Bob Grant and the Invention of Combat Talk

Bob Grant (March 14, 1929 – December 31, 2013) built the confrontational, personality-driven format that national broadcasters later carried across the country, and he built it a decade or more before the men now attached to the genre reached a national microphone. Admirers heard in him a plain-spoken champion of citizens whom the political class ignored. Detractors heard a provocateur whose language crossed the lines of acceptable public speech. Both camps conceded his reach. They disagreed over his meaning. That disagreement has outlived him, and it shapes every attempt to fix his place in the history of broadcasting.

He was born Robert Ciro Gigante in Chicago, into a working-class Italian-American home. He attended Steinmetz High School and enrolled briefly in the journalism program at the University of Illinois, which he left to chase a career in broadcasting. Station executives of that era counseled young announcers with ethnic surnames to adopt names that carried less of the old country, and Gigante became Grant. He served in the Illinois Army National Guard from 1948 to 1949 and afterward in the United States Navy Reserve from 1950 to 1958. The name change and the military service mark a man assembling the public self that the microphone demanded, trimming the parts that might slow his entry into a national medium.

Grant came up through radio during the postwar years, when the medium still carried the prestige of its golden age and had not yet surrendered the evening hours to television. He worked at several Chicago stations and then moved to Los Angeles, where his trade took its decisive shape. At KNX he handled comedy and satire. At KABC during the 1960s he found the form that carried his name for the rest of his life. There he worked in the orbit of Joe Pyne (1924-1970), a host whose aggressive interviewing had already begun to remake the talk format. Grant filled in for Pyne and rose into the front rank of KABC personalities. He acknowledged in later years that the methods New Yorkers credited to him had their origins in these California seasons. Even his signature sign-off, “Straight Ahead,” belonged first to Pyne, and Grant took it, kept it, and made it his own.

The California years also put him across the desk from the public men of the moment. He interviewed Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) as Reagan moved from the screen toward the governorship and the politics that carried him to the White House. He interviewed Muhammad Ali (1942-2016) and a long file of politicians, officials, and celebrities. He gained television experience through local appearances, broadening a craft that had begun in the radio booth. By the close of the decade he had the instrument, the technique, and the confidence. He needed a larger room.

He found it in New York. In 1970 WMCA converted to an all-talk format, and Grant arrived to anchor it. He had hesitated to leave the California sun, yet New York answered him at once. The city took to a host who argued with his callers, mocked the conventional wisdom, and pressed an opinion into every subject that crossed the board. The neutral moderator, the courteous referee of competing views, had no place in his method. Grant set himself at the center of the program and made the audience orbit him. He built the trademarks that defined the rest of his career, among them the line he used to throw a tiresome caller off the air: “Get off my phone.”

His first New York run lifted him into the small company of the city’s recognized media voices. He addressed his callers as “sir” and “madam,” and the courtesy served as the prelude to the demolition of their arguments. He filed his political opponents under “fakes,” “frauds,” and “phonies.” His listeners did not tune in for the news. They tuned in for the fight. Observers later named the form “combat talk,” and it set a pattern that shaped a generation of broadcasters who followed him to the microphone.

The career did not run in a straight line. In 1977 Grant left WMCA for WOR and climbed quickly to the upper reaches of the New York ratings. In 1979 the station dismissed him after a controversy over remarks he made on the air. A short Philadelphia interval followed. He returned to WMCA, and then, in November 1984, he landed at WABC, where his largest work waited.

The WABC years carried Grant to the height of his influence. He held the afternoon drive slot, the hours when the commuting city sat in its cars and listened, and he became among the most heard talk hosts in the country. He spoke of crime, of illegal immigration, of welfare dependency, of urban decline, of a government that failed the people who paid for it. He spoke of these subjects in the 1970s and 1980s, well before they hardened into the standard inventory of conservative media. The themes that later filled a thousand broadcast hours sat at the center of his program when the national format had not yet been born.

He married politics to theater. He invited the listener in and never surrendered control of the exchange. The voice carried, the wit cut, and the willingness to turn on a caller gave the program an edge that competitors struggled to match. He championed the police officer, the soldier, and the crime victim. He defended Israel without hedging and took open pride in his Italian-American roots. The combination of grievance and showmanship held an audience that returned each afternoon for the next round.

The audience grew, and the controversy grew with it. Civil-rights organizations, media critics, and political opponents charged him with racism and with rhetoric that fed division. His attacks on welfare programs, on affirmative action, and on the political leadership of the day moved from the local airwaves into national headlines. His supporters answered that the establishment punished him for speaking truths it preferred to suppress. His critics answered that his words taught the city to think along the lines of race and resentment. Neither side persuaded the other. The argument hardened into the permanent backdrop of his fame.

During 1994, Dennis Prager hosted an hour-long daily show on WABC in New York. He got caught up in the controversy over racial comments made by Bob Grant. To the dismay of Grant and WABC, Prager refused to support Grant, and Dennis eventually decided that the frequent hassling he took from management and Grant was not worth it. He quit WABC in early 1995.

Bob Grant wrote on page ten of his book Let’s Be Heard about one day in 1994:

Once the attacks began in full force, I can’t say I was totally surprised by them. After all, liberals and anarchists are my natural enemies. That’s why I decided after a while not to give any more interviews. They only fueled the fire. Then I got a call from a man named Dennis Prager. You may never have heard of him, but he is a fairly conservative fellow with a TV show based in Los Angeles. He and I even share the same manager. So when Prager called and asked me to come on his show, I agreed. He was a colleague, after all, and if anyone could sympathize with what I was going through, he’d be the one.
My understanding was that we were going to discuss the thing as two colleagues — you know, “Hey Bob, how do you feel about all this ruckus?”
So we’re on the air. He’s in his studio in Los Angeles, and I’m in my studio in New York. He begins by holding up the damned [New York] magazine cover [alleging Grant hates blacks] and then proceeds to recite the slanderous charges against me exactly as they were made: “He’s called blacks savages! He’s done this! He’s done that! Bob, what do you say about it?”
It was a rare moment for me — I was at a loss for words. I said, “What do I say about it? My God — do you want me to plead guilty right now?”
I said, “Good heavens — I didn’t know you were going to do this.”
Then — then! — he introduces a germ named Walter Fields, at the time an official of the New Jersey NAACP and the man who probably has more genuine hatred for me than any other human being in the world today. Over and over in the course of that broadcast, Fields said he was going to get me off the radio. Finally I said, “Well, look, you want my head on a platter, so what’s the point of my saying anything?” It was a complete and total hatchet job. Dennis Prager is a son of a bitch and a snake. Because only a snake would do what he did.
It’s hard to imagine anything worse than being on that show that night.

The controversy that closed his first WABC tenure arrived in 1996, after Commerce Secretary Ron Brown (1941-1996) died in a plane crash in Croatia. Grant’s on-air remarks about Brown drew a national backlash. The reaction landed on ground that organized pressure had prepared over years, as the NAACP and allied advocacy groups ran sustained campaigns against the advertisers who paid for his program. His ratings held. WABC dismissed him in April 1996 all the same. The firing entered the lore of the medium as a marker of a shifting landscape and the occasion for a loud quarrel over free speech, political correctness, and the leverage that advertisers held over what a host might say. Sean Hannity (b. 1961) took the afternoon slot Grant left behind, and the handoff read, to those who watched the genre, as the passing of conservative talk radio from its first generation to its second.

Grant did not stay off the air for long. Within weeks WOR returned him to the New York audience, and he held a major place there for another decade. He tried national syndication through several networks and gathered a following beyond the city, yet his power stayed rooted in the tri-state region. His method drew on the ethnic, political, and cultural fault lines of New York, and his listeners caught the local references and the old rivalries that gave the broadcasts their charge. The reach that syndication promised never matched the hold he kept on the streets he knew.

He set down his own account in a memoir, Let’s Be Heard, published in 1996. The title carried his broadcasting creed and his conviction that the ordinary citizen deserved a louder voice in public life. He had used the phrase before, on a spoken-word recording released earlier in his career, and it served him as a kind of motto across the decades.

One chapter of his life drew little public attention and meant a great deal to him. Grant recovered from alcoholism and joined Alcoholics Anonymous, and he stayed sober for forty-four years. He credited the recovery program with saving his life and with sustaining the long career that followed. Friends and colleagues counted the sobriety among the achievements he prized above the ratings.

His shadow falls across the broadcasters who came after him. Rush Limbaugh (1951-2021) carried the methods Grant had worked out in a single city onto the national grid. Sean Hannity took up parts of the style and inherited the WABC audience itself. Mark Levin (b. 1957) cited Grant’s importance to the rise of the format. Howard Stern (b. 1954), who shared neither his politics nor his manner, praised him as a performer of the first order and ranked him among the great talents the medium produced. The men who built the modern industry treated him as a source, whether or not they shared his views.

After he left daily radio he kept a hand in through commentaries, internet broadcasts, and a Sunday program on WABC. His final broadcast aired on July 28, 2013. Declining health narrowed his public life through his last years. He died on December 31, 2013, at his home in Hillsborough Township, New Jersey, at the age of eighty-four. He left his children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and his longtime companion Josephine Saracco.

The legacy stays contested and the quarrel stays warm. Critics return to the provocations and the rhetorical excess that ran through the career. Admirers return to the man who refused the orthodoxies of his time and declined to flatter the elite that disdained him. Even those who could not stand him granted his place in the record. Grant did more than ride the growth of talk radio. He helped invent it. The confrontational, host-centered format that fills so much of modern political broadcasting carries his stamp. His closing line held his sense of the bond between a host and his city, and of the medium that joined them: “Your world is my world, and my world is your world. Straight Ahead.”

The Voice

Grant came to radio as an actor, not a reporter. As a Chicago schoolboy he performed in radio plays, and the actor’s training stayed with him for the rest of his life. The voice was the first instrument. He worked a baritone with gravel in it, slow when he wanted the room to lean in, loud when he wanted to flatten a caller. He opened each show by reminding listeners that the program ran unscripted and unrehearsed. The claim did double work. It promised danger, and it cast him as a man with nothing to hide among broadcasters who read from cards.
His diction joined two registers that should not have fit together. One was the hard, plain speech of the working-class Chicago and outer-borough listener: short words, flat declaratives, no ornament. The other was a stagey, near-courtroom formality. He called the caller “sir” and “madam,” and the courtesy set the trap. He granted a man the title and then took apart his argument, and the distance between the manners and the verdict carried the comedy and the cruelty at once. When the man had nothing left, Grant closed him out with the line later hosts borrowed: “Get off my phone.”
The contempt ran through a small, fixed vocabulary. Opponents were fakes, frauds, phonies. The words repeated until they turned into a refrain, and the repetition did more than any single charge. He built his public self as the honest man among liars. He put it this way in one account of his method: a caller got an honest answer, and an honest answer might not always be the “correct” one. The split between honest and correct was the whole argument. It cast political correctness as a demand to lie and cast Grant as the holdout who refused.
The shape of the hour came from the theater. He opened with “Let’s be heard,” and he closed with a sign-off about influence and a “Straight Ahead.” He held the wheel the entire time. He let the caller talk, gave him room, then chose the moment to cut. The exasperation read as real and played as performance. When callers pestered him about a guest, he could blow up on the air, shouting that it was not the guest’s show, and the blowup was part of the entertainment.
What the obituaries missed, and what Howard Stern caught, was the repertory company. Grant ran recurring characters the way a serial runs them. A regular named Ms. Trivia aired her “Beef of the Week,” George the Atheist called in, and Grant paid mock-reverent obeisance to a Beatrice-like presence he called “The Lady Josephine,” a nod to Dante. His son phoned in. He name-checked his diner in New Jersey. The running cast set the combat inside a frame of play, and the play is why men who hated his politics still listened. Stern, who shared none of the politics, ranked him the best broadcaster he had ever heard and praised the flair that held an audience for hours.
So the rhetoric works on two levels. On the surface, grievance: crime, welfare, the failing city, the phony official. Underneath, a steady offer of intimacy. He spoke to the listener as a confidant, the two of them against the frauds, and he let the listener in on what the polite world would not say. The voice carried the authority, the courtesy laid the trap, the catchphrases marked the ritual, and the recurring cast kept the thing human enough to return to the next afternoon. The anger was the product. The craft beneath it was an actor’s.

Bob Grant and the Interaction Ritual Chain

Randall Collins builds his sociology on a single small unit, the interaction ritual, and on the claim that men move through life chasing the charge that good rituals throw off. The ritual gathers people, fixes their attention on one thing, and pulls them into a shared mood. When it works, it produces solidarity, it marks out sacred symbols the group will defend, and it leaves each member carrying a personal charge that Collins names emotional energy. Men run on this charge. They drift toward the encounters that pay it and away from the ones that drain it, and the encounters link across time into chains. Interaction Ritual Chains lays out the parts. Bob Grant built an engine from those parts, and he built it twice. One ran in public, on the air, every weekday afternoon. The other ran in private, in a meeting room, for forty-four years. Both ran on the same parts.

Collins grounds the whole theory in bodily co-presence. Bodies in a room read each other below the level of speech, fall into rhythm, and build the charge through that rhythm. Radio has no room. The listener sits alone in a car in afternoon traffic. So the frame has to earn its keep here, and it earns it through the one live encounter the show contains: the call. The host and the caller meet in real time, two voices locked on each other, and that pair forms a true interaction ritual, thinned by the wire and still alive. The audience does not join that ritual. It watches it. Grant’s voice carries the rhythm that bodies carry elsewhere, the pace and the swell and the drop, and the daily hour sets the beat. The listener gets a weaker, one-way charge, the kind a crowd at a ballpark draws from the men on the field. The frame holds. It holds through the call and the voice, not through any room, and a careful reader should keep an eye on that seam.

Grant supplied the rest of Collins’s parts in full. The barrier to outsiders ran clear. The man who caught the references, knew the running cast, and shared the grievance stood inside. The phony official, the welfare bureaucrat, the elite who looked down on the outer boroughs stood outside, and the show talked about them, not to them. The mutual focus held tight because Grant ran one show, his own, with himself at the center and a single subject in front of the group at any moment. The shared mood came ready-made: grievance, the sense that the city and the country had been handed to frauds while honest men paid the bill. Collins asks for a common emotion that the ritual heightens. Grant took the resentment a commuter carried into the car and raised it hour over hour until it turned into something close to joy.

The caller did the work of the offered figure. Collins notes that a ritual needs an object the group can focus on together, and a degradation ritual needs a target the group can stand against. Grant gave his listeners both at once in the caller who came on weak. He addressed the man as “sir,” granted him the title, let him talk, and took the argument apart while the audience listened. The courtesy raised the focus. The dismantling fed the mood. When the man had nothing left, Grant ended him with the line that worked as the fixed marker of the rite: “Get off my phone.” The “fake” and the “phony” served as the profane symbols, the things the group named together and pushed away together, and naming them together is what bound the group. “Straight Ahead” closed the hour the way a benediction closes a service. Repeat a phrase across years and it stops carrying information and starts carrying membership. The regular hears it and feels the charge of belonging.

What the listener took away from the hour was emotional energy: confidence, the loss of isolation, the feeling that a strong man had said what the listener felt and could not say. The charge faded by the next afternoon, as Collins says it must, and the next show topped it up. That return is the chain. The drive-time hour set a reliable rhythm, the listener invested his attention where the return ran highest, and Grant paid out day after day. His reminder that the program ran unscripted and unrehearsed raised the stakes of the rite, because real risk lifts the charge, and a show that might go off the rails pays better emotional energy than a show that cannot.

Grant sat at the rich end of the charge. Collins separates power rituals, where the order-giver gains energy and the order-taker loses it, from status rituals, where the man at the center of the group’s attention gains energy and the man at the margin loses it. The host commanded both. He gave the orders and ended the calls, which charged him and drained the caller he cut. He held the center of attention for three hours a day, which charged him again. The repertory company solved the drain on the regulars. Ms. Trivia, George the Atheist, the Lady Josephine, the son who phoned in: these were not victims fed to the group but members the group centered, status rituals that handed a loyal caller the charge of being known by name to a city. The combat degraded the stranger and the fraud. The serial warmed the insider. The show ran both rituals in the same hour, and that pairing is why men who hated the politics still came back. The play kept the charge clean enough to seek again.

The Alcoholics Anonymous meeting is the textbook high-solidarity ritual, and it gave Collins’s parts in their full bodily form. Bodies sit in a room. The barrier runs absolute, anonymity and members only. The focus locks on the speaker and on the shared shape of the story, the fall and the surrender and the climb. The mood runs deep, the identification of a man who has been there with a man still in it. The sacred objects stand plain: the medallion, the count of days, the higher power, the prayer said as one. The moral standard is sobriety, and the group defends it. The charge a newcomer carries out the door is the thing that holds him until the next meeting, and the meetings link into the chain that the program names in its own folk wisdom, ninety meetings in ninety days, the chain that keeps the energy above the line where craving wins. Forty-four years of sobriety is a four-decade interaction ritual chain. The anniversary is the purest status ritual the room performs, the night the group centers the member and hands him the charge of the count. Grant ran on manufactured solidarity. He built two plants to make it, one loud and public and one quiet and closed, and both turned the same raw feeling into the same charge that let him face the next day.

The firing reads as a collision between two ritual orders. Grant’s show generated its solidarity by charging sacred symbols and degrading profane ones, and the degradation was the engine, not a side effect. His remark about the death of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown struck a sacred object of a rival ritual order. Collins’s theory predicts the result: violation of a group’s sacred symbol triggers righteous anger, and righteous anger mobilizes. The campaign that followed ran as a counter-ritual that drew its own solidarity from the act of expelling him, the way a community charges itself by naming and casting out a polluting figure. The advertiser sat at the node where the two energy markets crossed. Association with the polluted symbol drained the advertiser’s standing, so the advertiser pulled out, one call at a time. WABC read the wider market and cut him while his ratings held, because ratings measured the strength of his ritual and the boycott measured its cost in the market around it. One ritual order made him. Another unmade him. The man stood at the line where they met.

Straight Ahead: Bob Grant and the Denial of Death

Three o’clock at WABC. The clock on the studio wall has a sweep hand, and Grant watches it the way a fighter watches a bell. The phone board lights up green across the bottom, a row of waiting men, and the engineer points through the glass. A recorded promo runs in his headphones, the one that calls him the most listened-to talk host in America. The board feeds him a caller. He leans into the microphone, and the voice comes out low and gravel-bottomed, the instrument he has tuned for forty years.

“Yes, sir. You’re on. Go ahead.”

The caller starts in on welfare, or the mayor, or the men who run the schools. Grant lets him build. He grants the man the courtesy of the title, calls him sir, lets the sentence get long enough to carry weight, and then he takes it apart in four words and the man has nothing left.

“My point is that—”

“Get off my phone.”

The line drops. Grant fills the silence with his own verdict, the studio hums, the hour rolls toward six, and at the close he signs off the way he has signed off since Los Angeles, two words borrowed from a dead mentor and made his own.

“Straight Ahead.”

A man knows he is going to die. He knows it the way he knows his own name, in the body, and he spends his life building something that lets him not feel it. Ernest Becker called the something a hero system, a scheme of meaning that hands a man a way to count, to register as a creature of value in a drama larger than his sixty or eighty years of meat and breath. The terror of death is the engine under everything men make, the cathedrals and the empires and the children named after grandfathers, and the hero system is the answer a culture and a man work out together. Earn the right to feel you will not vanish. Become a hero in a story that outlasts the body. Grant built such a system, and he built it out loud, and the word he closed every show with was the creed of it.

Start with the name, because the name is the first stone. He was born Robert Ciro Gigante. Gigante. The giant. An Italian body-name from a working-class Chicago home, the father’s name, the old country carried into the new on the back of a surname that announced the village before the man said a word. He buried it. Station men told young announcers to shed the ethnic surname, and most did it for the marquee, but in Becker’s reading the act runs deeper than the marquee. The man unmade the father and made himself. Becker named this the causa sui project, the oldest and most secret human wish, to be the author of one’s own being, to be one’s own father, to owe the self to no one and to no body. Gigante was given. Grant was chosen. And the form the chosen self took was a voice, which has no body and no village and no death you can see, a pure broadcast self that fills a city and leaves no flesh on the floor. He fathered himself in the studio every afternoon.

So the voice is the immortality vehicle, and the audience is the congregation that confirms the man is real. Becker understood that a man cannot grant himself significance alone; he needs the eyes and ears of others to tell him he counts. The ratings are the count of souls. The largest audience is the proof that he matters most, that of all the voices in the city his is the one that fills the cars at rush hour. He reminds them at the top of the hour that the show runs unscripted and unrehearsed, and the claim does the work of a man saying, in effect, that everything you hear is real, that there is no script between you and a real man, that I am not a phony.

Which brings the prism to the first of his sacred words, the one under all the others. Honest. Grant said he had been dead-on honest his whole life on the air, that a caller got an honest answer, and the answer might not always be the correct one. The split between honest and correct is the whole architecture of his heroism. Around him stand the frauds, the fakes, the phonies, and he is the one real man in a hall of pretenders. Becker, in Escape from Evil, took the dark turn that The Denial of Death set up. A man secures his own reality, he wrote, by puncturing the reality of another. The scapegoat carries off the death-fear of the group. The fraud across the desk is the man whose claim to count is false, and exposing him is not cruelty in the hero’s own eyes but a service, a cleansing, a way of saying that the universe still sorts the real from the fake and that the host stands on the side of the real. This is the engine that runs hot, and the place it ran past the edge has a name. When Commerce Secretary Ron Brown died, Grant’s remark about the death drew the firing that ended his peak. Read through Becker, the remark is the project showing its underside, the moment a man advances his own significance by diminishing another’s, the cost the hero system tries never to let you see. He never apologized. The creed forbids it. To apologize is to look back, and to look back is to admit the grave is behind you and gaining.

That is what Straight Ahead means in the studio. It means a man in motion cannot be caught. Forward, never back, never sorry, the immigrant’s whole physics turned into a sign-off, the same forward that carried the line out of the village and up out of the old neighborhood and into the marquee name. Momentum against mortality. Keep moving and the end cannot land.

Now walk down the stairs into the other room, because the same man kept a second hero system, and it contradicts the first, and the contradiction is the truest thing about him.

A church basement. Folding metal chairs in a horseshoe, a coffee urn that ticks as it heats, a banner with the steps, a man at the front holding a bronze medallion stamped with a number. Grant sits in the horseshoe. Here he does not father himself. Here he says the opposite of everything the microphone says. He says he could not save himself, that he had handed his life to a thing that nearly killed him, that the cure began the day he stopped claiming to be the author of his own being and admitted a Power above him. The causa sui man surrenders. He keeps a count, not of listeners now but of days, and the count runs to forty-four years, a tally against oblivion kept one day at a time. The alcoholic who would have rotted in a furnished room is reborn, and the rebirth is literal, death and resurrection on the cheap chairs, the oldest hero story there is. In this room Straight Ahead means something it cannot mean upstairs. It means do not pick up the drink today. It means surrender, and keep surrendering, and the keeping-on is not the conqueror’s forward march but the penitent’s. One man. Two answers to the one terror. At the microphone he denies the body and authors himself. In the basement he confesses the body and hands the authorship up. He ran both his whole adult life and never reconciled them, and no one does, and that is the human estate.

Here is the part for the reader who has sat through ten of these. The word does not carry its meaning in itself. The word is charged by the system it serves, and the same two syllables ring as different bells in different chests.

Picture a Carthusian in the Grande Chartreuse, in the white habit, in a cell he will not leave, who has taken silence as the shape of his life. Tell him a man’s glory is to be the most heard voice in a great city and he will not understand the sentence. To be heard, for him, is the noise the soul must climb out of to reach God. His Straight Ahead is a wheel, the same office at the same hours, matins in the cold dark, the year turning back on itself toward the one death that opens onto the only life that counts. He earns his place by vanishing. Grant earned his by filling the air. Same hunger to not be nothing. Opposite cures.

Picture a widow in a hill town in Sicily, in black for thirty years for a husband under a stone she visits every week, who keeps the photographs and the saint’s day and the recipe and the grave. For her the sacred lies behind, in the dead, in the village, in the line of women who wore the black before her. Say avanti, straight ahead, and she hears the word that took her sons across the water and emptied the town and left her alone with the photographs. Forward is the thief. The same motion the man in Chicago turned into a creed is, to her, the loss of everything that holds a name to the earth. And the joke under the essay is that the man with the microphone came from her, from a Gigante who went forward and did not look back.

Picture a hospice nurse on the night shift, who has sat with the last hours of more men than Grant ever cut off a phone. For her there is no straight ahead. There is the work of the good ending, the morphine and the wet cloth and the family in the hall, and honest does not mean the blunt verdict that ends a caller. Honest at three in the morning means knowing which truth a dying man needs and which one to hold. Her heroism is to be present at the place every other hero system is built to look away from. She does not deny death. She keeps it company.

Picture a founder in a glass conference room, in the soft hoodie, pitching men who hold the money, for whom forward and fast and break things is the whole faith, who means to live forever in a company that runs after the body stops, who says honest to mean a number on a slide that the lawyers will defend. His Straight Ahead and Grant’s rhyme on the surface and split underneath. The founder builds a thing to outlast him. Grant became the thing. The voice was the company and the product and the man, all one, with no body in the way.

There are more. There are as many as there are systems, the soldier and the scholar bent over the old text and the singer who pours the wound into the song and faces the death the rest of us run from. The point is the prism, that no word arrives clean, that honest and forward and heard are not facts about the world but bids against the dark, each one struck in the currency of a particular scheme for not being erased.

Grant’s scheme half-worked, which is the most any of them does. The body failed in Hillsborough Township at eighty-four, on the last night of a year, and the village name he buried outlived him on the death certificate where the law keeps the giant. But the voice runs on. There is a fan site where men post the airchecks, the studio tape from 1975 and the edited reels from 1993, and you can sit in a chair sixty years from the studio and hear the gravel and the green board and the four-word cut and the sign-off. The body is gone and the voice keeps going, low and certain, sir, get off my phone, straight ahead, a self that fathered itself out of a Chicago surname and is still, against the only fact that beats every hero in the end, moving forward.

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Joe Pyne and the Ranking Nuisance of Broadcasting

Joe Pyne (December 22, 1924-March 23, 1970) built a career out of conflict. He hosted radio and television talk shows that treated the interview as combat. He advocated his own opinions, baited his guests, and insulted the callers and studio visitors who came to argue with him. The broadcasters before him played records and asked courteous questions. Pyne shouted, mocked, and cut people off, and the audience kept coming. Historians of American media now credit him as the first angry talk-show host, the man who showed that hostility could sell.

He was born Joseph Pyne in Chester, Pennsylvania, the son of a bricklayer named Edward and a homemaker named Catherine. The family moved to Atlantic City when he was five. When he was eleven his younger brother died in a car accident. The family returned to Chester, and Pyne finished at Chester High School in 1942. He enlisted in the United States Marine Corps the same year.

Pyne saw combat in the South Pacific and earned three battle stars. In 1943 a Japanese bombing raid wounded him in the left knee, and he received a Purple Heart. The wound stayed with him. In 1955 doctors found a rare cancer in the same leg and amputated below the knee. For the rest of his life he wore a wooden leg, a fixture of the image he built as the hard ex-Marine who feared no one.

After the war he enrolled in a drama school to correct a speech impediment. He once described himself to reporters as an overly compensating introvert, a shy man who taught himself to perform. While he studied, radio drew him in. It occurred to him, he said, that talking on the air might be a pleasant way to make a living. He worked first as a conventional disc jockey and announcer, the genial voice that introduced the next record and read the weather. That was the postwar radio he came up in, mild and polite, and the manner he soon abandoned.

The early years moved fast and ended badly. He worked briefly in Lumberton, North Carolina, then landed at a new station, WPWA in Brookhaven, Pennsylvania, where a quarrel with the owner cost him the job within weeks. He went to WILM in Wilmington, Delaware, the first of three stints there, then to WVCH in Chester in March 1948, then to WLIP in Kenosha, Wisconsin. The Kenosha job ended in a confrontation with the owner, William Lipman, during which Pyne threw a typewriter against the wall. He was a radio gypsy, a man who could not hold a room long without picking a fight in it.

The turn came in Atlantic City. There he slipped commentary between records, and one night he attacked what he called the town’s corrupt politics. The station manager told him to stop playing records and just talk. People responded. From that point Pyne aimed himself at talk.

He returned to WILM and around 1950 launched the show that set his course, It’s Your Nickel. The title came from the nickel a pay-phone call cost. The format was simple and new. Pyne stated his opinions, and listeners called to question him, agree, complain, or raise a fresh subject. At first he kept callers off the air and paraphrased them for the audience. The callers and his clashes with them soon became the heart of the program. He had found something the genial postwar format suppressed: that an argument held an audience better than a record. He attacked the Delaware attorney general, the mayor of Wilmington, and other local figures. He challenged racial discrimination on the air. He drew threats. He drew listeners. The broadcasting historian Donna Halper (b. 1947) dates his first call-in show to a Delaware station in 1951. For six and a half years he sharpened the abrasive, opinionated manner that became his signature, and he did it under the Fairness Doctrine, the 1949 federal rule that required stations to air opposing sides of a question. The rule defined the era he worked in and the genre he helped invent.

He tried television early. In 1954 he hosted a Sunday version of The Joe Pyne Show on WDEL-TV in Wilmington that ran a few months. In 1957 he sold what he owned and moved to Southern California. No Los Angeles station would hire him at first. He took a radio job in Riverside, sixty miles east, and within a month exposed a narcotics scandal at a local high school. The scoop made his name, and Los Angeles television came calling. KTLA put him behind a desk for a nightly insult show, and the form that made him famous took shape.

By 1960 he hosted a radio show on KABC. The acerbic Bob Grant (1929-2013) took over that show in 1964, and Pyne moved to KLAC, then to a television show on KTTV. His earnings climbed into territory few broadcasters reached. Time reported in 1966 that he drew a salary larger than most sports stars. He had arrived in the second-largest media market in the country with the highest ratings in the city.

The national breakthrough came in March 1966, when the NBC Radio Network began syndicating The Joe Pyne Show. Within months more than two hundred stations carried it. His syndicated television program, distributed by Metromedia, reached as many as two hundred forty stations and drew an audience reported at ten million a week. He opened each television hour with a line that became his trademark: “This is Joe Pyne, and the action starts in just a moment.” That year he also hosted a short-lived NBC game show, Showdown, whose gimmick dropped a contestant through a collapsing chair after a wrong answer. Time put him in print in July 1966 under the name his fans used, Killer Joe. The New York Times called him the ranking nuisance of broadcasting. The Anti-Defamation League accused him of pandering to bigots. None of it slowed him.

The show ran on confrontation. Pyne sat behind a plain desk, a cigarette always in hand, and opened with a monologue on whatever held his attention, the day’s news or a song he had heard. His politics ran conservative. He backed the Vietnam War and labor unions and presented himself as a champion of the ordinary man. He introduced his guests as controversial and meant it. Malcolm X (1925-1965), George Lincoln Rockwell (1918-1967), Anton LaVey (1930-1997), James Meredith (b. 1933), the Black student who integrated the University of Mississippi, the activist Jerry Rubin (1938-1994), Maulana Karenga (b. 1941), and the future congressman Robert Dornan (b. 1933) all sat across from him. So did members of the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, hippies, feminists, Scientologists, swingers, and at least one snake charmer. He ran an audience segment he called the Beef Box, where anyone present might step up and state a grievance, and he turned on the complainers as fast as on the guests.

Time magazine reported July 28, 1966:

Insult, like any other minor art, attracts its not-so-artful practitioners. Currently the bluntest instrument of them all is a Los Angeles broadcaster named Joe Pyne, who has become simultaneously the industry’s hottest property and, as New York Times Critic Jack Gould recently said, its “ranking nuisance.” On his interview shows, Pyne often addresses callers and guests as “stupid,” “jerk” or “meathead.” An epileptic was once asked: “Just why do you think people should feel sorry for you?” Pyne’s standard lines run from “Go gargle with razor blades” to “Take your teeth out, put ’em in backwards and bite your throat.” Says Pyne of himself: “I’m not a nice guy, and I don’t want to be.”

Why should he—when being so nasty makes him so popular? His morning hot-line radio show ranks No. 1 in its time slot among the 90-odd stations in the Los Angeles area. His local weekly TV interview show is doing just as well. Another TV program, taped for syndication, is carried weekly in three cities across the country and 21 more will be added in September. His syndicated radio interviews play daily in 254 cities, with an average ten new stations signing up each week. In addition, Pyne is host of NBC’s daily Showdown, a typically mindless daytime quiz game. Blond, seldom-smiling Joseph Pyne, 41, is on the air altogether 27 hours a week, earns about $200,000 a year.

Masochism Syndrome. Pennsylvania-born Pyne got his first job at the age of eleven working on an ice truck in Atlantic City, later put in time on seven radio stations in four states and Canada. A World War II marine with three battle stars and a wooden leg, Pyne fancies himself a foreign-affairs expert. His Asia policy, for instance, is to bomb Red China. When California Democratic Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan expressed a less hawkish view, Pyne, who had phoned him for an opinion in the first place, sneered: “What qualifies you to comment on military strategy?”

A better question is why anyone bothers to confront Pyne. “It’s a masochism syndrome,” opines Pyne. “They look to me for approbation, as a father image, but sometimes they feel the need to be punished—and they know that I’ll punish them.” Many of those who do volunteer are extremist polemicists or plain hucksters who will suffer any indignity for a soapbox. Characteristic guests on his syndicated TV show: Black Muslims, prophets of eccentric sects, American Nazis, champions of free love or free LSD, homosexuals, and Helen Gurley Brown.

Punching the Producer. Members of the studio audience, who themselves tend to resemble a road company of Marat/Sade, are invited into the “Beef Box” to vent further ill logic, ill manners, neologisms and non sequiturs. Guests are frequently told to “get lost” or they steam off the set voluntarily; one threw a phone at Joe (it missed), punched the producer in the mouth. During last year’s Watts riot, Pyne displayed a gun on screen in front of a Negro guest and was himself bounced for a week. Pyne does not deny charges that he prefers heat over light. “The subject must be visceral,” he figures. “We want emotion, not mental involvement.”

His insults became a catalogue. He told troublesome callers to go gargle with razor blades. He told extremists to take a walk. He closed each program with “Straight ahead.” His credo he stated to Time: “We want emotion, not mental involvement.” In 1965, during the Watts riots, he argued on television with a Black militant and opened his coat to show a handgun in his belt. His guest did the same. The station suspended him for a week.

Two of the most repeated stories about Pyne might never have happened. In the first, the musician Frank Zappa (1940-1993) answered Pyne’s jab about his long hair, “I guess your long hair makes you a woman,” with “I guess your wooden leg makes you a table.” In the second, The Realist editor Paul Krassner (1932-2019) asked Pyne whether the wooden leg gave him trouble in bed. Both exchanges circulate as fact in print and online. Neither survives on tape. No one present has confirmed the Zappa duel, and most media historians treat it as legend, since no record places Zappa on the show at all. Krassner maintained his exchange occurred and was edited out. The stories endure because they fit the man, and because audiences liked the idea that the bully could be beaten at his own game.

Friends and family drew a line between the broadcaster and the man. His son Ed called the on-air anger a shtick, a built act for ratings, and recalled his father’s counsel to worry only when people stopped talking about him. Off the air, colleagues found him personable and generous. He married twice and had three children. In 1965, at forty, he married the Norwegian actress Britt Larsen, then twenty, in Las Vegas. On the wedding night, the story goes, Frank Sinatra (1915-1998) spotted him in a showroom audience and asked the great Joe Pyne to stand and take a bow.

Pyne smoked through his whole adult life and seldom appeared without a cigarette, on the air or off. In 1969 his breathing failed and doctors found lung cancer. He stopped the television show when the drive to the studio grew too hard, then ran the radio show from a makeshift studio at home until that too became impossible. He retired in November 1969 and died in Los Angeles on March 23, 1970, at forty-five.

Much of his television work vanished. More than a hundred episodes survived on heavy two-inch videotape in a private collection, and a small group of archivists and engineers has worked to rescue the reels before they rot. They do it because the line from Pyne runs straight through American broadcasting. Bob Grant filled in for him and inherited a time slot, then ruled confrontational talk radio in the 1970s and 1980s. Morton Downey Jr. (1932-2001) built a television persona on the same aggression in the 1980s. Rush Limbaugh (1951-2021) fused Pyne’s sensational manner with a focused political program, by the account of the historian Nicole Hemmer, and Michael Savage (b. 1942), Bill O’Reilly (b. 1949), Glenn Beck (b. 1964), Wally George (1931-2003), Alan Burke (1922-1992), and later Tucker Carlson (b. 1969) carried versions of the style forward. Pyne found the formula that now drives cable shouting matches, political talk radio, and the outrage trade of social media: conflict as the product, emotion over information, the host as combatant. Admirers saw a fearless truth-teller who refused to flatter. Critics saw the man who taught American broadcasting to yell. He held both reputations at once, and he earned them.

Guts

The set held one desk, one chair for the guest, a microphone, and a man in a jacket and tie with a cigarette burning between two fingers. Under the desk, where the camera never went, sat a wooden leg. The studio audience came off Hollywood Boulevard, pulled in from the sidewalk, and they booed on cue. The host leaned toward the guest, a young man with long hair and a cause, and waited for him to finish a sentence so he could take it apart. When the young man pushed too far the host said two words and pointed at the door. Take a walk. The crowd roared. Another guest filed into the chair, and the war started again, the way it started every night.

Joe Pyne sold this as honesty. He told reporters he was not a nice guy and had no wish to be one. He cut the world into two kinds of men. There were men with guts, who said what they meant and faced what came, and there were phonies, the soft men, the genteel hosts who smiled and asked after your health and lied with every courtesy. Guts was the whole of his creed. A man earned the right to exist by refusing to flinch and by making the other man flinch first.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) gives the frame to read him. In The Denial of Death and Escape from Evil he argues that man is the animal who knows he will die and cannot live with the knowledge. To carry it, every culture hands its members a hero system, a scheme of roles and rules that lets a man feel he counts on a scale longer than his own flesh. Heroism is the central term. A man earns the sense that he outlasts the grave by serving something the culture calls great and lasting. Self-esteem, in this reading, makes a cosmic claim: the feeling that one stands as an object of primary value in a universe of meaning. The body works against the project, because the body ties a man to the animals, to appetite and rot and the worm. And because each hero system competes with the rest for the title of the real and the great, a man defends his own by denying the next man’s. There Becker finds the root of human cruelty.

Becker borrows a phrase for the deepest wish of the hero, the causa sui project, the dream of fathering oneself. The bricklayer’s son from Chester with the stammer he drilled out at a drama school knew the dream in his body. He authored Killer Joe. He became his own father, a man with no give in him, made of nerve and nothing else.

His body argued against him the whole way. A Japanese bomb tore his left knee on a Pacific island when he was eighteen. Cancer took the lower leg when he was thirty, and after that he walked on wood. The cigarettes never left his hand. Here sat the most creaturely man in American broadcasting, marked by the flesh three times over, and he built a room where he performed invulnerability for an hour a night. The guest in the chair took the wounds now. The host dealt them. On the air no one could reach him, and the unreachability was the point of the air.

In 1965, during the Watts riots, he argued on television with a Black militant and opened his coat to show the audience a handgun on his belt. The guest opened his coat and showed one too. The station took him off for a week. Two men in a studio, each armed, each sure the other was the danger. The scene carries his creed in a single frame.

He knew what he sold. We want emotion, not mental involvement, he told Time. The line names a hero system in six words. The viewer at home did not think his way to significance. He felt his way there. He booed the Nazi and cheered the Marine and took a side in the war, and for an hour he soldiered in a cause larger than his living room. Pyne handed the small man a share in the heroic. The price of the share was thought.

Guts reads as a plain word. It changes meaning the moment it crosses from one hero system into the next. Carry it across a few of them and watch.

In a Trappist monastery the day starts in the dark with vigils, and the rule is silence. The monk owns a cowl, a cell, a bed, and the hours. His courage runs the other way from Pyne’s. He stays. He bends his will to the bell and the abbot and the long obedience, and the work of his life is the slow death of the self that wants to talk back. To this man Pyne’s noise reads as fear in a costume. A man who fills every silence with a shout cannot sit in front of the nothing, and builds a career to keep from hearing it. The monk hears, behind all the volume, a frightened man.

The matador dresses in the suit of lights and walks toward an animal bred to kill him. His courage lives in the wrist that does not shake and the feet that do not run. He faces the death animal and makes no sound. Grace under pressure, an American writer called it, and he meant the stillness. Pyne also staged death every evening and called it a show. He met it with screaming. The matador takes the same war and wins it by going quiet, and to him the screaming is the tell of a man who has not mastered the fear, only drowned it out.

A hospice nurse works in a dim room beside a morphine drip. Her courage asks her to come close with no armor, to hold the hand of a man who is leaving and to let his leaving touch her, and to weep and stay in the chair. Pyne wore armor for a living. He let nothing through. In her hero system the armor is the cowardice, and the man who never let anyone near him never carried guts. He carried a wall, and a wall is the opposite of the thing he sold.

Among the Pashtun the code is Pashtunwali, and at its center sits melmastia, the law of hospitality. The guest at your hearth is sacred. You feed him, you shelter him, you guard him with your life, and you do this for an enemy who comes under your roof. Courage here binds to honor, and when honor calls, to revenge. The code names one act past forgiving: to shame the guest you have taken in. Pyne built his trade on that act. He invited men into his house on the air and broke them for the crowd. To the tribesman the show is the work of a man with no honor, and what Pyne called guts reads as the empty room where honor should stand.

In the Soviet years a man typed the truth on thin paper with carbons, four copies at a sitting, and passed them hand to hand, and waited for the knock at the door. Courage meant telling the forbidden thing when the price was the camp, and the price ran past you to your wife and your children. Pyne told forbidden things on two hundred stations. His price ran the other way, to a paycheck larger than a ballplayer’s. The dissident measures courage by what the truth costs the man who tells it. By that scale Pyne’s truth cost him nothing, and a truth that pays is a different animal from a truth that ruins.

One word, six hero systems, six meanings that do not meet. The monk reads guts as the noise of fright. The matador reads it as fear undrowned. The nurse reads it as a wall. The tribesman reads it as honor gone missing. The dissident reads it as a counterfeit that turns a profit. Inside Pyne’s system the same word names the highest thing a man can own. There stands Becker’s claim in the flesh. No neutral scale weighs these courages against each other. Each lives inside the system that grows it, and a man who steps from one system to the next does not find the same value priced differently. He finds a different value wearing the same four letters.

The word the whole decade fought over was real. The young man in Pyne’s chair, the one with the long hair and the cause, called the straight world phony and his own crowd real. Pyne called the long-haired crowd phony and called himself the last real man on television. They shared a god and a vocabulary and could not hear that they prayed in different churches. Becker reads the scene without surprise. Each man guarded his own claim on significance by denying the other’s, and the studio became the altar where the two immortality projects met and bled for ratings. Pyne thought he stood outside the believers, the one realist in a room of frauds. He stood in the middle of the faith, its loudest communicant.

The flesh he spent a career denying kept its appointment. The cigarettes that finished the tough-guy costume finished the lungs. He died at forty-five, the age when most hosts find their feet. More than a hundred tapes of the show went into a barn and lay there rotting on the reel, the immortality project breaking down in the dark, until a few archivists came with their machines to pull back what guts had made. He built a hero system out of nerve and a contempt for the soft, and it held an audience of millions, and it could not hold the one thing every hero system stands up to deny. The leg was wood. The rest was meat. He knew it every night, and every night he picked up the microphone and said the action started right here, and dared the dark to come and prove him small.

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Gloves Off by Lowell Cohn

Cohn is the best sportswriter of the San Francisco Bay Area in the last 50 years.
He published a memoir in 2020 called Gloves Off. It’s great.
Lowell writes:

* I wrote why white guys and black guys had trouble performing smooth handshakes. I had never learned the maneuvers African Americans used with each other, and when I shook
hands with a black player our hands collided. We were speaking two different languages—or shaking hands in different grammars.

* Walsh never liked people being angry at him. Had a horror of direct confrontation. Held Northwestern against me.
When my book came out, Walsh went on national television and, with a grief-stricken face, said, “This book that’s been written I had nothing to do with.” An interesting statement considering we had signed a contract giving him a healthy part of my advance from HarperCollins. Sure seemed like he had something to do with the book. He had said he would donate his share of the advance to Stanford athletics. I believe he did, although I never checked. If he wanted nothing to do with the advance, I sure could have used the money. I reminded him he had signed a contract. I told him not to deny it again. He said he understood. I could not give up my anger. He made me look bad on television and he bad-mouthed me to his coaches. We did not speak for years after that. I didn’t want to.

* Walsh and I had been close before the book appeared. He was an endearing man with a warm, lovely smile. He was brilliant and funny, had mastered irony, had great comic timing.
And he was capable of acts of kindness.

* Walsh always could relate to an underdog. His father had been abusive to him, and Walsh felt an endless need for encouragement and psychological hand-holding.

* Walsh was a confessional man, needed to get things off his chest, an endless list of things.

* Walsh defined friendship a certain way. A friend was someone who listened to him. He was not interested in listening to you or me.

* He was always looking to feel better. He started every day of his life with a deficit. I never understood why.

* Walsh always would bring up Raiders defensive coordinator Rob Ryan, whom he called a fat fuck. Ryan’s gut preceded him by a half foot and hung over his belt like a water bag. His gray hair was long and uncombed and, all in all, he looked like he had crawled out of the hamper. Walsh had disdain for fat people. He was trim, worked hard to look good, and he insisted his coaches keep fit, cut an athletic image. Walsh constantly phoned Davis about Ryan and said, “You’ve got to fire that fat motherfucker.”

* BARRY BONDS WAS THE SADDEST ATHLETE I EVER COVERED.

* WHEN MARK JACKSON COACHED the Golden State Warriors for three seasons starting in 2011, he presented himself as a holy man. In news conferences, he lectured the media about God and once even said his team was touched by the hand of the Creator.
Not that I cared about Jackson’s religious beliefs or if the Warriors were touched by Jehovah. I was there to cover hoops, not Jackson’s theology. I would attend Jackson news conferences and wonder what was so special about the Warriors in a metaphysical sense. Why weren’t the Celtics or the Knicks or the Cavaliers touched by God? Or the Lakers. I’ve always worried that these God spielers suffer from the sin of pride. But I could have lived with Jackson’s spiel and his pride. It was his hypocrisy that was the living end.
Allow me to be more specific. The living end with Mark Jackson was his penis, his schlong, his dick, his dingus, his ding-dong, joystick, peter, chub bie, boner, hard-on, Mr. Winky, pickle, one-eyed monster, pee-pee, putz, lizard, wanker, and, of course, his schvantz.
Jackson may be a very holy man. He preached at True Love Worship Center International in Van Nuys, California, along with his wife Desiree. But his trouser snake, python, cobra, not to mention his Chairman Mao, once got him in trouble, a fate visited on many unsuspecting men.

* My professors at Stanford who thought I was a middle-of-the-road literary scholar—I was—phoned me for all sorts of favors. Would I guest teach a class in Jane Austen? Like she played second base for the Oakland A’s. Would I meet job-seeking undergraduates and preach the benefits of majoring in English? You bet, I would. You study English, you learn to write and think. Would I have lunch with the full professors in English at the faculty club—it would make them so happy? Sign me up.

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NYT: The Secret Reason Bosses Want Everyone Back in the Office, Every Day of the Week

Three psychologists write in The New York Times:

As a general rule, though, it turns out that ordering people back to the office full time is a power and status move. It’s a signature strategy of leaders who exhibit narcissistic qualities. They see any kind of remote work as a threat to their authority and admiration. They want to be worshiped at the office altar…
When people aren’t in the office, it’s harder to command and control. Leaders can’t intimidate by hovering over cubicle desks and slamming doors. They can’t establish their dominance by summoning people to a conference room and pounding their fists on the table. They can’t even make direct eye contact to stare people down.
Remote work also prevents leaders from basking in the glow of employee reverence. Instead of standing out in the corner office, leaders are lost in a sea of equal squares on a screen. Instead of rapt attention, they’re met online with boredom, fatigue and interruptions from partners, children and pets. Instead of being showered with immediate gratification, they get glitchy facial expressions and delayed replies. Sycophantic reassurances from employees just don’t have the same effect if they’re on Slack.

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Dennis Prager Prefers Clarity to Agreement

Dennis Prager (b. August 2, 1948) likes to say he prefers clarity to agreement. The line serves as a creed and as a confession. In David Pinsof’s frame, clarity is the act of sorting a smooth, continuous world into two bins. Prager sells the sorting and calls it truth.

He grew up Orthodox in Brooklyn and studied at the Yeshiva of Flatbush. He took degrees at Brooklyn College and at Columbia, where he read Russian and Middle Eastern studies. In 1969 he carried messages to Jews behind the Iron Curtain on behalf of the Soviet Jewry movement, work that involved real risk and earned him a public profile young. He built a radio career out of Los Angeles, hosted a daily show for decades, and in 2009 co-founded the online video outfit PragerU with the writer Allen Estrin. His books include Happiness Is a Serious Problem, Still the Best Hope, and the multivolume Torah commentary The Rational Bible. With Joseph Telushkin (b. 1948) he wrote The Nine Questions People Ask About Judaism and Why the Jews?

Pinsof’s claim is that groups coordinate on categorical variables, not continuous ones, because a continuous variable dissolves the group the way acid dissolves a hand. How tall counts as tall? How conservative counts as conservative? Uncertainty is group poison. The antidote is a sharp cut, declared by a leader, agreed on by everyone, and known by everyone to be agreed on. Once the cut exists, the group can hand out hats and fight songs.

Prager’s catalog is categorical from end to end. Good and evil. Left and right. Judeo-Christian values and the forces that hate them. Clarity and confusion. The American Trinity, his name for the three mottoes on the coinage, Liberty, In God We Trust, and E Pluribus Unum, fixes the cut and dares the listener to stand on one side of it. The product is the line. He draws it every hour, on every topic, and the drawing is the service his audience pays for.

PragerU completes the picture. The five-minute video is a catechism, not an inquiry. It states a position, arms the viewer with three reasons, and sends him back into the world able to recite. A crowd argues. A group recites. PragerU bears the name of a university and runs as the opposite of one. A university, when it works, is a quarrelsome crowd of specialists who compete to be right and let reality referee. PragerU gathers no quarrel. It distributes a finished creed in a form short enough to memorize and confident enough to repeat. The name is the tell. He calls it a university because the warm glow of learning sells, and he builds a group because a group is what holds.

Happiness is a moral obligation, Prager says. The line does heavier work than it appears to. It converts a private state into a public duty, and a duty can be performed in front of others. The listener who adopts the creed, repeats the phrase, and reports his improved temperament signals membership. Pinsof’s point about virtue signaling holds here with the polarity flipped. The progressive activist signals by walking a thousand miles for a cause. The Prager listener signals by mastering his moods, thanking God, and reciting gratitude. Both advertise devotion through display. The content differs. The engine is the same.

The strongest part of the frame concerns how Prager reads his opponents. He treats the left as a single religion with a single set of sins, a faith that hates God, the family, and the nation in roughly equal measure. Pinsof’s misunderstanding myth reads this not as an error a smart man keeps making but as a coalition marker he keeps maintaining. The caricature is the wall. To grant the other side a fair, internal reading, to admit that a given progressive holds his view for reasons that hang together, weakens the wall, and the wall is the thing the group needs most. Prager has the intelligence to steelman the left. The frame predicts he will decline, because steelmanning is individual behavior and his trade is group behavior.

This also explains what he cannot say. Prager is a smart man. The frame grants that and then sets it aside, because the constraint is not in his head. It sits in the coordination problem he has to solve every hour. He cannot tell his audience that immigration helps here and harms there, that a policy carries a real upside and a real downside, that a question turns on a trade-off with no clean winner. A silver-tongued host who shouts the upside and buries the downside outcompetes the host who weighs both. So Prager weighs nothing in public. He sorts. The refusal of grey is not a failure of his mind. It is the price of his coalition.

The frame also predicts the meanness, and finds it. Much of the daily product is a tour of the outgroup’s latest outrage, an inventory of what the universities, the media, and the Democratic Party did this week. The reward the listener gets is not new information about how the world works. The reward is the pleasure of standing inside a virtuous tribe and looking out at a wicked one. Zero-sum framing sells because the ape brain it sells to was built for zero-sum life.

The deflation reads sincerity as signaling and cannot tell the two apart. A man who carried real risk for strangers in the Soviet Union, who has held the same convictions across fifty years of cultural weather, looks identical in the model to a man performing those convictions for an audience. The frame flattens the difference because the frame is built to flatten it. His Torah commentary cuts the other way as well. There he works a text line by line, takes objections seriously, and lands on readings that resist the bumper sticker, which is closer to crowd behavior than to group behavior. The frame catches Prager the broadcaster and loses Prager the reader.

And the deflation turns on the man holding it. The Prager listener who feels the warm glow of clarity is doing what Pinsof says the voter does at the ballot box. So is the reader who feels the warm glow of seeing Prager exposed. The frame is itself a coalition product, with its own ingroup of wise individuals and its own outgroup of dumb tribes, and the satisfaction of running it on Prager is the same satisfaction it claims to debunk. That recursion does not break the analysis. It bounds it. The frame is sharpest on the operator and dullest on the believer, including the believer who happens to be holding the frame.

Prager prefers clarity to agreement because clarity builds the coalition and agreement does not require one. Two men who agree need no wall between them and the rest. Clarity puts up the wall, names the sides, and hands out the hats. He has spent a long career as a builder of walls, and he calls the trade truth, and a large number of people pay him for the warmth of standing on the right side of one.

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Pinsof on Democracy

David Pinsof writes June 22, 2026:

Throughout our evolutionary history, our ancestors faced a variety of threats to their survival and reproduction—feuds, raids, tyrants, power struggles—that no individual could overcome on their own. As a result, early humans evolved to do what the Autobots do in the Transformers movies. They evolved to click into a new shape, to transform from a set of isolated individuals into… a GROUP.

A group is a thing that binds itself together with orthodoxy and conformity. It’s a thing with rituals that demarcate insiders from outsiders. It’s a thing that manufactures narratives that justify sacrifices to insiders and hostility to outsiders. It punishes traitors, freeriders, dissidents, and other poisonous elements, while rewarding heroes, martyrs, and true believers. It produces feelings of meaning and inspiration in its members.

But then what causes us to click into the shape of a group? A context where we are weak as individuals but strong as a collective. Maybe it’s an unruly alpha male who’s dominating us. Maybe it’s a vengeful outgroup who’s plotting our demise. Maybe it’s an enormous beast that can only be felled by a torrent of arrows. It is this type of situation that, across evolutionary time, selected for all the cognitive machinery of tribalism. It is this type of situation, marked by the futility of individual toil and the power of collective synchrony, that activates something deep inside us: group mode.

So what is democracy? It is a key that perfectly fits the lock of group mode. It is a system that brandishes a fearsome weapon before our eyes—the coercive power of jails and cops and militaries—and tells us we cannot control it, and cannot defend ourselves from it, unless we band together into huge, lumbering groups. It is a system that pries power away from the hands of individuals and tosses it to mobs, cliques, unions, religions, interest groups, ethnic groups, and grotesque agglomerations of all the above called “political parties.” It is a system defined by the crushing hopelessness of individual toil and the awesome power of collective synchrony.

Once we recognize this, the political world comes into focus. We can see why dropping a ballot on top of millions gives our ape brains a rush of dopamine, and why we commemorate the ritual with a sticker that says “I voted” (instead of “I have accurate political beliefs”). Voting in unison is like chanting or dancing in unison: it sends a signal that we’re part of a unified force or hivemind—something larger than ourselves. We don’t vote to change the world: we vote to be part of a group.

Of course, not every member of the electorate is in group mode. Some citizens feel alienated by both parties and remain in individual mode. By and large, these are the people who don’t vote. They don’t feel any tribal allegiances—they don’t trust any politician—so they disengage from politics. In some ways, they see reality more clearly than the rest of us. The political scientist Diana Mutz has shown that the people who are best at “hearing the other side” and accurately understanding opposing viewpoints are the least likely to vote and engage in politics.

So why is it taboo to utter the words: “Voting is a waste of time” (aside from the fact that they are vile, untrue words that I wholeheartedly repudiate)? Because we’re afraid of what those words can do to us. We’re afraid that they will jolt us out of group mode and into individual mode. People who don’t vote, or who tempt us into nonvoting with the sinful logic of probability theory, are freeriders and traitors—poisonous elements that threaten us from within. People who do vote (you know, for our guys) are heroes and true believers—defenders of the common good.

Individuals, on the other hand, don’t get it. “What’s so heroic about adding a grain of sand to the Sahara desert?” “Why should I bother learning about public policy when I have essentially no chance of influencing it?” These are the questions that flow through the mind of the individual when cogitating in individual mode. Groups have a hard time answering these questions, so they make them taboo.

If there’s a lesson here, it’s that democracy is not designed to empower the individual. It marginalizes and discourages the individual. Democracy is designed to empower groups. It is a government of groups, by groups, for groups.

Posted in Democracy | Comments Off on Pinsof on Democracy

Catharine MacKinnon

Catharine A. MacKinnon (b. 1946) changed American feminist legal theory more than any scholar of her generation. She works as a lawyer, an academic, and an activist, and across nearly five decades she has reshaped how courts, legislatures, and international bodies understand sexual harassment, pornography, rape, prostitution, and sex discrimination. Her central claim holds that the legal system does not merely fail to protect women from inequality but often reflects and reproduces the social hierarchy that places men in positions of power and women in positions of subordination. Through scholarship and litigation, she helped move feminist concerns from the edges of legal debate to the center of constitutional law, employment law, and international human rights.

She was born Catharine Alice MacKinnon in Minneapolis, Minnesota, into a family of political and legal standing. Her father, George E. MacKinnon (1906-1995), served as a congressman and a lawyer and later sat as a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. She was the third generation of women in her family to attend Smith College, and she graduated magna cum laude in government in 1969. She earned a J.D. from Yale in 1977 and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University in 1987. While at Yale she created the first course that grew into the university’s women’s studies program. She opposed the Vietnam War, trained in martial arts, and took part in the early women’s liberation movement. These years hardened her conviction that legal institutions cannot be read apart from the social power relations that shape them.

MacKinnon’s first major work, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979), altered American employment law. Before her intervention, courts and employers treated sexual harassment as a private dispute, a regrettable feature of working life, or a question of individual misconduct. MacKinnon argued that it amounts to sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it reflects and enforces unequal power between men and women. She drew the distinction between quid pro quo harassment, where job benefits turn on sexual compliance, and hostile work environment harassment, where pervasive conduct undercuts a woman’s capacity to do her job. Both categories entered the working vocabulary of employment law and remain there.

The theory moved from the seminar into the courtroom through her role as co-counsel in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. In its first ruling on workplace sexual harassment, the Supreme Court held without dissent that sexual harassment can constitute sex discrimination under federal law. The decision wrote into doctrine many of the principles MacKinnon had set out years earlier. Few legal scholars have shaped the development of American law so directly.

During the 1980s she widened her analysis into a general theory of social power. She borrowed from Marxist method while she rejected the Marxist premise that class supplies the primary source of domination, and she argued that sex hierarchy serves as a basic organizing principle of society. As Karl Marx (1818-1883) examined the social organization of economic power, she set out to explain the social organization of male power. The project found its fullest form in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989), which many readers regard as her central scholarly book. There she argued that ideas such as neutrality, consent, privacy, and equality often conceal domination rather than remove it. The state presents itself as impartial, yet its standards frequently track male experience and male assumptions. In a formulation that drew wide attention, she argued that sexuality holds the place in gender hierarchy that labor holds in class hierarchy.

Her work on pornography produced some of the sharpest intellectual and legal conflicts of the late twentieth century. Alongside the radical feminist writer Andrea Dworkin (1946-2005), MacKinnon argued that pornography functions not as mere speech but as a practice that eroticizes inequality and contributes to the subordination of women. The two drafted civil-rights ordinances that would let women harmed by pornography seek legal remedies, and they framed the harm as a matter of equality rather than morality.

The resulting fight became a defining First Amendment controversy. After Indianapolis adopted a version of their ordinance in 1984, publishers and booksellers challenged the law. In American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, Judge Frank Easterbrook (b. 1948) held that the ordinance breached the First Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion, and the ruling raised a high constitutional barrier to her approach within the United States. Civil libertarians read the decision as a defense of free expression. MacKinnon and her supporters read it as a sign that conventional free-speech doctrine ignores structural inequality.

The framework she built found a more receptive audience abroad. In R. v. Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada folded aspects of her analysis into Canadian obscenity law, shifting the focus away from traditional moral standards and toward the harm pornography can inflict on the equality and safety of women. The contrast between the American and Canadian results showed that constitutional context, more than the strength of the argument, governed the reception of her project.

MacKinnon also became a leading feminist critic of prostitution. She argued that prostitution functions as a system shaped by economic vulnerability, coercion, and male dominance rather than as ordinary labor. She championed the Nordic or Swedish model, which seeks to reduce prostitution by criminalizing buyers and third parties while it decriminalizes those who sell sex and offers support services for leaving the trade. Through her work with the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, she helped frame international debate about prostitution, trafficking, and sexual exploitation.

Her writing on rape and sexual violence pressed against settled legal assumptions in the same way. MacKinnon argued that legal standards treat consent as a simple act of individual choice while they ignore the social conditions that shape what a woman can choose. On her account, disparities in power influence what looks voluntary and distort the legal grasp of coercion. The argument left a deep mark on later feminist scholarship, on university policy, and on legal reform around sexual violence.

From the 1990s her influence reached past domestic law into international human rights. She argued for treating wartime sexual violence as a crime against humanity and as an act of genocide, and she represented Bosnian survivors of genocidal sexual violence in Kadic v. Karadžić. In 2000 a jury awarded $745 million in damages, the first legal recognition of rape as an act of genocide. The case helped change how international law understands sexual violence in armed conflict and fed the legal developments that arose from the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

From 2008 to 2012 she served as the first Special Gender Adviser to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. In that post she worked to build sex-equality concerns into the practice of international criminal law and to establish the principle that sexual violence belongs at the center of atrocity rather than at its margin.

MacKinnon has taught at many of the leading law schools, among them Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, and the University of Michigan Law School, where she holds the Elizabeth A. Long Professorship of Law. Her books include Feminism Unmodified (1987), Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989), Only Words (1993), Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws (2005), Are Women Human? (2006), Sex Equality, Butterfly Politics (2017), and Women’s Lives in Men’s Courts (2022). In 2023 she published “A Feminist Defense of Transgender Sex Equality Rights,” which extends her equality framework to current debates over transgender rights.

Her work has drawn sustained criticism from civil libertarians, from sex-positive feminists, and from scholars who hold that her theory underrates individual agency, sexual autonomy, and the range of women’s experience. Critics charge that she reads sexuality through domination and victimization. Supporters answer that she exposed forms of coercion and inequality that liberal theory passed over. Few legal theorists have provoked such lasting controversy while they exerted such practical influence.

Her significance rests in the attempt to build a full theory of gendered power and then carry that theory into legal doctrine. Liberal feminists often sought wider access to existing institutions. MacKinnon asked whether those institutions embody male dominance in their design. Through scholarship, litigation, and activism she pressed courts, universities, legislatures, and international bodies to take up questions long treated as private. Read as a pioneer of women’s equality or as a critic of liberal individualism, she changed the vocabulary through which modern societies discuss sex, power, and law. Few legal scholars have altered both intellectual debate and legal practice on a comparable scale.

Alliance Theory

Alliance Theory holds that a political belief system grows not from abstract values but from the structure of a person’s alliances and rivalries. The values come later, as ad hoc justifications that mobilize support for allies and opposition to rivals. Read Catharine A. MacKinnon through this frame and her equality theory stops looking like a philosophy and starts looking like a patchwork narrative built to serve one set of groups against another. The thread that ties her positions together is not a moral principle. It is a map of who she stands with and whom she stands against.

Begin with how she chooses allies. The first criterion is similarity. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin shared beliefs, language, and markers, and they coordinated as radical feminists with little friction. Their partnership shows the easy case, two similar people who assort by shared loyalty toward women as a class and shared rivalry toward the pornography industry and the men who consume its products. The harder case, and the one that gives Alliance Theory its name, is the partnership MacKinnon formed with the religious right.

The anti-pornography ordinances drew radical feminists and social conservatives into the same coalition. These two camps agree on almost nothing about sex, family, or the place of women. They agree on a rival. Alliance Theory predicts exactly this through transitivity, the rule that the enemy of my enemy becomes my friend. Conservatives wanted to suppress pornography for reasons of religion and public morals. MacKinnon wanted to suppress it as a practice that subordinates women. The reasons clash. The target matches. So the alliance forms, and each side supplies what the other lacks. Conservatives in Indianapolis supplied the votes and the legislative muscle. MacKinnon and Dworkin supplied the equality argument that let a censorship measure present itself as a civil-rights remedy. That is interdependence, the third criterion, allies who reliably provide benefits to one another in a conflict.

A coalition of radical feminists and evangelicals appeals to incompatible principles at the same time. One partner argues from the dignity and equality of women. The other argues from chastity and the moral order. Alliance Theory expects this incoherence and treats it as the normal product of any wide alliance. The combination did not emerge from philosophical analysis. It emerged from a shared rival, the same way libertarianism and Christian fundamentalism came to share a party in the United States without sharing a worldview.

Now turn to how she supports her allies. Alliance Theory names three propagandistic biases that partisans apply to the groups they stand with. The first is the victim bias. Allies emphasize the perpetrator’s responsibility, deny mitigating circumstances, attribute the perpetrator’s motives to malevolence, and embellish the severity and duration of the harm. MacKinnon’s account of male power runs along each of these lines. Her treatment of consent denies the mitigating circumstance of apparent agreement and relocates responsibility onto the structure of male dominance. Her treatment of pornography reads the harm as severe, lasting, and woven through the whole of women’s lives. Her work on wartime rape in Kadic v. Karadžić presses the harm to its highest pitch, naming it genocide and winning a jury award of $745 million. Alliance Theory does not ask whether these accounts are true. It notes that they take the shape victim biases take, and that MacKinnon applies them on behalf of the group she stands with.

The second bias runs the other way. Toward rivals, partisans apply the perpetrator’s mirror image, holding them to full responsibility and reading their motives as domination rather than circumstance. MacKinnon’s portrait of men as a class, and of the pornography industry and the buyers of sex, carries this charge. The motive she assigns is the wish to subordinate. The third bias, the attributional one, sorts advantage and disadvantage by allegiance. Her framework attributes women’s disadvantages to external causes, to a legal order built on male experience, and treats male advantage as the internal product of a system men designed and maintain. The pattern fits a theorist arguing for her allies and against her rivals.

The frame also explains her fiercest fights, which fall inside her own broad coalition rather than across the partisan line. Sex-positive feminists and civil libertarians belong, in the rough American map, to the same side as MacKinnon. They split from her over pornography because the alliance structure shifted under the issue. The civil libertarians stood with free-speech interests and the publishers. The sex-positive feminists stood with sexual autonomy and the performers. MacKinnon stood against both. Feminists are not always allies, any more than feminists and ethnic minorities were always allies during the suffrage movement. Alliance Theory treats this kind of realignment as ordinary. A rival can sit within what looks like one’s own group, and a single issue can redraw the lines.

The contrast between Canada and the United States makes the frame’s central claim plain. The same argument failed in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, where Judge Frank Easterbrook (b. 1948) struck the Indianapolis ordinance as viewpoint discrimination, and then succeeded in R. v. Butler, where the Supreme Court of Canada folded her harm analysis into obscenity law. One argument, two verdicts. Alliance Theory accounts for the gap through the difference in alliance structures across nations. The American free-speech coalition is broad, well-armed, and ringed with constitutional doctrine, so the equality framing lost. The Canadian structure gave the equality framing more room, so it won. Nothing about MacKinnon’s argument made one outcome inevitable. The structures decided.

Her later turns extend the pattern. The Nordic model on prostitution binds feminists to prosecutors and to conservative governments, a fresh strange-bedfellows coalition aimed at buyers and traffickers. Her years as Special Gender Adviser to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court bind her to the apparatus of international criminal law. Each move adds allies, and each new ally reshapes which arguments she presses and against whom.

MacKinnon presents her work as the demand of a single value, the equality of women. Alliance Theory reads egalitarian rhetoric as a tactic that mobilizes support for particular allies rather than an impartial principle that cuts across groups. Her equality runs in one direction, toward women as a class and against men as a class. The frame predicts that such rhetoric will track allegiance, and hers does. The moral pitch serves a further use as well. By creating common knowledge that her side stands for justice and the other for domination, she draws third parties to her cause, the courts, the legislatures, the human-rights bodies, and emboldens her allies to press the rivals hard. Politics runs on conflict and loyalty while wearing the dress of morality, and her career shows the costume at its most accomplished.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

MacKinnon’s account of why women go along with their own subordination is a false-consciousness story, and false consciousness is the misunderstanding myth in older dress. Pornography shapes desire, she argues, so that women come to want what subordinates them, and the consent they give is manufactured rather than free. If women understood how power formed their wants, they would refuse. That is consciousness-raising as the cure, and consciousness-raising assumes that the trouble lies in what women fail to understand about themselves. She borrowed Marxist method from Karl Marx (1818-1883), and she borrowed this with it. So the myth she rejects about men returns about women. Men understand their interest too well. Women understand theirs too little. The intellectual stands ready to correct the second group.

The savior role follows from the structure. Someone has to raise the consciousness, name the harm the law cannot see, and turn the state’s power toward the cure. MacKinnon casts the feminist legal theorist in that part. She is the one who understands what consent hides and what neutrality protects, and her understanding becomes the lever that might fix a broken order. This is the move the frame treats with suspicion, the intellectual whose grasp of the problem doubles as the solution to it.

The stated mission is equality for women, an end to subordination. The frame asks what the work pursues apart from what it announces. Status, for one. The career climbs to the leading position in feminist legal theory, a named chair at Michigan, appointments at Harvard and Stanford and Chicago, and an office inside the International Criminal Court. Derogation of rivals, for another. Men as a class, the pornography industry, the buyers of sex, and the feminists and civil libertarians who break with her all take the role of the enemy. And control of the coercive apparatus of the state, which the frame names by name as one of the things we chase under moral cover. MacKinnon’s whole project reaches for that apparatus. The ordinances would arm women to sue. The Nordic model would jail buyers. The genocide prosecutions would put men in prison. The frame does not read this as a misunderstanding waiting to be cleared up. It reads it as a real bid for power inside a real conflict, carried out in the language of justice. The frame passes the same verdict on her rivals, who pursue their own interest in their own moral dress, so the reading levels rather than condemns.

The bracing part of the frame is its claim that the world does not want to be saved. Some things cannot be fixed, because the resistance to fixing them is interest rather than ignorance. MacKinnon’s decades of effort meet exactly this wall. American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut did not strike her ordinance because the court failed to grasp her argument. It struck the ordinance because a powerful free-speech coalition had real stakes in the outcome and the constitutional tools to defend them. Men have no incentive to surrender the advantages she catalogs. The legal order resists not from confusion but from the interests built into it. The conflict is real, so it endures, and no amount of consciousness-raising dissolves a conflict of interest. The frame would tell her that the order she calls broken is running the way the people who run it want.

MacKinnon is more cynical than most about men and power, and the equality vocabulary can be read as the attractive wrapping over a cold account of domination. Yet she earns a partial pass the frame rarely gives. She names conflict where her peers name misunderstanding. She says the fight over sex is a fight, not a failure to communicate. On that half of her thought she is closer to the frame than the consciousness-raisers and bridge-builders she left behind.

So MacKinnon turns out to be the case that tests the misunderstanding myth from both sides. She sees through it when she looks at her enemies and rebuilds it when she looks at her friends, and she reserves for the intellectual the power to set things right. The frame leaves her with two questions. What if the resistance to her project is not misunderstanding but interest, the men and the courts and the industry all understanding their stakes too well to be talked out of them? And what if the consent she calls false is not a thing women fail to understand, but a settlement they reach inside a conflict they did not choose, and will not be raised out of by a better theory? If the answers run the way the frame expects, then the trouble with her life’s work is not that the world misunderstood her. It is that the world understood, and had its own reasons.

Hero System

She writes one word on the board and the room changes.

A law-school lecture hall, late afternoon, the radiators ticking. Catharine A. MacKinnon (b. 1946) caps the marker and steps back so the class can read it. CONSENT. A student near the front, a woman in her twenties with a legal-aid tote bag on the desk, raises a hand and tells the case of a dancer she met over the summer, a woman who said she chose the work, liked the money, and wanted no one’s rescue.

“She told me it was her decision,” the student says. “Who are we to say it wasn’t?”

MacKinnon does not rush. “The decision is real,” she says. “The conditions that produced the decision are not free. Both things are true. You are looking at the choice. I am asking what had to be arranged before the choice could be made.”

The room goes quiet, and the quiet is the interesting part, because the two women are not arguing about a fact in the world. They are defending two ways of not dying.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) gave us the apparatus for hearing that quiet. In The Denial of Death and Escape from Evil he argued that the human animal alone knows it will die, and that this knowledge would paralyze us if culture did not hand each of us a hero system, a scheme of meaning in which a life can count for something that outlasts the body. We earn cosmic significance by playing our part in the scheme. We deny death by becoming, in our own eyes and our neighbors’ eyes, of permanent value. The hero system tells us what counts as a heroic life, what counts as a wasted one, and what counts as evil, evil being whatever threatens the scheme. A sacred word is a load-bearing beam in such a structure. It cannot mean the same thing for two people whose structures are built to different plans, because the word is doing different work in each, holding up a different roof against the same weather.

MacKinnon’s hero system makes the heroic act an act of unmasking. The world presents her with words that promise freedom, consent and neutrality and privacy and choice, and her vocation is to see through them to the arrangement of power underneath. In Toward a Feminist Theory of the State the unmasking becomes a whole cosmology. The official story, that men and women meet as equals before a neutral law and that a woman’s yes is the end of the inquiry, is on her account the great concealment, and to pierce it is to do the one thing that gives a life lasting weight. This is why the dancer’s testimony cannot settle the question for her. Inside MacKinnon’s scheme, taking the yes at face value is not respect. It is collaboration with the thing she exists to expose.

Read her theory of male dominance through Becker and it deepens past sociology into something closer to a creation myth. Becker held that sex is the sharpest reminder of creatureliness, the moment the symbolic self that dreams of eternity is dragged back into the animal body that sweats and ages and dies. Men, in his telling, flee that reminder by trying to become the master of the flesh rather than its victim, to be self-caused, godlike, the author of themselves. Set MacKinnon’s account beside that and her dominating man stops looking only like an oppressor and starts looking like a frightened creature staging his own immortality on a woman’s body. He makes her the mortal one, the body, the thing used, so that he can feel like the one who transcends. MacKinnon names this arrangement evil and builds her heroism on refusing it. What Becker lets us add is that her enemy is running a hero system of his own, a bad one, a death-denial bought at another person’s expense, and that her fury at it has the heat that only a rival cosmology can provoke.

Her own bid against death is visible in the record. She does not reach for the usual immortalities. The work reaches instead for the law and the language, for the permanent alteration of the words a society uses to think about sex and power. She wants the categories she built, the hostile environment, the harm of pornography, sexual violence as an act of genocide, to outlast her and to shape arguments in courtrooms she will never enter. To change the vocabulary forever is a symbolic immortality of the highest order, the inscription of the self into the permanent speech of the species. A woman who fears that male power has written itself into the deep grammar of the law answers by writing herself into that same grammar, in her own hand, to stay.

Now bring in the others, because Becker insists there is never only one scheme. The sacred word travels, and at each stop it is asked to hold up a different roof.

A performer on a fetus-lit soundstage, thirty-four, reads the call sheet and the rider and marks her limits in the margin before she signs. The safe word is hers and the crew knows it. To her, consent is not the veil over her degradation. It is the proof that she is the author of the scene and not its object, the line that separates her craft from the assault she would name as assault the instant it crossed her. “I wrote the rules of this room,” she says, initialing the page. Inside her hero system the heroic life is the self-possessed one, and MacKinnon’s reading of her does the very erasure MacKinnon means to fight, telling her that the one thing she is sure she owns, her yes, belongs to someone else.

A Cistercian in the choir stall before dawn has given his consent away on purpose, to a vow of chastity, and counts the surrender as the road to the only life that does not end. For him the body is the thing to be transcended by obedience, not mastered by use. He and MacKinnon both distrust the eroticized body and both refuse the performer’s gospel of self-ownership, yet they refuse it toward opposite eternities, hers in the permanent law, his in God. “I consented once,” he says, “so that I would not have to keep choosing.” The word that grounds the performer’s whole world is, in his, a thing you spend a single time and are free of.

A vascular surgeon scrubs in and checks the form a last time, the signature, the marked skin, the procedure named in block letters. Consent to him is the clinical boundary that lets a man cut into a stranger’s living body and call it healing rather than wounding. His hero system is the literal war on death, mortality held off by the hour with sutures and clamps, and the word he shares with MacKinnon means, in his theater, almost the reverse of what it means in hers. For her it conceals harm. For him it licenses the knife and makes the knife clean.

A platoon sergeant tightens a rucksack strap and does not think about consent at all, because the word that holds up his scheme is the oath, the willingness to spend the body for the men beside him and be remembered by them after. Sacrifice is his immortality, the name read at a future formation. The whole civilian apparatus of choice and harm strikes him as a soft country’s luxury, and MacKinnon’s cosmos, where the central injury is the unfree yes, reads to him as a place that has never asked anyone to die for anything. “You want to talk about who consented,” he says. “Nobody consents to this. You do it because it’s yours to do.”

A farmer’s daughter in a village where the grandmothers arrange the matches takes the husband chosen for her and enters, as she understands it, not a subordination but an order, a place in a line that runs backward and forward past her own short life. Her dignity is the dignity of the link in the chain, and her children are her answer to the grave. Tell her that her marriage is the polished face of male power and she hears an insult, a stranger from a rich country reaching in to call her highest meaning a cage. “You think I was taken,” she says. “I was given a place. You have no place. That is why you have to invent one out of words.”

Five rooms, one word, five roofs it is asked to bear, and no two the same. This is what Becker’s frame shows that an argument about definitions hides. The performer, the monk, the surgeon, the sergeant, the daughter, and MacKinnon are not failing to communicate. Each is defending the beam that keeps a particular ceiling off the floor. MacKinnon’s certainty that her sense of the word is the true one and the rest false is not a flaw in her reasoning. It is the necessary intolerance of any hero system, which cannot treat a rival meaning as merely other, because a rival meaning is a rival way of being significant, and significance is the coin we are all fighting death to keep.

Becker held that a hero system needs a carrier for its evil, a scapegoat onto which the terror can be loaded and then expelled, so that the righteous may feel clean and lasting. MacKinnon’s scheme has its carrier, men as a class, the industry, the buyers, the figures onto whom the structure of domination is gathered and named and condemned. The performer has her prudes, the monk his world, the sergeant his soft civilians, the daughter her meddling strangers. Each purges a devil to feel immortal. To see this in MacKinnon is not to refute her, any more than seeing it in the sergeant refutes the worth of his sacrifice. It is to notice that her crusade draws part of its force from the oldest source there is, the need to place death outside the self and drive it off.

So the lecture hall does not end in agreement, and Becker tells us why it cannot. The student and the professor, and the five strangers who will never share a room, are not divided by a fact that better evidence could settle. They are divided by what they are each doing with the brief time a body is given, and by the different eternities they have staked on a single word. MacKinnon spends her life trying to make her meaning of that word the law’s meaning, permanent and shared, and there is something both heroic and unbearably human in the size of the wager. She is not only fighting male power. She is fighting, with the only weapon a thinker has, the same thing the monk fights from his stall and the surgeon fights with his blade and the daughter fights by bearing her children. She is fighting the fact that she will die, and answering it the way her hero system allows, by carving the truth as she sees it into language hard enough to outlast her.

Posted in Abuse, Feminism, Law, Pornography, Sex | Comments Off on Catharine MacKinnon

Who Rules: The Political Thought of Angelo Codevilla

Angelo Codevilla (1943–2021) joined classical political philosophy to the practical work of intelligence, diplomacy, and statecraft. He served in government, taught in universities, and wrote for a popular audience, and across those settings he built a sustained critique of the national security bureaucracy, the administrative state, and what he came to call the American ruling class. He moved between Machiavelli, espionage, nuclear strategy, and constitutional government with a freedom few American thinkers of his era could match.

He was born Angelo Maria Codevilla on May 25, 1943, in Voghera, a town in northern Italy near Milan. His father ran a business. The family emigrated to the United States in 1955, when Angelo was twelve, and he became an American citizen in 1962. Growing up between two political orders shaped his thought. He set the American tradition of constitutional self-government against the bureaucratic and technocratic habits he saw in modern European states. He treated the American constitutional order as a rare achievement rather than a stage in some inevitable march of history, and he held that such an order survives only through constant defense.

Codevilla took a bachelor’s degree from Rutgers University in 1965, where he studied natural sciences, languages, and politics. He earned a master’s degree from the University of Notre Dame and a doctorate from Claremont Graduate School in 1973. At Claremont he encountered the study of the American Founding and the tradition of political philosophy tied to Leo Strauss (1899–1973) and Harry V. Jaffa (1918–2015). He drew on these teachers without becoming a pure textualist. He matched close reading of old books to direct experience in intelligence and foreign affairs, and the combination gave his work a concrete character.

He served in the U.S. Navy Reserve from 1969 to 1971 and reached the rank of lieutenant junior grade, receiving the Joint Service Commendation Medal. He then entered the U.S. Foreign Service before moving to Capitol Hill. The decisive years of his government career ran from 1977 to 1985, when he worked as a staff member on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under Senator Malcolm Wallop (1933–2011). During the same period he taught political philosophy at Georgetown University. In 1980 he served on President-elect Ronald Reagan’s (1911–2004) transition teams for the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. These years taught him how intelligence agencies, diplomatic offices, and bureaucracies work from the inside. They also persuaded him that government organizations drift toward serving their own institutional interests rather than the public purposes that created them.

Much of his early standing rested on intelligence studies. His book Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century (1992) argued that intelligence can never stand in for statesmanship. Information, however abundant, stays useless without political judgment. He rejected both the romance of espionage and the technocratic faith that more data yields better decisions. The hard task, he held, lies not in gathering information but in seeing what matters and folding it into a coherent political strategy.

His national security work reached beyond intelligence. In the late Cold War he became a leading intellectual defender of strategic missile defense. In The Arms Control Delusion (1987), written with Wallop, he challenged the premises of conventional arms control. He argued that mutual assured destruction accepted civilian vulnerability as a permanent feature of world politics. Missile defense, and the Strategic Defense Initiative in particular, he judged morally and strategically better, since it sought to protect people rather than threaten them with retaliation. A self-governing republic, on his account, owes its citizens defense rather than a balance of terror.

His broader foreign-policy scholarship turned on the link between political institutions and national character. In War: Ends and Means (1989), written with Paul Seabury (1923–1990), and in The Character of Nations (1997), he argued that prosperity, military strength, civic trust, and political stability rest on the character of a nation’s ruling class and its governing institutions. He resisted explanations of international affairs built on economics or military statistics alone. Political culture, constitutional form, and the conduct of elites counted for more.

His engagement with classical thought reached a high point in his 1997 translation of and commentary on The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527). The project showed his method. He argued that many modern readings shrink Machiavelli to a cynical technician of power and miss his wider grasp of ambition, leadership, conflict, and the survival of regimes. Machiavelli, for Codevilla, exposed permanent features of political life rather than offering tips to Renaissance princes. The translation carried his larger conviction that elite education often hides the realities of statecraft rather than revealing them.

In 1985 he returned to academic life as a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford. From 1995 until his retirement in 2008 he taught international relations at Boston University, where he later held the title of professor emeritus, and he served as a senior fellow of the Claremont Institute. Students remarked on his ease in tying old texts to present controversies. His seminars moved between Thucydides, intelligence reform, constitutional government, diplomacy, and military strategy, since he saw them as aspects of the same questions about power and political order.

He reached his largest audience through political commentary. His essay “America’s Ruling Class and the Perils of Revolution,” published in The American Spectator in 2010, became a much-discussed conservative essay of the early twenty-first century and the longest article in that magazine’s history. He expanded it into the book The Ruling Class: How They Corrupted America and What We Can Do About It. There he argued that American society had split between a self-conscious ruling class and a broader country class.

The ruling class, in his account, ran past elected officials to take in senior bureaucrats, media leaders, corporate executives, academics, judges, and policy professionals who shared assumptions about governance and expertise. The country class held citizens whose lives stayed rooted in local communities, practical work, family duty, and older forms of self-government. The central conflict in modern America, he argued, turned more on who governs than on which policies pass. The widening estrangement between governing elites and ordinary citizens, he warned, threatened the legitimacy of constitutional institutions.

This argument ran ahead of much that later attached to populist politics. Years before the rise of Donald Trump (b. 1946), Codevilla held that large parts of the public had lost faith in institutions they saw as contemptuous of their values and interests. His critique helped form a generation of conservative and post-liberal writers concerned with administrative power, the making of elites, and the decline of democratic accountability.

Where many conservatives pressed taxes, regulation, or judicial philosophy, Codevilla named the administrative state as the defining political problem of the age. Bureaucracies, he argued, reach for greater autonomy and influence as a matter of course. Over time they gather authority that slips past democratic control. The process turns constitutional government into managerial government and moves power from citizens and their elected representatives toward permanent officials whose expertise stands in for political accountability.

His criticism carried into foreign policy, where he faulted the assumptions of a bipartisan national-security establishment. Many interventions and nation-building projects, he held, served the preferences of governing elites rather than clear American interests. In Advice to War Presidents (2009) and To Make and Keep Peace Among Ourselves and With All Nations (2014), he pressed a foreign policy grounded in constitutional principle, national interest, and prudent statecraft.

Away from politics and the university, Codevilla built a life that matched the values he defended on the page. In his later years he ran a vineyard in California. The work drew together themes long present in his writing: respect for productive labor, attachment to property and place, and distrust of bureaucratic abstraction. His Italian boyhood, classical schooling, government service, and farming gave his thought a grounding in tangible things. He admired people who worked with real materials and set their view against that of professional administrators. He married Anne Marie Blaesser, and the couple raised five children over a marriage of more than fifty years.

Codevilla died on September 20, 2021, in a car accident near Tracy, California, at the age of seventy-eight. His legacy rests on three achievements. He helped make intelligence studies a branch of statecraft rather than a technical trade. He built an influential conservative critique of the administrative state and of rule by a credentialed elite. And he revived an older understanding of politics centered on the character of regimes, the conduct of elites, and constitutional form.

Whether he wrote on espionage, missile defense, Machiavelli, foreign policy, or domestic division, Codevilla returned to one question: who rules, by what authority, and for whose benefit? He took that question for the permanent core of political life and the right place to begin in understanding any political order.

Alliance Theory

Angelo Codevilla spent his last decade mapping an alliance structure and calling it a moral order. The ruling class and the country class are the two super-alliances of American politics, and he drew the line between them with care. On one side he placed senior bureaucrats, federal judges, tenured academics, network anchors, foundation officers, and the executives of large firms. On the other he placed small-business owners, churchgoers, gun owners, men who work with their hands, and residents of towns the credentialed never visit. He held that the first coalition governs and the second submits, and that the conflict between them runs deeper than any quarrel over taxes or war. He was right about the structure. Alliance Theory shows what he did with it.

David Pinsof and his coauthors argue that political belief systems do not grow from abstract values. They grow from alliances. People choose allies by similarity, by shared friends and shared enemies, and by mutual benefit, and then they defend those allies with propaganda. The propaganda runs in predictable channels. Allies who do wrong get excused. Allies who suffer get their wounds enlarged. Allies who prosper are said to have earned it, and allies who fail are said to have been cheated. The same act draws the opposite judgment when a rival performs it. The contents of a belief system are the residue of these maneuvers, which is why belief systems come out as patchworks of incompatible principles rather than as philosophies. The difference between a liberal and a conservative, on this account, is a difference of friends, not of values.

Read this way, Codevilla’s two classes are the two super-alliances the paper describes. His ruling class is the liberal coalition of intellectual elites and the institutions they staff: the universities, the press, the agencies, the courts, the large foundations. His country class is the conservative coalition that formed across the same decades, the religious, the small-town, the men whose work and standing fell as manufacturing left and credentials rose. Pinsof traces this coalition to a string of historical accidents. The Civil Rights Act moved the white South toward the Republicans. The pro-life turn pulled Christian traditionalists in and pushed secular feminists out. Globalization and immigration produced a white underclass that blamed its decline on forces from outside. Codevilla took the coalition these accidents built and presented it as a class with a character, rooted in labor and faith and place. The bundle looks like a nature. It is a sediment.

Codevilla performs the unmasking that Alliance Theory recommends, and he performs it on one coalition only. He shows, with skill, that the ruling class holds the beliefs that serve its position. Expertise becomes a claim to rule. Diversity becomes a spoils system. Administrative discretion becomes a way to govern without consent. Every value the ruling class professes turns out, in his telling, to advance the ruling class. This is an alliance reading of his rivals, and it is largely sound. What he never turns on his own side is the same lens. The country class, in his pages, does not hold beliefs that serve it. It holds true ones. Its attachment to local control, to gun rights, to religion in public life, to the citizen-soldier and the family farm, appears as fidelity to the American thing itself, not as the propaganda of a coalition defending its interests. The asymmetry is the tell. A man who can see one super-alliance whole and cannot see the other stands inside the second.

The propagandistic biases run through his work in the forms the paper predicts. Take the victim bias first. Codevilla builds his case on grievance. The country class is dispossessed, sneered at, ruled by people who despise it, taxed and regulated and lectured by a class that produces nothing it can touch. This is competitive victimhood in the sense the paper gives the term. The groups the ruling class champions, in his account, are not the real victims; the real victim is the ordinary citizen stripped of self-government. The polling Pinsof cites shows the same pattern across the country class at large, which reports that discrimination against Christians is a grave problem, that men face more bias than women, that the offended are too easily offended except when the offended are its own. Codevilla gives this sentiment its most learned voice. He does not invent it. He dignifies it.

Take next the attributional bias. The ruling class, in Codevilla’s telling, owes its standing to external causes that have nothing to do with merit. It captured the accrediting bodies. It rigged the credentials. It rose by conformity and connection rather than by work. The country class owes its lower standing to no fault of its own, and its virtues to its own character: it works, it serves, it raises children, it keeps faith. This is the self-serving attribution the paper describes, swung toward his allies. Advantage on the rival side is theft. Disadvantage on his own side is injustice. Virtue on his own side is earned. The mirror image, in which the rural white underclass blames immigration and globalization for its decline, appears in the same polling, and Codevilla supplies the philosophical version.

The perpetrator bias completes the set. Codevilla holds the ruling class to a hard standard and grants his own coalition a soft one. The military’s errors he tends to forgive or recast as the costs of necessary strength. Business owners who flout regulation he reads as men resisting illegitimate authority rather than as men serving their interest. The same act, performed by an agency or a professor or a judge he counts as a rival, becomes usurpation. Pinsof’s marines and Iraqis make the point in miniature: the transgression is grave when a rival commits it and forgivable when an ally does. Codevilla keeps the conservative books.

His own category undoes him. The paper splits the modern upper class into intellectual elites and business elites, two factions of the educated and the rich that came to despise each other. Codevilla belongs to the first. He holds a doctorate, taught at universities, wrote for journals read by a few thousand people, translated Machiavelli, lived among books. He belongs to the credentialed class he indicts, and he writes for the coalition that recruits the credentialed class’s defectors. Alliance Theory has a name for this kind of figure, the bridge between a high-status group and a coalition not its own, the ally who lends a popular movement the prestige of learning. His learning does not place him above the alliance structure. It places him at a useful node within it.

What of his deepest claim, that the fight is about who rules and not about which policies pass? Here Codevilla and Pinsof nearly shake hands. Both say the surface quarrel over values hides a contest of loyalty and power. Codevilla refuses the comforting story that the two classes might agree if they only talked. He insists the conflict is real and the interests opposed. The paper says the same: politics is about conflict and loyalty, and the moral language is recruitment. The difference is that Codevilla, having seen that politics is a contest of coalitions, still dresses his own coalition in the robes of principle. He calls its cause constitutional self-government and the rule of the people. The frame answers that “the rule of the people” is the country class’s name for the rule of the country class, as “expertise” is the ruling class’s name for the rule of the ruling class. Each coalition calls its own ascendancy legitimate and its rival’s a usurpation. Codevilla wrote the conservative half of that exchange better than anyone of his time.

Codevilla saw that his enemies were a coalition and that their values served their power, and he could not see that the same held for his friends, because a man cannot see the coalition he stands in. He took one side of an alliance structure for the nation and the other for a faction. The whole achievement, the ruling-class thesis that shaped a generation of the right, reads in this light as elite propaganda of high quality, produced by a member of the intellectual elite on behalf of the coalition that needed him, and offered to third parties as the truth about who rules America. It is the truth about half of who rules America. The other half wrote its own.

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The Other Constitution: John Marini on Bureaucracy and the American Founding

John Marini (b. 1946) is an American political theorist whose study of the administrative state has become a reference point for contemporary conservative constitutional thought. He spent his career within the orbit of the Claremont School, and he built that career around a single question: how the growth of the modern federal bureaucracy changed the constitutional order designed by the American founders. His scholarship treats Congress, the presidency, public administration, constitutionalism, and the shifting structure of political authority in the United States. He holds the title of Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno, and he serves as a Senior Fellow and board member of the Claremont Institute.

Marini took his bachelor’s degree at San Jose State University and earned his Ph.D. in government at Claremont Graduate University. There he absorbed the Straussian tradition and the constitutional conservatism associated with Harry V. Jaffa (1918-2015). Before he joined the University of Nevada, Reno in 1988, he taught at Agnes Scott College, Ohio University, and the University of Dallas. He served as associate editor of Political Communication: An International Journal, and he moved through a range of public policy and governmental institutions that shaped his interest in how government works.

Critics and admirers often file Marini under the familiar conservative complaint about big government, but his argument reaches further than that. He contends that the administrative state is not an accumulation of agencies but a distinct political regime, one that runs on principles at odds with those written into the United States Constitution. The founders, on his reading, built a system around separated powers, legislative supremacy, political accountability, and popular self-government. Administrative governance brought in a rival system grounded in expertise, professional management, and bureaucratic discretion. The two cannot share the same constitutional space without one displacing the other.

His treatment of Congress sets him apart from many who share his politics. Where conservatives often blame activist judges or grasping presidents for the decline of constitutional government, Marini puts much of the weight on the legislature. In The Imperial Congress: Crisis in the Separation of Powers (1989), co-edited with Gordon S. Jones, and in The Politics of Budget Control: Congress, the Presidency, and the Growth of the Administrative State (1992), he argues that Congress surrendered its first constitutional task, the making of law. Members stopped writing detailed statutes and accepting responsibility for what those statutes produced. They passed broad measures and handed the hard decisions to administrative agencies.

This arrangement pays the members well in political terms. Bureaucrats take on the work of writing detailed regulations and absorb the blame for unpopular outcomes. Legislators free themselves for oversight, constituent service, and intervention on behalf of citizens tangled in federal programs. The trade strengthens incumbency and weakens legislative authority as the founders understood it. Marini reads the rise of administrative power, then, not as a story of executive ambition alone but as a result of the incentives that govern modern electoral politics. Congress gives away its authority because giving it away serves the people who hold office.

His historical account traces the roots of this change to the Progressive Era. Marini argues that the early Progressives, and Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) above all, set out to replace the founders’ understanding of politics with a system run by trained experts. The Progressives saw constitutional restraints and separated powers as drags on efficient government. They held that modern social problems called for scientific administration. In Marini’s telling, this amounted to a challenge to the constitutional order, not a tidying of governmental procedure.

He also insists that the administrative state outgrew its Progressive beginnings. By the middle of the twentieth century, and during the Great Society in particular, administrative institutions became carriers of interest-group liberalism. Agencies built relationships with advocacy organizations, professional associations, congressional committees, and policy specialists, and together these actors shaped public policy. Bureaucratic governance closed itself off from presidential direction and from democratic control alike. What emerged was not a neutral apparatus of expertise but a web of institutions pursuing political ends of their own.

These themes run through his major works, among them The Progressive Revolution in Politics and Political Science: Transforming the American Regime (2005), co-edited with Ken Masugi, and The Founders on Citizenship and Immigration (2007), co-authored with Edward J. Erler and Thomas G. West. His essays and lectures from several decades were later gathered in Unmasking the Administrative State: The Crisis of American Politics in the Twenty-First Century (2019), edited by Ken Masugi. Across these pages Marini holds to a steady claim: the rise of administrative governance as a rival constitutional order is the central political development of modern America.

His reach runs past the academy. During the Reagan administration he served as a special assistant to Clarence Thomas (b. 1948), then chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The post placed him among conservative thinkers who worried about the constitutional weight of bureaucratic power. Thomas later became the Supreme Court’s most stubborn critic of administrative deference. No one can reduce Marini’s influence on Thomas to a clean line of cause and effect, yet both men belong to a broader movement that questions the legitimacy of modern administrative governance.

His public service includes directing the Legislative Intern Program in the Nevada Legislature from 1989 to 1995 and serving since 1989 on the Nevada Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights. This work kept him close to the daily operation of governmental institutions and gave him a direct view of how constitutional principle meets administrative practice.

Within the conservative intellectual movement Marini holds a particular place as a figure who joins political theory to institutional analysis. He does not center the courts and constitutional interpretation, as many of his colleagues do. He studies the evolution of governmental structures and the incentives that drive political behavior. Long before the phrase “administrative state” entered ordinary political talk during the Tea Party movement years and the presidency of Donald Trump (b. 1946), Marini had named administrative governance as the central constitutional problem facing the country.

His later writing frames American politics as a conflict that cuts across party lines. The deepest division, he argues, runs not between Democrats and Republicans but between those who defend administrative governance and those who defend constitutional self-government. Quarrels over regulation, executive authority, judicial power, and bureaucratic discretion all return to a single question: who governs. Elected representatives answerable to the public, or a permanent managerial class set apart from elections. In a widely discussed 2016 essay, “Donald Trump and the American Crisis,” he read Trump’s appeal as a sign of public anger at institutions that no longer seemed to answer to ordinary citizens.

Recognition arrived in 2011 when the Claremont Institute awarded him the Henry Salvatori Prize in the American Founding. The prize marked decades of work on constitutional government, separated powers, and the growth of administrative authority. By then the ideas he had pressed for years were moving out of academic argument and into wider political debate.

Marini’s importance rests on his attempt to explain not the growth of government but the transformation of the American regime. He argues that the administrative state carries its own principles, its own institutions, and its own claim to legitimacy, and that scholars should treat it as a constitutional development. Accept his conclusions or reject them, his account of how bureaucracy, expertise, and administration remade American government after the Progressive Era remains a systematic and influential one. As arguments over executive power, regulatory authority, and democratic accountability go on, his work stays close to the constitutional questions beneath them.

The Great Delusion

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Marini treats self-government and popular accountability as principles the founders reasoned into being. Mearsheimer reads the same attachment as the sentiment under the principle. Men want their own to rule. They resent a distant class that governs them without sharing their loyalties. The managerial state offends that sentiment before it offends any clause. So Mearsheimer agrees with Marini about the worth of self-rule and parts from him on its source. The founders did not argue the wish for self-rule into existence. They built a frame around a feeling older than the frame.

Marini’s project is restorationist. He wants citizens to see the regime question, to recognize the administrative order for what it is, and to choose constitutional self-government. That hope runs on reason. It asks men to weigh two regimes and pick the better one. Mearsheimer puts reason last. Men do not choose a regime the way Marini’s argument asks them to. They feel their way to it through sentiment and through the values their society pressed on them young, while their critical faculties were still forming. The restoration Marini calls for cannot arrive by the route he offers.

The 2016 essay shows the gap. Marini read Trump’s (b. 1946) rise as a sign that citizens had noticed institutions that no longer answered to them. He read it as recognition. Mearsheimer’s anthropology reads it as sentiment. The voters who turned to Trump did not work through Marini’s account of delegation and the separation of powers. They felt a class above them that did not share their loyalties, and they moved against it the way the tribal animal moves. The movement that carried Marini’s phrase into power ran on the fuel Mearsheimer describes, not on the reasons Marini supplies. The two reach the same enemy by different paths, and Mearsheimer explains why the crowd’s path, not the theorist’s, put the enemy in reach.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology spares no one, and it does not spare the man who studies regimes. Marini took his training at Claremont Graduate University inside the Straussian tradition and under Jaffa. The value infusion came early and came from a small, tight group. His attachment to the founders is group attachment. His long defense of a position the mainstream discipline holds in low regard is the sacrifice for one’s own that the frame predicts. The Salvatori Prize, the institute, the line of students and co-editors: these mark a man embedded in a society and cooperating with its members. Marini studies the tribe and belongs to one.

So if Mearsheimer is right, Marini wins the argument he did not know he was making and loses the one he thought he was making. The administrative state does rest on a false picture of man, and the wish for self-government does run deeper than any clause. That is the win. But the founders become an inheritance rather than a conclusion, self-government becomes sentiment before it becomes principle, and the restoration cannot come by the reasoned recognition Marini asks for, because reason does not rule the men he asks. Marini the theorist leans on a rationalism his deepest ally denies him. He builds his case for the regime on the one faculty Mearsheimer ranks last. And he builds it as a loyal member of the small tribe that raised him to build it.

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Nancy MacLean and the History of Concentrated Power

Nancy MacLean (b. 1959) is an American historian of the twentieth-century United States whose scholarship treats the relationship among democracy, inequality, race, labor, and organized political power. She built her reputation on studies of White resistance to civil rights, the integration of the American workplace, and the intellectual roots of modern libertarianism. Through archival research, public engagement, and intervention in current political debate, she has worked to explain how institutions, ideas, and organized interests set the limits of democratic participation. She holds the title of William H. Chafe Distinguished Professor Emerita of History and Public Policy at Duke University, a status she took up in 2025.

MacLean studied at Brown University, where she finished a combined bachelor’s and master’s program in history and graduated magna cum laude in 1981. She earned a doctorate in history from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1989 under the feminist historian Linda Gordon (b. 1940). Her graduate years fell within a period of upheaval in the historical profession, when social history, labor history, women’s history, and African American history pressed against older narratives built around political elites. Gordon’s influence shaped her lasting concern with how institutions distribute power and how social movements challenge a settled hierarchy.

Her first book grew straight from her doctoral research. In Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan (1994), she examined the Klan of the 1920s through a close study of Athens, Georgia. She rejected the portrait of the Klan as a band of rural cranks and social outcasts. Many members, she argued, came from the lower middle class: small proprietors, clerks, and skilled tradesmen who felt pressed by modernization, corporate consolidation, labor militancy, immigration, and the widening opportunities open to Black Americans. The book reshaped scholarly understanding of the Second Klan by stressing its social roots and its appeal among respectable townsmen rather than fringe radicals. It won a string of honors, among them the James A. Rawley Prize from the Organization of American Historians and the Frank L. and Harriet C. Owsley Prize from the Southern Historical Association, along with prizes in labor and legal history. The themes it opened recur across her career: the link between social anxiety and political mobilization, the institutional roots of exclusion, and the part organized movements play in defending an existing order.

After her doctorate MacLean joined Northwestern University, where she taught from 1989 to 2010. Over more than two decades she became a leading scholar of twentieth-century American social and political history. She chaired the History Department and held the Peter B. Ritzma Professorship in the Humanities. Her years at Northwestern also drew her into labor and living-wage campaigns on campus, work that sharpened her interest in the meeting point of academic inquiry and public life. In 2010 she moved to Duke University as William H. Chafe Professor of History and Public Policy. At Duke she founded and directed the Center for the Study of Class, Labor, and Social Sustainability, a venture that carried forward her long commitment to tying historical scholarship to current questions of economic justice and democratic governance.

Her second major project turned to the transformation of the American workplace after the civil rights revolution. Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace (2006), published by Harvard University Press with the Russell Sage Foundation, examined the enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the deep changes it brought to employment across the country. The book traced how Black Americans, women, Latinos, and other long-excluded groups gained entry to occupations closed to them for generations. MacLean argued that workplace integration ranks among the underappreciated achievements of the civil rights era. She held at the same time that these gains drew heavy political backlash, and that opposition to affirmative action, equal-employment rules, and government action in labor markets fed the rise of modern conservatism. The book joined labor history, civil rights history, legal history, and political history in a single account of how American democracy changed. It drew the Philip Taft Labor History Book Award, the Allan Sharlin Award in social science history, and the Willard Hurst Prize in socio-legal history, all in 2007.

Across these works MacLean developed a method that blended social, political, and intellectual history. Rather than confine herself to elected officials and formal institutions, she examined networks of activists, donors, business leaders, academics, and political organizations. Her scholarship traces how ideas become policy and how organized groups try to shape the rules that govern economic and political life. This focus on institutions and concentrated power places her within a tradition of historians who study how inequality survives or gives way.

She also reached past the conventional monograph. In 2014 she co-edited Scalawag: A White Southerner’s Journey through Segregation to Human Rights Activism with Edward H. Peeples, a book that joined memoir, oral history, and historical analysis. The work fit her long interest in how a man raised inside a racial order comes to reject it and turn advocate.

Her most influential and most contested book is Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America (2017). The project began in research on Virginia’s campaign of Massive Resistance against school desegregation after Brown v. Board of Education. While studying the closure of public schools in Prince Edward County, MacLean took an interest in the economist James M. Buchanan (1919-2013), founder of public choice theory and a future Nobel laureate. After Buchanan’s death she gained access to his papers at George Mason University and found material she read as evidence of a long campaign.

In Democracy in Chains MacLean argued that Buchanan built an intellectual framework designed to limit the power of democratic majorities and to shield property rights from popular political demand. She traced the path of these ideas from segregation-era Virginia through later libertarian movements and the organizations tied to the businessman Charles Koch (b. 1935). On her account, a long-term political project took shape that sought to fence off economic decisions from majority rule through constitutional restriction, privatization, judicial protection, and rules that hold popular politics at a distance. One of her sharpest claims concerned the proximity between Buchanan’s early work and the efforts of Virginia elites to resist federally ordered integration; she read his constitutional political economy as offering tools that could narrow the reach of majoritarian politics, and she presented this link as an overlooked chapter in the intellectual history of modern conservatism.

The book reached a wide audience. It became a finalist for the National Book Award in Nonfiction, won the Los Angeles Times Book Prize and the Lillian Smith Book Award, took the Lannan Foundation Cultural Freedom Award, reached the New York Times bestseller list, and drew The Nation’s naming of it as Most Valuable Book of the year. Few historical monographs in recent decades have drawn comparable public attention.

The reaction ran hot. Economists, political scientists, libertarian scholars, and some historians mounted long critiques. Georg Vanberg, Michael Munger, David Schmidtz, and Phillip W. Magness argued that MacLean misread central parts of public choice theory, quoted archival material selectively, and overstated the continuity from mid-century segregationist politics through Buchanan’s thought to present-day libertarian organizations. They held that public choice grew from economic analysis of political incentives rather than from a defense of segregation. The political theorists Henry Farrell and Steven Teles, who share none of Buchanan’s politics, called the book a conspiracy theory dressed as intellectual history and judged the broad thrust of the criticism sound. MacLean and her defenders argued that the book named the anti-majoritarian strain in important currents of libertarian thought and drew connections among arguments, donor networks, and institutions. Supporters read the heat of the attack as a measure of the political stakes. The exchange became a visible scholarly controversy of the new century, turning on archival interpretation, intellectual history, ideology, and the duties of historians who write about live political movements.

After 2017 MacLean carried these themes into articles, essays, lectures, and public commentary. Her later work has examined the global reach of libertarian political economy, the tie between privatization and racial inequality, the roots of school-choice movements, and the influence of corporate-funded policy networks. She says that current fights over voting rights, judicial power, administrative governance, and public education carry roots that run back decades.

She has stayed active as a public intellectual. She co-founded Scholars for North Carolina’s Future, the successor to Scholars for a Progressive North Carolina, and has taken part in public arguments over voting rights, labor rights, public education, privatization, and democratic institutions. Like many historians shaped by the social history of the late twentieth century, she treats scholarship as a way to light up present struggles.

Her central concern stays consistent across more than three decades. Whether she writes about the Ku Klux Klan, workplace discrimination, segregationist resistance, or libertarian constitutional theory, she returns to one question: how organized groups hold influence against rising demands for equality and democratic participation. Admirers count her a leading historian of democracy, race, and inequality in modern America. Critics hold that her political commitments at times push her to overstate the coherence and the intent of the movements she studies. Even many critics grant that she has forced scholars and the public to face hard questions about the bond among wealth, power, institutions, and self-government. Few living historians have done more to set the history of political ideas in direct conversation with present debate.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

The public, in her account, has been fooled. Ordinary people back the policies that gut their own unions, schools, and votes because they cannot see the hand behind the curtain. They need the curtain pulled. This is the misunderstanding myth restored at the bottom of the hierarchy after she banished it from the top. The masses do not understand their interest. A historian will explain it to them. Pinsof has a line for this move. Capitalism, false consciousness: if only the workers knew how much they were exploited, they would unite. MacLean offers the same structure with better footnotes.

Her own coalition gets a third treatment. The right acts from actual motives, naked and documented. The public acts from confusion. But the people who oppose the right act from their stated motives, and she leaves those motives alone. They defend democracy. They protect the vulnerable. They follow the evidence where it leads. Pinsof’s first instruction reads the deeds and not the mission statement. MacLean reads the deeds of her enemies and the mission statement of her friends.

The frame asks what her friends might want if we read them as she reads Koch. The answer sits in her own subject. She writes about the fight to control the state. Pinsof says that fight is what partisan conflict has always been, a zero-sum struggle over the machine that puts people in prison at gunpoint. MacLean describes that struggle in detail. She names the donors, the think tanks, the long game. Then she narrates her own side as though it stood outside the struggle, wanting only fairness while the other side wants power. The symmetry she will not grant is the plain one. Both coalitions want the state. Both understand this. Her book is a weapon in the war it claims to expose.

Consider the role the story builds for her. If the right runs a stealth plot against democracy, then the scholar who finds the plot in the archive saves democracy by the act of finding it. The work and the heroism become the same gesture. This is the payoff Pinsof identifies in the misunderstanding myth, the reason intellectuals love it. It makes them the most important people in the room. MacLean reaches the payoff by a different road. She does not say the right misunderstands. She says the right deceives, and that the historian who exposes the deception performs a public rescue. The savior survives the move from misunderstanding to conspiracy. Only the costume changes.

The reception of the book settles the question in Pinsof’s favor rather than hers. Economists and political scientists charged that she misread Buchanan, quoted him out of context, and stitched a plot from loose thread. Historians on her side defended the reading. The lines held by coalition. Almost no one crossed. If the quarrel were a misunderstanding, better archival work might resolve it, and the sides might converge. They did not converge, because the quarrel is not about Buchanan’s sentences. It is about which coalition gets to narrate the origins of the present order. The split runs along coalition lines because the participants read their interests well. They are not failing to understand each other. They understand each other and fight.

The Great Delusion

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

MacLean’s books form a catalogue of tribe beating creed, and she narrates each victory as a scandal.

Look at her subjects. The Second Klan draws five million White Protestant men who feel their group losing ground. Massive Resistance closes the schools of Prince Edward County rather than seat Black children beside White ones after Brown v. Board of Education. The backlash she traces in the integrated workplace pits one group’s gain against another’s standing. The Buchanan project she pursues across the Koch archive defends a coalition that fears the unleashed majority. Each case shows a group choosing its own survival and rank over the universal claim of equal rights. MacLean reads each case as a pathology, a wound in the body of democracy, a thing to diagnose and cure. Mearsheimer reverses the polarity. The tribe protecting itself is the baseline of human conduct. The universal creed is the late and fragile overlay. If he is right, her whole shelf documents the rule and keeps calling it the exception.

MacLean thinks tribalism intrudes on a democratic order that would otherwise hold. Mearsheimer thinks the democratic order floats as a thin film on a tribal deep. She has written the same surprised story many times about an outcome that was never a surprise. Men defended their group. Men have always defended their group. The puzzle she keeps posing, why the arc bends back toward exclusion, dissolves once you grant that the arc was never bending the way she assumed.

Her faith in the majority runs into the same rock. She trusts the democratic many and blames the constraints that the right places on majority rule. Let the people govern free of the donor class, she argues, and they choose fairness. Her own first book unsettles the hope. The majority of White Athens joined the Klan. The demos she trusts is the demos that built the hood. Mearsheimer asks the question she steps around: why assume the unleashed majority bends toward her justice rather than toward its tribe? Strip away the checks and the people might choose the creed of equal rights, or they might choose their own. The record she assembled gives the gloomy answer more often than the bright one.

Her method takes a hit too. She presents her conclusions as the residue of evidence, the archive read close and followed where it leads. Mearsheimer ranks reason below socialization and innate sentiment in the forming of a moral code. A historian trained inside the social-history insurgency, raised in the academic class, settled in a progressive coalition, absorbs that coalition’s sense of right and wrong long before she weighs it. The value infusion comes first. By the frame’s logic her universalism is the badge of her tribe, the mark that shows which group she belongs to, worn by a member who takes the badge for a description of all mankind.

The crusade follows from the creed. Liberalism, once it holds power, turns intolerant of those who reject its universal rights and treats them as enemies of humanity rather than as a rival people. That logic sends liberal states abroad to remake other nations and ends in long wars. The same logic turns the liberal scholar into a crusader at home. MacLean’s opponents are no rival coalition with interests of their own. They are a stealth plot against democracy as such, architects of a design to undo the universal. A frame that grants the other side honor cannot survive in the crusading mind, because the universal admits no honorable dissent, only heresy. Her portrait of Buchanan as a cold engineer of oligarchy is the demonization Mearsheimer predicts the universalist will reach for.

So what then for MacLean, if Mearsheimer is right here? Her universalism becomes a dream rather than a map. Her enemies become ordinary men doing the ordinary work of their group rather than monsters outside the human run. Her hope that equal rights can defeat entrenched group loyalty runs against the order of the forces that move men, with reason last and the tribe first. She has spent a working life writing the refutation of her own faith and reading it as the proof.

Hero System

MacLean has called herself an archival rat. The name fits the posture, the patience, the nose for the one folder in a long run that turns the whole story over.
This is a scene of devotion. Ernest Becker (1924-1974) has a word for what she is doing.
Becker argued that every man builds a hero system, a scheme of meaning that tells him how to count, how to be of use, how to win a place in something that outlasts the body.
MacLean’s hero system makes her a sentinel of democracy. That is the holy word. Around it her cosmos turns. A teaching career alone will not earn the standing the scheme demands, and a monograph that ages on a shelf will not hold off the dark. The work has to bend the present. She has to find the plot, name the architect, and bind her own name to the rescue. The box at George Mason is the altar where that happens. When she lifts the lid she is not gathering data. She is reaching for the deed that will let her matter after she is gone.
Set a second man at a second desk, three decades earlier, in Virginia. He handles the same papers from the writing end. To him the word democracy names the thing he fears, the many voting away what belongs to the few, the crowd reaching for his purse and his school and his peace. His sacred word is liberty, the self fenced off from the mob. His hero system makes him the lone clear mind who sees what the herd cannot, who designs the rules that guard the reasoning few against the appetites of the mass. He earns his immortality by building chains for the beast and calling the chains freedom. Two people, two altars, one archive. Each takes the other’s holy word for a curse.
Becker’s point is that the word carries the whole cosmos with it, and the cosmos differs from stall to stall. Put democracy to a Trappist in his choir stall and it weighs nothing. It is a noise from the city. His sacred is obedience, the rule, the long silence, the surrender of the will. Salvation is not put to a vote. Put the word to a staff sergeant at Camp Pendleton and he nods at the recruiting poster and then forgets it, because the holy thing for him is the man on his left and the man on his right. He will die for the fire team. The franchise is for speeches. Put the word to a young engineer in Menlo Park who means to route human judgment around the slow and the foolish, and democracy becomes a faulty input device, a thing to be modeled and corrected by the smart hands that see the curve. The sacred for him is the optimum and the future it serves. Put the word to a grandmother in Calabria and she waves at the television where men in suits shout. The sacred sits at her table, in the blood, in the name her grandsons will carry. Five altars, five readings of one word, and on each altar a different act counts as heroism. MacLean treats democracy as the redeeming cause of a human life. The economist treats it as the disease. The monk, the sergeant, the engineer, the grandmother file it under noise, or duty, or inefficiency, or nothing. The word does not hold still, because the hero system underneath it does not hold still.
A hero system runs on a subtraction. Becker named the deep one, the denial of the body, the refusal to know oneself as meat that rots. MacLean’s scheme runs a subtraction of its own. For democracy to stay the one sacred thing in the room, the dead economist has to have no altar. He has to be an engineer of chains and nothing more, a cold designer with cunning and no reverence. Her book grants him intelligence on every page and withholds from him an inner faith. She cannot let him be a man defending his own holy thing, because a rival faith is a tragedy, and tragedy would dim the clean light her cause throws. So she subtracts his soul to keep her own cause spotless. She subtracts a second thing nearer home. The hunger that drove her to the box, the need to outlast herself, the wish to be the one whose name attaches to the rescue, she reads as service. The drive to matter wears the robe of selflessness, and the robe hides the drive from the woman wearing it.
Does she know? The phrase archival rat shows a little play, a little distance, a writer who can see herself bent over the foam cradle and smile. The play stops at the edge of the cause. She knows she is a partisan for democracy and she wears the badge with pride. She does not show the further knowledge, that her democracy is an immortality project, that the heat in her prose is the heat of a believer at the rail, that the man she hunts kept an altar too. Her self-awareness reaches her politics and halts before her metaphysics.
Three coordinates fix her in Becker’s scheme. Her hero is the archival rat as guardian of the republic, the scholar who saves self-government by dragging the plot into the light and who steps thereby into the line of historians who armed the people against the rich. Immortality by exposure. The rival she fights without naming is not the economist, whom she names on every page, but his faith, the rival hero system she battles while calling it only a conspiracy, since a conspiracy can be beaten and a faith can only be mourned, and the refusal to see the faith is the move that lets her win. The one cost her ledger cannot price is her own need to endure. She can audit the donors’ money and the economist’s footnotes to the dollar and the comma. She cannot audit the hunger that chose the shape of the book, because to price it would melt the selflessness the whole scheme runs on. The vital lie at the center of her work is not about Buchanan. It is about why she went to the box.
The room stays cold. The pencil moves. She turns the next page in the run, certain she is reading a dead man’s secret, and she is, and she is also writing, in that careful hand, the terms of her own bid against the grave.

The Theory

Nancy MacLean wrote a book to destroy public choice theory. Public choice is half of David Pinsof’s analysis of democracy, the economic study of political actors as creatures who chase incentives. So the cleanest way to read her is with the thing she tried to bury, dug up and turned back on the digger.

In 2017 she published Democracy in Chains, a finalist for the National Book Award in Nonfiction and the book that made her a star outside the academy.

The book’s claim is large. James Buchanan (1919-2013), the Nobel economist who founded public choice with Gordon Tullock (1922-2014), serves in her telling as the secret architect of a long, Koch-funded plan to chain democracy in favor of capital and property. She draws a line from John C. Calhoun (1782-1850) through Buchanan’s years at the University of Virginia to the donor network of Charles Koch (b. 1935). She reads his work on school choice as cover for the massive resistance that fought Brown v. Board of Education. The history becomes a plot. The economist becomes a villain. The reader gets a stealth conspiracy with a single dark mind behind it.

Run Buchanan’s own theory on the author and the book comes into focus. MacLean is an actor inside a prestige economy, the progressive academy, with its own currency of status, its own sacred causes, and its own enemies. Public choice predicts that she will respond to the incentives of that economy rather than to some incentive-free love of the record. A book that names the right as a hidden cabal against democracy pays in that economy. It wins awards, speaking fees, citations, and the warm regard of the ingroup. A flat, fair intellectual history of Buchanan, granting that a Nobel laureate held his views for reasons that hang together, pays nothing there. The frame predicts the book she wrote, and she wrote it.

Pinsof’s claim about groups is that they coordinate on categorical cuts because a continuous record dissolves the coalition. Buchanan’s actual career runs along a continuum, a long argument about constitutions, majority power, and the limits of the state, full of qualifications and second thoughts. MacLean crushes the continuum into a morality play. Democracy against the radical right. The people against the cabal. A villain to boo and a sacred cause to rally behind. The stealth plan supplies the categorical cut the coalition needs, and the cut is the product the book sells.

The strongest evidence for the frame is in the documented misquotation. Critics across the spectrum found that she clipped quotations, reversed their sense, and built chains of inference the sources do not support. This is coalition behavior. The misreading is a feature, because an accurate Buchanan weakens the wall, and the wall is the thing the group needs most. To grant the man a charitable internal reading would let air into the conspiracy. So she does not grant it.

When economists and historians challenged the book, MacLean suggested the criticism might be an organized push funded by the network she described. The move is clean coalition defense. A mild alternative reading becomes a paid attack, and the critic becomes an operative. The trouble for that defense is that some of the sharpest critics were not libertarians at all. The center-left scholars Henry Farrell and Steven Teles warned their own side away from the book. The frame predicted she would bucket mild critics as enemies, and she did, including the ones standing inside her own coalition. She gave Buchanan that same treatment in reverse, and the symmetry is the point. School choice becomes segregation. A constitutional worry becomes a plot. No charitable reading survives, in either direction, because charity is individual behavior and her trade is group behavior.

MacLean cannot grant that Buchanan’s fear of majority power had any legitimate content, that a majority can in plain fact vote to harm a minority, that constitutions exist partly to slow such votes. To price that trade-off in public, to admit an upside to the man she is burying, would hand ammunition to the enemy. So she prices nothing. She sorts.

Her defense against her critics, that they respond to Koch money, is a public choice argument. People follow funding incentives. That is Buchanan’s logic, the logic of the school she set out to destroy. She reaches for the theory the moment it serves her coalition and denies it the rest of the time. And the deeper irony stands above that one. The theory she tried to bury explains her own book better than her book explains Buchanan.

The Convenient Reading

Two reviews of Democracy in Chains run in the same season. One appears in a journal read by economists. It charges that MacLean misread Buchanan, lifted quotations from their setting, and built a plot out of proximity. The reviewer is careful, cites pages, and closes near contempt. The other appears in a venue read by historians of the American right. It calls the book brave, overdue, a map of the money behind the movement. That reviewer is careful too, cites pages too, and closes in admiration. Same book. Same six hundred pages. Two readers who would each pass a polygraph swearing they read in good faith.
Stephen P. Turner (b. 1951) has an exaplanation.
Turner writes about convenient beliefs. The plain interest theory says a man holds what serves him because it serves him, that somewhere inside him sits a sum, this pays, therefore I believe it. Turner finds that picture crude and too kind to the cynic. The belief that serves you does not feel like interest from the inside. It feels like the truth. You did not reason your way to it by weighing a payoff. You were trained into a setting that rewarded the belief, punished its rival, and filtered the rival out before it reached the front of your mind. By the time you hold the belief you hold it as plain fact, and you can give reasons for it, good reasons, the reasons your training handed you. The convenience sits in the structure around you, not in a secret ledger in your head. That is what makes it hard to see and harder to break. Bad faith would be easier to cure.
Start with her own confidence. MacLean says she followed the evidence. By Turner’s account she did follow it, through trained eyes. The graduate years under the social-history insurgency installed a way of seeing, a set of dispositions that read a certain figure out of a mass of paper. An archive is noise until a trained reader finds the shape in it. She found Buchanan the architect of oligarchy because that is the shape her field rewards a reader for finding, and she found it the way a radiologist finds the shadow on the film, fast, sure, and unable to say much about the seeing beyond pointing at the plate. The skill is real. The skill was also built to see one thing.
Turner’s instrument is cost. Put the counterfactual to her. What would it have cost MacLean to reach the opposite verdict, to publish a book clearing Buchanan and crediting public choice as honest economics? The regard of her peers, her citations, her standing in the only rooms whose opinion reaches her. What did the verdict she reached cost her? Nothing it did not repay many times over, with the National Book Award shortlist, the Lillian Smith, the bestseller list, the lecture invitations from people who already agreed. The belief is convenient by the test. Turner then says the hard part out loud. Convenience is not refutation. A belief can be convenient and true. The test flags the belief for suspicion and stops there.
Now turn the instrument, since she turns it first. Her whole case against Buchanan is an interest reading. He served wealth and White Virginia, therefore his constitutional economics carries the taint of the interest it served. Aim the same reading at the reader. Her portrait of Buchanan is the convenient belief of a woman who serves the progressive academy, rewarded by it, trained by it, filtered by it. The method cuts both ways and cannot pull its own blade. Worse for her, the method rests on an inference Turner denies. She moves from the interest a belief serves to the standing of the belief, from Buchanan profits the rich to Buchanan is suspect. Interest does not settle truth. If serving an interest discredited a belief, her book would fall before his, since hers pays her salary and his cost him decades of obscurity. The move that powers her indictment of him acquits him the moment she aims it at herself.
Press her and her defenders, and the appeal shifts to the rules. The archive. Rigor. The standards of the craft. Peer review. Turner reserves a particular suspicion for this turn, where convenient arrangements get laundered into duties. The evidence requires this reading is what a trained reader says when the reading is the one her training requires. The critics answer in kind, with the standards of intellectual history, fidelity to context, the duty to read a man as he understood himself. Those norms run convenient to the critics’ side. No neutral bench hears the case. Both parties cite the rules of procedure, and the players wrote the rules.
Return to the two reviews. The split is no scandal and no lapse in reading. Call it convenient belief running across two fields at once. The economist who praised the book would have lost face among economists. The historian who panned it would have lost face among historians. Each paid nothing for the convenient verdict and would have paid for the other, so the line held down the middle, and each camp felt its verdict as the honest one because each camp was sincere. Turner predicts the pattern and predicts the sincerity, since the sincerity is what convenient belief produces. The partisan reception people treat as a failure of one side is the frame working at scale, in plain view, with no villain in it.
The frame gives a corrosive tool and then withholds the pleasure of swinging it. It shows that MacLean’s reading is convenient, that she cannot feel the convenience, that her interest analysis of Buchanan collapses under its own weight the instant it turns around. It does not show that she is wrong about the man. A convenient belief can be a true one. The plot might be real and her reading sound, held for convenient reasons by a woman who would have held it for those reasons whether or not it were so. There lies the trap. The instrument cannot sort a convenient truth from a convenient error, which is why it can end any argument and settle none. And it turns last on the hand that holds it. To write this page is to take a seat, the skeptic above the brawl, and that seat has its conveniences too, its small rewards, its alternatives quietly filtered out before they arrive. Turner might note as much. The cold comfort of his frame is that no one stands outside it, the analyst least of all.

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