons. It controls few if any institutions in Western countries and, even worse for its future, possesses no identity that its current representatives would all recognize as their own. The Right is not only untethered but also burdened by the infighting of its constituent groups. Mainstream “conservatives” in the meantime have become an integral part of the public discussions in the national media. These designated “conservatives” enjoy journalistic acceptance as the respectable opposition and provide televised sound bites and political best
sellers in an age of mass communication.

The success of this artificial Right stems at least partly from the backing of moneyed interests, whether in the form of corporate donors or leaders of the Republican Party. Those who receive this largess are now the sole recognized occupants of the visible opposition, and they have been sedulous in keeping out of their political conversation unseemly reactionaries. This media-approved Right has nothing to fear from what lies outside the mainstream. The nonaligned or classical Right, call it what one will, cannot even agree on what defines its “Rightness.” Its competing representatives are all holding tight to fragments of what was once a pristine conservative worldview. But that may be where the common ground ends. The traditionalists are beset with quarrels about what exactly the “true teachings” are.

* The true or essentialist Right simply wants to stop what is generally viewed as the train of progress and, if possible, reverse its direction. Although there were once unifying visions of order among classical conservatives, these orientation points have disappeared and been replaced by pure desperation.

This continuing loss of ground is disheartening for those who are struggling against a hostile age, and comparable developments have overtaken the independent Right—or those groups that comprise one—in Western European countries. In Germany at the time of national reunification in the early 1990s, the national Right vibrated with excitement over the prospect of a unified country. Germans would at last be able to put off their sackcloth and ashes and would no longer have to view themselves as a pariah nation. Their reference point as a people would no longer be their humiliating defeat in 1945, nor would they would have to talk in a ritualized fashion any longer about the “burden” of their entire history, as a prelude to Auschwitz. Once again, Germans could be a proud nation, as they were at the time of their unification in 1871.
Never did national conservatives anywhere miscalculate so badly. Former Communist functionaries and agents of the Communist secret police streamed into government positions in the Federal Republic, exchanging their pro-Soviet Communist identities for cultural Marxist ones. A party of the Left became a major force in German politics, and it was made up of hastily disguised Communists like
the leader of the Party of Democratic Socialists, Gregor Gysi. Indeed, even the current chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, turns out to have been an obliging Communist, almost up until the moment when the Berlin Wall fell.
Hoping to protect themselves against the anxieties voiced by Western journalists and politicians about a resurgent German nationalism, German chancellors from Helmut Kohl down to Angela Merkel have put funds and energy into a government-organized “crusade against the Right.” This enterprise has turned out to be little more than a witch hunt against the opposition directed by embattled Leftists—including longtime Communists—but no significant outcry against this intimidation has been raised. Furthermore, no politician hoping to make a career in Germany would express patriotic sentiments too loudly or suggest that he or she is not eagerly awaiting Germany’s further absorption into the European Union (EU). German elites have been pushing their country dramatically toward the Left ever since reunification.

* The treatment of Bismarck, as illustrated by Steinberg’s work,¹⁸ points to a problem that I myself encountered as a young man writing about German history. The difficulty of my task was already evident when I was doing graduate work at Yale in the mid-1960s. No matter what aspect of German history was under consideration, we were expected to uncover a path leading to the Third Reich. All German history was considered “tragedy” or—as underlined in A. J. P. Taylor’s The Course of German History¹⁹ and William M. McGovern’s From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy²⁰—the prelude to a disaster inflicted on the world by an unusually nasty people who had been perpetually taken in by horrible leaders and diabolical intellectuals. From Bismarck to Hitler, a world historical catastrophe was always just around the corner between the Rhine and the Elbe. We were also urged to assume that the Germans and Austrians were exclusively responsible for the Great War.
According to Fritz Fischer, who pioneered studies stressing Germany’s premeditated plan to unleash a European-wide war on the way to becoming a world power, “Hitler was no operational accident.”²¹ From Fischer’s perspective, all of German history since Bismarck’s work of unification had been preparation for the Nazi catastrophe.²² As a graduate student I was treated to the less than friendly admonition that believing any other account of the outbreak of World War I was to belittle the German problem.²³ Such a move would send a dangerous message—or so the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has underlined for more than forty years—that the Germans were not required to abjure their national identity as a precondition for world peace. According to Habermas, nothing less than a repudiation of the German past would cleanse his country of its inherited evil ways and protect surrounding countries against further eruptions of Teutonic violence.²⁴
In my periodic discussions with teachers and later, colleagues, it seemed that veracity mattered less than moralizing. Stress was placed on the therapeutic effect of certain narratives…
[Harry Elmer] Barnes’s summary explanation for the outbreak of the Great War comes closest to my present view on the subject:

“The basic causes of the war were general ones such as nationalism, imperialism, militarism, for which no single country can be held either uniquely or primarily responsible. They were fanned and intensified by both future belligerent sides and sprang from German militarism, French revenge aspirations, British navalism and imperialism, the century-old Russian ambition to get control of Constantinople and the Straits. Whatever the case earlier, Germany was far less prepared for war in a military sense in 1914 than Russia and France. General Buat [a French commander] admits that in 1914 the French active army was 910,000 to 870,000 for Germany with nearly twice the population of France; and Repington, the English military critic, admits that the German army in regard to equipment, military manoeuvres, and leadership was inferior to the French. This was especially true in the artillery branch. The active Russian army [at the time] numbered 1,284,000.²⁹”

Although Barnes made regrettable statements after World War II that downplayed Nazi atrocities, these indiscretions do not detract from his understanding of World War I. All too often, his positions taken at different times about different events are dishonestly run together in a way that makes Barnes’s defensible views on World War I appear to be a prelude to his later depreciation of Nazi crimes.

* The more than a million Russian troops that appeared on the Austro-German border just before the outbreak of war were not placed there for decoration. The Russians were preparing for a conflict with the Central Powers, and with special vigor after French president Raymond Poincaré promised military assistance from his country during a visit to St. Petersburg during the third week of July.

* Noting shared responsibility for the war does not require us to defend the Schlieffen Plan—as modified by the chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke—in 1914.³⁵ Moltke’s success in getting the German government to move its armies through a neutral country, Belgium, in order to carry out a flanking motion around the bulk of the French forces, led to predictable disaster. Indeed it may have doomed the German side during the first week of the struggle.³⁶ This strategy required the occupation of an intensely hostile Belgian population, a reaction that might have been expected since the Germans were obliged to move
through a fervently Francophile region of Belgium.³⁷ Moltke’s military venture also provided the English war party with an excuse to declare war on the Central Powers.

* For example, history should not be practiced as a form of political advocacy; the area of study that the historian concentrates on should provide enough intellectual and emotional stimulation so that he does not have to yield to partisan enthusiasms; and someone doing history should aim at Sachlichkeit, objectivity, even if this ideal can never be more than distantly approximated in practice.

* Unlike “democratic” France and “liberal” England, the German Empire, we are told, was “autocratic” and “militaristic” and therefore had no scruples about unleashing World War I. But as Barnes reminds us, France had a much larger and better equipped army, with a much smaller population, than did Germany in 1914. Although there was an established principle of ministerial responsibility in relation to the National Assembly, and although France held direct elections for its exec-
utive head, this did not prevent the French government before World War I from behaving militaristically and belligerently. French president Poincaré, who tried to goad Russia into war against the Central Powers, was more given to saber rattling
than German chancellor Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg. Although Bethmann- Hollweg was technically only responsible to his sovereign, he tried in vain to conciliate the British—who viewed Germany as a dangerous rival—and even succeeded in scaling back the German naval program by 1912. Certainly the British had a better-developed parliamentary system than their German cousins, but this did
not prevent a minority of the Liberal cabinet after 1905 from engaging in adventurous continental diplomacy in order to isolate Germany. Moreover, these “conversations” were carried out behind the backs of the Commons, that is, behind the backs of seventeen members of the ruling cabinet who would have opposed the actions of the war party.⁶³
Nor should we assume, as Barnes and Walter Karp⁶⁴ point out, that the US government, which was supposed to be paradigmatically democratic and pacifistic, behaved in a restrained manner during World War I. Neither major party in the United States stayed neutral in the war; both were demonstratively pro-British. Nor did our leaders—except for the principled secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan—make serious efforts to stay out of the European strife or push peace initiatives when they were still possible. Although President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing—who took over for William Jennings Bryan after
he resigned in 1915—were effusively pro-British and turned a blind eye to the starvation blockade imposed by the British on the German civilian population, their opponents attacked them as insufficiently pugnacious. Republican leaders were furious that Wilson waited until April 1917 before plunging his country into the war. The subsequent suppression of civil liberties in “democratic” America went well beyond anything that occurred in “autocratic” Germany or Austria-Hungary, where opposition to the war did not result in the protestor’s immediate arrest and where enemy newspapers were still openly circulated.

* Another example of the victor’s history being given a Manichean twist has been the tendency of the recently deceased Harry V. Jaffa and his well-placed disciples to play off the “democratic statesmanship” of Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln against what was allegedly autocratic leadership. The heavies in this hagiography are predictably the Germans, the antebellum South, and the Muslim enemies of the state of Israel. Yet those who entered the democratic pantheon may have gotten there because of good fortune as much as for any other reason.

* The attempts in the nineteenth century to compare Bismarck and Lincoln were fully understandable. But we must also consider that one of these giants was obviously more successful than the other in gaining the admiration of a later generation. This may have been partly due to the vagaries of fortune rather than humanitarian behavior. Bismarck, who is now far less admired than Lincoln, shed far less blood in achieving his national goal. Let us say counterfactually that Lincoln saved the American Union at an enormous price, but did not free slaves after he sent armies to quell the southern rebellion. Would he still enjoy his present divine-like status?

* I used to gripe (and perhaps still do) about a lightweight book published by Republican Party journalist Jonah Goldberg, Liberal Fascism.⁸³ I was annoyed by the attention this work received in a field in which true researchers usually labor for a pittance. Unlike diligent but largely unrecognized scholars, Goldberg drew copious comments from the national press and parlayed his writing efforts into big bucks. I was especially turned off by the ludicrous comparisons of prominent Democratic politicians to Italian fascists and by the forced parallels between Hillary Clinton and German Nazi officials. Most horrifying of all, this screed remained on the New York Times best-seller list for nonfiction from February 2008 through April 2008 and even reached first place by March 8, 2008.⁸⁴
Since then it has dawned on me that there is nothing about this publishing coup that should have offended me. Goldberg produced propaganda for his party masked as historical analysis and sold his well-packaged product to FOX News junkies and Republican Party loyalists. Recently, Republican presidential candidate senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) paid homage to Goldberg’s interpretation by accusing the Democrats of being “the home of liberal fascism.”⁸⁵ It was as a Republican commentator, not as a scholar of fascism, that Goldberg achieved mass sales and obtained lucrative invitations to speak. The author achieved what he was hoping to
accomplish in a media culture. To paraphrase an old adage, nothing succeeds as thoroughly as success.

* The preface to the second edition might well be Bagehot’s most truly conservative commentary. There he insisted that there was nothing inherently just or moral about extending the vote, if it would weaken constitutional liberty and the quality of national leadership. Englishmen should not have been congratulating themselves on having a “newly enfranchised class.” As Bagehot put it:

We have not enfranchised a class less needing to be guided by their betters than the old class [of small property owners]; on the contrary, the new class needs it more than the old. The real question is, Will they submit to it, will they defer in the same way to wealth and rank, and to the higher qualities of which these are the rough symbols and the common accompaniments?²³

As a much younger person, I quoted these lines almost verbatim when the US Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.²⁴ Even while acknowledging that the black vote had been deliberately depressed for many decades in violation of the US Constitution, self-styled conservatives need not have rejoiced, which many of them did, that a massive black vote was being mobilized with federal assistance. One effect of that added vote was electoral support for laws and executive acts that reduced traditional restraints on the federal government. The Voting Rights Act also led to measures that increased government surveillance over what has be-come a greatly restricted liberty of association. Although Bagehot regarded the Reform Act of 1867 as almost unstoppable, he certainly didn’t believe that sanctified its passage.²⁵ Nor did Bagehot equate “justice” with extensions of the franchise,
particularly if the effect of the widened suffrage would be a leap into the dark. The Reform Act was something that he knew he and his allies could not hold back, but as an advocate of “rule by the best,” he was justified in questioning what he viewed as a falling away from his ideal.

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