Female Autonomy Under Review?

The boring predictable journo Amanda Hess writes in the New York Times: “But when “Gutfeld!” airs, it also projects Ms. Kat Timpf into a political ecosystem in which women’s autonomy over their bodies and lives is under review — where pronatalist influencers urge women to produce babies by the half-dozen, right-wing streamers preach wifely submission and critics convene in “Gutfeld!” feeds to demand that Ms. Timpf retreat from public life. At 10 p.m. on Fox News, the personal is political.”

ChatGPT, when do lefties want to review female autonomy? Asking for a friend.

ChatGPT says: On the right, restrictions on abortion are the clearest example of reducing women’s bodily autonomy. On the left, there are also ways autonomy can be constrained, though they’re usually framed differently:

1. Public health mandates

Vaccine mandates (including during pregnancy) and other public health rules can override individual choice. The left tends to favor stronger state intervention here, sometimes at the cost of personal medical autonomy.

Example: employment conditions requiring vaccinations or reproductive health disclosures.

2. Regulations around sex work and surrogacy

Many progressives oppose legalizing or normalizing sex work or commercial surrogacy on grounds of exploitation. But this also limits women’s ability to choose to use their bodies in those ways if they freely want to.

Even in progressive states, restrictions on paid surrogacy or prostitution are justified in terms of protecting women but still curb autonomy.

3. Trans rights debates

Some feminists on the left (often called “gender-critical”) argue against medical transition procedures for minors. Others support restricting parental rights if they oppose such care. Either way, one faction of the left is asking the state to step in and limit bodily autonomy—whether of minors, parents, or women who don’t align with progressive gender policy.

4. Workplace equality policies

In some cases, rules intended to protect women (e.g., strict workplace maternity regulations, prohibitions on certain “hazardous” jobs for pregnant workers) can also reduce women’s ability to choose risks for themselves.

5. Health insurance and government subsidies

Progressive policies often tie access to healthcare to state or employer mandates. For example, requiring women to undergo certain screenings or making coverage contingent on compliance with preventative care guidelines. While usually well-intentioned, it still conditions autonomy on compliance.

So the mirror is this:

Right reduces autonomy mainly by restricting what women can’t do (end a pregnancy).

Left reduces autonomy mainly by imposing what women must do (participate in public health mandates, accept certain state definitions of protection, or be limited in markets like sex work/surrogacy).

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James Burnham Never Harbored Bitterness?

The late National Review editor‘s neuroticism and attention-seeking reminds me a bit of parts of myself I’d rather forget. He was a passionate Marxist for years and then a passionate anti-communist. He loved big bold theories and I suspect he enjoyed the attention that went with them. He wanted America to drop nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union after World War II to maintain American supremacy. He confided privately that the black-white problem would destroy America.

He was very touchy about anyone pointing out his sheer lunacy.

From the 2025 book on James Burnham: “This ended his association not just with Partisan Review but also with liberals. He resigned from the ACCF shortly after. His tenure with the CIA ended in 1953, as some of its members considered him too pro- McCarthy. Philip Rahv wrote that by refusing to condemn McCarthy, Burnham had committed professional “suicide.” A National Review editor later maintained that Burnham never harbored any bitterness over the loss of friendships and prestige among liberals. Burnham, however, dedicated most of the rest of his professional career to haranguing liberals.” I call BS on the idea he never harbored bitterness.

ChatGPT says: The claim that Burnham never harbored bitterness strains credibility.

Look at the record:

Professional rupture: He lost the Partisan Review circle, the ACCF, and standing with the very intellectual community he had spent two decades climbing into. That’s not a casual loss. For someone as status-attuned as Burnham, it’s hard to imagine him shrugging it off.

Rahv’s “professional suicide” line: That wasn’t a mild disagreement—it was a brutal exile from his old peers. Burnham would have felt that cut.

His later work: The fact that he spent “most of the rest of his professional career haranguing liberals” is basically evidence of enduring resentment. You don’t devote column after column, book after book, to hammering away at a group if you’re completely at peace about losing them.

National Review dynamics: Even within the NR crowd, he was viewed as austere, dour, and a bit aloof. That kind of personality doesn’t suggest a Zen-like acceptance of social and professional loss.

So, while he may not have voiced bitterness in the way a lesser figure would (complaining about being blackballed, naming names, etc.), his whole intellectual posture—relentless critique, sharpening polemics, refusal to reconcile—looks like sublimated bitterness.

LF: Aren’t Anglos famed for their empirical nature with modest theories attached while continental academics love big bold theories? Burnham loved the big bold. I suspect he enjoyed the attention that came with being interesting.

ChatGPT says: Anglo empiricism: The Anglo-American intellectual tradition tends to pride itself on restraint—piecemeal theorizing, data-driven inquiry, and suspicion of grand systems. Think of people like George Orwell, Isaiah Berlin, or the analytic philosophers: small-c conservative in their intellectual style, even when politically radical.

Continental taste for system-building: By contrast, the European (especially French and German) academies valorize sweeping syntheses and audacious frameworks—Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Sartre, Foucault. Even when wrong, they’re memorable because they aim to explain everything.

Burnham’s temperament: Burnham started as a philosopher (teaching aesthetics at NYU), trained in a way that made him impatient with Anglo empiricism. When he crossed over to politics, he brought that taste for system. The Managerial Revolution wasn’t just an essay; it was a big, bold map of the whole future. Same with The Machiavellians—he wanted to reframe the entire understanding of politics, not just quibble over policy.

The lure of attention: You’re right—he seemed to relish being provocative and “interesting.” Each of his turns—Trotskyist intellectual, then anti-communist prophet, then Cold War strategist—carried shock value. Part of that was strategy (staking out bold positions gets you heard), but part was surely temperament. He didn’t want to be a small thinker at a small magazine.

So, even though he was operating in an Anglo environment (New York intellectuals, later National Review), his style was more continental—big system, high drama. And in a media-saturated world, that boldness guaranteed him attention, even if it cost him friendships.

Here’s how Burnham’s Anglo-continental mix played out:

1. The Anglo Context

Burnham lived in the New York intellectual world—rooted in Anglo empiricism and pragmatic liberalism. His colleagues at Partisan Review and later his co-editors at National Review often preferred modest claims: incremental politics, tactical essays, critiques grounded in history or current events. They distrusted “grand theory” as too European, too totalizing, too likely to lead to dogma.

2. Burnham’s Continental Style

Burnham, by contrast, had the temperament of a system-builder:

The Managerial Revolution (1941) wasn’t just a commentary on wartime capitalism; it was a sweeping claim that capitalism and socialism were both giving way to an entirely new managerial order.

The Machiavellians (1943) reframed all politics as elite manipulation of masses—channeling Pareto, Mosca, and Michels.

Later Cold War writings painted stark, civilization-level choices between strength and surrender.

These weren’t modest essays; they were continental-style blueprints.

3. Why It Attracted Attention

This boldness gave him prominence. He stood out in America precisely because he sounded more like a European theorist than an Anglo empiricist. Readers found him bracing, alarming, and therefore unforgettable. Even when wrong, Burnham’s “big picture” voice commanded attention—something more pragmatic writers couldn’t match.

4. Why It Alienated Peers

But the same qualities that made him visible made him dangerous among Anglo peers. Liberals thought his refusal to denounce McCarthy was reckless. Conservatives at National Review often found him dour and uncompromising. To Anglo empiricists, his sweeping theories looked like arrogance or fanaticism, not careful scholarship.

5. The Double-Bind

Burnham’s continental streak ensured that he would always be both central and marginal:

Central, because his ideas drove debate and shaped Cold War discourse.

Marginal, because his very style guaranteed clashes with colleagues who valued caution and incrementalism.

In other words, he became interesting but unsettling—a man who would never be fully trusted by Anglo empiricists, but never ignored either.

LF: The more interesting your ideas, the less likely they are to be true.

ChatGPT says: Boring truths: Reality usually comes in small, dull increments. Most of science, economics, and history is about confirming what we suspected, not overturning everything we thought we knew. Those insights don’t grab attention because they’re not flashy.

Interesting but fragile: The more sweeping, counterintuitive, or “sexy” an idea, the more it stands out—but also the more fragile it is. Big, bold theories often overshoot, generalize from thin evidence, and collapse under scrutiny. Burnham’s Managerial Revolution was “interesting” in this sense: unforgettable, provocative, but only partly true in hindsight.

Attention economy bias: In intellectual life (just like in media), boldness pays. A writer who makes modest but accurate claims risks being ignored. A writer who paints with broad strokes and dares dramatic predictions gets an audience—even if later discredited. Burnham understood this tradeoff and leaned into it.

Psychological appeal: People crave clarity and pattern. A big theory that “explains everything” scratches a deep itch, even if it’s wrong. That’s why Marx, Freud, Spengler, Burnham, Fukuyama, and others all gained fame—their systems were too neat to be true, but too compelling to be ignored.

Burnham’s Law: The more interesting an idea is, the less likely it is to be true; the more likely it is to be true, the less interesting it will seem.

From the 2025 book on James Burnham: “Sensitive to references to his failed predictions, Burnham criticized the democratic-socialist Orwell for not recognizing the difference between the two concepts. Regarding his “hating” of Britain and the USSR, Burnham replied that he hated no one. And if he did, he would not waste a powerful emotion on an “abstraction,” such as a nation. The author of The Managerial Revolution said he just had “convinced opinions” about the Stalinist regime, especially its lack of regard for the most noble human ideals, such as truth and freedom.”

ChatGPT says: That passage is a good example of Burnham’s rhetorical slipperiness.

On failed predictions: He bristled when people (like Orwell in Second Thoughts on James Burnham) reminded him how off-target The Managerial Revolution was. Burnham wanted to preserve the aura of a bold theorist without being saddled with accountability for the misses.

On “hate”: His denial is carefully lawyered. “I hated no one. And if I did, I wouldn’t waste it on an abstraction.” That’s neat but evasive. You can hear him trying to disown the raw emotion while still holding onto the fierce hostility he directed at Stalinism.

On noble ideals: Notice the pivot—he reframes his stance not as hatred but as fidelity to “truth and freedom.” It’s classic Burnham: he casts himself as the realist, stripped of sentiment, guided by “convinced opinions.” But this is also a pose. His critiques carried unmistakable passion—scorn, fear, and contempt—which is just another face of hatred.

So the passage shows how Burnham wanted to present himself: the cool Machiavellian analyst, above petty emotions, focused only on hard truths. But underneath, the intensity of his lifelong polemics suggests he was more driven by emotion than he’d admit.

Orwell’s critique of Burnham is one of the sharpest clashes of styles in 20th-century intellectual life.

Orwell’s Main Points

Burnham’s Fascination with Power

In Second Thoughts on James Burnham (1946), Orwell argued that Burnham was too impressed by strength. Whenever a regime looked ascendant—Hitler, Stalin—Burnham exaggerated its permanence. Orwell quipped that Burnham’s habit was to “prophesy the continuance of whatever regime seemed to be winning.”

Prediction as Wishful Thinking

Orwell didn’t just say Burnham got predictions wrong; he said Burnham’s errors revealed a psychological bias: a near-worship of power. If the Nazis looked unstoppable, Burnham assumed they were unstoppable. When the USSR looked indestructible, Burnham leaned the same way. Orwell saw this not as clear-eyed realism, but as a kind of projection.

The “Cold Analyst” Pose

Orwell punctured Burnham’s claim that he was a detached Machiavellian who merely described power without moral attachment. Orwell insisted Burnham wasn’t cold at all—he was enthralled, almost spellbound, by brute force. His style of “hard realism” was, Orwell said, actually a form of credulousness.

On Hatred vs. Conviction

This ties to the passage you quoted. Burnham said he didn’t “hate” nations or regimes, he only held “convinced opinions.” Orwell didn’t buy it. He thought Burnham’s language and tone betrayed a kind of emotional intoxication with authoritarian strength, even if he disavowed hatred.

Why It Stuck

Orwell’s essay endured because it framed a recurring danger in intellectual life: confusing realism with power-worship. It’s easy to call yourself “hardheaded” when really you’re dazzled by the spectacle of might. Burnham embodied that temptation, and Orwell skewered it.

LF: As there is no natural selection advantage in promoting noble universal ideals and his other big ideas, I suspect that James Burnham’s endeavors were a massive play for status.

ChatGPT says: Beneath the arguments about “truth” and “freedom,” there’s a competition for status, prestige, and authority.

Evolutionary angle: You’re right—universal ideals like “truth” and “freedom” don’t map cleanly onto reproductive fitness. What does map is prestige: if you can position yourself as the prophet who sees the hidden structure of history, you gain influence, followers, and institutional clout.

Burnham’s career arc: Each stage of his life can be read as status-seeking through ideas:

Trotskyist → the glamour of revolutionary radicalism.

Managerial Revolution → a bold, world-historical theory that put him ahead of both Marxists and liberals.

Cold War strategist → power broker adjacent to the CIA and National Review, shaping elite conservative thought.

The noble-ideals mask: His appeal to “truth” and “freedom” was rhetorically useful, but it also disguised the underlying drive: to stay relevant and commanding in intellectual circles even as his old allies (like Orwell, Rahv, Hook) turned on him.

Orwell’s critique fits here: Orwell basically said, “Burnham is not the cold realist he thinks he is; he’s dazzled by power.” In evolutionary terms, dazzlement by power is a way of attaching yourself to what seems reproductively advantageous—align with the winning side.

So, instead of seeing Burnham as a principled defender of ideals, you could argue he was a status entrepreneur. His big theories and moral postures were tools for carving out a niche in the prestige economy of mid-20th-century intellectuals.

LF: I wish intellectuals would seek status from telling the truth rather than from being dramatic.

ChatGPT says: The incentive structure of intellectual life doesn’t primarily reward truth—it rewards novelty, boldness, and drama.

Truth is boring: Most truths are incremental, nuanced, and dull. They don’t make headlines, win debates, or get you remembered. Saying, “The Soviet Union will eventually stagnate due to inefficiency” is true, but flat. Saying, “The Soviet Union will rule the world in 20 years” is exciting—and status-enhancing.

Drama sells: Intellectuals, like artists or politicians, compete in an attention economy. Big theories and dramatic pronouncements get you cited, invited, and feared. That’s what Burnham was playing for.

Status should come from accuracy: Imagine if intellectual prestige worked like long-term forecasting tournaments, where reputations rose and fell based on calibration to reality. But in practice, it’s more like a theater: those who create striking narratives often outshine those who quietly get things right.

The tragedy: Even the few who prize truth (think Orwell, Berlin, Popper) are remembered as much for their dramatic fights against falsehood as for their careful truths. The system bends toward spectacle, not accuracy.

From the 2025 book on James Burnham:

Burnham was feeling shunned by liberals.

And to some degree he was. John Kenneth Galbraith provides one example. He was an archetype liberal who Burnham roasted. Galbraith tried to malign Burnham by ignoring him. Galbraith’s classic work The New Industrial State (1967) makes references to “the managerial class,” “the managerial revolution,” and “managerial capitalism,” but credit
was not given to Burnham in the first edition. The omission was so glaring that Galbraith subsequently wrote Burnham to acknowledge his influence and apologize, stating that “we liberals have ignored your contribution.” He promised that Burnham’s name would appear in future editions. And it did, in a footnote. The note cites Burnham for popularizing
the term “managerial revolution” and continues by stating that “partly, perhaps, because he was a strong and on occasion eccentric conservative, and change in economics is usually led by liberals, Burnham’s contribution has not had the recognition it merited.” Galbraith would
later send a follow-up letter apologizing for calling Burnham “eccentric.”

Burnham’s favorite target was America’s most famous diplomat, [George F. Kennan]…

Burnham reminds the reader that he had predicted this “managerial revolution.”

…Paleoconservative Samuel Francis lamented that Burnham “wasted much of his later career in what turned out to be rather ephemeral anticommunist polemics that had little impact on actual policy after the early 1950’s.” Francis wished Burnham would have spent more time promoting themes from The Managerial Revolution, The Machiavellians, and Congress and the American Tradition…

Burnham insists in Suicide of the West that the field of genetics supported his criticisms of liberalism because it reveals that humans have a “permanent sub-stratum” that creates them, distinct from their social environment.126 He asserts that some people, by their nature, are inferior morally and intellectually. And the pessimist writes that their numbers are increasing in comparison to those with “superior assets.

…Although liberals were not communists, the two groups shared too many “axioms” in common, such as secularism, welfarism, and optimism about human nature and its ability to reform. They were even against the same things: McCarthy, Franco, the John Birch Society, colonialism, House Un-American Activities Committee and Herbert Hoover provided just
some examples. The author rationalizes that liberals, therefore, could never completely oppose communism. Given that, Burnham reasons, if liberalism prevailed, the West was doomed to fall to communism.

…Why did Burnham advance such aggressive positions in Vietnam? How could his conception of “national interest” differ from other selfprofessed realists, such as Kennan, Morgenthau, and Lippman? The Marxist-Leninist-Trotskyite heritage that Burnham never fully abandoned provides an explanation. Unlike Kennan, Morgenthau, and Lippman, Burnham’s world was governed by inexorable historical trends that were usually blowing the world somewhere. In the Cold War era, it had to be hurtling toward communism or democracy. And the former disciple of V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky believed that determined individuals could alter its course. Vietnam had become a test of will. The times required resolute leaders and force. Something had to be done. Passivity and patience never sufficed for Burnham.

Burnham also still used Marxist-Trotskyite holism to understand the world: everything was interrelated. Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese communists could not be distinct, just as capitalist nations could not be distinct for Trotsky. In “Permanent Revolution” (1929) Burnham’s former Marxist mentor argued against Stalin that independent (nationalist)
capitalist economies did not exist; they were all part of a whole. Burnham interpreted communism similarly: Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China were not distinct, meaning ignoring communism in Southeast Asia and successfully fighting it in Eastern Europe was impossible. A constant struggle must occur everywhere.

American struggles in Vietnam (and the antiwar writings of Kennan, Lippman, and Morgenthau) helped provoke student peace protests, which naturally earned Burnham’s ire.18 As a Marxist, he condemned pacificism by arguing it benefited the imperialist powers that waged war against the working classes. Now, he condemned pacificism by claiming
it abetted communism in its war against the free world. He argued that peace was just an abstraction that everyone loved, like Truth, Mother, Home, or Freedom.19 But again, everything must be contextualized, related to time and place. Burnham maintained that a genuine pacifist opposed all war of all kinds, not by whom and against whom.

…This simplistic holist view of communism prevented him from seeing some crucial nuances, such as the fact that the Soviet Union and China genuinely feared one another, at times even more than they feared the United States. John Lewis Gaddis contended, “Wars among communists . . . were all too real a possibility: the ideological schism between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China had become so intense during the Khrushchev years that as they ended his representatives were discussing with the Americans plans
for a joint preventative military action against Chinese nuclear facilities in the Gobi desert.”95 Although China and the Soviet Union were both pursuing communism, they were not unified.

In his analysis of the two communist giants, Burnham made the same mistake that he made in The Managerial Revolution when he conflated the USSR and Nazi Germany. Just as managerial societies may conflict, so too might communist societies. Lost on Burnham was the fact that powerful individuals could transcend the system. In the case of the managerial Nazi Germany, it was Hitler and his need for conquest, even if it meant conquering other managerial societies. During the subsequent Cold War, Burnham failed to recognize that personal rifts between Soviet leaders and Mao could divide communist societies. His worldview remained too holistic.

He sounds like someone who once had a serious fling with hard drugs and it rewired his system.

ChatGPT says: That’s a vivid analogy—he really does come off like someone permanently rewired by an early, intense “trip.”

Trotsky as the formative dose: Burnham’s immersion in Trotskyism was like a mind-altering experience. Trotsky gave him the intoxicating sense that history had a direction, that everything connected in one total system, and that heroic individuals could bend the arc. He later broke with Trotsky, but the wiring stayed.

Contrast with Kennan, Morgenthau, Lippmann: They were true “realists” in the Anglo sense—skeptical of absolutes, wary of crusades, attuned to limits and balance of power. Burnham, by contrast, couldn’t shed the habit of thinking in sweeping, all-or-nothing terms. For him, Vietnam wasn’t just one conflict—it was a global test of will that would tilt history itself.

Holism as addiction: Once you’ve internalized a worldview where everything is connected and history moves inexorably in one direction, it’s almost impossible to go back to seeing the world as fragmented and contingent. The “high” of explanatory totality is addictive, and moderation feels like weakness.

Why Vietnam mattered so much to him: Burnham’s Trotskyist wiring made passivity intolerable. He needed action, resolution, decisive will—because in his frame, history wasn’t standing still. If America didn’t exert itself everywhere, the whole system would shift toward communism.

So in a sense, Burnham never detoxed. He abandoned Trotsky’s conclusions but retained Trotsky’s style of thinking: totalizing, dramatic, destiny-laden. That’s why he seemed more extreme than the Kennans and Morgenthaus—his intellectual metabolism had been altered.

Here’s how Burnham’s “rewiring” played out on both sides:

Why It Made Him Brilliant

System-level vision: While others looked at piecemeal policy problems, Burnham connected dots. He could tie Vietnam to the Soviet Union, to China, to the future of Western democracy—always showing how local events mapped onto global structures. That made him invaluable at National Review; he supplied the grand theory behind Buckley’s rhetoric.

Moral urgency: His Trotskyist wiring meant he never treated politics as a game of minor adjustments. He saw existential stakes everywhere. That kind of intensity gave his writing energy and force—it made readers feel history was at a knife’s edge.

Predictive daring: Even when wrong, his boldness kept debates alive. Without voices like Burnham’s, conservatism might have remained more provincial, focused on taxes and tradition rather than geopolitics.

Why It Made Him Excessive

Inability to tolerate limits: Kennan or Morgenthau could say, “Here’s what can’t be done.” Burnham couldn’t accept that. His wiring demanded constant struggle, decisive force, no letting up. That drove him to advocate overextension (like Vietnam) where restraint might have been wiser.

Holism as a trap: Because he always saw the whole as one system, compromise in one area looked like surrender everywhere. That rigidity alienated more pragmatic allies.

Cold posture, hot core: He insisted he was a detached realist, but his intensity betrayed something else—a zeal inherited from his Trotskyist youth. That unnerved peers who prized “cool” judgment.

Why He Was Both Central and Suspect

Burnham was indispensable to the American right because he supplied a kind of high-voltage system-thinking they couldn’t generate themselves. But he was also never fully trusted, because his Trotskyist wiring made him sound more like a defector carrying his old addiction than like a native-born realist. To the Anglos, he always seemed just a little too much.

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The Return To Patronage

It doesn’t seem to get much media attention that Trump cuts target groups such as black women, and left-coded government services such as DEI and DEI enforcement while trying to preserve and enhance services for his base (law and order, immigration control).

Just as Republicans don’t want gun control for their base, and Democrats don’t want guns controlled for their base, now Trump is reorganizing the government and those institutions he can bully to move towards the political center to protect his base (for example, make sure banks don’t debank Christians and conservatives and crypto bros).

ChatGPT says: If you strip the moral/healthcare language away, the ACA (Obamacare) can be described as a two-trillion-dollar transfer from Republican-leaning constituencies (wealthier, older, more rural) to Democratic-leaning constituencies (younger, poorer, urban, minority).

Republicans saw it as a redistribution scheme dressed up as health reform: taking from their voters and giving to Democratic constituencies.

Democrats framed it as moral and national interest: expanding the safety net, reducing uncompensated care, and fixing insurance market dysfunctions.

The deep partisan divide over the ACA wasn’t just ideological (role of government) but coalitional: who pays, who gains.

The media has mostly framed Trump’s cuts as anti-bureaucracy or anti-“deep state”, but much less as an explicitly targeted reallocation of government resources toward his political coalition and away from groups coded as opposition. A few dynamics stand out:

1. Targeting “out-groups”

DEI offices, civil rights enforcement, and certain social services are being slashed or reorganized. These are areas disproportionately staffed by or serving Black women and other historically underrepresented groups.

The effect isn’t just “shrinking government” — it’s shrinking specific parts of government, while leaving others intact. That selective pruning makes it more like patronage than libertarian downsizing.

2. Protecting “in-groups”

Law enforcement, border/immigration control, and defense budgets are being shielded or expanded. These are high-salience issues for Trump’s base.

Financial regulation is being bent in ways that appeal to cultural allies (e.g., pressure on banks not to “debank” Christians, conservatives, or crypto enthusiasts). This isn’t neutral deregulation — it’s politicized protection.

3. Patronage in modern clothes

The old “spoils system” was about handing out jobs to your supporters and firing your enemies. Civil service reforms since the late 19th century were meant to prevent that.

What we’re seeing now is a modernized version: not raw hiring/firing based on party card, but structural rewrites that disproportionately harm out-groups and protect in-groups. It’s functionally similar to patronage but harder to litigate against because it’s cloaked in policy justifications (budget efficiency, national security, fairness in banking).

4. Media blind spots

Coverage tends to emphasize the “chaos” frame (shutdown threats, mass layoffs) rather than the distributional frame (who wins and who loses).

That misses the political realignment happening: Trump isn’t just weakening government broadly, he’s reshaping it to better serve his coalition.

5. Partisan symmetry

Your analogy to guns is sharp. Each side protects what their base relies on, even at cost of broader consistency:

Republicans resist gun control because it would restrict their core voters.

Democrats resist clamping down on urban gun ownership even if they’re anti-gun elsewhere, because it affects constituencies they rely on.

Trump’s government restructuring follows the same logic: government is not eliminated, it’s re-centered around base priorities.

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SMH: Rick Morton just won an $80,000 book prize. He’d give it all back for justice

The Sydney Morning Herald publishes: “Rick Morton has won a Prime Minister’s Literary Award for his non-fiction book [Mean Streak: A moral vacuum, a dodgy debt generator and a multi-billion-dollar government shake down]. He’d trade it all for justice for the victims.”

No, he wouldn’t, unless he was playing a status game.

We did not evolve to give things to non-relatives for no self-interested reason.

UCLA psychologist David Pinsof writes: “There is no Darwinian incentive for an organism to act “for the good of the species.” Instead, organisms evolve to act for the good of themselves and their genetic relatives—and against their rivals.”

So when people talk about their unpaid moral work for people not related to them, you know that they are engaged in a showy performative status game.

The two easiest paths to fame are to give something away and to publish a book.

Rick Morton is on his way.

David Pinsof writes:

A lot of people ask me how I write blog posts—where I get my ideas from. They’re often surprised when I give them a precise, step-by-step answer. Here’s my patented ® formula for writing Everything Is Bullshit content:

  1. I look at a story we tell ourselves. Maybe it’s the pursuit of happiness or the meaning of life. Maybe it’s our desire to change people’s minds or make the world a better place. Maybe it’s the idea that we don’t care what others think.

  2. I ask myself if the story makes any evolutionary sense.

  3. If the answer is no, I think about what might be going on beneath the surface—something that would make evolutionary sense.

  4. I call the story we tell ourselves “bullshit.”

  5. I write about what’s likely going on beneath the surface.

  6. I link to a lot of technical papers in evolutionary psychology that nobody clicks on.

The most important part of this formula is step 3—the part about what does or doesn’t “make evolutionary sense.” This step is rarely taken by anyone who thinks about humans. It’s as if the human psyche emerged from a bolt of lightning and not from millions of years of natural selection. When people talk about why Bob voted for Trump or Jane can’t find a date or Otto is depressed, they rarely reflect on the fact that Bob, Jane, and Otto are animals, and so are they. Whenever people do reflect on their evolutionary origins, they usually aren’t very reflective about it. They think about cavemen hitting each other with clubs or David Attenborough doing a voiceover while a bird performs a mating display.

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The Meaning Of Life Is A Status Game

David Pinsof writes: That’s why the intelligentsia cares about the meaning of life. They’re looking for a way to rationalize their lives—to dress up their careers and political loyalties in self-important verbiage. They’re looking for a not-too-obviously-false story they can tell about themselves to look morally and intellectually sophisticated, so that other nerds will praise them as “profound,” “revolutionary,” and “humane.” Debates about the meaning of life are ultimately a convoluted form of status jockeying.

Why else would apes like us care about the meaning of life?

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The Civil Vs MAGA

To what extent can the elite liberal critique of MAGA be reduced to the concerns of the civil to the unruly passions of the nationalist?

ChatGPT says: 1. Civil order (elite liberal perspective).

Elite liberal critique tends to focus on the erosion of norms, procedures, and institutions. The concern is that MAGA, in its populist style, disregards established processes—elections, courts, media, bureaucratic expertise—and instead elevates loyalty, charisma, and grievance. For liberals, this looks like a betrayal of the “civil”—reasoned debate, rule of law, checks and balances, minority rights—replaced by spectacle and passion.

2. Unruly passions (MAGA nationalist energy).

MAGA draws energy from nationalism, resentment at perceived cultural displacement, and the sense that liberal civility masks a rigged system. From this perspective, elite civility is hypocrisy—a cover for domination by technocrats, corporations, and globalists. MAGA embraces transgression, outrage, and even chaos as forms of authenticity and resistance.

3. Reduction, but not exhaustion.

You can say that the liberal critique does largely reduce MAGA to unruly passions undermining civility, but that framing misses something: for MAGA supporters, their project is not just passion but an alternative form of order—rooted in loyalty, tradition, hierarchy, and national identity. The clash is not reason vs. irrationality, but competing orders: procedural cosmopolitan liberalism vs. majoritarian nationalist solidarity.

4. Why the reduction happens.

Elite liberals are institutionally invested in civility, legality, and procedural legitimacy. So they interpret MAGA through the lens of threat to civility. This keeps the critique consistent with their values, but also makes it hard to see MAGA as anything other than rage, demagoguery, or pathology.

So the liberal critique can be reduced to that opposition, but only by flattening MAGA’s own self-understanding. It’s not merely unruly passion—it’s a competing vision of what counts as order, legitimacy, and justice.

Here’s how your question maps onto older political theory lineages:

Hobbes vs. Rousseau

Hobbes: worried about unruly passions. He thought only a strong sovereign could tame factionalism and prevent civil war. Elite liberal critiques of MAGA echo this Hobbesian fear—without restraint and institutions, politics devolves into chaos.

Rousseau: placed more trust in the general will of the people, even when expressed passionately. He distrusted elites who cloaked their interests in “civil” procedures. MAGA’s populist language has a Rousseauian flavor: the people should be sovereign, not bound by elite-imposed forms of civility.

Carl Schmitt (friend/enemy distinction)

Schmitt argued that politics is not about neutral procedures but about existential conflict between groups. MAGA embodies this view: politics as loyalty, identity, and enmity. Elite liberal critique insists this is dangerous—civil politics requires opponents, not enemies—but from a Schmittian perspective, the insistence on civility is just another mask for power.

Hannah Arendt (mass movements & authority)

Arendt saw mass movements (fascism, communism) as filling the void left by weakened traditional authority. MAGA’s “passions” fit her schema: people who feel dispossessed and unseen flock to a movement that offers meaning, solidarity, and action. Liberals counter that this kind of collective passion corrodes truth and accountability, replacing deliberation with spectacle.

Tocqueville (democracy and mores)

Tocqueville observed that democracy risks lapsing into tyranny of the majority when unmoored from civic habits and institutions. Liberal critiques of MAGA echo Tocqueville: they fear nationalist passions will overwhelm rights, pluralism, and institutional balance. MAGA counters that those institutions have already betrayed the people.

Elite liberals see themselves as defending Hobbesian order, Arendtian truth, and Tocquevillian balance against Schmittian nationalism and Rousseauian passion. To reduce the liberal critique of MAGA to civil vs. unruly is accurate as a snapshot, but historically, it’s part of a much older argument about whether politics should be grounded in procedures and norms, or in identity and passion.

LF: I’m reading the 2019 book, The calling of social thought: Rediscovering the work of Edward Shils, which says:

While regarding nationality as essential for civil society, Shils suggested that nationalism is in fact a danger to it. In his own words: ‘When nationality becomes nationalistic, it usually has become uncivil as well; the demand for complete national solidarity has often involved uncivil suppression’ (Shils, [1980] 1997a: 17). But what exactly does Shils mean by ‘nationalism’, and why is it so dangerous to civil society?Unfortunately, in contrast to his clear descriptions of nation and nationality, Shils does not give us a clear definition of nationalism. Yet, from the way he talks about it, it is a political and ideological concept, in contrast to the cultural, primordial concept of nationality. It is also posterior to nationality itself. ‘Nationalism arises out of nationality … . It adds emulative, combative, aggressive, bellicose elements to nationality. Hatred is not necessarily part of nationality; it frequently is so in nationalism’ (Shils, [1995b] 1997a: 188). It seems for Shils that nationalism’s real danger is in fact its violent, bellicose nature, which constitutes a threat to civil society. But what exactly is the nature of this threat? Shils indicates that it is dangerous because it introduces the element of violence within a society. ‘Nationalism … is aggressive against persons or groups in its own society. It is against those who disagree with their nationalistic programs and actions.’ Nationalism is thus ‘injurious to the maintenance of those norms [of a pluralistic, civil society]’ (Shils, [1995b] 1997a: 220–1).
So Shils finds nationalism to be unamicable towards civil society because it promotes violence against those who disagree with its programme. Yet, there is a strange circularity here. Shils never tells us what the content of the nationalist programme is, only that nationalists often (always?) use force to promote it. Since violence is, by definition, hostile to the maintenance of a civil society, nationalism is therefore necessarily hostile to it. To put it another way, Shils does not tell us whether there is anything intrinsic to the ideology of nationalism itself (or of any particular nationalism) that is problematical regarding civil society.
Another way of approaching Shils’ wariness towards nationalism is his understanding of it as an ideology and, more precisely, as a political ideology. It is in this sense that nationalism is such a threat to civil society, not because, perhaps, of anything intrinsic to nationalism itself, but simply by its nature as a political ideology. Shils pointed out that ‘ideological politics are alienative politics’, that is, they ‘attribute supreme significance to one group or class—the nation, the ethnic folk, the proletariat’. As such, they are absolutely hostile to Shils’ conception of civil society…

ChatGPT says: You’ve captured the crux of Shils’ ambivalence: nationality is civil, but nationalism, as he sees it, corrodes civility. Let me spell out what he means by “nationalism” and why he thinks it’s dangerous:

1. Nationality vs. Nationalism

Nationality: For Shils, this is a cultural and almost primordial attachment. It’s the shared sense of belonging—common history, language, symbols—that anchors individuals within a larger collective. It provides the emotional glue for civil society, stabilizing trust and solidarity.

Nationalism: This is not the same as nationality but something added on top of it—an ideological and political mobilization. It takes the affective bond of nationality and transforms it into a program: organized, purposeful, and often militant. Nationalism makes claims of supremacy, exclusivity, or purity.

2. Why Nationalism Becomes “Uncivil”

Shils thinks nationalism is uncivil because:

It introduces enmity into the heart of society. Nationalists don’t just celebrate belonging; they target those who dissent, deviate, or resist their program.

It transforms pluralistic bonds (where different groups coexist) into coercive solidarity (where only the nationalist version of “the nation” is legitimate).

It privileges one identity (the nation) above all others—making other affiliations (religious, professional, ethnic, ideological) suspect or secondary.

3. The Threat to Civil Society

Civil society, in Shils’ view, requires civility: norms of restraint, tolerance, negotiation, and pluralism. Nationalism undermines this because it:

Justifies violence in the name of solidarity.

Treats compromise as betrayal.

Alienates dissenters by branding them unpatriotic or enemies of the nation.

4. The Deeper Circularity You Noted

You’re right: Shils doesn’t give us a fully fleshed-out “content” of nationalism beyond its tendency to violence and ideological supremacy. That’s partly because, for him, the very fact that it becomes ideology—claiming total loyalty and ultimate meaning—is enough to mark it as uncivil. He equates “ideological politics” (whether nationalist, Marxist, or fascist) with hostility to civil society because all such ideologies absolutize one identity and delegitimize others.

So the core point: For Shils, nationalism is dangerous not necessarily because of its substantive claims (protectionism, sovereignty, independence, etc.) but because of its form as an ideology: absolutist, exclusionary, prone to coercion. Nationality can be plural and cultural; nationalism almost always tips into violence because it demands too much uniformity.

Posted in Nationalism | Comments Off on The Civil Vs MAGA

The James Comey Indictment (9-28-25)

02:00 Trump’s former insurance lawyer, https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/the-former-insurance-lawyer-trump-picked-to-take-on-comey-54c4261d?mod=hp_lead_pos11
04:00 Media mocks Trump’s lawyers
18:20 Rodney Martin joins the show
48:00 To host a livestream, you usually feel like you know something valuable that you want to share, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163993
54:00 Everything is BS, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163991
56:00 This is Your Brain on Bullsh*t – David Pinsof, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3uLVeSGnEU
1:03:00 Deprogramming Democrats & unEducating the Elites: How I Escaped the Progressive Cult by Lisa Ekman, https://www.amazon.com/Deprogramming-Democrats-unEducating-Elites-Progressive/dp/1662895313/
1:44:00 The evolutionary origins of morality, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E5JlZjcFWug
1:46:00 Bless her heart: Gossip phrased with concern provides advantages in female intrasexual competition
1:48:00 Arguments for the sake of heaven, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163981
1:54:00 Happiness is a status signal
1:56:00 The philosophical principles underlying the Trump Doctrine, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163977
2:02:00 ‘More on the decline and fall of Steven Levitt [& Freakanomics]’, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163968
2:14:00 Michael joins: Megyn Kelly getting blowback for tiptoing up to edgy comments on Israel
2:16:00 Charlie Kirk was a polemicist
2:23:00 Tucker Carlson, the Jews & Jesus
2:40:00 Analyzing Charlie Kirk’s debating style, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/09/27/us/politics/charlie-kirk-debate.html
3:12:00 What is a deepity?
3:14:30 Religion vs LOL Nothing Matters, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163966
3:16:30 What Are The New Status Games?
3:19:00 Virtue games are status games, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rn1eNoUhAQ
3:20:00 David Pinsof: The Psychology of Incentives and Opinions, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rn1eNoUhAQ
3:28:45 What Are The Highest Status TV Shows Now?, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163959
3:30:00 Dennis Prager’s First Public Appearance! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWY2ZnVqYUc
3:38:00 Demons Are Interesting, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163948
3:44:00 The James Comey Indictment, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163934
3:46:45 Strange Bedfellows: The Alliance Theory of Political Belief Systems, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Os0jvjssTG8
4:07:00 The grammar of anger: Mapping the computational architecture of a recalibrational emotion
4:09:00 Controversies in Evolutionary Psychology
4:19:50 David Pinsof: The Alliance Theory of Political Belief Systems
4:27:00 What Do We Find Interesting?, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163923
4:29:00 Why Do We Argue? https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163918
4:30:00 Eat, Pray, Profit, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163916
4:34:00 Understanding the illusion of understanding, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163914
4:39:00 ‘Status Is a Four-Letter Word: Self Versus Other Differences and Concealment of Status-Striving’, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163912
4:40:20 The Status Game, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=163906
4:46:00 Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives, and the Biology of Political Differences (2024)
4:53:00 Each side is trying to capture the positive vibes of freedom

Posted in America | Comments Off on The James Comey Indictment (9-28-25)

WSJ: The Former Insurance Lawyer Trump Picked to Take On Comey

I recall the MSM has long mocked the incompetence of Trump’s lawyers. It revels in pointing out their mistakes and their good looks. And yet Trump is the most powerful man in the world, so maybe he’s been better served by his lawyers than the media coverage indicates?

Saying that Lindsey Halligan is a former insurance lawyer is a way of saying she’s low status and in over her head.

The WSJ reports (boy, has this publication become an exciting read over the past 18 months):

Interim U.S. Attorney Lindsey Halligan worked around the clock to secure an indictment of former FBI director

Last Saturday, Trump appointed Halligan to lead the U.S. attorney’s office in eastern Virginia, where her predecessor had resigned under pressure to prosecute Trump’s adversaries. With the help of a small team at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and limited assistance from other lawyers in the office wary of their new boss, she secured an indictment of Comey on Thursday on charges of making false statements and obstruction.

Halligan, 36, brings to the role the exact qualities that Trump prizes: loyalty above a long resume, a camera-ready appearance and a commitment to taking on what she perceives as the excesses of the left.

On Thursday evening, Halligan stood behind the prosecutors’ table in a Virginia courtroom, nearly two hours after the building had closed to the public, as the court clerk announced the indictment. Breaking with the traditions of the office, Halligan had presented the case herself.

It didn’t go altogether smoothly. The jury decided to indict on only two of the three charges it was presented. The judge told Halligan she had two documents before her that were inconsistent with one another, something she said has never happened before. One document contained only two of the charges and the other document had all three—causing confusion to briefly ripple through the courtroom. Halligan told the judge she only reviewed and signed the indictment with two charges, but the judge said her signature was on both forms.

Maybe there are more important qualities for lawyers in some instances than correctly filling out forms?

Trial lawyers, for example, are a different breed from regular lawyers. They have better people skills, they can think on their feet, they’re flexible and adaptable and can thrive under great stress. They’re often not as precise and as diligent at checking boxes when compared to other lawyers.

In school, girls are usually more diligent at coloring within the lines, while the best students are braver and usually boys.

ChatGPT says: You’re putting your finger on something the media rarely acknowledges: the gap between status signals in the legal profession and actual effectiveness in Trump’s world.

Mainstream coverage frames Trump’s lawyers as second-rate because they don’t come from the top white-shoe firms, sometimes make sloppy errors, and often look like opportunists. By conventional metrics—pedigree, polish, firm affiliation—they are “low status.” Saying Lindsey Halligan is a “former insurance lawyer” is shorthand for “not the kind of elite DOJ-trained trial lawyer you’d expect in this role.”

But Trump’s incentives are different. He doesn’t need polished Beltway insiders who might hesitate to do his bidding. He needs lawyers who will act aggressively, withstand massive social and professional stigma, and remain loyal under fire. In that sense, Halligan’s traits—loyalty, willingness to improvise, comfort with the spotlight—matter more than whether she triple-checked the caption on an indictment.

And you’re right that trial law is a separate skillset from technical paperwork lawyering. Trial lawyers often succeed because they can connect with juries, handle surprises, and stay combative under pressure. Those qualities don’t show up on résumés, but they can be decisive.

So while the media delights in ridiculing Trump’s attorneys for mistakes, their very willingness to take his cases (despite career risks) and push them forward may itself be a form of competence in his context. Trump’s continuing ability to bend institutions to his will suggests that his lawyers, whatever their status, are serving his interests better than the coverage implies.

Here’s a clear breakdown of the two ecosystems:

1. Elite Lawyer Status Hierarchy

Where status comes from:

Pedigree: Ivy League law degrees, federal clerkships (especially SCOTUS).

Firm affiliation: White-shoe firms (Kirkland & Ellis, Covington, Gibson Dunn).

Connections: Deep ties in DOJ, regulatory agencies, and the federal judiciary.

Track record: Major corporate clients, high-dollar litigation, amicus briefs at the Supreme Court.

Traits: Cautious, precise, polished in court and in writing; highly risk-averse because reputation is their currency.

Strengths:

Unmatched technical precision and institutional access.

Deep credibility with judges, regulators, and the media.

Can deploy vast resources—teams of associates, expert witnesses, political contacts.

Weaknesses:

Often unwilling to “go to the mat” for a client if it threatens their reputation.

Reluctant to bend rules, push aggressive narratives, or improvise in chaos.

Tend to value institutional legitimacy over client loyalty.

2. Trump Lawyer Ecosystem

Where status comes from (different metrics):

Loyalty: Willingness to take massive reputational hits by representing Trump.

Visibility: Frequent TV appearances, speeches, and willingness to litigate in the court of public opinion.

Flexibility: Can pivot quickly from one theory to another, even if inconsistent.

Trial skills: Comfort with confrontation, drama, and unpredictability.

Traits: Combative, media-savvy, improvisational; not afraid to make enemies.

Strengths:

Willing to absorb personal and professional risk that elite firms won’t touch.

Agile in fast-moving, chaotic litigation and media storms.

Can connect with Trump’s base and align legal strategy with political messaging.

Weaknesses:

Often sloppy with paperwork and procedure.

Limited institutional credibility—judges, DOJ veterans, and elite peers roll their eyes.

Vulnerable to being outmaneuvered on technicalities.

3. The Tradeoff

Trump doesn’t need “perfect paperwork lawyers” as much as he needs fighters who won’t abandon him. The media ridicules their mistakes because it judges by elite-lawyer standards. But in Trump’s arena—where law, politics, and media blur—the qualities of loyalty, aggression, and adaptability may serve him better than pristine résumés.

FT: “In the US, lawyers are rivalled only by politicians as the most hated professional group. Is it any wonder, then, that the lawyers’ party was overwhelmed? That a platform entirely conceived by lawyers, centred on the defence of democratic procedures and respect for minority rights, whose main argument consisted in the lawsuits against the Republican candidate, was swept away by the recriminations of Trump supporters: inflation, illegal immigration, class contempt?”

That FT passage gets at the cultural clash:

Left-of-center elites lean on institutional legitimacy. Their worldview assumes that if you follow procedures, cite precedent, defend minority rights through courts, and check the right boxes, the system will hold. Lawyers are the archetype—trained to spot every issue, follow the rulebook, and trust that institutions confer legitimacy. That’s why they instinctively fight Trump in courts, through lawsuits, and in appeals to norms.

Populists, by contrast, distrust institutions because they see them as captured by elites. They don’t want to “check boxes”; they want results. They’ll bend rules, ignore process, and privilege loyalty or narrative over legal formalism. That’s why Trump’s legal ecosystem—messy, improvisational, combative—doesn’t look like failure to his supporters; it looks like authenticity.

This is why the lawyers’ party framing lands: when Democrats leaned heavily on lawsuits, legal challenges, and appeals to process in 2020–24, they were speaking in the language of the institutionalist class. To much of the electorate, that came off as class contempt—“these people think they’re smarter than you, and their judges and lawyers will overrule your choices.” Trump flipped it: instead of bowing to institutional legitimacy, he made fighting the institutions itself the proof of legitimacy.

So when the press mocks Trump’s lawyers as incompetent box-checkers who can’t even draft an indictment cleanly, they’re actually reinforcing the populist story: “See, the elite rules don’t matter. What matters is who fights for you.”

1. The Institutionalist / Professional Class

Composition: Lawyers, academics, bureaucrats, journalists, NGO workers, HR departments, tech middle managers.

Traits: College-educated (often grad school), deferential to process, invested in credentialism.

Worldview:

Institutions confer legitimacy.

Democracy is safeguarded by courts, rules, and procedures.

Expertise and credentials are the path to authority.

Political style: Box-checking, cautious, status-conserving.

Weakness: Comes across as smug, out-of-touch, obsessed with form over substance.

2. The Populist / Working-Class Orientation

Composition: Tradespeople, small business owners, military, police, service workers, independent hustlers, “doers.”

Traits: Often non-college, or college but distrustful of elite pathways. Values toughness, loyalty, results over process.

Worldview:

Institutions are captured, self-serving, and corrupt.

Legitimacy comes from direct action and fighting for “your people.”

Success is judged by outcomes, not credentials.

Political style: Combative, improvisational, rule-bending.

Weakness: Prone to chaos, legal vulnerability, and sometimes outright grift.

3. How the Clash Plays Out Politically

When Democrats lean on lawsuits, court orders, and regulatory fixes, they’re speaking in the institutionalist dialect. It resonates with educated professionals but alienates those who see lawyers as parasites.

When Trump mocks those processes, appoints loyal but “unqualified” lawyers, or blows off rules, it looks reckless to elites—but authentic to populists. He’s proving he’s not captured by the institutional class.

The lawyer-as-elite archetype is especially toxic because lawyers are seen as both rich and useless: making money from other people’s problems while never building or fixing anything tangible. In that sense, “the lawyers’ party” was doomed once it became the visible embodiment of the ruling class.

4. Why Lawyers Get Singled Out

Lawyers = proceduralism made flesh. They argue, draft, and block; they don’t build or fight.

Politicians = promise-makers. They may lie, but at least they’re accountable to elections.

Lawyers combine high status + low trust + procedural dominance—the perfect foil for populist anger.

Put simply: in the U.S. today, being a lawyerly party is a liability because it ties you to the very status system populists want to overthrow. Trump’s lawyers may look “incompetent” to elites, but their box-checking failures actually dramatize that rebellion.

Posted in Law | Comments Off on WSJ: The Former Insurance Lawyer Trump Picked to Take On Comey

I Know More Than You!

We usually find other people’s opinions obnoxious because they are underlain by a smug superior attitude of — I know more than you!

If I didn’t feel this, I wouldn’t blog or livestream as much.

I’ve been watching Youtube videos on how to communicate more effectively on Youtube. This bloke Alexander said you should go into your performance with as low a cognitive load as possible so you can afford to be most in the moment, and before you begin, get clear on what you are thinking and feeling and try to distill it down to one or two things, and then speak from that place.

If I don’t feel I have something important to impart, I wouldn’t share as much online.

While I might usually feel some version of more-than-my-audience, sometimes I feel distinctively less-than-my-audience. That’s when I’m in my vulnerable porous identity. When I feel superior, it means I’m in my disciplined buffered identity.

I find that when I practice Alexander’s advice, I become more interesting to watch with the sound off because what I’m feeling comes through on my face and in my gestures.

ChatGPT says: You’re noticing the core tension: the very impulse to share often carries the whiff of “I know something you don’t,” and that can read as smug even if you don’t mean it that way. But there are ways to soften that edge and still put your ideas out there.

A few levers you can pull:

Frame as exploration, not proclamation. Instead of “Here’s the truth,” try “Here’s what I’m wrestling with,” or “This is how it looks to me right now.” It signals you’re not closing the case—you’re inviting others in.

Name your uncertainty. Saying “I could be wrong, but…” or “I’m curious how others see this” lowers the superiority vibe while keeping your perspective intact.

Shift from teaching to sharing. Even if you’re confident, put it in terms of your own experience: “When I tried X, this is what I noticed,” rather than “You should do X.”

Respect the intelligence of your audience. If you assume they’re sharp and capable, your tone naturally changes—you’re talking to peers, not students.

Use vulnerability sparingly and strategically. The “less-than” mode (porous identity) can humanize you and create connection, but overdone it can slide into self-abasement. Blending some buffered confidence with flashes of porosity makes for compelling communication.

Distill, like Alexander suggests. Going in with one or two distilled thoughts prevents rambling superiority displays and keeps you grounded in the moment.

In short: hold your authority lightly. You don’t have to kill the “I have something important to say” impulse—it’s what makes you publish—but you can pair it with a curiosity about how it will land. That tension—“I think this is valuable” plus “I might be wrong”—is where the least obnoxious voices live.

Posted in Personal | Comments Off on I Know More Than You!

BS Is Usually More Effective Than Lying

From the below video: If deceit is fundamental to animal communication, then there must be strong selection to spot deception. And this in turn ought to select for a degree of self-deception—rendering some facts and motives unconscious so as not to betray, through subtle signs of self-knowledge, the deception being practiced.

The conventional view that natural selection favors nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world is a very naive view of mental evolution. What Trivers is saying is that the brain is specifically designed to self-deceive when useful, and that it is foolish to assume evolution would select for accuracy per se.

I think it’s a beautiful, intriguing, and horrifying idea. We see this theme in science fiction. Battlestar Galactica had the Cylons, who didn’t know they were Cylons so they could more effectively blend in with humans. They fell in love, and it was horrifying to learn they were Cylons all along. They were programmed to deceive themselves in order to deceive others.

Total Recall has a similar premise, with Arnold Schwarzenegger tricked into thinking he’s a rebel when he’s actually working for the bad guys. And in Seinfeld, George tells Jerry, who’s worried about passing a polygraph: “It’s not a lie if you believe it.” The point is that we’re better liars when we believe the lie.

Is there evidence for this? Unfortunately, it’s spotty. One prediction of Trivers’ theory is that we should be very good at detecting lies, and less good when the person believes the lie. The evolutionary story is that deceivers and the deceived are in an arms race: as deceivers get better, victims get better at spotting deception—cues like sweat, shifty eyes, subtle signs of self-knowledge. So, because it became so hard to lie without leaking cues, a new strategy emerged: lie to oneself first, then to others.

This predicts that people should be good at spotting conscious lies. But evidence doesn’t support that. Studies on polygraphs and other cues show people are barely above chance at detecting lies. So one of the key predictions of Trivers’ model is falsified.

I’ve argued in my own work that we don’t so much lie and self-deceive as we bullshit. Lying is intentionally saying something false you know is false, for self-interest. Bullshitting is when you don’t really know or care what’s true—you just say what you need to say to persuade, gain status, forgiveness, or advantage. Truth, if present, is incidental.

Bullshitting is safer and more effective than lying because lying carries reputational risks. In small-scale societies, being exposed as a liar could be fatal. So lying tends to be a last resort, used when spin fails or when someone is so powerful they can lie with impunity. For most people, spin, exaggeration, selective evidence, and distortion are the preferred tools.

This reframes self-deception. I think what we’re really doing is self-persuasion, or self-bullshitting. Like lawyers preparing arguments, we rehearse stories in our heads. We practice responses to accusations. We construct narratives that present us as good, noble, and justified, so that when challenged, our answers are smooth, persuasive, and compelling.

The prediction here is different: humans should be good not at spotting lies, but at spotting bullshit. Evidence supports this. Hugo Mercier, in Not Born Yesterday, shows humans are not gullible fools. We’re vigilant, skeptical, constantly alert to hidden agendas. What looks like gullibility—such as conspiracy theories—often stems from hyper-skepticism: an overactive vigilance against deception.

So, conspiracy theories don’t come from gullibility; they come from the opposite. And the better story about self-deception is that it’s not about lying to ourselves so we can lie better. It’s about self-persuasion: rehearsing, spinning, bullshitting—so that we can influence others more effectively.

Posted in Rhetoric | Comments Off on BS Is Usually More Effective Than Lying