The Porous Appeal: Why Institutions Misread Mike Benz

Mike Benz sits in a contested zone. The establishment sees him as a threat or at least a vector of narratives that need explaining or de-escalating.

To understand the appeal of Mike Benz—and the fierce polarization he generates—one must look beyond standard political analysis and into the realm of the self. Benz sits almost perfectly at the “porous” end of the psychological spectrum. This positioning is the key to decoding his resonance with audiences and the confusion of his critics.

Benz’s entire worldview assumes that institutions do not merely act upon the world; they penetrate the individual.

Benz’s audience is heavily porous. They experience the censorship story as something that violates them. They feel surveilled, managed, nudged, curated. His maps of overlapping nonprofits, agencies, and platforms speak directly to people who already feel invaded by institutional power. He is translating their preexisting sensations into a grand architecture. That is why his work hits so hard.

Journalists assume institutions are flawed but basically legitimate. They see transparency issues, not existential ones. They see power imbalances, not metaphysical overreach. To them, Benz is an outsider constructing a sweeping system narrative that threatens to collapse distinctions between coordination, coercion, and conspiracy. Their impulse is to parse, contextualize, and contain.

Journalists believe they are “responsible to the facts” through internalized norms, while viewing outsider commentary as unfiltered, emotive, and epistemically dangerous. The press and expert-opinion makers loathe the uncontrolled public because they see themselves as disciplined by norms that others lack. That’s buffered identity in action.

Institutional media often start with the buffered assumption that their norms insulate them from distortion. But as Stephen Turner showed, public counter-narratives routinely reveal blind spots in expert communities. So when someone like Benz maps censorship infrastructure, the question isn’t only whether he’s right. It’s also whether buffered institutions have become blind to how their own coordination looks from the outside.

According to Turner, blog publics (outsiders) often perform a “folk sociology of knowledge” that situates experts, motives, and institutional incentives, and that this irritates elites because it undermines their claim that they alone mediate authoritative knowledge. Figures like Benz do for the censorship debate what Turner observed bloggers doing in complex medical disputes: they contextualize institutional actors and incentives. Legacy outlets sometimes experience that as destabilizing because it challenges their buffered belief in their own neutrality.

Alliance Theory helps you puncture pieties too, without getting personal. The theory shows that belief systems aren’t principled but strategic. What liberals present as abstract commitments to truth, transparency, or norms of discourse are actually alliance-preserving tactics.

One reason Benz unsettles legacy media is that he calls attention to alliance structures they usually don’t foreground. Alliance Theory predicts that elite groups rationalize their coalitions as principled commitments. Benz flips the frame and calls them political. That feels like an attack to people inside buffered institutions, even if from the outside it looks like an attempt to map power.

Every coalition produces narratives that serve its interests. That’s Alliance Theory. Benz oversimplifies in ways that fit his audience. But legacy institutions also oversimplify in the other direction because their buffered self-understanding resists seeing themselves as political actors.

The MSM is built on buffered identity assumptions. The institution rests on the idea that reasoned analysis, expertise, professional norms, and procedural safeguards create a reliable boundary between the self and the world. That’s the buffered worldview in practice.

People who rise in the MSM tend to share certain instincts.

Institutions are imperfect but fundamentally legitimate.

Systems can be audited and improved.

Threats come from breakdowns or abuses, not from the structure itself.

Information governance is a technical challenge, not a metaphysical one.

The self is stable, rational, and not easily invaded.

Porous identity means the self feels permeated by larger forces. External power reaches inside your life. Institutions, elites, bureaucracies, algorithms, intelligence agencies, NGOs. The world acts on you more than you act on it. People with porous identities experience censorship infrastructures not as abstract governance but as something that shapes their very perception and agency. When Benz talks, he names the forces they feel seeping into their autonomy. It feels like revelation.

Buffered identity is the opposite. The self is walled off. The world is composed of systems and organizations that can be studied, criticized, reformed. People with buffered identities see censorship not as a metaphysical intrusion but as policy, coordination, and institutional logic. Reporter types tend to inhabit this mental world. They see themselves as protected by the boundaries of reason, professional norms, and institutional checks. When they cover Benz, they treat him as a narrative to analyze, not a threat to their sense of self.

To a “buffered” identity—the default mode of modern technocrats and journalists—censorship infrastructure is a matter of policy debate. It is a procedural issue involving distinct legal entities. To Benz, however, censorship is an integrated force-field. It shapes what you see, what you think, what you can express, and ultimately, how society processes truth.

This is textbook porous cognition. Where buffered thinkers insist on clear distinctions and procedural separations between bureaucracies, NGOs, platforms, intelligence cutouts, and philanthropic networks, Benz treats them as fused. To the porous thinker, those boundaries are rhetoric rather than reality; they collapse into a single, coordinated pressure.

This explains the divide over his famous diagrams. To a buffered observer, his complex webs of connection look conspiratorial—a messy conflation of disparate groups. But to his audience, those diagrams feel revelatory. Benz reads communication flows as power flows that enter the self.

The Existential Register

The fundamental disconnect lies in how the self perceives its own safety.

The Buffered Self thinks: “My mind is intact. Information environments can be adjusted, but I remain separate from them.”

The Porous Self thinks: “My mind is shaped by unseen actors. The outside world floods into me.”

Benz speaks directly to that lived sense of permeation. Because he operates from this porous framework, he frames censorship not as a governance issue to be reformed, but as an existential threat to be survived.

This dictates his emotional register: Urgent. Maximalist. Totalizing.

He does not discuss discrete problems; he outlines systems that seep into everything. When a buffered thinker hears the word “existential” applied to content moderation, they assume exaggeration. A porous thinker, feeling the weight of the system pressing in, hears accuracy.

Folk Sociology and the Search for Agency

Benz belongs to the lineage of what Fred Turner described as the “folk sociology of knowledge.” He represents the outsider who, feeling the effects of power, develops explanations that contextualize elites, expose incentives, and dismiss institutional boundaries.

His audience shares this porous identity. They feel acted upon by large, opaque structures that they cannot name. Benz provides a service: he gives them a villain with agency and a map that makes their sensations legible. His audience does not require him to be procedurally perfect; they need him to make sense of a world that feels intrusive.

Conclusion: The Great Misreading

When buffered journalists cover Benz, they almost always misread him. They critique him for claiming total coordinated control, interpreting his work as a “grand conspiracy” theory. But Benz is describing the world as a permeable system.

He is not just on the porous side; he is a maximal porous case. Yet, he is neither sloppy nor crazy. He is systematic. His specific gift lies in translating complex institutional interlocks into a narrative that matches the porous lived experience.

While the media hears paranoia, his audience hears validation: “Finally, someone is naming what I feel.”

I come from Australia. Before Europeans arrived, Aboriginal identity was almost entirely porous, but in a very different way than modern porous identities like Benz’s audience. You have to separate three layers to talk about this cleanly.

I. The experiential world

Aboriginal cultures lived in a world where the boundary between self, land, ancestors, spirit forces, and social obligations was thin. The land spoke. The dead were present. Dreams carried knowledge. Country was not a backdrop but a living relation. Identity wasn’t buffered off into an interior psychological space. The person was porous to kinship ties, to story, to place, to ritual demands.

That doesn’t mean “superstitious.” It means the metaphysics assumed interpenetration rather than insulation.

II. The social order

Aboriginal law wasn’t individualistic. Autonomy was not the central ideal. Obligations flowed through kinship lines, totems, and ancestral beings. A person wasn’t a sealed unit. They were a node in a network. Harm or magic done to one person reverberated through others. Knowledge itself was relational and often restricted. You didn’t “own” it as a private good.

This kind of world produces a porous identity as a matter of course. The buffered self is a very recent European invention.

III. The contrast with colonial modernity

When Europeans arrived, they brought the buffered assumptions with them: linear law, property as a discrete object, the individual as a rights-bearing unit, a sharp divide between objective and subjective. They could not understand how a people could be wounded through their land as if it were their flesh. They thought in categories that made Aboriginal reality literally unintelligible.

The shock of colonization was partly military and economic, but it was also metaphysical. A porous identity encountering a buffered civilization ends up pathologized. The colonizer sees the Indigenous worldview as irrational or mystical. The Indigenous sees the settler worldview as spiritually blunted.

Aboriginal porousness wasn’t paranoia or conspiratorial thinking. It wasn’t a sense of invisible bureaucracies shaping cognition. It was a cosmology in which the world and self interpenetrated by design. It was adaptive in that environment. It kept social order, resource distribution, and meaning structures intact across tens of thousands of years.

Porous identity is not fringe. It is the human default. The buffered identity is the anomaly. It emerges through literacy, bureaucracy, Protestant interiority, and scientific rationalism. Most of human history is porous.

When institutions assume a buffered identity, they forget that most people historically lived with porous assumptions. So when someone like Benz speaks in porous terms, he isn’t introducing a pathology. He’s tapping into a very old human way of experiencing power.

On July 6, 2024, I wrote this blog post: “Liberals Were Blinded To Biden’s Senility By Their Own Speech Codes

Today I asked Gemini to analyze it through the lens of buffered vs porous identity. It said:

The “buffered” identity—characteristic of the liberal elite and MSM described in the text—insulates itself from raw reality through layers of expertise, professional norms, and approved language.

Epistemic Authority: The buffered self does not trust its own eyes; it trusts credentials. The text notes that while conservatives trusted their observations, liberals “consistently derided this and demanded expert evidence”.

Medicalization of Reality: For the buffered elite, “senility” is not an observable trait but a medical diagnosis that only doctors can bestow. The text highlights how liberals deferred to “physicians with expertise on the aging brain” who urged voters to ignore what they saw. This is why media fact-checkers declared assessments of senility “false” because they had contacted “experts in the health care of older people” who disputed the diagnosis.

Protection through Norms: The buffered self prioritizes social propriety and the “hero system” of elite institutions over raw data. Admitting Biden’s condition was “too sensitive for their hero system”.

2. The Porous Self: Direct Observation and “Common Sense”

The “porous” identity—attributed here to conservatives and the general public—allows reality to impact the observer directly without the filter of “expert consensus.”

Direct Perception: Conservatives saw Biden’s decline “years before liberals” because they relied on direct observation rather than waiting for permission from elites. As the text asks, “Does one have to be a doctor to diagnose Chris Christie as obese?”.

Rejection of Abstract Categories: The porous identity rejects the buffered obsession with abstract moral categories like “ageism” and “ableism” when they conflict with survival or reality. Conservatives spotted the decline because they “don’t accept ageism and ableism as real moral categories”.

Intuitive Language: While the buffered self polices language to avoid offense, the porous self uses the word that “rises most readily to the lips,” which was “senile”.

3. Speech Codes as the “Buffer”

The text argues that liberal speech codes acted as the specific mechanism of the “buffer,” blinding elites to the physical reality of the President’s condition.

Linguistic Insulation: By categorizing words like “senile,” “elderly,” and “frail” as offensive slurs rather than descriptors, the buffered elites made it impossible to articulate—and therefore think about—the reality of the situation.

Internalized Censorship: The text notes that “That which you are not allowed to say out loud is increasingly not thought”. Because “senile” was removed from the elite vocabulary in favor of “cognitive changes,” the urgency of the decline was diluted.

Class Differentiation: Using “buffered” language became a marker of high status. The text notes that for those with elite educations, using a word like “senile” signals that you are “low class” and outside the boundaries of “careful critical discourse”.

4. The Collapse of the Buffer

The text describes the June 2024 debate as the moment the physical reality (the porous world) shattered the constructed narrative (the buffered world).

The Disintegration of Fantasy: The debate is described as a “transcendental event” where the “fortress of fantasies disintegrated” and the “replica vanished”.

The Failure of Experts: The buffered reliance on expertise failed because the experts were politically aligned. The text notes that even if there were expert diagnoses, liberals “would only accept the one they wanted to hear”.

In summary, the buffered identity allowed liberals to construct a “fantasy universe” protected by speech codes and expert denials, while the porous identity allowed conservatives to acknowledge the “obvious signs of cognitive decline” because they were not inhibited by the moral imperative to avoid “insensitive terms”.

On July 3, 2024, I wrote: “How Did Conservatives Spot Joe Biden’s Cognitive Decline Years Before The Liberal Elites?”

Today Gemini comments on my post:

1. The Porous Self: Direct Observation and “Common Sense”

The “Porous” identity is characterized by an openness to the world where the individual is directly impacted by their environment and relies on visceral, unmediated experience. In the text, conservatives are depicted as operating with this cognitive style.

Direct Access to Reality: Conservatives and populists trusted their immediate sensory experience—what they saw “with [their] own eyes”—rather than waiting for external validation. For example, Brit Hume declared Biden “senile” in 2020 based on observation, and Nikki Haley cited visible behavioral lapses, such as Biden not knowing what country he was in or how many grandchildren he had.

Epistemological Populism: The text describes a “populist” epistemology where “individual opinions based upon firsthand experience are much more reliable… than those generated by theories and academic studies”. This aligns with the porous self’s reliance on “common sense,” defined by conservatives as “something that strikes you as obvious”.

Visceral Language: The porous identity does not filter language through social norms. Conservatives used “visceral” and “insensitive” terms like “senile” because they prioritized descriptive utility over social propriety. The text notes that conservatives are just as likely to mock moral classifications like “ageism” as revere them.

2. The Buffered Self: Mediated by Experts and Norms

The “Buffered” identity creates a boundary between the self and the world, often mediated by professional standards, expertise, and moral regulations. The text portrays liberal elites as operating within this insulated framework, which “blinded” them to the raw reality of the President’s condition.

Reliance on Credentialed Mediation: The buffered liberal self creates a layer of protection against “unrefined” reality through expertise. Liberals demanded “expert evidence” and “studies” rather than accepting direct observation. They waited for “credentialed medical elites following protocol” to diagnose the President before they would accept it as truth.

Insulation via “Speech Codes”: The text argues that liberal elites use “speech codes” (specifically regarding ageism and ableism) to buffer themselves from uncomfortable realities. For liberals, “reporting on anyone’s old age requires extreme sensitivity,” whereas conservatives do not exercise this sensitivity. PolitiFact, representing the buffered elite, declared Brit Hume’s observation “false” not based on observation, but by consulting “experts in the health care of older people” who labeled the term “senile” as pejorative.

Inversion of Common Sense: The text suggests that the liberal/buffered identity defines itself by rejecting the “unreflective common sense” of the masses. For the buffered elite, “common sense” is redefined as the “consensus of experts”. This creates a closed epistemological loop where reality is only valid once it has been processed and approved by the administrative class.

3. The Gap Between the Two

The conflict described is not just political, but a clash of how these identities process information.

The Gap: Joe Nocera describes a “gap” between what people see (porous reality) and what the “arbiters of truth” (buffered elites) allow to be said.

Populist Reaction: The text argues that populism arises when the “buffered” elite view fails to accord with the “popular sense of reality” (the porous view). The general public, operating without the buffer of “expert consensus,” spotted the decline years prior because they did not require an expert to interpret what was visible.

On July 2, 2024, I wrote: “Joe Biden Must Go Because The Desperate Nature Of The Situation Should Prevail Over Precedent

Gemini comments today:

Based on the text provided, Luke Ford’s argument frames the political crisis as a collision between the Buffered reliance on procedure and the Porous necessity of survival.

Here is the analysis of the text through that framework:

1. The Buffered Elite: Rule-Bound and Compartmentalized

The “Buffered” identity constructs a boundary between the self and the chaotic world, relying on rules, procedures, and abstractions to maintain order. In the text, the “political elites” and “MSM” represent this worldview.

Process Over Reality: The buffered mind believes that because Biden “made it through the various bureaucratic hurdles,” he must be the nominee. To them, the “law,” “precedent,” and “procedure” are more real than the physical condition of the candidate. They retreat into the “learned helplessness” of the rules, believing they cannot act against the process even if the result is “suicidal.”

Compartmentalization of the Person: The text notes that pundits claim Biden is “capable of operating as president… just not capable of campaigning.” This is a distinctly buffered distinction. It separates the abstract office of the Presidency (which can be managed by staff and bureaucracy) from the physical reality of the man holding it. The porous perspective rejects this, arguing that in a “nuclear crisis,” you cannot rely on a buffer of staff; you need the man himself.

Temporal Buffering: The elite defense relies on managing the President’s time—keeping him active only between 10 am and 4 pm. This is an attempt to create a temporal buffer around his decline, shielding the public (and themselves) from the reality of his condition outside those hours.

2. The Porous Populist: “The Situation is the Boss”

The “Porous” identity allows reality to penetrate directly, prioritizing survival and visceral experience over abstract rules. Ford’s argument is purely porous: “The situation determines the comparative power of all other factors.”

Survival Over Law: The text uses the examples of the Jewish Sabbath and the Japanese Constitution to argue that when “survival of your people” is at stake, the “buffer” of law must be breached. A porous identity recognizes that adherence to an abstract rule (like the 4th Commandment or the Constitution) is a death warrant if it ignores the immediate physical threat.

Direct Perception: While elites look at delegate counts (abstractions), the porous observer looks at the “vacant checked out stare” (physical reality). The text argues that “regular folks” (grassroots) saw the decline earlier because they trust their eyes, whereas elites trust the process.

Statistical Context: This alignment with the “grassroots” is supported by polling data from the time; roughly 45% of Democratic voters thought Biden should not run even before the debate, reflecting a disconnect between the base and the party apparatus.

Narrative as a Permeable Shield: Ford argues that “Law depends upon narrative.” This suggests that the “buffer” (law/norms) is not a solid wall but a fragile story. When the “desperate nature of the situation” becomes too intense (a flood of reality), the narrative collapses, and the buffer fails.

3. Conclusion: The Collapse of the Buffer

The text predicts the inevitable victory of the Porous reality over the Buffered illusion.

The “Trickle” to a “Flood”: The “trickle” of politicians asking Biden to step aside represents the initial leaks in the buffer. The text predicts this will turn into a “flood” as the “bad faith” of the buffered elite—who tried to hide the decline—is exposed by the undeniable reality of the situation.

Rejection of Learned Helplessness: The author explicitly rejects the “learned helplessness” of the buffered state. To be porous is to retain agency: “Don’t give in… If breaking your constitution is what is required to survive, then break away.”

On June 14, 2024, I wrote: “What Determines The Winning Narrative?

Today Gemini said:

Based on the text provided, the winning narrative is determined by the alignment of needs and events with the influence of power and resonance.

Here is an analysis of the factors that determine narrative dominance, drawing from the provided excerpts:

1. Power and Dominance

The most direct determinant of a winning narrative is the influence of dominant groups. As Grok notes, “dominance comes from who’s holding the megaphone, who’s got the muscle”.

Institutional Control: Groups with political or cultural power can promote stories that serve their interests. The text highlights how cultural elites, such as the literary community after WWI, shaped the “disenchantment narrative” because they had “access to publishers… and cultural gatekeepers”.

Manufacturing Demand: Professionals and experts can manufacture demand for their services by promoting narratives that require their intervention. For example, “genocide scholars… need hot new ‘genocides’” to increase demand for their services, just as psychiatrists may widen definitions of mental illness.

Exclusion of Rivals: Dominant groups often exclude competing narratives to maintain their power. The text cites Peter Novick’s observation that Jewish historians were once marginalized by Anglo-Saxon academics who believed “History belongs to the Anglo-Saxons”. When Jews later surged into these disciplines, they transformed them to reflect their own perspectives.

2. Resonance and Needs

Power alone is not enough; a narrative must also resonate with the public’s emotional and psychological needs.

Tension Release: A winning narrative provides catharsis. The “disenchantment narrative” of WWI won out because it “lanced the boil” of the public’s grief and betrayal, offering a release from the tension of the war’s initial jingoism.

Emotional Satisfaction: Humans are wired for stories that “produce emotion” rather than those based solely on logic. Narratives that evoke “pity” or “indignation” are more likely to succeed because they “reinforce opinions readers already have” and offer an emotional payoff.

Validation of Identity: People gravitate toward narratives that validate their identities and worldviews. The text notes that political attitudes emerge from “synaptically encoded moral narratives” that define heroes and villains. Winning narratives confirm these internal scripts, making people feel “seen” and understood.

3. Alignment with Events

Narratives often rise to dominance when a catalytic event confirms them.

Confirmation of Under-News: Joe Biden’s debate performance on June 27, 2024, became a “sledgehammer to the official story” because it confirmed the “under-news narratives” about his decline that had been circulating. The event provided the undeniable proof that allowed the latent narrative to explode into dominance.

Shifting Contexts: As societal contexts change, so do the needs for different stories. The WWI “disenchantment” narrative only became dominant after the war, when the public mood shifted from patriotic duty to mourning and disillusionment.

4. The Role of “Codes” and Community

Narratives are also shaped by the “codes” of the communities that produce them.

Community Standards: Knowledge and narratives are defined by communities with specific codes of value. To advance a narrative within a community (like academia or journalism), one must operate “under the code,” using the language and values accepted by that group.

Self-Perpetuation: Once a narrative becomes dominant, it becomes the “water we swim in,” seeming objective and natural. This makes it difficult to challenge without being dismissed as illegitimate or “mad”.

In summary, a narrative wins when it effectively meets the emotional needs of the public, is validated by undeniable events, and is amplified by powerful groups who use it to advance their own interests and status.

The dynamics of Buffered vs. Porous identity are central to understanding why certain narratives dominate (“win”) and how they are constructed. The text explicitly links the “liberal” or “elite” worldview to a Buffered identity (insulated, rational, controlled) and the “traditional” or “populist” worldview to a Porous identity (open to external forces, resonant, emotional).

Here is the analysis of the essay through that framework:

1. The Buffered Elite: Constructing the “Sanitized” Narrative

The “Buffered” identity creates a boundary between the self and the world, valuing control, “codes,” and emotional distance. In the text, this is represented by the “dominant” elites (editors, academics, gatekeepers) who curate reality to maintain order.

Sanitization of Reality: The text uses the example of the JFK assassination reporting to illustrate the Buffered impulse. While the “porous” street reaction was tribal and chaotic (Italians blaming Jews, etc.), the editors demanded a “proper,” sanitized response (“little old ladies collapsing”). The Buffered elite “didn’t want any turmoil” and sought to provide the public with “correct feelings” rather than raw truth.

Knowledge as a Closed Code: The section on Larry McEnerney and academic writing highlights how the Buffered elite maintains power through “codes.” Knowledge isn’t just facts; it’s a social agreement among “a bunch of people” (the Buffered class) who decide what counts as valid. To enter this sphere, one must “do it under the code,” accepting the elite’s buffered norms of discourse.

The Illusion of Autonomy: Rony Guldmann’s analysis explicitly identifies liberalism with the “Enlightenment narrative” of the Buffered self—a “self-congratulatory” story of liberation from ancient illusions. Liberals view themselves as “autonomous,” “self-regulating,” and “rational,” dismissing conservative/porous views as “hallucinatory” or “unthinking”.

2. The Porous Public: The Need for Resonance and Catharsis

The “Porous” identity is defined by its openness to the world; it is permeable to emotions, external forces, and “enchantment” (or trauma). The text argues that for a narrative to truly “win,” it must penetrate this porous defense and offer emotional release.

Tension Release as a Force: A narrative dominates not because it is factually “true” (a Buffered criterion) but because it resolves a “gnawing dissonance” for the Porous self. The WWI “disenchantment narrative” won because it “lanced the boil” of the public’s grief, offering a visceral release that the “patriotic” narrative could not.

Primordial Intuition: The text explicitly argues (via Guldmann) that human beings are “porous by default” and that the Buffered identity is a “cultural superimposition”. Conservatives and traditionalists are described as defending this “primordial intuition” against the “suffocating” rationalization of the Buffered elite.

The “Tribal Reflex”: The text describes the public’s reaction to events like the JFK assassination or political campaigns as a “tribal reflex.” This is a Porous mode of being where individuals see themselves not as atomized agents, but as permeable members of a group (race, class, tribe) affected by external forces.

3. The Clash: “Official Fictions” vs. “Lived Reality”

The conflict described in the text is a struggle between the Buffered elite’s attempt to impose a “nomos” (normative universe) and the Porous public’s demand for narratives that match their lived experience.

Narrative as a Control Mechanism: The Buffered elite uses dominant narratives (e.g., “Dallas as the city of hate”) to impose a “normative force field” on reality. This is an attempt to buffer the society from the chaos of the random/communist assassin by framing it within a controllable moral story.

The Collapse of the Buffer: When the elite’s “sanitized” narrative clashes too violently with the Porous reality (e.g., the “bad faith” of covering up decline, or the disconnect in WWI), the Buffered narrative fails. The “winning” narrative is the one that acknowledges the “wild sweet meadow-grass of common sense” (Porous) over the “manicured green lawn of science” (Buffered).

Identity Politics as “Porous” Competition: The section on the Holocaust and victimhood illustrates a shift toward Porous identity politics. Groups compete to claim “historical victimization”—a distinctly Porous state where the self is defined by what has been done to it by external forces, rather than by its internal autonomy.

The essay suggests that while the Buffered elite holds the “megaphone” and determines the “official” narrative through codes and institutions, the Porous masses determine the winning narrative through their need for emotional resonance. A narrative only truly dominates when it successfully bridges the gap, or when the Buffered imposition is shattered by a Porous reality (an event) that can no longer be ignored.

On April 6, 2024, I wrote: “On knowing what you are not supposed to know and feeling what you are not supposed to feel”

Today Gemini said:

Based on the text provided, the dynamics of knowing and feeling “forbidden” things map directly onto the conflict between the Buffered and Porous identities.

Here is the analysis of the essay through that framework:

1. The Porous Self: Permeable to Truth and Pain

The “Porous” identity is characterized by an openness to the world where the boundaries between self and other, or self and reality, are permeable. The text describes a distinctly Porous experience of truth and emotion.

Direct Impact of Forbidden Knowledge: The Porous self cannot “buffer” itself against truths that contradict social norms. The text speaks of those who “know things you are not supposed to know” (like the reality of in-group preference or the biological basis of conflict) and “feel things you are not supposed to feel” (like indifference to out-groups or anger at cultural shifts). These truths penetrate the Porous self directly, causing “chronic dysregulation” if suppressed.

The Scapegoat as a Porous Figure: The “family scapegoat” is described as the person who is “more in touch with the truth of what is happening inside of that system” but is punished for it. Because they lack the “buffer” of denial or social conformity, they absorb the system’s dysfunction.

Emotional Permeability: The text argues that “all feelings we experience are true by virtue that they are happening” and should be viewed as “raw sensations” rather than judgments. This is a Porous view of emotion as an external force that enters the self, rather than a Buffered view of emotion as a subjective state to be managed or judged.

2. The Buffered System: Denial and Social Control

The “Buffered” identity constructs a boundary between the self and the chaotic world, often mediated by social norms (“hero systems”), polite fictions, and “approved” knowledge.

The “Hero System” as a Buffer: The text describes “hero systems” (liberalism, religious orthodoxy, etc.) as mechanisms that penalize those who tarnish the sacred. These systems act as a buffer for the group, protecting it from “inconvenient truths” that would threaten its cohesion.

Liberalism as a “Buffered” Enforcer: Liberalism is depicted as a “meta-narrative” that imposes a “reflexive innerness” and “self-possession” (Buffered traits) while pathologizing the “visceral animus” or “common sense” of conservatives (Porous traits). The liberal insistence on “universalism” and “equality” buffers them from the Porous reality of tribalism and biological conflict.

Suppression of the Porous Reality: The text notes that powerful institutions (governments, media) create a “unanimity” of discourse to buffer against the “deteriorating situation” (e.g., in foreign policy). This is a “failure of imagination and of courage” typical of a Buffered system trying to maintain order against a chaotic reality.

3. The Clash: Authenticity vs. Belonging

The central conflict in the text is between the Porous need for authenticity (aligning with reality/truth) and the Buffered requirement for social belonging (aligning with the hero system).

The Cost of Being Porous: To be Porous (authentic to one’s forbidden knowledge) is to risk becoming the “scapegoat” or “dissident”. Figures like John Mearsheimer or the family scapegoat pay a price for piercing the buffer of social politeness.

Healing as Re-integration: The “healing process” described by Heidi Priebe involves rejecting the “negative beliefs” internalized from the Buffered system (that you are “bad” or “broken”) and accepting the Porous reality of one’s own feelings and perceptions. It is about dismantling the false buffer imposed by a dysfunctional family or society.

The text argues that we live in a “Buffered” society (liberal, universalist, polite) that actively suppresses “Porous” realities (tribalism, biological difference, the pain of dysfunction). Those who cannot maintain the Buffer—who “know what they are not supposed to know”—are pathologized as scapegoats, but they are also the ones most “aligned with reality.”

Today Gemini said:

Based on the essay provided, the concept of “Good Energy” can be powerfully analyzed as a shift from a Buffered Identity (defensive, isolated, cognitively controlled) to a Porous Identity (permeable, resonant, physically connected).

Ford’s essay essentially argues that “Good Energy” is the sensation of interacting with a positively Porous person—someone who has lowered their defenses to allow for the flow of reality and connection—while “Bad Energy” or “Weird Energy” is the friction caused by a Buffered person struggling to maintain a facade.

Here is the analysis through that framework:

1. The Porous Nature of Social Interaction (“Wifi” and “Jumper Cables”)
In a Buffered worldview, the mind is an isolated interior space; thoughts and feelings are private unless verbally communicated. Ford rejects this, adopting a Porous view where human beings are permeable vessels that transmit affect directly to one another.

Direct Transmission: Ford describes human interaction as a direct connection of nervous systems, not just an exchange of words. He writes, “We’re all like wifi… When I touch you or talk to you… I’m connecting my central nervous system to yours”.

The Porous “Force Field”: He explicitly uses the language of porosity, stating, “We all exert a moral force field”. This aligns with the porous idea that the self is open to external forces. If a person is tense (buffered/armored), they “send that tension into you,” whereas ease acts as “jumper cables” to release others’ armoring.

2. The Buffer as “Body Armoring” (Alexander Technique)

The essay identifies the “Buffer”—the boundary used to protect the self from the world—as physical muscular tension and psychological defensiveness. Ford argues that maintaining this buffer destroys “good energy.”

The Defensive Crouch: Ford equates the buffered state with a “defensive crouch” or a “fight or flight reaction,” noting that “Nobody wants to get close” to someone in that state.

Releasing the Buffer: Through the Alexander Technique, Ford learned to release “body armoring of unnecessary muscular tension”. By dismantling this physical buffer, he feels “less need to defend [himself],” allowing him to become “buoyant and flow up”.

Cognitive Stiffness: The essay links the physical buffer to a mental buffer: “Stiff people tend to be stiff in their thinking”. The buffered identity narrows possibilities, whereas the porous (flexible) identity opens them up.

3. “Leaky Feelings” and the Failure of the Buffer

Ford and the cited expert Heidi Priebe describe “Weird Energy” as the result of a failed Buffer. This occurs when a person tries to maintain a buffered exterior (pretending to be fine) while their porous interior (true emotion) leaks out.

Incongruence: “Weird energy” is defined as incongruence—when “what they’re signaling with their body language is different from what they’re doing”.

The Porous Reality of Truth: The essay suggests we cannot actually buffer ourselves from the truth of our state. Priebe notes that “our true state is evident to everyone around us based on the way we are acting, our posture, our tone”. Trying to hide this (buffering) causes distrust, while admitting it (porosity/alignment) “puts people at ease”.

4. Collective Effervescence: The Joy of Porosity

Citing sociologist Randall Collins, the essay describes high-energy social interactions as moments where individual boundaries dissolve—a quintessential Porous experience.

Rhythmic Entrainment: “Good energy” is described as “rhythmic entrainment” where nervous systems become “mutually attuned”. This is the collapse of the buffered individual into a shared “collective effervescence”.

The Energy Star: A leader (like Napoleon) is described as an “energy star” who is the “center of all the circuits,” effectively channeling the group’s energy through themselves. This requires being open to the group’s feedback loop, not walled off.

In Ford’s essay, “Good Energy” is the state of a healthy Porous Identity: authentic, resonant, and physically relaxed. “Bad Energy” is the state of a Buffered Identity that is either rigidly defensive (“body armoring”) or deceptively incongruent (“leaky feelings”). The essay argues that we find joy and connection only when we lower the buffer and allow ourselves to “live in the reality of the situation”.

On October 14, 2023, I wrote: “Concepts Illuminate & Obscure Reality

Today Gemini said:

Based on the text provided, the interplay between buffered and porous identities is central to how concepts and theories illuminate or obscure reality. The text contrasts rigorous, “buffered” theories (which rely on careful definitions and evidence) with “porous” or “folk” concepts (which rely on intuition, emotion, and “magical thinking”).

Here is the analysis of the discussion through that framework:

1. The Buffered Approach: Theory as a Map

The “Buffered” identity creates a boundary between the self and the world, relying on structured models, theories, and empirical evidence to navigate reality.

Simplification for Comprehension: The text argues that because the world is “infinitely complex,” we need theories as “simplified pictures of reality” or maps. A buffered approach acknowledges that these maps are “abridged versions” that leave out details but provide a coherent causal story.

Rigorous Definition: Well-developed theories (buffered) carefully define key concepts and causal mechanisms, specifying what is included and excluded. This intellectual discipline creates a buffer against the chaotic influx of data.

Correction through Evidence: A buffered identity is capable of correcting its concepts when reality intrudes. The author describes his own journey of correcting “false concepts” about religion, sex, and politics by confronting them with empirical reality (e.g., the law-abiding nature of secular Japan challenging the necessity of ethical monotheism).

2. The Porous Approach: Intuition and “Magical Thinking”

The “Porous” identity is open to direct, unmediated experience and often relies on intuition, emotion, or “folk theories” that lack rigorous boundaries.

Folk Theories: Poorly developed theories (porous) are stated cursorily, with ill-defined concepts and loose causal mechanisms. Examples given include the “domino theory” or the belief that “the bigger the government, the smaller the citizen”. These concepts feel profound but often fail to map onto reality.

Magical Thinking: The porous mind is susceptible to “magical thinking,” such as the belief that “it won’t happen to me” or that specific rituals (like Torah study) are the “answer to everything”. This reflects a lack of a buffer against wishful thinking.

Emotional Resonance over Fact: Gurus like Dennis Prager appeal to the porous desire for “profound” sayings and “satisfying sensations of intellectual non-conformity” rather than rigorous reality testing. Prager’s rejection of academic studies in favor of his “common sense” or intuition is a hallmark of a porous epistemology that distrusts buffered expertise.

3. The Danger of Porous Concepts in a Complex World

The text argues that relying on porous concepts (intuition, dogma, wishful thinking) in a complex world leads to disaster because they “obscure more than they reveal reality”.

Intelligence Failure: The failure of Israeli intelligence on October 7 is attributed to a porous reliance on a fixed concept (“the Arabs would not attack”) despite contradictory data. The intelligence analysts became “so deeply embedded” in their belief that they could not abandon it, effectively dissolving the buffer between their desire for safety and the reality of the threat.

Misidentifying Enemies: The use of emotive, porous terms like “Islamo-Fascism” creates “inaccurate pictures” of the enemy. By conflating distinct historical phenomena (European Fascism vs. Islamic terrorism) based on emotional resonance rather than structural analysis, one fails to understand the actual threat.

The essay suggests that while we all need models (a buffered necessity), the danger lies in allowing our “porous” desires (for safety, simplicity, or self-importance) to dictate those models. True understanding requires the buffered discipline to test our concepts against reality, rather than letting our “natural mode of thinking” (intuition) override evidence.

On October 5, 2023, I wrote: What Makes A Great Pundit?

Today Gemini said:

1. The Pundit as a Porous Channel (“Good Energy” vs. “Ersatz Wisdom”)

The text contrasts the “public intellectual” (Buffered: rational, evidence-based, scholastic) with the “pundit” or “guru” (Porous: emotional, resonant, theatrical).

Punditry as Emotional Transmission: The successful pundit, like the pre-modern clergy, paints “vivid pictures” of a world of “gods and devils,” “demons and angels,” and “titanic battles”. This is a quintessential Porous mode of communication: it bypasses the buffered intellect to strike directly at the emotions and fears of the audience. The pundit does not offer dry facts; they offer “excitement,” “distraction,” and a “comforting narrative” that fills the “hole in the soul” of the listener.

The “Vibe” and “Energy”: Ford explicitly links the concept of “good energy” to Porous connectivity. He writes, “We all give off a vibe… We’re all like wifi… When I touch you or talk to you… I’m connecting my central nervous system to yours”. The great pundit understands this: they don’t just speak; they transmit tension, excitement, or relief directly into the listener’s nervous system. They act as “jumper cables”.

The Failure of the Buffer: The pundit succeeds when the audience’s buffer fails. Listeners who are “disconnected” or “broken” seek a parasocial bond to feel whole. They want a “substitute parent” to protect their hero system, allowing the pundit to bypass their critical faculties and shape their reality directly.

2. The Buffered Intellectual vs. The Porous Showman

The text distinguishes between those who “optimize for truth” (Buffered) and those who “optimize for excitement” (Porous).

Buffered Truth is Boring: The text argues that truth is “mundane, complicated, contradictory,” and requires a “slower way of speaking” with “variable melody” (gratitude). A Buffered intellectual like Steve Sailer or Charles Murray offers insights that help you understand the world, but they don’t offer the dopamine hit of the pundit.

Porous Excitement is Compelling: To be a great pundit, one must abandon the Buffered constraint of truth and embrace the Porous imperative of “excitement.” Dennis Prager, for example, sees a “holocaust bearing down on us” where others see a beautiful world. This creates a shared, heightened reality (a “secret” world) that binds the audience to the pundit through fear and exhilaration.

The “Hard Man” vs. The “Free Man”: The text touches on the appeal of the “hard man” (authoritarian leader/speaker) in certain situations. This aligns with the Porous desire for a strong figure to impose order on a chaotic world, versus the Buffered desire for a “free man” (flexible, rational) who can navigate complexity.

3. The Mechanics of the “Clubhouse” (Porous Belonging)

The description of talk radio as a “clubhouse” for conservatives perfectly illustrates the creation of a Porous community in a Buffered world.

Shared Reality: The pundit creates a “safe space” or “clubhouse” where the listener’s specific worldview (e.g., victimhood, fear of the left) is validated and reinforced. This is a form of collective Porosity—the group creates a shared emotional field that buffers them against the outside world while remaining open to one another.

The Enemy as Unifying Force: To maintain this Porous bond, there must be an external enemy (the “bad guy,” the “liberal media”). This us-versus-them framing tightens the group’s cohesion (solidarity) and emotional energy, as described by Randall Collins’ interaction ritual theory.

Rejection of Nuance: The Buffered world values nuance (“shades of gray”), but the Porous world of the pundit rejects it. “There is no political middle… Three extremists are worth more than ten moderates”. Nuance kills the “buzz” or “collective effervescence” that keeps the audience hooked.

The essay suggests that the “Great Pundit” is a master of Porous communication in a secular age. They provide the “jolts of collective effervescence” and the “vivid pictures” of good and evil that used to be the domain of religion. They succeed not by being right (Buffered truth), but by being resonant (Porous connection), filling the emotional void of their audience with “excitement” and “solidarity” against a hostile world. The Buffered intellectual, constrained by facts and nuance, cannot compete with this visceral power.

On August 21, 2023, I wrote: Your Hero System Is Your Morality And You Get It From Your Tribe

Today Gemini said:

The essay contrasts the modern, buffered liberal worldview (individualistic, self-referential, abstract) with a traditional, porous conservative worldview (tribal, embedded, realistic).

Here is the analysis of the essay through that framework:

1. The Buffered Self: The “Moral Crisis” of Liberalism

The text identifies David Brooks and Dennis Prager as representatives of a Buffered moral system. This worldview is characterized by the belief that the self is an autonomous, bounded entity that can be “morally formed” through education, abstract propositions, and self-referential growth.

Abstract Universalism: Buffered liberalism (and Prager’s “proposition nation”) posits that morality is a matter of adopting the right abstract values (“universal human rights,” “shared beliefs”) rather than being rooted in blood or soil. The text critiques this, noting that Prager’s idea that “you are defined by you, not by your family” is a “modern liberal delusion”.

Disengaged Agency: Taylor’s definition of the buffered self (“taking a distance… from everything outside the mind”) is echoed in the description of modern moral formation as a “self-awareness business” where the goal is to “get in touch with you” rather than conform to external standards.

The Failure of the Buffer: The text argues that this buffered individualism leads to “anomie” and meanness because it strips people of the porous bonds (tribe, family, religion) that actually regulate behavior. Without the “hero system” of a tribe, the buffered self collapses into narcissism and “politics of recognition”.

2. The Porous Self: The “Biological Necessity” of Tribe

The essay advocates for a Porous understanding of human nature, where the self is permeable to, and defined by, its community, genes, and environment.

Embedded Morality: The porous view holds that morality is not an intellectual exercise but a result of being “embedded with other people”. We are good because we don’t want to hurt our bonds, not because we learned abstract virtues.

The Reality of In-Group Preference: A central theme is that the porous self naturally favors its own kind (“genetic similarity predicts closer ties”). The text argues that what liberals call “racism” or “sexism” is often just the healthy porous instinct to “prefer your own hero system” and protect one’s kin.

Permeability to the Sacred: The porous self recognizes that “meaning and morality exist outside of the individual” and that we must conform to objective standards (marriage, work, children) rather than inventing our own. This is a rejection of the buffered fantasy of autonomy.

3. The Clash: “False Maps” vs. Reality

The essay frames the conflict as one between the Buffered delusion (that humans are blank slates who can be engineered into universal altruists) and the Porous reality (that humans are tribal primates shaped by biology).

The Liberal “Hero System”: Liberalism is described as a “hero-system in disguise” that pretends to be neutral but is actually a “secularized asceticism” that demands we deny our porous nature (our tribal instincts). This creates a “culture devoid of moral education” because it denies the biological roots of morality.

The Consequences of Denial: By trying to buffer society against “primal drives” like hierarchy and in-group preference, liberalism creates a “dysfunctional family” dynamic where people are forced to lie about reality. The essay suggests that a return to a more porous, realistic acceptance of human nature (as seen in Yellowstone or traditional societies) is the only path to genuine social cohesion.

The essay argues that the Buffered project of modern liberalism—trying to create a moral society through individual self-actualization and abstract universalism—has failed because it ignores the Porous reality of human nature. True morality and happiness come from being “embedded” in a tribe, accepting the constraints of biology, and serving a hero system that connects the self to something larger than itself.

On January 21, 2023, I wrote: What Should You Expect From The News?

Today Gemini said:

The essay essentially argues that the “News” is a Buffered product (bureaucratic, administrative, procedural) that often fails to satisfy the Porous need for truth, reality, and resonance.

Here is the analysis through that framework:

1. The News as a Buffered Product (“Bureaucratic Events”)

The text explicitly defines the news not as “truth” or “reality,” but as “the passage of bureaucratically recognized events through administrative procedures”. This is a perfect description of a Buffered system.

Administrative Filtering: The news does not report raw reality; it reports what bureaucracies (courts, government agencies, police) have processed and approved. The O.J. Simpson verdict is cited as an example of a “bureaucratic event” that had nothing to do with the “truth” of the murders. The buffered system cares about the procedure (the trial), not the porous reality (the guilt).

Stenography over Insight: Reporters are described as “good stenographers” for official sources. They operate within the buffered sphere of officialdom, repeating what the President or the Commerce Department says. This insulates them (and their readers) from the messy, unverified reality outside the bureaucratic walls.

Insulation from Reality: The text notes that relying on the news (the “employee handbook”) makes one less effective than relying on “what you see and hear” (direct porous experience). The buffered news creates a false map that obscures the territory.

2. The Porous Craving for Reality (and “Interesting”)

The essay contrasts the buffered nature of news with the Porous desire for direct connection, truth, and excitement.

Money in “Interesting”: Talk show hosts (pundits) optimize for “interesting,” not truth, because that is what the porous audience craves. They want to be moved, excited, or validated, not bored by administrative procedures.

The “Hole in the Soul”: People who get “hooked” on pundits are described as having a “hole in their soul” that they try to fill with a parasocial bond. This is a porous need for connection that the dry, buffered news cannot satisfy.

Direct Experience vs. Mediation: The text argues that a handful of “stereotypes about group differences” (porous/folk knowledge) are more helpful for navigating reality than “all the news and academic articles” (buffered/official knowledge). The porous self trusts its own eyes; the buffered self trusts the official report.

3. The Failure of the Buffer (“The Great Mugger of Reality”)

The essay argues that the mainstream media (a buffered institution) essentially attacks reality rather than reporting it.

Inverted Paranoia: Bryan Caplan is cited arguing that the media spreads “grotesque stories about ultra-rare problems” (terrorism, plane crashes) while ignoring common ones. This distorts the porous reality of daily life, creating a false sense of danger (or safety) based on buffered narratives rather than statistical truth.

Social Desirability Bias: The media promotes “stuff that superficially sounds good” (buffered ideals) over “stuff that sounds bad” (porous realities). This creates a “deeply false Big Picture” where government intervention is always the answer and social problems are always crises.

The “Clubhouse” of Anger: The media keeps conservatives “engaged and enraged” by constantly provoking them. This exploits the porous nature of the audience (their ability to be triggered) to maintain a profitable state of agitation, rather than informing them.

The essay suggests that to consume news wisely, one must adopt a Buffered stance: “place people and institutions into their correct genre”. Recognize that the news is a bureaucratic output, not a window into reality. However, the essay also acknowledges that most people consume news with a Porous hunger—seeking validation, excitement, or a “Big Picture” to believe in—and are thus “mugged by reality” when the buffered narrative inevitably fails.

Today Gemini said:

Based on the essay provided, the concept of “News as a Stress Test” can be interpreted as a diagnostic tool for measuring the strength of one’s Buffer.

The essay argues that a healthy relationship with the news requires a Buffered Identity (observation, understanding, knowing limitations), while an unhealthy relationship is characterized by a Porous Identity (feeling assaulted, over-identification, merging with external narratives).

Here is the analysis through that framework:

1. The News as a Porous Assault

The text describes the state of getting “unhinged” by the news as a failure of the self’s boundary to withstand the “unpredictable world beyond yourself”.

Permeability to External Forces: The essay asks, “Do you feel assaulted by the news?”. This is the definition of the porous experience—where the outside world (the news cycle) forcibly enters the private self, causing damage.

Over-Identification: The text notes that people damage themselves by “identifying too strongly with winners or losers in the news”. This is a porous state where the individual’s sense of self is entangled with external actors they cannot control.

The Loss of Agency: Ford describes his pre-2016 state (a porous state) as getting upset because “the world refused to conform to my expectations”. The porous self feels that the world’s actions are a personal affront, whereas the buffered self accepts the world’s autonomy.

2. “Understanding” as the Ultimate Buffer

Ford contrasts his past behavior with his current, healthy consumption of news, which is defined by the Buffered goal of “understanding” rather than “activism”.

Disengaged Observation: The buffered identity allows one to consume vast amounts of news (NYT, WSJ, etc.) without it “diminishing [one’s] happiness”. By framing the news as an object to be understood rather than a battle to be fought, the individual creates a protective distance.

The Reality Principle: The essay argues that mental health requires being “clear about the things you cannot change and the things you can”. This is a buffered distinction. It separates the internal locus of control from the external chaos. The porous person, by contrast, “overestimate[s] their ability to change the world,” believing their internal intent can magically alter external reality.

3. Hero Systems as Fictional Realities

The essay lists “blindness to the fictional reality of their hero system” as a cause of becoming unhinged.

Porous Attachment: A person with a porous identity treats their “hero system” (political tribe, ideology) as a sacred, constitutive part of their being. When the news attacks the hero system, the person feels physically attacked.

Buffered Detachment: The buffered observer recognizes the hero system as “fictional” or constructed. This detachment allows them to analyze the news without their identity collapsing when their side loses or is criticized.

The essay suggests that the news acts as a “stress test” for the Buffer. If the buffer is intact, the individual can process the “unpredictable world” as information (“understanding”). If the buffer is weak (porous), the news becomes an “assault” that causes the individual to “rage against reality” and lose their mental health.

Posted in Journalism, Mike Benz, Pundits | Comments Off on The Porous Appeal: Why Institutions Misread Mike Benz

Liberalism Can’t Heal Itself

Ross Douthat writes in the NYT:

First, growth alone does not solve the return of great-power conflict, even perhaps civilizational conflict, as a force disrupting the frictionless ideals of globalization. The liberal model of trade and exchange works best in a world of broadly shared values, where governments and peoples are all at least somewhat Lockean in their perspectives and desires.

But if that world seems to be defunct or in retreat, then just insisting over and over again that global trade makes everyone richer can be an evasion of national responsibility. It’s a true-enough statement that doesn’t tell you what to do when some of the powers getting richer are using the wealth to prop up authoritarian and totalitarian systems, buy allies across the developing world and underwrite wars and potential wars against their neighbors.

In this environment, you can’t just answer questions like, “Is it a great idea for Europeans to buy so much oil and gas from Russia?” or “Is it a good idea for so much of the U.S. industrial base to have relocated to China?” or “Should we let our A.I. companies sell chips and technology to all comers while we’re barreling toward superintelligence?” with reference to G.D.P. statistics and consumer purchasing power.

A second example: Growth alone doesn’t tell you what to do about the social costs of liberal individualism. This is an old reactionary critique of liberalism — that what’s gained in wealth and freedom might be lost in alienation and anomie — but it’s garnered new force in the last two decades because of a very specific interaction between technological change and libertarian values.

In our time, political liberalism has pushed the envelope on individual liberties (around drugs and gambling and suicide, as well as sex and sexual identity) at exactly the same moment that technological progress has given us radical new means for exploiting and amplifying addictive behaviors. The results are a world that’s richer and more technologically proficient — and also seemingly unhappier, more despairing, more addicted, more deranged. And while this may be a temporary situation, and hopefully culture and politics will adapt, those adaptations will not themselves be liberal in either a philosophical or a post-Cold War political sense of the term. They might be post-liberal in the sense of political regulation of technology or in the sense of religious-moral regulation of individual choice — but they will not just emerge organically from the proper application of John Stuart Mill or Milton Friedman.

Finally, crucially, the shadow over everything: There is simply no obvious liberal answer, in economic policy or otherwise, to the confluence of wealth and technology and individualism leading to lower birthrates, which incentivizes mass migration to keep the economic system running, which leads to native resentment, ethno-religious separatism and roiling social conflict.

All the political post-liberalisms of our time, including not just right-wing populism and nationalism but also the managerial-bureaucratic style of centrist speech suppression and anti-democratic maneuvers, have emerged because post-Cold War liberalism doesn’t know how to manage the internal divisions of aging societies with large immigrant populations. The liberal prescription is a normative exhortation — natives shouldn’t be bigoted and migrants should assimilate to our values, whenever we figure out what those are — that has failed so far in all its forms, center-left and center-right and “woke.”

Douthat is putting his finger on something liberals mostly dodge because it forces trade-offs instead of moral posturing.
On geopolitics. Liberal economics assumes a Lockean world where enrichment softens conflict. That assumption is dead. Growth can bankroll repression, military buildup, and civilizational rivalry just as easily as it can bankroll middle-class comfort. Once that’s true, GDP stops being a sufficient guide. At that point, trade policy becomes national strategy, not efficiency maximization. Pretending otherwise is not principled liberalism, it’s abdication.
On social costs. This is the most damning critique. Liberalism expanded choice just as technology maximized temptation. Those two forces interact badly. You don’t just get freedom, you get industrial-scale addiction, despair, and social breakdown. Mill never imagined infinite porn, crypto casinos in your pocket, fentanyl logistics, or algorithmic slot machines optimized for compulsion. Liberal philosophy offers no tools to regulate that environment except wishful talk about “autonomy.” Any real fix will involve constraints. Meaning non-liberal moves.
On demography. This is the quiet catastrophe liberalism has no answer for. Wealth plus individualism plus technology yields fewer births. Fewer births force immigration. Immigration without shared norms produces conflict. Liberalism responds with scolding and slogans, not mechanisms. “Don’t be bigoted” is not a policy. “Assimilate” is meaningless if elites refuse to define what assimilation even means. The resulting vacuum gets filled by nationalists on the right and managerial coercion on the centrist left.
The deeper point. Post-Cold War liberalism was built for a young, growing, culturally confident world with weak external enemies and strong internal trust. We now have the opposite. Old societies. Low fertility. High migration. Fragmented moral consensus. Powerful rival states. Addictive technologies. Liberalism’s language still floats around, but its machinery doesn’t work in these conditions.
That doesn’t mean liberalism was evil. It means it was situational. We are entering a phase where trade, speech, technology, and migration will be managed rather than moralized. The real question is who does the managing and with what values. The liberal imagination has not yet caught up to that reality.
Where does buffered vs porous identity play a role in this discussion?
It sits right under everything Douthat is describing.
Post–Cold War liberalism assumes a strongly buffered self. The individual is imagined as autonomous, cognitively sovereign, and largely impermeable. Choices happen inside the self. Social structures, technologies, incentives, and moral ecologies matter less than intention and consent. That assumption props up liberal confidence in growth, trade, migration, and expanding choice. If people are buffered, they can handle it.
But the world Douthat describes keeps producing porous outcomes.
Geopolitics first. Liberal trade theory assumes nations are buffered actors too. We trade, we get richer, conflict fades. But in a porous world, wealth flows through institutions, ideologies, and power systems. Trade with China or Russia does not stay economic. It mutates regimes, alliances, weapons systems, and propaganda environments. Thinking in buffered terms leads to naive policy. Porous reality punches back.
Now the social and technological sphere. Liberalism treats drug use, sexual expression, gambling, and even suicide as matters of individual autonomy. Buffered logic. But modern technology is explicitly designed to breach the boundary of the self. Algorithms target attention, dopamine, identity formation, and habit loops. Addiction is porosity made systematic. Liberalism’s answer sounds hollow because it was never built for a world where the self is actively engineered from the outside in.
Demography is the clearest case. Liberalism assumes identity and values are chosen and portable. People migrate. They assimilate. Everyone gets along eventually. That only works if identities are thin and bufferable. In practice, identities are thick, inherited, moralized, and porous. They transmit through families, religious communities, language, and memory. When mass migration meets low native fertility, porous identities collide rather than dissolve. Liberal exhortation fails because it misunderstands how identity actually works.
Even the managerial left Douthat mentions is reacting to porosity. Speech control, moral regulation, and institutional pressure are attempts to stabilize a porous environment by force. When persuasion fails and autonomy produces chaos, management steps in. That too is post-liberal, even if it uses liberal vocabulary.
So buffered identity is the fantasy engine of late liberalism. Porous identity is the reality it increasingly governs. The gap between the two produces exactly what Douthat is pointing at. Trade that creates enemies. Freedom that creates addiction. Migration that creates fragmentation. Liberalism keeps prescribing norms for buffered selves in a world that treats humans as porous systems. That mismatch is why post-liberal answers are emerging whether elites like the label or not.

Free trade relies on a deeply buffered picture of both persons and nations.

At the individual level, classical free-trade arguments assume consumers are autonomous choosers. Cheaper goods increase welfare. Preferences are stable. Effects stop at price and income. Moral, cultural, and psychological spillovers are treated as externalities or ignored. That only works if people are buffered, meaning culture, status, habits, and identity are not significantly transformed by what they consume or by how production is organized.

In a porous frame, consumption reshapes identity. What a society makes and buys affects skills, dignity, status hierarchies, family formation, time horizons, and moral norms. Offshoring a manufacturing base does not just lower prices. It dissolves trades, weakens local authority structures, degrades male wages, alters marriage markets, and erodes civic confidence. These changes seep into identity formation over generations. Free-trade models do not count those costs because they are invisible in a buffered framework.

At the firm and national level, free trade assumes countries are buffered too. Trade is exchange, not entanglement. Wealth does not meaningfully alter values or power structures beyond making everyone richer. In reality, nations are porous systems. Capital transfers institutional capacity, military capability, surveillance tech, ideological confidence, and geopolitical leverage. Trading with an authoritarian state strengthens the regime’s internal control and its external reach. Growth flows through politics and coercion, not around them.

Free-trade advocacy also assumes values are separable from markets. The Lockean idea is that commerce civilizes. In porous reality, markets magnify whatever moral ecology they sit in. A society oriented toward discipline and hierarchy will use growth differently than one oriented toward atomized consumption. Globalization does not flatten values. It transmits them asymmetrically.

This is why GDP talk now rings evasive. Buffered reasoning says losses are transitional and individuals will retool. Porous reasoning observes that once norms, institutions, and identities break, they are not easily rebuilt. Telling displaced workers to “learn to code” misunderstands the injury. The harm is not only economic. It is social and existential.

So the free-trade debate keeps breaking down because one side is arguing with a buffered model and the other is responding to porous damage. Until trade policy takes porosity seriously, meaning identity, institutions, power, and culture as first-order effects rather than regrettable side costs, the liberal case for free trade will keep sounding abstract and disconnected from lived experience.

Buffered identity runs through economics at a foundational level, usually without being named.

Core microeconomics assumes a buffered agent. Preferences are stable, endogenous shocks are limited, and identity is exogenous or irrelevant. Individuals are utility maximizers who respond to prices, not moral ecologies. Culture, habit, and social meaning are either fixed or safely bracketed off. That abstraction works for many narrow problems. But it quietly builds a picture of the self as impermeable to context.

Rational choice depends on buffering. If preferences are shaped by advertising, institutions, technology, family structure, and social status in deep and persistent ways, then the clean separation between wants and constraints breaks down. Porous agents do not just choose within markets. Markets choose them back.

General equilibrium rests on buffered systems too. Shocks propagate through prices, not identities. Adjustment happens via retraining, migration, and capital reallocation. Social cohesion, legitimacy, and meaning are assumed to elastically adapt. In a porous reality, shocks propagate through norms, trust, fertility, health, and civic order. Adjustment is not smooth. It is cumulative and sometimes irreversible.

Welfare economics assumes measurability of value through consumption and income. Utility is inferred from revealed preference. That presumes agents know what benefits them and are not systematically misled or reshaped by the choice environment. If addiction, attention capture, and algorithmic manipulation are central features of modern markets, revealed preference becomes unreliable. You cannot infer welfare from choices made under engineered compulsion.

Externalities are the discipline’s main concession to porosity. Pollution, public goods, and information asymmetries admit that some effects leak. But identity formation, moral degradation, civic demoralization, and institutional decay are treated as either non-economic or unquantifiable. Economics does not deny porosity. It marginalizes it.

Macroeconomics carries the same bias. Growth, productivity, and GDP take center stage. Distribution, family formation, demographic replacement, and social trust are secondary. The implicit claim is that if aggregates improve, society will cope. That only works if societies are buffered enough to absorb disruption without losing coherence.

Even policy advice reflects this. Economists prefer price instruments, nudges, and marginal adjustments. These are tools suited to buffered agents. When reality demands hard boundaries, prohibitions, strategic trade-offs, or moral regulation, economics goes quiet or retreats to “that’s a political decision.”

The discipline’s power came from abstraction. Its blind spot comes from the same place. Economics works best in worlds where selves, cultures, and states are buffered. The more porous those systems become, under technology, migration, and geopolitical conflict, the less reliable economic reasoning becomes as a governing framework rather than a partial tool.

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The Opportunist

Opportunism is often adaptive. Calling it bad is mostly a moral overlay, not an evolutionary one.
From an evolutionary standpoint, opportunism is sensitivity to changing incentives plus willingness to exploit openings. That combo is gold in unstable environments. Food scarcity, shifting hierarchies, migration, tech change. The organisms and people who notice openings and move fast tend to survive and reproduce more.
Where opportunism really shines is at boundaries. New niches, collapsing institutions, weak enforcement, transitional periods. Settlers, traders, inventors, political climbers, market entrants, sexual strategists. All are opportunists doing well when the old rules wobble.
Why the bad reputation then.
Because opportunism creates negative externalities inside stable groups. Groups need predictability, trust, and rule-following. Opportunists free-ride, defect early, switch loyalties, and exploit asymmetries. That threatens group cohesion. So moral systems evolve to stigmatize opportunism even while benefiting from it in practice.
Another wrinkle. Opportunism scales poorly with visibility. Low-level, flexible opportunism is tolerated or praised as hustle. High-status or late-stage opportunism gets condemned as betrayal, sellout behavior, or bad character. Same behavior, different optics and power levels.
There’s also an environment mismatch story. In stable, high-trust societies, long-term cooperation beats short-term opportunism. In volatile or zero-sum environments, opportunism outperforms loyalty. Modern life mixes both, which is why people feel morally confused about it.
A useful way to frame it.
Opportunism is a strategy, not a trait.
It’s adaptive when uncertainty is high and enforcement is weak.
It’s punished when stability is high and reputation systems are strong.
Evolution doesn’t care whether something feels noble. It cares whether it works under local conditions. Opportunism keeps beating extinction, which is why every society denounces it while quietly relying on people who practice it.

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Video: Women Can’t Find Jobs and are LOSING Their Social Status

ChatGPT says: Yes, there are real sex differences in how people react to AI, but the video you shared layers a bunch of ideological stuff on top of a kernel of truth.

What the data actually says about sex differences and AI

a. Attitudes and usage

Recent survey and experimental work is pretty consistent about a few points.

• Women, on average, report more AI anxiety, less positive attitudes to AI, lower perceived AI knowledge, and lower AI use than men.

• A 2025 Pew study found women are less likely than men to say AI will have a positive impact on the country and more likely to want stronger control and regulation of AI systems.

• Across multiple datasets, there is a clear “gen AI gender gap”: roughly 50% of men vs high-30s % of women have used generative AI, and women have around 20–22% lower odds of using gen-AI tools, even when you control for role, country, and sector.

• An HBS team finds women often avoid using AI partly because they have more ethical concerns about it, not because they are incapable of using it.
Harvard Business School Library

So your anecdotal sense that “women are more hostile to AI” has real backing in the aggregate. The average woman is less enthusiastic, uses it less, and is more worried about it. This is not “all women” vs “all men,” but there is a clear shift in the averages.

b. Job risk is genuinely gendered

Here the video touches reality but then runs off into caricature.

• The International Labour Organization finds that in high-income countries, about 9.6% of female-dominated occupations are at high risk of AI-driven transformation, compared with 3.5% of male-dominated jobs, mainly because AI is great at admin/clerical tasks where women are overrepresented.
Reuters

• Other work on automation shows that “traditional automation” (robots, etc.) hits male blue-collar jobs harder, but newer AI tools that target text, back-office, and customer-service work sit right on top of many female heavy roles.

• Several recent policy and think-tank pieces explicitly warn that the AI shock may worsen gender inequality if women are slower to adopt AI and are clustered in at-risk white-collar roles.

So there is a plausible structural story:

Women are more concentrated in exactly the jobs that gen-AI displaces or compresses.

Women, on average, use AI less and are more anxious about it.

That combination means they are more likely to see AI primarily as a threat rather than a tool.

You do not need any “women are lazy and entitled” talk to get to that outcome. The macro structure is enough.

What the video gets right

Stripping the rhetorical bomb-throwing away, there are some fair points in what she is describing.

• Digital media and content jobs are being hammered. Search changes, AI overviews, and AI-generated content absolutely are wrecking the economics of a big slice of journalism, copywriting, SEO, and “brand content” work. That is real.

• There is a genuine oversupply of communications, media, and arts graduates relative to stable, well paid writing and comms jobs. That predates AI, but AI is turning a slow bleed into a sharper cut.
• A lot of the women she is talking about really did follow the “do everything right” script: AP classes, elite school, unpaid internships, media/arts/communications career ladder in NYC/LA, then they walked straight into a collapsing business model.
• That has status implications. For highly educated women, “I am a New York media / tech / comms person” has been a big part of identity and mating-market signaling. Losing that hurts twice: financially and psychologically.

So if you ask “why do I see women in my circles more hostile to AI,” one simple answer is:

AI is visibly undermining the particular labor markets and status ecosystems that a lot of highly educated millennial and Gen-Z women live in, while many men they know are either in tech, more numerate roles, or more likely to see AI as a toy and power-up. The threat feels more immediate and more unfair.

Where the video goes off the rails

Here is where I’d separate diagnosis from ideology.

a. “Women are lazy / don’t work as hard as men”

There is no serious evidence that women as a group “just don’t work as hard.” What we actually see:

• Women are overrepresented in physically and emotionally demanding work: healthcare, childcare, elder care, teaching, cleaning, retail. These are not brunch and SoulCycle jobs. They are underpaid, not easy.

• Women work fewer hours in paid employment on average partly because they are doing a disproportionate share of unpaid domestic and care work. You can argue about choices, but calling that “lazy” is unserious.
Pew Research Center

The video takes a specific subculture (upper-middle-class, coastal, credentialed, media-adjacent women) and universalizes their habits as “women.” That plays to a certain audience but it is not a description of women generally.

b. “Women won’t reskill”

Reality is mixed.

• The data shows women are slower to adopt gen-AI and are less likely to seek out AI training, which really can hurt them.

• But it also shows that time constraints, lack of employer support, and lower baseline digital skills are big drivers, not just brunch addiction.

So the structural story is:

Women often have less slack time, less targeted training, and more risk if they screw up. That can produce cautious behavior around a new tech that feels ethically suspect and job-threatening. “They’re lazy and don’t want to get up at 4 am” is a YouTube personality simplification.

c. “Women are a liability at work because they’re political”

Two things are being mashed together:

Many younger women are indeed at the vanguard of DEI, progressive causes, and HR-centered workplace politics.

A lot of managers, especially in tech and finance, are sick of internal ideological fights and prefer “low-drama” hires.

Both are true to a point. But again, she collapses it into “women in white collar jobs are liabilities,” which ignores the fact that:

• Plenty of male employees are also political headaches, just in different directions.
• Women are overrepresented in HR and comms partly because companies valued their skills for decades, not out of charity.

Her politics is framing one faction of the professional class war as “women vs men” rather than “certain credentialed progressives vs everyone else.” That is rhetorically effective but analytically sloppy.

d. The leap to “mass socialism led by destitute women”

You can see the contours of a plausible worry:

• A group of people loses status and income fast.
• They are heavily urban, single, and politically engaged.
• They are clustered on the left.

That can absolutely shift electoral coalitions and policy. But she jumps from some early signals to “one way ticket into socialism” without considering:

• Male workers who have already lived this de-industrialization story and did not all become socialists.
• The role of broader housing, healthcare, and education policy in making everyone feel shafted, not just single women.
• The possibility that as AI hits male heavy jobs harder over time, you also get a large cohort of pissed off men, not just women.

Again, she is doing ideological storytelling for a right-leaning audience, not neutral social analysis.

So why are women more hostile to AI, really?

Here is the stripped down version.

Objective exposure
Women are disproportionately in jobs where AI can substitute for at least some of what they do: admin, customer service, media, comms, paralegal-adjacent back office, non-technical knowledge work. That makes AI feel like a direct threat, not a fun gadget.

Adoption and literacy gap
Men are more likely to be early adopters of new tech and to frame it as a toy or power-tool. Women are more likely to come in later, with more anxiety, and to care more about ethical and social externalities. That gap is showing up clearly in the gen-AI data.

Different relationship to institutions
Younger professional women have, for the last few decades, been rewarded for trusting schools, HR, and liberal institutions. Those same institutions abruptly cannot protect their jobs from AI. That feels like betrayal. Men, especially in your kind of circles, already assumed the system was rigged, so they experience AI more as a new power lever than a rug-pull.

Status psychology
A high-achieving woman whose self-conception is “good girl who did everything right and earned a white-collar life” will experience the AI shock as a status humiliation, not just an economic problem. That makes her more likely to see AI as illegitimate, cheating, or dehumanizing rather than “creative destruction.”

If you combine 1–4, you get exactly the vibe you are picking up: a lot of women in your world who are hostile or anxious about AI, and a lot of men who are either indifferent, enthusiastic, or nihilistically “might as well surf this wave.”

How I’d rate the video

If I had to put it cleanly:

• Structurally useful: 40%
She is right that AI is smashing some female-heavy white-collar sectors, that many of these women were following an elite script that no longer works, and that there will be real political knock-on effects.

• Ideological venting: 60%
The “women are lazy, brunch-obsessed, entitled, and a corporate liability” stuff is culture-war fan service. It makes her audience feel superior, but it is not needed to explain the underlying trend and it flattens class and regional reality into “girls these days.”

If you want to use the video, I would treat it as a case study in how right-wing content creators are metabolizing a genuine gendered AI shock and turning it into a story about female moral failure instead of about institutional failure and structural change.

You can acknowledge the kernel: women really do seem to be at higher near-term risk from AI in certain sectors and are, on average, more anxious and less engaged with the tools. You do not have to buy the rest of the narrative that this is because women are inherently lazy, political, or unfit for serious work.

If anything, the hard question for you and me is: what would it look like for women who are anxious about AI to get pulled into high agency adoption, rather than mocked into paralysis or pushed into LARPing as revolutionaries? That is the part that actually matters for where this goes.

Posted in AI | Comments Off on Video: Women Can’t Find Jobs and are LOSING Their Social Status

Where Is Ross Douthat On The Buffered Vs Porous Scale?

Douthat sits in a hybrid spot. He isn’t fully buffered in the Charles Taylor sense and he isn’t romantic about porousness either. He’s a modern Catholic intellectual who feels the costs of buffering but distrusts the naïve return to enchantment. His whole project is about trying to live with a managed porousness inside a buffered age.

He accepts the buffered frame as the default habitat. He writes as someone who knows he is formed by technocracy, analytic habits, elite-college secular culture, medicalization, and a meritocratic worldview. He treats the buffered self as the water he swims in.

He feels the insufficiency of that mindset. Much of his work reads like a lament for a world where transcendence is harder to experience and harder to take seriously without feeling self-conscious. He sees the boredom, drift, and sterility of purely buffered life.

He selectively valorizes porousness. Bad Religion and The Deep Places both circle the idea that spiritual experience, suffering, and the supernatural can break through modern insulation. But he never glamorizes full porousness. He sees it as dangerous if unmoored. He prefers porousness disciplined by tradition rather than porousness as free-floating mysticism.

He tries to carve out a narrow middle lane that is emotionally porous but epistemically cautious. In The Deep Places his own chronic illness pushes him toward a more open posture to non-material explanations while his journalistic training keeps him wary of credulity. You can feel him negotiating between the buffered reflex to doubt and the porous reflex to receive.

In political commentary he treats the decline of shared thick moral horizons as a buffered-world problem rather than a purely institutional one. He sees the loss of enchantment, ritual, and hierarchy as a key source of malaise. That’s a porous diagnosis of a buffered society.

He is deeply Taylorian even when he doesn’t cite Taylor. He agrees we live in an “immanent frame” that narrows spiritual possibility. But he thinks meaning leaks in anyway. So his entire vibe is: the frame is real, you are formed by it, but openings remain. Follow them carefully.

Douthat is a buffered man who wishes he weren’t quite so buffered and spends his writing life working out how to let a controlled amount of porousness back in without losing sanity, reason, or social footing. This is why he resonates with readers who feel the same tension. It’s also why he annoys both hard secularists and hard mystics.

The elite-journalist mindset is built inside institutions that reward detachment, verification norms, procedural rationality, and self-presentation as an autonomous chooser. All of that pushes them toward the buffered identity as the obvious, sane way to exist. They don’t experience it as a theory. They experience it as adulthood.

The buffered frame lets them do their job. It supports skepticism, emotional distance, and the sense that you can stand outside belief systems and evaluate them. It keeps them from being captured by movements and it protects their professional neutrality.

But the costs show up too.

They underestimate how much people are shaped by ritual, myth, sacred ideals, group enchantment, status ecologies, and spiritual hunger. They often misread charismatic movements because they assume a buffered psychology where people make discrete, rational choices instead of being swept into collective emotion. They miss the heat and stickiness of identity. They flatten everything into ideology when much of politics is really liturgy.

They also don’t see their own porousness. Their profession has its own sacreds and taboos but they treat them as neutrality. They have their own rituals and collective effervescence, only it happens in newsrooms, conferences, Slack channels, and social media echo chambers. Because they name it “reason” they don’t recognize it as enchantment.

So yes, most elite journalists assume the buffered identity is just the water everyone should swim in. It gives them a sense of competence and control. It also blinds them to the deep forces moving the people they cover. This is why figures like Benz, Fuentes, Trump, or any other charismatic actor often disorient them. They don’t have the conceptual tools to see how porous identity works in practice.

The buffered identity shapes news in ways most reporters don’t even notice.

It narrows what counts as a real cause. Buffered identity assumes people are governed by incentives, interests, and rational calculations. So coverage leans heavily toward material explanations and treats emotion, ritual, myth, and spiritual longing as fringe or decorative. Reporters cover policy, not liturgy. They miss the fact that many conflicts are really battles over sacred meaning rather than cost-benefit logic.

It sanitizes the texture of lived experience. Porous moments feel uncanny or charged. People describe being moved, seized, pulled, swept up. Buffered reporters translate all that into “motivated reasoning,” “identity,” or “disinformation.” They flatten intensity into categories that feel safe inside the immanent frame. The mystical or the collective gets written out of the story.

It builds a blind spot around charisma. Charismatic authority looks irrational from inside buffering. Journalists interpret it as manipulation or demagoguery because they can’t feel its appeal from the inside. They handle it like a pathology. This creates constant misreads of movements that run on enchanted energy. They don’t get how status, ritual, and shared ecstasy function.

It produces tone policing. Buffered identity values emotional restraint. So anyone who speaks from visceral conviction gets labeled extreme or unserious. Passion reads as danger. Newsrooms reward the type of writer who watches life rather than participates in it. That shapes who gets hired and who shapes the narrative.

It makes “balance” and “objectivity” feel like moral goods instead of professional techniques. Buffered identity treats distance as virtue. You become suspicious of anything that smells like commitment. This influences what stories get framed as “important,” which voices get credibility, and which experiences are dismissed as subjective.

It drives a preference for elite sources. The buffered self identifies with technocratic competence. So reporters instinctively trust institutions, experts, and credentialed authority. They assume these people see clearly and everyone else is clouded by passion or myth. That produces coverage that leans managerial and treats grassroots sentiment as noise rather than signal.

It creates an allergy to sacred language. Any talk of good, evil, sin, redemption, vocation, or destiny makes elite reporters recoil. They translate everything into psychology or politics. They don’t know how to report on meaning except through the buffer’s filters. This makes huge parts of human experience feel invisible in mainstream coverage.

The result is a news ecosystem that is excellent at tracking facts inside the immanent frame and often terrible at understanding the forces that actually move people. It’s why populism keeps surprising them. It’s why they misinterpret religious reactions, culture wars, online subcultures, and charismatic influencers.

They’re reporting a world that’s half real. The half they can measure and verify. The half that fits the buffered template. The other half leaks out through the cracks but never quite gets named.

In the news business, the differences in buffered vs porous identity track along role, format, status, and generational cohort. The news business isn’t a single cognitive style. It’s a hierarchy of bufferedness.

National prestige reporters are the most buffered. Think NYT, WaPo, FT, NPR, and similar outlets. Their training, peer environment, and professional survival incentives all reward analytic distance. Their identity depends on being the person who is not swayed. They police porousness in themselves and each other. This is the zone where the buffered self feels like the only legitimate self.

Magazine feature writers and essayists sit one notch less buffered. They’re still formed by elite norms, but they’re allowed some emotional and existential range. You see more willingness to describe awe, fear, enchantment, trauma, liminal moments. They still translate it into secular terms, but there’s more space for porous energy to leak in. Douthat is an example, though he’s a columnist not a magazine writer. The Atlantic often lives here.

Investigative reporters vary. The national-security and corruption-oriented investigators skew buffered because they need suspicion and institutional distance. But the on-the-ground human condition investigators sometimes absorb more porousness because they’re immersed in people’s intense experiences. They still report through a rational frame, but their antennae pick up what the buffered elite often miss.

Local reporters tend to be more porous. They cover communities where ritual, religion, collective identity, and local mythology play a visible role. They feel the weight of family networks, churches, fraternal orders, booster clubs, sports cultures, and civic rituals. The coverage still uses a buffered style, but the sensibility is closer to the porous world because they’re embedded in it.

Tabloid and sensational outlets are performatively porous even if the writers themselves are often buffered. Sensationalism runs on intensity, transgression, moral panic, and mythic conflict. It’s not reflective porousness but it mimics it. This is why porous audiences gravitate to tabloids even though tabloids are manufactured by cynical professionals.

Opinion commentators sit all over the map. Some treat buffered identity as sacred. Others lean fully into a porous style, drawing on mythic narratives, visceral emotion, or spiritual categories. The right populist ecosystem is more porous. The centrist or establishment punditry is extremely buffered. The left has both: traditional liberal commentators are buffered while some more spiritual or identity-driven factions operate porous.

Longform audio (podcasts) has opened the door to a more porous register. Because conversations run for hours, people speak less guardedly. Reporters trained in the buffered style drift into porous states without noticing. They tell personal stories, admit uncertainty, express awe, wrestle with meaning. The medium itself weakens the buffer.

Generational differences matter. Older Boomers came up under a Walter-Cronkite ideal of buffered professionalism. Younger reporters often still inherit the frame from their institutions but are less secure in it. Some Gen Z reporters are surprisingly porous in private but write in a buffered voice because the job demands it. Others bring activist tastes, which are a type of secular porousness re-entering the newsroom.

The higher the prestige and the closer the role is to adjudicating public reality, the more buffered the identity. The closer the role is to lived experience, subculture, or longform narrative, the more porous energy seeps in. This is part of why news often feels thin to readers who sense the porous world. The people closest to the commanding heights have the strongest buffers.

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WP: ‘Justice is not meant to be a luxury good’

WP: Max Raskin is a fellow and adjunct professor of law at New York University School of Law. He is a co-founder of Uris Acquisitions. He writes:

The bar exam, the Law School Admission Test and law school itself are the price you pay for joining a government-protected legal guild — no different from taxi medallions or liquor licenses. It is essentially illegal to represent someone else in court without passing this test, which is an exception to the general rule that people should be allowed to hire whomever they want without the government’s permission.

Many empirical studies question the effectiveness of the bar exam in predicting lawyerly prowess, but this should be settled by a free market. We don’t make auto mechanics or electricians go to school for an additional three years, even though their professions can cause much more physical harm. We rely on credentials, social signaling, reviews and other market mechanisms for determining quality.

Lawyers are not doctors, so more experimentation in the legal profession can be tolerated. Lawyers are not constantly making life-or-death decisions, and when they do, there are procedures to ensure that counsel is competent. Run-of-the-mill contract review and regulatory filings, however, don’t warrant a licensure scheme.

This is especially true in light of advances in artificial intelligence. AI systems already draft wills, nondisclosure agreements, term sheets, employment contracts and regulatory memos at associate-level quality. There are those who point to the occasional lawyer who doesn’t check hallucinated citations and embarrasses himself in court, but these are exceptions. The vast majority of lawyers who use AI don’t want to admit it for the same reason doctors don’t want to admit to Googling symptoms, so there is a negative selection bias where stories of federal judges sloppily using AI catch more attention than routine use of the tool…

Standardized legal work, which primarily consists of updating form documents, can almost certainly be automated. The billable hour is not a sacrosanct system etched on the tablets of Moses. It is a 20th-century invention that will collapse when the cost of producing effective legal work falls dramatically because of AI. Lawyers expect to save 240 hours a year on average by using generative AI tools, according to a Thomson Reuters survey this year. This is partly due to the nature of law itself — once a rule turns out to be just and workable, it can simply be repeated. In our common law system, this means that law ought to be more, not less, efficient as time goes on…

One of the most nefarious forms of protectionism is the limit on nonlawyers being partners in law firms. This rule prevents specialization, which is the cornerstone of economic order. Why would someone think that a lawyer who has trained in a narrow field would be good at firm operations or marketing or hiring? In most other industries, chief technology officers deal with tech, chief operation officers deal with operations and hiring is with human resources. But in law firms, essentially all the ultimate decision-makers must be lawyers. Kim Kardashian could surely run a more efficient marketing department than a white-shoe firm.

These rules are marketed as protecting justice when they really protect incumbents. Over the past decade, legal costs have risen by about twice the rate of inflation, while technology should have driven costs down.

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Interaction Ritual Chains (2005)

This Randall Collins classic book gives you a clean sociological bridge between Charles Taylor’s porous identity and buffered identity. It’s not metaphysics. It’s what happens to people when the ritual energy dries up or concentrates.

Porous selves come out of strong, dense interaction rituals. You’re saturated with emotional energy from face-to-face encounters. You feel carried along by groups. Boundaries feel thin. You experience meaning as something that flows through you. Collins would say you’re high in emotional energy that was generated collectively, not individually. That produces permeability. You’re open because the group is holding you up.

Buffered selves develop when the ritual conditions weaken. Fragmented attention, thin group solidarity, weak synchrony, low mutual focus. Collins argues that without thick rituals you lose the shared charge that binds people. When that happens, you fall back on a more brittle, self-contained identity. You operate as a buffered unit because nothing in your environment is giving you the social electricity that dissolves boundaries. You have to generate your own emotional energy, which makes you more defended and inward.

A few core takeaways.

Porous identity is a product of high-synchrony ritual life. Think religious communities, intense subcultures, military units, or even music scenes. People feel possessed by something larger because the ritual entrainment is that strong. Collins calls this the “rush” of emotional energy. Taylor calls it porousness. Same phenomenon.

Buffered identity emerges when your rituals shift from embodied and communal to abstract and individual. Modernity disrupts attention and weakens shared focus. You get people who rely more on cognition and less on collective entrainment. The boundaries harden because social energy is scarce. Taylor describes it as a self sealed off from outside forces. Collins describes it as low ritual density.

Porousness isn’t mystical. It’s what people look like when they’re plugged into powerful IR chains that extend backward and forward in time. You inherit emotional capital from prior rituals and pass it on. The self feels open because you’re literally wired into a chain of shared practices.

Bufferedness isn’t heroic independence. It’s a symptom of isolation in the ritual economy. Without reliable IR loops, you collapse into self-monitoring, self-regulation, self-consciousness. You get the modern “interior” self because your social environment forces you to generate meaning alone. That feels buffered because nothing breaks through.

Importantly, both states can flip. When people find a new high-intensity ritual environment, the buffered shell goes soft. That’s why people get swept up in revivals, cults, fandoms, political rallies. Their identity becomes porous again, not through belief but through entrainment.

So Collins gives you a materialist mechanism for what Taylor frames as a historical shift. Ritual density and emotional energy distribution determine whether people feel sealed or permeable. The buffered–porous distinction is basically a phenomenology of high vs low ritual entrainment.

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American post-liberalism is less a doctrine than a pile-up.

You have high-church theorists writing about “the common good,” technolibertarians who decided democracy is a bug, Trumpist nationalists who want tariffs and vengance, and online paranoids who think the CIA flew the planes into the towers. They all claim liberalism has failed, but they want very different things from whatever comes next.
The Dispatch roundtable and the ISI piece you linked trace how that jumble is now fighting to control the institutions that used to form “respectable” American conservatism. I’ll use that as the through-line: not just “what are the varieties of post-liberalism,” but how they are competing inside the right’s existing elite pipeline, and why it feels like rot rather than mere intellectual evolution.

I. What “post-liberal” means in this context

In the podcast, John McCormack gives the cleanest definition around minute 5. “Post-liberal” here does not just mean “anti-progressive.” It means people who fault the American founding itself, the whole classical-liberal package of individual rights, limited government, and procedural neutrality.
On their telling, the trouble is not just left-liberalism since the 1960s. It is the liberal part of the American experiment going back to Madison and Locke.
So the shared moves are:

Treat “liberalism” as a comprehensive, corrosive order, not just a set of rules.

Blame liberalism for atomization, loneliness, cultural decay, and weak national will.

Call for a thicker, more directive state that can actively promote substantive goods (religion, family, nation, order), not just referee private choices.

Once you see that common frame, the varieties of American post-liberalism sort themselves into a few main families.

II. Catholic integralists and “common-good” conservatives

This is the most self-consciously intellectual variety, and the one that got ISI’s board to start talking about a “post-liberal hijacking.”
Rough sketch:
• Patrick Deneen’s “Why Liberalism Failed” argues that liberalism didn’t just go off the rails recently; it succeeded on its own terms. Emancipated individuals, uprooted communities, managed by faceless technocrats, is the logical endpoint.
• Adrian Vermeule’s “common-good constitutionalism” explicitly rejects originalism and rights-talk in favor of reading the Constitution as a mandate for the state to promote objective moral goods.
• Integralists more broadly want an avowedly Christian (usually Catholic) state that uses law to buttress religious truth, restrict blasphemy and pornography, and subordinate markets to a thick moral order.
On the Dispatch pod they mention a professor who has openly endorsed blasphemy laws in the United States and who has been given pride of place at ISI conferences. That is integralism in miniature: the problem is not just drag queen story hour; it is the First Amendment as Americans have understood it since the Warren Court, and arguably since the Founding.
This camp generally:
• Is bookish, footnote heavy, and thinks in terms of regimes and teleology.
• Is skeptical of free markets and global capitalism.
• Wants real coercive power, not just “cultural influence.”
Its weak spot is sellability. You can fill an ISI conference with it; it is a lot harder to build a majority coalition for “American blasphemy laws.” So it tends to piggy-back on more populist energies.

III. National conservatism and economic populists

A step down from integralism in theological intensity, but closer to mass politics, you get national conservatism and economic populists.
Think of:
• The Buchanan tradition of tariffs, immigration restriction, and non-intervention abroad.
• “Industrial policy” conservatives who want to break with Reagan’s free-trade consensus.
• The NatCon network and magazines like The American Conservative, which Johnny Burtka ran before taking over ISI. The Dispatch
On the podcast they distinguish this “national populism” from the more academic post-liberals, but the overlap is obvious. Both treat Reagan-Bush fusionism as exhausted. Both think a neutral, procedural state is a fantasy. Both want government to side openly with some groups and values against others.
In practice this looks like:
• Economic nationalism: tariffs, buy-American, hostility to multinational corporations and Wall Street.
• Civilizational rhetoric: “defend Western civilization,” “secure the border,” “fight woke capital.”
• Strong leader politics: a taste for executives who “get things done” without agonizing over norms.
At ISI and Heritage, this is the faction that sells itself as “relevant.” Burtka reportedly told donors he wanted to speak for “the Tucker Carlson wing of the GOP,” which is basically this tendency with a TV face. The Dispatch+1
This camp is more electorally viable than integralism, but less coherent. Some of its people still like the founding; others talk as if the Constitution is a neoliberal psy-op. That fuzziness is a feature not a bug. It lets a lot of different grievances fly under the “post-liberal nationalist” flag.

IV. Tech-adjacent neo-reaction and the “CEO of America” fantasy

Then there is the neo-reactionary or “NRx” stream around Curtis Yarvin, whom the Dispatch folks mention around minute 6 as the guy who tells Americans to get over their “dictator phobia.”
Yarvin’s basic pitch:
• Liberal democracy is inefficient, chaotic, and captured by a progressive “Cathedral” of media, academia, and NGOs.
• The solution is something closer to a high-tech monarchy or corporate state, with a single sovereign CEO in charge of the country.
• Rights, elections, and egalitarian rhetoric are mostly propaganda that keeps the real oligarchy unaccountable.
This is post-liberalism stripped of both Christianity and civic piety. It is attractive to a certain tech-bro who has concluded that democracy is stupid and that Singapore is nicer than San Francisco.
The striking thing, as the Dispatch pod notes, is that ISI invited Yarvin for a friendly talk at a time when its own trustees were complaining of a “post-liberal hijacking.” So you had a once-Buckleyite institution giving a platform to a man who openly talks about relaxing into dictatorship. The Dispatch+1
That tells you something about the current mood: contempt for liberal democracy is no longer disqualifying in the way it would have been for the old fusionist right.
V. The conspiracist post-liberalism of Alex Jones, Fuentes and friends
At the outer edge you get the Fuentes / Alex Jones / “groyper” ecosystem. Here post-liberalism is less a philosophy and more an affect: nihilistic, paranoid, contemptuous of procedural norms, and comfortable with explicit bigotry.
Nick Fuentes gives you the incel-Catholic blend: talk of Christian nationalism, open antisemitism, misogyny, and a performative rejection of liberal taboos. Jones gives you the full paranoid style: 9/11 was an inside job, Sandy Hook was staged, the “globalists” are poisoning the population. Wikipedia+1
In theory, a respectable right could say: look, there are legitimate post-liberal critiques, and then there are deranged people we will not touch. In practice, that line is exactly what has blurred:
• Tucker Carlson brings Fuentes on for a chummy conversation.
• Heritage’s president rushes out a video defending Carlson, which triggers resignations and crisis. The Dispatch+1
• ISI flies its top student journalists to Carlson’s Florida home for a “journalism 101” retreat whose surprise guest is Alex Jones, fresh off losing nearly a billion dollars in defamation judgments for lying about dead schoolchildren. Mediaite+1
The symbolism is not subtle. You are telling the next generation of right-leaning elites: these men are your models. Learn from them. Emulate their style, not the old-fashioned bore who cares about fact checks and constitutional norms.
At that point “post-liberalism” becomes a marketing label for a general stance of anti-institutional hostility and gleeful norm-breaking, glued together by internet clout and ressentiment.

VI. Protestant and evangelical post-liberalism

There is also a more Protestant, often non-Catholic version that shows up in Christian nationalism, parts of the MAGA church world, and some segments of “post-woke” evangelicalism.
Features:
• Less interest in Aquinas, more in reclaiming “Christian America.”
• Talk of America as a covenant nation that must honor God or face judgment.
• Calls for a more muscular use of state power on abortion, LGBT issues, school curricula, and immigration.
Some of these figures avoid the “post-liberal” label, but the substance overlaps. Liberal neutrality is seen as a myth that always favored secular progressives, so it is time to drop the mask and fight for our side’s dominance.
This stream often blends into the Trumpist one in practice. The theology is fuzzier than integralism, but the political imperative is similar: stop pretending the Constitution is a neutral umpire, and start using power to advance substantive Christian goods.
VII. The institutional story: from convening debate to picking winners
The Dispatch team’s ISI reporting is basically a case study in what happens when these post-liberal tendencies begin to capture gatekeeping institutions.
Historically, ISI’s brand was:
• Give smart right-leaning students a canon (Burke, Kirk, Hayek, Tocqueville).
• Convene debates among different conservative schools: libertarians vs traditionalists vs neocons, etc.
• Keep some distance from day-to-day Republican politics and from obvious cranks.
On the podcast they describe ISI as the place where you might see a traditionalist, a neocon, and a libertarian argue about the Iraq War or the size of the welfare state, under the assumption that everyone shares some basic liberal-constitutional framework. The institute’s role was referee and convenor, not cheerleader for one faction.
The new pattern, as they document:
• The president, Burtka, explicitly orients ISI toward the “Tucker Carlson wing” while assuring the board he will keep a “big tent.” The Dispatch+1
• “Serious” post-liberals like Deneen get pride of place at marquee conferences.
• Neo-reactionaries like Yarvin get invited for uncritical conversations.
• Student journalists are flown to Carlson’s house, where Alex Jones shows up as a surprise inspirational guest.
• At the same time, mainstream conservatives who are anti-populist, like Kevin Williamson, are blackballed by leadership for their “contempt for the working class.”
As McCormack puts it around minute 17, everyone gatekeeps. The question is which direction. At ISI, the dial has been moved so that Fuentes-adjacent energies are now “inside,” while old-guard Reagan-Bush conservatives are increasingly “outside.”
Something similar has been happening at Heritage, Hillsdale, and parts of the NatCon network. Shared board members, donor overlap, and a common fear of “irrelevance” in the Turning Point / Charlie Kirk era all push them toward embracing the hottest post-liberal brands, even when those brands are marinated in conspiracy and antisemitism. The Dispatch+1
So the varieties of post-liberalism are not just academic categories. They map onto very concrete institutional bets: Do we align with Carlson despite Fuentes and Jones, because that’s where the kids and the clicks are? Do we give the integralists the plenary session? Do we tell the old Kirk-style people to get over their “dictator phobia”?
VIII. Why this is happening now
A few drivers, many of which the Dispatch conversation hints at:

Liberal exhaustion and broken promises
Post-liberals are not wrong that the liberal order is under strain. Housing is unaffordable, family formation is down, addiction and loneliness are up. The old “free markets plus family values” formula looks fake to a lot of people under 40. That creates a real demand for alternatives.

Attention economics and the charisma premium
The institutions chasing “relevance” are reacting to a media ecosystem that rewards outrage and certainty. Tucker, Jones, Fuentes, Yarvin, and some integralists are all, in very different registers, good at performance. They feel transgressive and high-energy next to a panel on Edmund Burke’s conception of prudence. If you are a struggling think tank or student outfit, the temptation to ride that energy is obvious.

Donor incentives
Big right-wing donors are frustrated that they funded white papers for decades and still got gay marriage, abortion liberalization (before Dobbs), and ESG. They want fighters, not scholars. Aligning with post-liberal brands signals that you are in the fight, not stuck in 1985.

The collapse of confidence in neutral institutions
Once you believe “the regime” is fundamentally hostile and that mainstream media, universities, and even corporations are captured by the left, it becomes easier to rationalize your own turn to illiberal methods. If the other side is waging total culture war, why are you still talking about process?

Generational resentment and elite overproduction
The Dispatch folks touch on this indirectly when they talk about ISI as a “self-selecting elite.” The post-liberal moment is partly a revolt of younger, ambitious right-wing strivers who feel blocked by old gatekeepers. Carlson’s platforming of Fuentes had exactly that flavor: the rebel prince bringing the banned heretic into the palace and humiliating the old guard.

IX. Possible trajectories

In rough outline, I think you can see three paths American post-liberalism might take from here.

Responsible post-liberalism that accepts guardrails
In theory there could be a post-liberal conservatism that keeps its critique of atomized liberalism, pushes for a thicker common good, and still draws bright red lines at conspiracy mongers and racists. That would mean:

• No more dinners where Alex Jones is introduced to student journalists as a career inspiration.
• No more “dictator phobia” jokes from your flagship speakers.
• A clear distinction between hard-edged policy fights (tariffs, immigration restriction, industrial strategy) and open contempt for constitutional constraints.
Right now, that line is extremely blurry. But it is conceptually possible.

A full illiberal turn on the right
If current incentives continue, you get a consolidated “post-liberal right” that is openly hostile to liberal democracy and comfortable with using state power to reward friends and punish enemies. The varieties I’ve described congeal into a kind of Catholic-NatCon-NRx stew with a Tuckerish media style and a Jones-ish relationship to truth.

The institutional story you brought in is the early stage of that: once the elite pipeline is retooled to treat Fuentes-adjacent figures as edgy but acceptable and Carlson as the north star, the next generation of staffers, judges, and candidates is going to look very different.

A re-liberalization or splintering

The Dispatch world is betting on a different outcome: that the overt antisemitism, the 9/11 truther nonsense, and the open praise of autocracy will eventually discredit this post-liberal wave and create demand for a renewed liberal-conservative synthesis. That could be a revived Reagan-style right, or some new center-right that keeps parts of the populist economic critique but re-embraces basic liberal norms.

The problem is time and personnel. As they say near the end of the podcast, ISI’s alumni already include a Supreme Court justice and a raft of major journalists. The kids going to those Carlson/Jones dinners and hearing Yarvin explain dictatorship phobia will be the ones running things in 20 years.
So the “varieties of post-liberalism” question doubles as a pipeline question: which of these strands will be normal for the 2040 right, and which will be remembered as a fever?
If you wanted to turn this into a more formal paper you could hang it on ISI as the central case and treat each post-liberal variety as a different faction trying to capture the same gatekeeping machinery. But even at the essay level, the main thing is clear enough. There is no single American post-liberalism. There is a loose coalition of people who think liberalism has failed so badly that it is worth gambling on various forms of authority, hierarchy, or rage. Right now the institutions that once existed to discipline that impulse are busy chasing it instead.

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Rony Guldmann Revisits Jonah Goldberg’s 2008 Book Liberal Fascism (11-30-25)

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Charisma: Micro-sociology of Power and Influence

Randall Collins writes in this 2020 book:

Lawrence of Arabia is probably the most famous name to come out of World War I. It was a long grinding, muddy war in the trenches that ended more with exhaustion than victory, leaving nobody covered with glory. T.E. Lawrence was the exception, the lone individual who made a difference, an Englishman riding a camel out of the golden desert sands of the Middle East. Everywhere else, the generals are hard to remember, and the politicians ended up with reputations of blame rather than accomplishment. Other than Lawrence of Arabia, the only name of a World War I hero that is remembered is the Red Baron—the top German flying ace. He wasn’t one of the good guys, but he was the heavyweight champion everyone else tried to beat. And like Lawrence, he was away from the dirty trenches, flying solo in the open sky, dog-fighting at a few thousand feet where everyone could watch his exploits from the ground.Lawrence is remembered for organizing the Arab revolt in the desert that drove the Turks out of Palestine and Syria, bringing down the Ottoman Empire and putting in its place the Middle East that we know today: the arbitrary partitions that became Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. Anyone who has seen the Academy Award-winning film (seven Oscars in 1962) Lawrence of Arabia, will know that Lawrence was full of good intentions for the Arabs, but was frustrated by the diplomats, especially the dirty deals between the French and the British. Although Lawrence did his best, the politicians always mess things up and the result was the endless series of illegitimate regimes whose resentments and infighting have lasted down to today. Peter O’Toole, the tall handsome actor who plays Lawrence, drives off sadly in a car (leaving his camel behind) after his last victory at Damascus, while Alec Guinness, who plays King Faisal (who in real life became the first ruler of Iraq) folds his hands and smiles cynically about these Western people who lack the simple honor of the desert.
We need to keep reminding ourselves that movies aren’t reality, and that just because you see it on the screen doesn’t mean that is the way it happened. Movies pick out a few exemplary scenes, chosen for their dramatic qualities, and fold years into a few hours. Add the film ethic of show-don’t-tell, and the result is that what we see on the screen sticks in our memory, but what gets lost is the tangled web of motives and the thousands of players that determined what went on. For the reality, there is no substitute for reading long books.
So how did we get to the towering Peter O’Toole image from the original T.E. Lawrence? The real Lawrence, as of 1916 when he went off on his mission into the desert, was not only barely five feet six inches tall, but was just one of the British officers who could speak Arabic, went out on missions, rode camels, wore desert robes, and led guerrillas behind enemy lines. How did he get to be the famous one?
The problem is universal. There are many more capable people than the small number who get into the narrow spot-light of fame; and that is true in the intellectual world, in Hollywood, and in most other things. Most big enterprises take teamwork, with dozens of prime movers and thousands who contribute; no single hero accomplishes anything without all those other people. The spot-light on some necessarily puts many others in the shadows. So how does a particular individual get the chance to be the one in the spot-light? The career of T.E. Lawrence tells how.
he film image of Lawrence gives the impression that he was a loner. He didn’t like people, and the British military establishment didn’t like him. He is the true existentialist hero, who answers to himself alone. Lawrence tells the visiting American journalist that he likes the desert because it is clean—while most of the world isn’t. And Lawrence feels uneasy about the dirty politics he has to get involved with; he feels uneasy about all sorts of things, whether he is coming to enjoy killing, whether he is homosexual and likes being flagellated (homosexuality barely peeping out of the closet in 1962). Lawrence is just plain uneasy because he is the last honest man in a world full of people who aren’t.All of this is not exactly false; and the way he behaved in the 1920s after he became famous, up until his mysterious death in 1935, certainly shows he was a complicated person. But the impression that he was a loner, that he went off and did things by himself and against all authority, is extremely misleading. Lawrence was an agent of British policy. He was very familiar with political factions inside the army and the government, and he strongly agreed with some policies and opposed others. Lawrence was quick to devise plans for achieving goals that high-ranking people were glad to hear. He kept getting his chances because he was the bringer of good news in a war that was full of disasters, and he offered practical ways to carry out policies that sincere British imperialists also believed were right—and cheap at that, since they could use native Arab troops without putting British boots on the ground. Lawrence was known for speaking his mind, but the way he spoke to key people went with the flow, not against the grain.
Throughout his life, Lawrence had extremely good networks. He started out as a protégé of the most important British archeologists, and excavating with them is how he became fluent in Arabic. He quickly moved into the center of British intelligence-gathering for the Middle Eastern Theatre, and soon had the ear not only of the local High Commissioner and the military Commander-in-Chief, but of top cabinet officials in London, the Foreign Office, and the Secretary of War. He became a confidant of Winston Churchill. It was not a case of who-you-know rather than what-you-know; that stupid cliché misses the key point that you have to know how to talk to important people, and that means having something important to say. Lawrence built his networks by leveraging the importance of what he could say to them. And vice versa.

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