NYT: ‘Searching for Clues in Jeffrey Epstein’s Boyhood’

The New York Times reports:

Every villain prompts a hunt for an origin story — an understandable if often fruitless quest to try to comprehend the incomprehensible. With Epstein, it’s exponentially more difficult: a trek through emails and documents written decades after his youth, complicated by interviews with aging people incredulous that their lives collided with his. Still, deep exploration of these millions of pages yields astonishing insights. Epstein’s life touched innumerable others, not just tycoons and aristocrats and politicians, and not just a wide network of “girls” and procurers of “girls.” Epstein lived in a tight-knit community among relatives and classmates and teachers and neighbors. People who knew him as a child struggle to square the sexual predator with the boy they knew.

This is the kind of piece that announces its own trap and then walks into it. Miller and Eder say up front that every villain prompts an origin hunt and that the hunt is often fruitless. Then they spend thirty-three minutes hunting. The honesty of the disclaimer does not stop the genre from doing its work, which is to read every boyhood detail backward through the crime. A sockless boy at music camp becomes foreshadowing. That pull is almost impossible to resist once you commit to the form, and they do not resist it.
The strongest thread is the one they treat almost in passing. Epstein (1953-2019) grew up inside literal walls. Sea Gate had a fence and a private police force. Mark Twain Junior High sorted the high-achieving Jewish kids into Special Progress classes that one classmate calls an island. The boy spent his formative years inside enclaves that sorted the in from the out, and he spent his adult life rebuilding that architecture in stone and water, the townhouse, the ranch, the island. The harem line carries the whole piece. He says the harem means protection for those inside from those outside. That is a man describing the floor plan he was raised in and then reproduced. The sociological origin holds because it rests on structure. The psychological origins the article floats, the abuse hypothesis, the neurosis, the attachment theory, stay speculative and the writers know it.
Watch what carries the darkest early material. The knife letter from Jeff Nier, the girls told at knifepoint to take their suits off, is the most lurid evidence of early predation in the piece. It is undated. Mark Epstein says his brother met Nier a couple of years after high school. It comes from a braggart five years older, written into a tribute book that Ghislaine Maxwell (b. 1961) compiled for a fiftieth birthday. So the article’s most damning “boyhood” detail is not from boyhood, rests on no corroboration, and arrives through the most compromised source in the file. A careful reader has to flag that the evidentiary base for the predator-was-always-there thesis is a curated nostalgia document and the memories of people in their seventies and eighties who cannot square the boy with the man.
The class story is sharper than the sex story and the writers underplay it. A laborer father earning under eight thousand a year, mocked by his sons for stained boxers, asked by Mark in an email whether Seymour was part ape. A boy who watches jets take off at the TWA terminal and picks up girls. Timmy Kafka teaching him the grift ethic, let them think you are the schmuck. Epstein learning in Europe that people are schmucks. The con precedes the fortune by decades. The unexplained money that trailed him his whole life makes more sense once you see that his core competence formed early and it was making powerful men believe he was the schmuck.
The piece is a good model of status reporting. The five-dollar seats at the Fillmore, the lobster roll as the ultimate luxury, the fifty-five-degree bedroom, the mandatory socks he would not wear. Wolfe would approve of the detail. He might ask why all of it points one direction.

Epstein ran his world as a series of concentric rings, and the offer at every ring was the same: you belong here, with the people who matter, above the rules that bind ordinary men. What changed from ring to ring was what belonging meant once you were inside.
The outermost protective ring held the patrons. Leslie Wexner gave him capital, power of attorney, and the cover of legitimate fortune. That tie answered the question that trailed Epstein his whole career, which was where the money came from. Wexner functioned less as a member of the club than as the man who built the clubhouse.
The next ring held the trophies, the names that made Epstein look like a serious man rather than a fixer of unclear origin. Scientists came through the funding channel, Harvard money, the evolutionary dynamics program, dinners with physicists and Nobel laureates. Politicians and royalty came through Maxwell’s address book and the airplane. Clinton, Prince Andrew, Ehud Barak, the financiers and lawyers. For these men the frame was intellectual and power. You sit among the chosen minds and the people who run things. The island, the townhouse, the ranch, and the plane worked as the physical markers of who was inside. The flight logs survive as the artifact of that ring.
Maxwell and the operational staff formed the working ring, the pilots and house managers and recruiters who ran the supply.
Then the victims, who entered through a frame that promised the in-group and delivered the opposite. The recruitment pitch offered mentorship, modeling, money for school, a way up and in. The girl who took it learned she had crossed into the tier that the whole apparatus treated as fungible, the out-group the inner rings used and did not see. The Palm Beach pyramid ran on this. A girl recruited a girl, and each new recruit thought she was being let in.
So the organizing logic was status brokerage. Epstein owned the power to grant entry, and he priced that power differently at each ring. The men paid in legitimacy and discretion and got the feeling of belonging to something above the ordinary world. The girls paid with themselves and got the discovery that the belonging was a lure.
There was one circle of human beings who counted and one supply of human beings who did not, and Epstein sold movement toward the first while sorting most arrivals into the second.
Where the record stays thin is the interior experience of the trophy ring, how many of those men understood the lower tier and how many chose not to look.

How many Jeffrey Epstein types are operating now? Where would you look?
A predator who operates at scale leaves a structural signature, and the signature is more legible than any single act. The act hides. The structure has to stand in the open because it needs other people to function. So you watch the structure.
The first marker is wealth without a legible source. Epstein’s whole career sat on the unanswered question of where the money came from. A man with a townhouse, an island, and a plane, and no business anyone can describe, is a man whose fortune does work other than the work fortunes usually do. The money buys silence, lawyers, and the loyalty of people who would otherwise ask questions.
The second marker is a recruitment pipeline disguised as opportunity. Nassar had USA Gymnastics. Raniere had a self-improvement curriculum. Epstein had modeling and mentorship and scholarship money. The pipeline gives the predator a steady supply of young people and gives the young people a story about why they are there that is not the true story. Watch for an older man with structured access to a renewable population of the young and the precarious, especially where a parent or institution hands them over and calls it a chance.
The third marker is the asymmetry of the guest list. The powerful flow in one direction and the vulnerable flow in another, and the two populations occupy the same houses without occupying the same status. A home where titans of finance, science, and politics mix with a rotating cast of teenage girls or barely-adult women, and where the second group has no clear reason to be present, describes the Epstein floor plan exactly.
The fourth marker is the buffer layer. Epstein had Maxwell. Raniere had his inner circle of women. The principal rarely touches the supply directly at the recruiting stage. A trusted lieutenant, often a woman, often charismatic and well-connected, does the procuring and the grooming and absorbs the early suspicion. When you see a charming fixer whose job is to bring people to one powerful man, look at the man.
The fifth marker is legal overmatch deployed early and often. NDAs handed to interns and house staff. Settlements that close before a complaint is filed. Private investigators retained against accusers and journalists. A man who lawyers up against teenagers is telling you what he expects teenagers to eventually say.
The sixth marker is institutional capture through giving. Epstein bought Harvard, MIT Media Lab, scientific conferences, and a reputation as a patron of ideas. The donations purchase a chorus of respectable people who will vouch for the man and who have a financial reason not to look hard. Money flowing to universities, hospitals, and foundations from a figure whose underlying business is opaque buys exactly this cover.
The seventh marker is the geography of control. Islands, ranches, compounds, a private plane. Isolation is the point. A predator wants jurisdictions he controls and exits that others cannot use, and the more a wealthy man’s life happens in places only he can grant access to and only he can revoke, the more those places function as the apparatus rather than the luxury.
Put them together and the composite is not subtle. Opaque money, a youth pipeline sold as advancement, a two-class guest list, a procuring lieutenant, preemptive legal force, philanthropic cover, and controlled space. Any one of these has innocent explanations. The cluster does not.
This cluster describes a risk profile, not a verdict, and plenty of eccentric rich men hit several markers and harm no one, so the markers tell you where to look rather than what you will find. And the people best positioned to spot the pattern early are the staff, the pilots, the assistants, the procuring lieutenant herself, which is why these cases break open through insiders far more often than through the victims, who are the people the structure is built to keep quiet.

John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology inverts the article’s whole method. Miller and Eder hunt for the cause inside the man, the abuse that might have been done to him, the narcissism, the attachment wound, the hebephilia. That is the liberal anthropology at work, the atomistic actor whose conduct traces back to something in his own head. Mearsheimer says start with the group, because the group came first and did most of the shaping before the boy could reason at all.
Take the value-infusion claim. Epstein’s long childhood ran inside enclaves that taught a code. Sea Gate behind its fence and private police. The Special Progress class, the island within the school, resented from the outside. The boy quartet. By Mearsheimer’s clock the moral code set early, while the critical faculties still formed, and what got infused was a tribal sort, the opposite of the universal-rights ethic liberalism assumes. In and out. Protect your own and treat the rest as available. The harem line is that infusion spoken back in adulthood. He calls it protection for those inside from those outside. He describes Sea Gate.
Then the loyalty puzzle, which the liberal frame cannot solve. Why does an oncologist banter about girls with a convicted sex offender? Why does Kafka track the release date, wire condolences, write him into a eulogy as a soul mate? The liberal answer says these men should have judged Epstein as an autonomous moral agent and walked. Mearsheimer says the tribe outranks the reasoning. These men got socialized into one society as boys, and the membership held for fifty years against the evidence. Attachment to the group, and the will to keep faith with a member, beat the moral verdict. That is the part of the story the article reports and cannot explain.
What Mearsheimer adds is a relocation. The cause moves from Epstein’s psyche to Epstein’s societies, the one that made him and the one he rebuilt. The townhouse and the island reproduce the fence. The girls-network reproduces the in-and-out sort. The friendships show the strength of early socialization against later reason.
Where the frame stops. Mearsheimer’s anthropology describes ordinary men. Tribalism, group attachment, value infusion: these run through every working society and produce loyalty and sacrifice, not trafficking. The frame reaches the architecture and the loyalty. It does not reach the deviance. Plenty of boys grew up behind that fence in that SP class and built no harem. So Mearsheimer explains why Epstein cut the world into inside and outside, and why his boyhood friends stayed. The step from sorting to predation needs something the social anthropology does not supply.

David Pinsof says that almost everything people say in public is signaling, including the moralized horror around an Epstein piece, and that the gap between what someone thinks and what someone writes is the data. Pinsof would read the article as a coalition product before he read it as reporting, and he would read his own reluctance to say so out loud as confirmation of the theory.
What he might think privately, working through his concepts.
Sacred values. Epstein is now a sacred-value object, which means the cost of saying anything except condemnation is social death. Pinsof’s claim is that sacred values are sacred because they are coalition-membership tests, not because they track truth. The article performs the test. Every boyhood detail gets bent toward the verdict because the writers cannot afford a sentence that reads as humanizing him. The sockless boy, the geometry tutoring, the holding-him-while-he-slept girlfriend, all of it has to resolve into monster or the writer fails the loyalty check. He would see the disclaimer about fruitless origin hunts as a tell. They name the trap because naming it buys cover to walk in anyway.
The Opinion Game. The piece is an entry in a status tournament among people who decide what counts as knowledge in this corner. NYT runs it because Epstein is the rare subject where the audience and the staff want the same verdict, so there is no coalition risk and pure reputational upside. He would notice the absence of any claim that could cost the writers anything. The one genuinely uncomfortable thread, the friends who stayed loyal for fifty years, gets reported and then dropped, because following it leads somewhere that implicates ordinary people rather than a safely dead villain.
Confabulation. The forensic psychiatrist supplies a story that feels causal and explains nothing falsifiable. Abused-becomes-abuser, except most abused do not, and most offenders, so the model predicts both outcomes and is unfalsifiable. Pinsof would call it confabulation that serves a function, giving readers the feeling of understanding while keeping the explanation safely inside the bad man rather than out in the social world the readers share.
Anti-status and the harem line. Here he might depart from the piece’s own reading. The article treats the harem quote as a clue to deviance. Pinsof might read it as Epstein telling something close to a general truth about coalitions, that the function of the in-group is protection from the out-group, and that the horror the quote provokes comes partly from its being recognizable. The discomfort tracks accuracy, not error.
Dark idealism. He would suspect the writers half-believe their own frame, that they are not cynically signaling but sincerely cannot see the coalition work they are doing, because sincere belief is the better signal. That is the part he would feel freer to think than to write, because saying it impugns colleagues and the institution that grants him legibility.
The reason he would not publish it. The theory eats the author. If all public moralizing is coalition signaling, then a public essay applying that claim to an Epstein story is itself a coalition move, a bid for status among the contrarian-realist set, and Pinsof knows it. Writing it costs more than it pays, because the sacred value is live and the audience for the deflationary read is small. So the honest version stays private, which is exactly what his framework predicts a person would do with a true and costly belief.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) reads the article as a product of the journalistic field before he reads it as a story about Epstein, and the first thing he sees is two reporters accumulating capital. The byline note tells you the stakes. Cousins, classmates, thousands of emails, two dozen interviews. That is the display of journalistic labor that converts into professional standing. The piece is a position-taking in the field, a bid by Miller and Eder and by the Times to own the definitive boyhood account, and the rivalry with every other Epstein outlet sits underneath the prose whether the writers feel it or not.
Then habitus, which does more work here than any other concept. Bourdieu would take the Sea Gate boy and read his whole life as the playing-out of a disposition laid down early and carried in the body. Epstein (1953-2019) acquires a habitus inside a walled enclave that sorts insiders from outsiders, and he never leaves it, he reproduces it. The fifty-five-degree bedroom, the surgical bathrooms, the no-tea-bag-on-the-counter exactness, these are not quirks, they are the bodily signature of a man managing the gap between where he came from and where he climbed. Schmidt calling him the Just So Guy is reporting the hexis, the way class anxiety lives in posture and habit. The article notices the details. Bourdieu would say they are the trace of a trajectory.
Mark Twain sorts the high-achieving Jewish kids into Special Progress, an island, resented from outside. That is the school doing what Bourdieu says schools do, converting one kind of advantage into another and laundering it as merit. The SP class teaches the boy that the world divides into the selected and the rest and that the division is earned. Interlochen does it again at a higher altitude, a new elite sphere, talented youth marked as special. Epstein learns the structure of distinction by passing through institutions built to produce it. The harem line is that lesson restated. Inside means protection from outside. He learned it in a tracked classroom.
Capital and its conversions run the adult arc. The boy holds almost no economic capital, a laborer father under eight thousand a year. He builds cultural capital first, the Jacques Loussier records, the calculus book with the Beethoven, the bassoon at music camp, the lent copy of Tolkien. Then he lies it into credentials, the invented Cooper Union degree, the invented NYU master’s, the Dalton job got through European polish. Bourdieu would fix on the forgery as the key act. A man with no inherited capital fabricates the cultural and educational capital the field demands, and it works, because the field rewards the display of distinction more than its provenance. The unexplained fortune that trailed Epstein his whole life is a capital-conversion story, social capital into economic, the address book into the money.
On the loyal friends Bourdieu parts from the psychological reading. The oncologist and the billboard man and the optometrist stay bonded to Epstein for fifty years because they share a habitus, a Sea Gate formation that no later success dissolves. Kafka writing “we came from nothing” is naming the common origin that holds the group. Their loyalty is not a moral failure to be explained, it is the durability of a class formation, the way a shared early world keeps its grip across the trajectories that pull men apart.
The New York Times occupies a dominant position in the field of cultural production. Its judgment of Epstein is also a defense of its own authority to judge, an assertion of the boundary between the legitimate and the disgraced. The horror is sincere and it is also a boundary-maintenance ritual by an institution whose standing rests on being the body that draws such lines. Bourdieu would say the verdict does work for the one who delivers it, and an account that cannot see its own position in the field has missed half of what is happening on the page.
Where the frame stops. Field and habitus explain the architecture, the climb, the forgery, the loyalty, the institutional ritual of condemnation. They explain a man who reproduces the enclosure that made him. They do not explain the trafficking. Many boys carried that Sea Gate habitus through those SP classrooms and built no such apparatus. Bourdieu reaches the structure of Epstein’s distinctions and the social labor of the article about him. The turn from distinction to predation lies outside what the sociology of taste can deliver.

A pure libertarian opposes child labor laws. A person that pure is rare enough that you should picture a type, not a representative, because almost nobody holds the position without hedging, and the hedging is the social-status management I rule out. So grant the premise: a man who takes self-ownership and contract as bedrock, opposes child labor laws because he opposes the state overriding voluntary agreement, and feels no pull to soften any of it for an audience. What does he see in the article.
First he separates two things the piece fuses. There is fraud and there is coercion, and there is also a large middle the article fills with moral horror that he would empty out. Epstein lying his way into Bear Stearns, inventing the Cooper Union degree and the NYU master’s, that is fraud, and the hard libertarian has no trouble condemning it, because misrepresentation to obtain a position vitiates the consent the counterparty gave. Bear Stearns contracted with a man who did not exist. That is a real wrong on the theory. He would note, with some dryness, that the institution Epstein defrauded is the respectable one, and that the article treats the forgery as a colorful detail rather than the early tell it is.
On the central matter he splits hard from both the article and from where you might expect a contrarian to go. The doctrinaire libertarian does not defend sex with minors, because the whole edifice rests on valid consent, and a child cannot give it. Coercion and the violation of someone who cannot contract are the paradigm wrongs in the system, not the gray zone. So the trafficking is not a libertarian puzzle. It is the clearest kind of rights violation the theory recognizes, person treated as the property of another, consent absent or manufactured. He would say the article is right to condemn and confused about why. It condemns from disgust and from coalition. He condemns from the violated boundary of the person. Same verdict, different ground, and he would think the ground matters because disgust is unreliable and the boundary is not.
Where he turns the knife is on the child-labor frame, and he uses it against the article’s sentimental anthropology of childhood. The piece leans on the idea of the protected child, the long nurtured childhood, innocence betrayed. The libertarian who opposes child labor laws rejects the regulatory version of that idea. He thinks the state drawing bright lines around what the young may do, sell their labor, leave school, work the hours they choose, infantilizes them and substitutes bureaucratic judgment for the family’s. But he would see that his own position cuts the other way here and he would follow it where it goes. If you locate authority over the child in the family and in developing capacity rather than in a state age-line, then you have to say what happens when the family is the thing handing the child over. The article’s recruitment pipeline runs through parents and institutions that deliver the young to Epstein. The honest libertarian cannot wave that away with parental authority, because the parents are the channel of the harm. So he lands on capacity. The wrong is exploiting someone who lacks the formed will to consent, and a parent who trades that child away has violated a trust, not exercised a right.
He would also notice what the article will not. The loyal friends, the oncologist and the rest, the libertarian reads as a market in reputation. Epstein bought silence and standing with money and connection, and the men around him sold their vouching because the price was right and the cost looked low. He would say the article moralizes the friendships and misses that they were transactions, and that the account is exchange, not corruption of the soul. Epstein describes a protection racket and calls it security. The libertarian distrusts protection rackets whether the state runs them or a private man does.
On the Times he would be cold. He sees a state-adjacent prestige institution performing the boundary work that keeps its authority intact, and he trusts its verdict about as far as he trusts any monopolist defending its franchise. He would say the paper is correct about Epstein and self-interested in how it is correct, and that the correctness does not launder the self-interest.
The libertarian’s system runs on consenting adults, and childhood is the case where the consenting adult does not yet exist. A man fully committed to the framework and indifferent to status has to either build a theory of emerging capacity, which most libertarian writing dodges, or admit the framework is thin exactly where Epstein operated, in the manufacture of apparent consent from people too young or too precarious to give the real thing. The serious version of the type bites that bullet and says the theory needs a developmental account of the will. The unserious version retreats to the age-line it claims to reject. Which one you get tells you whether the commitment was ever real or was itself a status play in a different room.

A tribalist reads the story and says the animal at the edge gets taken by predators. The animal in the middle is covered by the bodies around it.
Look at who Epstein could reach. The recruitment ran on girls from broken homes, foster situations, lower-income families, the precarious. Giuffre at Mar-a-Lago. The modeling pipeline pulling girls from Europe and South America, far from anyone who owed them protection. The throughline a tribalist would draw is that every one of these girls was at the edge of some herd or outside all of them. No father with standing, no community that would make her disappearance cost someone, no men around her whose duty and whose shame were tied to her safety. Epstein selected for the unprotected, and unprotected means exactly what you mean, outside the middle of a tribe that guards its own.
So the trad claim is not that tribalism caused Epstein. It is that the absence of functioning tribes created his hunting ground. A world that dissolved the structures that put a wall of kin around a young woman left a supply of girls accountable to no one and guarded by no one, and a predator with money found them easily. The liberal order that prizes the autonomous individual, the girl free to model in a foreign city at seventeen, free of the father and the village and the watchful brothers, produced the isolated unit Epstein needed. On this reading the atomization Mearsheimer attacks is not a neutral philosophical error. It is the thing that stripped the protection off the young.
The protection-of-young-females claim is the oldest tribal duty there is, and most traditional societies organized a great deal of their structure around it, the guarding of daughters, the codes of honor that made a harm to a girl a harm to her men, the marriage customs that kept her inside a web of obligation. A trad reads the Epstein supply chain as what happens when that web is gone. The girls were not protected because no tribe held them in the middle.
Two honest pressures on it.
The first is that the protective tribe and the predatory tribe are the same institution seen from two angles, and the trad has to hold both. The structure that guards the young female also controls her, and the same honor codes that made her harm a harm to her men also treated her as their property and sometimes traded her, married her off, silenced her when the harm came from inside. The article gives you the dark case. The recruitment pyramid ran on parents and trusted adults handing girls over. The pipeline used the protective relations, the mother who lets the mentor take her daughter, the institution that vouches. So the wall of kin protects against the outside predator and exposes the child to the inside one, and a serious tribalism has to say which harm it is built to stop, because it cannot stop both with the same wall. The herd protects against the wolf at the edge. It does nothing about the wolf born in the middle, and historically the middle wolf, the uncle, the rabbi, the coach, the family friend, took more of the young than the stranger ever did.
The second is that Epstein was a man deep in the middle of a herd, covered by bodies, and the cover is what let him operate. The loyal friends, the powerful patrons, the institutions he bought, the lawyers, all of it was tribe in your protective sense, a wall of allies that made harming him costly and made his victims’ accusations bounce off. The same logic that protects the vulnerable female in the middle protected him in the middle. So the protective theory has a hard edge it has to face. Being inside a tribe protects you whether you are the lamb or the wolf, and a tribe strong enough to guard its daughters is strong enough to guard its predators, and the stronger the wall the more it does both. The thing that would have stopped Epstein was not more tribe. It was a force outside any tribe that could reach a powerful man covered by his own, which is closer to the impartial law the liberal prizes than to the herd.

A tribalist recoils in horror at the sovereign individual, the man who treats his own conscience as the court of last resort. The article is full of him before he ever touches a girl. Epstein lies his age and his degrees onto the Bear Stearns form, and the lie is not just fraud, it is a declaration that the credentialing order of the tribe does not bind him, that he will write his own warrant. He attends peace marches not from conviction but because the marches are where the girls are, which means he stands inside the moral theater of his moment and feels nothing it asks him to feel. Kafka names the conversion. You learned you could get away with shit, that people in general were schmucks. That is the birth of the man who has slipped the leash of every external code and answers only to himself.
The tribalist reads this as the core catastrophe, not a side effect. A man who follows his own conscience has made his conscience the god, and a conscience with no tribe above it has no brake an appetite cannot override. Mearsheimer gives you the structural version. The value infusion that should have set in childhood is the thing that holds a man when his reason and his desire conspire toward a wrong. Epstein got the tribal infusion of inside and outside, the sorting, but he seems to have shed the part that binds, the part that says these are the things our people do not do and you do not get a vote. Once the code is yours to author, the only question left is what you can get away with, and a clever man with money can author a code that permits nearly anything.
This is the trad case against Protestant conscience and against liberal autonomy in one breath, and it is worth seeing that the article hands it to you. The whole modern apparatus that the Times speaks for says the free individual following his own lights is the high human achievement. The tribalist says the free individual following his own lights, unbound by an external sacred order he did not choose and cannot revise, is Epstein. The autonomy the liberal celebrates and the autonomy that produced the harem are the same faculty. The difference between the good liberal and Epstein is that the good liberal happens to have a conscience that still echoes the tribal code he no longer believes authorizes him. He is living on inherited moral capital, coasting on infusions he has stopped replenishing, and the tribalist predicts that across generations the echo fades and more Epsteins appear, because a code with no transcendent or tribal authority above the self cannot reproduce itself, it can only be spent.
The conscience point cuts at the loyal friends too, and harder than the herd reading did. The oncologist and the rest stayed loyal, and a liberal calls that a failure of individual moral judgment, each man should have consulted his own conscience and walked. The tribalist inverts it. Their loyalty was the tribal bond doing its proper work, holding men to their own across decades, and the thing that failed was not their loyalty but the absence of any tribal authority that could have told all of them together, including Epstein, that this is forbidden and no man’s private judgment overrides it. They had the bond and lacked the law. Conscience individualized gave each of them a private exit they did not take and gave Epstein a private permission he did take, and a real tribal code would have removed both the exit and the permission, because the code would not have been theirs to consult.
The same horror, aimed one notch differently, indicts the heroes. Every man who defied a wicked tribal code by following his conscience did the thing I recoil from. The one who hid the hunted family, who refused the order, who broke with his own people over a cruelty they had sanctified, set his private conscience above the tribe. The faculty that produced Epstein produced him too. So the tribalist cannot simply condemn the sovereign conscience, because he needs it precisely when his own tribe goes wrong, and tribes go wrong, the article’s Sea Gate sorted and excluded and the SP island bred resentment and the honor codes traded daughters. A code with no appeal above it is a code with no remedy when it rots, and tribes rot.
What corrects the tribe when the tribe is the thing doing wrong? The liberal answer is the individual conscience, which is the very faculty you recoil from, and which does produce Epstein. The pure tribal answer is that there is no appeal, the code is the code, and that answer sanctifies the rot. The serious traditional answer, the one the trad needs, is a code above both the individual and the tribe, a sacred order that binds the self so it cannot become Epstein and judges the tribe so it cannot become the mob. That is the move that escapes the trap, and it is a religious move, not a tribal one. Without it the trad is stuck choosing between the sovereign conscience that frees the predator and the sovereign tribe that protects him. The thing that binds Epstein and also corrects Sea Gate is not the herd and not the autonomous self. It is the law that neither the man nor the tribe gets to author.

A hardcore tribalist reads this article and the first thing he notices is the thing the article cannot say about itself, which is that it is a tribe handling one of its own. Sea Gate is a Jewish refuge behind a fence. The SP class is the high-achieving Jewish kids sorted onto an island. The boyhood quartet, the bar mitzvahs, the accordion teacher, the camp, all of it is the inside of one people, and Epstein (1953-2019) spends his life rebuilding that inside in stone. The tribalist sees a co-ethnic network as the engine of the whole story and watches the Times report every tile of it while declining to name the floor.
He would respect the structure and refuse the horror. To the tribalist, in-group preference is not a pathology, it is the natural order, the thing that lets a people survive. So the harem line that the article treats as a clue to deviance, he reads as ordinary wisdom stated plainly. Inside means protection from outside. He thinks every healthy tribe knows this and only a liberal raised on the atomized individual finds it shocking. He would say Mearsheimer is right and the article is the proof, because the loyal friends who stayed fifty years did exactly what blood and shared formation are supposed to make men do, and the article reports their loyalty as a moral failure because liberalism cannot read tribal solidarity as anything but corruption.

Catherine MacKinnon (b. 1946) reads this article and sees a category error running through every line, the treatment of Epstein as an aberration when her whole work argues he is the system made visible. The other readers in this thread looked at enclosure, sovereignty, tribe, field. MacKinnon looks at the one thing the article keeps in frame and refuses to center, which is that the entire apparatus existed to deliver the bodies of girls to powerful men, and that this is not Epstein’s deviation from how male power works but a concentrated instance of how it works.
Her foundational claim is that sexuality is the form male dominance takes, that under conditions of inequality the eroticization of dominance and submission is not a private taste but the social relation of the sexes itself. So she reads the harem line where the article reads it as a clue to one man’s pathology. He says the harem means protection for those inside from those outside. MacKinnon hears the structure of male sexual ownership stated without apology, women as a holding to be guarded and used, and she would say the only unusual thing about Epstein is that he said it plainly. The article finds the quote chilling. MacKinnon finds it ordinary, which is worse.
She would tear into the language the piece cannot help using. The article speaks of girls, in quotation marks, of a network of girls and procurers of girls, of Epstein’s girlfriends and victims as a continuum. The forensic psychiatrist supplies hebephilia, the clinical term, attraction to early adolescents, framed as a disorder located in Epstein. MacKinnon’s lifelong move is to refuse the clinical individualizing of what is structural. She would say the diagnosis does the system’s work, converting a social relation of dominance into one man’s medical anomaly, so that the readers who share the world that produced him can locate the problem safely inside his skull. The abuse-excuse hypothesis, that he was a victim who became a predator, she would read as the same maneuver, a story that turns a man’s power over girls into a symptom, eliciting a flicker of sympathy and dissolving the politics into psychology.
The Kathleen Suter material is where she would press hardest, because the article hands her the consent problem whole. He sits behind a girl in homeroom, the purity he chases, the muse, the prototype. The piece renders this as adolescent infatuation, almost tender, the pretty girl with golden hair. MacKinnon would say watch what the romance language conceals. The article itself reports the apartment application, the marriage index, the decades of fond emails, the guardian angel letter, the offer to pay her son’s education, and then the harder note, the lessons that were not easy. She would read the fond nostalgia not as evidence the relationship was benign but as evidence of how thoroughly women learn to narrate their own subordination as love, how the structure reproduces itself by being experienced from inside as affection and gratitude. The character references Epstein’s lawyers solicited, the women writing to praise him before his plea, are to her the clearest data in the piece, women recruited to launder a trafficker because the relation of dependence and gratitude is exactly what dominance feels like to the dominated. She would not call these women liars or dupes. She would say their sincerity is the point, that the system works by producing real feeling.
On the question of whether Epstein selected Jewish or non-Jewish girls, MacKinnon would set it aside as the wrong axis entirely. He selected girls, and he selected the unprotected, and the relevant category is sex and powerlessness, not ethnicity. She would read the supply chain, the broken homes, the foster girls, the modeling pipeline pulling the poor from Europe and South America, as a map of which women male power can reach, the ones stripped of the resources that let a woman refuse. Class and youth and isolation are the coordinates of availability, and availability is the whole game. The tribal reading two turns back, the herd and the edge, she would half accept and then redirect. Yes the unprotected get taken. But she would say the protection the trad imagines, the wall of kin around the daughter, is itself a form of ownership, the girl passed from the guardianship of her men to the guardianship of a husband, never herself a person who owns her own body, and that Epstein is what happens when one owner finds girls between guardianships. The honor system and the trafficking system both treat the girl as property. They differ on who holds title.
She would read the loyal friends as MacKinnon always reads male solidarity, as the thing that makes the system run. The oncologist, the billboard man, the banter about the girls in the house, the fifty years of loyalty across a guilty plea. The article treats this as a puzzle of friendship. MacKinnon would say it is the male collective protecting a man’s access to women, the ancient agreement among men not to break ranks over what one of them does to a girl, and that the bond is not despite the trafficking but partly constituted by the shared understanding that women are the kind of thing men may use. Eisenstein bantering about the girls in the house after the guilty plea is the bond stated. The friendship and the impunity are the same fact.
Then she turns it on the Times. Bourdieu sees the paper performing class boundary work. MacKinnon sees the paper performing the liberal trick she spent a career attacking, the conversion of a structural wrong into an individual crime so that the structure survives the prosecution of the man. By making Epstein a monster, singular, dead, cast out, the article lets every reader and the institution itself off the hook for the world that supplies men like him with girls like these. The condemnation is sincere and it is also exculpatory, of the system, of the men who are not Epstein but who live in the same arrangement of power. She would note that the paper can run thirty-three minutes on his boyhood and never once frame the question as why a society produces a steady supply of unprotected girls and powerful men who want them. The individual frame is the system’s defense.
Where MacKinnon stops, held to the same standard as every other reader here. Her frame explains the supply, the language, the consent problem, the loyal men, the laundering by grateful women, and the article’s individualizing as ideological work. It explains Epstein as an instance of male dominance rather than a deviation from it. What it does not explain is the variance. Most men live inside the structure she describes and do not traffic children, and her theory, which locates the cause in the structure of male sexuality as such, has a hard time saying why this man built the apparatus and the man next to him did not. She would answer that the difference is one of degree and opportunity, not kind, that Epstein simply had the money and the will to actualize what the structure makes most men merely complicit in. That answer is strong on what they share and weak on what separates them, and the separation is most of what the article is trying to explain. MacKinnon reaches the system that made Epstein possible and legible. She is least illuminating on the gap between possible and actual, which is the gap where this particular man and his particular victims actually live.

Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) reads this article and goes straight to the line the Times will not draw and cannot stop drawing. His whole thought rests on the friend-enemy distinction, the claim that the political begins when a group separates those who belong from those against whom it might have to fight, and that every real community is constituted by that division. So the first thing he sees is a boy raised inside the friend-enemy architecture and a newspaper performing the same division while denying that division is what politics is.
Start with the boy. Sea Gate is friend-enemy made of brick. A fence, a private police force, a gate, and on the other side of it the demolition zone, the burned blocks, the racial tension the article names and steps past. The enclave exists by drawing the line, inside protected, outside threatening, and the line is physical and policed. Mark Twain repeats it, the SP island, the high-achievers walled off and escorted past the others, resented from outside. Schmitt would say Epstein did not learn deviance in these places, he learned the political, the original act of sorting friend from enemy, and he learned it as the ground of safety. The harem line is the doctrine stated bare. Inside means protection from outside. Schmitt would recognize his own concept in a trafficker’s mouth and not flinch, because he always insisted the distinction is prior to morality, that it describes how groups cohere whether we approve or not.
Then the sovereign. Schmitt’s sovereign is he who decides on the exception, the one who stands inside the legal order and also above it, who suspends the norm when he judges the situation demands it. Read Epstein’s life as a sustained claim to sovereignty in this sense. He fabricates his own credentials, deciding that the rules of qualification do not bind him. He builds jurisdictions he controls, the island, the ranch, the plane, spaces where his will is the law and the ordinary norm is suspended. The 2008 Florida deal is the sovereign exception in its clearest form, a man powerful enough that the law bent, the prosecution suspended its own normal operation for him. Schmitt would say Epstein achieved, in private, what Schmitt said only the state could legitimately hold, the power to decide where the norm applies and where it stops. The article reports this as corruption. Schmitt reads it as a private man seizing the sovereign prerogative, and he would find that more interesting than the sex, because it touches his real subject, where decision overrides norm.
The loyal friends Schmitt reads through the friend-enemy bond directly, and with less moralizing than anyone in this thread. These men were friends in his strong sense, bound to their own against the outside, and the fifty-year loyalty is not a moral failure, it is the political relation surviving every liberal pressure to dissolve it into individual judgment. Schmitt despised the liberal who thinks the autonomous moral agent should weigh each association on private conscience. He would say the oncologist and the billboard man kept faith with a friend because keeping faith with friends is what constitutes a people, and that the Times cannot praise this because the paper is committed to the liberal fiction that there are only individuals and universal humanity, no friends and enemies in between.
That is where Schmitt turns the knife on the article. His lifelong charge against liberalism is that it denies the friend-enemy distinction while practicing it, that it dresses its enemies not as enemies but as criminals, monsters, enemies of humanity, and so wages a more total war while claiming to have transcended war. The Epstein piece is this operation. The Times cannot say we are drawing a line and Epstein is on the far side of it, because liberalism forbids the open admission of the friend-enemy act. So it converts the political expulsion into a moral and clinical one. He is a monster, a hebephile, a case. Schmitt would say the disgust is real and it is also the friend-enemy distinction wearing the mask of universal morality. The community constitutes itself by casting Epstein out as the absolute enemy, the inhuman one, and the language of pathology and evil is how a liberal order performs an excommunication it will not call excommunication. The invocation of humanity, Schmitt wrote, is the move of those who would deny the enemy the quality of being human so as to wage war on him without limit. The article makes Epstein the enemy of humanity, and Schmitt would point out that this is the rhetorical structure he warned about, the depoliticized total enemy, applied here to a single dead man.
He would press the point about the absolute enemy further than is comfortable. Once a figure becomes the enemy of humanity, no proportion governs the response, because he has been placed outside the human community where proportion applies. Schmitt is not defending Epstein, he is diagnosing the form. The total moral condemnation, the figure who can have nothing said in his favor, not the geometry tutoring, not the boy who would not grab girls in the hall, every detail forced to resolve into monstrosity, this is what the absolute enemy looks like when a society that denies it has enemies produces one anyway. The need was there. Epstein fills the slot of the enemy that a humanity-invoking order is not supposed to have and therefore needs all the more.
Where Schmitt stops, and it is the same wall every frame in this thread hits. Friend-enemy explains the enclosure, the sovereignty over private space, the suspended law, the loyal friends, and the article’s own structure as a disguised act of political expulsion. It explains the form of Epstein’s life and the form of his condemnation. It says nothing about why the man trafficked children. Schmitt’s distinction is about the constitution of groups and the location of decision, not about appetite or harm. Many men were raised inside friend-enemy walls and seized what private sovereignty they could and never built a harem. Schmitt reaches the political architecture, his own deepest subject, and the political architecture is not the crime. The crime sits in a register, the wounding of specific children, that Schmitt spent a career declining to look at, because his thought is about the group and the decision and the line, and a raped girl is none of those things, she is the human particular his categories pass over. This is the cost of a politics that begins with the line and never arrives at the person on either side of it.

A Christian mother reads the article and feels the revulsion build, but not at the place the Times wants to direct it. The paper offers her a monster, singular, dead, safely outside. She declines the offer. She sees a culture, and Epstein is its logical end, not its exception, and her horror is that everyone in the story is somewhere on the same road and only the distance traveled differs.
She would start where the article starts and read it against the grain. The boyhood the piece treats as the seedbed of a deviant she reads as the ordinary formation of her age. The unwatched childhood Kafka celebrates, adults beside the point, the constant pursuit of sex and talking about sex, the boys picking up girls at the airport terminal, the light shoplifting and the out-of-bounds pranks, all of it nostalgic in the birthday book, all of it presented as innocent boyhood. She sees a world that had already severed sex from marriage, from consequence, from God, decades before Epstein had money, and she sees the men who wrote those fond letters as men who never questioned the premise, only lacked Epstein’s means to run it to the bottom. The peace marches Epstein attended because they were the easiest place to get laid she reads as the whole sixties indictment in one line, the moral theater of liberation that was, underneath, a machinery for uncoupling sex from covenant.
The continuum the article draws without meaning to, girlfriends to victims, muse to harem, is the continuum she already believes in. She holds that sex outside consecrated marriage is quicksand, that there is no stable footing anywhere on that ground, only degrees of sinking. So the article’s careful sorting, this was a girlfriend, this was a victim, this was infatuation, this was a crime, collapses for her into a single substance. The Kathleen Suter romance the piece renders as tender, the homeroom whispers, the golden hair, she reads as the first step onto the quicksand, and she would say the article cannot see that the tender beginning and the harem end are the same thing because the article shares Epstein’s premise that sex is for pleasure and acquisition rather than for the covenant that alone makes it safe. Remove the covenant and you have removed the only floor. Everything after is depth.
Pornography and the commodified woman she would name, because the article gives her the modeling pipeline, Brunel, the agency, the girls pulled from Europe and South America to be photographed and used. She sees the whole OnlyFans logic prefigured, the woman’s body as image, as inventory, as a thing to be optioned and traded, and she sees Epstein not as the inventor of this but as a man who simply bought at scale what the culture was already selling retail. Her revulsion at porn is exactly that it trains everyone to see what Epstein saw, the body detached from the soul and the person, available, rankable, consumable. The harem line, four hundred women, the security of the harem, she reads as the pornographic imagination given a house and a staff. The article finds the number monstrous. She would say the number is just honesty about where the appetite goes when nothing binds it, that every man formed by the culture of the loosed genie carries a smaller harem in his head and Epstein only externalized it.
Here her frame turns toward the victims with something the other readers in this thread mostly lacked, which is grief rather than analysis. The unprotected girls, the broken homes, the foster situations, she reads through the lens of a sacramental vision of the family. A girl belongs inside a covenant household, under a father who answers to God for her, inside a community that consecrates her worth as a soul and not a body. Strip that away, as the culture has, and you produce the isolated girl the predator needs, and you produce her by design, because the same liberation that freed sex from marriage freed the girl from the household that was her shelter. She would agree with the trad reading from earlier in the thread about the edge of the herd, and then deepen it. The herd is not enough. What protects the girl is not just kin around her but a sacred order above her that declares her body is not for sale at any price, an order the culture demolished when it decided her body was hers to license and the market’s to buy. The girls were not protected because the thing that protects them, the marriage covenant and the God who stands behind it, had been laughed out of the public square by the very class that produces the Times.
She would read the loyal friends as the most damning part. Not the trafficking, which any decent person condemns, but the banter. The oncologist and the others joking about the girls in the house after the guilty plea, the lewd exchanges that continued for decades, the men who knew and kept the friendship warm. She sees men whose consciences were not seared by Epstein but were already dulled by a lifetime inside the loosed culture, men who could joke about a house full of girls because they had been formed to find that comic rather than damning. Their easiness is the evidence. A culture that consecrated sex would have made the banter impossible. The friends could stay friends because the premise that sex is play, that women are sport, was the water they all swam in, and Epstein had merely swum out further than the rest.
On the Times she would be cold in her own way. She sees the paper as a pillar of the class that built the world she mourns, the class that championed every loosening, the sexual revolution, the normalization of porn, the dissolution of the marital norm as repression, and that now recoils in horror at the monster its own project produced and refuses the connection. The article’s thirty-three minutes of forensic boyhood, the psychiatrist, the hebephilia, the attachment theory, she reads as elaborate misdirection, a way to make Epstein a clinical singularity so that no one has to ask whether the culture of liberation and the predator are parent and child. She would say the paper hunts for the wound in Epstein because the alternative is to look at the wound in the civilization, and the paper cannot look there because it helped open it.
Now the pressures her frame has to bear.
One. The covenant household and the sacred order she trusts to protect the girl are the very places where a great deal of the abuse of the young has happened, the church that shielded its predators, the trad family that hid its incest under the authority of the father, the religious community that silenced the girl to protect the institution’s name. The article’s own engine, the recruitment running through trusted adults and parents, is the dark form of her sacred order, not its absence. So she cannot simply say the covenant protects and the liberation exposes, because the covenant has its own long record of producing the wolf in the center and then using its sanctity to cover him. The honest version of her position has to say that the sacred order protects the girl only when the order itself submits to a judgment above it, the God who condemns the abusing priest as fiercely as the libertine, and that an order which makes its own authority the final word becomes Epstein with incense. She knows this if she is serious, because her own scripture is full of the prophet rebuking the corrupt temple.
Two. Her continuum, the quicksand on which all extramarital sex is one substance, flattens a distinction the law and the victims need kept sharp. The seventeen-year-old told at knifepoint to remove her suit and the adult girlfriend who wrote a fond letter are not points on one moral gradient, whatever they share in her theology. Consent and age and force are real lines, and a frame that dissolves them into a single sin of unconsecrated sex loses the ability to say why the trafficking is a crime and the girlfriend is not. She would answer that she keeps the legal lines while holding the theological continuum, that she can call one a felony and both a fall, and that is a coherent answer, but she has to be careful, because the move that says it is all quicksand can slide toward saying the victim who was not married was also on the quicksand, which is the blaming of the girl that her own compassion should forbid. The discipline her frame requires is to hold the theological judgment about the culture and refuse to let it touch the victim, who was sinned against and did not fall but was pushed.
Three. Her revulsion at the culture can become its own comfort, a way of locating the rot entirely out there in the liberal class and the loosed genie, and never in herself or her own house. The article tempts every reader toward a villain, and her villain is the culture, which is more sophisticated than the Times’s villain but serves the same function, the placing of the evil safely outside the self. The deepest version of her own tradition would turn the revulsion inward first, the recognition that the appetite Epstein actualized lives in every fallen heart including hers, that the harem in the head is not only the libertine’s, and that the line between the watching and the doing is grace and circumstance more than native virtue. The genie loosed in the culture was first loosed in the human heart at the start, and the marriage covenant is not a wall that keeps the rot outside but a discipline for the rot already within. If she reads the article only as the indictment of a culture and never as a mirror, she has used a theology to perform the same exculpation she accused the Times of performing, just with the boundary of the saved redrawn around herself.

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Who Has Discussed Realist Anthropology in Polite Society?

Several respectable bodies of thought reach John J. Mearsheimer’s premises without his realist framing, and they have done so for two centuries.

The oldest line runs through the counter-Enlightenment. Edmund Burke (1729-1797) holds that reason is thin and inheritance is deep, that a man draws more from the partnership of generations than he can work out on his own, and that the abstract rights-bearing individual of the French theorists names no creature who ever lived. Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) puts it in his line about having seen Frenchmen and Italians and Russians but never, in his life, Man. David Hume (1711-1776) supplies the engine for the claim about reason a generation earlier when he makes reason the slave of the passions. These three carry the whole structure: weak reason, prior attachment, the fiction of the unencumbered self.

The sociological founding gives it a science. Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) treats the social as a thing in its own right, prior to the individual and productive of him, so that even the modern cult of the individual is a collective creation. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) names the value infusion Mearsheimer describes. His habitus is the set of dispositions laid down early, below awareness, that shapes how a man perceives and judges before he reasons at all.

The communitarian philosophers built the respectable critique of liberal anthropology in the 1980s and they sit at the center of polite society. Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-2025) in After Virtue and Dependent Rational Animals argues that a man is constituted by traditions and narratives he did not choose. Michael Sandel (b. 1953) in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice takes apart the Rawlsian self that arrives prior to its ends. Charles Taylor (b. 1931) in his essay “Atomism” and in Sources of the Self argues that the very capacities liberalism prizes can only form inside a society. Robert Bellah (1927-2013) and his coauthors in Habits of the Heart show American individualism eating the bonds Americans depend on.

A conservative line attacks reason directly. Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) in Rationalism in Politics sets technical reason against the practical knowledge carried in traditions and never fully stated. Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) in The Constitution of Liberty and The Fatal Conceit makes tradition the bearer of knowledge no single mind commands, and treats the constructivist faith in reason as a conceit. Roger Scruton (1944-2020) defends prior attachment to home and people as the ground of the self.

The evolutionary and psychological strand reaches the same premise about reason from the lab. Jonathan Haidt (b. 1963) in The Righteous Mind makes intuition the elephant and reason the rider who rationalizes after the fact, and calls man ninety percent chimp, ten percent bee. Daniel Kahneman (1934-2024) gives the slow deliberate system second place behind fast intuition. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber in The Enigma of Reason argue that reason evolved for winning arguments inside a group, not for finding truth alone. Robin Hanson and Kevin Simler in The Elephant in the Brain treat conscious reasoning as a press secretary for motives it does not see.

The cultural anthropologists supply the transmission. Joseph Henrich in The Secret of Our Success and The WEIRDest People in the World argues that man is a cultural animal who survives by copying, and that the atomistic individual of liberal theory is a recent and peculiar product of one strange corner of the world rather than the human default.

The tribal core has its respectable carriers too, though they pay a higher price for it. Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) in Who Are We? and The Clash of Civilizations puts group identity ahead of creed. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) grounds the political in the friend and enemy grouping. E.O. Wilson (1929-2021) defends group selection and the eusocial pull.

The live synthesis is Patrick Deneen in Why Liberalism Failed, published the same year as Mearsheimer, which argues that liberalism rests on a false picture of the autonomous self and undoes itself by acting on it. Christopher Lasch (1932-1994) reaches a near neighbor from the left in The Culture of Narcissism and The True and Only Heaven. John Gray (b. 1948) in Straw Dogs turns the whole apparatus against liberal humanism and its faith in progress.

For epistemic dependence, the sources are John Hardwig, whose 1985 paper named the problem, C.A.J. Coady in Testimony, and Steven Shapin in A Social History of Truth, who shows trust standing under even the hardest knowledge.

These premises move freely in polite society when they wear evolutionary psychology, communitarian philosophy, cultural anthropology, or the conservative inheritance. The same premises, stated plainly and drawn toward their political conclusions, get a man expelled from those rooms. The respectable carriers keep their standing by holding the anthropology and declining the politics Mearsheimer is willing to name. That gap, between who may say these things and who may act on them, is the part almost no one writes about.

A correction. Tribalism as fact does not yield favor your tribe. Haidt holds the same anthropology and draws the reverse lesson: your moral mind lies to you, so distrust it, build institutions that check it, practice humility toward the people you find disgusting. Mearsheimer holds it and draws the nationalist lesson: the bonds are real and durable, so stop pretending the species dissolves into a liberal universal, and let nations be nations. One description, two roads. The fact says nothing about which to take. So polite society does not police the premise. It polices the road. You may carry the dark anthropology into the room on one condition, that you pay it off with the meliorist conclusion, the humility, the warning against your own instincts. Hold the fact and recommend restraint, keep your chair. Hold the fact and recommend partiality, lose it. The toll is the direction you point the same truth.
Then the question of why partiality is the firing offense and restraint the dues. In-group preference does not read the same on every group. Among out-groups and minorities it reads as peoplehood, solidarity, self-determination, and the institutions bless it. Among majority or founding or dominant groups it reads as chauvinism, and the institutions were built after 1945 to suppress it. So the same sentence, my people should look after their own, is civic virtue from one mouth and menace from another. The anthropology is neutral as to coalition. The license is not. That asymmetry is the live wire in the whole subject, and touching it is the thing that gets a man put out.
Society already acts on the premises. It runs ethnic patronage, diaspora lobbies, group remedies, speech rules that protect some groups from others, immigration politics keyed to who counts as us. It acts on the tribal anthropology every day, for some coalitions, against others, and never under the banner of the anthropology. So the gap does not sit between belief and action. The action is everywhere. The gap sits between the action and its avowal. Naming the thing is the crime. Doing it is administration. Mearsheimer’s sin is not that he wants tribes to matter. They already govern. His sin is that he says so in the open and points at the asymmetry that lets the saying be punished selectively.
This explains the silence. The cost of describing the gate is paid at the gate. The men positioned to see it, the respectable carriers, hold their standing on the condition of not saying it, so their incentive runs against the only sentence that would describe it. The men who do say it, the dissident right and the realists, arrive pre-discredited, so their description does not register as scholarship. It registers as recruiting. The topic is self-sealing. The toll falls on whoever names the toll. That is why the literature thins to nothing right at the point where it would get interesting.
Here is the strongest argument for leaving it alone, and a serious man has to answer it. The gap might be load-bearing. A polity of tribal animals may cohere only by forbidding the open avowal of tribalism. The taboo does the work that Plato gave the noble lie and that the fourth chapter of Turner’s book Making Democratic Theory Democratic gives to myth: it suppresses the war of all coalitions by denying that the coalitions are at war. Schmitt sits behind the curtain with the friend and the enemy, and the curtain is the thing keeping the room from becoming a battlefield. On this reading the silence is not failure of nerve. It is distributed prudence. To name the gate is not to liberate anyone. It is to hand every tribe the permission slip at once and detonate the truce. The writer who tears the veil thinks he is telling the truth. He may be firing the starting gun.
The counter is that the guardrail has a shelf life, and the bill comes due in the way Turner’s populists arrive. A rule administered to one coalition and not another stays stable only while the disfavored coalition fails to notice, or lacks the numbers and the voice to object. Cheap speech lowers the cost of noticing. Once the asymmetry is visible to the people on the wrong side of it, the denial stops calming them and starts enraging them, and the populism is the predicted result, not a malfunction. So the gate is a guardrail with an expiration, and the eruptions of the last decade are what expiration looks like.
I will not pretend to resolve it, because the resolution is the contested thing. The descriptive claim holds: the premises move freely in academic dress and get a man expelled in plain clothes, and the line tracks coalition rather than truth. What that gap is, a hypocrisy to expose or a fiction holding the floor up, divides exactly along the politics the anthropology was supposed to be neutral about. And the writer who wants to describe the gate honestly has the standpoint problem from before. He cannot get outside the room to report on the door, because there is no outside. He writes from a coalition too, and the act of naming the asymmetry is a move in the game he claims to be describing.

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Making Democratic Theory Democratic (2023)

Grant John J. Mearsheimer his anthropology, and most of this book survives. Authors Stephen Turner and George Mazur have already done much of the demolition Mearsheimer wants done.
They deflate. Democracy is a majoritarian procedure for making law and choosing leaders, no more. The will of the people is a fiction, and they cite Max Weber (1864-1920) saying so. Values vary from man to man, and no reasoner stands outside the variation to rank them. The Rawlsian veil and the Straussian philosopher are virtual beings, not citizens. John Rawls (1921-2002) and Leo Strauss (1899-1973) each build a reasoner who escapes his socialization to reach a standard above the fray. Turner says no such reasoner exists. The rule of law, stripped of its decorative associations, is a coercive order obeyed and effective, turnable to many ends.
All of this sits well with Mearsheimer. Both men reject the rationalist, universalist picture of the liberal self. Both treat the unencumbered chooser as a story. Turner’s Ideologiekritik of liberal shibboleths and Mearsheimer’s demolition of liberal universalism cut in the same direction. So the book is not a target. It is, for long stretches, an ally.
Now the damage.
Turner clears away the virtual citizen and keeps a thinner one, the conversationalist. He sets the conversation against the abstraction. Citizens, he writes, persuade each other on factual, prudential, pragmatic, and empathic grounds, and might reach a novel compromise. This is his wish, the thing he defends once the absolutist models fall. Grant Mearsheimer and the conversationalist joins Rawls and Strauss as a fiction. Mearsheimer ranks reason the weakest of the three sources of preference, behind socialization and innate sentiment, and he says the value infusion lands early, before a man can think for himself. A conversation that moves men by reasons is the open reasonable feedback Mearsheimer denies. Men do not get talked out of their group attachments by prudential and empathic appeals. They defend the coalition and find reasons after. Turner thinned the liberal reasoner without killing him.
Watch where Turner puts value. It varies, he says, from person to person. Different men value different things and ground their preferences in different experience. The unit of valuation is the individual. This is the fact-value picture he takes from Kelsen (1881-1973): values are personal, hot cognition, relative to the cognizer. Mearsheimer moves the unit. Value is not first personal and idiosyncratic. The family and the society impose the value infusion, and men hold strong attachment to the group and sacrifice for it. So the variation Turner sees among individuals is, on Mearsheimer’s account, variation among the tribes that made those individuals. Turner’s value-relativism stays individualist at its root, the same root liberalism stands on. He keeps the atomistic seat of value while denying the atomistic reasoner. Mearsheimer relocates value to the coalition and reads individual preference as the tribe speaking through the man.
The fourth chapter, on anti-populism, runs closest to Mearsheimer and then stops one step short. Turner calls the people, the state, and expertise an unstable triad, and says it is mythogenic. Stabilizing it requires fictions. Expertise is the neutral third leg, and its neutrality is a legitimacy claim, a myth that lets administrators rule while the people keep a place without power. Anti-populism is the counter-myth that reconciles practices drawn from absolutism with the rhetoric of democracy. This is close to Mearsheimer already. The expert faction claims the narrative engine of the state under cover of neutrality. But Turner reaches for myth where Mearsheimer reaches for tribe, and the difference holds. A myth is a story a society tells to stabilize an arrangement. A tribe is a coalition fighting rivals for control. Turner’s myths float a little free of the warring groups that author them. He treats them as answers to a structural problem, the triad that cannot be balanced. Mearsheimer grounds each myth in a coalition’s bid to win and to coerce the belief of others. Read his way, anti-populism is not a fiction the system needs. It is the weapon one faction, the credentialed, carries against another, the people, and the talk of neutrality is the disguise tribal power wears in a regime that must still call itself democratic.
The deepest tension lies in the standpoint. Turner’s enterprise is meta. He offers a framework that enables understanding, not a side in the fight. He excludes ideology from the basic framework. He half-admits the strain when he writes that meta arguments have the effect of taking sides. Grant Mearsheimer and the strain becomes the whole problem. There is no meta position. The man doing Ideologiekritik is socialized, tribal, reason-weak, the same as the men he studies. His deflationary positivism is not a view from above. It is a position in the contest, and it serves a coalition: the realists and positivists against the Rawlsian left and the Straussian right, the anti-normativists against the normativists. Turner the value-relativist becomes, on his own premises read through Mearsheimer, a participant who mistook his faction’s frame for neutrality. The critic of myths makes a myth, the myth of the standpoint that sees myths plain. Mearsheimer denies any man the buffered position the method needs.
So the book and the frame agree on the corpse and part over what killed it and what lives. Both bury the rational universal liberal self. Turner buries it and keeps three things: the reasoning conversationalist, the individual as the seat of value, and the meta-critic who stands clear of ideology. Mearsheimer’s premises take all three. What remains, granted those premises, is closer to Turner’s own anti-populism chapter than to his conversational ideal. A permanent contest among tribes for the engine that makes belief, with procedures, expertise, and the rule of law as its truce lines and its weapons, and no conversation wide enough, no critic neutral enough, to rise above the fight.

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Stephen P. Turner’s Anthropology & Epistemics

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

If Mearsheimer’s premises are right, the impact on Stephen Park Turner (b. 1951) is nuanced. His framework would receive both a powerful validation and a major structural challenge.
As a Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of South Florida, Turner has spent his career examining the philosophy of the social sciences, the nature of expertise, and the sociology of knowledge. The realist framework intersects with his life work in two ways.
One. The validation of his critique of shared culture. In The Social Theory of Practices, Turner argues against collective, supra-individual concepts like a uniform “culture” that group members simply download and share. Instead, he focuses on the actual, messy mechanics of transmission. He posits that what looks like a cohesive collective culture is a rough uniformity built through individual interactions, varied personal experiences, and feedback loops. If Mearsheimer is right about the total power of childhood value infusions, Turner’s emphasis on the transmission mechanism is completely validated. Culture is not an abstract cloud floating above individuals; it is a concrete, persistent series of behavioral habits and moral codes driven into the young to create group cohesion. However, the realist premise pushes Turner’s model further than his individualist focus on varied interactions implies because it suggests that these feedback mechanisms are not accidental or open-ended, but are heavily wired by an evolutionary necessity for tight in-group solidarity.
Two. Validates Turner’s analysis of epistemic inequality. In The Politics of Expertise and Liberal Democracy 3.0, Turner tracks the rising authority of technical and scientific experts in modern society. He points out that this reliance on experts introduces a profound “epistemic inequality” into liberal democracy, creating a fundamental tension between technocratic guidance and public governance. If the realist premise holds, Turner’s skepticism toward the neutral authority of experts is fully vindicated. Experts are not value-free information processors standing above the tribal fray. They are highly socialized members of a specific elite sub-tribe, trained in academic fortresses. The data and objective policy recommendations they issue are not neutral truths, but the protective ideology of their own institutional caste. Turner’s warning that expertise introduces a new axis of inequality matches the realist conclusion: “expert knowledge” functions as a highly effective weapon used by a managerial tribe to assert dominance over competing social groups.
While Turner is a sharp critic of how expertise distorts democratic processes, his work seeks to understand how civil society and liberal structures might adapt to or survive these epistemic tensions. If Mearsheimer is right, the very concept of a stable liberal democracy operating via open, reasonable feedback loops is an illusion. The tension Turner identifies cannot be managed or resolved through a better structural design of civil society. The rise of competing experts and the suppression of alternative views through “epistemic coercion” are not institutional malfunctions that can be corrected; they are the permanent, zero-sum dynamics of tribal factions fighting to control the narrative engine of the state.
Mearsheimer and Turner agree that epistemic coercion and epistemic dependence sit together because a man knows almost nothing on his own. He takes most of what he holds true on trust, from teachers, books, experts, and the people around him. John Hardwig gave this the name epistemic dependence in 1985, and it follows from the division of cognitive labor. No one checks the chemistry, the law, the history, and the medicine for himself. He relies on others who claim to know.
Once you grant that, coercion stops looking like a fault in the system and starts looking like a feature of the ground. Whoever controls the sources a man leans on holds power over what that man believes. The dependence is the opening. You cannot close the opening without removing the dependence, and you cannot remove the dependence, because no one thinks alone any more than he survives alone. That is the bridge to Mearsheimer. The social necessity he describes at the level of survival shows up again at the level of belief. We are embedded thinkers for the same reason we are embedded actors. By necessity.
Turner does not agree that these tensions are permanent, zero-sum, past repair by any design of civil society. Turner writes that structures can alter and mitigate. Mitigate is the word to watch. A man who held the contest zero-sum would not reach for it. Turner tells you the room for institutional work is real. Courts, universities, a free press, rival centers of expertise, these change how dependence spreads and how coercion travels. They do something.
Turner’s books, The Politics of Expertise and Liberal Democracy 3.0 among them, doubt that anyone can engineer the conditions of legitimate knowledge from above. The people who would design the mitigating structures depend on experts too. They face the same problem they mean to fix. And the effects of any reform run loose. You cannot model them in advance and collect the result you planned. So structures help, and the help comes without a guarantee and without a forecast.
There is slack between the anthropologies of Mearsheimer and Turner. The slack is small, and no one can promise where it leads, and inside that slack runs Turner’s project. He does not defend the liberal dream of open reasonable feedback. He denies that its failure leaves only tribal warfare with nothing left over. The slack is the partial, unreliable purchase that structures keep on a problem they can never solve.
The case for convenient belief by Turner here is strong. Take away the slack, seal the contest, call it zero-sum, and his books and articles lose their subject. A scholar of how liberal structures survive needs the structures to survive a little. The mitigation thesis keeps the enterprise running. He has spent his career on whether expertise and democracy can be reconciled, and a man cannot spend a career on a question he holds already closed. So the belief pays him. It pays his standing, his shelf, his reason to keep writing. The first beneficiary of the belief is Turner.
But convenience names the pull on a man who holds a belief. It says nothing about whether the belief tracks the world. A view can serve the one who holds it and still be true.
Now the part that complicates the easy verdict. Watch how little he kept. He concedes almost the entire hard claim by Mearsheimer. Rooted in necessity, yes. He keeps only “partially and unpredictably,” the smallest remainder a man could keep and still have work to do. A purely convenient belief runs the other way. It inflates. The comfortable version says structures work, reform succeeds, the dream sits within reach. That flatters the liberal and flatters the scholar’s craft. Turner refuses it. He also refuses the tribal answer that would please the realist. His hedge pleases no coalition.
Turner concedes the maximum, retains the minimum, and you have what an honest mind looks like under pressure. You also have what convenience looks like once an honest mind puts it on a short leash. The frame cannot pry those two apart from the outside. What you can say with confidence: if this is convenience, it runs lean. He bought himself the least belief that keeps the lights on, and he paid full price in concessions for it.

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What Might A Democratic Party Platform Look Like If It Aligned With Reality?

If John Mearsheimer’s premises are right, meaning humans are deeply tribal, national identity reigns supreme, and abstract moral crusades mask the raw struggle for security in an anarchic world, the Democratic Party would face a total structural realignment.

To remain viable, the party would have to abandon the modern post-Cold War consensus of liberal internationalism, borderless cosmopolitanism, and technocratic global governance. Instead, a realist Democratic platform would fuse left-wing economic solidarity with an intense focus on preserving domestic group stability, using state power to protect the working-class tribe from the disruptive forces of global capital and international conflict.A platform built on these realist imperatives would lead on four primary pillars.

1. Class Solidarity as Tribal Cohesion

Modern Democratic platforms often treat economic policy through a universalist lens of human rights or individual opportunity. Under a realist framework, economic disparity is recognized as a direct threat to the internal solidarity of the national tribe.

High, progressive taxation on mobile capital, the revitalization of powerful labor unions through federal protection, and massive state-directed redistribution programs like universal healthcare and guaranteed public employment.

If a nation-state is to survive in a competitive global system, it cannot allow its internal population to fracture along wealth lines. Class stratification undermines the shared sense of oneness necessary for a tribe to sacrifice for the collective good. The working class must be economically locked into the state’s survival, ensuring they view the national government as their primary protector.

When capital is highly mobile and concentrated in a small, transnational managerial caste, that elite develops interests separate from the national group. They no longer rely on the local working class for their status, and they no longer view the survival of the state as tied to their personal well-being.

This detachment creates a dangerous internal fault line. If the ordinary citizens who populate the military, manufacture the goods, and maintain the infrastructure see that the state functions primarily to protect the assets of a detached elite, their willingness to sacrifice for the collective good evaporates. In a great power conflict, a state with an alienated working class faces internal rot and potential collapse.

Under this model, high progressive taxation is not a tool for achieving cosmic fairness; it is an act of state preservation. It is designed to pin capital to the territory of the nation.

By imposing severe financial penalties on capital flight and offshoring, the state forces corporate entities to reinvest their surpluses domestically. The wealth generated within the borders is systematically captured and transformed into tangible state capacity.

Standard economics views labor unions either as market distortions that reduce corporate profits or as instruments for individual worker empowerment. A realist platform completely reframes organized labor as a vital mechanism for internal stability.

Federal laws that mandate unionization and protect collective bargaining perform a critical sociological function: they institutionalize class conflict within a controlled, state-sanctioned architecture. By giving the working class an institutionalized lever to secure a premium on their labor, the state prevents the development of radical, anti-systemic domestic movements. Unions become a stabilizing force, binding the material destiny of industrial workers to the regulatory power of the state.

The establishment of massive, state-directed redistribution networks—such as universal healthcare and a federal job guarantee—serves as the ultimate engine of civic socialization.

By removing healthcare from the private market and placing it entirely under state administration, the citizen’s physical survival is rendered explicitly dependent on the survival of the government. Private anxieties are replaced by a baseline reliance on the public apparatus.

A federal job guarantee ensures that during global economic downturns or supply chain reorientations, the human capital of the nation is not left to decay in unemployment. The state absorbs the excess labor pool, directing it toward the construction of roads, ports, energy facilities, and defense infrastructure.

The ultimate objective of this platform is to build an unyielding psychological and material link between the ordinary citizen and the sovereign state.

If human beings are naturally tribal and look to their group for defense against a hostile world, the national government must be the undisputed provider of that defense. When a worker receives his healthcare, his employment, and his community’s economic stability directly from the state, his loyalty to that state becomes absolute.

Class stratification is erased not to achieve a utopian, borderless equality, but to forge a highly disciplined, cohesive social unit. By locking the working class economically into the state’s survival, the nation ensures that when it must compete against rival great powers, its internal population operates as a singular, unbreakable column.

If Mearsheimer’s premises are right, a Democratic Party looking to secure its long-term survival would radically alter its approach to hot-button social issues like Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) and transgender rights.

Currently, the progressive wing of the party approaches these issues through a combination of post-modern intersectionality and liberal universalism. They treat minority identities as global, unencumbered categories of individual rights that must be liberated from local historical power structures.

Under a realist framework, this approach is exposed as an internal security disaster. If human beings are fundamentally tribal and require a unified national identity to maintain the internal cohesion necessary to survive great power competition, then fragmenting the population into competing sub-tribes is a form of state suicide.

To maintain political dominance and protect the state, a realist Democratic platform would strip these social issues of their intersectional rhetoric, re-framing them through the strict logic of national integration, majoritarian solidarity, and civic socialization.

Modern DEI programs are built on the assumption that a institution must mirror and elevate distinct group identities, often cultivating a race-conscious, sub-tribal awareness.

Democrats would dismantle the current iteration of DEI, replacing it with a state-directed program of Civic Integration and Shared Class Identity.

If you teach a multi-ethnic population to view themselves primarily through the lens of separate racial and cultural sub-tribes, you dissolve the shared “oneness” required for a nation-state to endure. The party would stop using DEI as a tool to celebrate permanent fragmentation. Instead, they would use public institutions and corporate frameworks to enforce a singular, working-class national identity. Diversity would no longer be celebrated as an end in itself; it would be treated as a demographic reality that the state must actively manage and assimilate into a cohesive, patriotic whole to prevent domestic balkanization.

The dominant progressive position on transgender issues rests on radical individualism—the belief that the individual mind is a self-authoring entity that can completely redefine its identity, biology, and social role independent of collective norms.

The party would pivot away from defending fluid, open-ended gender definitions, instead anchoring its policies in state-sanctioned stability, age-restricted medical protocols, and the preservation of majoritarian social norms.

Early, non-negotiable childhood socialization is what keeps a human society stable. When an institution introduces concepts that suggest the baseline biological coordinates of a community are infinitely plastic and self-directed, it induces deep cultural anxiety and weakens the group’s foundational socialization engine (the family). To protect its standing with the broader working-class tribe, the Democratic platform would adopt a position of institutional stabilization. They would restrict gender-affirming care for minors, protect traditional privacy spaces based on biological realities, and frame the issue around civic tolerance for adults rather than a state-sponsored rewriting of social biology.

Under this realist realignment, the way Democrats talk about social issues would shift entirely. They would no longer speak the language of individual expression or global human rights.

The party would argue that internal social peace is a national security requirement. Constant, low-intensity cultural warfare over pronouns, corporate quotas, and historical revisionism drains the state’s energy and prevents the formation of a unified front against external adversaries like China.

By dumping the unpopular, hyper-individualistic vanguard elements of the cultural left, a realist Democratic Party would remove the primary cultural weapon the Republican Party uses to win over the working class. They would settle the culture war through an enforcement of majoritarian stability, clearing the terrain to focus entirely on their primary structural goal: locking the working class into a powerful, insulated, and hyper-cohesive domestic economic fortress.

2. Progressive Environmental Realism

The conventional platform frames climate change as a global moral imperative requiring international treaties, shared carbon markets, and multilateral cooperation. A realist Democratic platform would strip away this cosmopolitan rhetoric.

An aggressive, state-directed industrial mobilization to achieve complete clean energy autarky, deploying heavy federal capital into domestic wind, solar, and next-generation nuclear infrastructure, combined with carbon tariffs on foreign competitors.

The party would stop pretending that global climate agreements can override the self-interest of rival great powers like China or Russia. Instead, the green transition would be weaponized as a tool for national security. By freeing the state from reliance on global oil and gas supply chains, the platform ensures the national tribe cannot be strangled by foreign adversaries during geopolitical crises.

3. Foreign Policy Restraint and Domestic Reconstruction

For decades, the foreign policy establishment within the Democratic Party championed “liberal hegemony”—using American military power to spread democracy, enforce international law, and build transnational institutions. Mearsheimer’s core thesis labels this a catastrophic failure that triggers bloody nationalist backlashes abroad.

A grand strategy of restraint and offshore balancing. The party would advocate for the winding down of open-ended foreign entanglements, the rejection of humanitarian interventions, and a sharp reduction in global military footprint, redirecting hundreds of billions of dollars into domestic infrastructure, public education, and state capacity.

Nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on earth; foreign populations will always violently resist American attempts at social engineering. The state must husband its power, preserve its blood and treasure, and focus strictly on maintaining a balance of power in critical regions, letting local actors bear the costs of regional stability.

4. Controlled Borders for Labor and Social Stability

The modern progressive faction often views strict border enforcement with skepticism, advocating for relaxed asylum laws and open paths for global migration. A realist platform recognizes that an influx of unassimilated populations destabilizes the internal culture.

A highly regulated, enforcement-heavy immigration system that ties entry strictly to domestic labor shortages, paired with massive federal funding for public integration programs, English language education, and civic socialization.

If intense childhood and civic socialization is what creates a functional human community, a state cannot maintain order if it introduces millions of individuals from entirely different socialization engines without a strict mechanism for assimilation. Border control is not treated as a racial or moral issue, but as a basic requirement for protecting the domestic labor market and maintaining the cultural cohesion of the existing national group.

5. Sovereign Labor Subsidies and the Anti-Globalist Welfare State

The platform would abandon the classic neoliberal approach to welfare, which relies on globalized growth to lift all boats and retraining programs to fix structural unemployment.

Enact a federal job guarantee in public infrastructure, direct wage subsidies for unionized domestic workers, and the implementation of aggressive wealth taxes to permanently fund a fortress of universal public services (childcare, healthcare, and state pensions).

If internal friction weakens a group’s survival capacity, extreme wealth inequality is a national security crisis. The platform treats the working class not as atomistic consumers looking for the cheapest imported goods, but as the primary human core of the nation. By insulating this group from global labor market shocks, the state builds unyielding domestic loyalty and structural stability.

6. Demolishing Corporate Monopolies as Hostile Internal Factions

The platform would move past standard regulatory anti-trust enforcement and treat multi-national tech, finance, and agricultural conglomerates as powerful, un-socialized internal factions whose interests run counter to the national tribe.

The systematic breaking up or nationalization of mega-corporations that control vital infrastructure, such as digital banking networks, pharmaceutical manufacturing, and communication utilities. Corporate charters would be tied directly to a mandate for national public utility.

In a zero-sum political environment, an elite corporate caste with no national loyalty is an existential threat. These entities use their vast wealth to captured regulatory bodies and shape public narratives for their own benefit. The state must crush these independent power centers to ensure that the material resources of the country remain under the direct control of the democratic collective.

7. The Defense of Public Space and Radical Civic Socialization

The platform would recognize that left-wing political longevity requires capturing the primary socialization engines of the state. It would abandon the idea that civic values emerge organically from a neutral public square.

Massive federal investment into physical public goods—parks, libraries, municipal recreation centers, and state-funded civic clubs—paired with a mandatory curriculum in public schools that explicitly instills a moral code of civic obligation, collective labor history, and national solidarity.

If human minds are captured by early value infusions, leaving the social landscape to be atomized by private real estate developers, commercial algorithms, and insular private schools is political suicide. The party would actively use public infrastructure to forge a unified social identity, injecting the young with a shared moral framework centered on collective mutual aid and loyalty to the democratic state.

8. Ecological Territorialism and Resource Denationalization

The party would reframe the environmental movement away from international carbon markets and transnational climate treaties, which are consistently subverted by great power self-interest.

The aggressive invocation of national security powers to seize, protect, and restore public lands, water networks, and agricultural resources from private or foreign exploitation, combined with severe ecological tariffs on imported goods produced via environmental degradation.

A tribe cannot survive without a secure, fertile, and self-contained material habitat. Environmental degradation is treated as a physical invasion of the national territory. By securing and state-managing the physical landscape, the platform ensures that the primary biological prerequisites for the group’s long-term survival—clean water, arable land, and dense domestic energy—remain entirely sovereign and insulated from global market volatility.

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What Might A Republican Platform Look Like If It Aligned With Reality?

If John J. Mearsheimer’s premises are correct that human behavior is governed by innate tribal sentiments and childhood value infusions, that abstract reason is a weak secondary tool, and that the international arena is an unyielding great power competition, the Republican Party would maximize its interests by abandoning conventional libertarianism and neoconservative globalism.

Instead, the platform would focus entirely on protecting the native tribe’s primary socialization engine and securing the material power of the state within a dangerous, anarchic world.

A platform engineered around these realist imperatives would lead on these pillars:

1. Absolute Sovereign Border Protection and Cultural Assimilation

Under the realist lens, a state cannot survive if its internal cohesion fractures. A borderless nation or a completely fragmented multicultural society is an existential failure.

An immediate, severe restriction on immigration, coupled with an aggressive, state-backed mandate for cultural assimilation.

The platform would treat immigration not as an economic calculation of cheap labor (rejecting the corporate libertarian view), but as a demographic challenge to group solidarity. To ensure state survival, incoming individuals must be thoroughly digested by the native tribe’s socialization engine, adopting its language, legal traditions, and historical memory.

2. Economic Mercantilism and Industrial Sovereignty

Neoliberal globalism and free-trade agreements like NAFTA assume that global efficiency maximizes human welfare. Mearsheimer’s premises reveal this as a catastrophic vulnerability: interdependence creates weakness.

High strategic tariffs, aggressive industrial policies to repatriate manufacturing, and total supply-chain independence in steel, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and energy.

If Mearsheimer’s premises are right, a sophisticated Republican economic platform must entirely reject the mid-century consensus that separated “free markets” from “national security.” In an anarchic world where state survival depends on relative power, economic policy is simply a weapon of statecraft.

A fully realized Republican Trade and Industrial Policy platform built on these realist imperatives moves beyond generic protectionism. It structures the state to achieve absolute material self-reliance, strategic insulation, and dominance over great power rivals.

The goal of trade policy is no longer consumer welfare or absolute global efficiency; it is the minimization of strategic vulnerability. Interdependence is weakness.

Implement a permanent, non-negotiable baseline tariff on all foreign manufactured goods, with an aggressive, multi-tiered tariff regime specifically targeting non-market adversaries. This systematically alters the cost-benefit analysis for domestic firms, forcing the repatriation of capital.

Move away from multilateral frameworks like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Most-Favored-Nation principle. Trade agreements must be bilateral, strictly conditional, and based on absolute reciprocity. If a foreign nation imposes a tariff or non-tariff barrier on an American product, the US automatically mirrors that exact barrier.

Revoke Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR). Strip strategic adversaries of normal trade status. The state uses targeted enforcement mechanisms under Section 301 and Section 232 to systematically sever economic dependencies in dual-use technologies and advanced manufacturing.

The state cannot rely on the open market to provision the baseline requirements of survival. The party abandons laissez-faire abstraction to mandate domestic production capabilities in four existential pillars:

Force the rebuilding of domestic productive capacity in steel, aluminum, copper, heavy trucks, and shipbuilding through state-guaranteed purchase agreements and long-term capital subsidies.

Mandate that all essential medicines, active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and medical equipment used in American hospitals or stockpiles be manufactured within the physical borders of the United States.

Critical minerals. Establish a state-directed, border-adjusted price mechanism for critical minerals and rare earth elements. The state insulates domestic mining and processing from foreign predatory pricing, creating a secure, alternative supply network independent of adversary control.

Extend aggressive domestic fabrication mandates down the entire supply chain—not just for high-end logic chips, but for the legacy and foundational chips that power defense infrastructure, telecommunications, and the automotive sector.

Capital mobility must be subordinated to the national interest. Wall Street cannot be permitted to fund the rise of foreign adversaries or hollow out domestic stability for short-term arbitrage.

Ban American venture capital, private equity, and institutional funds from investing in technology, manufacturing, or infrastructure assets located within strategic adversary nations.

Make the 18% corporate tax rate and full capital expensing contingent on domestic manufacturing footprint. Corporations that outsource production face punitive tax penalties and are barred from receiving federal contracts, research grants, or participating in public-private partnerships.

Use state power to acquire “golden shares” or direct equity positions in critical, fragile domestic industries (such as specialized aerospace or advanced machine tools) to shield them from foreign acquisition, hostile takeovers, or bankruptcy during market downturns.

A manufacturing renaissance requires cheap, dense, and dispatchable power. The platform treats energy not as a regulatory portfolio, but as the foundational input for all industrial competitiveness.

Eliminate federal tax credits and mandates for intermittent green energy sources that destabilize the grid and inflate industrial power costs.

Fast-track permitting timelines, opening public lands for resource extraction, and executing state-backed guarantees for the construction of a new generation of small modular civilian nuclear reactors and natural gas infrastructure directly attached to industrial manufacturing hubs.

A factory is useless without a disciplined, highly skilled workforce. The platform treats the working class as the vital human core of the national tribe, protecting it from both wage suppression and ideological alienation. Opportunities for honor and status must be expanded to include more persons who do not go to college.

Abolish foreign guest-worker programs and low-skill visas that multi-national corporations use to bypass American workers and suppress wages in the construction and manufacturing sectors.

Divert federal student loan guarantees and research funding away from abstract humanities programs at elite universities and directing those resources into localized vocational training, technical institutes, and advanced engineering programs explicitly aligned with regional industrial needs.

In a zero-sum, competitive world, the “wealth of nations” is secondary to the “security of nations.” The platform would reject the myth of a borderless global market. It would treat economic policy as an instrument of statecraft designed to maintain the material dominance of the state over rivals like China, while ensuring the domestic working class remains loyal and economically integrated into the national tribe.

3. Retrenchment and Realist Foreign Policy

The neoconservative crusade to export democracy and enforce a “rules-based international order” through military intervention is viewed under this framework as a dangerous liberal delusion. It triggers intense nationalist resistance abroad and wastes the state’s blood and treasure.

A foreign policy of offshore balancing and strategic retrenchment. The military would pull back from open-ended nation-building deployments in the Middle East or eastern Europe. Resources would be concentrated entirely on maintaining a lethal nuclear deterrent and a dominant naval and technological presence in critical geographic zones (like the Indo-Pacific) to check rival great powers.

Alliances are temporary arrangements based on raw self-interest, not permanent moral commitments to shared values. The state must husband its power and let regional rivals balance against each other, intervening only when an existential threat directly challenges the global balance of power.

4. Recapturing the Domestic Socialization Engines

The most critical domestic battle under a realist framework is the fight over value infusion. The party would recognize that whoever controls the schools, the universities, and the legal defaults controls the future of the tribe.

The systematic defunding of DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) bureaucracies in public institutions, universal school choice to bypass captured public school systems, and the protection of traditional family structures and religious freedom through federal and state law.

If a child’s moral imagination is captured during a long childhood before critical thinking develops, the left-wing managerial tribe’s current monopoly over elite education is an existential threat to conservative survival. The platform would stop appealing to a neutral “marketplace of ideas” and use raw state power to dismantle the opposing faction’s fortresses, ensuring that the next generation is injected with a moral code centered on national loyalty, civic duty, and historical continuity.

5. Explicit Pro-Natalism and Demographic Security

The platform would abandon the standard view of family policy as either a purely private religious issue or an abstract tax credit consideration. It would treat demographic decline as an immediate threat to the long-term survival of the national tribe.

Aggressive, state-backed financial and social incentives for married native citizens to have larger families, combined with the restriction of foreign worker programs that suppress domestic wages.

A state cannot project power or maintain internal solidarity without a stable, replacement-level population that shares a unified historical identity. Relying on mass immigration to fill labor shortages is a catastrophic structural failure that introduces incompatible socialization models into the state. Demographic security is the foundation of national power.

6. The Subversion of Left-Wing Institutional Fortresses

The platform would recognize that the long march through the institutions executed by the progressive managerial tribe cannot be countered by pleading for “viewpoint diversity.” It would treat captured universities, foundations, and public broadcasters as hostile territory that must be dismantled.

Using the power of the purse and federal tax codes to target elite university endowments, stripping tax-exempt status from ideological non-profit foundations, and establishing new, state-directed parallel institutions that explicitly train a counter-elite in traditional national values.

If childhood and early-adulthood value infusions dictate lifelong political loyalty, leaving the elite credentialing apparatus in the hands of an opposing faction is a form of political suicide. The party would stop pretending the university is a neutral seminar room and treat it as a captured fortress that must be subverted through raw state power.

7. Technological Autarky and Sovereign Data Control

The platform would reject the Silicon Valley myth of a borderless digital commons managed by multi-national corporations. It would treat technology and information infrastructure as the primary modern terrain of great power conflict.

The mandatory domestic ownership and localization of all critical data infrastructure, severe federal restrictions on foreign tech platforms, and state-directed investments into sovereign artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and satellite networks.

Interdependence in digital infrastructure creates extreme strategic vulnerability. Allowing foreign adversaries or detached globalist corporations to control the algorithms that shape the domestic population’s information intake is a failure of statecraft. The state must control its digital borders as strictly as its physical ones to prevent hostile psychological manipulation and espionage.

8. Legal Realism and Judicial Power Project

The platform would discard the conservative romance with abstract legal neutralism, originalist passivity, and the myth of the referee judge who simply calls balls and strikes.

The deliberate appointment of judges who view the law through the lens of legal realism—recognizing that law is an instrument of authority used to maintain social order, protect core national structures, and defend the primary group against internal subversion.

In a zero-sum struggle for political survival, appealing to neutral procedural rules while the opposing faction uses the legal apparatus to enforce its own moral code is an explicit strategy for defeat. Judicial power would be used actively to secure the administrative and legal conditions necessary for the national tribe to survive and project its authority across generations.

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John Stuart Mill and the Enlightenment

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

The atomistic liberal of The Great Delusion picks his values off a menu by reason. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) held the reverse. The force behind On Liberty comes from his fear of custom, not from any faith that men reason their way to their beliefs. He calls it the despotism of custom. He points to China as the case of a people who perfected their customs and then stood still for centuries. Mill concedes John Mearsheimer’s (b. 1947) premise before Mearsheimer states it. Most men inherit their beliefs and then defend what they inherited.
Mill does not describe man as a lone reasoner. He laments that man is a herd creature and then asks what a society might do to protect the few who are not. The individualism in On Liberty works as a prescription built on top of the social man, not as a portrait of him. Mearsheimer reads liberal individualism as a claim about what men are. In Mill it operates as a claim about what a small number of men can become, and why the rest have a stake in shielding them.
Grant the whole socialization story and Mill’s politics still stands, because his politics answers that story. He wants room for the dissenter, the eccentric, the man who runs an experiment in living, against the pressure Mearsheimer describes. He does not justify that room by pretending everyone reasons. He justifies it by the gain that comes to a society when it leaves a channel open for the rare man who pushes against the inheritance and turns out to be right.
Mill needs reason to override socialization at least sometimes, in at least a few men, under good conditions. Mearsheimer ranks reason last among the three sources of our preferences and puts socialization and inborn sentiment above it. Push that ranking hard and Mill’s hope narrows to a thin band: the exceptional mind in whom criticism outruns the value infusion. Mill half believed this himself. He worried about mediocrity and the weight of mass opinion, and he wanted a learned class to hold the higher ground. Mearsheimer’s anthropology pushes Mill toward his own colder side, the side that doubts the many and rests its hopes on the few. The democratic Mill recedes. The aristocratic Mill comes forward.
Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) read Mill’s deepest commitment as self-creation rather than happiness, the man who makes his own life as a work and chooses his own path. Set that Mill against Mearsheimer and the conflict sharpens. If the self arrives all but finished, fabricated by family and society before the boy can weigh anything, then self-creation describes a late and partial edit, not an authorship. Mearsheimer does not deny that a man can revise himself. He denies that the revising self came from nowhere. Berlin’s Mill wants an author. Mearsheimer offers an editor working on a manuscript other hands already wrote.
Mill’s view of where moral feeling comes from takes a separate hit. Mill stood with the associationists against the intuitionist school of William Whewell (1794-1866). He held that our moral sentiments, however fixed they feel, come from education and association rather than from innate structure. His reform program depends on that plasticity. Remake the schooling and the institutions and you can remake the character, and so the society. Mearsheimer lists inborn sentiment as a force that shapes how a man thinks before he thinks. If that is right, character resists the reformer’s hand more than Mill allowed, and tribal feeling sits deeper than association can reach.
The sharpest defeat falls on Mill’s cosmopolitanism. In Utilitarianism he roots the sanction of morality in the social feelings of mankind, the wish to live in unity with one’s fellows, and he thought civilization widens that feeling. There lies the hope: the circle of sympathy grows until it reaches the species. Mearsheimer agrees that man is social and bonded and ready to sacrifice for his group. He denies the expansion. The bond holds at the level of the tribe and the nation and goes no further with any force. The quarrel is not whether man is social. Both men say he is. The quarrel is the ceiling. Mill bets the sympathy climbs to humanity. Mearsheimer bets it stops at the nation, and that when nationalism and liberalism collide, the nation wins. If Mearsheimer is right, the communitarian half of Mill survives and the cosmopolitan half fails.
Mearsheimer says liberal universalism breeds crusades, the urge to carry rights to every people for their own good. Mill is the case in point, not the exception. He worked for the East India Company for most of his career. On Liberty exempts the barbarians and the societies it calls backward from the liberty principle and grants that despotism suits them so long as it improves them. The missionary liberalism Mearsheimer describes runs straight through Mill’s imperial writing. A defender can answer that Mill’s universalism comes hedged. Mill does not think you can hand free institutions to any people at any stage. He ties good government to national character and to a people’s readiness, which reads closer to Mearsheimer’s realism than to the abstract creed Mearsheimer attacks. So Mill ends up more universalist and more particularist than the figure in the book, the imperialist by his paternalism and the realist by his developmentalism.
What comes through intact is the core argument of On Liberty about speech and harm. Those arguments never rested on atomism. Mill defends open debate because collision with error keeps truth alive and because the silenced opinion may hold the part of the truth the reigning view lacks. He defends the harm principle as a line drawn around the social pressure he saw everywhere. Grant Mearsheimer’s man, the social creature shaped by inherited value, and these arguments earn their keep, because they answer the very conformity Mearsheimer treats as our default. Mill becomes less a prophet of the sovereign individual and more a designer of guardrails against the herd.
Mearsheimer ranks reason last and then writes four hundred pages of reasoned argument meant to change how readers think, and he ranks the three sources for us as though we can weigh his ranking. The genre fights the thesis. Mill at least carries a theory for why argument earns its keep among the small class that reads and writes and decides what counts as knowledge. Mearsheimer leaves reason a junior place and then asks it to do the heavy lifting of his book. The tension does not sink his anthropology. It marks the seam where his account and Mill’s might still do business, in the narrow niche where reason does more work than it does in the run of men.

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The Nathan Cofnas Debates

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Grant Mearsheimer his three claims. Men are tribal before they are anything else. Reason ranks below socialization and inborn sentiment in setting what a man wants. Colorblind meritocracy is a local creed, not a law of nature. Run the Cofnas affair through that frame and the familiar story comes apart. The free-speech reading and the inclusion reading both assume a contest over evidence and rights. The realist reading sees a tribe defending the engine that reproduces its young.
Start with what Cofnas wants, because his own program carries the flaw he finds in his enemies. He argues that wokeness follows from the equality thesis, the premise that every group holds the same spread of cognitive traits. Accept that premise and any gap left over reads as proof of hidden racism. He wants the elite to trade the equality thesis for hereditarianism, genes playing a non-trivial part in average group differences, and he expects a colorblind meritocracy of individuals to settle out the far side. The fight then narrows to which premise the elite carries.
Mearsheimer’s man wrecks the payoff. A meritocracy of sorted individuals asks men to hold still while status flows to whoever scores highest, and to take their rank without forming a faction. No people does this. Tell a group it sits low on a prized trait and it does not scatter into lone strivers. It organizes. It mobilizes along the line Mearsheimer says runs deepest. Under his premises, hereditarian facts, once public and believed, arm tribal competition rather than dissolve it. Cofnas imagines the truth about genes yields peace and merit. The realist predicts it yields sharper coalitions and a harder scramble for power and resources. So Cofnas underrates tribe in his cure as the liberals underrate it in theirs. Two rationalist projects, one blind spot.
Look at the pair side by side and they rhyme. The woke elite holds that reason and reformed schooling erase the difference and widen sympathy toward all mankind. Cofnas holds that reason and accepted data sort men by talent and leave a creed of individual merit. Both trust the right facts to govern the man. Mearsheimer ranks reason last of the three and puts the value infusion above it. Both projects misread the creature in the same direction.
The crusade reading falls on Cofnas next. His hereditarian revolution is a missionary campaign. Convert the elite at the top universities, reform the society from above, carry the unwelcome truth into the fortress for the good of all. That is the universalist structure Mearsheimer attacks in liberalism, the urge to remake men by fixing the doctrine. Cofnas stands inside the pattern, not outside it. He is another missionary with a rival gospel, and the gospel travels by argument because he believes argument moves the men who run things.
That belief is the heart of the misread. He pins his hope on a vanguard of intelligent, rational leaders who change their preferences when shown the chart. Mearsheimer’s account of childhood value infusion says the elite mind is the most socialized mind in the country, formed inside the institution that selected it, trained it, and handed it its moral coordinates. Reason there is a lawyer for inherited preference, not a scientist chasing the taboo fact. Asking that elite to adopt race realism by philosophical argument asks the immune system to welcome the thing it formed to destroy.
The institution behaves the way the frame predicts. The university reproduces a value infusion and passes it to the next ruling class. The marketplace of ideas is a story the engine tells about itself. Its work is transmission, generation to generation, of a moral code, and the equality thesis sits at the center of that code as the sacred premise. Cofnas attacks the premise at the root. Function drives what follows. They did not disprove him. They removed him, the way a body clears what threatens its cohesion, and the removal needed no finding of fact.
Cofnas held no tenure. He was a Leverhulme early-career fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy and a College Research Associate at Emmanuel, a peripheral and unprotected affiliate. The college cut the affiliation. The faculty held the line. Realism expects the tribe to cull the exposed member first, at the lowest cost, and to send its signal through the cheapest available actor. A marginal post-doc is the easy target. The pattern then repeated at Ghent, where his own department moved against the appointment. One campus might be an accident. Two is a fault line.
So the protestors read the institution right and read themselves wrong. They see that the fortress lives by enforcing its code, that an affiliated insider who breaks the code threatens the cohesion of the whole, and that the safe move is expulsion. They are correct about all of it. Then they tell themselves the expulsion serves a borderless human liberation. Under Mearsheimer it serves their tribe and no one beyond it. Realists in the deed, universalists in the self-description: that is his portrait of the liberal, drawn from life.
The affair resolves into a hard diagnosis. No neutral seminar room. No resting point in colorblind merit, because the merit creed is one tribe’s myth and the egalitarian creed is another’s, and neither describes the man as he is. The university is an arena of great power competition, and the prize is the engine that infuses the next elite. Academic freedom and the Equality Act 2010 set the rules of the contest. They do not name the prize. The only live question is which tribe runs the engine, and on what terms it shapes the moral coordinates of the men who will govern.
Cofnas bets the truth about genes will free the West, and he addresses his guide to the most heavily socialized people in the country, on the faith that argument reaches them. The genre fights the thesis, the way the genre fights Mearsheimer’s own four hundred reasoned pages. If reason ranks last, the hereditarian revolution is a sermon preached to men whose tribe has already told them what to believe. The only readers it converts are the few in whom criticism outruns the infusion. That band is real, and it is too thin to turn an elite. It is also the one niche where Cofnas, and Mearsheimer, and the argument itself still do their work.

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The Amy Wax Debates

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Grant Mearsheimer his premises. Men are tribal first. Reason sits below socialization and inborn sentiment in setting what a man wants. Universalist, individualist talk is a shield, not a description. Run the Amy Wax affair through that frame and the academic-freedom story and the inclusion story both thin. Instead, we see a fight between two coalitions for the engine that forms the next elite.
Wax argues that all cultures are not equal and defends mid-century bourgeois culture, the Anglo-Protestant legal inheritance, and assimilation. Her enemies hear White supremacy. Her friends hear a brave defense of the West. The frame hears Wax defending a value infusion. She tells the society that its order rests on a code drilled into children, and that the code holds the state together. On Mearsheimer’s account she has this right. The childhood infusion does most of the work, more than reason, and a people that loses its infusion loses its cohesion.
Then she breaks her own insight. She treats the Anglo-Protestant matrix as an open system that any individual can enter by learning the script. That is the conservative-liberal hope folded inside her realism, assimilation as a merit on-ramp for the atomized newcomer. She names a real friction, the strain when millions arrive carrying other infusions, and then she prescribes a cure that assumes the tribe is a club a man joins by reading its handbook. Mearsheimer’s man does not join a tribe that way. The script he lives by went into him in childhood, before he could weigh it, and an adult does not swap one infusion for another the way he changes an opinion.
Wax’s case rests on culture, not blood. She says the bourgeois script can be taught and absorbed, which puts socialization above inborn sentiment, the order Mearsheimer sets. The hereditarian leans the other way, on genes.
Now the institution. Penn argued professional norms and equal learning opportunity. The Heterodox Academy and the free-speech camp answered with the Chicago Principles and the marketplace of ideas. The frame treats the marketplace as a story the engine tells. The elite university transmits a moral code to the class that will run things, generation after generation, and a managerial faction now holds the engine and runs a code built around diversity, equity, and inclusion. The sacred premise of that code is the equality of groups and the openness of the multicultural settlement. Wax attacks the sacred premise by name and in public.
The sanction follows from that function. Her offense, in the frame, is the breach of the sacred said out loud. A tribe punishes the spoken heresy harder than the private doubt, because the spoken heresy threatens the cohesion the code exists to hold.
Penn left her tenure standing. One year of suspension at half pay, the loss of her named chair and her summer pay in perpetuity, a public reprimand, and a standing order that she state at every appearance that she speaks for herself and not for the law school. The faction measured the cost. A tenured chair is an expensive target. Dismissal makes a martyr and hands the courts a clean claim. So the tribe drew the boundary, shamed the heretic, and contained her, all short of the rupture that firing brings. The disclaimer is the sharpest stroke and the most telling. It cuts her voice away from the tribe’s name. You may speak, it says, but never again in our name. Against a peripheral affiliate the tribe can expel outright. Against a tenured insider it calibrates. The cost of the target sets the maneuver.
Her legal strategy then walks into the frame. She files under Titles VI and VII and her tenure contract, appealing to colorblind, neutral principle. The court reframed the suit as breach of contract and set the speech claim aside. The district judge dismissed the case in August 2025. She stands now on appeal before the Third Circuit, with a separate contract suit filed in Pennsylvania state court in November 2025 waiting behind it. The realist reading says the neutral-rights vocabulary she reaches for belongs to the order the faction has already displaced, and that law serves the arrangement in power, so she pleads the old rules into a room that keeps new defaults.
If law were only an instrument of the dominant tribe, Wax would hold no case. She holds one. A contract claim has teeth a captured institution cannot wish away. Procedure binds even a faction that runs the engine. Belief and contract suits sometimes lose in the first round and win on appeal, as Forstater did in Britain. Pure realism overshoots here. The old liberal rules are not a fiction all the way down. They run weaker than Wax hopes and stronger than the frame allows, and the appeal is the place to watch which reading the law bears out.
Then the symmetry. Both sides reject the neutral university, and both dress their tribe in a universal creed. The new faction wields inclusion and harm reduction to purge dissent and enforce its code, and it tells itself it serves a borderless human equality. The traditionalist camp wields academic freedom and merit to hold ground for the old alignment, and it tells itself it serves universal reason and the open society. Each pairs a true tribal instinct with a false universal story.
The affair resolves where the Cofnas affair resolves. No neutral seminar room. No value-free university, because the university is always a site of socialization and never anything else. The only live question is which faction holds the engine and which code it pours into the students who pass through. Wax names the engine and defends one code for it. Her enemies hold the engine and defend another. The contest is great power competition over the right to form the next elite, and the rest, the principles and the statutes and the reprimands, is the vocabulary the two sides speak while they fight for the prize.
Wax defends the bourgeois infusion as the ground of a stable order, and then she asks colorblind law and open debate to rescue her, as though reasoned principle stood above the fight. The frame says reasoned principle ranks junior to the value infusion and serves whoever holds the engine. If she has it right that childhood socialization rules the man, then her appeal to neutral reason is the weakest card in her hand, and her strongest holding is the one her enemies hold too, a tribe that will fight for the engine. She asks the room to honor a creed the room no longer teaches its young.

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Benjamin Schreier: Literary Critic of Jewish Identity and Ethnic Studies

Benjamin Schreier (b. 1972) holds the Mitrani Family Professorship of Jewish Studies and a professorship in English and Jewish Studies at Penn State University, where he has directed the Jewish Studies Program and the graduate program in English. Since 2011 he edits Studies in American Jewish Literature, a journal published by Penn State University Press and one of the field’s central venues. His scholarship occupies the meeting point of literary theory, intellectual history, ethnic studies, and the sociology of academic knowledge, and across three monographs he presses a single sustained argument: that the categories scholars use to organize literature, above all the category of Jewish identity, are products of critical and institutional labor rather than reflections of a prior cultural essence.

Schreier earned his B.A. in English at Swarthmore College in 1994, graduating with High Honors, and completed his Ph.D. in English and American literature at Brandeis University in 2003. His training joined close textual reading to the theoretical currents that remade the humanities in the late twentieth century, among them post-structuralism, cultural studies, and the critical theory of identity and representation. That double inheritance marks all his work. He reads particular texts with care, and he reads the disciplines that read those texts with equal care.

His first book, The Power of Negative Thinking: Cynicism and the History of Modern American Literature (University of Virginia Press, 2009), takes cynicism as a category of literary and intellectual history. Schreier traces how skeptical and oppositional habits of thought shaped modern American writing, and the book already shows the concern that organizes his later career: the tension among identity, critique, and the cultural authority that lets some readings count and others fall away.

The book that established his reputation, The Impossible Jew: Identity and the Reconstruction of Jewish American Literary History (NYU Press, 2015), turns that concern on his own field. Schreier rejects the premise that Jewish American literature expresses a coherent Jewish communal self waiting in the texts to be found. He argues instead that “Jewish American literature” is a critical and institutional construction, assembled by scholars, critics, editors, and teachers who decide which writers belong and what their belonging means. Through readings of figures across the canon, among them Abraham Cahan (1860-1951), the New York Intellectuals, and Philip Roth (1933-2018), he asks what identity-based literary study does when it puts identity to work, and he treats the answer as a question about the discipline rather than about the writers. The book reached debates well beyond Jewish studies, touching canon formation, ethnicity, and the politics of identity in the academy, and reviewers noted the paradox at its center, that a sustained critique of the field also enriches it.

The Rise and Fall of Jewish American Literature: Ethnic Studies and the Challenge of Identity (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020) extends the argument into a cultural and intellectual history of Jewish American literary study as such. Schreier traces how the field formed across the twentieth century and which institutional and political conditions gave it shape. He holds that labels like “Jewish American literature” are not neutral descriptions but artifacts of particular historical circumstances, and he asks whether identity-based frameworks still serve the reading of literature in a more mixed and connected cultural world. Read together, The Impossible Jew and The Rise and Fall of Jewish American Literature form one argument against essentialist accounts of ethnicity and identity in literary scholarship, and they place Schreier among a cohort of critics who want to rebuild the foundations of minority and ethnic literary study rather than add to its accumulated readings.

His other publications widen the frame. He edited Studies in Irreversibility: Texts and Contexts (2007), and with Jonathan Eburne he edited The Year’s Work in Nerds, Wonks, and Neocons (2017), a project that carries his interests into the politics and self-conception of contemporary American intellectual life. As editor of Studies in American Jewish Literature he has pushed the journal toward ethnic studies, secularism studies, political theory, postcolonial scholarship, and the critical study of identity, positioning it as a site for interdisciplinary work that situates Jewish culture inside larger social and theoretical arguments.

At Penn State he teaches across American literature, Jewish American literature, ethnic literature, American comedy, modernism, post-Holocaust literature, Jewish American film, contemporary political fiction, and the intellectual history of the New York Intellectuals, at both undergraduate and graduate levels. His teaching turns on close reading, theoretical self-awareness, and reflection on the categories through which readers assign value to texts.

A constant runs through the scholarship, the editing, and the teaching: the relation between literary criticism and institutional power. Schreier holds that a critic must read the assumptions and structures that govern his own methods alongside the texts those methods address, and this reflexive demand separates his work from more conventional literary history. His current research carries the program into new material. He is at work on a study of Palestinian American literature within the development of Arab American studies, and on a second project concerning Zionism and the institutional and cultural politics of the Jewish Studies field, both of which keep his long-standing question in view: how cultural categories form, gain authority, and govern reading inside the academy and beyond it.

The Great Delusion

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

The liberal error, for Mearsheimer, lies in treating the person as a free-standing chooser of his own moral code, when the code arrives mostly from birth and upbringing. If this anthropology holds, what happens to Benjamin Schreier?
Schreier’s argument moves in the opposite direction. He treats Jewish identity as made rather than given, and he treats the communal self that the field claims to read as the field’s own product. The category gets assembled by critics and editors and teachers, and a man might dismantle it by showing the seams. That is a claim about contingency. The thing the field calls a Jewish communal essence has no fixed reality. It can be built, and what can be built can be taken apart, or built otherwise, or set aside.
Run the two men against each other. Mearsheimer does not say group identity is fixed in its content. He says attachment to the group is near-universal, deep, and prior to reason, planted by socialization before the man can weigh it. Schreier’s construction thesis and Mearsheimer’s social anthropology might seem to meet here, because both deny a timeless essence and both grant that identity gets formed rather than inherited from nature. The agreement breaks on what the formation produces. For Schreier the construction is light, a critical and institutional artifact a scholar might expose and loosen. For Mearsheimer the construction is heavy, a value infusion welded to the man in childhood, carried below the reach of argument, defended sometimes to the death. Schreier shows that the academic category was assembled. Mearsheimer answers that the assembly of a category and the durability of a bond are separate questions, and that the bond survives the demolition of the category.
Mearsheimer’s account turns on the weakness of reason against socialization, and Schreier’s project is a project of reason. It asks a man to see through his inherited sense of who he is, to recognize the communal self as a construction and hold it at the distance critique requires. Mearsheimer ranks that capacity last among the forces that move us. He might read the whole anti-essentialist program as a late and local product of one particular socialization, the training of the theory-formed humanities of the 1990s, a group with its own intense value infusion and its own sacred refusal of essence. The man who learned to distrust group belonging learned it from a group. His cosmopolitan suspicion of the tribe is the marker of his tribe. On Mearsheimer’s terms the academic who announces that identity is constructed performs the membership badge of the cosmopolitan intellectual class, and he mistakes a socialized preference for the verdict of free reason.
Samuel Moyn (b. 1970), whom Mearsheimer quotes on the rise of human rights, sits near this point. The elevation of the rights-bearing individual over the inherited group is, for Mearsheimer, the signature liberal move, and Schreier’s loosening of communal Jewish identity belongs to the same family. It frees the person from the weight of the collective self. Mearsheimer says the weight does not lift, that the liberal who proclaims the autonomous chooser describes a creature who never existed, and that the social animal goes on cooperating with his fellow members and sacrificing for them after the theorist has declared the bond a fiction.
What survives for Schreier, if Mearsheimer is right, is narrower than the full anti-essentialist claim but firmer for the narrowing. Schreier might be correct about the academic category and wrong about the attachment beneath it. Jewish American literature as a field, a canon, a journal, a set of chairs, got built by men making choices, and Schreier maps the building with care. The error, on this reading, comes when the construction thesis migrates from the category to the bond, when the demonstration that scholars assembled a label becomes a suggestion that the communal self is similarly optional. Mearsheimer holds that the self is not optional. The group precedes the man, shapes him before he can refuse, and holds him after he thinks he has reasoned his way out. The category is paper. The tribe is not.
There is a cost to Schreier in this collision, and a cost to Mearsheimer. The cost to Schreier is that his rationalism might overreach, treating critique as a solvent strong enough to dissolve what childhood welded, and underrating the durability of the attachment his own readers carry into the seminar room. The cost to Mearsheimer is that he can prove too much, since an anthropology that makes reason nearly powerless against socialization struggles to explain Schreier at all, the man who did, in fact, turn his critical faculties against the value infusion of his own people and his own field. If socialization wins as completely as Mearsheimer says, the heretic should not exist. He does exist. Either reason can do more than Mearsheimer grants, or Schreier’s heresy is the socialized loyalty of a rival group, and the tribe he serves is the one that taught him to doubt the tribe.

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