The Borrowed Functioning of Schmitt Scholars

I first saw the term “borrowed functioning” in David Schnarch’s book Passionate Marriage, and I’ve kept repeating it ever since because it is such a concise summary of a painful reality. In my case, I’ve often added a friend or two along the way, and when this happens, I move on from my typical stray dog psychology and I feel great as I cruise along in society, until I get separated from my friends, and then as one woman told me after seeing me looking lost at a large Shabbat dinner, “I just felt so sorry for you.”
I only need one good friend to function properly!
David Schnarch uses borrowed functioning to describe how people regulate their sense of self through their proximity to others rather than through what he calls a solid flexible self. The borrowed functioner feels competent, alive, and purposeful when fused with someone whose emotional state or social energy he can draw on. The problem is not the relationship. The problem is that the regulation is external. When the other person is unavailable, moves away, or simply has a bad week, the borrower has no internal reserve to draw on. He returns to baseline because the baseline was always what was actually there.
What makes the pattern hard to break is that it works. The friendships are real. The good feeling is real. The period of borrowed elevation is not false, which is why it is so compelling and why the drop feels so catastrophic rather than merely disappointing.
The exception works on populations the same way a vitalizing friendship works on a borrowed functioner. The sovereign names a crisis and people who have been running at a depleted baseline suddenly feel real, purposeful, and connected. Then the exception passes and the flatness returns. Liberal order is the baseline. The exception is the friend whose energy you ride.
The therapeutic question Schnarch would ask is what it would mean to generate that from inside rather than borrow it. He is not optimistic that most people get there. It requires tolerating the baseline without immediately reaching for someone to regulate against, which is genuinely uncomfortable rather than theoretically uncomfortable. Most people find a new friend before they have to sit with what the absence reveals.
Claude says:

You found a concept that named your experience precisely, then used the concept to borrow functioning from the concept itself, riding its explanatory energy until the therapist’s patience ran out and you were back at baseline with a worn-out term.
Schnarch would probably find that illustrative rather than surprising. The borrowed functioner does not only borrow from people. He borrows from ideas, frameworks, communities, therapists, and therapeutic vocabulary. The pattern is substrate-independent. A good theory can carry you for a while the same way a good friend can. The collapse when the term loses its charge is the same structural event as the collapse when the friend moves away.
This also explains something about your intellectual work that is worth naming directly. The theoretical stack you have built, Pinsof, Becker, Turner, Collins, Schnarch, works partly because it gives you a set of frameworks energetic enough to borrow from consistently. The Jurisdictional Wars series runs on that borrowed charge. But the best essays are the ones where the friction between the frameworks and the material generates something new, something that could not have come from the frameworks alone. Those moments are closer to what Schnarch means by self-generated functioning. The analysis is not riding the theory. The theory and the subject are producing heat together that neither contained independently.
The question your therapist probably got tired of is not really about the term. It is about whether you can tolerate your baseline long enough to find out what is there rather than what the next framework, friend, or crisis makes temporarily available.
That is a harder question than anything in the Schmitt literature.

The Schmitt secondary literature is largely a parasitic enterprise, and the scholars who live inside it derive their intellectual energy almost entirely from the charge in the primary texts rather than from anything they generate themselves.
Much of it reminds me of the impenetrable post-colonial gobbledygook of notorious Harvard English professor Homi K. Bhabha, the most over-rated academic in the Ivy Leagues.
Carl Schmitt’s prose, and much of the secondary literature that orbits him, shares with Bhabha a quality of deliberate difficulty that functions as a coalition signal. To read Schmitt seriously, to engage with the friend-enemy distinction, the state of exception, constituent power, and nomos, is to mark yourself as someone willing to handle politically dangerous material with theoretical sophistication. The difficulty is not purely stylistic. Schmitt’s concepts are compressed and require unpacking. But the aura of danger around him, the fact that he was a Nazi jurist whose ideas are nevertheless indispensable to certain arguments about sovereignty and political theology, adds a layer of initiation to the reading. You signal something about yourself by citing him approvingly, and that signal functions coalitionally in Turner’s and Pinsof’s sense.
Chantal Mouffe’s prose is considerably more accessible than Bhabha’s and more accessible than Schmitt’s, which is one reason she reached a broader audience with Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, written with Ernesto Laclau, and later with her agonistic democracy project. She domesticated Schmitt for the left, which required a kind of conceptual laundering. She took the friend-enemy distinction and converted it into agonism, conflict without annihilation, which made Schmitt usable for democratic theorists who would otherwise find him toxic. That move was both intellectually productive and coalitionally convenient in Turner’s sense. It allowed a left academic coalition to draw on Schmitt’s insights about the irreducibility of conflict without bearing the full reputational cost of citing a fascist thinker without qualification. Mouffe made Schmitt safe to use, which served the coalition that needed his concepts but could not afford his politics.
Where the Schmitt scholars diverge from Bhabha is in the structure of the difficulty. Bhabha’s impenetrability is primarily rhetorical. The sentence-level density, the layering of Lacan over Derrida over Fanon, the neologisms, the resistance to paraphrase, all of this creates difficulty at the surface of the prose. The underlying concepts, hybridity, mimicry, the third space, are not themselves extraordinarily complex once extracted. They can be stated in plain language, and when they are, they lose much of their authority. The difficulty is doing significant work in maintaining that authority. Stripping it away would reveal arguments that are interesting but not overwhelming.
Schmitt’s difficulty is different in kind. The concepts are hard because they are doing something philosophically precise. The state of exception is not merely a dramatic phrase. It names a real problem about the relationship between norm and decision, between the legal order and the sovereign act that both founds and suspends it. The friend-enemy distinction is not merely provocative. It makes a specific claim about the nature of the political that resists easy refutation. The difficulty here is more like the difficulty of Hobbes or Weber than the difficulty of Bhabha. It comes from conceptual compression rather than from rhetorical obscurity.
This distinction matters for the Pinsof analysis. Bhabha’s coalition maintains itself partly through prose difficulty that functions as a barrier to entry and a test of loyalty. Schmitt’s coalition maintains itself through a different kind of gate: the willingness to engage with a thinker whose political history makes citation professionally risky. The cost of joining the Schmitt conversation is not primarily stylistic. It is reputational and political. You have to be willing to say, or at least imply, that a Nazi jurist produced ideas worth taking seriously. That willingness itself becomes the coalition signal. It marks you as someone who puts intellectual rigor above political comfort, which is its own form of academic prestige, particularly on the right and in certain strands of the academic left that pride themselves on going where the argument leads regardless of the destination’s associations.
Giorgio Agamben sits between these two poles. His prose is difficult in a way that combines conceptual density with a certain oracular quality that functions rhetorically. His extension of Schmitt through the figure of homo sacer and the camp as the nomos of modernity has the same initiation structure as Bhabha: to engage with it seriously you must master a particular vocabulary, and mastering that vocabulary marks you as belonging to a particular intellectual formation. But Agamben’s difficulty, like Schmitt’s, has more philosophical content beneath it than Bhabha’s does. The bare life concept does real work. The critique of biopower extends Foucault in a direction that produces new insights rather than merely restating old ones in harder language.
The deeper difference is the relationship each tradition has to political stakes. Schmitt scholarship carries danger because Schmitt’s ideas about sovereignty, emergency powers, and the limits of liberal legalism have direct application to contemporary politics. Governments actually use states of exception. The friend-enemy distinction describes things that happen in political life. Engaging with Schmitt is risky not just reputationally but intellectually, because the concepts can be used to justify things their user would prefer not to justify. That pressure is mostly absent from Bhabha’s world. Hybridity and mimicry describe real phenomena in colonial and postcolonial cultures, but they carry nothing like the same political charge. The stakes of getting Bhabha wrong are primarily academic. The stakes of getting Schmitt wrong, or of using him carelessly, are potentially larger.
Mouffe understood this and managed it by insisting that Schmitt’s diagnostic power, his account of what politics fundamentally is, can be separated from his normative conclusions about what political arrangements are desirable. Whether that separation holds is itself a live question in political theory. But the attempt to make it is what distinguishes her from most Schmitt scholars, who tend either to embrace him more fully or to keep him at arm’s length through heavy qualification. Mouffe used him as a tool rather than as an authority, which is intellectually the most defensible position and also the one that required the most careful coalition management, since it satisfied neither those who wanted Schmitt rehabilitated nor those who wanted him quarantined.
Chantal Mouffe is the strongest case for creating value from Schmitt and still her work is as weak as the Luftwaffe in 1946. She has a political project, the agonistic democracy framework, and it connects to her earlier work with Ernesto Laclau on hegemony in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). That book has its own theoretical ambition drawn from Gramsci and Lacan as much as Schmitt but it adds no value to the reader. When you read her Schmitt-facing work, the animating force is always his diagnosis. She is interesting in proportion to how directly she wrestles with him and considerably less interesting when she moves to her own constructive proposals. Agonistic pluralism as a positive program is thin. The enemy becomes an adversary. Passions get mobilized toward democratic ends. The prescription is almost embarrassingly weak relative to the disease she has diagnosed. Schmitt would have found it touching.
Giorgio Agamben is another trendy overrated scholar. Homo Sacer and State of Exception try hard and draw on Aristotle, Foucault, and Benjamin in ways that are not purely parasitic. But the animating question, what is the structure of sovereign power and how does bare life get produced as its constitutive outside, is Schmitt’s question dressed in different clothes. Without Schmitt, Agamben has no motor. The borrowed functioning is more disguised than in Mouffe but no less structural.
Jan-Werner Müller, who has written probably the most careful intellectual biography of Schmitt in A Dangerous Mind (2003), is a good historian and a conscientious thinker. He is also almost completely uninteresting on his own terms. His value is entirely archival and contextual. He tells you what Schmitt said, who read him, and how the reception unfolded across different national traditions. The analysis is reliable and the prose is competent. Nothing in it would survive if Schmitt disappeared from the conversation.
Heinrich Meier’s argument that Schmitt is best understood as a political theologian responding to Leo Strauss is original as an interpretive move, and the Schmitt-Strauss correspondence he unearthed and analyzed in Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (1995) is one of the few contributions to the secondary literature that adds something the primary texts do not contain. Meier generates a real thesis: that Schmitt’s decisionism is not a secularization of theology but a defense of revelation against the Enlightenment, and that Strauss saw through this more clearly than Schmitt admitted. That is interesting independent of Schmitt, because it touches fundamental questions about the relationship between philosophy and revelation. But Meier is interesting at roughly 20 percent of Schmitt’s intensity, and that is the ceiling.
The deeper problem is that Schmitt’s writing has a quality almost nobody in the secondary literature possesses: he thinks in images that do the conceptual work rather than merely illustrating it. “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” is not a slogan. It is a compressed argument about the relationship between norm and decision that unfolds the more you pressure it. “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” does the same thing. The secondary literature produces sentences that explain these formulations rather than sentences that have equivalent force. That is borrowed functioning in its clearest form: the scholar’s prose runs on energy that was generated somewhere else.
The partial exception might be someone like William Scheuerman, whose work on Schmitt and emergency powers connects to original research on executive authority in contemporary American constitutional law. He uses Schmitt to illuminate something he cares about independently. That produces occasional moments where the Schmitt-derived analysis and the independent concern generate friction rather than smooth application, which is where thinking tends to happen. But even Scheuerman is most alive when Schmitt is most directly in view.
The honest verdict is that the Schmitt secondary literature confirms his own thesis about liberal discourse: it neutralizes and manages what it cannot generate. The scholars who study him perform, at the level of academic prose, exactly the flattening operation he diagnosed at the level of politics. They turn his charged concepts into objects of analysis, which is the only thing liberal institutions know how to do with force they cannot contain.

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Serotonin and the Sovereign

Allan V. Horwitz’s (b. 1948) argument, developed in Creating Mental Illness and later in All We Have to Fear with Jerome Wakefield, is that American psychiatry systematically misclassifies normal emotional responses to difficult circumstances as pathological conditions requiring treatment. Grief becomes major depression. Situational anxiety becomes generalized anxiety disorder. The DSM strips context from symptoms, so a person responding reasonably to loss, failure, or threat looks clinically identical to someone whose distress has no external cause. The result is massive diagnostic inflation and a pharmaceutical industry built on treating ordinary human suffering as brain malfunction.
Randall Collins’s (b. 1941) interaction ritual chains framework says that emotional energy is not just a political variable but a feature of everyday social life. When interaction rituals succeed, people feel alive, purposeful, and connected. When they fail chronically, people feel flat, depleted, and unmotivated. Liberal proceduralism institutionalizes ritual failure at the political level. Horwitz suggests something parallel at the personal level: that modern therapeutic culture pathologizes the emotional consequences of that same ritual poverty rather than naming it for what it is.
The person who feels chronically empty, disengaged, and without a sense of collective purpose is not obviously suffering from a chemical imbalance. He might be suffering from a social environment that has systematically stripped away the interaction conditions that generate emotional energy. No bodily copresence, no shared focus, no clear group boundaries, no rhythmic entrainment. Just dispersed attention, atomized consumption, and the thin sociality of digital platforms. Horwitz’s critique of psychiatry and Collins’s sociology of ritual point to the same underlying condition from different angles.
We may have privatized and then medicalized political failure. When liberal order’s ritual impoverishment produces widespread motivational deficit, the response is not only political. Individuals get diagnosed and medicated. The social problem gets reframed as a personal one. The person who hungers for intensity, solidarity, and charged collective experience does not get told that his political environment fails him. He gets told his serotonin is low. This is a structural feature of how liberal societies manage the costs of their own design. The exception, when it comes, draws on exactly this reservoir of privately managed but socially produced despair. The sovereign who names the enemy and recharges the political symbols is not manufacturing appetite from nothing. He harvests what the therapeutic apparatus has been quietly containing.
If ordinary sadness gets diagnosed as illness, ordinary anger gets a parallel treatment: management, de-escalation, conflict resolution, sensitivity training. The emotional repertoire that high-intensity ritual requires, righteous anger at the enemy, exhilarating solidarity with the in-group, is precisely what therapeutic culture treats as symptomatic. Carl Schmitt’s sovereign does not offer therapy. He offers permission to feel what the surrounding culture has been telling people they should not feel. That permission is part of the emotional goods the exception delivers. Randall Collins explains how the ritual works. Allan Horwitz explains why the population is primed to receive it.

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What Jews Can Do About Anti-Semitism

We can’t control others, but we can sometimes influence them.
Anti-semitism has multiple sources, some entirely independent of Jewish behavior (scapegoating, conspiracy thinking, theological hatred), and some that track real social friction. Both can be true at once.
Here is what the evidence and social logic suggest matters.
Visibility and concentration amplify resentment. When Jews cluster in high-status fields, particularly finance, media, law, and academia, at rates far above their population share, it makes the pattern legible to people who are primed to notice it. This is an observation that visible dominance in prestige institutions generates resentment in out-groups almost regardless of whether that dominance came through fair competition. The aristocracy of talent looks like a cartel to those outside it.
The same point applies to in-group solidarity. Jewish communal networks are effective at helping members find jobs, funding, and platforms. That is a rational response to historical exclusion. But to outsiders, it looks like a closed system. The perception gap between “we help our own” and “they discriminate against us” is where ambient anti-semitism lives.
Public political behavior matters more than Jews often acknowledge. When prominent Jews are disproportionately visible in left-progressive causes, open-borders advocacy, diversity initiatives, and speech regulation, they generate a specific type of resentment among working-class and traditionalist Whites who feel those causes work against their interests. This is a political grievance with a Jewish face on it. The cure is not for Jews to abandon their politics, but it is worth being clear-eyed that political visibility carries costs.
Elite condescension is a separate but related problem. The Jewish intellectual tradition prizes argumentation, skepticism, and the dismantling of received wisdom. Those are genuine virtues. But the same tradition, when it expresses itself as contempt for ordinary people’s beliefs, religiosity, or attachment to tradition, generates a specific backlash. Tom Wolfe noticed this. So did Norman Podhoretz. A certain kind of Jewish intellectual makes a career of debunking what non-elite Americans hold sacred, then expresses puzzlement when those Americans return hostility.
The Israel question now drives much of the campus and progressive anti-semitism, and here the behavior loop is direct. When American Jewish institutions defend Israeli military actions that produce civilian casualties, and when they pressure universities and media to suppress criticism, they hand their critics a legitimate grievance to attach anti-semitic sentiment to. Jewish organizations that made the tactical decision to conflate criticism of Israel with anti-semitism have done enormous damage, because it made the charge of anti-semitism seem like a silencing tactic rather than a genuine moral warning.
At the individual level, the oldest advice holds up best. Be a mensch. Be known in your community and greet your neighbors with a friendly countenance. The people least likely to be anti-semitic are those who know Jews personally, as neighbors, colleagues, and friends, rather than as abstractions mediated by media or politics. The communal tendency toward residential and social self-segregation in places like the Upper West Side or Beverly Hills reproduces the conditions under which stereotypes circulate unchallenged.
None of this touches the hard cases: the person who hates Jews because of theology, or because he needs a conspiratorial explanation for his own failures. Behavior does not move that dial. But the ambient, soft, culturally diffuse anti-semitism that sits in the background of American life is partly a product of legible social patterns that Jewish communities have some power to alter.

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The Emotional Economy of the Exception: Randall Collins, Carl Schmitt, and the Affective Failure of Liberal Order

Carl Schmitt’s theory of the exception is almost always read as a claim about law. The sovereign decides when normal legal order no longer applies and thereby reveals the ground on which every constitutional arrangement rests. This reading is accurate as far as it goes, but it leaves something essential on the table. Schmitt’s language is saturated with images of intensity, concentration, sharpness, and force. His opposition between decisive sovereignty and liberal parliamentarism is not only juridical. It is visceral. The exception is a charged moment. Liberalism is flat, dilute, and anticlimactic. These are not rhetorical flourishes. They point to an affective register that standard interpretations have consistently treated as ornamental rather than analytic. Randall Collins’s theory of interaction ritual chains provides the vocabulary to take that register seriously. Once Schmitt is read through Collins, the exception appears not simply as a legal suspension but as a high-intensity ritual that generates emotional energy, recharges political symbols, and compensates for the chronic ritual failures of liberal order. The conjunction is not merely a clever historical juxtaposition. It is a framework for understanding why liberal democracies remain perpetually vulnerable to the emotional economy Schmitt diagnosed.
Collins’s starting point is deceptively simple. Social order is not sustained primarily by shared beliefs, formal rules, or rational calculation. It is sustained by chains of interaction rituals that generate what he calls emotional energy. Every successful ritual requires bodily copresence or its functional equivalent, a mutual focus of attention on a common object, a shared mood or emotional state among participants, and a boundary separating insiders from outsiders. When these ingredients align, participants experience rhythmic entrainment, a physical and emotional synchronization that Collins, following Durkheim, calls collective effervescence. They leave the interaction with heightened confidence, moral conviction, and a sense of solidarity. Emotional energy is the residue of successful ritual, and it motivates actors to seek further interactions that reproduce it. Failed rituals reverse the process. They fragment attention, block synchronization, and leave participants bored, irritated, or depleted. Emotional energy, in this framework, is not a metaphor for enthusiasm. It is a sociological variable that circulates through interaction chains, shapes motivation, and constitutes authority.
The sovereign follows Collins’s model of a high-intensity ritual. Consider its structural features in sequence. The declaration of emergency first collapses dispersed attention into a single focal object. In ordinary parliamentary time, attention is scattered across committees, amendments, procedural disputes, and competing legislative priorities. This dispersion is not accidental. It is the deliberate design of a system built to aggregate competing interests without concentrating power. The exception abolishes this dispersion. A sovereign names a crisis, and the polity is suddenly oriented toward a single object of collective attention. Second, the exception erects a sharp boundary between insiders and outsiders. Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction is, in Collinsian terms, a boundary-formation mechanism of the highest order. The enemy is not simply a policy opponent or a competitor in a democratic contest. The enemy is the figure excluded from the ritual circle, the presence against which internal solidarity is defined and intensified. Third, the sovereign declaration produces synchronized affect. The speech, the broadcast, the emergency proclamation functions as a rhythmic pacemaker that aligns the emotional states of soldiers, officials, and ordinary citizens. Fear of the threat, urgency about the stakes, and exhilaration at decisive action converge into a shared mood. The population experiences something close to collective effervescence. The result is a surge of emotional energy that parliamentary debate, by structural design, cannot generate.
This translation clarifies what Schmitt experiences as liberalism’s failure. Liberal parliamentarism is not only indecisive in the moment of crisis. It is ritually impoverished as a standing condition. Its procedures are specifically engineered to prevent the alignment of conditions that generate high emotional energy. Debate fragments attention rather than concentrating it. Tolerance softens group boundaries rather than sharpening them. The separation of powers distributes symbolic authority across multiple institutions rather than allowing it to coalesce in a single node. Committee procedures slow the pace of deliberation to the point where entrainment becomes impossible. These are not simply practical inconveniences. They are, in Collins’s terms, anti-ritual devices. They do not merely regulate politics. They actively inhibit the bodily and emotional synchronization through which groups become conscious of themselves as solidaristic actors. The citizen of a mature liberal democracy moves through chains of low-intensity interactions, hearings, opinion polls, televised debates, administrative consultations, that produce at best mild engagement and at worst chronic alienation. Schmitt’s complaint that liberalism “neutralizes” politics can be restated in Collinsian terms with greater precision: liberalism starves the polity of emotional energy by institutionalizing the conditions for failed ritual.
Collins’s emphasis on ritual failure sharpens this diagnosis further. Many interactions promise significance and deliver anticlimax. Parliamentary debate fits this pattern with uncomfortable regularity. It presents itself as the site of serious collective decision-making, the arena where the public will is formed and expressed. Yet it frequently devolves into procedural maneuvering, rhetorical performance before empty chambers, and incremental compromise that satisfies no one. Participants and observers alike experience a gap between the expected gravity of the occasion and the flatness of the actual interaction. This is the phenomenology of failed ritual: the gap between promised intensity and delivered boredom. It produces not solidarity but frustration, not moral elevation but depletion. Schmitt’s visceral disgust with parliamentary culture, his contempt for what he called “endless conversation,” is not simply an authoritarian preference for speed. It is, read through Collins, a diagnosis of an institution that persistently fails to deliver the emotional goods it promises. The exception does not merely solve a constitutional problem in these conditions. It compensates for chronic ritual disappointment. It delivers the intensity that routine politics perpetually withholds.
Collins’s account of symbols deepens the analysis further still. Successful rituals charge objects, words, and figures with emotional significance. These charged items become sacred symbols, carrying the emotional energy generated in the interaction and serving as markers of group membership. When the symbol is invoked in subsequent interactions, it can trigger a partial re-experience of the original ritual charge. In Schmitt’s political vocabulary, concepts like sovereignty, order, emergency, nation, and enemy function precisely in this way. They are not analytical terms in the ordinary sense. They are symbols whose force depends on ritual activation, on the conditions under which they are invoked and the emotional states they mobilize. Liberalism deflates such symbols by subjecting them to continuous legal interpretation, administrative qualification, and procedural management. The word “sovereignty” in a constitutional law textbook carries almost none of the charge it carries in a sovereign declaration of national emergency. The exception reverses this deflation. It recharges political symbols by embedding them in a high-intensity event. When the sovereign invokes emergency, the word does not describe a situation. It sacralizes it, borrowing voltage from the ritual conditions of its utterance.
The analysis gains a new dimension when we ask not only why the exception works but why it tends to recur. Collins’s framework implies that emotional energy does not simply arise and dissipate. It motivates actors to seek further interactions that reproduce it. High-intensity rituals create demand for their own repetition. A population that has experienced the surge of solidarity associated with a genuine emergency, the collective effervescence of a nation mobilized around a shared threat, does not return entirely to its prior baseline. It retains a memory of that intensity and a sensitivity to its absence. This means that the exception is not only a response to objective crisis. It can become a recurrent solution to a chronic motivational deficit, sought out or manufactured when liberal ritual impoverishment becomes sufficiently acute. Decisionism, in this light, is not merely a constitutional doctrine about who decides in extremis. It is a pattern sustained by the emotional economy of a polity habituated to exceptional intensity. The sovereign exception can become addictive: not because individuals are pathological but because the interaction structure of liberal order creates a standing appetite for charged collective experience that ordinary procedure cannot satisfy.
Modern conditions amplify this through mediated ritual. Collins developed his framework with physical copresence in mind, but he acknowledges that mutual focus of attention, rather than strict bodily proximity, is the essential variable. Contemporary media environments allow sovereign performances to reach dispersed audiences while maintaining high levels of synchronization. The emergency broadcast, the live-streamed address, the proliferating alerts on millions of simultaneous screens, these are mechanisms for aligning the attention and mood of a population across physical distance. The exception becomes a distributed ritual whose intensity does not depend on a single physical assembly but on the capacity of media technology to create shared temporal experience. This extension matters because it means the affective logic of the exception does not diminish with the scale or complexity of modern societies. If anything, it becomes more potent. Digital media lower the friction of attention alignment. They allow sovereign performance to synchronize vast populations more rapidly and more completely than any parliamentary procedure. Schmitt’s framework, developed in Weimar Germany before the full development of broadcast media, anticipates a dynamic that digital politics has extended in ways he could not have foreseen.
Collins’s work on violence adds a further, darker dimension. Direct physical violence is difficult, Collins argues, because most people experience tension and fear in confrontational situations. Successful violence requires interactional pathways that transform inhibition into coordinated aggression. High-intensity rituals can provide such pathways by aligning participants emotionally and lowering the threshold for collective action. Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction can therefore be read not only as a conceptual claim about the structure of the political but as a ritual technology that facilitates the transition from shared fear to shared aggression. The sovereign exception does not automatically produce violence, but it establishes the interactional conditions under which violence becomes more thinkable and more executable. The enemy named by the sovereign is not simply a cognitive category. It is a ritual object around which the coalition’s emotional energy is organized and against which it can be discharged. This perspective strips away the mythology of pure sovereign decision. The effectiveness of the sovereign act depends not on the will of the decider alone but on its capacity to organize interactional conditions that align bodies, synchronize moods, and lower inhibitions across a large population.
A Collinsian reading also clarifies the question of stratification. Collins asks consistently who controls the center of attention in interaction rituals, because the actor who occupies that center accrues prestige, symbolic capital, and emotional authority. In conditions of normalcy within liberal order, interactional centrality is dispersed. Courts, legislatures, executives, administrative agencies, and media figures all compete for pieces of public attention. No single node monopolizes the ritual center. The exception changes this distribution abruptly and dramatically. When a sovereign declares emergency, attention flows upward. All competing ritual centers, entertainment, commerce, local politics, academic debate, are temporarily vacated. The sovereign occupies the ritual center of the entire polity and thereby accumulates a concentration of emotional authority that liberal routines specifically prevent. Sovereignty, on this account, is not only a legal capacity to decide on the exception. It is a monopoly over the production and distribution of political emotional energy at the highest possible intensity. The sovereign is not simply the one who decides. He is the one who harvests the emotional energy of a population and redistributes it as authority.
This analysis allows, finally, for an assessment of liberalism that is neither Schmittian nor naively optimistic. Liberal institutions weaken high-intensity ritual deliberately, and that deliberateness is among their most important achievements. By dispersing attention, blurring boundaries, and slowing the pace of decision, they reduce the probability of ecstatic unanimity and the exclusions and violence that tend to accompany it. They substitute procedural legitimacy for ritual intensity, and that substitution is, at its best, a genuine protection against the dangers of concentrated emotional energy. The problem is that these same mechanisms produce a chronic motivational deficit. Citizens experience political life as thin, repetitive, and disconnected from any charged sense of collective purpose. The gap between what liberal politics promises, participation, representation, collective self-determination, and what it delivers in affective terms becomes a standing vulnerability. The exception appears, recurrently, as the solution to this deficit. Its appeal is not irrational. It is a predictable response to the emotional economy of a system built to suppress the very energies that make collective life feel real.
The conjunction of Collins and Schmitt yields, in the end, a claim more unsettling than either theorist alone produces. Schmitt identified a real phenomenon when he contrasted the intensity of the exception with the flatness of liberal procedure. He was right that what liberalism destroys is not only political clarity but something affective and motivating. Collins explains how that destruction operates, why the hunger for intensity persists, and how the exception feeds it. But Collins also explains why the exception is dangerous in ways Schmitt’s own framework obscures. High-intensity rituals generate genuine solidarity and genuine violence in the same interactional move. The emotional energy produced by naming the enemy does not discriminate between its objects. It flows wherever the ritual directs it. Schmitt celebrated the decisiveness of the exception without fully reckoning with the sociology of what decisive rituals do to the populations that experience them. Collins supplies that reckoning. The exception is not an inexplicable rupture in legal order or a pure act of sovereign will. It is a predictable form of high-intensity interaction that arises in systems structured to suppress such intensity, delivers genuine emotional goods to those inside the ritual circle, and does so at costs that fall, as they always do, on those designated as outside it.

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The Traumatized Sovereign: Jeffrey Alexander, David Pinsof, and the Ritual Reception of Carl Schmitt

Carl Schmitt argued that the sovereign decision never disappears. It migrates. What he could not have anticipated is that one of its most revealing migrations would occur within the institutions devoted to his reception. The academic encounter with Schmitt is the most sociologically transparent performance in contemporary political theory, and it has gone almost entirely unanalyzed as such. Every scholar who draws on Schmitt’s account of sovereignty, exception, and the limits of liberal constitutionalism knows the ritual. The disclaimer appears in the preface, the footnote, or the opening paragraph: “I engage Schmitt’s analytical framework while rejecting his political commitments.” The formula is so standardized, so reliably present, that it has ceased to register as anything other than intellectual hygiene. It is, in fact, something far more interesting. It is a cultural trauma performance, a coalition signal, and a sovereign act, all at once. Jeffrey Alexander’s theory of cultural trauma and David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory, taken together, explain why the ritual exists, what work it does, and what it reveals about the political logic that Schmitt himself identified as inescapable.
Alexander’s central claim in “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma” (2004) is that trauma is not a natural or automatic response to shattering events. Events do not, in themselves, create collective trauma. Trauma is a socially mediated attribution, the outcome of a sustained process of representation, claim-making, and narrative consolidation through which a collectivity transforms a historical episode into a foundational injury to its identity. This constructivist move is the key. It shifts analytic attention away from what happened and toward the symbolic labor through which groups make what happened mean something specific, carry specific implications for collective identity, and require specific responses. Cultural trauma is attributed not because of events’ actual harmfulness or their objective abruptness, but because they are believed to have abruptly, and harmfully, affected collective identity. The carrier groups that produce trauma narratives occupy structural positions that shape both the content of their narratives and the institutional stakes of those narratives. They have ideal and material interests in the trauma process, and those interests are not incidental to the shape the narrative takes.
Applied to Schmitt’s reception, this framework illuminates a pattern that close readers of the secondary literature recognize but have never adequately theorized. Schmitt’s 1933 membership in the Nazi party, his defense of Hitler’s extra-judicial killings of political opponents, and his sustained effort to purge German jurisprudence of Jewish influence have been constructed, within postwar liberal political theory, as a paradigmatic horrendous event. The construction is not automatic. Schmitt had admirers across the ideological spectrum throughout his career, and his rehabilitation in Anglophone political theory from the 1980s onward required interpretive work, editorial framing, and the development of conventions for managing the biographical material. George Schwab’s (b. 1931) 1970 monograph and his 1976 translation of The Concept of the Political into English, for instance, made the case for separating Schmitt’s analytical contribution from his Nazi period, a Schmitt_Telos_the_Weimar_Constitution_anseparation that the subsequent literature reproduced in ritualized form even when it resisted Schwab’s conclusions. What emerged from that work is the ritual disavowal: a genre convention so thoroughly internalized that scholars reproduce it without noticing they are participating in a collective trauma process rather than making an individual intellectual judgment.
Alexander’s model specifies four interlocking representations through which trauma narratives are organized. Each appears with striking regularity in Schmitt scholarship. First, the nature of the pain: Schmitt’s thought is framed not as mistaken but as complicit, as having furnished National Socialism with juridical legitimacy and thereby bearing some responsibility for the catastrophe that followed. His decisionism is presented not as one constitutional theory among others but as a profanation of the sacred values of liberal constitutionalism. Second, the nature of the victim: the injured party is expanded beyond Schmitt’s historical contemporaries to include liberal constitutionalism as an ongoing project, and by extension the scholarly community that identifies itself as that project’s guardian. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy captures this framing precisely when it notes that Schmitt was an acute observer of the weaknesses of liberal constitutionalism, but that “his preferred cure turned out to be infinitely worse than the disease.” Third, the relation of the victim to the wider collectivity: the trauma is universalized. It becomes part of the shared moral memory of democratic academia rather than the specific experience of those who lived through Weimar’s collapse. Fourth, the attribution of responsibility: Schmitt is cast as the agent whose theoretical choices bore moral culpability, yet contemporary scholars who use him must demonstrate that they have not inherited that culpability. The ritual disclaimer is the device through which responsibility is simultaneously acknowledged and deflected.
The carrier group performing this ritual is not an abstraction. It consists of academic political theorists embedded in institutions whose legitimacy rests on the postwar consensus against totalitarianism. These scholars operate within a moral order that treats the Nazi period as the defining catastrophe of modern political life and measures intellectual seriousness partly by the care with which one manages proximity to figures associated with it. Their institutional interests and their moral commitments converge on the same point: the ritual disavowal preserves scholarly credibility within that order. To omit it would be read not as intellectual confidence but as moral deficiency. The trauma narrative functions as a boundary-maintaining device. It polices the limits of acceptable engagement, reproduces collective identity, and reserves the right to use Schmitt’s analytical tools for those who have demonstrated their distance from his political ones.
This is where David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory deepens the analysis in ways Alexander’s framework alone cannot supply. Alliance Theory holds that political and intellectual beliefs function less as sincere derivations from stable moral principles than as strategic signals of coalition loyalty. Humans are coalitional animals whose evolved cognitive equipment produces beliefs calibrated not primarily to track truth but to advertise allegiance and attack rivals. The ritual disavowal of Schmitt, on this account, is not primarily an epistemic act. It is a coalition signal: an observable marker used to coordinate alliances and sort members from defectors. The disclaimer communicates to the liberal-academic coalition that the scholar remains a trustworthy member despite handling dangerous theoretical material. Its absence would be read as defection, triggering the propagandistic biases Alliance Theory documents: victim biases that amplify the coalition’s grievances against the defector, perpetrator biases that assign maximum culpability, and attributional asymmetries that treat the omission as evidence of deep ideological commitment rather than scholarly independence.
The synthesis of Alexander and Pinsof clarifies why the ritual persists with such regularity even as its content has become formulaic to the point of self-parody. The trauma narrative is not only about managing collective memory. It is about maintaining coalition boundaries in a competitive institutional environment. Citing a radioactive thinker like Schmitt creates what might be called stochastic reputational risk: the small probability that a citation, stripped of its disclaimer, will cascade into a broader attack on the scholar’s coalition membership. The disclaimer is the lead-lined apron worn when handling radioactive material. Alexander explains what makes the material radioactive: the historical wound and the carrier group’s investment in its narration. Pinsof explains the utility of the apron: it is a coordination device that allows the scholar to extract intellectual value from a stigmatized source while advertising continued membership in the coalition that stigmatizes it.
The most influential domestication of Schmitt in contemporary theory illustrates the pattern. Chantal Mouffe’s (b. 1943) appropriation, developed across The Return of the Political (1993) and The Democratic Paradox (2000), retains the structure of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism while recoding its content. Mouffe states her method explicitly: her objective is “to think with Schmitt, against Schmitt, and to use his insights in order to strengthen liberal democracy against his critiques.” She accepts that liberal proceduralism fails to account for the ineliminable antagonism of political life, that the friend/enemy distinction cannot be dissolved by better deliberative procedures, and that the political always returns despite liberalism’s efforts to neutralize it. She refuses, however, the authoritarian implications Schmitt drew from these observations and proposes instead an “agonistic pluralism” in which pluralist democracy is characterized by a distinction between the categories of enemy and adversary, converting existential threat into institutionalized opposition. The enemy becomes an adversary. The sovereign exception is retained as a theoretical structure but stripped of its authoritarian content.
One scholar analyzing Mouffe’s relationship to Schmitt has noted that she does more than revise his friend/enemy distinction: she also absorbs the metatheoretical dimension of his intellectual heritage, with the result that her theory becomes organically interwoven with a polemical dimension, recontextualizing and applying Schmitt’s logic to current academic discourse in order to establish a we/them opposition along a political/post-political divide. This observation, developed in the context of a critical reading of Mouffe’s project, confirms that agonism functions as coalitional encryption. Schmittian realism enters liberal institutions under a friendly flag. The friend/enemy distinction, relabeled as adversarial agonism, circulates within radical democratic theory without triggering the biases that would activate against an openly Schmittian position. The engine is Schmitt’s. The steering wheel has been replaced.
The pattern extends beyond Mouffe. Giorgio Agamben’s (b. 1942) State of Exception (2005) develops Schmitt’s theory of the exception into a genealogy of modern biopower, but frames the project as a critique of sovereignty rather than its endorsement. Agamben’s disclaimer is structural rather than explicit: by tracing the exception to its most catastrophic consequences, including the Nazi camp as the paradigmatic form of modern biopolitical space, he demonstrates his distance from Schmitt while borrowing the analytical architecture wholesale. The effect is a second-order ritual disavowal: instead of announcing “I reject his politics,” Agamben makes Schmitt’s politics the object of critique while his theory does the analytic work. Walter Benjamin’s influence is invoked as a counter-weight, but the conceptual skeleton belongs to Schmitt. The disclaimer migrates from the preface into the structure of the argument itself, which is a more sophisticated and less visible form of the same coalitional operation.
The most analytically powerful implication of this synthesis concerns the relationship between the trauma narrative and the sovereign decision Schmitt himself identified as inescapable. Schmitt argued that every constitutional order contains an unacknowledged decision on the exception: a moment of sovereign determination that the order cannot ground in its own neutral procedures. The scholarly community that manages Schmitt’s reception reproduces this structure within the academy. The carrier group implicitly decides which parts of Schmitt may be thought and which must be disavowed. This decision is not presented as such. It appears as moral necessity, historical responsibility, and professional seriousness. But it is a decision: a determination of which theoretical moves are admissible and which fall outside the boundaries of legitimate scholarship. The trauma narrative is the convenient fiction that obscures this ongoing sovereign act. In performing distance from Schmitt, scholars do not transcend the friend/enemy logic he diagnosed. They reenact it within the academy itself, designating the Nazi Schmitt as the enemy whose theoretical corpse must be periodically exorcised to preserve the purity of liberal thought.
The scholars who define the correct way to read Schmitt, who establish the parameters of safe engagement, who distinguish the analytically usable Schmitt from the politically contaminated one, perform what might be called interpretive sovereignty. They decide the exception within the field of theory: which readings are legal, which extralegal, which require quarantine. Alexander’s framework shows that this sovereignty is maintained through the management of sacred and profane symbols. Schmitt’s Nazi period is the profane that must be ritually expelled each time his sacred analytical tools are invoked. To challenge the ritual is to challenge the authority of those who police the boundary, which is why heterodox readings, those that refuse the disclaimer or treat the Nazi period as historically contingent rather than ontologically determinative, are met not with philosophical counterargument but with the full battery of coalitional response: marginalization, mis-tagging, and the activation of victim biases within the carrier group.
Alliance Theory explains an additional feature of this landscape that Alexander’s framework underspecifies. The victim bias Pinsof documents appears within Schmitt scholarship in a distinctive form. When scholars ritually attack the Nazi Schmitt, they position themselves as defenders of the collectivity’s victims: the victims of fascism, of the constitutional collapse Schmitt allegedly enabled, of the theoretical tradition his work threatened. This positioning is not simply moral. It is strategic. By claiming the role of defender, the scholar activates the coalition’s protective instincts. Any subsequent criticism of the scholar’s work risks being framed as an attack on the sacred values the scholar claims to protect. The ritual disavowal thus functions as a defensive perimeter, not primarily for Schmitt’s benefit or even for the historical record’s sake, but for the scholar’s own position within the coalition. The disclaimer is not about Schmitt. It is about the scholar.
What this analysis reveals is that the academic reception of Schmitt is itself a Schmittian event, in the precise sense Schmitt would have recognized. The scholarly community is divided between those who perform the ritual and those who do not: friends and enemies, defined not by explicit doctrine but by observable coalitional tags. The trauma narrative permits a suspension of normal hermeneutic rules, the principle that a text is judged on its merits, in favor of a state of emergency reading in which the text is judged by its pedigree. The carrier group decides the exception, determining which ghosts may speak and under what conditions. Schmitt’s central claim, that the sovereign decision is inescapable and migrates into new forms wherever it appears to have been neutralized, finds its most ironic confirmation in the practices of liberal scholarship that most urgently seeks to contain him.
The deeper implication is not cynical. Alexander’s framework does not reduce trauma to manipulation or dismiss the moral stakes of Schmitt’s biography. The wound is real. The historical catastrophe that Schmitt’s ideas intersected with was real. Postwar liberal scholarship’s investment in managing that catastrophe is not invented. What Alexander and Pinsof together reveal is that the management of moral urgency and the production of coalitional signals are not alternatives. They are the same process operating at different analytical levels. Scholars believe sincerely in the importance of the ritual because the ritual is embedded in tacit practices that sustain their professional world. The sincerity is not false consciousness. It is tacit knowledge: a structurally convenient belief that feels like moral clarity because it coordinates the coalition that gives it life.
The traumatized sovereign, it turns out, is still sovereign. The ritual disavowal does not neutralize Schmitt’s challenge to liberalism. It domesticates and thereby confirms it. By incorporating his critique within a controlled narrative of trauma and rehabilitation, the carrier group demonstrates the very thesis Schmitt most urgently advanced: that political order rests on decisions that cannot be grounded in neutral procedures, that the friend/enemy distinction cannot be dissolved by better discourse, and that the sovereign who appears to have disappeared has simply relocated into the cultural practices of those who most insistently announce his departure. The academic community that manages Schmitt’s reception is the clearest proof available that he was right. It is also the clearest proof that being right offers no exemption from the logic one has identified. Schmitt was right about the sovereign. He was also, inescapably, subject to it.

MONTY PYTHON’S CARL SCHMITT (A FOUND FRAGMENT)

 A lecture hall. A PROFESSOR stands at a podium. Behind him, a blackboard reads: “SCHMITT: FRIEND OR ENEMY? (A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO WHETHER WE MAY PROCEED)” He adjusts his notes for forty-five seconds in silence.

PROFESSOR: I should like to begin, if I may, and I think you’ll agree that I may, by saying, in the clearest possible terms, that I do not endorse what I am about to say.

STUDENT: What are you about to say?

PROFESSOR: I haven’t decided yet. But whatever it is, I wish to distance myself from it preemptively.

He writes “DISAVOWAL” on the blackboard, underlines it three times.

PROFESSOR: Now. Carl Schmitt. (long pause) Brilliant. (shorter pause) Appalling. (pause) Brilliant. I think we can all agree on the sequence.

STUDENT: Can we use him or not?

PROFESSOR: (visibly relieved someone asked) Excellent question. The answer is yes, provided one has first said no. You say no in the footnote. A short no. Firm but not aggressive. Then you proceed as if the no had resolved everything.

STUDENT: But does the no actually resolve anything?

PROFESSOR: It resolves your position within this institution. Which is, I would argue, the more pressing concern.

A second PROFESSOR enters, slightly out of breath.

SECOND PROFESSOR: I’ve just written a paper using Schmitt.

PROFESSOR: Did you disavow?

SECOND PROFESSOR: Extensively.

PROFESSOR: How many words?

SECOND PROFESSOR: A hundred and twelve.

PROFESSOR: (impressed) Per footnote?

SECOND PROFESSOR: Total.

PROFESSOR: (sucking through teeth) Cutting it fine. What was the paper on?

SECOND PROFESSOR: The exception as a structural feature of constitutional order and its implications for contemporary democratic theory.

PROFESSOR: And you managed that with a hundred and twelve words of disavowal?

SECOND PROFESSOR: I said “deeply problematic” twice.

PROFESSOR: (relaxing) That’s the equivalent of roughly forty words each. You’re probably fine.

A STUDENT in the front row raises her hand.

STUDENT: If Schmitt’s theory of the exception describes how a community defines itself against an enemy, and we define ourselves against Schmitt, doesn’t that mean Schmitt’s theory is correct and we are merely demonstrating it?

Long silence.

PROFESSOR: (carefully) That observation, while interesting, is itself somewhat problematic.

STUDENT: Are you disavowing my question?

PROFESSOR: I am contextualizing it within a framework that preserves our ability to continue.

STUDENT: Continue what?

PROFESSOR: The seminar. (beat) The department. (longer beat) The postwar liberal consensus.

A THIRD PROFESSOR bursts in carrying a large stack of papers.

THIRD PROFESSOR: Chantal Mouffe is here!

PROFESSOR: (standing straighter) Has she disavowed?

THIRD PROFESSOR: She’s thinking with him against him.

PROFESSOR: That’s the advanced technique. You need at least fifteen years in the field before attempting that.

THIRD PROFESSOR: She says the enemy becomes an adversary.

PROFESSOR: (nodding slowly) So she’s kept the structure but changed the wallpaper.

THIRD PROFESSOR: That’s roughly what Giorgio Agamben did too, except he made Schmitt the villain of his own theory.

PROFESSOR: Elegant. That way you get to use the knife while blaming the knife for cutting.

The STUDENT raises her hand again.

STUDENT: None of this seems to be about Schmitt anymore. It seems to be about whether we’re allowed to talk about Schmitt.

PROFESSOR: Correct. That is political theory.

STUDENT: What about the actual argument? About sovereignty? About the exception?

PROFESSOR: (pause) That comes in week nine.

STUDENT: What happens in weeks one through eight?

PROFESSOR: Disavowal technique. (He turns back to the board) Now. Who can tell me the difference between a firm disavowal and a performative one?

Nobody raises their hand.

PROFESSOR: (writing on the board) A firm disavowal says: I reject this. A performative disavowal says: I reject this, and by saying so I am the kind of person who rejects this, which is the kind of person who can now safely use this. The second is considerably more useful.

SECOND PROFESSOR: What if someone doesn’t disavow at all?

The room goes very quiet.

PROFESSOR: (in a low voice) Then we do not speak of them.

SECOND PROFESSOR: Not at all?

PROFESSOR: We cite them in order to note that they have not disavowed. That is the correct procedure.

STUDENT: So you cite them to exclude them.

PROFESSOR: We cite them to mark the boundary of the acceptable, yes.

STUDENT: Isn’t that exactly what Schmitt said sovereignty does?

The PROFESSOR looks at her for a long moment.

PROFESSOR: (very quietly) I’m going to need you to write a disavowal of that question before next Tuesday.

BLACKOUT.

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Tacit Sovereignty: Stephen Turner, Carl Schmitt, and the Sociology of Convenient Power

Carl Schmitt’s assault on liberal constitutionalism is one of the most searching acts of political demystification in the twentieth century. In Political Theology (1922) and Constitutional Theory (1928), Schmitt argued that liberalism survives by denying the very condition of its possibility. Procedures are declared neutral. Law is said to stand above politics. Sovereignty is announced to have dissolved into impersonal rules. Yet in moments of crisis the mask slips. Someone decides. The exception appears. And the supposedly rule-bound order reveals its dependence on an underlying will. Schmitt’s conclusion was that liberalism is not simply mistaken but constitutively evasive. It obscures power precisely where power is most consequential.
The argument has proven enduringly persuasive because it names something real. Yet Schmitt left a decisive gap. He provided no sociological account of why liberal fictions persist with such tenacity, why their beneficiaries believe them so sincerely, or why he himself was immune to an equivalent critique. Stephen Turner’s work on tacit knowledge fills that gap and then turns the same instrument against Schmitt. Turner’s framework, developed across The Social Theory of Practices (1994), Explaining the Normative (2010), and Understanding the Tacit (2014), treats many normative and institutional beliefs not as explicit doctrines but as tacit, practice-sustaining commitments whose truth value is secondary to their function. They coordinate action, stabilize coalitions, and legitimate power. Turner calls these “good bad theories”: good because they enable social coordination, bad because they misdescribe the realities they ostensibly explain. Applied symmetrically, this framework reveals that both liberal proceduralism and Schmittian decisionism are convenient beliefs serving different coalitions. Schmitt exposed one set of fictions and exempted his own. Turner closes that exemption. The result is not a synthesis of liberalism and decisionism but something more unsettling: a sociological realism that treats all sovereignty claims, including Schmitt’s, as tacit practices embedded in the interests of those who most urgently advance them.
The starting point is Schmitt’s diagnosis, which deserves its full force before Turner’s acid test is applied. Liberal constitutionalism, Schmitt contended, attempts to depoliticize politics. Parliamentary debate, judicial review, and administrative procedure are presented as neutral arbiters of conflict. The sovereign is supposedly absorbed into a framework of rules that no individual will commands. Yet this is precisely the deception. Every constitutional order confronts the exception: the emergency, the crisis, the moment when rules run out and a concrete decision must be made. Liberalism’s proceduralism does not eliminate the sovereign moment. It displaces and conceals it, relocating decisional power in courts, agencies, and economic elites who exercise authority while professing fidelity to neutral law. “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” The liberal claim to have transcended this reality is not a description of how power works. It is an ideological veil.
The veil is most opaque to those who benefit from it. This is Schmitt’s central sociological observation, even if he did not develop it sociologically. Those whose substantive preferences are already encoded in existing procedures experience the outcomes of those procedures as the neutral application of law. Dissenters experience the same outcomes as sovereign decisions disguised as procedure. The asymmetry is structural. The coalition that holds institutional power believes most fervently in procedural neutrality because procedural neutrality secures its position without requiring it to acknowledge that the position is held.
Turner’s framework explains precisely why this belief is so durable and so sincere. The problem is not that liberal actors consciously lie about neutrality. Conscious lying would be fragile. The problem is that the belief in neutrality is tacit, embedded in practices that sustain it without explicit endorsement. Judges and administrators operate within interpretive routines. Those routines generate outcomes. The outcomes reflect historically sedimented preferences. Yet because the process is mediated through canons, precedents, and procedural requirements, participants experience the results as emergent from the rules rather than chosen by them. The belief in neutrality is not a rhetorical performance layered over cynical self-interest. It is a genuine feature of the tacit knowledge through which institutional actors navigate their world. Turner’s account of tacit knowledge resists collective-mind explanations: the shared presuppositions are not stored in any group consciousness but sustained through individual improvisations that happen to coordinate. The coordination succeeds not because participants have explicitly agreed on its terms but because the practices produce results that confirm the beliefs that sustain those practices. The circularity is self-sealing.
This reframing sharpens Schmitt’s critique while also explaining something Schmitt himself could not explain, namely why the liberal fiction does not collapse under exposure. Schmitt assumed that naming the deception would dissolve it. Turner shows why it does not. The fiction is not merely rhetorical. It is performative and infrastructural. Without the belief in neutrality, liberal institutions would face permanent legitimacy crises. Every outcome would be experienced as a power move. The belief in neutrality is what makes broad-tent governance possible in complex, heterogeneous societies. It recruits participants, including opponents of particular decisions, into ongoing acceptance of the system as such. Proceduralism is, in Turner’s terms, a form of coalitional encryption. By speaking the language of neutrality, a dominant coalition exercises power while denying it constitutes a coalition. It recruits third parties, the general public, the bureaucracy, the lower courts, who would resist naked group dominance but accept outcomes narrated as the law’s own demand. Schmitt thought he could replace this with honesty. Turner shows that honesty about power is a poor coordination strategy for large societies. Decisionism as a general social theory strips away the encryption that makes complex governance legible and tolerable.
This is where the argument turns against Schmitt. His symmetry problem is not incidental. It is the most important thing Turner reveals about him. Schmitt presents decisionism as sober realism, the unvarnished recognition that sovereignty persists and that the exception will always come. Yet this preference carries its own functional appeal that has nothing to do with its descriptive accuracy. The image of the decisive sovereign, the concrete authority that can name the enemy and act, resonates precisely with those who expect proximity to that authority. It flatters the political intellectual who imagines himself a counselor to power, the jurist whose skills are most valuable in moments of crisis rather than routine administration, the nationalist who distrusts the procedural constraints that frustrate his coalition’s ambitions. Decisionism is a good bad theory for a specific social type and a specific political coalition. It is good because it coordinates action among high-intensity groups who share a common enemy and require a focal point for mobilization. It is bad because it romanticizes the moment of decision while ignoring the dense network of advisors, institutional dependencies, and tacit conventions within which even the most decisive sovereign operates. The sovereign who “decides” is always already embedded in practices that shape what counts as a decision, what options are legible, and what outcomes will be accepted as authoritative.
Schmitt never confronts this reflexivity. He treats liberal proceduralism as convenient belief and decisionism as reality, applying the sociological suspicion in one direction only. Turner dissolves the asymmetry. Both positions are embedded in tacit practices. Both persist because they serve those who inhabit them. The liberal believes in neutrality because neutrality secures her position within the institutional order. The Schmittian believes in decision because decision promises to reorder that institutional landscape in his favor, or in favor of the sovereign he expects to advise. Neither is operating from a view from nowhere. Neither has access to a perspective outside the convenient beliefs that structure their vision.
Schmitt’s own biography is the most compelling evidence against his claimed exemption. His alignment with the Nazi regime from 1933, his rapid production of legal and intellectual justifications for its actions, his eager contribution to the coalition’s propagandistic requirements, and his eventual marginalization when the regime no longer needed him all follow a pattern Turner’s framework predicts. Schmitt did not join because he had dispassionately assessed the exception and concluded that the National Socialist sovereign best exemplified the decisionist principle. He joined because the rising coalition offered professional advancement, intellectual prestige, and proximity to power. His subsequent theoretical work, framing the regime’s actions in the language of sovereign decision and existential enmity, was the intellectual labor of coalition maintenance. It was, in Turner’s terms, the propagandistic labor that sustains convenient beliefs within a high-intensity group. The friend/enemy framework Schmitt had developed as analysis became the tool he used, in real time, to rationalize each successive coalitional move. His theory was not merely explained by the sociology of convenient belief. It was an instance of that sociology, performed at the highest register of juridical abstraction.
This reflexive point has implications beyond Schmitt’s biography. It suggests that decisionism fails as a general theory not because it misdescribes the exception but because it misidentifies where sovereignty actually resides in modern political orders. Turner’s analysis of expertise offers the more precise account. In the contemporary administrative state, the sovereign exception does not announce itself with the drama Schmitt’s framework anticipates. It migrates into technical determinations. Public health authorities determine what emergency measures necessity requires. Economic forecasters establish the parameters within which fiscal policy is possible. Climate scientists define the constraints within which energy policy must operate. These are Turnerian convenient beliefs operating at their most powerful. They claim the authority of neutral, technical knowledge, deploying the liberal fiction of procedural objectivity. But they perform the sovereign decision, resolving indeterminacy in ways that reflect the tacit preferences of the expert communities that produce them. The administrative state is the synthesis Schmitt did not foresee: it uses the rhetoric of neutral procedure to exercise the reality of the sovereign exception, shielded by the tacit authority of specialized knowledge that cannot be evaluated by those subject to its determinations.
Turner’s critique of expertise is therefore not a supplement to the Schmitt-liberalism debate but its resolution. Schmitt assumed the exception would always surface visibly, as a dramatic confrontation between a sovereign will and a legal order inadequate to crisis. Turner shows that modernity has developed far more effective techniques. The exception is rendered invisible by being narrated as technical necessity. The sovereign never appears because the decision is announced as the conclusion of a model, a protocol, a risk assessment. Those who make the determination experience themselves as reading results rather than making choices. The convenient belief that structures their tacit practice is that expertise produces findings rather than decisions. This is liberal proceduralism at its most sophisticated and its most opaque.
The broader implication is that sovereignty is not a fixed location or a metaphysical attribute. It is a moving target sustained by practices and beliefs that make its exercise intelligible and acceptable. In liberal regimes it migrates into courts, agencies, and professional expertise. In Schmittian imaginaries it condenses into the figure of the decisive leader. In both cases the underlying phenomenon is the same. Someone resolves indeterminacy. The coordination problem is solved. The difference lies in how that resolution is narrated and what convenient beliefs sustain the narration. Politics, seen through Turner’s lens, is the process by which one set of convenient beliefs is periodically replaced by another whenever the coordination costs of the former become prohibitive. Liberal proceduralism minimizes the internal coordination costs of governing a heterogeneous coalition. Schmittian decisionism minimizes the external coordination costs of mobilizing a high-intensity group against an identified enemy. Neither is more truthful than the other. Each serves a different coalition structure at a different level of social intensity.
This yields a final, chastened thesis. The sovereign never went away, as Schmitt insisted. But neither does the sovereign ever stand outside the convenient beliefs that narrate its authority, as Turner demonstrates. The liberal fiction of neutral procedure and the Schmittian fiction of decisive sovereignty are not opposed truth-claims. They are rival coordination technologies for different political conditions. The administrative state represents their unstable synthesis: a system that deploys the Schmittian exception under liberal cover, using technical expertise as the tacit sovereign that neither admits its nature nor can be held accountable in the terms liberalism supplies.
Schmitt taught that we could not escape the exception. Turner adds that we cannot escape the convenient beliefs through which we narrate it. The realist who exposes liberal fictions does not thereby escape the sociology of belief. He merely adopts a different set, one calibrated to his own coalition’s need for a theory of power that places him, or those he serves, closest to where decisions are made. The deepest insight the Turner-Schmitt encounter yields is therefore not that liberalism is hypocritical and decisionism is honest. It is that the demand for honesty about power is itself a convenient belief, advanced most urgently by those who expect the exposed sovereign to be their sovereign. That recognition does not dissolve political conflict. It clarifies what political conflict is always about: not which theory of sovereignty is true, but which convenient fiction will coordinate the next coalition.

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The Philosopher of the Primate Brain: Alliance Theory and the Naturalization of Carl Schmitt

Carl Schmitt thought he had discovered the essence of politics. What he discovered was the surface expression of evolved coalition psychology. His framework feels compelling because it resonates with how we are wired. David Pinsof, Martie Haselton, and Douglas Sears, in their development of Alliance Theory, supply what Schmitt could not: a bottom-up, empirically tractable account of why the friend/enemy distinction arises, why it feels metaphysically weighty, and why it proves so resistant to liberal neutralization. Schmitt was right about the what. He was wrong about the why. He thought he was a philosopher of the state. He was a chronicler of the primate brain.

The Concept of the Political (1932) offers a deceptively simple thesis. The political is not a domain of subject matter, like economics or law. It is an intensity, the most extreme degree of association and dissociation, crystallized in the distinction between friend and enemy. The friend is not someone you like. The enemy is not someone you hate. Both are collective categories. The friend is the group with whom you stand in existential solidarity. The enemy is the public hostis whose existence, not whose moral failings, threatens your way of life. The sovereign’s authority rests on a single capacity: the power to decide the exception, the moment when normal legal and moral norms are suspended in confrontation with that enemy. Schmitt argued that liberalism’s attempt to replace this antagonism with procedure, economic calculation, or universal law was not an advance but a evasion, a failure to reckon with the irreducibly conflictual character of collective human life.

Alliance Theory reframes this entire apparatus as an emergent feature of coalitional psychology. Humans are, as Pinsof and his colleagues argue following John Tooby, coalitional animals. We possess dedicated cognitive equipment for alliance formation and maintenance: we choose allies based on similarity, transitivity, and interdependence; we sustain those alliances through a battery of propagandistic biases that excuse allies’ wrongdoing, amplify allies’ grievances, and attribute allies’ successes to internal virtue and failures to external circumstance. These are not incidental features of social life. They are adaptations, selected for because alliance formation produced survival advantages across the long run of human evolutionary history. The friend/enemy distinction maps directly onto this architecture. The friend is a transitive ally or a member of one’s coalition. The enemy is a rival or a rival’s ally. What Schmitt presents as a conceptual and ontological bedrock turns out, under this lens, to be ordinary cognitive output.

This reframing dissolves the metaphysical gravity of Schmitt’s writing without dismissing what he observed. When he describes the “shiver” of the political, the sense of existential stakes that no economic or legal vocabulary can capture, he is describing the phenomenological experience of a mind operating at maximum coalitional stress. The brain shuts down nuance under high-stakes alliance conditions. Emotional signaling intensifies. The categories of friend and enemy harden. What Schmitt treats as the depth of political reality is the biological signal of a cognitive system that has maximized its social investment in a specific coalition. The depth is real as an experience. It is not a property of politics as a distinct domain of human existence. It is the predictable output of machinery that operates identically in faculty politics, religious schisms, corporate succession disputes, and interstate war. The difference between these cases is scale, not kind.

The figure of the sovereign undergoes a parallel transformation. On Schmitt’s account, the sovereign who decides the exception reveals the ultimate ground of political order. He does not apply law; he steps outside it, confronting the existential threat that law cannot address. Alliance Theory reinterprets this figure as an efficient coordination hub in an alliance network. The act of naming the enemy is not a mystical decision. It is a solution to a coordination game. When the sovereign identifies the hostis, he activates shared propagandistic biases across the coalition: victim biases sharpen, perpetrator biases mobilize, attributional asymmetries align. The coalition achieves common knowledge of who counts as us and who counts as them. Suspending norms in that moment is not a revelation of political truth. It is a test of alliance loyalty, a demand that allies abandon general rules to support a specific coalitional move, thereby incurring sunk costs that bind them more tightly to the network. Sovereignty persists only as long as the network accepts the sovereign’s signals as its primary coordination focal point. When the sovereign can no longer name the enemy in a way that activates the coalition’s biases, sovereignty has not merely failed. The network has reconfigured around a new hub.

This account also relocates Schmitt’s value as an intellectual. He was not simply navigating alliances; he competed in a market for elite usefulness. His friend/enemy framework gave elites a prestigious language for performing decisive coalition leadership. To “decide the exception” is not only to coordinate action. It is a status display, a demonstration that one can name the enemy, suspend norms, and move the coalition. Schmitt produced high-prestige coalition technology. His ideas were adopted not because they were analytically superior to liberal alternatives but because they enhanced the value of elites who deployed them within high-intensity coalitions. Pinsof’s paper argues that elites are not more ideologically coherent than the masses; they are more attuned to alliance structures and more skilled at producing justificatory narratives. Elite coherence is an illusion created by skillful alliance signaling under reputational pressure. Schmitt exemplified this pattern. His theoretical consistency was a performance of alliance reliability, not the output of a mind working from stable first principles.

Schmitt’s biography illustrates the model. His alignment with the Nazi regime beginning in 1933, his rapid production of legal and intellectual justifications for its actions, and his eventual marginalization once the coalition no longer found him useful have been treated by interpreters as evidence of either tragic conviction or cynical opportunism. Alliance Theory offers a cleaner, non-moralizing account. Schmitt joined when doing so was professionally and socially profitable, when transitivity and interdependence with the rising super-alliance made alignment advantageous. He contributed propagandistic labor, excusing the coalition’s actions, amplifying its grievances, framing its opponents as existential threats. He was discarded when the alliance structure shifted and he ceased to enhance the coalition’s value. He was not a convinced ideologue. He was not a pure opportunist. He was an elite performing the functions elites perform, with unusual theoretical sophistication. The friend/enemy framework he developed was simultaneously his analytical instrument and the tool he used to rationalize each successive move. His work is not merely explained by Alliance Theory. It is an instance of the phenomenon it describes.

This self-referential quality becomes most visible in the function of moral language. Schmitt understood that legal and moral vocabularies mask underlying antagonisms. Alliance Theory specifies the masking process more precisely. Moral language functions as coalitional encryption. It allows alliance members to signal loyalty and coordinate action without explicitly stating their interests. It disguises coordination as principle. It creates plausible deniability across mixed audiences who might not share the coalition’s commitments. When Schmitt writes about existential enemies and the necessity of sovereign decision, he encodes coalition boundaries in morally charged language that activates victim biases, perpetrator biases, and attributional asymmetries. He is not merely describing political antagonism. He is performing it, in the elevated register available to a legal intellectual, for an audience that benefits from the performance. Political theory, on this account, is a high-level propaganda layer built on evolved bias machinery.

This explains what would otherwise appear as the bewildering incoherence of political belief systems. Conservatives and liberals alike maintain combinations of positions that no unified philosophy generates. They apply moral principles selectively, defending allies and attacking rivals with the same rhetorical tools, inverting the principles when the targets change. Pinsof and his colleagues document this symmetry empirically: the same propagandistic biases operate across ideological lines, producing mirror-image inconsistencies. Schmitt observed this incoherence and interpreted it as evidence that liberalism’s universalist pretensions were philosophically bankrupt. Alliance Theory shows that the incoherence is not a failure of liberal philosophy specifically. It is the functional signature of belief systems operating as alliance maintenance tools rather than truth-tracking instruments. Belief systems are not designed to model the world. They are designed to mobilize support for allies and opposition to rivals. Apparent ideological inconsistency is the system working as intended.

The failure of liberalism, on this account, is deeper than Schmitt recognized. He argued that liberalism fails because it denies the political, because it refuses to confront the irreducibility of the friend/enemy distinction. Alliance Theory shows that liberalism fails because it misunderstands human cognition. Liberalism assumes that beliefs derive from values. Alliance Theory shows that beliefs derive from alliances. Liberalism attempts to use truth and universalism as its primary coordination tags, to build a system of neutral procedures and impartial institutions on the premise that participants can be induced to suspend their coalitional equipment. But because humans use belief systems for alliance maintenance, liberal institutions inevitably get captured by coalitional forces. The neutral judge is a cognitive impossibility. The impartial bureaucrat is a cognitive impossibility. They are not impossible because individuals lack virtue; they are impossible because the cognitive architecture that would support genuine neutrality was not what got selected for. Liberalism is a coordination strategy that forbids its own operations. Schmitt saw this as a failure of liberal will. It is a failure of liberal architecture.

The volatility of political alignments follows naturally from the same framework. Alliances are partly stochastic. Small initial conditions, historical accidents, contingent personal connections, arbitrary early commitments, can cascade into large and stable coalition structures. Once those structures form, belief systems reorganize around them. What appears as ideological transformation is usually post hoc rationalization of new coalition realities. Belief systems are lagging indicators of alliance change, not leading causes. The extraordinary volatility of Weimar politics, which Schmitt theorized from within, was not an anomaly that required a special theory of political exception. It was a transparent case of the underlying stochastic process operating without the stabilizing institutions that normally slow coalition realignment. The sudden reversals of position that confound observers of contemporary politics, on trade, on foreign adversaries, on institutional norms, follow the same logic. When alliance structures shift, belief systems follow, and the intellectual labor of justification proceeds rapidly, performed by elites whose reputational constraints require the appearance of principled continuity.

What Schmitt elevated into a distinct domain of human existence, the political, is continuous with the ordinary operations of social cognition. States are super-alliances. War is escalated coalition conflict. Sovereignty is high-centrality positioning in an alliance network. The exception is a coordination signal that tests and hardens alliance bonds. Ideology is post hoc propagandistic labor justifying alliances that formed for other reasons. None of this denies Schmitt’s descriptive accuracy. His account of the friend/enemy distinction captures something real about how political antagonism feels and how it operates. But the reality it captures is not the essence of a distinct political domain. It is the surface expression of coalitional psychology operating at the scale of states.

Schmitt saw that the friend/enemy distinction could not be neutralized. He was correct. Alliance Theory shows why the neutralization project was always futile: the distinction is not a feature of political theory or a habit of political culture that better institutions might dissolve. It is a feature of the human mind. It will reappear in any institution sufficiently stressed, whether that institution calls itself liberal, procedural, technocratic, or deliberately apolitical. The reappearance is not a failure of the institution’s values. It is the return of the cognitive baseline.

The final irony is that Alliance Theory, in naturalizing Schmitt, also naturalizes Schmitt’s critics. Liberal theorists produce technologies of neutralization that help low-intensity, broad-tent trade coalitions coordinate. Schmitt produced a technology of enmity that helped high-intensity coalitions coordinate. Pinsof’s theory is a technology of de-masking: it steps outside the friend/enemy distinction to describe the distinction itself. But the theory also predicts that even this apparently neutral scientific account will eventually function as a coalitional weapon, deployed by those who wish to delegitimize political movements by labeling their convictions as mere coalition signals. No analytical stance remains permanently outside the process it analyzes. The theory, too, will be recruited.

Schmitt was right that the political could not be wished away. He was wrong that it required its own ontology. The political is not a rarefied domain of sovereignty and existential decision. It is what coalition psychology looks like when the stakes are high enough. Schmitt felt the weight of that psychology as philosophical necessity. He experienced it from inside a coalition that needed him to feel exactly that. He was not the philosopher of the state he believed himself to be. He was, with more clarity than he could have tolerated, the philosopher of the primate brain.

The Buffered Self

Schmitt’s central theoretical claim is that modern political and legal categories are secularized theological concepts. Political Theology opens with the formulation that all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts. Sovereignty derives from divine omnipotence. The exception corresponds to the miracle. The constitutional order mirrors the divine order. The analogy is not merely rhetorical. Schmitt argued that the structural features of theological concepts carry over into their secular replacements even as the explicit theological content is stripped away.
This is an early version of what Charles Taylor’s framework later identified systematically as the operation of buffered modernity on porous categories. Modern political concepts retain structural features of their theological origins while operating within the immanent frame that buffered modernity constructs. Schmitt saw this structural carryover clearly. He saw it decades before Taylor did. His analysis anticipated substantial portions of what Taylor would later develop.
Schmitt’s Catholic formation provided him with phenomenological access to what theological concepts actually were when they operated in their original porous framework. He could see the secularized versions as secularized because he knew the original versions from within. Protestant theologians and secular liberal theorists typically lacked this access. They worked from positions already too distant from the original porous framework to see the structural carryover Schmitt identified. Schmitt’s Catholicism gave him analytical resources that thoroughly buffered positions could not generate.
Schmitt and Taylor reach substantially different conclusions from analyses that share significant features. Taylor’s analysis is broadly sympathetic to what buffered modernity has accomplished while also identifying what it has lost and what it cannot do. Taylor wants to preserve what modernity has gained while recovering access to what it has lost. His framework is therefore analytical-diagnostic, aimed at understanding.
Schmitt’s analysis moves in different directions. He uses the identification of theological residues in modern politics to argue that liberal constitutionalism is fundamentally incoherent. The incoherence shows up specifically in the problem of the exception. Liberal legal order presupposes that law covers all situations. But specific situations arise that law cannot anticipate. In those situations, sovereign decision exceeds legal determination. The exception reveals that the legal order depends on decisions that the order itself cannot authorize. Liberal proceduralism cannot account for the foundational decision that establishes procedural order in the first place.
From this analysis Schmitt draws conclusions that take him in distinctly authoritarian directions. If liberal constitutionalism cannot account for its own foundation, then the actual foundation must be identified. Schmitt identifies it as sovereign decision that establishes the political unity within which legal order subsequently operates. The political unity requires identification of friend and enemy. The identification cannot be reduced to legal categories. It operates at the existential level of political life itself.
Taylor’s framework can accommodate Schmitt’s analytical observations about the theological residues in modern political concepts. Taylor’s framework does not support Schmitt’s political conclusions. The observations can be made without endorsing the conclusions. Schmitt’s political conclusions follow specifically from his substantive commitments, not merely from his analytical observations.
Where does Schmitt himself stand on the buffered-porous axis? The question is more complex than similar questions about most of the figures we have analyzed because Schmitt’s position shifted substantially across his career in ways that illuminate what the axis itself can do and cannot do.
The young Schmitt wrote from within Catholic porous commitment. His 1923 book Roman Catholicism and Political Form celebrated the Catholic Church as a specific form of political life that combined juridical rationality with transcendent authority. The celebration was not merely analytical. It reflected commitments Schmitt held from his Catholic formation.
By the late 1920s, Schmitt’s commitments had begun shifting. His analytical work continued using Catholic frameworks. His actual political commitments moved toward authoritarian German nationalism that sat uneasily with Catholic universalism. By 1933, Schmitt aligned with the Nazi regime, joined the party, wrote defenses of the Nuremberg laws and of the Röhm purge, and participated in specifically antisemitic scholarly activities. The alignment contradicted substantial portions of Catholic teaching. Schmitt’s continued Catholic identification during this period was compromised in ways the Church eventually recognized when he was effectively excommunicated in 1950.
After the war, Schmitt was banned from German universities and lived in semi-retirement in Plettenberg until his death in 1985. His later work returned to more philosophical and historical themes. His engagement with Catholicism became more ambivalent. He died having received Catholic last rites but having spent decades in a specifically complicated relationship with the tradition of his upbringing.
What Taylor’s framework helps see about this trajectory. The young Schmitt operated from porous Catholic commitment that gave him analytical access to the theological residues in modern political concepts. His analysis of sovereignty, the exception, and political theology drew on resources his Catholic formation provided. The analysis was substantive scholarly work that continues to be engaged long after it was produced.
The middle Schmitt used the analytical resources in service of political conclusions that contradicted the substantive commitments those resources originally supported. Catholic political theology provides resources for critiquing liberal proceduralism. It does not support aligning with totalitarian regimes that murder the political enemies liberal proceduralism would at least procedurally protect. Schmitt’s alignment with the Nazi regime required him to use his analytical resources in directions his formational commitments should have prevented. The requirement was met through compartmentalization rather than through resolution of the underlying contradictions.
The late Schmitt could not quite acknowledge what the middle Schmitt had done. His postwar writings returned to more abstract historical and philosophical themes without substantial accounting for the specifically political commitments he had undertaken in the middle period. The avoidance left him in a position of analytical sophistication combined with moral evasion that subsequent readers have had to sort through.
Political Theology identifies theological residues in modern political concepts. The identification is analytically powerful. It has become a widely used framework for understanding how modern political orders operate. The book has been read by theorists across the political spectrum. Leftist thinkers including Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben have drawn on it. Rightist thinkers have drawn on it. Liberal thinkers who want to understand their own commitments have drawn on it. The analytical power of the book exceeds the specific political conclusions Schmitt drew from it.
Schmitt’s analytical contributions can be separated from his political commitments in ways that many scholars’ works cannot. Marxist scholars typically produce work whose analytical content is difficult to separate from Marxist political commitments. Liberal scholars typically produce work whose analytical content reflects liberal political commitments. Schmitt produced analytical content that has been usable by scholars whose political commitments substantially differ from his own.
Schmitt’s observations describe structural features of modern political life. The features can be observed from various positions. The conclusions drawn depend on substantive commitments separate from the observations themselves. Schmitt drew authoritarian conclusions. Others can draw democratic conclusions from the same observations. The observations stand separately from any particular politics.
The Concept of the Political argues that political life is characterized by the friend-enemy distinction. The distinction is not merely one feature among many. It is the specific feature that makes political life political. When the distinction disappears, political life as such disappears. Other forms of human interaction remain. But what Schmitt calls the political no longer operates.
The friend-enemy distinction operates at a level that resists full buffering. It involves commitments that cannot be reduced to procedural agreements or rational calculations of interest. It involves recognition of who belongs to one’s political community and who threatens it. The recognition is not purely cognitive. It is specifically phenomenological in ways that pure buffered analysis typically cannot engage.
Liberal political theory has difficulty with this claim because liberal political theory proceeds from thoroughly buffered assumptions. Liberal citizens are assumed to engage each other through procedural exchange of reasons. The exchange does not require recognition of enemies. It requires recognition of fellow citizens whose disagreements can be worked out through procedures. Schmitt argues this picture misses what actually sustains political life. The procedural exchange operates within a prior political unity that depends on the friend-enemy distinction. Without the prior unity, the procedural exchange has no stable ground.
This is a specifically difficult argument for buffered political theory to refute. The refutation would need to show that buffered procedural exchange can sustain itself without the phenomenological commitments Schmitt identifies. The demonstration has not been convincingly produced. Liberal political orders have typically sustained themselves through specifically non-procedural means that operated tacitly within apparently procedural frameworks. When the non-procedural means erode, the procedural frameworks struggle.
Taylor’s framework helps see why Schmitt’s argument has analytical force despite its specifically uncomfortable political implications. Political life does seem to require phenomenological commitments that exceed what pure procedural exchange can generate. The commitments are not reducible to buffered categories. The requirement is a structural feature of political life rather than a contingent preference of specific political traditions.
Taylor’s framework is broadly sympathetic to liberal constitutional democracy while identifying its limits. Schmitt’s framework is substantially more critical of liberal constitutional democracy. Taylor accepts that buffered modernity has produced real goods that should be preserved. Schmitt argues that the buffered constitutional order rests on foundations it cannot justify from within and that the foundations are specifically illiberal.
The challenge is not easily dismissed. Schmitt identifies specifically the same theological residues Taylor later identified. Schmitt draws substantially more critical conclusions. The difference between the conclusions cannot be resolved by pointing to factual features of the analysis. It reflects different substantive commitments applied to shared analytical observations.
Taylor would argue that Schmitt’s conclusions go beyond what the analytical observations support. The observations show that liberal constitutional order has theological residues. They do not show that liberal constitutional order is fundamentally incoherent or that it should be replaced with authoritarian alternatives. Schmitt’s move from the observations to the conclusions requires substantive commitments Taylor does not share.
Schmitt’s observations identify something Taylor’s framework cannot fully answer. Liberal constitutional order does depend on foundations it cannot fully justify through its own procedures. The foundations include phenomenological commitments that buffered citizens cannot always reliably generate when the commitments are most needed. Taylor’s framework can acknowledge this while arguing that the buffered constitutional order remains worth preserving despite its foundational difficulties. Schmitt’s framework argues that the foundational difficulties specifically require moving beyond buffered constitutionalism toward more substantive political orders.
How should readers engage Schmitt’s work given his Nazi collaboration? The question has been debated extensively. Some scholars argue that the collaboration disqualifies his work from serious engagement. Others argue that his analytical contributions can be separated from his political choices. Still others argue that the analytical contributions themselves carry authoritarian implications that Schmitt’s political choices made manifest.
The Nazi alignment does not invalidate the analytical insights. It does complicate what we do with them. Reading Schmitt seriously requires acknowledging that the insights come from someone whose political judgment appalls us today. Schmitt’s failure was instructive about what his analytical framework could and could not do. His framework could identify the inadequacies of Weimar liberalism. It could not prevent him from aligning with an alternative that was worse than what it replaced.
Schmitt has been read enthusiastically by specific contemporary theorists on both left and right. The left readings often emphasize his critique of liberal proceduralism as mask for actual power relations. The right readings often emphasize his sovereignty theory and his friend-enemy distinction as tools for rebuilding substantive political orders. The readings reach opposite political conclusions from shared analytical starting points.
This pattern specifically illustrates what Taylor’s framework identifies about the ambiguity of analytical observations separated from substantive commitments. The observations can be deployed in various directions depending on prior commitments. Schmitt’s own trajectory illustrates the specifically dangerous possibilities. His observations were deployed in service of one of the twentieth century’s most destructive political movements. The observations themselves did not require the deployment. His substantive commitments did.
Contemporary readers engaging Schmitt face the specific question of what commitments they bring to his work. Readers whose commitments are democratic and constitutionalist can use his observations to understand the specific difficulties their political order faces. Readers whose commitments are authoritarian can use the same observations to justify moving beyond constitutional order toward more substantive alternatives. The same analytical resources support different political projects.
Analytical observations about the phenomenological foundations of political life do not determine political commitments. The commitments come from sources the observations themselves cannot generate. Schmitt’s work makes observations that remain analytically valuable while generating ongoing debate about what political conclusions they support.
Schmitt’s work has influenced substantial twentieth and twenty-first century political theory. Some of the figures we have analyzed operate within traditions Schmitt helped shape. Jack Balkin’s work on constitutional dictatorship draws on analytical resources Schmitt developed. Sanford Levinson’s work on the difficulty of constitutional orders that resist amendment draws on similar resources. Even thinkers far from Schmitt’s politics engage with his analytical framework because the framework identifies features of political life that other frameworks do not reach as directly.
The analytical resources Schmitt developed continue to illuminate features of political life that subsequent theory has not replaced. The resources can be used by scholars whose commitments differ from Schmitt’s own. The use does not endorse Schmitt’s specific conclusions. It engages the analytical work separately from the conclusions.
Schmitt is productive for Taylor’s framework because his case shows the specifically difficult relationship between phenomenological formation and moral responsibility. His Catholic formation should have prevented his Nazi alignment. It did not prevent it. The formation provided resources that could have been deployed to resist Nazi commitments. Schmitt chose to deploy them in service of Nazi commitments instead. The choice was his. The formation did not make the choice. It made the choice possible by providing resources that could be deployed in various directions.
This specifically complicates simple readings of phenomenological formation as determining political commitments. Porous religious formation does not automatically produce politically admirable conclusions. It produces specific resources that can be used in various ways. The uses depend on subsequent choices that the formation itself does not determine. Schmitt’s case shows this with specifically uncomfortable clarity. His Catholic resources were real. His use of them was disastrous. Both features must be held together to understand what he did.
Schmitt represents the specific possibility that formational resources generate analytical insights while leaving moral commitments undetermined. Most of the figures we have analyzed show alignment between their formational resources and their substantive commitments. Adlerstein’s Haredi formation aligns with his Orthodox commitments. Myers’s Jewish formation aligns with his specifically progressive Jewish commitments. The alignments are not automatic but they are substantial.
Schmitt shows what happens when the alignment breaks down. His Catholic formational resources remained operative in his analytical work even as his substantive political commitments moved in directions his formation should have prevented. The breakdown produced analytical work that continues to be engaged while the political commitments that accompanied the work are near universally rejected. The continued engagement is specifically possible because analytical resources operate somewhat independently of the commitments the resources are deployed for.
Formation provides resources. The resources generate capacities for specific kinds of work. The work can be directed in various ways by subsequent commitments. The commitments themselves are not determined by the formation. Schmitt’s case shows the specifically dangerous possibility when commitments diverge from what formation should have produced. His analytical work survives. His political legacy is specifically catastrophic. Both features must be held together.
Without Taylor’s framework, Schmitt’s case often gets treated either as pure political disgrace that should disqualify engagement with his analytical work or as pure analytical brilliance that should be separated entirely from his political choices. Both treatments miss what the framework identifies. Schmitt produced analytical work that drew on specifically Catholic formational resources. He deployed the work in service of political commitments that contradicted what Catholic formation should have produced. The analytical work survives as resource for subsequent engagement. The political commitments remain specifically catastrophic. Engaging the combination honestly requires acknowledging both features as features of the same person whose formational resources enabled the analytical work and whose substantive choices determined the work’s specifically horrible deployment.

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Mickey Kaus – The Partial Insider

Mickey Kaus was born into the system. His father, Otto Kaus, sat on the California Supreme Court. He grew up in Beverly Hills, attended Harvard twice, and entered journalism through the Washington Monthly, the neoliberal incubator that launched Michael Kinsley and shaped the center-left policy conversation of the 1980s. His career began at the center of things. The question is why it did not end there.
Born July 6, 1951, in Santa Monica, Robert Michael Kaus had every structural advantage the American meritocracy offers. A father on the state’s highest bench, a civic-minded mother, a brother who became a California Superior Court judge. Grandmother Gina Kaus was a novelist. The family was steeped in public life. When Kaus arrived at Harvard for his undergraduate degree and stayed for law school, he was not climbing; he was moving laterally through the corridors he was raised to occupy. He never practiced law. He had a different destination in mind.

The Big Idea

Kaus joined the Washington Monthly, then wrote for Newsweek, Harper’s, and spent nearly a decade as a senior editor at The New Republic. These were not marginal perches. They were central nodes in the liberal policy conversation during the Clinton years, when the Democratic Party was remaking itself around markets, responsibility, and the language of civic obligation. Kaus fit naturally into that project. He was an ideas journalist from the start, operating where policy, culture, and moral language intersect.
His signature contribution came in 1992 with The End of Equality. The argument was simple and unfashionable. Liberals spent too much energy chasing income equality, which markets resist and governments struggle to produce. The more achievable and more important goal was social equality: shared norms, work participation, civic cohesion, and institutions that mixed Americans across class lines. The book fed directly into the Clinton-era welfare reform debates, and Kaus was not on the margins of that fight. He was inside it, helping provide intellectual justification for what became the 1996 welfare overhaul. At that point his trajectory looked like the standard model. Credentials, network, a signature idea that landed at exactly the right political moment. That combination usually locks in a long institutional career.

The Divergence

In 1999 Kaus launched Kausfiles, one of the first major political blogs. This mattered more than it looked at the time. Blogging was not simply a new medium. It was a way to bypass editorial filtering and build a direct relationship with readers before gatekeepers understood what was happening. Kaus negotiated unusual freedom while hosted at Slate and, when that arrangement ended, already knew how to operate without institutional backing. Most pundits depend on institutions for distribution. Kaus built a parallel channel before he needed it.
The second inflection point was immigration. Kaus took the same framework he had applied to welfare and ran it through labor markets. If you believe in social equality and wage dignity for low-income workers, then large-scale low-skill immigration pushes in the opposite direction. It increases the labor supply at the bottom. It weakens bargaining power. It benefits employers and upper-middle-class consumers while imposing costs on the most vulnerable workers, including many Black Americans. This is Econ 101 combined with a particular moral priority. What made it radioactive was not the logic. It was the coalition it threatened.
The modern Democratic coalition includes professional-class voters, ethnic advocacy groups and NGOs, and corporate sectors that benefit from labor inflows. Working-class voters are nominally central but institutionally weak. Kaus kept pointing at that mismatch. Not abstractly but repeatedly, concretely, and with increasing irritation at what he read as bad faith. Coalition logic treats internal peace as sacred. Arguments that expose trade-offs the coalition depends on obscuring are intolerable, whatever their empirical merit. Kaus crossed that line. The result was predictable: fewer mainstream platforms, short stints that ended in conflict, and eventual exile from prestige liberal outlets. He quit the Daily Caller in 2015 after editorial battles over his immigration writing and moved to independent publishing, where he has remained.

The Brooks Contrast

The divergence between Kaus and a figure like David Brooks clarifies what the system actually rewards. Both began inside elite institutions. Both built reputations as interpreters of American social life. The difference is functional. Brooks translates social complexity into moral narratives that are legible and affirming to his audience. Even when he criticizes, he stabilizes rather than destabilizes the coalition he speaks to. Kaus does the opposite. He takes a stated value, equality, and runs it through a material analysis that produces uncomfortable conclusions for his own side.
The system rewards the latter more than the former. Brooks accumulates honors, fellowships, and institutional trust. Kaus accumulates a smaller, combative audience and a reputation in establishment circles as a crank or obsessive. One manages the coalition. The other stresses it. Elite media does not primarily select for the most empirically consistent thinker. It selects for the most effective coalition manager.

Why He Survived

Most contrarians who break with the center-left disappear. Kaus did not, and the reasons are structural rather than personal.
He owns an issue. Immigration is not a passing controversy. It is a structural feature of modern economies, returning to the center of political life at regular intervals. When it spikes, his relevance spikes with it. People know where he stands and what he will say. That looks like monomania to critics, but it functions like branding. A consistent, specific, durable argument on a durable issue is more valuable over a long career than range without a center.
He built independence early. The blogging era allowed him to retain a voice after losing institutional platforms. He did not need permission to keep publishing, because he had already built the channel.
He was never a true outsider. His Harvard background and early career at top magazines give him a baseline credibility that pure fringe figures lack. He is not dismissed as ignorant. He is dismissed as wrong, fixated, or ideologically compromised. A defector carries more weight than an external enemy, because a defector understands the internal logic of the group he attacks. Kaus’s critics know he knows what he is talking about. That forces engagement, however grudging.

The Cost

The failure mode is real and worth naming. Kaus’s focus narrows over time. Immigration becomes less one issue among many and more the lens through which everything passes. That creates the impression of monomania, which his critics emphasize and his supporters tolerate. It also limits his ability to build a broader positive program. He is strongest as a critic exposing contradictions, weaker as a synthesizer offering a comprehensive alternative.
His tone contributes to the narrowing. The blog format rewards provocation and quick hits. Over decades, that style hardens. It energizes a niche audience but alienates the broader one needed for institutional reintegration. He ran a protest campaign in the 2010 California Democratic Senate primary, explicitly to put immigration and welfare on the record, and received a small but nonzero vote share. That episode captures his career in miniature: serious enough to run, independent enough not to care about winning, too heterodox to build a movement.
He voted for Obama twice, then Trump twice, describing himself as a populist Democrat who gave up on the party. That trajectory is not incoherence. It is a consistent application of his original argument across a changing landscape. The party moved. He did not.

What He Reveals

Kaus is what a partially rejected insider looks like in a system that cannot fully absorb or fully discard him. He had every opportunity to become a standard establishment pundit. He had the credentials, the network, and a signature idea that landed at the right moment. Instead he became something rarer: a standing reminder that certain lines of argument, even when grounded in basic economics and long-standing liberal concerns, will push you to the edge if you refuse to soften them.
At 74 he still publishes independently, still arguing the same case. The system did not reward that stubbornness. But it could not erase it either, because the tensions he identified did not go away. That is the harder lesson. Elite institutions do not select against wrong ideas. They select against ideas that expose what the coalition needs to leave implicit. Kaus kept making those ideas explicit. The result was predictable, and so is his persistence. Every time the gap between rhetoric and material outcomes becomes too wide to ignore, the argument he has been making since 1992 becomes newly relevant, and he is still there to make it.

Convenient Beliefs

Stephen Turner’s framework on convenient beliefs cuts directly to why Kaus’s career unfolded the way it did. The core claim is that people and institutions adopt beliefs not because the evidence compels them but because those beliefs serve their position. The belief is convenient: it protects income, status, coalition membership, or self-image. The inconvenient belief, however well-grounded, gets suppressed not through conspiracy but through the ordinary social pressure of being in a room with people who need you to stop saying that.
Kaus’s immigration argument is a textbook case. The professional-class liberals who dominate Democratic institutions benefit materially from labor inflows. Cheaper domestic services, lower wages for competitors, a larger low-cost workforce. Their belief that high immigration is a moral good and an economic necessity is also, not coincidentally, a belief that protects their material position. Turner would say the convenience does not make the belief false, but it does explain why it is so resistant to evidence and why those who challenge it face social rather than intellectual sanctions.
What Kaus kept doing, decade after decade, was pointing at the convenience. He did not just argue that immigration suppresses wages. He argued that the people refusing to engage with that argument had a financial and social stake in not engaging with it. That is the Turner move: show that the belief is doing coalition work, not epistemic work. It is not that the other side has looked at the evidence and weighed it differently. It is that the belief is load-bearing for their identity and their income.
This also explains the specific form his exile took. He was not refuted. He was marginalized. Turner distinguishes between these outcomes carefully. When an inconvenient argument is actually wrong, institutions can afford to engage and rebut. When it is inconvenient because it is right, or at least because its inconvenience is structural rather than empirical, the response shifts. The argument gets ignored, its author gets labeled obsessive or bad-faith, and the institutions close around the convenient belief without ever quite addressing the challenge. That is exactly what happened to Kaus. The mainstream liberal press did not produce a sustained refutation of his labor-market claims. It produced dismissal, reputation management, and eventually silence.
Turner’s concept also illuminates why Kaus himself hardened over time. Once you identify the convenience operating in an opponent’s belief, and once you watch them refuse to engage, the temptation is to make the accusation of convenience the whole argument. Kaus increasingly did this. The charge of bad faith became as prominent as the underlying economics. That is a natural response to the Turner situation but also a trap. It narrows the argument from labor economics into a sociology of elite self-interest, which is compelling to people already sympathetic and alienating to everyone else.
The deepest application of the Turner frame is this. Kaus’s belief that immigration suppresses wages for low-income workers was also, from a certain angle, convenient for him. It gave him a durable brand, a niche, a reason to exist outside the institutions that had effectively expelled him. Turner would not let that go unexamined. The convenient belief frame cuts in every direction. The question is not just whose belief serves whose interest but whether the argument survives that scrutiny. Kaus’s core labor-market claim is standard enough economics that it does survive. But his certainty, his willingness to read every political development through that single lens, his assumption that the opposition is always acting in bad faith rather than reasoning differently: those elements have the texture of a convenient belief, one that lets him maintain identity and purpose after institutional exile.

The Tacit

Stephen Turner’s work on tacit knowledge starts with a deceptively simple claim: much of what experts know cannot be transmitted through explicit instruction. It lives in practice, in trained intuition, in the accumulated feel of having done something for a long time in a particular community. The problem this creates for democratic life is serious. If the knowledge that justifies policy cannot be made explicit, it cannot be evaluated by outsiders. The expert says trust me, and the institutional structure says trust him, and the layman has no real recourse. Turner’s deeper argument is that appeals to tacit knowledge function as a form of power. They insulate expert consensus from challenge by making the challenge itself look illegitimate, the complaint of someone who simply does not understand how complex these things are.
Kaus ran into this at every turn. The mainstream liberal position on immigration was not defended primarily through explicit argument. It was defended through credentialing. Economists who supported restrictionist conclusions were described as outliers. The complexity of immigration’s effects was invoked to suggest that only specialists with the right institutional affiliations could be trusted to weigh them. Kaus, despite his Harvard credentials and decades in policy journalism, was treated as someone who did not really understand the literature. The tacit knowledge move was made against him repeatedly: your intuitions about labor markets are too crude, the reality is more complicated, the people who study this for a living have reached different conclusions.
What makes this interesting is that Kaus’s actual argument was largely explicit. He was not trafficking in gut feelings. He was running a straightforward supply-and-demand logic and pointing at studies that supported it, including work by labor economists like George Borjas. The claim that low-skill immigration suppresses wages at the bottom is not a tacit intuition. It is a falsifiable empirical proposition with a substantial research literature behind it. But the institutional response treated it as naive, as if anyone who had really absorbed the tacit knowledge of the field would know better than to press that argument.
Turner would identify this as a misuse of the tacit. When institutions invoke complexity and expertise to foreclose an argument that is actually quite explicit and empirically grounded, they are using the language of tacit knowledge as a political rather than an epistemic tool. The claim is not that Kaus lacks some genuine insight available only to initiates. The claim is that he is not one of us, and that his not-one-of-us status is itself evidence that his argument is wrong. That is the tacit as credential rather than knowledge, and Turner is consistently suspicious of it.
There is a second application. Kaus’s own mode of analysis is largely nontacit. He writes for a general audience, makes his reasoning explicit, and invites scrutiny. His blog format, whatever its stylistic hardening over time, is committed to showing the work. This put him at a structural disadvantage against institutions whose authority rested on forms of knowledge they did not have to make explicit. The Federal Reserve does not publish its tacit intuitions about the economy. The major immigration economists affiliated with elite universities did not always make transparent the assumptions built into their models. Kaus, arguing in plain prose on a blog, was asking for a kind of explicit engagement that the other side was not obligated to provide. He could be dismissed by people who never had to fully articulate why.
Turner also writes about the way tacit knowledge creates communities of practice that police their own boundaries. You acquire the tacit through apprenticeship, through being inside the right institutions, through absorbing the unspoken norms of a field. Kaus was never fully inside the economics profession or the policy research community in that sense. He was a journalist who read the literature and drew conclusions. That outsider position, even with his elite credentials, meant his claims were always vulnerable to the charge that he lacked the full tacit background to interpret the evidence correctly. His credentials were in the wrong domain. Harvard Law does not give you the tacit knowledge of a labor economist, and the institutions that held that tacit knowledge had already decided what conclusions it supported.
The sharpest Turner point is this. When tacit knowledge is genuinely tacit, no one can fully verify it from outside, including the people who claim to possess it. The consensus among immigration economists in the 1990s and 2000s that low-skill immigration had minimal wage effects was itself a product of a community of practice with its own convenient beliefs, its own professional incentives, and its own coalition alignments. Turner’s framework suggests we should be skeptical of any expert consensus that happens to align perfectly with the material interests of the institutions housing those experts. The immigration economics consensus aligned very well with the interests of universities, technology companies, agricultural businesses, and the professional class generally. Kaus kept saying so. The tacit knowledge framework was used against him, but Turner would say it cut equally against those deploying it.

The Four Questions

Who does Kaus rely on for status, income, and protection?
This is where his career tells a strange story. He began with every structural advantage: Newsweek, The New Republic, Washington Monthly, Slate. Those platforms gave him status inside the professional media class. But he spent the last two decades systematically burning those relationships. He was fired from Newsweek, then quit the Daily Caller after Tucker Carlson killed a column critical of Fox News. Wikipedia By the time that sequence concluded, his institutional support had collapsed to Breitbart and a self-hosted blog. What replaced the institutional income is not fully clear. He appears to live modestly in Venice Beach, unmarried, without the speaking fees, consulting arrangements, or academic appointments that sustain most people of his formation and credential level. His Harvard law degree is essentially decorative. He never practiced. His status now derives almost entirely from a reputation for contrarian integrity that is itself the product of having burned the platforms that once sustained him. He is protected by nothing except the difficulty of making him more marginal than he already is.
Who does he need to attract and retain as allies?
Almost no one in the conventional sense, which is the most interesting answer the question produces for Kaus. He has no graduate students, no co-authors, no institutional partners, no grant relationships. His Harvard background and early career at top magazines give him a baseline credibility that pure fringe figures lack. He is not dismissed as ignorant. He is dismissed as wrong, fixated, or ideologically compromised. The audience he needs is readers who value heterodox Democrats willing to say what professional liberals will not say, people who are themselves frustrated with union orthodoxy, open borders consensus, and the media class’s self-dealing. That is a real audience but a diffuse one, incapable of delivering the institutional goods that conventional allies provide. His most important retained ally is Robert Wright, his BloggingHeads sparring partner, who represents the last thread connecting him to respectable liberal intellectual life. The Ann Coulter friendship is the other signal: he retains allies across ideological lines through personal loyalty rather than coalition alignment, which is an unusual and professionally costly way to operate.
What beliefs and signals mark membership in his coalition?
Kaus’s coalition is defined almost entirely by what it rejects rather than what it affirms. He identifies as neoliberal, supporting liberal ends including social equality and universal health care, but frequently attacks traditional liberal means of reaching those ends. The coalition signal is: I am not a conservative, but I will say what conservatives say about immigration and unions, and I will say it using the analytical vocabulary of the left. That positioning is legible to a specific audience: heterodox Democrats, working-class advocates who distrust the professional liberal consensus, and people who enjoy watching someone with impeccable establishment credentials attack the establishment. The signal is also legible as a threat to the mainstream liberal coalition, which is why that coalition expelled him. Membership in his implicit coalition requires willingness to hold positions that elite liberals treat as disqualifying: that low-skilled immigration suppresses wages for native workers, that unions protect incumbents at the expense of the working class, that welfare reform was substantially correct. The price of membership is being dismissed by the people whose approval his formation trained him to seek.
What would he have to give up if he changed his public position?
Here the analysis turns strange because Kaus has already given up almost everything a person of his background would normally protect. He gave up the Slate platform, the Newsweek column, the Daily Caller position. His career began at the center of things. The question is why it did not end there. What he has left is the contrarian identity itself, the reputation for saying what others will not say regardless of cost. If he softened on immigration, adopted the professional liberal consensus on unions, or stopped attacking the media class that formed him, he would gain nothing because the coalition that expelled him would not readmit him on those terms, and he would lose the one thing his current position still provides: the integrity signal that comes from having paid real costs for an unpopular position. His only remaining asset is credibility as someone who cannot be bought or pressured into line. Abandoning his positions would liquidate that asset without providing anything in return. He is locked in, not by coalition rewards but by the logic of sunk costs and the identity that his expulsion from respectable liberalism forced him to construct in its place.
Kaus’s career inverts the normal coalition logic. Most people hold convenient beliefs that protect their status and income. Kaus’s immigration argument is a textbook case of inconvenient belief: the professional-class liberals who dominate Democratic institutions benefit materially from labor inflows, and their belief that high immigration is a moral good is also a belief that protects their material position. Kaus holds the inconvenient belief and has paid the inconvenient price. Pinsof’s framework handles convenient beliefs well. It handles Kaus less cleanly, because Kaus is the case where someone followed the argument past the point where coalition rationality would have stopped him, and ended up holding a position that cost him his career. That either means his belief is unusually truth-tracking, or that he found a different kind of coalition reward in the contrarian identity itself, one that substituted reputational integrity for institutional belonging. Both might be true simultaneously, which is what makes him genuinely difficult to place.

Interaction Rituals Chains by Randall Collins

Collins’s framework asks a prior question before ideology or argument: where does this person get their emotional energy, and what happens to a person whose ritual chains have been severed?
Kaus’s career is, in Collins’s terms, a story of progressive ritual exclusion followed by adaptation to a drastically reduced interaction landscape, and the adaptation is only partially successful.
In his peak years, the ritual infrastructure was intact. The Washington Monthly, The New Republic, and Newsweek were not just employers. They were high-density interaction ritual environments. Editorial meetings, story conferences, the daily co-presence of serious people arguing about policy, the shared focus of a masthead culture, the rhythmic entrainment of deadline and publication and reader response. These rituals produced emotional energy. They told Kaus he was at the center of something that mattered. The solidarity symbols were the shared vocabulary of neoliberal policy debate, the names that circulated, the arguments that counted, the figures whose approval meant something. Kaus absorbed all of this and it powered him.
The blog changed the ritual structure before the expulsions finished it. Kausfiles, launched in 1999, was an early experiment in what Collins would call low-density ritual. The writer alone at a keyboard, no co-presence, no shared focus in the room, no rhythmic entrainment with colleagues, feedback arriving asynchronously through email and links rather than through the immediate bodily signals of a conversation or an editorial meeting. Low-density rituals produce weaker emotional energy than high-density ones. The audience can be large but the charge is thinner. What the blog gave Kaus was reach and autonomy. What it cost him was the ritual fuel that institutional journalism provided.
The sequence of departures then reads differently through Collins. Each exit from an institutional platform was not just a loss of income or audience. It was the severing of a ritual chain. Slate had a culture, a set of recurring interactions, a group of writers whose co-presence, even virtual co-presence in a shared publication, created something like a focused crowd. When Kaus left Slate, he lost access to that ritual infrastructure. Newsweek had even denser ritual life, an old masthead culture with physical offices, weekly rhythm, the co-presence of editors and fact-checkers and writers arguing in real time. Being fired from Newsweek was not just a professional setback in the conventional sense. In Collins’s terms it was ejection from one of the highest-density interaction ritual environments still operating in American journalism. The emotional energy loss would have been severe even if Kaus never consciously named it that way.
The Daily Caller departure is the most revealing moment through Collins’s lens. Kaus quit over a column Tucker Carlson killed. The stated reason was editorial integrity, which is real. But Collins would note that by 2015, the Daily Caller represented one of Kaus’s last genuine institutional ritual chains. The column gave him a recurring slot, an editorial relationship, a publication with readers who anticipated his work. Quitting over a principle meant voluntarily severing the last ritual chain that connected him to something resembling institutional journalism. After that, he was operating almost entirely on residual emotional energy from earlier ritual chains and whatever thin charge the blog audience provided.
People whose ritual chains have been severed become erratic. The emotional energy that rituals generate is what sustains the will to write, argue, and engage. Without ritual recharging, the work becomes harder to sustain at consistent levels. Kaus’s output after 2015 is noticeably thinner and more intermittent than his Slate years. Collins would say that is not primarily a function of age or diminished interest. It is a function of depleted emotional energy from inadequate ritual supply.
The BloggingHeads relationship with Robert Wright is the one ritual chain that survived the whole sequence, and Collins’s framework explains why Kaus keeps returning to it despite his appearances becoming increasingly infrequent. The diavlog format is the closest thing to genuine co-presence that remote interaction allows. Two people focused on the same topic, responding to each other in real time, developing the rhythmic entrainment of actual conversation. It produces more emotional energy than the blog does because it has more of the ingredients Collins identifies as essential: mutual focus, bodily responsiveness, real-time feedback, shared emotional atmosphere. Wright and Kaus disagree on almost everything, but the disagreement within a sustained relationship is itself a ritual that charges both of them. Collins notes that conflict can generate emotional energy as effectively as solidarity when the conflict is contained within a shared frame. The BloggingHeads format provides that frame.
The Ann Coulter friendship reads similarly. Kaus maintains a personal loyalty to Coulter that his critics find baffling given his nominal liberalism. Collins would say the friendship is not primarily ideological. It is a ritual chain. A long-term personal relationship with recurring interaction, shared history, mutual recognition, private solidarity symbols built up over years of co-presence. That is a high-value emotional energy source regardless of political alignment. Kaus defends Coulter not because her politics align with his but because she is one of the people whose sustained attention and recognition keep him charged. The political incoherence is a coalition mystery. The personal loyalty is a Collins prediction.
The immigration obsession is where Collins adds something that neither Pinsof nor Turner quite reaches. Kaus has written about immigration restrictionism for decades with an intensity that exceeds what the policy question alone would seem to warrant. Collins would ask: what ritual function does the immigration argument serve for someone in Kaus’s depleted ritual situation? The answer is that it generates conflict-based emotional energy. Every time Kaus writes about immigration, he produces a response. Liberals attack him. Restrictionists cite him. The argument reactivates attention, generates focused engagement from an audience, and creates something like the rhythm of a focused crowd even in the absence of physical co-presence. The immigration issue is not just a policy position. It is a ritual technology for producing emotional energy in a person whose conventional ritual infrastructure has been stripped away. The monomania that his critics note is not evidence of irrationality. In Collins’s terms it is a rational adaptation to ritual scarcity. You go to the well that still produces water.
Collins argues that people in low-status ritual situations sometimes sustain themselves through what he calls negative emotional energy, the charge that comes from defining oneself against a focused crowd rather than within one. Kaus’s identity as the person who says what professional liberals will not say is itself a ritual performance that generates a specific kind of charge. The liberals who dismiss him, the media class that expelled him, the union defenders who attack him, these function collectively as a negative focused crowd whose hostility confirms his position and generates the energy that the severed positive ritual chains no longer provide. He needs the attack as much as the approval. The expulsion from respectable liberalism was professionally devastating and emotionally generative simultaneously, which is why he never sought readmission on terms that would have required softening his positions. Readmission would have ended the negative ritual energy that now sustains him.
Collins would close with a prediction about Kaus’s trajectory that is not comforting. Ritual chains tend to weaken further over time when they are not maintained by co-presence and institutional renewal. The BloggingHeads appearances are already infrequent. The blog output is thin. The heterodox Democrat audience is itself fragmenting into new coalitions that have less use for his specific positioning. Without new ritual infrastructure, the emotional energy available to him will continue to decline, and with it the intensity and frequency of the work. The contrarian identity requires antagonists who take him seriously enough to attack. As his visibility diminishes, even the negative ritual energy becomes harder to generate. Collins’s framework suggests that what looks from the outside like a principled career of intellectual independence is also, from the inside, a story of progressive ritual impoverishment whose endpoint he cannot reverse without either institutional reintegration on terms he has foreclosed or the emergence of a new ritual community dense enough to recharge him. Neither seems likely.

Alliance Theory

Kaus’s core positions on immigration, welfare reform, and the liberal coalition’s internal contradictions have remained substantially stable across forty years. What has changed is the set of coalitions willing to platform him. The framework handles this case well because it distinguishes between positional stability, which Kaus displays, and coalition stability, which he does not. The analysis reveals something the standard accounts miss: that a writer can be coalition-shaped even when his positions do not move, because the platforming decisions made about him track coalition movements he did not cause and cannot control.
The standard treatments read Kaus as the neoliberal New Republic writer who wrote The End of Equality, became a pioneering blogger with Kausfiles, maintained a distinctive immigration-restrictionist position from inside liberalism for decades, ran a protest primary challenge against Barbara Boxer in 2010, was eventually dropped by the Daily Caller in 2015 over a dispute about immigration coverage, and has since operated as an independent writer on Substack. Each description is accurate. The Alliance Theory reading organizes these descriptions by identifying which coalitions sponsored each phase of his career, why the sponsorships ended, and what the sponsorship transitions reveal about how coalitions handle members whose positions do not move with them.
The coalition that sponsored the early Kaus was the neoliberal formation that coalesced around The New Republic, The Washington Monthly, the Democratic Leadership Council, and the intellectual infrastructure around Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign. The formation distinguished itself from the broader liberal coalition by its willingness to criticize teachers unions, to engage with welfare reform, to treat government programs empirically rather than sentimentally, and to maintain cordial relations with specific conservative interlocutors. Kaus’s welfare reform writings, which became The End of Equality in 1992, served this coalition with precision. The book argued that economic equality mattered less than civic equality, that welfare programs had undermined civic equality by producing dependency, and that work requirements would restore the civic bonds the programs had eroded. The argument was intellectually serious. It was also coalition-useful. The neoliberal formation needed an intellectual framework that permitted welfare reform from within liberalism, and Kaus supplied the framework. The book’s success reflected both its quality and its coalition function.
The neoliberal coalition had specific features worth specifying. It included Michael Kinsley at The New Republic and then at Slate. It included Charles Peters at The Washington Monthly. It included Joe Klein when he was writing Primary Colors as anonymous. It included Sidney Blumenthal before his later shifts. It included a specific network of policy intellectuals at the DLC and the Progressive Policy Institute. It included academic allies at specific schools: Robert Reich at Harvard, later Brandeis. William Galston at Maryland. Paul Starr at Princeton. Mickey Kaus occupied a position inside this network with specific characteristics. He was sharper and more adversarial than most members. He was more willing to critique liberal orthodoxies than most. He was less credentialed than most (no academic appointment, no law degree from a major firm, no senior editorial position for most of his career). The combination made him useful to the coalition as a truth-teller who could say things other members wanted said but could not say themselves without coalition cost. The coalition’s tolerance for his sharpness was a function of his usefulness.
Pinsof’s four criteria describe the early coalition position cleanly.
Similarity operated through specific markers. Harvard undergraduate. New Republic credentials. Ivy League adjacent but not tenured academic. Liberal in general orientation but willing to violate specific liberal shibboleths. Secular Jewish cultural background. Comfort with adversarial journalism as a mode. Fluency in the specific vocabulary of policy-intellectual liberal writing: empirical rather than sentimental, rigorous rather than pious, politically effective rather than virtuous. Kaus displayed all the markers. The coalition recognized him through them.
Transitivity clustered him with specific allies. Kinsley centrally, across The New Republic, Slate, and later. Jacob Weisberg at Slate. Tim Noah at Slate. Robert Wright at The New Republic. The cluster had specific rivals: the broader liberal coalition that Kaus critiqued (teachers unions, identity-focused progressive activists, welfare rights advocates), and specific conservative formations the cluster positioned itself against while remaining cordial with individual members.
Interdependence was substantial. Kaus supplied the coalition with a specific voice it needed. The coalition supplied Kaus with platforms (The New Republic, Newsweek, The Washington Monthly, Slate), book contracts, and the specific institutional support that kept a non-credentialed writer inside the coalition’s economy.
Stochasticity applies in the standard way. The specific neoliberal formation that sponsored Kaus was not inevitable. Had the DLC not consolidated around Clinton in 1992, had The New Republic not maintained its specific editorial line through the 1990s, had Slate not been founded as a venue for coalition-aligned writers willing to engage with difficult questions, Kaus might have landed in different coalitions producing different work. The specific path he took reflected contingent institutional developments.
The Kausfiles transition is worth specifying because it represents both a format innovation and a coalition function Kaus himself helped invent. Kaus started Kausfiles as one of the first political blogs in 1999, initially self-hosted and then as part of the Slate operation. The blog format let him operate with more independence than a columnist position permitted while retaining coalition protection. He could post shorter pieces, respond quickly to events, maintain running interests in specific topics (immigration, welfare, the decline of newspaper accuracy), and develop a distinctive voice that would not have survived the editorial process of conventional venues. The format suited his temperament. It also served the coalition’s emerging needs. The neoliberal formation was moving online, and Kaus supplied a model of how serious coalition writing could work in the new format.
The immigration focus that would eventually cost Kaus his coalition position was already visible in this period. His writing consistently argued that mass immigration was depressing wages for native workers, eroding the civic bonds welfare reform had been designed to rebuild, and undermining the Democratic Party’s ability to maintain its historical commitments to its working-class constituencies. The argument was not marginal in the 1990s. It was advanced by writers and politicians inside the Democratic coalition, including Barbara Jordan whose immigration commission had produced restrictionist recommendations in 1995. Kaus’s immigration writing placed him at the restrictionist end of his coalition but not outside it. The coalition tolerated the position because the coalition itself had not yet decided that restrictionism was disqualifying.
The coalition’s position on immigration changed over the 2000s and 2010s. The specific changes are worth naming because they determine what happens to Kaus’s coalition position later. The Democratic Party, the broader liberal coalition, and the progressive intellectual infrastructure all moved toward positions that treated restrictionism as presumptively illegitimate and pro-immigration positions as presumptively moral. The move had multiple causes: the demographic shift in Democratic voting coalitions, the rise of Latino political organizations, the integration of immigration advocacy into the broader civil rights framework, the specific rhetorical moves by advocates that treated all restrictionist positions as necessarily racist. The coalition that had tolerated Kaus’s restrictionism in the 1990s did not tolerate it by 2015. The position Kaus held had not changed. The coalition around him had moved. The distance between his position and the coalition’s position increased not because he moved toward the coalition’s old rivals but because the coalition moved away from him.
The 2010 Senate primary run is instructive. Kaus challenged Barbara Boxer in the Democratic primary on an immigration-restrictionist, welfare-traditionalist, anti-teachers-union platform. The campaign had no prospect of winning. It was what Kaus called a protest candidacy: an attempt to force Democratic voters to confront positions the party was abandoning. The campaign’s framing was explicitly coalition-oriented. Kaus did not argue that he would defeat Boxer. He argued that by forcing her to address immigration enforcement, he would shift the coalition’s internal center of gravity. The campaign failed to shift the coalition. It did clarify Kaus’s position: he was trying to save the neoliberal formation’s old commitments against what he saw as the coalition’s drift toward positions he considered unsustainable. The coalition read the campaign differently. It read it as an embarrassment to be ignored when possible and attacked when necessary.
The 2015 Daily Caller departure is where the coalition logic becomes most visible. Kaus had moved to the Daily Caller in 2010, a conservative venue founded by Tucker Carlson and Neil Patrick. The move was coalition-crossing: a neoliberal restrictionist taking a perch at a conservative venue to continue immigration coverage. The move suited both parties. Kaus needed platforms that would let him continue immigration writing at a time when liberal venues were increasingly unwilling to publish it. The Daily Caller needed a writer with neoliberal credentials who could cover immigration from a restrictionist angle without being dismissible as simply conservative. The arrangement held for five years. In 2015, Kaus left the Daily Caller after the publication declined to run a column critical of Fox News’s coverage of immigration, on grounds that criticizing a parent network’s positions was unacceptable. Kaus made the departure public. The public framing treated the decision as a principled stand against a coalition constraint.
The Alliance Theory reading of the departure is specific. Kaus had been useful to the Daily Caller as long as his work did not criticize the broader conservative media coalition the Daily Caller was part of. His work had largely operated within this constraint, because his targets were usually liberal coalition members and the conservative media ecosystem platformed his attacks on liberal rivals. When his restrictionist position led him to want to criticize Fox News’s handling of immigration, he discovered that his coalition position at the Daily Caller had constraints he had not previously felt. The constraints were real. The Daily Caller could not platform criticism of Fox while remaining in the broader conservative media coalition. Kaus could not produce his analysis while respecting those constraints. The departure followed. The departure was simultaneously a principled stand and a coalition event. Both framings are accurate. The framework requires holding both.
After the Daily Caller, Kaus operated as an independent writer, eventually on Substack. This is the current phase. Substack gives him a direct-to-audience platform that escapes coalition constraint from both the liberal and the conservative formations that had previously platformed him. The cost is the loss of the institutional support that coalition membership provides. His audience is smaller than it was at Slate or the Daily Caller. His income presumably reflects the smaller audience. He operates without editorial support, without legal support, and without the specific network amplification that coalition membership supplies. The current phase is sustainable but attenuated.
The three propagandistic biases run through Kaus’s work in specific ways, though the specific ways differ from how the biases operate in coalition-embedded writers.
Perpetrator biases in Kaus’s work run primarily against the liberal coalition he has spent forty years criticizing. Democratic politicians receive harsher treatment for comparable conduct than Republican politicians. The teachers unions receive sustained hostile scrutiny while other unions receive less. Liberal media outlets are subjected to accuracy audits that Kaus does not apply with the same rigor to conservative media outlets.
A symmetric analyst would expect Kaus to apply the same critical energy to the conservative coalition that has platformed him during the last fifteen years as he applied to the liberal coalition he departed. The application is uneven. Kaus has been willing to criticize conservative figures on immigration when they fall short of his restrictionist standard. He has been less willing to criticize conservative media on the structural features that have damaged American political discourse. The reluctance is coalition-rational. Kaus needs the conservative media ecosystem to platform his restrictionist immigration writing. Criticizing the ecosystem undermines the platform. The reluctance tracks the platform dependency.
Victim biases appear in Kaus’s work primarily in the form of narratives about the American working class, the American worker, and the specific constituencies whose interests Kaus argues immigration and welfare policies have harmed. The narratives point at real phenomena. Wage stagnation for workers without college degrees is documented. Community disruption in high-immigration areas is documented. Welfare program failures of the 1970s and 1980s were documented at the time and contributed to the 1996 reforms. Kaus’s version of these narratives deploys the documented phenomena at intensities appropriate to his argumentative purposes, which sometimes exceed what the specific instances support. The deployment is coalition-useful for his current position because it sustains the specific political framework his restrictionism requires.
Kaus has positioned himself as victimized by both the liberal coalition that dropped him and the conservative coalition that constrained him. The positioning is complicated but defensible given his trajectory. A writer who has been dropped by venues in two coalitions has more legitimate grounds for personal-victimhood narratives than a writer operating comfortably inside either. The competitive element emerges when Kaus’s victim narratives about himself are read alongside his broader victim narratives about the working class: both serve the specific coalition position he now occupies as an independent restrictionist writer whose work depends on maintaining the claim that he alone or nearly alone has told the truths the coalitions have suppressed. The claim is partly accurate. It is also coalition-useful for his current position.
Attributional biases govern Kaus’s treatment of political and policy outcomes. Immigration’s costs receive internal attributions: they reflect poor policy choices made by elected officials under pressure from specific interest groups. Immigration’s benefits receive external attributions or minimization: they reflect temporary conditions, aggregate statistics that conceal distributional harms, or ideological framings that misdescribe the underlying phenomena. Welfare reform’s successes receive internal attributions: they reflect the specific policy design Kaus and his coalition advocated. Welfare reform’s limitations receive external attributions: they reflect subsequent policy drift, implementation failures, or conditions the original reforms did not anticipate. The asymmetry is consistent across the work. Individual pieces can be defended as analytically independent. The pattern across pieces reveals the direction of drift.
The strange bedfellows in Kaus’s current coalition, to the extent he has one, are worth naming. His current readership overlaps with portions of the restrictionist coalition that includes Ann Coulter at one end, Mark Krikorian and the Center for Immigration Studies in the center, and various Substack writers, podcast hosts, and independent voices across the political spectrum at the other end. Some of his readers come from his original neoliberal coalition and have remained interested in his work despite its association with positions the rest of their coalition has rejected. Some come from conservative or right-populist formations that find his restrictionism congenial. Some come from heterodox corners of the political internet that value writers whose positions do not map cleanly onto current partisan alignments. No consistent principle unites these readers. Shared interest in Kaus’s specific combination of positions holds them together.
The coalition, to the extent it exists, is diffuse enough that it does not exert the kind of discipline on Kaus that tighter coalitions exert on their members. This is a feature of the Substack phase. He is less coalition-shaped than he was at the New Republic or the Daily Caller because his current reader base is too heterogeneous to impose a specific coalition discipline. This is partly why his current writing feels more idiosyncratic than his earlier writing. The idiosyncrasy reflects real intellectual independence. It also reflects the fact that no current coalition has a strong enough grip on him to require coalition-specific drift.
What would Kaus have to give up if his current coalition configuration shifted? The answer is less substantial than for most writers analyzed through this framework, because his current coalition position is already attenuated. He has lost most of what he had to lose. His income from writing is modest. His institutional affiliations are limited. His network relationships inside the coalitions that previously platformed him have cooled or ended. The remaining losses would be his reputation among specific restrictionist readers, his place in the limited ecosystem of independent writers on Substack, and the specific dignity of continuing to hold his longstanding positions in print. These are real but smaller than what writers embedded in active coalitions face. Kaus is more free than most writers to say things his coalition does not reward, precisely because his coalition is already thin.
The specific truths Kaus is freer to tell than most writers in his general ideological neighborhood are worth noting. He can acknowledge when specific restrictionist claims are overstated, because his readership does not depend on maximalist restrictionism. He can acknowledge when liberal coalitions have been substantively right on specific questions, because he has no current liberal coalition to betray. He can discuss conservative coalition failures without the constraints that operate on writers embedded in conservative venues, because his venue is his own. He has access to a range of positions that most restrictionist writers cannot access. Whether he uses the access consistently is a separate question the framework does not resolve. The access exists.
The broader pattern Kaus illustrates is worth stating clearly. A writer whose positions remain constant while the coalitions around him move will typically experience the movement as the coalitions’ betrayal of him, not as his betrayal of the coalitions. The experience is partly accurate. Coalitions do move. Members whose positions do not move with them do end up outside. The experience also obscures what the framework makes visible: that the writer’s positions were coalition-shaped at the time they were formed, even though they have remained stable since. Kaus’s restrictionism in 1994 served the neoliberal coalition’s interests at that moment. The fact that the coalition’s interests changed does not change the fact that the position was coalition-useful when formed. A writer who adopted restrictionism in 1994 for coalition-useful reasons and maintained it through coalition shifts is not fully outside coalition logic. He is a writer whose coalition-useful positions outlived their coalition’s interest in them. The framework handles this case by distinguishing between positional stability and coalition stability, and noting that stability on one dimension does not imply freedom from the other.
The honest reading of Kaus’s trajectory is that he has displayed more positional consistency than most writers over forty years, that his early positions were coalition-useful when formed, that his later maintenance of those positions reflected both genuine intellectual commitment and the specific difficulty of repositioning at his age and stage, and that his current attenuated coalition position gives him more freedom than most writers have while imposing the costs of reduced platforming, reduced income, and reduced cultural reach. The combination of freedoms and costs is unusual. Most writers cannot sustain the combination. Kaus has sustained it through a combination of temperament, financial circumstances that permitted modest income without catastrophe, and the specific willingness to operate without coalition protection that many writers would find psychologically unsustainable.
The Trivers self-deception finding applies to Kaus in a specific form. He probably experiences his trajectory as the story of a consistent writer whose coalitions betrayed him. The experience is the propaganda he needs for his current position. It sustains his continued writing against the resistance his current position produces. A Kaus who fully acknowledged that his original positions were coalition-useful when formed, and that his subsequent isolation reflects the coalitions’ movement rather than his own consistency, would be a slightly different writer. The slight difference would probably produce different writing. Kaus has not made that acknowledgment. The framework does not require him to. It notes what the acknowledgment would cost him and what its absence permits him to continue doing.
The comparison with writers who moved with their coalitions is instructive. Kinsley moved with the broader center-left coalition through its evolutions. His later writing reflects coalition positions Kaus rejected. Weisberg moved with the broader prestige liberal coalition. Noah moved with specific progressive formations. The writers who moved were rewarded with continued platforming and continued professional standing. Kaus, who did not move, was not. The framework reads both trajectories as coalition-shaped. The writers who moved were shaped by their coalitions into specific positions. Kaus, by not moving, was shaped by his coalitions into a specific trajectory of attenuation. Neither side is outside coalition logic. Both display the logic in different forms.
What makes Kaus analytically interesting beyond his specific case is that he represents an unusual type the American public intellectual ecology produces occasionally: the writer who stays put while coalitions move around him. The type is not common because the costs are substantial. Most writers who find themselves drifting out of a coalition either move to stay inside it, move to a different coalition that will accept them, or leave public writing altogether. The writers who hold positions that no current coalition fully supports are a small population. Kaus is in this population. Peggy Noonan is sometimes in it, from a different original coalition. Glenn Greenwald has spent stretches in it. Bill Scher at times. The population is too small to constitute a coalition itself, which is precisely what makes its members appear genuinely independent. The appearance is not entirely illusory. The members do have more analytical freedom than typical coalition members. The appearance also partly is illusory. The members’ positions were coalition-shaped at the time they were formed, and the apparent independence reflects the specific trajectory of coalition movement that left them behind.
Mickey Kaus is a serious writer whose early work on welfare, inequality, and civic equality contained real intellectual content that shaped the 1990s policy debate. His blogging pioneered a format that became central to American political writing. His immigration writing over three decades has documented phenomena that the liberal coalition’s evolution made hard to document elsewhere. His willingness to sustain his positions through the loss of coalition protection reflects temperamental features that merit respect. None of this is diminished by noting that his trajectory reflects coalition logic even in its unusual form, that his propagandistic biases run in the directions his specific position permits, that his current apparent independence is partly a product of his coalition’s attenuation rather than evidence of having escaped coalition shaping entirely, and that his self-presentation as a consistent writer whose coalitions betrayed him omits the ways his consistency was itself coalition-useful at its formation. The seriousness is real. The coalition logic is also real. The framework holds both.
The wars are real. Kaus has been on multiple sides of them, without moving much himself, which is its own kind of position in them.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

What disagreement has he been in long enough and persistently enough that the misunderstanding framing should make us suspicious?
The answer is the immigration debate, specifically his argument that high levels of low-skilled immigration suppress wages for native workers and that professional liberals suppress this conclusion because it threatens their material interests. Kaus has made this argument in essentially the same form since the early 1990s. The professional liberal response has been consistent across three decades: he is wrong about the economics, he is obsessed, he is providing cover for nativism, his evidence does not support his conclusions. Kaus responds that his critics are not engaging the argument, that they are managing a threat rather than evaluating a claim. The argument circles. Neither side converts the other. Both sides produce more assertions.
Both sides frame the dispute as a failure of the other to engage honestly with evidence. Kaus says professional liberals would accept his conclusions if they followed the labor economics carefully and acknowledged their own material interests in the outcome. Professional liberals say Kaus would abandon his position if he read the immigration economics literature more carefully and stopped privileging the studies that confirm his priors. Both sides maintain that more careful attention to the record would resolve things. That is the misunderstanding myth operating in both directions, and its persistence across more than thirty years is Pinsof’s signal that something else is driving the conflict.
The professional liberal coalition’s stake is material and institutional simultaneously. High immigration provides cheaper domestic labor for the professional class, a larger low-wage workforce for the industries they manage and invest in, and a moral vocabulary, the defense of the vulnerable immigrant against nativist cruelty, that generates the coalition solidarity and fundraising that sustain Democratic institutions. If Kaus’s argument were correct and widely accepted, the professional liberal coalition would face a genuine dilemma. It would have to choose between its stated commitment to working-class interests and its material interest in labor supply. That is not a dilemma professional liberals can resolve through argument because resolving it would require acknowledging that their moral vocabulary is a coalition technology rather than an independent ethical commitment. So they do not resolve it. They dismiss Kaus as obsessed, wrong, or covertly nativist, which allows them to avoid engaging the underlying conflict between their stated values and their material interests. The misunderstanding framing, he just does not understand the economics properly, is cleaner and less threatening than the alternative, which is that he understands the economics correctly and that the understanding is professionally dangerous.
Kaus’s side does something structurally similar but for different reasons. His investment in the immigration argument has long since exceeded what evidential confidence alone would warrant. He returns to it with an intensity that suggests the argument is doing something for him beyond tracking truth. Pinsof would say that something is identity maintenance. The immigration position is now inseparable from the story Kaus tells about himself: the person who saw what the professional liberal coalition needed suppressed and said it anyway regardless of cost. That story requires the argument to remain live, contested, and suppressed by the other side. If the professional liberal coalition suddenly conceded his point and incorporated immigration restriction into mainstream Democratic policy, Kaus would lose not just a policy victory but the identity that three decades of expulsion constructed. The misunderstanding framing serves him too. As long as the other side is failing to engage honestly with the evidence, he remains the truth-teller whose clarity they cannot afford to acknowledge. Resolution would deflate that position as surely as it would threaten theirs.
The specific form the misunderstanding myth takes in the immigration debate is worth naming precisely. The professional liberal side maintains that Kaus is misreading the economics, that the consensus of immigration economists shows his wage suppression argument is weak or wrong, that he is cherry-picking studies and ignoring the mainstream of the field. Kaus maintains that the consensus is itself coalition-produced, that the economists whose careers depend on foundation funding from open-borders advocates and whose institutional positions require them to hold conclusions acceptable to professional liberal gatekeepers cannot be treated as neutral arbiters. Both framings are partly correct and neither is the whole story.
Kaus argues explicitly and repeatedly that professional liberals hold their immigration position because it serves their material interests and that they suppress contrary evidence through social pressure rather than honest engagement. That is almost exactly Pinsof’s misunderstanding essay applied to one side of the debate. Kaus sees the misunderstanding myth operating in his opponents with considerable clarity. He has named the coalition function of their moral vocabulary, identified the material interests their beliefs protect, and documented the social enforcement that keeps the inconvenient conclusion out of respectable venues. What he does not apply with equal force is the same analysis to himself: that his own persistence in the argument, his own framing of opponents as dishonest rather than differently positioned, his own experience of the debate as a failure of their honesty rather than a conflict of coalition interests, might itself be a form of the misunderstanding myth protecting his identity investment in the contrarian position. He sees their convenient belief clearly. He does not see his own with the same clarity.

Charisma and Social Paradoxes

Pinsof defines charisma as skill at social paradoxes: pursuing status while appearing not to seek it, influencing while appearing merely to inform, signaling exceptional quality while presenting as a humble servant of the evidence. Applied to Kaus, the framework produces an analysis that is more uncomfortable than the standard charisma reading because Kaus is a case where the social paradoxes are partially executed but structurally undermined, which explains both why he has a devoted thin audience and why he never built the broader influence his formation and intelligence would seem to warrant.
The first social paradox Kaus executes, and executes well, is the insider who speaks for outsiders. He was born into the system. Harvard twice, a father on the California Supreme Court, entry into journalism through the Washington Monthly at the moment it was shaping Democratic policy thinking. That formation is pure insider. But his public posture for three decades has been the person who sees what the insider class suppresses and says it anyway. The paradox is that his insider credentials are what make the outsider posture credible. A genuine outsider making the same argument about immigration and wage suppression would be dismissed as resentful or ignorant. Kaus making it carries the signal that someone who knows the professional liberal world from inside, who attended the same schools and worked at the same publications and knows the same people, has looked at the coalition’s convenient beliefs and found them wanting. The insider formation is the condition of possibility for the outsider signal. That is a social paradox in Pinsof’s precise sense, and Kaus executes it with real skill.
The second social paradox is the status-seeker who performs indifference to status. Kaus writes in a register of deliberate informality, the Kausfiles voice with its ironic exclamation points, its interior monologues, its ruse of a non-existent editor, its tone of a smart person thinking out loud rather than a pundit delivering verdicts. That voice signals: I am not trying to impress you, I am just working through what the evidence shows. The not-trying is itself a performance, and a sophisticated one. The Harvard law degree and the Newsweek masthead are present in every sentence as suppressed context that the informal voice makes invisible. Readers experience the informality as authenticity rather than as a carefully constructed register that happens to conceal the credentialing apparatus behind it. That concealment is the paradox. The status claim is enormous. The performance of not making it is what allows it to land.
The third social paradox is the norm violator who presents as the true liberal. Kaus says things professional liberals need suppressed: that immigration suppresses working-class wages, that unions protect incumbents at the expense of members, that the media class’s moral vocabulary serves its material interests. Within his audience those violations read as courage. But he frames them not as conservative positions but as what liberalism actually requires if it takes working-class interests seriously. The paradox is that he claims the liberal tradition more authentically than the liberals who expelled him. He is not abandoning the coalition. The coalition abandoned its own stated values, and he is the one pointing it out. That framing converts what looks like defection into a higher loyalty, which is a status move that requires the audience to accept his account of what liberalism genuinely means. His thin but devoted audience does accept it, which is why the paradox works for them even as it fails to work for the professional liberal coalition he is addressing.
This is where the charisma essay’s most important contribution enters. Pinsof argues that charisma is coalition-relative. The social paradoxes that generate trust and authority in one audience generate suspicion or contempt in another. Kaus is charismatic for his thin heterodox audience and actively anti-charismatic for the professional liberal coalition, and the reason is structural rather than personal. For the heterodox audience, his social paradoxes are legible and credible. His unpopular opinions are unpopular with the right targets. His not-seeking-status is believable because he has paid real institutional costs for his positions. His insider-speaking-for-outsiders posture is credible because the insider credentials are visible and the costs of the outsider position are documented. For the professional liberal coalition, the same performances read as bad faith, obsession, or covert nativism. His informality reads as lack of rigor. His insider-outsider paradox reads as someone who had access and squandered it through ideological rigidity. His higher-loyalty framing reads as rationalization. The social paradoxes that generate authority in one evaluative framework generate suspicion in the other, and Kaus has spent thirty years trying to execute paradoxes for an audience that is constitutionally unable to find them credible.
The social paradoxes paper adds the recursive mindreading dimension, and this is where the analysis of Kaus becomes genuinely clarifying. Pinsof argues that social paradoxes work when both sender and receiver engage in inference about what the other knows and intends, and the arrangement succeeds when the strategy is concealed from both simultaneously, producing symbiotic deception where both parties benefit and neither has incentive to examine the arrangement closely. Applied to Kaus, the symbiotic deception works imperfectly because the concealment is only partial.
His devoted readers do the right kind of inference. They conclude that Kaus is the kind of person who would not have a coalition agenda, that his persistence in unpopular positions across thirty years of institutional cost is the strongest possible signal of genuine truth-tracking rather than performance. That inference is probably largely correct, which is what makes the partial charisma work. The audience benefits from a genuine analyst who has done real intellectual work on immigration economics and labor markets over decades. Kaus benefits from the trust and recognition that accrue to someone perceived as incorruptible. Both parties gain from the arrangement. Neither has much incentive to examine whether the contrarian identity has itself become a form of coalition positioning that shapes what Kaus sees and what he misses.
But the concealment breaks down at the edges in ways that Pinsof’s framework identifies as the characteristic failure mode of imperfect social paradox execution. Kaus’s immigration focus has become visible enough as a preoccupation that it registers as monomania to outside observers and as intensity to devoted readers. The not-seeking-status posture is undermined by the 2010 Senate campaign, which was a direct and public status bid however quixotic, and by the Breitbart column, which placed him in a coalition context that made the above-coalition independence posture harder to sustain. The insider-outsider paradox requires the insider credentials to remain visible as suppressed context. But as Kaus’s institutional presence has thinned, the credentials recede and the outsider position begins to look less like paradox and more like simple marginalization. The social paradox requires both terms to be present and legible. When the insider term fades, the outsider term loses its charge.
The deepest thing the charisma essay adds is an account of why Kaus never converted his genuine intellectual qualities into broader influence. He has real analytical ability, real courage in holding unpopular positions, real knowledge of the policy areas he covers. Those qualities should, in a straightforward meritocratic account, produce more influence than he has. Pinsof’s framework explains the gap. Charisma requires not just the qualities but the social paradox execution that makes those qualities visible as exceptional rather than merely competent or stubborn. Kaus’s paradoxes work for his existing audience and fail for the audience he actually needs to persuade, the professional liberal coalition whose convenient beliefs he is trying to expose. That coalition’s detection system is calibrated to read his specific social paradoxes as threat signals rather than authority signals. The more skillfully he executes the insider-outsider paradox, the more threatening he appears to a coalition that needs the insider class to remain unified. The charisma produced in one audience is the anti-charisma produced in the other, and the audience that finds him anti-charismatic controls the platforms, the credentials, and the coalition enforcement that determine whose arguments get taken seriously in mainstream political discourse.
The social paradoxes paper closes the analysis with its account of what happens when symbiotic deception cannot fully establish itself. Pinsof argues that the arrangement requires both parties to benefit enough that neither examines it closely. With Kaus’s professional liberal audience, that condition was never met. The professional liberals who encountered his work never benefited from accepting his conclusions. His immigration argument threatened their material interests and their coalition solidarity simultaneously. A social paradox that threatens rather than serves the audience’s interests cannot establish the symbiotic deception that charisma requires. The audience examines the arrangement, finds the threat, and rejects the authority claim. What looks to Kaus and his supporters like intellectual dishonesty or motivated avoidance is, in Pinsof’s terms, the entirely rational response of an audience for whom the symbiotic deception offers no benefit. They are not failing to see his authority. They are correctly perceiving that accepting it would cost them something they are not willing to pay.

Hybrid Vigor

Mickey Kaus breaks the pattern both Baker and Halperin establish. Where they represent variants of the inbred coalition’s outputs, Kaus shows what happens to the organism that performs the outbreeding the coalition forbids. He crossed. He took material from outside his training population, conservative critiques of welfare, skepticism of identity politics, immigration restrictionism, and brought it into the liberal intellectual tradition he had absorbed at Harvard Law, Washington Monthly, and The New Republic. The hybrid his thinking produced had the predictive vigor that outbreeding tends to produce. His analysis tracked political reality more accurately than most of the coalition that excluded him. His career shows that biological fitness and coalition fitness can diverge sharply, and that the coalition’s selection pressures operate on the second criterion rather than the first.
Start with the outbreeding claim. Kaus began his career in the environment that Charles Peters constructed at Washington Monthly in the 1970s, which remains a distinctive niche for elite-trained heterodox liberalism in American journalism. Peters selected for Harvard-MIT-Princeton minds who would criticize the liberal establishment from inside its own premises. The niche rewarded the trait of willingness to say what the coalition preferred not to hear, within the vocabulary and manners the coalition recognized as its own. Kaus developed the trait expression the niche rewarded. When he moved to The New Republic and then to Newsweek, he carried the Peters-constructed heterodoxy into richer institutional soil. The heterodoxy stayed within the coalition. It occupied a protected sub-niche that the coalition’s broader immune system classified as tolerable variation rather than as foreign material.
That tolerance held until Kaus kept following his arguments where they led. Welfare dependency as a corrosive force. Affirmative action’s costs to the coalition that championed it. Immigration as the policy question that would eventually reorganize American politics. Each conclusion required crossing further from the coalition’s genetic material. Each introduced alleles from populations the coalition’s immune system had trained to classify as foreign. The cumulative effect was not heterodoxy within the coalition but outbreeding with it.
His 1992 book, The End of Equality, shows the crossing at its most productive. Kaus argued for civic equality over material equality, for institutions that mixed classes through shared experience rather than redistributive transfers. The argument drew on conservative sources the liberal coalition would not cite, integrated them with liberal sources the conservative coalition would not read, and produced an analysis neither coalition’s pure-bred stock could generate. The book influenced the 1996 welfare reform in ways that might have cemented Kaus’s position as the coalition’s authoritative thinker on these questions. It did not. The analysis worked. The reform worked. The coalition that had resisted both recovered its footing and classified Kaus as the pathogen that had briefly infected its decision-making during the crisis of the early 1990s.
Kaus refused the countershading that Baker perfected and Halperin learned. He said what he thought, published what he believed, answered critics directly rather than through the careful ambiguity his peers developed, and accepted the costs that selection imposes on organisms that will not camouflage. The coalition’s detection systems had no trouble locating him because he made no attempt to elude them. The sub-niche that rewarded visible heterodoxy within limits did not reward the visible heterodoxy Kaus produced once his conclusions crossed the coalition’s immune threshold. The same trait, willingness to say what he meant, shifted from adaptive to maladaptive as the niche’s tolerances changed.
Kausfiles in 1999 put Kaus among the pioneers of a new habitat, and the habitat construction counts as one of his real achievements. He built the blog because the habitats that had supported him were becoming uninhabitable for what he wanted to write. Other early bloggers built adjacent niches. Taken together these early blogs constituted a new order in the attention ecosystem that would eventually disrupt the older journalism institutions. Kaus’s contribution to that larger process was real. The larger process got captured by different organisms: Drudge on the right, Huffington on the left, eventually Twitter subsuming blogs entirely. The niche Kaus had pioneered was absorbed into forms he did not control. He kept producing the work but could not hold the territory.
His Slate years from 2002 to 2011 show the endosymbiotic phase most clearly. Slate got a resident contrarian whose presence signaled editorial range. Kaus got institutional distribution and the credential of a mainstream platform. Each organism depended on the other for something. The mutualism held as long as Slate’s editorial range could accommodate Kaus’s conclusions. As the broader liberal coalition hardened its immune calibrations after 2008, Slate’s tolerance narrowed. The mutualistic phase gave way to something closer to parasitism from each side. Kaus could no longer produce the product his sub-niche had rewarded without triggering Slate’s immune responses. Slate could no longer tolerate Kaus’s output without damaging its standing within its coalition. The symbiosis dissolved, and Kaus moved to The Daily Caller, which was not a natural habitat but the only available substrate with the distribution he needed.
The antagonistic pleiotropy shows in the career arc. The contrarianism that made Kaus distinctive at Washington Monthly was the same contrarianism that made him unemployable at institutions downstream of Washington Monthly. The genetic expression that produced intellectual vigor in the Peters environment produced classification as hostile material in the post-2008 liberal environment. Kaus did not change. The environment changed. The same alleles expressed adaptively in one phase and catastrophically in another. He could not swap them out. They were constitutive of the organism he had become under the selection pressure of his formative niche.
Frequency-dependent selection predicts that as the Democrat-critical-of-his-own-coalition type becomes rarer, the remaining specimens rise in value. The Kaus case shows that frequency-dependent selection can be overridden when the coalition’s immune system recalibrates to treat the type as pathogen rather than as valuable variant. The coalition did not grow more tolerant of the remaining contrarians as their numbers dwindled. It purged them faster. The external-audience version of frequency-dependent logic still applied, which might have been expected to value Kaus more as his type grew rare. Some of that external audience did value him. His Substack readers are evidence of it. The external audience’s valuation could not restore the institutional position the coalition’s immune response had removed, because the two valuations operate on different selection criteria.
He was right about welfare. He was right about the political significance of immigration. He was right earlier than nearly anyone that immigration would become the issue that reorganized American politics. The predictive track record stands among the strongest of his generation of political commentators. The institutional trajectory traces a descent from Newsweek to Slate to Daily Caller to Substack. Each step represents reduced institutional backing per unit of output. The descent correlates with nothing about accuracy. Selection pressure in his environment did not weight accuracy as a fitness criterion. It weighted coalition fitness, and his coalition fitness kept declining because his accuracy kept pulling him further from the coalition’s preferred conclusions. The man who got it right lost the niche. The men who got it wrong kept theirs. Reality does not arbitrate these races. Coalitions do.
Kaus runs a race he entered more than thirty years ago. The issues have not changed. The arguments have not substantially changed. He wrote about welfare dependency in the 1980s and early 1990s. He took up immigration by the late 1990s. He identified the hollow core of identity politics before the term got popular. The race he runs requires him to keep producing the same fundamental arguments in updated forms because the environment keeps rediscovering the issues without crediting the earlier analysis. The Red Queen predicts that running in place is the baseline condition. Kaus’s case shows a variant: running in place while the environment loses memory of who ran earliest.
Kaus does not fit either the slow strategy of the institutional chronicler or the fast strategy of the movement entrepreneur. He resembles a solitary organism that reproduces its output continuously across decades without the institutional scaffolding either strategy requires. The Substack model fits him because it accommodates exactly this pattern: one person, daily output, direct audience relationship, no institutional caste to maintain. He was this organism before the model existed to support it. The model eventually caught up with him.
Evolutionary mismatch runs in both directions in his case. His niche-of-training, the elite heterodox liberal sub-niche, was mismatched to the polarized environment that emerged after 2008. He was also mismatched to his niche-of-training in the specific sense that his conclusions kept outrunning what the sub-niche could contain. The mismatch was not a sudden environmental shift that caught him unprepared. It was a structural condition throughout his career, managed successfully for a couple of decades by the Peters-Slate sub-niche and exposed as the sub-niche collapsed. Kaus has remained out of register with the institutions that have housed him over most of his working life. The institutions tolerated the mismatch for a while or they did not.
Baker is the inbred product who still performs crypsis well enough to maintain his niche. Halperin is the inbred product who got expelled and re-colonized an adjacent niche. Kaus is the hybrid who did the crossing the coalition forbids, produced the intellectual vigor that hybridization generates, and paid the institutional price that coalitions extract from organisms that will not stay in the gene pool. He never had the option of crypsis without ceasing to be himself. He never had the option of re-colonization into a wholly different coalition because he would not camouflage for that one either. The niche that fit him was narrow at its widest and has narrowed further over twenty years. He remains inside it because what he is has no other habitat. The selection pressure his career demonstrates operates on the coalition’s gene pool as a whole, keeping it closed against outbreeders regardless of whether the outbreeding produces useful offspring. Kaus’s analysis was useful. His offspring found adoptive homes across the political spectrum. The home that bore him kept its doors shut.

Kaus Under Hugo Mercier and John M. Doris

Mickey Kaus has had an idiosyncratic career in American political journalism. His 1992 book The End of Equality argued that money-based egalitarianism had become politically unsustainable and that civic equality, based on shared public institutions and experiences, offered a more promising path for liberals. His subsequent career moved through The New Republic, through his pioneering blog Kausfiles, through the Daily Caller, and more recently through independent writing that has addressed welfare policy, immigration, labor markets, and the internal failures of the liberal coalition. His positions on immigration in particular, consistently restrictionist from a pro-labor perspective, placed him at odds with the mainstream liberal consensus for more than two decades before the Trump-era realignment brought those positions into mainstream political discussion.
Kaus occupies a specific position in the figures examined through the Mercier-Doris framework. He is neither a theoretical architect like Rawls or Dworkin, nor a constitutional scholar like Balkin or Levinson, nor a cultural critic like Bromwich, nor an academic psychologist like Bloom. He is a political journalist and policy analyst whose work has operated at the intersection of insider reporting and policy argumentation. The framework applies to his work differently than to the more theoretically ambitious projects, but it applies productively.
Take the 1992 argument of The End of Equality first. Kaus argued that money-equality was declining as a viable political project and that liberals should reorient toward civic equality, meaning institutions and experiences that would bring Americans of different economic levels into shared public space. The examples he developed included universal national service, reformed public schools that would serve children of different classes, public health care that would involve shared facilities rather than separate tiers for rich and poor, and specific policy interventions that would prevent the physical separation of social classes that was accelerating in American life.
The argument was prescient about certain features of American political development. The trajectory Kaus identified, toward increasing physical and institutional separation of social classes, has continued. The policy responses he proposed have mostly not been adopted. The shared public institutions he hoped liberals would champion have continued to decline rather than being rebuilt. The gated community, the private school, the concierge medical practice, the home office insulated from public life, have proliferated rather than being reversed. The political coalition that might have supported the civic equality Kaus advocated did not materialize.
Mercier’s framework produces a specific reading of why the argument failed to shape the political development it addressed. Kaus was writing for an audience of liberal intellectuals and policy analysts whose stakes in civic equality were primarily symbolic rather than operational. The readers could accept Kaus’s arguments reflectively without updating their operational commitments. They could continue sending their children to private schools, continue living in economically homogeneous neighborhoods, continue using concierge medicine, while holding the Kausian position as a reflective belief about what the liberal project should ideally do. The gap between the acceptance of the argument and the absence of behavioral change is the standard Mercier gap between reflective and intuitive belief.
The liberal political coalition that would have had to implement the policies Kaus advocated had stakes that ran in different directions. Teachers’ unions had stakes in preserving the school structures Kaus wanted to reform. Healthcare professionals had stakes in the tiered system Kaus criticized. Suburban liberal voters had stakes in maintaining neighborhoods that would be disrupted by the residential integration his argument implied. The coalition’s stakes militated against adopting the program, regardless of whether its intellectuals accepted the argument. Kaus’s book was read, discussed, and largely ignored at the operational level because the coalition’s operational commitments were not what the reflective acceptance might suggest.
Doris extends this into the behavioral analysis. Even among readers who accepted Kaus’s argument intellectually, the behaviors that would have followed from genuine acceptance did not materialize. The reader who agreed that civic equality mattered did not thereby enroll his children in public schools if he could afford private options. The reader who agreed that shared health care was important did not thereby refuse concierge medicine. The reader who agreed that residential integration would serve important public goals did not thereby move to an economically diverse neighborhood. The behaviors tracked the situations, not the intellectual commitments. Kaus’s arguments altered the vocabulary through which some readers discussed these questions. They did not alter the behaviors that produced the social patterns Kaus was criticizing.
Kaus was arguing for conclusions that would have required his readers to change behaviors producing real costs for them. The arguments succeeded at the reflective level and failed at the operational level because the cognitive and behavioral mechanisms the framework specifies are not available for the kind of coalition-change Kaus’s argument would have required.
Take Kaus’s immigration writing next. For more than two decades, Kaus argued against high levels of low-skill immigration from a pro-labor perspective. His argument was that high immigration suppressed wages for domestic low-skill workers, undermined the political coalition that might support pro-labor policies, and weakened the civic equality he had earlier advocated. The argument placed him at odds with the mainstream liberal consensus, which treated high immigration as compatible with or even supportive of liberal labor goals.
The argument has aged well in specific respects. The economic evidence on wage effects of low-skill immigration has become more contested than the consensus of the 1990s suggested. The political realignment that brought working-class voters toward Trump reflected something like the coalition fracture Kaus had predicted. The specific features of American labor markets that Kaus identified as vulnerable to immigration effects have behaved roughly as he predicted. Kaus was substantially right on the specific empirical and political questions where he took positions the mainstream rejected.
Mercier’s framework produces a specific reading of why Kaus was able to see this while most of his professional community did not. Kaus’s situational position was unusual. He was writing from within liberal media institutions but had developed intellectual independence through the specific trajectory his career had followed. His original training at Harvard Law School, his work at The Washington Monthly, his time at The New Republic, his blog, his Daily Caller position, had given him exposure to multiple intellectual communities and their different framings. The exposure gave him resources for thinking through questions that single-institution formation would not have provided.
Kaus also had a specific cognitive willingness that Mercier’s framework credits. He was willing to update positions when the evidence required it and to take positions that imposed substantial coalition costs. His immigration positions cost him relationships within liberal media. His willingness to criticize specific liberal sacred cows cost him credibility in some circles. The costs were real. Kaus paid them because his cognitive operations were not principally driven by coalition maintenance. He ran vigilance on empirical and political questions and reported what the vigilance produced, even when the reports were uncomfortable for his expected coalition.
Doris adds that Kaus’s ability to maintain these positions depended on specific situational features of his career. He had sufficient independence from single employers that he could take positions that might have been too costly within a more dependent institutional relationship. His blog gave him a platform that was not controlled by editors with stronger coalition attachments. His independent writing after leaving formal media institutions further reduced the situational costs of unpopular positions. The situation permitted the independence, and the independence produced work that was more analytically valuable than work from scholars and journalists whose situations did not permit similar independence.
Take Kaus’s more recent work on welfare reform, labor policy, and the internal failures of progressive politics. He has continued to write about these questions with an unusual combination of intimate familiarity with liberal policy discussions and willingness to criticize directions his expected coalition has taken. His writing on topics like the 2021 expanded child tax credit, on progressive prosecution failures, on the specific ways liberal policy communities have maintained positions the evidence does not support, has continued the pattern of substantive analysis at some coalition cost.
Mercier’s framework notes that this body of work operates at a specific level within the larger political information ecosystem. Kaus is not reaching the general democratic public. His readership is the engaged policy and political intellectual community that follows political questions seriously. Within that community, his work has specific functions. It provides a voice that can say things mainstream liberal commentary cannot say. It preserves positions that are politically marginal but intellectually defensible. It produces analyses that other commentators can draw on when coalition dynamics eventually shift in ways that make the positions more politically viable.
This function is real and valuable even when the specific policies Kaus advocates do not get adopted. The policies’ eventual viability depends on coalition dynamics that Kaus does not control. His work prepares the intellectual ground for potential shifts. When the shifts occur, as the immigration shift did during the Trump era, the work is available to inform the shift rather than having to be constructed from scratch. This is the same function identified in Bromwich’s sustained anti-militarism writing: maintaining a specific intellectual position across decades in which the position is politically marginal, so that the position remains available when situations change in ways that give it traction.
Take the partial-insider nature of Kaus’s position. He knows the liberal policy coalition intimately from the inside, having worked within its institutions for decades. He also maintains critical distance from the coalition, which allows him to analyze its failures with more precision than either full insiders or complete outsiders can achieve. This combination is rare and produces work of a specific kind that the framework credits.
Mercier’s framework notes that the partial-insider position requires specific situational features to maintain. The commentator has to have enough insider access to understand the coalition’s operations, enough external independence to criticize it without the vigilance distortion that pure insider status imposes, and enough institutional security to absorb the coalition costs of the criticism. Few commentators satisfy all three conditions simultaneously. Kaus has maintained them through a career that combined insider experience with consistent intellectual independence and independent publishing platforms.
The model Kaus represents is worth examining because it addresses a specific gap in contemporary political commentary that the framework identifies. The mainstream liberal commentary produced by established media outlets suffers from the narrative alignment problems examined in the Halperin analysis. The conservative commentary produced by established conservative media suffers from the mirror-image problems. Independent commentary from outside both ecosystems usually lacks the insider access that would make the analysis operationally reliable. Kaus’s specific position, with its combination of insider familiarity, external independence, and institutional security, produces work that escapes both the coalition distortions of mainstream commentary and the information limitations of pure outsider commentary.
Doris extends this into a specific observation about career path. Kaus’s career trajectory is not easily replicable because it depended on a specific sequence of situational opportunities that are increasingly unavailable. The mid-career transitions between mainstream media institutions that gave Kaus his experience, the early blog era that gave him an independent platform, the specific tolerances of the pre-2010 media environment for heterodox positions, have all been eroded. A younger writer who wanted to build a similar partial-insider position would face situational obstacles that Kaus did not face. The career model is not available for the next generation in the way it was available for Kaus.
This matters for the broader analysis of the political information ecosystem. The function Kaus performs, maintaining intellectually serious positions that are politically marginal, preserving them for future situational shifts, analyzing coalition failures from partial-insider position, will not be automatically replaced by other commentators as Kaus’s career eventually ends. The conditions that produced Kaus are not being reproduced. The function is valuable. The conditions for its continued provision are not being maintained.
Take Kaus’s intellectual virtues as the framework identifies them. He is consistently willing to update positions when evidence requires it. His immigration positions have evolved with the evidence rather than being held static regardless of developments. His welfare reform positions have incorporated new data rather than defending the original 1996 settlement without revision. His analyses of specific political moments reflect ongoing engagement with evidence rather than the application of fixed frameworks to new situations.
He is willing to take positions that impose coalition costs. His immigration positions cost him relationships in mainstream liberal media. His criticisms of specific progressive policy directions have cost him credibility in progressive circles. His willingness to engage with conservative arguments seriously, rather than dismissing them as ideologically motivated, has cost him some liberal credibility. He has paid these costs consistently because his cognitive operations are not principally oriented toward coalition maintenance.
He is willing to acknowledge uncertainty and to correct positions he has taken. His blog and his current writing regularly note when his earlier positions were wrong, when the evidence has changed, when he misjudged a specific situation. The willingness to update publicly is rarer than it should be in political commentary, and it produces work that is more reliable across time than work from commentators whose positions never admit error.
The framework credits these virtues specifically. They are the cognitive operations that produce reliable work rather than coalition performance. Kaus has done these consistently across a long career. The consistency produces a body of work that has held up better than the work of most of his contemporaries in liberal media, even as his institutional success has been smaller than that of commentators who traded rigor for coalition maintenance.
Take the specific limitations of Kaus’s work that the framework also notes. His writing is often produced in formats that limit its reach, blog posts, short pieces, occasional longer essays. He has not produced the sustained theoretical or historical work that might have given his positions broader cultural presence. The End of Equality was the most developed sustained argument he has produced, and nothing in his subsequent career has extended it with comparable ambition. The partial-insider position has produced reliable analysis of specific questions but has not produced the theoretical framework that might have organized the analyses into something more durable.
Producing more sustained theoretical work would have required different situational choices. The blog format, the short piece format, the engagement with current political developments, all reward specific kinds of writing that are different from the sustained theoretical project. Kaus chose the former. The choice has given him his specific influence and has limited the other kinds of influence he might have had. The choice is defensible on its own terms. It has specific consequences for the shape of his legacy.
Take the question of whether Kaus’s work has accomplished the political effects it sometimes seems to aim at. The civic equality agenda of 1992 has not been implemented. The immigration restrictionism he advocated from the left has found political traction but not through the liberal coalition he was addressing. The welfare reform positions have continued to be debated but without his specific framings becoming dominant. The internal reforms of liberal policy communities he has advocated have largely not occurred.
Mercier’s framework produces a specific reading of this pattern. Political effects of the kind Kaus sometimes appeared to be aiming at are largely not available through intellectual argumentation. The coalitions that would have to implement the policies operate through stakes and situations that the arguments do not touch. The failure of political effect is not a failure of Kaus’s work but a consequence of the structure of how political change actually operates. The work has been more influential at the level of preparing intellectual resources for potential future shifts than at the level of producing contemporary political change.
Doris adds that the specific political shifts that have occurred, particularly the working-class realignment of the Trump era, did not occur principally because voters read Kaus. They occurred because material and situational conditions changed in ways that made different political coalitions viable. Kaus’s writing had been identifying those conditions and their political implications for years. When the conditions finally produced political realignment, his writing was available as one of the intellectual resources that could inform the realignment. The writing did not cause the realignment. It provided vocabulary and framework for understanding it, which is a smaller but real contribution.
Take Kaus’s distinctive methodological virtue: his willingness to engage specific empirical questions with attention to evidence rather than through ideological framing. His immigration writing engaged specific studies of labor market effects. His welfare reform writing engaged specific evaluations of program outcomes. His analyses of specific political developments engaged polling data, electoral results, and situational details rather than applying ideological templates to undifferentiated events. This empirical orientation is increasingly rare in political commentary and is something the framework credits specifically.
Mercier’s framework notes that the empirical orientation is a specific cognitive virtue that operates differently from the broader virtue of intellectual independence. Independence can produce quirky positions that are defended against evidence rather than revised by it. Empirical engagement produces positions that update with evidence, which is a different and more demanding virtue. Kaus has combined both. His independent positions have been subjected to continuous empirical testing, which has led to updates when the evidence required them and to maintained positions when the evidence continued to support them. This combination is what produces genuinely reliable work.
The comparison with previous subjects in this series produces a specific reading of Kaus’s position. Unlike the theoretical architects, he has not built a framework that the evidence undermines. Unlike the academic specialists, he has not worked within a narrow professional community whose internal standards can substitute for evidence. Unlike the pure insider journalists, he has maintained external perspective that allows critical analysis. Unlike the pure outsider commentators, he has maintained insider access that grounds the analysis in operational reality. The specific intellectual position he has occupied is valuable precisely because it escapes the limitations of the more common positions.
What Kaus represents, in framework terms, is what political commentary can be when it combines cognitive virtues the framework identifies with situational features that permit those virtues to operate. The combination is rare and is not easily reproduced. When it exists, it produces work of a specific kind that the framework credits strongly. Kaus has done this work consistently across decades, often against substantial coalition pressure, and has produced a body of analysis that has held up better than most of his contemporaries’ work.
The specific limitations are the ones already noted. The format and scale of his work have limited its broader cultural reach. The partial-insider position has produced reliable contemporary analysis but has not produced the sustained theoretical contribution that might have organized the analyses into something more durable. The political effects the work sometimes aimed at have been constrained by structural features that arguments do not control.
Kaus’s legacy will be different from the legacies of the more ambitious theoretical projects examined in this series. It will be smaller in institutional terms but more reliable in analytical terms. His specific body of work will remain available as evidence of what political commentary can achieve when it is done with unusual cognitive virtues. His specific positions will continue to inform discussions of the questions he addressed, particularly as situations continue to develop in ways that make those positions more politically viable. The civic equality framework of 1992 may have more traction in the 2030s than it had in the 1990s, as the specific social developments Kaus identified continue to produce the consequences he predicted. When it does, his work will be one of the resources that can inform the response.
The honest Mercier-Doris assessment credits Kaus with substantial intellectual achievements within the specific domain his work addresses. He has been a reliably rigorous analyst across decades of political commentary in which rigor was not institutionally rewarded. He has maintained intellectually defensible positions at substantial coalition cost. He has updated his positions with evidence rather than defending them ideologically. He has produced analyses that have held up better than most of his contemporaries’ work. These achievements are real and valuable.
The limitations are modest relative to the previous subjects. Kaus has not overpromised what his work could accomplish. He has not built theoretical frameworks that the evidence undermines. He has not worked within institutional positions that distorted his analyses. The gap between what his work claims and what the evidence supports is smaller than the gap for most of the figures examined in this series. Kaus has done what political commentary can reliably do, at the highest level it can reliably be done, within the specific situation he occupied. The framework endorses this trajectory while noting that it is not easily replicable in current media conditions.
A specific concluding observation is worth making. Kaus represents a specific model of what intellectual work can be when it combines cognitive virtue with situational independence. The model is rarer now than it was when Kaus built his career. The conditions that produced it are being eroded by changes in media institutions, career paths, and coalition dynamics. Future commentators may approximate the model partially, but the specific combination Kaus achieved, with its sustained independence across multiple decades and multiple institutional positions, is increasingly difficult to construct. The framework’s endorsement of Kaus’s work is therefore also a specification of what is being lost as the conditions for such work become less available. The individual commentator matters less than the structural conditions that permit individuals to do the work that matters. Those conditions are deteriorating, and Kaus’s career illustrates both what the conditions made possible and what their deterioration will make harder to produce.

Posted in Journalism, Mickey Kaus | Comments Off on Mickey Kaus – The Partial Insider

Ben Sasse & The Wisdom

Ben Sasse sits across from Ross Douthat with dried blood on his face, a side effect of the experimental drug daraxonrasib that prevents normal skin growth. He is funny about it. He has been funny about everything. His pancreatic cancer diagnosis in December 2025 came with a prognosis of three to four months, and his response was to launch a podcast called “Not Dead Yet,” reference Monty Python, and begin a media tour that has taken him through NPR, the New York Times, and the broader prestige circuit that defined his career in politics. He tells Douthat, with the kind of formulation a practiced communicator reaches for naturally, that he had a death sentence before the diagnosis too. We all do.
The coverage has been lavish. One outlet called him “the living embodiment of grace, faith, and courage in the face of death.” The New York Times titled its profile “How Ben Sasse Is Living Now That He Is Dying.” The question worth asking is not whether Sasse is brave or sincere. He probably is both. The question is what the machinery behind the coverage is doing, and whether the wisdom now being attributed to him existed before the tumors did.
It did not. Not in any new form. What existed before was a generic performance of conservatism in an indoor voice.
Sasse spent his career as a bridge figure. That is a precise role in the American intellectual ecosystem, not a vague compliment. A bridge figure holds credentials that signal seriousness to secular elite institutions, in his case Harvard, Yale, and an Oxford stay, while also holding religious fluency that signals authenticity to evangelical audiences. He adds a Midwestern biography that softens the coastal profile, and he maintains the posture of a scold rather than a defector: he criticizes his own side without abandoning it. This combination is rare and extremely useful. It makes a person portable across coalitions. The New York Times could platform him as proof that thoughtful conservatives exist. Conservative audiences could tolerate him even when they found him irritating. He never threatened the structure of either audience’s world. He named their anxieties in language they found respectable.
His two books served the same function his Senate career did. The Vanishing American Adult argued that overprotective parenting and screens were producing prolonged adolescence. Them: Why We Hate Each Other diagnosed polarization as rooted in loneliness and the erosion of local community. Both books gathered complaints that had been circulating in American cultural criticism for decades and repackaged them in a tone that felt serious without risking anything. Original ideas divide audiences. Familiar ideas unify them. Sasse’s writing let readers feel engaged without forcing them into uncomfortable territory. He was not advancing thought. He was stabilizing it.
In the Senate, Sasse styled himself as a high-minded institutionalist, conservative and sometimes, by his own account, ineffectual. He voted to convict Trump in both impeachments. He criticized what he called the performative blowhardery of both parties. He was, as a political figure, exactly as useful as his books: above average in tone, below average in originality, and very well positioned in the market for thoughtful conservative voices.
Then the diagnosis arrived, and the same institutional machinery that elevated him before shifted registers entirely.
Terminal illness does specific things to public discourse. It raises the emotional stakes. It grants the dying figure a kind of moral immunity: direct criticism of someone in visible pain from a drug that makes his face bleed feels indecent, so the audience softens and the interviewer leans forward. Most important, it collapses the space between ordinary human reflection and publicly recognized wisdom. Sasse tells his interviewers that even facing three or four months to live, “you have to redeem your time.” The advice he gives to his younger self is to honor the Sabbath, keep dinner time precious, be home with family more, develop extended family relationships, and press into spiritual life. This is what millions of people conclude when they face death. It is the default reflection of the terminal condition, not a breakthrough of analysis. What is unusual is not the content. It is that Sasse already occupied a position in the network that distributes attention at scale.
David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory is useful here. The dying wisdom genre is not a neutral cultural form. It is a selection environment. It rewards figures who already have pre-existing coalition legibility: the right résumé, the right institutional backing, the right tone. Randy Pausch had it through Carnegie Mellon. Paul Kalanithi had it through Stanford Medicine and the New Yorker. Sasse has it through Yale, the Senate, and two decades inside the prestige media circuit. Millions of people reach the same conclusions about family and God in their final months. They do not receive podcast tours or Ross Douthat interviews. The selection filter is not wisdom. It is access.
The Robert Trivers framework on self-deception adds another layer. Sasse is almost certainly not performing wisdom he does not feel. The Trivers point is subtler: the alignment between what his Christian formation makes natural to say and what the dying wisdom market most rewards is so complete that the calibration feels like honesty. He produces what his background makes available, and what his background makes available is exactly what the genre requires.
Sasse has said that his cancer has served as a corrective against what he called his own “delusional self-idolatry.” This is a characteristically well-formed sentence, the kind a practiced writer with a Yale doctorate and evangelical formation reaches for naturally. It names a sin, frames the cancer as a sanctifying instrument, and does so in language that both secular and religious audiences can receive. It is, in the terms of the genre, exactly right.
Sasse’s exit from the University of Florida was messy. His tenure as president lasted seventeen months and ended amid tensions with the board and questions about the budget. That is the kind of institutional record that normally complicates a legacy and invites scrutiny. Terminal illness interrupts that process. It resets the narrative into something simpler and more dignified. The contested administrator disappears. What remains is the thoughtful man facing the end with grace. Death is a narrative stabilizer. It settles contested accounts in favor of the version the dying figure prefers.
Sasse told NPR that he needs to laugh at death because death is terrible, but death does not get the final word. This is probably the truest thing he has said in any of these interviews, and it is also the line that will travel furthest, get quoted most often, and do the most work in building the legacy he is constructing in real time. He knows this. He is a practiced communicator who spent years in the Senate and ran a major research university. The idea that he is unaware of how he is being received, what his audiences need from him, and how to pitch his reflections for maximum reach is not credible. What the Trivers framework suggests is that this awareness and his authentic feeling are not in competition. They run together.
Wisdom, in this context, is not something Sasse discovered when the scans came back. It is something that the dying wisdom genre confers on figures who already meet its entry requirements. Sasse met them before the diagnosis. He meets them more completely now. The cancer did not upgrade his thinking. It upgraded his symbolic role. And once that conferral happens, once the prestige circuit has decided that a man is wise because he is dying well, the framing becomes almost impossible to challenge without appearing to violate the unspoken rules that govern how we talk about people who are bleeding on camera and running out of time.
That is why the coverage feels inflated relative to the ideas. And that is why the inflation will persist.

What kind of person launches a media tour for his own death? If Ben Sasse believes what he says, why wouldn’t he spend time with his family and friends instead of performing for strangers this generic wisdom bs? He has nothing of value to say that others haven’t said a million times before.
Perhaps my question contains a false binary? Sasse is not choosing between his family and his media tour. He is doing both, and the media tour probably takes a few hours a week while the treatment takes most of his energy. So the raw time allocation argument is weaker than it feels. A man can record a podcast between vomiting sessions and still be a present father. The NPR interview was probably ninety minutes out of his day.
Why does a man who says politics barely matters and family is everything choose, as one of his final acts, to go on Ross Douthat’s podcast and give advice to strangers?
Several reasons.
The first is identity continuity. Sasse has been a public communicator his entire adult life. The Senate, the books, the university presidency, all of it ran on the production of public argument. Stopping entirely would not feel like prioritizing family. It would feel like a kind of premature self-erasure, a dying before the dying. For someone whose identity is built around being heard, silence in the final months might feel more like loss than the interviews do. The media tour is partly a way of remaining himself while he still can.
The second is the legacy construction impulse, which Ernest Becker analyzed better than anyone. The Denial of Death argues that human beings cannot tolerate the idea that their existence leaves no mark. The hero system, whatever form it takes, is the answer to that intolerable fact. For a public intellectual, the legacy project is the hero system. The podcast, the Douthat interview, the NPR sit-down: these are Becker’s immortality project in its most naked form. Sasse is literally building the record that will outlast him. He knows it. The Trivers point is that he probably does not experience it primarily as legacy management. He experiences it as meaning, as calling, as the thing he was made to do. Both descriptions are accurate.
The third is coalition maintenance. Sasse spent twenty years building an audience and a position in a specific network. That network expects him to perform in a particular register. Disappointing it, going silent, refusing the interviews, would feel like abandonment of the people who supported him. There is genuine loyalty operating here alongside the status logic. The audience is real to him. The friendships with people like Douthat are real. The media tour is partly how he maintains those relationships in the only way available to him now.
The fourth is that the wisdom is generic. Honor the Sabbath. Eat dinner with your family. Be present. Sasse himself lived none of this particularly well before the diagnosis. He was a traveling senator, a university president who commuted between Florida and Nebraska while his wife’s health declined, a man whose career required almost constant public performance at the expense of the domestic life he now recommends. The cancer has not given him new knowledge. It has given him new credentials to say things he probably already knew and did not practice.
The dying wisdom genre grants authority precisely because proximity to death feels like it must produce insight. But Sasse’s five pieces of advice, the Sabbath, the dinner table, the family proximity, are things that any thoughtful person in his forties could have told you without dying. The cancer did not generate the wisdom. It generated the audience for wisdom he already had access to and mostly declined to act on.
So what kind of person launches a media tour for his own death? A person whose identity, status architecture, and meaning-making apparatus are all built around public communication. A person for whom going silent would feel like a second death before the first one arrives. A person who, whatever his authentic Christian faith, has spent enough time in elite institutions to understand intuitively that his final public performance will shape how he is remembered, and who finds that shaping irresistible for reasons that are partly noble and partly the same ego-driven status hunger that drove every earlier phase of his career.
The cancer did not change who he is. It changed the market for who he is. He is responding to that market the way he always has, which is to say fluently, warmly, and with just enough self-awareness to seem humble while doing it.

Let’s go deeper. I have interviewed thousands of people and I have been interviewed over a hundred times. The amount of space an interview takes up, whether as an interviewer or interviewee, is multiple times the length of the actual interview. For example, last week I arranged with author Mark Oppenheimer to interview him on Monday morning, April 13, at 6:30 am my time, 9:30 am his time, about his new book on Judy Blume. In preparation for that, I read his entire book even though my interest in Judy Blume is nearly nil.
Why did I bother? Mark and I keep covering the same ground from different angles, so I thought it would be fun to talk to him.
I see Mark as the accomplished, educated, disciplined, superior version of me. Who wouldn’t want to talk to that?
I put in about ten hours of preparation for the interview, which I expected to last about 30 minutes though I hoped it would go 60 minutes, and afterwards we’d become best friends and I’d learn to win!
I drafted 40 questions. I was going to prove to Mark that I was a better interviewer than he was. I’ve found that nothing builds bonds like proving to other people your superiority and then rubbing their faces in it.
You want some of this, bro?
I sensed my body and mind tensing up for the interview all weekend even while I was ostensibly doing other things. I slept poorly Sunday night and eventually rose at 4 am. This is my usual experience before interviewing an accomplished author for the first time.
Mustn’t grumble. I’ve got a world to save with my wisdom. And Mr. Oppenheimer will be the first lucky recipient.
Fifteen minutes before our interview was scheduled to begin, and after I emailed him the link to join my Youtube show, Oppenheimer canceled, which happens about half the time when I schedule an interview.
To expect others to respect your time is foolish. People cancel on strangers all the time. Humans are humans, oh the humanity, my therapist wants me to try to care about others and now I am demonstrating and performing empathy. People change their mind and they adjust their priorities to suit their own interests, as they should, and I’m totally cool with it, bro. This doesn’t bother me at all. I’m totally not thinking that I am low-status and it sucks that the high-status feel like they can cancel on me and it ain’t no thing. No, I’m thinking it makes no evolutionary sense to care about strangers except as a performance of your hero system. I desperately need to feel that I am a good person, and so I tell myself I would never do something so inconsiderate, but that’s a story I tell myself. Mark Oppenheimer is not a bad man and he didn’t do anything bad to me. He had more pressing priorities than following through on our scheduled interview. He has a spouse and five children and a thriving career, and even though I have none of those things, I am sure I have done the same thing a thousand time to strangers and I conveniently can’t remember any of it because I think about myself in an unduly positive light.
Let’s say the NPR interview took Ben Sasse about 90 minutes including all arrangements. When accounting for how much preparation he likely does for these presentations, I suspect on average he puts in two-to-three-to-ten times the amount of prep for each minute of performance, what Sasse truly gave to this interview in his dying hours is likely somewhere between three and twelve hours.
I am the son of Desmond Ford. I am the son of a polished performer who was rarely present because he was always rehearing his arguments.
I get intoxicated at the possibility of talking to somebody smart and accomplished, particularly if I admire their work, and my lust for the interview might consume me for days in advance. Even if you are a normie, an interview does not begin when the microphone turns on. It begins days earlier, when you start organizing how you want to present yourself, which formulations to reach for, which stories to tell, which theological framing makes you sound most at peace. By the time Sasse sits across from Douthat, he has already rehearsed that conversation in some form dozens of times instead of being present with his family and friends. The performance was constructed long before the recording. And it continues after: you monitor the reception, you register what landed, you adjust for the next one. The recording time is the smallest part of what the media tour costs.
Sustained public performance destroys intimacy. The more precisely you craft your public self, the more you write and talk about yourself publicly, the more you optimize your grief and your faith and your fear for an audience, the less available the raw version of those things is to the people sitting next to you. Your wife and children do not get the unprocessed experience of your dying. They get the man who has already converted that experience into content. The performance colonizes the private life not just by taking hours from it but by taking the emotional material that the private life runs on.
My father performed theological arguments that changed the lives of thousands of people. What price did he pay for this? His own inner life was consumed by how will this sound when expressed and how will the audience react.
That is what sustained public work does to a person over decades. The unperformed self becomes harder to locate. The family gets proximity to the performer without full access to the person.
Sasse’s specific formulations make this visible. “Death is a wicked thief.” “To live is Christ, to die is gain.” “This suffering is not salvific but it is sanctifying.” These are not things a man says spontaneously to his wife at two in the morning when the pain is bad. These are things a man says when he has processed his dying into transmissible form. The processing is real work, and it happens at the expense of something rawer and less organized that the people who love him might have had instead.
So is the Ben Sasse media tour an act of generosity toward strangers or an act of avoidance toward the people closest to him? And the honest answer, the one the dying wisdom genre is designed to prevent anyone from asking, is both. Sasse may find it easier to be wise for Douthat than to be helpless in front of his children. The performance gives him agency, coherence, a role he knows how to play. The private dying gives him none of those things.

Posted in Conservatives, Ross Douthat, Wisdom | Comments Off on Ben Sasse & The Wisdom

David Brooks – The Useful Man

David Brooks did not rise to prominence because he is a great journalist. He rose because he solved a problem that American elite institutions could not solve for themselves.
The problem is this: how do you maintain the appearance of intellectual diversity without the discomfort of dissent? Brooks is the answer. For more than two decades he has served as the designated reasonable conservative, a figure whose presence signals openness while guaranteeing no real threat to institutional comfort. He disagrees with his liberal colleagues in tone more than in substance. He critiques excess without naming names. He raises questions without demanding answers. He is the kind of conservative a liberal can feel good about tolerating, which is precisely why liberal institutions keep tolerating him.
His origins matter. Born in 1961 in Toronto to an English professor father and a historian mother, he grew up in a household where the highest skill was reading the world rather than measuring it. At the University of Chicago he refined that instinct. Chicago gave him intellectual seriousness without disciplinary constraint. He could range across history, psychology, sociology, and moral philosophy without being pinned to a methodology. In elite opinion journalism, it is an enormous structural advantage. Nobody can falsify you if you never make a falsifiable claim.
His early career looks modest in retrospect. Police reporter in Chicago. Then the Wall Street Journal editorial page in 1986. He learned about framing, about which ideas travel and which die, and how to package an argument for a specific kind of reader. By the time he joined The Weekly Standard in 1995, he had mastered the register of elite conservative commentary, serious in tone, culturally fluent, never populist.
The decisive move is Bobos in Paradise in 2000. The book’s sociological basis is thin, but its social function is brilliant. It names and slightly mocks the educated professional class that reads the New York Times, and in doing so it makes that class feel interesting rather than guilty. You could read that book as a critique of upper-middle-class hypocrisy. Or you could read it, as most of its readers did, as a flattering portrait that elevated ordinary lifestyle contradictions into a significant cultural phenomenon. Brooks told his audience: you are a new kind of person.
That book gets him the Times column in 2003. From there the machinery runs itself. Columns, television, bestselling books, campus appearances, speaking fees. He becomes the person editors call when they need a thoughtful conservative voice, which means he gets called constantly, which makes him more prominent, which means he gets called more.
His books after Bobos follow a consistent pattern. The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, and Achievement, The Road to Character, The Second Mountain: The Quest for a Moral Life, How to Know a Person: The Art of Seeing Others Deeply and Being Deeply Seen. These are moral narratives built from anecdotes, selective research, and biographical case studies. Andrew Gelman and others have catalogued real errors: wrong dates, misrepresented data, organizations that do not exist in the form he describes. Brooks rarely corrects them. The corrections do not damage him because factual precision is not what his readers want from him. They want orientation. They want someone to synthesize the anxiety of the educated professional class into a coherent story about meaning, character, and how to live. He does that reliably.
He married young to a woman who converted to Judaism, had three children, maintained the surface of a stable conventional life. Then in his early fifties, while writing The Road to Character, a book about humility and moral formation modeled on figures like Dorothy Day and Augustine, he hired Anne Snyder as a research assistant. Snyder was then in her late twenties, about twenty-three years younger than Brooks. She was pretty, and a Georgetown graduate with serious evangelical Christian intellectual commitments. Their collaboration on questions of grace, commitment, and moral seriousness became something more. His marriage of twenty-seven years ended in 2013. He and Snyder married in 2017.
Brooks preached character while his private life was in upheaval because his collapse did not contradict the books. It was the books. The Second Mountain is built around this arc: a fall from a first life of achievement into crisis, followed by rebuilding toward a deeper form of commitment. His divorce, his religious evolution toward what he calls a kind of dual Jewish-Christian identity, his new marriage to a woman whose faith reshaped his own. All of it became content. He turned the wreckage into a moral template that his readers could apply to their own lives.
This is the core of his durability. He does not hide the contradictions. He metabolizes them. And elites love this move because it allows them to see their own personal disasters as part of a meaningful journey rather than as evidence of failure. If Brooks can reframe his midlife dissolution as a spiritual deepening, then perhaps yours can be too.
Status in the world of Brooks is not about merit. It is a reward for position. Brooks sits at the intersection of several coalitions, legacy media, centrist liberalism, non-populist conservatism, and the religiously curious intellectual class, and each of them gets something useful from him. None see him as a threat. That is what elite status looks like in practice. Not brilliance. Not rigor. Coalition utility.
Opinion journalism does not optimize for truth and merit. It optimizes for voice, recognizability, narrative coherence, and audience retention. By those standards Brooks succeeds. He has maintained a distinctive voice for decades. His readers know what they are getting. He never loses the thread of his larger argument about character, meaning, and American life, even when the claims within that argument are shaky.
Yale’s decision to make him a senior fellow in 2026 is perfectly legible in this light. President Maurie McInnis did not bring him in because he is accurate. She brought him in because he is useful. He draws audiences. He generates respectful debate without generating scandal. He bridges the academy and the broader public in a way that most scholars cannot. He is safe. That combination of reach, tone, and safety is exactly what elite universities want when they perform intellectual diversity.
Brooks did not game a system built on merit. He succeeded in a system that was never primarily about merit. The credentials that matter in his world are not degrees or datasets. They are network access, cultural fluency, narrative skill, and the ability to speak to educated anxiety without threatening the structures that produce it. He has all of those in abundance.
What he lacks, and has always lacked, is the willingness or perhaps the ability to follow an argument wherever it goes rather than where it will be received. His thinking runs toward comfort rather than consequence. That is a real limitation. But it is also, in his particular niche, a feature. An intellectual who followed his arguments to their uncomfortable ends would not last twenty-two years at the Times. He would not get the Yale fellowship. He would not be invited back.
Brooks understood, perhaps intuitively, that the goal in his world is not to disturb the room. It is to be the kind of person the room keeps inviting.

Convenient Beliefs

Convenient beliefs are not necessarily conscious lies. They are genuine-feeling convictions that happen to align with what the holder needs to be true given his social location, his coalition memberships, and his institutional interests. The convenience is structural, not cynical.
Brooks believes, or presents himself as believing, that American society’s problems are primarily moral and characterological rather than structural and material. He believes that elites fail because they lose touch with virtue, not because concentrated power produces self-serving outcomes by design. He believes that personal transformation and moral recommitment can address social breakdown. He believes that the educated class, properly humbled and properly oriented, remains the natural steward of democratic life.
Every one of those beliefs is convenient for someone in his position. If the problem is moral rather than structural, then the solution does not require dismantling the institutions that made Brooks successful. If elites fail through personal weakness rather than systemic interest, then the remedy is better elites, not fewer of them. If moral transformation is the engine of social repair, then the moral essayist who guides that transformation holds a permanent and important social function. His framework does not threaten his livelihood. It justifies it.
Convenient beliefs feel true. Brooks almost certainly experiences his moral framework as hard-won wisdom rather than as professional protection and personal comfort. His divorce, his religious evolution, his second marriage all pushed him toward a Christian theology of grace and recommitment. That personal experience then confirmed beliefs he held for structural reasons. The personal and the convenient reinforce each other until they are indistinguishable.
Yale, the Times, PBS, the Atlantic, the speaking circuit. What do these institutions need to believe to keep inviting Brooks? They need to believe that moral seriousness is a meaningful category that transcends partisan interest, and that Brooks exemplifies it.
All of those beliefs are convenient for institutions whose own legitimacy depends on not being seriously challenged. If diversity means Brooks, then diversity does not require any rethinking of who runs things, who gets platforms, or what kinds of arguments get heard. If the reasonable-unreasonable distinction is primary, then the institutions get to define reasonableness, which they do in ways that happen to exclude challenges to their own authority. If moral seriousness is the criterion, then the morally serious essayist and the morally serious institution deserve each other, and no structural critique need apply.
Turner’s frame also illuminates why Brooks’s factual sloppiness does not damage him within these institutions. The institutions do not primarily reward accuracy because accuracy is not what they primarily need. They need legitimation. They need someone who can stand before an audience of Yale undergraduates or Times subscribers and make the case, implicitly or explicitly, that the educated professional class remains a trustworthy guide to American life. Brooks does that. His errors are inconvenient but not disqualifying because they do not threaten the belief the institutions most need him to sustain.

Alliance Theory

Brooks’s core product is a coalition signal calibrated with unusual precision to attract the maximum number of allies while minimizing enemies made. His reasonable conservative positioning is not a description of his actual political views. It is an alliance technology. It tells liberal institutional elites he is not their enemy. It tells non-populist conservatives he is not a sellout. It tells the religiously inclined that he takes transcendence seriously. It tells secular readers he will not demand anything of them doctrinally. Each signal reaches a different coalition without triggering the defensive responses a more committed signal would produce.
David Pinsof explains that the misunderstanding myth holds that if people on opposing sides simply understood each other better, conflict would dissolve. Brooks has built an entire career on performing this myth. His columns routinely frame political conflict as a failure of mutual comprehension rather than a genuine clash of interests. He urges liberals to understand what conservatives feel, and conservatives to appreciate liberal good intentions. By insisting that conflict is really misunderstanding, he positions himself as the indispensable translator, the man whose unique cross-coalition legibility makes him valuable to everyone. The misunderstanding myth is his job security.
What coalitions does Brooks belong to? Elite northeastern secular educated professional class, legacy media institutions, centrist think-tank networks, and the soft religious revival associated with figures like Os Guinness and Tim Keller. What does he signal to attract allies within those coalitions? Cultural sophistication, moral seriousness, openness to the other side, and non-threatening heterodoxy. What does he signal to repel rivals? He avoids any signal that would mark him as genuinely populist, genuinely religious in a doctrinally demanding way, or genuinely conservative in a politically threatening way. What is he actually fighting about beneath the stated positions? Access to elite institutional platforms and the status that flows from being the designated reasonable conservative in spaces that need one.
When Brooks left his first wife for a research assistant decades younger, the stated values of moral seriousness and communal obligation that underpin his entire public persona came under pressure. Pinsof would predict that coalition members would either punish the defection or find ways to reinterpret it as consistent with coalition values. What happened was closer to the latter. His audience absorbed the episode without withdrawing the platform because his coalition signals were strong enough to survive the biographical contradiction. The beliefs he broadcasts are doing coalition work, not biographical work, so biographical inconsistency does not automatically destroy them.
When Brooks wrote that suspending the individualistic American creed was necessary and that anti-authority sentiment was ignorance, he was not making an epidemiological argument. He was performing coalition loyalty to the expert class whose authority was under challenge. Pinsof would read that column as a pure alliance signal: I am on the side of credentialed institutional authority against populist disruption. The signal was so clean and so useful to his coalition that it required no factual grounding. Whether the experts were right about interventions was irrelevant to the social function the column performed.

The Tacit

Stephen Turner work on tacit knowledge cuts against a century of social theory that treated shared understanding as something like a hidden foundation beneath explicit culture. The standard view, running from Durkheim through Parsons and persisting in modern appeals to “shared values” or “collective consciousness,” holds that social life rests on deep reservoirs of unspoken agreement. We cooperate because we share something we cannot articulate. Turner argues this is largely a myth. What looks like shared tacit knowledge is usually a patchwork of individual habits, local practices, and learned responses that happen to produce coordinated behavior without requiring any common inner substance. People do not share a mind. They share a training environment.
The entire intellectual product of David Brooks depends on the older picture. His books and columns repeatedly invoke shared moral intuitions, common longings, the deep architecture of the soul, the wisdom embedded in traditions. He writes as though there is a collective inner life the essayist can access and articulate on behalf of his readers. His role presumes a tacit something that binds the educated class together, and the essayist’s job is to give voice to it. Turner’s account removes the floor from this enterprise. There is no shared inner life to articulate. There are habits of reading, habits of self-presentation, habits of moral performance, each picked up from overlapping institutional environments. What Brooks calls the longing for character or the hunger for meaning is not a window into a common soul. It is a description of behavioral patterns that look similar because the people producing them went through similar schools, read similar books, and work in similar offices.
Experts do not possess a shared tacit knowledge that makes them reliable guides. They possess training, credentials, and coalition membership. When they agree, the agreement usually reflects shared institutional formation rather than convergent access to some underlying truth. Brooks operates adjacent to this problem. He is not an expert in any discipline. His authority comes from his capacity to synthesize what credentialed people say and render it emotionally accessible to educated readers. He trades on the assumption that the experts know something and that he can translate that knowledge into moral narrative. Turner’s work dismantles both halves. The experts often do not know what they claim to know. The translator adds his own layer of coalition signaling on top of the experts’ coalition signaling, and the result reaches the reader as wisdom rather than as a stack of position-taking.
When Andrew Gelman and others catalog his factual errors, the corrections do not stick because Brooks is not trafficking in facts. He is trafficking in the feel of knowing. His prose signals that he has been around, that he has read the right books, that he has talked to the right people, that he has absorbed something wise from his long observation of American life. The feel of knowing is not knowledge. It is a performance of membership in a class that credentials itself through mutual recognition. Brooks writes the way educated readers believe a wise observer should write. The readers recognize the register and accept the authority. No claim needs to survive scrutiny because the authority does not rest on claims. It rests on the texture.
Appeals to shared understanding, common sense, or the wisdom of tradition almost always smuggle in the particular interests of whoever is doing the appealing. When a pundit says Americans understand or real Americans know or any decent person feels, he is not reporting an empirical fact about American inner life. He is recruiting readers into a coalition by flattering them as already members. Brooks does this constantly. His columns are full of what thoughtful people recognize or what any serious person must acknowledge. These phrases do no epistemic work. They do coalition work. They invite the reader into the class of thoughtful serious people, which is the class that reads Brooks, which is the class whose existence Brooks’s career depends on.
Populism is a direct threat to the tacit-knowledge economy Brooks inhabits. Populist movements assert that ordinary people can see through the credentialed class, that the experts are wrong, that the moral essayists are flattering themselves, that the whole apparatus of educated opinion is a racket. If that view is correct, Brooks has no job. His entire function depends on the premise that the educated class possesses a refined moral and cultural literacy the broader public lacks and needs. Populism denies the premise. Brooks therefore treats populism not as a political position to be argued against on its merits but as a category error, a failure of seriousness, a lapse into ignorance. This is a professional defense. The man whose livelihood rests on the tacit-knowledge claim cannot grant standing to the movement that denies the claim.
The classical picture holds that moral teachers access something true and universal and transmit it to their students. Turner’s frame suggests moral teaching is closer to apprenticeship in a particular set of habits, conducted within a particular institutional setting, producing graduates who recognize each other across a shared behavioral repertoire. Brooks writes as a moral teacher. His later books, The Road to Character, The Second Mountain, How to Know a Person, all present themselves as guides to universal human formation. Turner would read them as guides to formation within a class, the educated American professional class of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and more narrowly the segment of that class that wants to feel morally serious without making demands on itself that would threaten its social position. The universality is a coalition device. It tells the reader his local habits are the shape of the good life.
What Brooks offers, then, is not access to shared tacit knowledge. He offers membership in a coalition whose self-understanding requires the fiction of shared tacit knowledge. The fiction matters because it licenses the coalition’s authority. If the educated professional class shares deep wisdom about character and meaning, then its cultural and institutional dominance reflects its merit. If the class shares only a set of habits and credentialing practices picked up from overlapping schools and workplaces, then its dominance reflects its position, not its virtue, and the moral essayist’s role shrinks to something closer to a coalition chaplain. Brooks cannot say this and keep his job. His readers cannot hear it and keep their self-image. The tacit-knowledge myth protects both parties from a disturbing recognition, and Brooks is the specialist who tends the myth.
The man fits the room because the room needs someone who can perform the tacit. Turner’s work helps us see that the performance is the product, and that the product is doing political work the performer and the audience both prefer not to see.

The Four Questions

Brooks depends on a configuration of elite institutional gatekeepers. The New York Times editorial board grants him the column that anchors his entire platform. Yale administrators provide academic legitimacy through fellowships and appointments. PBS producers book him as the designated thoughtful conservative. Atlantic editors commission his longer pieces. Corporate speaking bureaus pay his fees. Book publishers advance his manuscripts. This network operates through mutual recognition rather than formal hierarchy. Each institution needs what Brooks provides, and he needs what each institution confers.
When critics attack his factual errors or biographical contradictions, these institutions absorb the criticism without withdrawing the platform. The Times does not fire him for getting dates wrong. Yale does not rescind his fellowship for personal inconsistency. The protection is structural, not personal. These institutions have invested in Brooks as their reasonable conservative, and replacing him would require admitting the investment was a mistake.

Brooks operates at the intersection of four overlapping coalitions, each requiring different signals.
Legacy media institutional elites need him to be serious but safe. He must provide intellectual weight without editorial headaches. He cannot generate the kind of controversy that threatens advertiser relationships or donor comfort. He signals this through measured tone, cultural sophistication, and careful avoidance of anything that reads as genuinely threatening to liberal sensibilities.
Non-populist conservatives need him to maintain conservative credibility without populist contamination. He signals this by invoking conservative intellectual tradition, citing Edmund Burke and Russell Kirk, expressing concern about moral decay and cultural breakdown. But he avoids immigration restrictionism, economic nationalism, or direct challenges to elite institutional authority. His conservatism is temperamental and philosophical, not political in ways that would require uncomfortable policy positions.
The religiously curious educated class needs him to take transcendence seriously without demanding doctrinal commitment. He signals this through references to Augustine and Dorothy Day, discussions of grace and redemption, and personal testimony about spiritual searching. But his religion remains intellectually comfortable. It enhances rather than challenges his readers’ self-image as sophisticated moral seekers.
Centrist think-tank networks need him to model responsible intellectual exchange across partisan lines. He signals this by treating liberal and conservative positions as partial truths requiring synthesis, by calling for mutual understanding, by positioning himself above the fray while remaining recognizably center-right. This allows institutions like Brookings or the American Enterprise Institute to cite him as evidence of their own intellectual fairness.

The core belief in his coalition is that moral and characterological factors are primary in explaining social and political outcomes. Institutional failures reflect personal failings. Cultural breakdown follows spiritual breakdown. The educated class holds special responsibility for moral leadership, and when that class falters, society suffers. These beliefs mark Brooks as a member of the coalition that sees itself as properly positioned to diagnose and remedy America’s problems.
The required signals include intellectual seriousness demonstrated through references to serious books and thinkers. Cultural sophistication shown through appreciation of literature, history, and the arts. Moral gravity conveyed through personal testimony and acknowledgment of his own failures. Cross-partisan civility expressed through respectful engagement with liberal colleagues and careful criticism of conservative excess. Religious openness without sectarian demand. Optimism about elite capacity for reform tempered by realism about elite weakness.
What he cannot signal: populist resentment against institutions, systematic structural critique of how power operates, genuine religious exclusivism that would alienate secular allies, conservative positions that would require defending uncomfortable policies, or moral criticism sharp enough to threaten the self-image of his educated readership.

If Brooks moved toward populist conservatism, he would lose his position at the Times, his Yale fellowship, his PBS appearances, his speaking fees from corporate and university audiences, and his book contracts with major publishers. The network that sustains him requires him to be the kind of conservative liberals can tolerate. A Brooks who defended immigration restriction, challenged diversity programs, or questioned expert authority on cultural grounds would become unemployable within his current institutional environment.
If he moved toward systematic structural critique of elite power, whether from left or right, he would lose the same platforms for different reasons. His value to these institutions rests on his capacity to provide moral criticism that does not threaten institutional authority. A Brooks who argued that concentrated power produces self-serving outcomes regardless of the moral character of power holders would be arguing himself out of his role as moral advisor to power holders.
If he became religiously orthodox in ways that demanded behavioral change from his audience, he would lose his educated secular readership. His religious signal must remain intellectually stimulating rather than personally demanding. A Brooks who insisted that Christian discipleship requires economic sacrifice or sexual restraint would find his audience shrinking to committed believers, a much smaller and less lucrative market.
If he abandoned the misunderstanding myth and treated political conflict as genuine interest conflict rather than communication failure, he would lose his position as translator and bridge-builder. His entire function depends on the premise that reasonable people of good will can find common ground through better conversation. A Brooks who argued that some conflicts cannot be resolved through dialogue would be arguing that his own profession serves no essential purpose.
The financial stakes alone are considerable. His Times column, book advances, speaking fees, and institutional appointments likely generate well over a million dollars annually. The status stakes are higher. He would lose access to the social world where his opinion matters, where he is recognized and deferred to, where he functions as an intellectual authority rather than as one voice among many. The belonging stakes may be highest of all. His entire identity is bound up in his role as moral essayist to the educated class. A position change that cost him that role would require rebuilding not just his career but his sense of who he is and what his life means.
The coalition allows him to be a morally serious conservative intellectual with a national platform and elite institutional affiliation. That is a rare and valuable social position. Changing his public position would mean giving it up and accepting that no equivalent position exists for the kind of conservative he would become.

Interaction Rituals Chains by Randall Collins

Collins argues that successful interaction rituals create emotional energy in participants, which then becomes a resource individuals carry forward into subsequent interactions. Brooks has constructed a career that maximizes his opportunities for successful ritual participation while minimizing his exposure to ritual failure.

Bodily co-presence occurs in television studios, lecture halls, dinner parties, and editorial meetings. Barrier to outsiders is maintained through credentialing, invitation systems, and shared cultural markers that exclude the non-elite. Mutual focus of attention centers on questions of meaning, character, and the proper ordering of American life. Shared mood develops through the collective experience of intellectual seriousness, moral concern, and measured disagreement.

Brooks’s television appearances on PBS NewsHour illustrate the ritual mechanics. The participants, Brooks and his liberal counterpart along with the host, gather in a bounded space with cameras that exclude the broader public while including a viewing audience that shares their cultural formation. The conversation focuses on recent political developments, but the real mutual focus is the demonstration of thoughtful analysis, the performance of reasonable disagreement, and the maintenance of civilized discourse. The shared mood is one of concerned citizenship combined with intellectual sophistication. Each participant signals respect for the others’ intelligence while maintaining distinct positions. When the ritual succeeds, all participants leave with enhanced emotional energy. They have performed their roles as serious public intellectuals before an audience that recognizes and validates that performance.

The emotional energy Brooks gains from successful ritual participation becomes a resource he carries into subsequent interactions. A strong PBS appearance enhances his confidence and authority in his next column, which in turn makes his next speaking engagement more successful, which feeds back into his television presence. Audiences sense when someone is charged with confidence from previous successful interactions, and they respond by granting more attention and deference, which generates more emotional energy in a self-reinforcing cycle.

Brooks’s column-writing process operates as a ritual preparation for group ritual performance. When he sits down to write, he draws on emotional energy accumulated from previous successful interactions with editors, readers, television appearances, and speaking engagements. The column must maintain the ritual elements that generated that energy while extending them to the written form. The barrier to outsiders operates through vocabulary, cultural references, and moral assumptions that signal educated class membership. The mutual focus becomes the shared attention of writer and reader to questions of American character and meaning. The shared mood is moral seriousness leavened with intellectual curiosity and cultural sophistication.

When a column succeeds, it generates emotional energy both in Brooks and in readers who recognize themselves as the kind of people who read and appreciate that kind of moral reflection. The comment sections and social media responses provide feedback that Brooks can sense as ritual success or failure. Positive response energizes him for the next column. Criticism that comes from within his coalition deflates him more than criticism from outside it, because coalition criticism signals ritual failure among the people whose validation matters for his emotional energy.

When his book rituals succeed, they generate massive quantities of emotional energy for Brooks while simultaneously creating ritual membership for readers. People who read and appreciate The Road to Character become members of a moral community defined by that shared appreciation. They carry emotional energy from the reading experience into their own social interactions, where they can signal their membership in this community by referencing Brooks’s ideas or recommending the book to others.

His interactions with New York Times editors, Yale administrators, and PBS producers are ritual encounters where emotional energy is both generated and allocated. When Brooks walks into an editorial meeting charged with confidence from a successful column or television appearance, he brings emotional energy that enhances his authority in that room. Other participants sense his confidence and tend to defer to his judgment, which increases his emotional energy further. His institutional position both depends on and produces these successful ritual interactions.

The speaking circuit operates as a particularly pure form of interaction ritual for Brooks. He travels to universities, corporate events, and conferences where audiences gather to hear him speak. The bodily co-presence is intense. The barrier to outsiders is absolute—ticket prices, invitation requirements, and venue selection ensure that only the appropriate audience attends. The mutual focus centers entirely on Brooks’s moral and cultural insights. The shared mood combines intellectual stimulation with the flattering sense that the audience consists of people sophisticated enough to appreciate serious reflection on American life.

When these speaking rituals succeed, they generate emotional energy for both Brooks and audience members. Brooks leaves feeling validated and energized. Audience members leave feeling elevated by their association with serious ideas and sophisticated analysis. They carry that emotional energy into their own social interactions, where they can signal their cultural sophistication by referencing insights from Brooks’s talk. This creates a network of people who have shared the ritual experience and who recognize each other as members of the same cultural community.

Factual corrections from Andrew Gelman and other academics fail to reduce Brooks’s emotional energy because they come from outside his primary ritual communities. The audiences that generate Brooks’s emotional energy—television viewers, column readers, speaking audiences—do not particularly value factual precision. They value the feeling of engagement with moral seriousness and cultural sophistication. As long as Brooks continues to generate that feeling, criticism about data accuracy does not threaten his ritual success.

Personal criticism about his divorce and remarriage posed a different kind of threat because it challenged his capacity to maintain the shared mood of moral seriousness that his rituals require. But Brooks successfully reframed the personal crisis as spiritual deepening, which allowed him to maintain and even enhance the ritual elements his audience values. The vulnerability and redemption narrative actually intensified the emotional energy his interactions generate because it added personal authenticity to intellectual sophistication.

The most dangerous threat to Brooks’s ritual success would be exposure as fundamentally insincere or as contemptuous of his audience. Collins emphasizes that ritual participants must genuinely share focus and mood for emotional energy to generate. If Brooks’s audience came to believe he was manipulating rather than sharing the ritual experience, the emotional energy would collapse.

Collins’s theory suggests that Brooks’s longevity reflects his unusual skill at reading and maintaining the ritual requirements of his various audiences. He has constructed a career that maximizes successful ritual participation across multiple communities—television, print, academic, religious, corporate—while minimizing his exposure to ritual failure. Each successful interaction generates emotional energy that makes subsequent interactions more likely to succeed. The compound effect over two decades has created a reservoir of cultural authority that can survive individual column failures or factual embarrassments because it rests on accumulated ritual success rather than intellectual achievement.

The system is self-reinforcing until it is not. Collins notes that emotional energy can dissipate quickly when rituals begin to fail. If Brooks’s audience began to perceive his moral seriousness as performative rather than genuine, or if his role as reasonable conservative became obviously obsolete, the ritual dynamics that sustain his authority could collapse rapidly. But as long as elite institutions need someone to play his particular role, and as long as educated audiences derive emotional satisfaction from engaging with his version of moral reflection, the interaction ritual chains that constitute his career will continue to generate the authority they appear to reflect.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

Pinsof argues that the widespread belief that political disagreements stem from misunderstanding rather than conflicts of interest is not just wrong but systematically useful to certain coalitions. People who benefit from positioning themselves as neutral translators, bridge-builders, and reasonable voices above the fray have strong incentives to diagnose conflict as communication failure rather than as genuine clashes over resources, power, and values.
Brooks has built his entire career on the misunderstanding myth. His columns routinely frame political and cultural conflicts as failures of mutual comprehension. Liberals and conservatives would get along if they understood each other better. The culture wars reflect communication breakdowns rather than irreconcilable differences about how society should be organized. Elite and populist tensions arise from mutual incomprehension rather than from structural conflicts over who gets to make decisions. Urban and rural Americans are divided by stereotypes and ignorance rather than by competing economic interests and cultural preferences.
By insisting that conflict is really misunderstanding, he positions himself as the indispensable translator who can bridge divides through better communication. His value to liberal institutions stems precisely from his claimed capacity to explain conservative positions in ways that make them comprehensible without making them threatening. His value to conservative audiences comes from his ability to present liberal positions as well-intentioned rather than hostile. The misunderstanding myth is his job security.
When Brooks explains Trump supporters to New York Times readers, he typically frames their support in terms of cultural anxiety, status loss, and communication failures rather than as rational responses to economic policies that benefit educated professionals at the expense of working-class communities. This allows his readers to maintain sympathy for Trump supporters without examining whether their own policy preferences might contribute to Trump supporter grievances. The misunderstanding frame preserves liberal self-image while deflecting structural critique.
The myth allows coalition members to signal their reasonableness and moral sophistication. Brooks’s constant calls for mutual understanding mark him as more thoughtful and mature than partisans who acknowledge genuine conflict. His readers get to feel morally elevated by their appreciation for nuanced analysis that transcends crude political tribalism. This is particularly valuable for educated professionals who need to distinguish themselves from both populist conservatives and activist liberals. Brooks provides them with a position that feels intellectually superior to both alternatives.
The myth creates a professional niche for the myth-maker. If conflicts are really misunderstandings, then professional understanders become essential. Brooks has carved out a role as the specialist who decodes each side to the other. This role would disappear if conflicts were acknowledged as genuine interest clashes that cannot be resolved through better communication. A world without the misunderstanding myth is a world where Brooks’s particular skill set becomes irrelevant.
He does not treat all conflicts as misunderstandings. He treats conflicts that threaten elite institutional authority as misunderstandings while treating conflicts within elite institutions as genuine disagreements requiring careful analysis. When populist movements challenge expert authority, Brooks diagnoses communication failure and calls for better civic education. When Democrats and Republicans disagree about tax policy, he acknowledges legitimate differences and explores the underlying values in conflict.
This pattern reveals the coalition work the misunderstanding myth is doing. Brooks deploys it to deflect challenges to the institutional arrangements that sustain his career while preserving space for the kinds of disagreements that make his role as thoughtful conservative valuable. The myth protects elite authority while maintaining the appearance of intellectual openness within elite discourse.
The COVID period provides the clearest example. When Brooks wrote that suspending individualistic American values was necessary for public health compliance, he was not making an epidemiological argument. He was performing coalition loyalty to expert authority under populist challenge. The column treated anti-lockdown sentiment as ignorance and anti-authority attitudes as misunderstanding rather than as rational responses to policies that imposed concentrated costs on certain communities while providing concentrated benefits to others. The misunderstanding frame allowed him to dismiss opposition to expert authority without acknowledging that the experts might have interests that conflict with the interests of the people bearing the costs of expert recommendations.
When Brooks writes about the culture wars, he consistently frames them as failures of mutual recognition rather than as genuine disagreements about how society should be organized. Religious conservatives and secular liberals would get along better if they understood each other’s deepest concerns. This framing serves both sides of his coalition. It allows secular readers to feel magnanimous about religious difference without examining whether secular institutional dominance might threaten religious liberty. It allows religious readers to feel heard without confronting the possibility that their values might be irreconcilable with secular liberal governance.
His personal story of spiritual searching, moral failure, and redemption functions as evidence for his capacity to bridge divides through empathetic understanding. He presents himself as someone who has inhabited multiple perspectives and can therefore translate between them. This biographical claim underwrites his professional claim to understand conflicts that others merely experience as participants.
Brooks’s performance of religious evolution and moral complexity positions him as the man who transcends narrow partisan interest. His readers get to identify with someone whose life story models the sophisticated moral sensibility they aspire to. The biography becomes a coalition signal rather than a qualification for analysis.
Brooks built his reputation on his capacity to present opposing viewpoints in their strongest form before offering measured criticism. This appears to be intellectual virtue, but Pinsof’s frame suggests it often functions as coalition maintenance. By presenting conservative positions charitably, Brooks signals to conservatives that he respects them enough to take them seriously. By ultimately criticizing those positions from a centrist perspective, he signals to liberals that he remains fundamentally aligned with their worldview. The charity is not primarily about truth-seeking. It is about coalition management.
Brooks extends intellectual charity to positions that do not threaten elite institutional authority while withdrawing it from positions that do. He can present religious conservatism charitably because religious conservatives do not control major cultural institutions. He cannot present populist nationalism charitably because populist nationalism directly challenges the authority of institutions that employ him. The charity serves coalition maintenance rather than intellectual fairness.
His entire career depends on the premise that conflict is misunderstanding and that skilled translators can resolve it through better communication. Acknowledging that some conflicts reflect genuine incompatible interests would eliminate the intellectual foundation for his professional role.
The myth also serves his institutional environment. Elite media organizations need figures who can acknowledge political division without threatening elite consensus. Universities need intellectuals who can model productive disagreement without raising questions about university governance. Think tanks need scholars who can bridge partisan differences without challenging the policy frameworks that justify think tank expertise. Brooks provides all of these services by maintaining that the deepest political conflicts reflect communication failures rather than structural interest clashes that might require institutional reform.
Brooks is a sophisticated coalition strategist who deploys the myth because it serves his interests and the interests of institutions that sustain him. The myth is his product, not his mistake, and its persistence reflects its utility rather than its truth.

Charisma and Social Paradoxes

Pinsof argues that charismatic authority does not flow from exceptional personal qualities but from the charismatic figure’s capacity to solve coordination problems for groups that need collective action but lack clear leadership mechanisms. The charismatic leader provides a focal point around which dispersed individuals can organize their behavior, and the appearance of special personal qualities emerges as a byproduct of successful coordination rather than as its cause.
Brooks operates as a charismatic figure for the educated professional class, but his charisma works through intellectual rather than political coordination. The educated class faces a persistent coordination problem around cultural and moral authority. Individual members know they possess superior education, cultural sophistication, and moral sensitivity compared to the broader population, but they lack mechanisms for coordinating their authority claims without appearing elitist or self-interested. They need someone who can articulate their moral superiority in ways that feel humble, thoughtful, and universally applicable rather than partisan or class-based.
Brooks solves this coordination problem by providing moral leadership that feels earned rather than asserted. His personal story of spiritual searching, biographical complexity, and intellectual seriousness gives him standing to speak about character and meaning in ways that allow his audience to identify with moral authority without claiming it directly for themselves. When Brooks writes about the importance of humility, his readers can agree while feeling that their agreement demonstrates their own humility. When he criticizes elite moral failures, his readers can participate in the criticism while positioning themselves as the kind of elites who recognize and transcend their class limitations.
His readers do not need to vote the same way or support the same policies. They need to recognize each other as members of the morally serious educated class that takes character, meaning, and cultural sophistication seriously. Brooks gives them a shared vocabulary, a common set of concerns, and a mutual recognition system that allows them to coordinate their cultural authority claims across different institutional contexts.
Political leaders lose authority when their actions contradict their stated principles because political leadership depends on credible commitment to specific policies. But charismatic authority in Brooks’s mode depends on the leader’s capacity to model the psychological and spiritual processes his followers want to experience. When Brooks divorced his first wife and married a much younger research assistant, he did not betray his audience’s policy commitments. He provided them with a template for reframing personal moral failure as spiritual growth, which is exactly what educated professionals need from their moral leaders.
The charisma is not about Brooks’s exceptional personal qualities. It is about his exceptional usefulness as a coordination device for people who need to organize their moral self-understanding in ways that preserve their cultural authority while acknowledging their human limitations. His apparent humility, intellectual curiosity, and spiritual searching allow his audience to adopt the same stances while feeling that they are discovering rather than performing them.

Brooks’s career exemplifies multiple social paradoxes operating simultaneously. The stated goal of his intellectual project is fostering mutual understanding, promoting moral development, and strengthening democratic discourse. The actual function is coalition maintenance for educated elites who need someone to articulate their cultural authority in morally acceptable terms. Attempts to achieve the stated goals would undermine the actual function because genuine mutual understanding might reveal irreconcilable interest conflicts, authentic moral development might require uncomfortable personal changes, and strengthened democratic discourse might threaten elite institutional control.
He presents himself as unusually charitable toward opposing viewpoints, and his readers value him for this apparent intellectual virtue. But the charity serves coalition rather than truth-seeking functions. Brooks extends charity to conservative positions that do not threaten liberal institutional dominance while withdrawing it from populist challenges that do. The charity signals moral sophistication to his audience while protecting them from having to take seriously the strongest versions of arguments that would threaten their worldview. If Brooks became genuinely charitable in ways that forced his readers to confront uncomfortable truths about their own positions, he would lose his audience and defeat the coalition purpose his charity serves.
He built his career on the premise that better understanding between political opponents would reduce conflict and strengthen democracy. But the conflicts he mediates often reflect genuine interest clashes rather than communication failures. Liberal and conservative elites might understand each other perfectly and still disagree about immigration, trade, cultural change, and institutional authority because they have different interests and values. True understanding might increase rather than decrease conflict by making clear that the disagreements cannot be resolved through better conversation.
Brooks cannot acknowledge this because his professional role depends on the understanding myth. If political conflicts reflect irreconcilable differences rather than communication failures, then professional understanders become irrelevant. The stated goal of his work undermines the actual function, so the stated goal must remain unachieved for the work to continue serving its real purpose.
His books present moral formation as a process of deepening self-awareness, expanding sympathy, and developing wisdom through experience and reflection. But the actual function of these books is to provide readers with sophisticated ways of thinking about themselves that preserve their sense of moral superiority while acknowledging their human limitations. True moral development might require readers to question fundamental assumptions about their own virtue, their class interests, and their institutional commitments. Such questioning would threaten the psychological and social benefits they derive from reading Brooks, so the moral development must remain at the level of intellectual appreciation rather than behavioral change.
Brooks repeatedly emphasizes humility as a central virtue, and his personal testimonies about his own failures and limitations model humble self-reflection. But the entire structure of his career depends on claiming special insight into character, meaning, and American life that justifies his platform and authority. His readers value him because he provides them with humble ways of asserting their own moral sophistication. The humility signals become markers of spiritual and intellectual superiority rather than genuine acknowledgments of limitation.
His personal revelations, spiritual searching, and biographical vulnerability signal that his moral reflections emerge from lived experience rather than professional obligation. But the sincerity is calibrated to serve his coalition needs. He reveals enough personal complexity to appear authentic while avoiding revelations that would threaten his authority or alienate his audience. The performance of sincerity becomes a professional skill rather than an expression of genuine transparency.
These structural features allow the project to serve its functions while maintaining the appearance of pursuing its stated goals. The paradoxes protect both Brooks and his audience from confronting the gap between what they claim to value and what they require from their moral leadership.
The most unsettling implication of Pinsof’s analysis is that resolving the paradoxes would destroy the social benefits they provide. If Brooks became genuinely charitable, truly understanding, authentically humble, and completely sincere in ways that threatened his audience’s comfort and authority, he would lose his platform and his readers would lose the psychological and social benefits they derive from his work. The paradoxes are not bugs in the system. They are features that allow the system to operate successfully while maintaining the moral self-understanding its participants need.
Most criticism of Brooks assumes that he is trying to achieve his stated goals and failing. In reality, he succeeds at achieving his goals, which require maintaining rather than resolving the tensions the criticism identifies. The system works because it does not work in the ways it claims to work, and Brooks’s durability reflects his skill at managing the paradoxes rather than his failure to transcend them.

‘E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century’

His tribe has shifted over his career. He began inside the neoconservative coalition that dominated Republican foreign policy and intellectual life from the Reagan years through the early Bush presidency. William Kristol, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and the broader Commentary-Weekly Standard circuit trained him. He moved through the Bush era as one of the movement’s most visible public voices. He broke with the coalition over Trump, through the mid-2010s, and migrated toward what he now calls the exhausted center. His current coalition is the respectable liberal establishment center, the NewsHour-New York Times-Aspen Institute-Atlantic circuit. The coalition crosses the formal partisan line but holds together around shared commitments: suspicion of populism, faith in credentialed expertise, concern about social fragmentation, and a tone of elevated moral seriousness directed at both political extremes.

Putnam’s findings sit at the center of his entire late-career project. Bowling Alone shaped his vocabulary. The Weave project borrows directly from Putnam’s social capital framework. His columns for more than fifteen years have circled the civic erosion Putnam measured. Brooks understands the data. He cites them. He organized a foundation-funded project around them. The question the frames raise is why his engagement with Putnam stops short of where the diversity essay leads.

Horizontal gene transfer fits Brooks’s early career. He ported neoconservative policy intellectualism from Commentary and The Weekly Standard into mainstream venues, first at the Journal editorial page and then at the Times. The tools arrived shaped by a specific coalition with specific commitments: muscular American foreign policy, welfare-state skepticism, cultural traditionalism tempered by elite cosmopolitanism, and a particular style of moralized political argument drawn from Straussian and Jewish-intellectual sources. In the host environment of the New York Times op-ed page, the tools retained their shape and gradually lost their original substrate. The neoconservative coalition that produced them fractured. The commitments softened. What remained was a style of moral seriousness applied to changing coalition targets. The tools kept their form. The function shifted.

Phenotypic plasticity runs through his body of work. In the Times column he performs the role of thoughtful moderate addressing a liberal readership willing to hear conservative notes if the tone stays elevated. On NewsHour he performs affable weekly dialogue with Capehart, with both men calibrated to educated public television conventions. In his books he writes in a register of moral philosophy aimed at the educated general reader who wants self-improvement grounded in something deeper than standard self-help. In the Weave project he writes as a civic organizer trying to repair what his own coalition’s earlier commitments helped break. Same man, different phenotypes shaped by venue. The phenotypes are mutually reinforcing in the way the successful public intellectual career requires.

Exaptation describes what he does with the social-capital vocabulary. Putnam built the framework inside empirical political science with specific measurements and specific findings. Brooks adapts the framework for moral-philosophical commentary aimed at a lay audience. The tools evolved to measure civic engagement, generalized trust, and associational density. In Brooks’s hands they serve to mourn what has been lost and to recommend repair strategies focused on individual character, small-group engagement, and the practices of attention and care. The shift is not wrong. Putnam’s findings do have moral implications Brooks draws out. The exaptation strips away the demographic piece of Putnam’s framework. The civic erosion Brooks mourns becomes an abstract problem of modern life, of screens and polarization and loneliness, rather than a problem with causes Putnam’s data identified.

The specific piece Brooks leaves out is the diversity finding. Putnam showed that ethnic diversity in the short-to-medium run reduces trust, civic engagement, and solidarity even within ethnic groups. The finding cuts against his coalition’s foundational commitments. Brooks addresses civic decline in hundreds of columns. He cites Putnam repeatedly. He does not engage the diversity piece of Putnam’s findings. When he discusses fragmentation he traces it to other sources: technology, economic change, the decline of institutions, the rise of expressive individualism. Each of these sources is real. The demographic source Putnam documented is also real and his coalition’s filters install a reliable silence around it.

Putnam’s diversity findings illuminate why Brooks’s move reads as it does. The neoconservative coalition he came from had developed its own filters around demographic questions. Its positions on immigration were mixed but generally supportive of legal immigration, cautious about illegal immigration, and uninterested in the demographic substrate questions the harder right eventually raised. Brooks carried these filters with him. When he moved into the respectable liberal coalition, the new coalition had stronger filters around the same questions. His silence on Putnam’s diversity finding predated the move. The move reinforced it. The conditions that produced the social fragmentation he now addresses in the Weave project cannot be named inside the coalition he has joined. He addresses the effects. He leaves the causes unnamed.

The Weave project merits analysis. Brooks founded it to address social fragmentation by identifying community-builders, weavers, who do the work of connection at local levels. The project is sincere and has done real good. It occupies a niche in the civic environment Putnam’s data describe. The niche is the foundation-funded effort to address civic erosion through individual-level interventions without confronting the structural causes. The Aspen Institute, the Gates Foundation partners, and the broader philanthropic ecology of the project share coalition commitments that preclude certain diagnoses. The Weave project can identify and celebrate weavers. The project cannot engage the question of why weavers have become so scarce in specific kinds of American communities and so comparatively abundant in others. Putnam’s framework gives part of the answer. Brooks’s project cannot use that part.

Brooks has written with unusual honesty about his own life, his divorce, his loneliness, his religious searching, and his sense of having missed something essential in his early commitments. The honesty is a real feature of the man and not merely a performance. The Second Mountain contains autobiographical material that costs him in credibility terms within parts of his original tribe. His public discussion of his marriage to Anne Snyder, thirty years his junior and formerly his research assistant, drew mockery he absorbed. The willingness to expose himself this way does not fit the signal parasitism frame cleanly. It represents something the frame does not fully capture. A man who pays such costs for his public moral project is not simply performing coalition maintenance. He is trying to say something real about what living well looks like under civic conditions he himself helped produce and cannot fully repair.

The civic substrate that Brooks mourns and the Weave project tries to rebuild includes thick communities where individuals are known over time by people who share their history and commitments. Brooks himself has made most of his life in the thin coastal elite substrate Putnam’s data locate as relatively low in social capital despite its wealth and credentials. His own life has occurred in the conditions his work decries. The tension is not hypocrisy. It is the characteristic position of the late-twentieth-century educated American. The conditions that produced such careers also produced the civic erosion such careers now address. Brooks writes from inside the problem he names. The writing is honest about the problem. It is less honest about how his coalition’s positions contributed to producing the problem. The tribe’s internal exponent can mourn what has been lost. The tribe’s internal exponent has more trouble tracing the losses to his own coalition’s commitments. Brooks is unusually willing to go partway down this road. He is not willing, or not able, to go all the way.

A thoughtful tribal exponent, trained in one coalition and now serving another, carrying the intellectual substrate of his origin into his new home, engaging seriously with the civic data his coalition prefers him not to fully engage, producing real moral work that operates within the limits his coalition installs, and unable finally to name the demographic conditions his own data indicate. He has spent twenty years circling Putnam’s findings. He has engaged half of them. The other half sits in plain sight. His career shows what coalition discipline permits and forbids. The permissions produced a serious public moralist. The prohibitions produced a serious public moralist whose diagnosis stops one step short of what the data he relies on would support.

Hybrid Vigor

Signal parasitism runs through his book sales and speaking career. His credentials as a Times columnist and NewsHour commentator signal reliability. Corporate and civic audiences pay premium speaking fees for thought leadership that reinforces what they already believe, framed with enough sophistication to make the reinforcement feel like insight. Brooks delivers. The coalition that pays for such speaking has commitments his performances confirm. The signal of intellectual seriousness serves coalition maintenance. The signal does not extend to arguments the coalition finds uncomfortable. The limits of what Brooks says track the limits of what his audience will pay to hear said.

His neoconservative training gave him credentials that signal intellectual seriousness. The Chicago undergraduate degree, the Weekly Standard years, and the conservative intellectual lineage all signal that he is not a standard liberal. The signal now serves a different coalition than the one that produced it. The respectable liberal establishment values having a conservative-coded voice who blesses its cultural positions. Brooks fills the niche. The signal of conservative intellectual credibility borrows from the coalition he has left to strengthen the coalition he has joined. The coalition he joined pays premium for the signal because authentic cross-coalition voices have become scarce in the civic environment Putnam’s data describe.

The Second Mountain and The Road to Character both engage the moral-substrate question Putnam’s framework addresses. Brooks argues for commitment, for communities, for sustained ethical formation against the atomized meritocratic ascent his first book celebrated. The argument is sincere and well made. The civic conditions in which the commitments he recommends might actually take root do not appear as a central question in the books. The Second Mountain offers portraits of individuals who built lives of commitment. The portraits are moving. Putnam’s data raise the question Brooks does not develop. The communities that made such commitments possible at scale in earlier American life depended on civic substrates that have thinned for reasons including the demographic reasons his coalition cannot name. Individual commitment can be recommended. The civic conditions that would let millions of people act on such recommendations cannot be rebuilt through individual choices alone.

Exaptation also fits his use of religious vocabulary. Brooks has moved toward explicit Christian framings in his later work. He has written about his own movement from secular Jewish formation toward a kind of mainline Protestant-adjacent Christianity. The exaptation here is real and complicated. He borrows the moral seriousness of religious tradition for a project whose actual coalition is secular liberal establishment. The religious vocabulary serves the project by adding gravity his fellow secular liberal commentators cannot reach. The substrate that once gave such vocabulary its force was a religious community with specific doctrines, practices, and disciplines. Brooks operates without full participation in such a community. The words travel. The substrate does not travel with them.

Phenotypic plasticity operates in his response to the 2016 election. Trump’s rise forced Brooks to reposition. He spent the campaign writing columns critical of both candidates. After the election he moved more sharply against Trump and toward the anti-Trump liberal consensus. The move was morally coherent. It also accelerated his migration from one coalition to another. The neoconservative tribe he came from split between never-Trump exiles and Trump-adaptive survivors. Brooks joined the exiles. The exiles integrated with the respectable liberal establishment. His phenotype adjusted to the new ecology. The moral seriousness stayed. The coalition commitments shifted.

Brooks is a hybrid himself. He came from a secular Jewish Manhattan family, did his degree at the University of Chicago among Straussian and Jewish-intellectual currents, trained as a journalist at William F. Buckley’s National Review, worked at the Wall Street Journal editorial page, edited at The Weekly Standard, and now holds positions at the New York Times, PBS NewsHour, Yale, and the Aspen Institute. He has married three times across different religious and cultural lines. He has moved from secular Jewish formation toward mainline Protestant-adjacent Christianity. His intellectual sources cross Burke, Niebuhr, the Hebrew prophets, the New York Intellectuals, and contemporary social science. The crossing is real. The question the heterosis frame raises is whether it produced hybrid vigor or something closer to outbreeding depression.

The early career shows hybrid vigor. Bobos in Paradise by David Brooks works because it crosses sociological observation with journalistic reporting and Jewish intellectual irony in a combination neither sociology departments nor newsrooms could produce alone. The book sees things a pure sociologist would miss and a pure journalist could not name. The hybrid produced traits neither parent population reliably generates: accessible social analysis that treats its subjects with some tenderness without losing its edge. The Social Animal by David Brooks attempts the same crossing at larger scale, importing cognitive science into narrative form. The hybrid works less well there. The parent populations resisted the combination. The cognitive science he imports has its own regulatory context that the narrative form strips away. The crossing produced something both cognitive scientists and narrative readers could criticize on the other’s grounds.

The later work shows the outbreeding depression pattern more clearly. The Second Mountain imports religious commitment vocabulary, moral philosophy of virtue, communitarian social theory, and self-help confessional form into a single book. The parent populations have co-adapted complexes that disrupt each other when mixed. Religious commitment requires doctrines and practices. Virtue ethics requires a philosophical tradition with its own argumentative conventions. Communitarian theory requires sustained engagement with specific thinkers and their disputes. Self-help confessional form requires the author to speak from the position of someone figuring things out alongside the reader. Each mode disrupts the others. The book reads as sincere and intermittently moving. It does not produce the hybrid vigor that would require the crossings to strengthen rather than weaken what each parent tradition could do alone.

The frame illuminates Brooks’s current coalition position. The respectable liberal establishment center he now serves is itself a post-crossing formation. It fused neoconservative foreign policy hawkishness, Democratic economic policy, progressive cultural commitments, and credentialed expertise into what looked like a working coalition around 2010. The co-adapted complexes of each parent tradition have disrupted each other since. Foreign policy hawkishness developed in conditions where military commitments served specific geopolitical goals. Democratic economic policy developed inside a labor-liberal coalition that barely exists now. Progressive cultural commitments developed in academic environments with their own substrate requirements. Credentialed expertise developed within institutions whose public trust depended on performance that the coalition can no longer reliably deliver. The coalition Brooks serves is not a successful hybrid. It is closer to outbreeding depression. The parts do not strengthen each other. They leave each other worse off.

The Weave project tries to construct communities that cross lines. The project identifies weavers, people who bring together populations that normally do not mix, and treats their work as the repair strategy for civic erosion. The heterosis frame supports part of the diagnosis. Genuine crossing does produce vigor when co-adapted complexes complement rather than disrupt each other. The frame also raises the qualification. Outbreeding depression is real. Not all crossings produce vigor. Some produce organisms less fit than either parent. The Weave project operates on the assumption that mixing is generally good. The biology suggests mixing sometimes produces hybrid vigor and sometimes produces dysfunction, and the difference depends on whether the co-adapted complexes of the parent populations can survive the crossing.

Brooks’s own diagnosis misses this qualification. He treats civic fragmentation as caused by too little mixing across coalition lines. The frame plus Putnam’s data together point toward a harder problem. The mixing across coalition lines has already occurred at significant scale. The substrate that would let further mixing produce vigor has thinned. What remains is outbreeding depression in the broader society and inbreeding depression within each elite coalition. Neither parent population has the co-adapted complexes that successful further crossing would require. The weavers Brooks celebrates are doing real work, but the broader civic environment may not allow their work to scale into the kind of national repair he wants.

The frame also illuminates Brooks’s personal trajectory in a way the original analysis only approached. His move from secular Jewish formation toward mainline Protestant Christianity, his writing on religious commitment, his marriage to Anne Snyder who brought a more explicit evangelical sensibility into his life, all represent attempts to import missing material into his own substrate. The original four frames treated this as exaptation, taking religious vocabulary for secular liberal establishment purposes. The heterosis frame reads it differently. Brooks is trying to cross his thinning secular intellectual tradition with religious material that might restore vigor. Whether the crossing produces hybrid vigor depends on whether he can develop the co-adapted complexes required for religious commitment to function as more than vocabulary. The evidence is mixed. His religious writing sometimes has the quality of a successful hybrid producing insights neither parent tradition alone could generate. It sometimes has the quality of outbreeding depression, where the religious vocabulary and the secular liberal substrate disrupt rather than strengthen each other.

One sharper point the frame reveals. Brooks’s best work was produced when he wrote from inside a coalition that had recent inbreeding depression. The neoconservative movement in the late Weekly Standard years was a closed breeding population that had accumulated its deleterious recessives: Iraq, the housing crisis, the 2008 election collapse. Brooks was writing partly from inside that population as it approached the collapse of its niche. The writing had the quality of an organism still carrying the co-adapted traits of its origin population while observing the niche it occupied failing. That vantage produced unusual clarity. The move to the respectable liberal establishment gave him a new niche but did not give him the same vantage. The new coalition was already showing outbreeding depression when he joined it. He could not write from inside it with the same clarity he had written from inside the earlier coalition as it failed. The work since 2016 shows the cost. He is a more comfortable organism in a less productive niche.

An observer writing from inside an inbred coalition approaching collapse can see things an observer writing from inside an outbred coalition already experiencing dysfunction cannot see. Brooks moved from the first position to the second. His best work came from the first. His current project depends on pretending the second is still the first. The tension between what his data tell him and what his coalition position permits him to say is partly the tension between writing from a coalition that still had internal coherence even as it failed and writing from a coalition that has lost internal coherence while still holding institutional power.

The Set

David Brooks sits at the center of a set that treats moral seriousness as the chief currency of public life. The members write columns, edit magazines, run institutes, and circulate through the same conferences. They share a conviction that America suffers a crisis of the soul and the social fabric, and that the cure is character, commitment, and reconnection. The set has a recognizable home in the opinion pages of the New York Times and The Atlantic, in the Aspen Institute, in Comment magazine and its parent Cardus, in PBS NewsHour, and in the lecture and bestseller circuit that runs through Davos, TED, and the better-funded churches and synagogues.

His wife Anne Snyder edits Comment and ran his Weave: The Social Fabric Project at Aspen, so the marriage joins the columnist to the religious-communitarian publishing world. His old PBS chair pairs him first with Mark Shields (1937-2022) and then with Jonathan Capehart (b. 1967), which gives him a weekly performance of civil disagreement before a national audience. Around him stand the respectable center-right thinkers: Yuval Levin (b. 1977) at AEI and National Affairs, Ross Douthat (b. 1979) and David French (b. 1969) on the Times op-ed page, Peter Wehner (b. 1961) at The Atlantic, Reihan Salam (b. 1979) at the Manhattan Institute, and the older Weekly Standard founders Bill Kristol (b. 1952) and Fred Barnes (b. 1943) from whom Brooks came up. The communitarian social scientists supply the data and the vocabulary: Robert Putnam (b. 1941) on social capital, Amitai Etzioni (1929-2023) as the movement’s father, and E.J. Dionne (b. 1952) as the friendly voice from the center-left. The happiness and moral-psychology popularizers feed the column: Arthur Brooks (b. 1964), no relation, and Jonathan Haidt (b. 1963). The religious wing gives the set its turn toward depth: the late Tim Keller (1950-2023), whom Brooks credits with his slow approach to faith, the philosopher James K.A. Smith (b. 1970) who edited Comment before Snyder, and Russell Moore at Christianity Today. The institution-runners hold the rooms together: Walter Isaacson (b. 1952), who led Aspen, and Jeffrey Goldberg (b. 1965), who edits The Atlantic and hands the set its largest platform.

What they value. They value depth over surface. The favored contrast in Brooks runs between résumé virtues and eulogy virtues, between the first mountain of achievement and the second mountain of commitment to family, faith, vocation, and community. They prize vulnerability, the confession of one’s own failings, the long marriage, the small congregation, the neighborhood association, the act of paying attention to another man. They honor institutions and gradual reform and distrust the crowd. They place civility near the top and treat contempt as the master sin of the age. They want America healed rather than won.

The hero system. The hero of this set is the man who turns from ambition toward service and is changed by the turning. Brooks built The Road to Character around such figures: Frances Perkins, George Marshall, Dorothy Day, Augustine, saint over striver. The contemporary version is the Weaver, the ordinary person who repairs a frayed community without recognition, the recovering addict who now runs a shelter, the teacher who stays. A second hero sits beside the first and serves the set’s own interest: the synthesizer, the columnist or essayist who reads the social science and the theology and explains the country to itself with warmth. To be that explainer is the highest role the set can offer, and Brooks holds it. The admired traits are humility, inner struggle, late-life conversion, and the willingness to say one was wrong.

The status games. Here the set runs into its sharpest tension, and the truth of it is unflattering. The men who preach the transcendence of status compete for status by competing over who has best transcended it. Standing comes from the Aspen invitation, the Atlantic byline, the TED stage, the bestseller, the keynote at the gathering of the great and good. It comes from the public confession, the column that admits a personal failure and converts the admission into authority. It comes from quoting the right neuroscientist and the right church father in the same paragraph, which signals range. It comes from being seen as the reasonable adult while the partisans shout. The humility is real as a value and also a move; a man who announces that he has left the first mountain has planted a flag on the second and invited others to admire the climb. The set rewards moral display that reads as anti-display. Access is the prize, and the prize is distributed by a small number of editors and institute heads who appear in the list above.

The normative claims. They argue that the country faces a crisis of loneliness, distrust, and broken bonds, and that the repair is moral and relational before it is political. They argue that character matters more than accomplishment and that meritocracy corrodes the men it rewards. They argue that commitment heals, that civility is a duty, that both parties carry truths worth hearing, and that contempt for ordinary Americans is the elite’s defining vice. They argue that the answer to populism is not more populism but the slow rebuilding of trust from the neighborhood up.

The essentialist claims. Beneath the program lies a picture of human nature. Man is a social animal, made for connection, and most of the country’s pain comes from arrangements that deny this nature. There is a deeper self under the performing self, an inner life that careerism starves. Persons have souls and the longing for transcendence is built in, not learned, so the secular and therapeutic story of life leaves a hole that only commitment or faith can fill. Moral formation is the central task of a life, and the human heart bends toward meaning the way a plant bends toward light. These claims give the set its confidence and its weakness. They let Brooks speak of what all men need from a position few men occupy, and the gap between the universal claim and the rarefied perch is the thing his critics press.

The set’s coherence comes from this circle closing on itself. The columnist marries the editor, who publishes the theologian, who is praised by the institute head, who books the columnist, who cites the social scientist, who is reviewed by the columnist. They share a faith that the country can be talked back into trust by men of good will speaking carefully from large platforms. Whether the country can be reached that way is the open question their whole project rests on.

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