Historicism says ideas, texts, and norms are products of time and place. Orthodox Judaism has produced several durable responses. These are the main ones that actually govern institutions and people.
1. Revelation above history
Torah is divine and binding regardless of historical context. History may explain behavior but cannot judge normativity.
Classic source: Guide for the Perplexed by Maimonides.
Modern restatement: Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik.
Soloveitchik accepts historical scholarship descriptively but denies it veto power. Halacha stands outside history because it is commanded. This is the Modern Orthodox elite position. Intellectually sophisticated and institutionally stable.
2. Covenant and commandedness
Judaism is not validated by historical truth claims but by lived obligation. We obey because we are commanded, not because we can prove it.
Key figure: Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner.
Later articulation: Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein.
This approach concedes much to historicism at the level of facts while blocking its moral implications. History may describe origins but cannot dissolve obligation. This move is psychologically effective for people exposed to modern scholarship.
3. Meta-historical eternity
Torah precedes and structures history. What looks historically contingent is actually the unfolding of eternal forms.
Key sources: Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto and Hasidic metaphysics.
Modern Hasidic articulation: Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson.
Historicism is inverted. Instead of Torah being explained by history, history is explained by Torah. Very effective at alliance maintenance. Weak on external credibility. Strong on internal meaning.
4. Rejection and insulation
Historicism is corrosive and should be kept out. Higher criticism is treated as spiritually dangerous rather than intellectually mistaken.
Institutional home: Haredi yeshivot.
Representative figure: Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach.
This works sociologically. It fails only when exposure is unavoidable. It is not a philosophical refutation. It is a boundary strategy.
5. Post-liberal realism
Historicism is itself a modern myth. All societies rely on inherited authority structures. Torah is honest about this while liberalism is not.
Contemporary articulation: Rabbi Meir Soloveichik.
This response does not deny history. It denies history’s claim to neutrality. It reframes Orthodoxy as no more historically naive than any rival moral system.
Orthodoxy does not beat historicism on its own turf. It survives by denying historicism final authority. The winning strategies are not abstract refutations but institutional ones. Commandedness. Boundary control. Meta-history. Narrative confidence.
People do not live by historical truth. They live by obligations their alliances reward. Orthodoxy understands that and acts accordingly.
There is a real camp inside Orthodoxy that accepts historicism at least methodologically. They do not deny development. They deny that development cancels obligation. The moves vary.
1. Dual-truth model
Academic truth and covenantal truth operate on different planes.
Representative figures:
Rabbi Mordechai Breuer
Rabbi David Weiss Halivni
Breuer accepted multiple voices in the Torah and treated them as divinely intended perspectives. Halivni accepted redaction and layers in the Talmud but preserved Sinai as the source of authority. The text has a history. The authority does not.
This works by separating descriptive history from prescriptive commitment.
2. Development within revelation
Torah unfolds historically but that unfolding is part of the divine plan.
Representative figures:
Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook
Rabbi Yehuda Amital
Rav Kook reads history as progressive revelation. Moral and halachic evolution are not betrayals but stages. Amital was more modest but accepted moral growth across time.
This move absorbs historicism. Change is real. But it is teleological.
3. Bracketing authorship
Authorship questions are secondary. What matters is the canon as received.
Representative figure:
Rabbi Shalom Carmy
You can acknowledge scholarly problems and still treat the Masoretic text as binding because that is the covenantal document of the community. Authority comes from communal reception, not from reconstructing origins.
This is philosophically sophisticated and institutionally cautious.
4. Limited critical adoption
Use academic tools selectively while rejecting their metaphysical assumptions.
Representative figure:
Rabbi Hayyim Angel
Textual criticism, archaeology, literary analysis are welcomed. Source division and radical skepticism are not. The line is pragmatic. Keep what helps peshat. Reject what destabilizes covenant.
5. Existential reframing
Historicism is true but religious life is a choice to stand inside a tradition.
Representative figure:
Rabbi Jonathan Sacks
Sacks often conceded modern scholarship’s force. His answer was not proof but narrative commitment. We inhabit a story because it forms a moral community.
This is persuasive to educated laity. It is less satisfying to maximalists on either side.
They accept that texts have layers, that law develops, that context matters. But they relocate authority.
Authority sits in one of four places:
Divine will expressed through process
Covenant and communal acceptance
Teleological history
Existential commitment
They concede historicism descriptively. They block it normatively.
The tension never disappears. People who lean this way must tolerate ambiguity. That is why these positions cluster in Modern Orthodoxy and Religious Zionism, where exposure to academic culture is normal and institutional insulation is weaker.
It is a high-wire act. It works for those who can live with layered truth. It collapses for those who need either total certainty or total skepticism.
James Kugel is the cleanest example of an Orthodox-trained scholar who accepts historicism fully and then refuses to rescue Orthodoxy philosophically.
He does not try to reconcile in the usual sense. He separates.
Here is how he does it.
He accepts academic historicism without hedging. The Torah is composite. It reflects multiple authors. Law and narrative develop over time. Biblical religion changes. Higher criticism is basically right on its own terms. He does not soften this.
Then he draws a hard line. Scholarship describes what the text is. Religion governs how Jews live. The two answer different questions and do not need to agree.
His core move is the distinction between
The Bible as it was. A historical artifact.
The Bible as it has been received. A sacred text interpreted by the tradition.
Orthodox Judaism is not based on original meaning. It is based on interpretive inheritance. Midrash, halacha, and rabbinic authority do not depend on what Isaiah or Deuteronomy “really meant.” They depend on what the Jewish community came to treat as binding.
That lets Kugel stay personally observant without pretending that academic conclusions can be neutralized. He does not say revelation overrules history. He says revelation is not a historical claim in the first place.
This is why his position is both honest and destabilizing.
Honest because he does not play word games. He does not redefine authorship. He does not hide redaction behind mysticism. He does not ask academics to stop asking their questions.
Destabilizing because once revelation is relocated entirely into reception and practice, Orthodoxy becomes sociological rather than metaphysical. Authority comes from tradition continuity, not from Sinai as an event you can defend.
That is tolerable for someone already committed. It is useless for boundary enforcement. It gives no tools for kiruv, no answers to skeptics, no way to say “you must believe X.” It only says “this is how Jews live if they choose to live as Jews.”
That is why Kugel ends up marginal.
The Haredi world rejects him outright. Modern Orthodoxy finds him too corrosive to teach. Academic Jewish studies embraces him as honest but sees no reason to adopt the practice he defends.
Kugel’s position works for one narrow type of person. Deeply literate. Already observant. Comfortable with loss of metaphysical certainty. Not interested in using Judaism to win arguments.
In alliance terms, he opts out of enforcement. He preserves personal fidelity at the cost of institutional usefulness.
That is why he matters. And why he has no real successors inside Orthodoxy.
Accepting full historicism and refusing to rescue Orthodoxy metaphysically is almost nonviable institutionally. Still, a small cluster exists.
Marc Zvi Brettler
Closest analogue to Kugel in method. Brettler accepts critical scholarship without dilution and then brackets theology. He treats Orthodoxy as a lived practice sustained by communal reading, not by defensible historical claims. Less explicit about personal observance, but the posture is the same. Descriptive honesty. Normative silence.
Benjamin Sommer
Accepts strong historicism and rejects classical notions of fixed authorship. His move is more theological than Kugel’s. Revelation is real but radically non-static. God speaks through plurality and contradiction. This preserves metaphysics but at the cost of classical halachic clarity. Tolerated at the edges. Not exportable.
Moshe Halbertal
Not a biblical critic but relevant. He accepts historical development of law and authority and relocates obligation in interpretive tradition and institutional continuity. Less destabilizing because he stays closer to halacha and philosophy than to textual origins. A Kugel-like move without touching Torah authorship directly.
Yair Lorberbaum
Accepts that halacha evolves through social and moral pressures and treats tradition as an interpretive system rather than a frozen code. This concedes historicism implicitly while keeping observance intact. Works only for elites who can live without totalizing explanations.
Why this path is rare
This position strips Orthodoxy of its strongest enforcement tools. No appeal to Sinai as a defendable event. No clean boundary between belief and disbelief. No leverage over skeptics.
It works only if:
You already want to live inside halacha.
You do not need certainty.
You are not responsible for maintaining institutions.
That is why almost everyone who goes this far either leaves Orthodoxy, becomes institutionally marginal, or retreats to a softer reconciliation model.
Kugel’s path is survivable for individuals. It is lethal for systems.
Louis Jacobs is the cautionary tale.
He accepted historicism openly. Not half measures. Not literary nuance. Real development. Real redaction. Real evolution of halacha.
In We Have Reason to Believe he argued that Torah is divine but not dictated word for word at Sinai. Revelation is mediated through human history. Law grows. Texts accrete. God works through process.
That is essentially Kugel’s honesty plus explicit theology.
Jacobs tried to remain inside Orthodoxy institutionally. He wanted to lead within the British Orthodox establishment. The Chief Rabbinate said no. He was blocked from becoming principal of Jews’ College and later from a major pulpit. The controversy split Anglo-Jewry.
He eventually helped found what became the Masorti movement in the UK.
Why did Jacobs fail institutionally while Kugel survives personally?
Because Jacobs tried to normalize historicism inside Orthodoxy.
Kugel privatizes it. Jacobs publicized it.
Orthodox systems can tolerate scholars who bracket belief and stay quiet about institutional implications. They cannot tolerate rabbis who redefine revelation while holding office.
Jacobs relocated authority into evolving tradition but still wanted halachic bindingness. That middle ground is unstable. If Torah is historically conditioned, why is it absolutely binding? He answered with covenant and continuity. For many Orthodox leaders, that was insufficient.
The lesson from Jacobs is blunt.
Once you accept historicism at the level of revelation, Orthodoxy must either redefine itself or remove you. British Orthodoxy chose removal.
Jacobs shows the cost of trying to fuse academic honesty with institutional authority. You can have one cleanly. Having both requires either insulation or ambiguity.
He chose clarity. The system chose boundary.
Marc B. Shapiro is different from Kugel and Jacobs. He is not a Bible critic. He is a historian of Orthodox thought. His project is to show that what counts as “Orthodox belief” has shifted over time.
In The Limits of Orthodox Theology, he argues that figures now considered fully Orthodox held views that would get someone branded heretical today. He documents diversity on issues like authorship, divine corporeality, and dogma.
His move is strategic. He accepts historicism at the level of doctrine. Beliefs evolve. Boundaries harden. What counts as mandatory theology is historically constructed.
But he does not reject Orthodoxy. He widens it.
Instead of saying revelation is sociological only, he says Orthodoxy has never been as theologically narrow as its current gatekeepers claim.
That makes him disruptive.
He undermines enforcement from inside. If earlier authorities tolerated positions X and Y, how can contemporary institutions exclude them?
Unlike Kugel, Shapiro does not bracket theology and move on. Unlike Jacobs, he does not openly reconstruct revelation. He historicizes dogma and then asks Orthodoxy to live with its own past diversity.
Institutionally, that is dangerous but survivable. He is not running yeshivot. He is writing books and blogging. He exerts pressure without holding office.
His stance works for educated Modern Orthodox readers who want room to breathe but do not want to exit. It does not work for systems that depend on tight boundary control.
So where does he sit?
Not outside like Jacobs.
Not existential like Kugel.
Not mystical like Rav Kook.
He is archival. He uses history to loosen present rigidity.
That is a very Modern Orthodox strategy. It preserves allegiance while destabilizing certainty.
It is also why he remains controversial but not expelled.
The Phenomenological Strategy
This move shifts the conversation from the “object” (the text and its origins) to the “subject” (the person experiencing the command). It does not care if the text has a history because the experience of the text is trans-historical.
Key Figure: Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits.
The Move: Berkovits argues that the “Encounter” at Sinai is a meta-historical event that enters time but is not of it. While the application of Torah (Halacha) must be sensitive to history—and he was a critic of Haredi “frozenness”—the source of the obligation is a direct, vertical relationship between God and Israel.
Institutional Utility: This allows for radical halachic flexibility and a high degree of historical awareness regarding the “human” side of the law, while maintaining a fierce, non-negotiable commitment to the divinity of the “voice” behind it. It appeals to those who find the “Dual-truth” model too clinical.
The Legal Positivist Defense
This approach treats the Torah and the Talmud like a constitution or a legal system. In secular law, it does not matter if a statute has a messy, political, or even “accidental” legislative history; what matters is that it is the law of the land until a higher authority or a specific process changes it.
Key Influence: Hans Kelsen or H.L.A. Hart applied to Jewish Law.
The Move: Proponents argue that “Truth” is a category for historians, but “Validity” is the category for Jews. Even if a historian proves a specific verse was added in the 5th century BCE, that verse remains “Divine” within the legal system of Judaism because the system recognizes it as such.
Institutional Utility: This is the ultimate “High-wire act.” It allows a scholar to be a radical historicist in the morning and a punctilious observer in the afternoon without needing a mystical or existential bridge. The bridge is simply the “Rule of Recognition.”
The Role of the “Timid Historicist”
There is also a large, unnamed camp of “Timid Historicists.” These are communal leaders who acknowledge that “some things changed” but refuse to define which ones. They use history selectively to solve local problems—like the status of women or electricity—while using the rhetoric of “Unchanging Sinai” to maintain the brand.
This is not a philosophy; it is a maintenance strategy. It works because it avoids the “Jacobs Trap” (publicly redefining revelation) while enjoying the benefits of “Post-liberal realism” (pragmatic adaptation).
The Final Boundary: The “Ikarim” (Principles)
The role of The Thirteen Principles of Maimonides as a sociological fence. In the modern era, “Historicism” is often used as a synonym for “rejecting the eighth principle” (that the entire Torah was given to Moses).
Orthodoxy survives not just by denying historicism final authority, but by turning the denial of historicism into a test of loyalty. For the system, the historical truth of a claim is irrelevant compared to the signaling value of the claim. To say “The Torah is from Heaven” is a speech act that signals “I am part of this alliance.”
This explains why Marc B. Shapiro is so disruptive. By showing that the “Thirteen Principles” themselves have a history and were not always universal, he attacks the very fence that Orthodoxy uses to keep historicism out. He doesn’t just use history on the text; he uses it on the gatekeepers.
Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits handles the tension by distinguishing between the eternal word of God and its application in a changing world. He argues that Halacha is the bridge between the absolute and the relative. For him, a law that remains static while the human condition changes ceases to be a living divine command and becomes a fossil. He views the history of Jewish law as a process of continuous “ethical sensitivity” where the rabbis of each generation must translate the Torah’s values into their specific context. This move avoids the trap of seeing change as a betrayal. Instead, he presents change as the very mechanism that keeps revelation relevant.
Rabbi Hayyim Angel and other pragmatic Modern Orthodox thinkers use a technique of “Controlled History.” They allow historical context to clarify the original meaning of a text (peshat) but stop the clock when it comes to the legal bottom line. For example, knowing that an ancient law responded to a specific pagan practice might help explain the logic of the verse, but it does not automatically cancel the law today. They treat history as a tool for deepening understanding rather than a lever for overturning practice. This keeps the scholar honest about the past while keeping the practitioner tethered to the present community.
The legal positivist model handles change through the concept of “Internal Recognition.” If you view Judaism as a sovereign legal system, then change only happens according to the rules of that system. It does not matter if a historian identifies an outside influence on a medieval rabbi. Once that rabbi’s decision is accepted by the community and recorded in the codes, it becomes “Torah.” The history of the law is irrelevant to the validity of the law. This creates a firewall between the historian’s office and the judge’s bench.
Rabbi Marc B. Shapiro uses history to reclaim discarded options. By documenting that certain halachic or theological positions existed in the past and were later suppressed or forgotten, he provides a “precedent for change.” This is a conservative-looking move with radical potential. It suggests that moving forward often requires looking backward to a time before the boundaries hardened. He uses the tools of the historian to prove that Orthodoxy was once broader, thereby making a wider future feel like a return to authenticity rather than an innovation.
In all these models, the goal is to prevent history from becoming the master of the system. They all agree that once you allow a purely external, historical “truth” to dictate what a Jew must do, the covenantal structure collapses. They differ only on how they construct the barrier. Berkovits uses theology. The positivists use legal theory. Shapiro uses the archive itself.
The challenge of Mosaic authorship represents the point where descriptive history and normative obligation collide most violently. If the Torah is a composite document edited over centuries, the classical claim of a single, divine dictation at Sinai fails. Orthodox thinkers who engage this head-on use several distinct strategies to maintain the system.
The most common move is the literary or “Synchronic” approach. This strategy acknowledges that the text contains different voices, styles, and even contradictions, but it refuses to assign them to different historical authors. Instead, it treats these variations as intentional, divine literary devices. Rabbi Mordechai Breuer is the primary architect of this model. He accepts the findings of source criticism—that there are different “documents” or layers—but he argues they represent different aspects of the divine personality or different ways God relates to the world. In this view, God is the author of the contradictions. The history of the text is not a record of human editing but a map of divine complexity.
A second strategy is the “Expansion of Sinai.” This view suggests that “Torah from Heaven” does not require every word to have been written by Moses. Figures like Rabbi David Weiss Halivni suggest that the original revelation at Sinai was perfect but became “blemished” or lost through human neglect during the period of the First Temple. The current text is a reconstruction by Ezra and the Great Assembly. While this admits a historical process of editing and redaction, it preserves the “divinity” of the text by claiming the editors acted under prophetic or communal authority. The history of the document is a story of recovery rather than one of mere human invention.
A more radical but quieter move is the “Canonization as Revelation” model. This approach essentially says that it does not matter who wrote the text. The moment the Jewish people accepted the Torah as their constitution, it became divine. Authority does not flow from the past (the origin) to the present; it flows from the community’s commitment back onto the text. This is the move James Kugel makes. He allows the historians to have the “Bible as it was” while the religious community keeps the “Bible as it is.” The historical layers are real, but they are religiously irrelevant because the only text that matters is the one the tradition interprets.
Finally, some thinkers adopt a “Minimalist Mosaicism.” They concede that Moses did not write the entire Torah—noting that the Talmud itself discusses who wrote the final verses describing Moses’s death—but they insist on a “Mosaic Core.” They might allow for later updates to place names, archaeological details, or small editorial flourishes while maintaining that the legal heart of the book is authentic to the Sinai event. This is a defensive strategy designed to keep the “Jacobs Trap” at bay by making small concessions to history to save the metaphysical whole.
These strategies allow an intellectual elite to remain within the community while knowing what they know. The system survives because these theories are rarely preached from the pulpit. They exist in footnotes and academic journals, serving as a pressure valve for those who cannot ignore the historical evidence but refuse to leave the alliance.
When authorship is decoupled from the legal validity of the text, the mechanism for halachic change shifts from “What did the author intend?” to “How does the system evolve?” The thinkers who accept aspects of historicism generally use the following maneuvers to handle change.
For the legal positivists, change is a purely internal procedural matter. If you believe the authority of the Torah rests on the Rule of Recognition—the community’s acceptance of the law—then historical discovery regarding the text does not trigger legal change. A historian might prove that a certain law was originally a response to a Persian tax code, but that fact has no standing in a Jewish court. Change only occurs when the recognized authorities within the system use established rules to reinterpret or amend the law. This creates a stable but flexible system that is immune to “archaeological” disruption.
Rabbi David Weiss Halivni and those who see revelation as a process rather than a single event view change as a form of “restoration.” If the text underwent a period of neglect or human editing as Halivni suggests, then halachic change can be framed as an effort to move closer to the “pristine” intent that was obscured by history. This allows for a more critical approach to the Talmudic text. If a scholar can show that a specific legal ruling was based on a corrupted text or a misunderstanding of an earlier layer, they have a theological mandate to correct it. Here, history is not the enemy of the law but the tool used to purify it.
Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and his successors use a “Teleological” model. In this view, the historical development of the Jewish people is itself a form of ongoing revelation. As the moral consciousness of the world evolves, our understanding of the Torah must evolve with it. Change is not seen as an admission that the original law was “wrong,” but as a sign that the “divine spark” within the law is revealing a new dimension. This allows for significant shifts in areas like the status of women or the relationship with non-Jews, framed as the natural ripening of a fruit rather than a graft from an outside tree.
For the “existential” or “communal” camp, such as Rabbi Shalom Carmy or Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, change is managed through the “Covenantal Narrative.” They argue that the community is in a partnership with God. The text provides the vocabulary, but the community writes the current chapter. This makes change a matter of communal integrity. If a traditional practice becomes morally or socially “unlivable” for the community, the authority exists to find a path forward that preserves the covenant. The historical origins of the text are secondary to the survival and flourishing of the people who live by it.
The common thread is that none of these thinkers allow “History” to act as an independent judge. They all subordinate historical data to a larger framework—whether legal, restorative, teleological, or communal. They use history to explain the “is” while reserving the “ought” for the tradition itself.
In modern medical ethics and the use of technology on Shabbat, these models provide the intellectual cover for significant shifts in practice while maintaining the claim of continuity.
The legal positivist approach treats new technology as a problem of classification. When a new device appears, such as a smartphone or a continuous glucose monitor, the historian might note how earlier generations defined work. The positivist ignores the historical “spirit” of the law and focuses on the technical definitions of forbidden acts. If a sensor operates via a circuit that does not involve heating a filament, it may fall into a different legal category than a lightbulb. Change happens by fitting new realities into old boxes. This allows for a high degree of technical adaptation without ever admitting that the law itself changed.
Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits and the “Ethical Sensitivity” camp approach medical ethics by prioritizing the human condition. In cases of end-of-life care or organ donation, they argue that the historical definitions of death (such as the cessation of breath) were based on the best scientific knowledge of the time. Because the Torah commands the preservation of life, the “historical” definition must give way to modern medicine to fulfill the underlying divine intent. Here, history is a record of human limitation. Overcoming that limitation through change is a religious obligation.
The “Development within Revelation” model, influenced by Rav Kook, sees medical and technological progress as part of the divine plan. If God allows humanity to discover the means to edit genes or extend life, that discovery is a signal that the Torah’s application must expand. Change in medical ethics is not a compromise with secularism but an embrace of a new stage of human capability. This model is often used to justify more liberal positions on fertility treatments and genetic screening, framing them as a partnership in the ongoing work of creation.
The “Timid Historicists” and institutional managers handle these challenges through “Pragmatic Bracketing.” They may permit a technological solution for a specific community need—such as a “Shabbat elevator” or certain medical procedures—while maintaining a formal rhetoric that the law is unchanging. They use history to find a lenient precedent from a different era and “resurrect” it to solve a modern problem. This avoids the appearance of innovation. It looks like a return to an older, authentic tradition, even if the context is entirely new.
In each case, the tension between the historical “is” and the religious “ought” is resolved by giving the current religious authority the final word. The history of the law provides the tools, but the needs of the present provide the direction.
David N. Myers provides the meta-analysis of the struggle. While James Kugel and Marc B. Shapiro act as practitioners or disruptors within the system, Myers is the historian of the “Crisis of Historicism.” His work, particularly in Resisting History: Historicism and Its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought, examines how Jewish thinkers first encountered the “grinding force” of history and tried to build defenses against it.
The Problem of the “Grinding Force”
Myers argues that historicism—the idea that everything is a product of its time—threatened to dissolve the “eternal” nature of Judaism. If everything has a beginning and an evolution, then nothing is absolute. He tracks how 20th-century thinkers like Isaac Breuer and Leo Strauss recognized that if they accepted the historian’s tools, they risked losing the “Holy.”
The Isaac Breuer Connection
Myers highlights Isaac Breuer as a fascinating case of “Anti-Historicist Historicism.” Breuer was a leader of Agudat Yisrael and a grandson of Samson Raphael Hirsch. He used Kantian philosophy to argue that while history is real for the human eye, the Torah exists in a “meta-historical” realm. This is a direct ancestor to the “Meta-historical eternity” model you noted in Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson. Myers shows that Breuer did not just ignore history; he used sophisticated philosophical arguments to “overcome” it.
The “Stakes of History”
In his later work, The Stakes of History, Myers moves from the past to the present. He asks what it means for a community to live with a “burden of history.” He notes that for Jews, history is not just an academic pursuit but a “battlefield” where identity is forged. He observes that while historians seek to deconstruct myths, the community needs those myths to survive. This creates a permanent tension between the “Faith of Fallen Jews” (the historians who still feel a tie to the tradition) and the “Faith of the Faithful” (who cannot afford the historian’s skepticism).
Historicism as a Survival Mechanism
In Jewish History: A Very Short Introduction, Myers offers a thesis that flips the “corrosive” narrative. He suggests that the ability to adapt to new environments—a form of lived historicism—is exactly why Jews survived. He sees assimilation and antisemitism as two forces that “exercise the cultural muscle.” For Myers, the history of the Jews is a history of successful, repeated encounters with the “other,” which the tradition then absorbs and labels as its own.
Myers’ contribution to your list is the observation that the “Resisters” of history are often its most creative users. They use the language of the modern world to protect a world they claim is ancient.