Decoding Attitudes Towards Jews & Israel

David Pinsof writes: “The more we all become aware of our incentive structures, the more incentivized we will be to choose them wisely.”
People work hard because of incentives. They obey or break the law because of incentives. Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, and Nick Fuentes oppose Israel not because something is wrong with their souls but because hostility toward Israel pays off inside their coalition. It earns status, belonging, and applause.
If behavior follows incentives, then anti-Israel attitudes in parts of MAGA are not primarily about hatred or ignorance. They are about what gets rewarded. The question, then, is simple: what currently makes anti-Israel talk profitable inside those spaces, and how might those incentives shift?
In many populist right circles, attacking Israel signals independence from the establishment. It says you are not controlled by donors or foreign lobbies. That posture earns status in a coalition that defines itself against elites. Calling critics antisemitic tends to backfire because condemnation from elites only raises their standing. A smarter move reframes anti-Israel rhetoric not as rebellion but as mimicry, as recycled talking points from old isolationist leftists, Iranian propaganda, or Ivy League NGOs. When the posture looks derivative rather than defiant, the status payoff drops.
People rarely adopt positions because they are persuaded. They adopt positions because those positions help them succeed inside their tribe. The strongest incentives in MAGA spaces cluster around national strength, border control, civilizational identity, hostility to global bureaucracies, and respect for military effectiveness. Israel framed through humanitarian rhetoric or liberal internationalism conflicts with all of those. Israel framed as a small nation that crushes enemies, guards its borders, and refuses lectures from international institutions fits them well. The same country, read through two different lenses, produces two different responses.
Pinsof’s point about the virtue game matters here. When pro-Israel advocates present their position as morally superior or morally mandatory, they trigger the exact incentive that produces backlash. In populist spaces, rejecting a moral lecture from elites proves coalition loyalty. The practical alternative is less moral language and more shared interest, less historical guilt and more strategic alignment.
Attitudes follow high-status figures. If the people gaining prestige in a coalition are strongly anti-Israel, others copy them. The only durable counter is competing prestige. When admired military veterans, nationalist politicians, or influential media figures express sympathy for Israel, they create reputational cover for followers to do the same. Endorsements move people faster than arguments.
Some hostility runs on a specific status game: accusing politicians of being controlled by Jewish money signals courage and anti-corruption. The only way to weaken that incentive is transparency and decentralization. When support for Israel looks like a normal geopolitical position held across many factions rather than the product of a single lobby, the conspiracy narrative loses its charge. The more a position appears monopolized by one interest group, the more rewarding it becomes to attack that group.
Coalitions also respond better to reciprocal alliances than to moral debts. Arguments that Americans owe Israel something tend to fail in populist contexts. Arguments that Israel delivers intelligence, technology, and strategic value work better because they fit the logic of mutual benefit. People support alliances when they feel they are gaining something.
The deeper lesson from Pinsof is uncomfortable. You do not change hostile attitudes by proving them wrong or immoral. You change the incentives that make those attitudes rewarding. When pro-Israel sentiment becomes the path to status and coalition success, attitudes shift fast. When hostility keeps generating applause, it persists, no matter how many arguments get written.

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Iran & Israel Share Some Responsibility For The Actions Of Their Proxies

I just watched a 2024 Finnish mini-series Conflict. Wikipedia says: “The series imagines a scenario where an unidentified enemy invades Hankoniemi during midsummer celebrations, and follows the resulting conflict through the lens of the country’s leadership and among those who remain in Hanko on the occupied territory.”

The hybrid forces invading Finland reminded me of not just Russia, but also of Iran acting through its proxies. While I was watching, I felt such hatred for the masked bad guys. I wanted to kill all the mercenary invaders of this noble nation.

We rarely can command others, but we often can influence them, and to the extent we can influence them, we may share some responsibility for their choices.

This Washington Post essay makes concrete and logical the raw rage I feel about Iran’s regime:

U.S. military action in Iran is justified because of longstanding armed conflict…

This campaign continues an ongoing and long-term armed conflict with Iran…

There are strong arguments that the conflict has been ongoing for the 47 years since the Iranian Revolution. Unquestionably, this armed conflict has persisted over the past several years. That the U.S. has historically chosen to tolerate acts of Iranian aggression or respond in limited ways in no way negates the reality of this conflict.

Before the current hostilities, Iran’s most recent actions against the U.S. occurred on Feb. 3, when an Iranian drone “aggressively approached” and was shot down by a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea. Hours later, two gunboats operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened to seize a U.S.-flagged tanker in international waters.

According to a 2024 report by Biden’s Director of National Intelligence, between October 2023 and November 2024, “the Iranian military helped facilitate” at least 190 attacks against U.S. military forces by Iranian-aligned militants. During 2025, the Iranian-backed Houthis repeatedly attacked U.S. naval ships in the Red Sea. Also in 2025, Iranian proxies attacked U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria.

During the same period, Iran brought its “shadow war” to U.S. soil. The Biden and Trump justice departments have documented Iranian plots to assassinate Trump, former secretary of state Mike Pompeo, former national security adviser John Bolton and Iranian American women’s rights activist Masih Alinejad.

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has been held responsible for the deaths of 603 U.S. troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, 241 service members in the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, three soldiers in Jordan in January 2024 and dozens of U.S. civilians.

The Talmud says “shlucho shel adam k’moto,” which means “a person’s agent is like the person himself.” In Jewish law, when someone appoints an agent to act on his behalf, the legal consequences attach to the principal as if he personally performed the act. American law contains almost the same rule through agency doctrine. Acts of an authorized agent are legally the acts of the principal. If the agent acts within the scope of authority, the principal bears responsibility.
The Restatement of Agency states that a principal is bound by the acts of an agent acting with actual or apparent authority. Contracts signed by the agent bind the principal. Torts committed by an employee in the course of employment bind the employer. A corporation only acts through agents, so when a CEO signs a contract or an employee makes a representation within their authority, the law treats the corporation as the actor. Conspiracy and accomplice liability extend this logic further: a person who directs another to commit a crime can be treated as having committed it himself.
States face similar rules. The International Court of Justice treats proxy forces or militias as attributable to a state if that state directs or substantially controls them. The framework appears in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility.
That logic applies to geopolitics. Iran does not always attack the United States directly. It acts through Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and other proxies. The argument is that those actors function as Iran’s agents. If their attacks are attributable to Tehran, they count legally as Iranian attacks. Once that premise holds, the rest of the argument follows.
First premise: Iran and the United States are already in an ongoing armed conflict because Iranian proxies have repeatedly attacked U.S. forces and allies. Second premise: in an ongoing armed conflict, each strike does not require a fresh imminence justification. Once the right of self-defense is triggered, operations can continue until the enemy’s capacity or intent to attack is neutralized. Conclusion: the current U.S. strikes are not a new war of choice but a continuation of an existing armed conflict.
This reframes the political debate entirely. Critics ask whether Trump just started a war. Corn and Kittrie ask whether the war already existed. If it did, the legal bar for action drops significantly.
The deeper fight is not really legal. It is narrative. The phrase “war of choice” was built during the Iraq debate and implies a war the United States chose to start unnecessarily. The authors try to invert that by arguing Iran created the conflict through years of proxy attacks. The whole argument rests on treating Iran’s proxies as its legal agents. Reject that premise and the argument collapses. Accept it and the logic runs straight through.
A friend says:

When holding Iran responsible for the actions of its proxies, don’t forget that Israel has acted through proxies as well. It supported the South Lebanon Army (Christian Falangists) and then stood by without attempting to stop it when it went on a rampage in the Sabra and Shatilla Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. My understanding is that Israel helped set up Hamas as a proxy to be a counterweight to the Palestinian Authority. Israel has armed and trained Kurds involved in separatist movements in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

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Decoding The Rise Of Zohran Mamdani

Unlike my friends who are 100% convinced that Zohran Mamdani will be a terrible mayor, I think there’s a decent chance that Mamdani will be a good mayor (about 10%) and a solid chance he’ll be an average mayor (20%). I don’t think he’ll destroy New York. I don’t think that his opposition to Zionism means he’ll govern New York badly.
I don’t share Gavin Newsome’s politics but I don’t think he’s destroyed California. He’s been a decent governor. He’s not a socialist apparatchik. He’s checked at times the left-wing legislature.
Socialism is not universally a disaster. In some situations, it works and in other situations, it doesn’t. There’s no one system of governance that is globally superior.
I take the evolutionary perspective on these matters. We have many different kinds of politics jostling for power today because in the past, our present instincts were particularly adaptive to their setting and led to reproductive success.
The easiest way to understand Mamdani’s rise is that he assembled a coalition that previous New York politicians ignored. Alliance Theory says politics is not about truth or ideology. It is about assembling the largest alliance that can defeat rival alliances. Mamdani did that by stitching together three blocs that had not previously been fully integrated.
The first is the activist professional class. This includes nonprofit workers, progressive lawyers, journalists, NGO staff, graduate students, and policy professionals. This class dominates the prestige institutions of New York: universities, foundations, media, and advocacy groups. For years they had influence but not full political control. They were culturally dominant but politically fragmented. Mamdani gave them a clear electoral vehicle. His language matches their moral grammar. Structural injustice, solidarity, anti-racism, global justice, Palestine, climate, housing as a human right. That vocabulary signals alliance membership. It tells this professional class that he is one of them.
The second bloc is the immigrant urban coalition. New York politics has run through ethnic networks: Irish, Italian, Jewish, Black, Puerto Rican, Dominican. Mamdani tapped into a newer coalition of Muslim, South Asian, Arab, and African immigrants, plus younger second-generation voters. His biography matters here. Ugandan Asian background, Muslim, immigrant family story, housing activist. These identity markers create immediate trust with voters who do not see themselves in traditional Democratic Party leadership. He also did something subtle. He connected identity politics to bread-and-butter issues: rent, buses, childcare, cost of living. That broadened the alliance beyond symbolic politics.
The third bloc is the anti-establishment young voter. New York has a large population of politically alienated young renters who are economically squeezed and distrust both parties. Mamdani’s socialist branding works as a rebellion signal. Even voters who do not understand the details read it as anti-system. This group overlaps with online political culture. TikTok, Twitter, podcast audiences. His campaign operated well inside that ecosystem.
His victory also reflects weakness on the other side. The traditional New York governing coalition was a triangle: real estate, police and public sector unions, and moderate Democrats in the outer boroughs. That alliance has fractured. Real estate is still powerful but politically unpopular. Police legitimacy dropped after the George Floyd era. Moderate Democrats are aging and less organized. When the old machine weakens, new alliances can take power quickly.
Even people in elite institutions who share Mamdani’s cultural politics are nervous about him, and the reason is coalition control. The traditional Democratic establishment prefers predictable managers. Mamdani represents a shift in power toward activist networks, which threatens city hall bureaucracies, real estate capital, older Democratic Party leadership, and some unions. So you get a strange situation: cultural elites sympathize with his values but worry about his governing style.
Alliance Theory predicts the hardest part comes after victory. Campaign coalitions are easy to assemble because promises can overlap. Governing forces tradeoffs. For Mamdani the tension will come from three directions. Activists want maximal policy change. City institutions demand fiscal stability. Business interests demand predictability. If he satisfies activists too much, capital and moderate voters panic. If he moderates too much, the activist base turns on him. Every big city mayor eventually faces this squeeze.
Mamdani is a prototype for a new type of Democratic politician. The old model was a coalition of unions, minorities, and moderate professionals. The emerging model looks different: highly educated progressive professionals, immigrant urban voters, and young renters and service workers. If that coalition proves durable in New York, you will see versions of it in Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, and maybe even nationally. The real question is whether it can govern or whether it only works during insurgent campaigns.
The group most enthusiastic about him is not the poorest voters in New York, nor the wealthiest. The core enthusiasm comes from what you might call the urban progressive professional class: teachers, nonprofit workers, graduate students, media staff, NGO employees, junior lawyers, cultural workers, and policy people. This group sits in a strange position. They are culturally powerful but economically squeezed. They dominate universities, journalism, and nonprofits, and much of the language that defines moral legitimacy. But they struggle with rent, student debt, childcare costs, and unstable career ladders. Many live in cities where buying a home feels impossible. That creates a particular tension. They feel morally victorious but materially insecure.
A figure like Mamdani resolves that tension. He validates their moral worldview. His rhetoric tells them that their understanding of injustice is correct. Housing is a human right. Capitalism produces exploitation. Western foreign policy is morally compromised. Structural inequality explains their struggles. He also promises material relief that fits their lifestyle: free buses, rent freezes, childcare expansion, public services. And he provides symbolic representation. He is young, articulate, activist-coded, and fluent in the moral language of the professional progressive world. Supporting him signals membership in the right coalition.
Alliance Theory would say that leaders often function as identity anchors for alliances. They embody the values that coalition members want to signal to each other. Mamdani performs that role well. There is also a generational element. The older urban liberal model was managerial. Think Michael Bloomberg or Barack Obama in his governing mode: technocratic, pragmatic, restrained. The younger progressive class does not want managerial competence as its primary signal. It wants moral clarity and coalition loyalty. Mamdani speaks in that register. That is why criticism from establishment Democrats often backfires. When older figures warn that his ideas are unrealistic, it reinforces the identity logic. It confirms that he represents a new coalition challenging an older elite.
But this psychological appeal also creates the central risk for his mayoralty. The more a leader becomes a symbol of moral identity, the harder it becomes to disappoint supporters. Governing requires compromise: budgets, contracts, zoning fights, union negotiations. If Mamdani governs like a pragmatist, parts of his alliance may feel betrayed. If he governs like an activist, capital flight and institutional resistance could intensify. Many insurgent politicians run into this exact problem. The coalition that elects them wants a symbol. The city they govern demands a manager.
Mamdani’s success is not mainly about raw personal charisma in the classic sense. It is about competence at the social paradoxes that signal coalition membership. David Pinsof’s key insight is that charisma comes from performing social paradoxes convincingly. The charismatic person appears not to be playing the game while playing it very well. Mamdani fits that pattern.
The first paradox is “not seeking status while gaining status.” Mamdani presents himself as an activist who reluctantly entered politics because ordinary people demanded change. The persona is movement first, personal ambition second. That posture signals moral purity. Yet the result is enormous status. He becomes the face of a national progressive movement. The trick works because the ambition is concealed beneath moral language. If he openly presented himself as a status climber trying to become the most famous socialist politician in America, the effect would collapse. Framed as service to a movement, the status gain feels legitimate.
The second paradox is the “authentic rebel who represents the group.” Pinsof notes that charismatic figures appear radically authentic. They are supposedly just being themselves. But the authentic self they present is exactly what their coalition wants. Mamdani’s authenticity is carefully aligned with the values of urban progressive professionals. His speech patterns, cultural references, and moral vocabulary match that world. Housing justice, immigrant solidarity, climate urgency, anti-colonial framing of foreign policy. Supporters experience this as authenticity. In practice it is precise coalition signaling.
The third paradox is “norm violation that earns praise.” Charismatic leaders often break norms in ways their audience secretly enjoys. Mamdani criticizes real estate power in a city dominated by real estate. He challenges traditional policing narratives. He openly supports Palestinian causes that older Democratic politicians avoided. These are violations of establishment norms, but within his coalition those violations read as bravery.
The fourth is the “not trying to impress you” paradox. The charismatic person appears relaxed and unconcerned about winning approval. Mamdani’s style is casual and conversational. He does not speak like a typical professional politician. But the casualness is itself a political signal. It says he is not part of the traditional machine. The performance of effortlessness creates the perception of authenticity.
Once a coalition believes someone is charismatic, the belief spreads socially. People assume others will also be drawn to the person. Supporting them becomes a safe bet in the alliance game. That has clearly happened with Mamdani in progressive media and activist networks. Journalists, academics, and influencers repeat the idea that he is compelling and exciting. The perception of charisma spreads through the coalition.
But charisma in Pinsof’s sense is always audience-specific. The same behaviors that look authentic to one coalition look manipulative or absurd to another. To a progressive urban audience, Mamdani looks sincere and principled. To a moderate suburban voter, the same behavior might look theatrical or ideological. This is why reactions to him are so polarized. His charisma is tuned to a particular alliance.
So Mamdani’s appeal does rely on charisma, but not in the mystical sense people usually mean. It relies on being very good at the social paradoxes that signal membership in the progressive urban coalition. The more interesting question is what happens when a charismatic insurgent becomes an administrator. The social paradoxes that win elections do not always work when you have to negotiate budgets, unions, and zoning laws. That transition is where many charismatic politicians lose their magic.

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Words, Words, Words & The Iran War

David Pinsof writes:

How do we figure out who the baddies are? Usually, we pay attention to whether they’re saying the right things. Are they saying things that make us nod and applaud? Or are they saying things that make us cringe and facepalm? We infer people’s character traits by the words they use and in what order they use them. When everyone uses this shortcut to identify the baddies, the result is what Robin Hanson calls “righttalkism,” the view that all it takes to improve the world is to change how people talk. The logic is straightforward:

Bad things are caused by bad people.

Good things are caused by good people.

Bad people are bad because they talk the wrong way.

Good people are good because they talk the right way.

Therefore, if everybody talks the right way and nobody talks the wrong way, then everything will be good.

This is essentially what modern discourse is all about.

David Pinsof argues that society runs on incentives, not character. Bad behavior comes from bad incentives, not bad people. He calls the opposite view “likability determinism,” the tendency to explain events by sorting actors into heroes and villains. Most political commentary, he says, is really about whether people use the right words, what Robin Hanson calls “righttalkism.” If everyone just talked correctly, the thinking goes, the world would improve. Pinsof finds this naive.
Applying his lens to Trump and the Iran war clarifies what looks like incoherence. Trump says the campaign is “very complete.” His Pentagon says they have “only just begun to fight.” Experts call this chaos. Pinsof’s framework calls it multiplex signaling, a president optimizing for several audiences at once, each pulling the message in a different direction.
Markets want reassurance. Allies want resolve. The base wants strength without another Iraq. The adversary needs to feel fear and uncertainty. No single narrative satisfies all of them. So the message shifts depending on who is listening.
Foreign policy experts criticize this as reckless, but Pinsof’s framework applies to them too. Think tanks, elite media, and former officials operate inside a prestige economy that rewards sounding sober and institutionally responsible. The highest-status move in that world is to warn about escalation and complexity. The expert critique of Trump’s rhetoric is not pure analysis. It is also a performance within its own incentive structure.
Trump’s volatility may also serve a deterrent function. Traditional deterrence assumes credibility comes from predictability. The madman model inverts this. If Tehran cannot calculate the ceiling of American escalation, the range of possible outcomes expands and the perceived risk rises without requiring further strikes.
The civilian-military split inside the U.S. government reflects the same logic. The Pentagon needs to maintain operational momentum and allied credibility, so it emphasizes ongoing campaigns. Trump needs domestic political legitimacy, so he emphasizes progress and nearing victory. Both statements might reflect the incentive structure of the speaker rather than confusion about facts.
Time horizons matter here. Military planners think in months or years. Foreign policy institutions think in decades. Presidents think in election cycles. Trump’s rhetoric collapses these timelines for domestic consumption. Rapid victory, imminent deals, nearly nothing left to target. All of it keeps the perceived cost of the war low enough to sustain public support.
Seven American combat deaths as of March 2026 represent the hardest constraint of all. Once casualties rise, or gas prices bite, the domestic incentive coalition shifts and the rhetoric will follow immediately. Not because anyone discovered new truths. Because the incentives changed.

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How Does Elon Musk Do It?

Many people I know want to dismiss Elon Musk as a fraud. A whole industry of pundits obliges them, because there is an ocean of people hungry for that narrative.
I don’t understand the intensity of the hatred.
Like Donald Trump, Musk says and does genuinely foolish things. He gives people who are already predisposed to hate him plenty of material to work with. But that is how the mind works. We decide something first, then we hunt for the best-sounding explanation. The mind doesn’t guide our choices so much as justify them.
We are also wired to dismiss people as an energy-saving device. When you hear about something stupid a celebrity said, it’s easy to write them off entirely so you have one fewer person to track. Add tall poppy syndrome to this, and the dismissal becomes almost pleasurable. Most people enjoy cutting down those who stand above them in status, and billionaires make satisfying targets.

David Pinsof writes: “As for the rest of bigotry, it probably comes from zero-sum competition over intergroup status. Such competition may be most acute among ethnic minorities’ closest rivals in the social hierarchy—i.e., low-status white people—which might explain why antiracism confers elite status. And it might also explain why antiracist elites resent “millionaires and billionaires”—i.e., their closest rivals in the hierarchy.”

David Pinsof writes:

[W]e prefer to think in stories. We see the world as revolving around a colorful cast of characters—often representing warring tribes—whom we either like or dislike. There’s a path to utopia, and we can get there if the likable heroes use their “free will” powers to save the day. There’s also a path to dystopia, and we’ll get there if the unlikable villains use their “free will” powers to ruin everything. The heroes must stop the villains, or the world will go to shit…

What matters is: some people suck, and other people are awesome. We don’t need to ask why.

Let’s give this rival worldview a name. Let’s call it likability determinism…

Patriarchy is caused by sexists who don’t care about women. Cancel culture is caused by woke sadists who love ruining people’s lives. Economic inequality is caused by greedy rich people hogging all the stuff. Poverty is caused by lazy and irresponsible freeloaders. War is caused by evil people who don’t recognize that war is bad. Homelessness is caused by heartless people who don’t care about the plight of others. We don’t need to think about the economic, social, and legal incentive structures that lead to cancel culture, homelessness, poverty, war, or wealth inequality. Booooring! We just need to point the finger at the baddies, and our work is done.

Likability determinism also helps us achieve our social goals—it’s a kind of bullshit. Any time something good or bad happens in the world, we use it as an opportunity to praise our allies or diss our rivals. By praising or dissing individuals and groups, we get to show off whose side we’re on and where our loyalties lie. And if we all agree on who the baddies are, then that brings us closer together—it makes us feel like we belong—which is a big incentive for us humans.

Words, words, words

How do we figure out who the baddies are? Usually, we pay attention to whether they’re saying the right things. Are they saying things that make us nod and applaud? Or are they saying things that make us cringe and facepalm? We infer people’s character traits by the words they use and in what order they use them. When everyone uses this shortcut to identify the baddies, the result is what Robin Hanson calls “righttalkism,” the view that all it takes to improve the world is to change how people talk. The logic is straightforward:

Bad things are caused by bad people.

Good things are caused by good people.

Bad people are bad because they talk the wrong way.

Good people are good because they talk the right way.

Therefore, if everybody talks the right way and nobody talks the wrong way, then everything will be good.

This is essentially what modern discourse is all about.

Praising allies and dissing rivals signals tribal loyalty. Agreeing on who the baddies are creates a sense of belonging. The analysis doesn’t need to be accurate. It just needs to be shared.
John M. Doris and the situationist tradition offer a more honest framework. Behavior varies dramatically by context. Instead of fixed character traits explaining everything, environments draw out different aspects of a person. Churchill was erratic and distrusted in peacetime. In existential war he was exactly what Britain needed. The context activated what worked. Saquon Barkley was a decent running back with the Giants and a brilliant one in his first season with the Eagles before settling back into average. Same person, different containers.
Musk fits this pattern. When the container is a whiteboard or a launchpad, what comes out looks like genius. When the container is a live interview or a social media platform, it looks like a spill. That isn’t contradiction. That’s situationism.
His core advantage isn’t temperament. It’s an unusually high tolerance for risk combined with genuine engineering focus. Most CEOs protect what they already have. Musk repeatedly bets everything on projects most executives would call suicidal. SpaceX nearly went bankrupt several times. Tesla almost collapsed in 2008 and again during the Model 3 production ramp. That kind of appetite for risk is rare among the already wealthy. It produces volatility, but also outcomes nobody else achieves.
The companies also survive his volatility because they carry real competence inside them. SpaceX in particular is staffed with engineers who can execute at a high level regardless of what the founder is doing on a given Tuesday. The founder provides what Carl Schmitt might call a state of exception, the moments when normal rules get suspended to force a breakthrough. The staff provides the silent logic that keeps the rockets from exploding. What looks like dysfunction from outside is often just a different distribution of risk.
His erratic public behavior also functions as a kind of signal. A founder who follows every conventional rule announces that he is replaceable by any other MBA. Unpredictability, attached to a grand and serious goal, tells the inner circle that the leader is not playing a standard social game. It forces everyone around him to choose a side. You are either a believer or an obstacle. That binary strengthens the coalition of believers. Critics read the same behavior as recklessness. Both groups are looking at the same trait.
Jeffrey Alexander’s work on purification rituals helps explain the “fraud” label. Every society draws a line between the sacred and the profane. For Musk’s supporters, he is a sacred figure leading humanity toward something larger. For his detractors, his behavior pollutes public discourse, and labeling him a fraud is a cleansing act. Both responses are more about the labeler than the labeled.
The people I notice most at ease with complexity tend to be the most secure in their own lives. They can hold contradictory evidence without needing to resolve it into a clean verdict. They can say Musk is brilliant in one domain, reckless in another, and ordinary in others without feeling that this admission costs them anything.
The people who need the cleanest verdict tend to need it most urgently. The belief that the successful are frauds restores a sense of moral order. It turns a lack of status into evidence of insight. That’s not analysis. That’s consolation.
Reality is messier. The traits that build frontier companies don’t look like the traits of a calm and balanced person, because they aren’t. Extreme ambition, high tolerance for chaos, obsessive focus, and willingness to gamble everything are not stable. They are just rare.

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Do We Need God?

I see debates about the need for God. My hunch is that the lonelier you are, the more you need God. That has been my life experience. The less connected I felt, the more desperately I reached for God. Conversely, the more connected I became, the less I thought about Him, unless the people I was most connected to happened to be Godly people, which is my present state.

On a practical level, I have found that belief in God, Torah, or Jesus tells you next to nothing about a person. As my father taught me, religion in America is a mile wide and an inch deep.

There is a saying in 12-step groups: going to meetings makes you feel better, while working the steps helps you get better. Believing in the transcendent might make you feel better, but joining a pro-social community will help you get better. On that score, religious communities are about the only healthy institutions that accept and help losers.

The distinction between feeling better and getting better mirrors the logic of many therapeutic frameworks. Emotional relief often comes from a shift in internal perspective. Lasting change requires a structural shift in how a person lives and interacts with others. Belief offers an internal buffer. It provides a sense of meaning and a way to process suffering. It changes how a person perceives their circumstances without necessarily changing the circumstances themselves.

Pro-social communities provide the machinery for improvement. They offer accountability and shared expectations. A community forces an individual into a series of social exchanges that require reliability and cooperation, and those exchanges create a feedback loop where the group reinforces positive habits. The steps in a 12-step program function as a technology for character change. They require the participant to perform specific actions that confront their past and their current behavior.

This raises an uncomfortable question. If you are underearning and dysfunctional, what healthy person wants you around? Probably only cults, gurus, and a small number of people willing to help.

Healthy people with high social capital generally avoid those who appear chronically dysfunctional. They protect their time and their reputations. Most high-functioning individuals view someone in that state as a drain on resources, a risk of social contagion, or a demand for emotional labor that offers no reciprocal value. This leaves a void, and three groups tend to fill it.

Cults and predatory gurus look for people in that state because dysfunction makes a person easy to isolate. They offer belonging and a roadmap that requires total submission. They do not want the person to get better so much as they want the person to become dependent. Altruistic individuals help because their moral code demands it, but they often lack the leverage to force a person into a new way of living. Their help tends toward maintenance rather than integration. Pro-social communities that actually work operate through high-cost signaling. They require a person to trade their dysfunction for a strict set of rules. A religious community or a disciplined 12-step group might take in a dysfunctional person, but only if that person agrees to change behavior as the price of admission.

That exchange creates the logic of recovery. The healthy people in those groups are there because they once shared that dysfunction and now maintain their health by helping others escape it. They are the only high-functioning group with a rational reason to seek out the dysfunctional.

David Pinsof’s alliance theory argues that humans form social groups primarily to increase their power and security against rivals. Every person is a potential ally, and individuals evaluate others based on what they bring to a cooperation or a conflict. High-status people seek allies who provide resources, reputation, or protection. A dysfunctional or underearning person represents a strategic liability. They cannot defend an ally in a social dispute and may damage their ally’s standing by association. Healthy, high-functioning people often practice social exclusion to signal their own high standards, treating status as a game where associating with losers lowers their own value.

The groups that welcome the dysfunctional do so because they have a different strategic interest. Cults benefit from broken allies because those individuals are easier to control. A person with no outside options is more loyal. The helpful minority gains social capital from being seen as virtuous. They need the dysfunctional to maintain their own identity as altruists. Recovered peer groups, such as 12-step communities, welcome newcomers because helping someone else is a high-cost signal of their own commitment. It keeps their own status secure within that subculture.

The dysfunctional person remains stuck unless they find a way to offer value that outweighs the cost of their presence. Joining a pro-social community usually requires a trade: the individual gives up autonomy and follows a strict protocol in exchange for the group’s protection and eventual standing.

Stephen Turner argues that most rules governing successful social life are not written down. This tacit knowledge is a set of skills and habits acquired through long-term practice within a stable culture. Healthy, high-functioning people possess these habits of mind and use them to navigate hierarchies and professional environments without thinking. A dysfunctional person often lacks this tacit knowledge. They might understand the literal rules of a job or a social gathering but miss the subtle cues and shared assumptions that make a person seem reliable or trustworthy. That gap makes them appear unpredictable to healthy groups.

This creates a trap. To get better, a person needs to be around healthy people to absorb their habits, but healthy people exclude anyone who does not already possess those habits. This is why 12-step groups or religious communities are often the only path out of dysfunction. They provide a structured environment where the unwritten rules are made explicit through rituals and repetition. They create a space where a person can fail and be corrected without being cast out.

Jeffrey Alexander argues that society maintains a boundary between the sacred and the profane. In this framework, dysfunction, underearning, and addiction are often viewed as forms of social pollution. This pollution makes a person untouchable to healthy groups because their presence threatens the perceived purity of the group’s environment. To move from the polluted category to the normal one, an individual must undergo a purification ritual. These rituals convince the community that the person has shed their old, dysfunctional identity and is now clean enough to associate with.

Pro-social communities provide the stage for these rituals. Public confession, working the steps, making amends, and strict adherence to protocol all function as high-cost signals. They prove the person is now governed by the group’s logic rather than their own chaotic impulses. Healthy people accept a formerly dysfunctional person only after these rituals are performed. Without this structured process, a person remains polluted in the eyes of high-status alliances, regardless of how much they feel they have changed internally.

Working the steps addresses the specific barriers identified by Pinsof, Turner, and Alexander. The fourth and fifth steps, the searching and fearless moral inventory, identify the bugs in a person’s social software that make them a liability. By the ninth step, making amends, the individual actively pays back social debt. This signals to potential allies that they understand the value of reciprocity. Turner’s concept of tacit knowledge explains why wanting to be healthy is not enough. Working with a sponsor places the person in a low-stakes environment where they practice the habits of high-functioning people: punctuality, honesty, and emotional regulation. Over time, these behaviors become second nature. Alexander’s purification framework provides the final piece. The spiritual awakening of the twelfth step serves as the ritualistic proof that the person has transitioned from the profane world of their previous life into a commitment to the group’s values.

The feeling better of meetings is the emotional comfort of finding an alliance that accepts the dysfunctional. The getting better of the steps is the rigorous process of acquiring the social capital, tacit habits, and ritual purity required to be wanted by healthy people again.

Underearning signals more than a lack of cash. It signals a failure of competency or a lack of social utility. High-status alliances are built on the expectation of future returns. If a person cannot generate a surplus, they cannot contribute to the collective advancement of the group. Turner suggests that underearning is often a symptom of failing to understand the hidden curriculum of the economy. Wealthy and high-functioning groups operate on subtle norms of networking, presentation, and professional etiquette. A person who is underearning often signals, through small errors in speech or behavior, that they do not possess this tacit knowledge. From Alexander’s perspective, financial success in a meritocratic society is treated as a sign of virtue, while poverty is treated as a sign of moral or psychological failure. This pollution of underearning makes a person a risk to the group’s reputation.

This creates the specific cruelty of dysfunction. The very people who could help you gain the habits of success are the ones most incentivized to avoid you.

Books on self-help provide explicit knowledge: facts, rules, and instructions. But as Turner argues, the how of social success is almost entirely tacit. A book can tell you to be assertive, but it cannot teach you the precise tone or timing that makes assertiveness effective rather than aggressive. A sponsor functions as a living repository of that knowledge. By interacting with a sponsor, the individual is not just receiving information but is being socialized into a new way of being. The sponsor corrects subtle behaviors, like a tone of entitlement or a tendency to deflect blame, that a book would never catch. This master-apprentice relationship is the traditional way humans have passed on complex social skills for centuries.

A sponsor is often the first healthy ally a dysfunctional person gains. This alliance is unique because the sponsor’s status within the 12-step community is enhanced by the success of the person they help. Usually, a high-status person risks their reputation by associating with someone polluted. In this specific subculture, the act of sponsorship signals the sponsor’s own recovery. When a sponsor tells the group that a person has completed their steps, they provide a character reference. This bridge allows the individual to move slowly from the profane world of dysfunction into the sacred world of the reliable.

Allan Horwitz adds a critical layer to this discussion by focusing on how society defines mental illness versus normal distress. He argues that modern psychiatry has expanded the definition of mental illness to include ordinary misery. By labeling social failure as a disorder, the system shifts focus away from the environment, poverty, isolation, unemployment, and onto the individual’s internal chemistry.

Horwitz views the mental health system as a machinery of social control. Psychiatry treats the person in isolation, often through medication, which helps them feel better but does not address the social causes of their distress. Communities like 12-step programs provide a communal form of control instead. They use social pressure and shared rituals to change behavior rather than suppressing symptoms. If a person adopts a sick role, they may gain temporary social permission to be dysfunctional. But that label eventually becomes a barrier. Healthy groups might tolerate a sick person for a while, but they rarely want one as a strategic ally. Getting better requires moving out of the diagnostic category and back into a framework of social accountability.

High-status groups prefer resilience over diagnosis because resilience signals a reliable ally, whereas a diagnosis signals permanent dependency. An alliance is a bet on someone’s future performance. If a person explains their dysfunction through a chronic mental health diagnosis, they signal that their reliability is subject to forces they cannot control. Resilience, by contrast, is a high-value signal. It suggests the person has been tested by ordinary misery and developed the internal machinery to stay functional.

This explains why pro-social communities focused on character and working the steps are more effective at job integration than purely clinical settings. Clinical settings focus on the individual as a patient. Pro-social communities focus on the individual as a potential ally. By emphasizing character defects and spiritual growth rather than chemical imbalances, these groups push the individual to acquire the habits of resilience that high-status people actually value. Getting better means rejecting the sick role and re-entering the world of social accountability. It means trading the excuse of a diagnosis for the reputation of someone who can carry the weight of an alliance.

Horwitz argues that the ability to hide or relabel distress is a form of social capital that the underearning usually lack. In high-status alliances, a breakdown or a period of dysfunction is often reframed as a sabbatical, burnout, or personal transition. These labels carry a much lower social cost than mental illness or chronic unemployment. High earners have the resources, savings, private therapy, and influential friends, to manage their distress in private without it ever polluting their professional reputation. For the underearning and dysfunctional, distress is public and expensive. They often rely on public clinics where the only available help is a formal diagnosis that qualifies them for state aid or medication. This creates a hidden tax: to get the resources they need to survive, they must accept a label that simultaneously excludes them from high-status alliances.

Working the steps in a pro-social community is one of the few ways to evade that tax. It provides a private, non-medicalized space to build resilience without accepting a sick role that would permanently lower one’s standing. It allows a person to re-enter the alliance market by presenting a narrative of character growth rather than clinical management.

The transition from feeling better to getting better directly addresses why a dysfunctional person often fails in a high-pressure job even with the technical skills. In Pinsof’s framework, a high-pressure workplace is a dense network of alliances. Every employee is constantly evaluated for their utility to the group’s goals. A person who is merely feeling better might show up to an interview with high energy but lacks the underlying stability to remain a useful ally when a crisis hits. Working the steps builds reliability capital. It moves the individual from being a volatile asset to a stable one. High-status managers do not just hire for talent. They hire for the certainty that a person will not collapse under social or professional friction.

Turner’s tacit knowledge is the primary currency of high-pressure environments. These workplaces operate on thin slices of communication: knowing when to speak, how to disagree without being disagreeable, how to read the unstated priorities of a boss. The discipline of a pro-social community acts as a training ground. By following the suggestions of a sponsor or a group, the person practices the same type of subordination and cooperation required in a professional hierarchy. Alexander’s purification rituals are essential for re-entry. In a professional setting, a history of underearning or gaps in a resume reads as social pollution. A person who has worked the steps learns to frame their past not as a permanent failure but as a redemptive narrative. This narrative is a ritual of its own. It allows a hiring manager to see the person as transformed rather than broken. The rituals of recovery provide the language and posture that signal the person has moved from the profane world of dysfunction back into the world of the productive.

Social death occurs when an individual’s utility drops to zero or becomes negative. In a tight-knit professional community, when a person is fired for dysfunction, they are not just losing a paycheck. They are being branded as a defective ally. High-status groups are defined by the quality of their members, and keeping a dysfunctional person in the alliance lowers the status of everyone else. To protect the group’s reputation, the remaining members coordinate to exclude the person. This coordination often feels like a sudden chilling silence. Friends stop calling. Professional inquiries go unanswered.

Turner’s tacit knowledge explains why this death is so hard to reverse. When a person is cast out, they lose access to the flow of information and the constant practice required to maintain subtle habits. The longer they stay in the outside world of the underearning and dysfunctional, the more their professional tacit knowledge atrophies. They lose the rhythm of the high-functioning world, making it even harder to pass the silent filters of a new interview. Alexander’s framework suggests that being fired visibly is a degradation ceremony. It is a public ritual that moves a person from the sacred category of colleague to the profane category of outsider. This pollution is contagious. Anyone who tries to bring the person back into the fold risks being polluted themselves.

The only way back from social death is a counter-ritual of purification. This is why working the steps or joining a rigorous pro-social community is so vital. It provides a new sacred identity that can eventually overwrite the profane one. Without this, the person remains a ghost in their old professional circles, visible but untouchable.

Chronic failure and underearning fundamentally alter a person’s strategic orientation. When winning, a person is a high-value ally. They view the world as a place of cooperation and merit because the system rewards them. They have every incentive to be generous and loyal to the existing social order. When a person experiences chronic failure, they become a low-value ally in the eyes of the dominant hierarchy. As healthy, high-status groups begin to exclude them, the individual experiences profound social isolation. To resolve the cognitive dissonance of rejection, many adopt a worldview of aggrievement. They stop seeing the system as a meritocracy and start seeing it as a conspiracy.

This shift serves a strategic purpose. If the system is rigged or evil, then failure is no longer a reflection of a lack of utility or tacit knowledge. Instead, failure becomes a sign of moral superiority. They are not losers. They are victims or dissidents. This allows them to form new alliances built on shared resentment rather than shared productivity. Turner’s concept of tacit knowledge explains the intellectual fog that accompanies this state. Because the individual is no longer in the flow of high-functioning circles, they lose the ability to read the subtle logic of how things actually work. They start to over-intellectualize social interactions, seeing hidden agendas where there is standard professional protocol. Their lack of the unwritten rules makes the world feel hostile, which further fuels the belief that the system is out to get them.

Alexander’s framework highlights how aggrievement functions as a counter-purification ritual. Instead of doing the hard work of the steps, the individual attempts to redefine the sacred itself. They argue that high-status people are the truly polluted ones, greedy, soulless, or corrupt, and that their own poverty or dysfunction is pure. This is the purity of poverty logic often seen in radical political or artistic subcultures. While it provides immediate emotional comfort, it prevents the person from ever getting better. It replaces the machinery of improvement with a machinery of blame.

The purity of poverty logic functions as a powerful tool for social control. Leaders of underground groups need loyal allies with no outside options. By framing financial success as selling out or moral pollution, the leader ensures their followers stay poor and therefore dependent. This creates a closed alliance where the only way to gain status is to demonstrate how little you care about the corrupt outside world. The leader becomes the sole arbiter of value. When a follower is underearning and dysfunctional, the leader does not encourage them to get better in a way that would lead to a stable job. Instead, they validate the dysfunction as a form of authenticity.

Turner’s concept of tacit knowledge shows how these groups actively prevent their members from reintegrating into healthy society. By encouraging a counter-culture vocabulary and hostile social habits, the group ensures its members become unemployable in high-status environments. They lose the ability to speak the unwritten language of the professional world. Alexander’s framework shows that these groups create a reverse sacred. In the mainstream, reliability, earning, and stability are sacred. In the underground group, these are profane. The rituals of the group, public denunciations of the system or living in shared poverty, are purification rituals that bind the member to the group. The more polluted the individual becomes in the eyes of healthy society, the more pure they become within the cult.

Distinguishing between a community that facilitates recovery and one that reinforces stagnation requires looking at the direction of the social capital. A pro-social community aims to make its members attractive to the outside world. A predatory group aims to make its members’ only value exist within the group itself. A healthy group encourages you to build exit capital. They want you to have a job, a stable bank account, and outside friends. A predatory group views your outside success as a threat to their monopoly on your loyalty. They will often subtly sabotage your professional efforts or guilt you for spending time with unenlightened outsiders.

Turner’s concept of tacit knowledge provides a clear test: does the group teach you the unwritten rules of the successful world, or does it teach you a private language that makes you sound strange to everyone else? A pro-social community corrects your social friction. They tell you when you are being rude, unreliable, or behaving in ways that would hurt you in a job interview. A predatory group encourages behaviors that alienate you from the mainstream, ensuring that your only safe social space is with them.

Alexander’s framework reveals the difference in the purification rituals. In a 12-step group, the ritual is designed to clean you of your dysfunction so you can re-enter the world of the productive. The goal is to make you normal again. In a predatory group, the rituals are designed to burn your bridges. They might ask for public denunciations of your family or your former career in ways that are socially irreversible. These rituals do not purify you for the world. They pollute you so thoroughly that only the group will have you. A pro-social community measures success by how little you eventually need them. They are happy when you graduate and move from being a full-time project to a contributing member of society. A predatory group measures success by how much you surrender to them.

A redemptive narrative recontextualizes past failure as a source of current strength. To a high-status employer, an unexplained gap in employment or a history of underearning signals pollution or hidden dysfunction. The goal of the narrative is to provide a logical bridge that moves you from the category of a risk back into the category of a reliable ally. An employer looks for signs of future utility. If you simply hide your past, you appear suspicious. If you overshare your struggles, you appear unstable. A redemptive narrative focuses on the costly signals of your recovery. Mentioning a structured program or a rigorous period of self-correction signals that you now possess the discipline you previously lacked. This transforms you from a liability into a proven asset who has survived a crisis and gained resilience.

Turner’s concept of tacit knowledge is crucial here. During an interview, you are being judged on fit. This is a test of whether you understand the unwritten rules of the professional class. Your narrative must be delivered in the language of the winners. This means avoiding the language of aggrievement, not blaming the economy or a former boss, and taking full responsibility. This signals that you now possess the tacit knowledge of professional accountability. It shows you understand the code of high-functioning environments where results matter more than excuses.

Alexander’s framework suggests that the interview itself is a purification ritual. The employer acts as the gatekeeper of the professional circle. Your narrative acts as the cleansing agent. You frame your period of underearning as a liminal space, a necessary time of transition where you shed old habits. By describing the specific steps you took to get better, you provide the employer with the proof they need to justify hiring you to their own allies.

A successful redemptive narrative follows a specific structure. First, briefly acknowledge the period of dysfunction without making excuses. Second, identify the specific pro-social community or machinery of improvement you used to change. Third, highlight the new habits, reliability, and social capital you have built since then. Fourth, explain how your past struggle makes you a more dedicated and stable ally today. This approach stops you from being a polluted outsider and makes you a purified insider who has been tested.

Maintaining authenticity while acquiring the tacit knowledge of high earners requires a shift from seeing professional norms as an identity to seeing them as a tool. High-status groups use specific behaviors, punctuality, certain speech patterns, and emotional restraint, as shibboleths. These are signals that prove you are a member of the same alliance. If you refuse to learn these because they feel fake, you are signaling that you are a low-utility ally who cannot be trusted with the group’s reputation. Turner’s work suggests that you can learn these unwritten rules without internalizing them as your soul. You can treat them as a second language. Just as a person can speak a foreign language to conduct business without losing their native culture, you can adopt the professional habitus to earn a high income. Authenticity, in this sense, is not about being raw or unfiltered at all times. It is about having the agency to choose which social software to run in a given environment.

Alexander’s framework helps explain the performance of the high earner. To get the job and the income, you must perform the ritual of the reliable professional. Your authentic self, the part that might be aggrieved, artistic, or dysfunctional, is kept in the private sphere. High-status alliances do not demand that you are a certain way in your heart. They demand that you perform a certain way in the alliance’s space. The trap for the underearning is the belief that being yourself is a moral obligation in all settings. This is often a luxury of the very wealthy or a coping mechanism of the very poor. Horwitz’s perspective suggests that resilience is the ability to move between these roles without collapsing. A pro-social community lets you practice this controlled performance. You learn to be authentic with your sponsor or your group while being functional and utilitarian with your employer. This dual-track life allows you to acquire the resources and habits to stop underearning while maintaining the purity of your inner life.

Professionalism is a high-cost signal of a person’s ability to suppress their own dysfunction and prioritize the needs of an alliance over their internal states. A professional is an individual who can be relied upon to act in the interest of the group even when tired, angry, or grieving. High-status groups use professionalism as a filter to exclude those governed by their impulses rather than by the logic of the firm.

Turner’s tacit knowledge explains why this suppression is so difficult to fake. It is not just about not screaming at a boss. It is about the unwritten rules of emotional labor. High earners possess the habitus of calm competence. They know how to signal that they are fine even when they are not. A person who is underearning or dysfunctional often lacks the social stamina to maintain this performance. They leak their distress through micro-expressions, tone, or oversharing. To an employer, this leakage signals a high-maintenance ally who will eventually demand more emotional labor than they provide in economic value.

Alexander’s framework suggests that the workplace is a sacred space of productivity where personal dysfunction is profane. Professionalism is the ritual of maintaining the boundary between the two. When a person brings their problems to work, they pollute the sacred space of the alliance. This is why high-status groups react so strongly to unprofessional behavior. It is seen as social contamination that threatens the group’s collective focus and reputation. Horwitz’s perspective highlights the resilience required for this performance. Being a professional does not mean you do not have problems. It means you have the resources and the character to keep those problems off-stage. The hidden tax on the dysfunctional is that they often lack the private support systems that would allow them to perform this suppression. They are forced to work the steps in a pro-social community to build the internal machinery that others received from their upbringing or their wealth.

Getting better means developing the ability to perform professionalism as a high-value signal. It means moving from a state where your dysfunction defines you to a state where your utility defines you. You learn to trade eight hours of suppression for the income and status that allow you to be authentic on your own terms.

Working the steps builds emotional stamina by treating the self as a system that requires regular maintenance rather than a fixed identity. In high-pressure environments, the primary cause of professional collapse is not a lack of skill but an emotional short circuit where personal distress overwhelms the ability to perform. A dysfunctional person often has low social battery because they constantly manage internal conflicts. Working the steps, particularly the inventory and amends process, resolves these internal conflicts. By clearing social debt and internal guilt, the individual frees up the cognitive and emotional energy required to be a high-utility ally for others.

Turner’s concept of tacit knowledge applies to the stamina of the workplace. Professionalism is a habit. In a 12-step group or a pro-social community, a person practices this posture in a low-stakes environment. They learn the tacit habit of showing up when they do not want to and listening when they want to talk. This repetition builds the muscle memory of reliability. When they enter a high-pressure job, they are not trying to be professional. They are simply running the program they have practiced for hundreds of hours in meetings and with their sponsor.

Alexander’s framework highlights the role of emotional purification. In a high-pressure environment, stress is seen as a form of pollution. If you cannot process stress, you become unclean and a risk to the group. The steps provide a daily ritual, often called step ten, for processing this pollution in real-time. Instead of letting a bad interaction at work fester into a conspiracy theory, the individual uses the ritual to cleanse the emotion and return to productive function. Horwitz’s focus on resilience is the goal of this process. Resilience is not the absence of distress. It is the ability to contain distress so it does not interfere with your social utility. Working the steps moves a person from a fragile state, where every setback is a catastrophe, to a resilient state, where setbacks are data points to be processed. This stamina is what high-status employers pay for. They are not just buying your time. They are buying your ability to remain a stable node in their alliance network.

The sponsor functions as a controlled stress-test for an individual’s emerging social utility. A high-status alliance is a high-risk environment. If you fail to deliver on a commitment in a law firm or a political campaign, the social death is swift and public. The sponsor is a low-cost ally whose specific role is to absorb and correct your initial failures. They provide a laboratory where you can test your reliability without the permanent consequence of a professional firing.

Turner’s tacit knowledge is rarely gained through pleasant conversation. It is gained through friction. A sponsor creates this friction by making demands that a dysfunctional person finds unreasonable: calling at a specific time, following a precise set of instructions, being told no without a long explanation. This simulates a boss-subordinate hierarchy. By reacting to these demands, the individual identifies their own triggers and gaps in their professional habitus. The sponsor acts as a mirror, showing the person exactly where their behavior would signal unreliable to a high-earning alliance.

Alexander’s framework views the sponsor as the priest of the purification ritual. Before you can enter the sacred space of the workplace, you must prove you are clean in the eyes of someone who knows the rules. If you cannot be honest with a sponsor about a small error, you will certainly lie to a client or a partner to cover up a big one. The sponsor stress-tests your integrity. They look for the old habits of deception, blame-shifting, or aggrievement and force you to process them through the steps before they reach the professional circle.

Horwitz’s concept of resilience is the final metric of this test. A sponsor will eventually let you down or be unavailable. This is a test of whether you revert to the sick role and feeling aggrieved or whether you use your new machinery of improvement to stay functional. If you can handle a disagreement with a sponsor and still show up to a meeting, you have developed the emotional stamina to handle a difficult partner at a law firm or a crisis in a business. The sponsor is the bridge. They take someone who is winning at nothing and train them to win in a small, private alliance. Only after passing this stress-test is the individual ready to compete for the high-status alliances that provide the income and standing they seek.

The question of whether we need God might be less interesting than the question of what situations generate a demand for God. Several conditions recur across cultures. When outcomes matter but control is low, war, illness, financial ruin, people reach for God. Belief in a supervising intelligence stabilizes the mind and restores a sense that events are not random. People invoke God when they must justify or restrain behavior. Religion provides a referee and says some actions are objectively wrong even if they benefit you. This matters when social enforcement is weak. A belief in divine surveillance substitutes for human surveillance.

A lonely person lacks a reliable audience for their thoughts and fears. God functions as an always-available listener. Prayer is a conversation that never risks rejection. People also turn toward God when worldly status collapses. Religion offers a counter-hierarchy. Someone ignored by elites can become spiritually significant. Many revival movements grow during periods when large groups feel excluded from prestige systems. Ernest Becker argued that human beings know they will die. God systems promise that life participates in a larger story that continues beyond biological death. This reduces existential terror. People who feel guilt for actions they cannot undo often need a structure for forgiveness. Secular systems handle this poorly. Religion provides rituals for repair.

Loneliness is one trigger, but not the dominant one historically. The deepest driver is vulnerability combined with lack of control. In highly stable environments where people feel socially embedded, materially secure, and psychologically buffered, the felt need for God tends to decline. In environments with chaos, grief, danger, or humiliation, the demand rises.

In my most God-intoxicated years, I thought belief in God was essential for producing a good society. Now I think the most important factor is connection. Atheists who are bonded to their families and friends tend to behave better than believers who are disconnected.

The strongest predictor of pro-social behavior is not belief in God. It is social embeddedness. People behave better when they are tied into dense networks of family, friends, coworkers, and community. Those networks create accountability: when people are surrounded by others who know them, their behavior is visible and reputation regulates conduct. You do not need God watching if your mother, spouse, coworkers, and neighbors are watching. Connected people have outlets for stress, anger, and loneliness. Isolated people ruminate and escalate. Many destructive behaviors come from unprocessed resentment or despair.

Religion historically worked well because it bundled belief with community. Churches, synagogues, and mosques were dense social networks. They provided rituals, mutual aid, marriage markets, and moral language. The behavioral benefits often came from the network more than from the theology. If you remove the network and keep the belief, the stabilizing effect weakens. A disconnected believer can still drift. If you remove the belief but keep the network, the stabilizing effect often remains. A well-integrated atheist with strong family ties, friendships, and community responsibilities tends to behave in a socially responsible way because the incentives are built into everyday relationships.

Robert Putnam described this in Bowling Alone. As American participation in civic groups, churches, clubs, and neighborhood institutions declined, loneliness rose and trust fell. The problem was not simply the loss of religion. It was the loss of connection. The key question becomes: how embedded is a person in a web of mutual obligations and care? People who are woven into those webs tend to behave better, whether they are believers or atheists. People who are socially adrift struggle more, even if they hold strong religious beliefs.

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Decoding Peace Studies

David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory holds that complex moral systems exist primarily to disguise the self-interest of a coalition by presenting its goals as universal truths. Peace Studies fits this logic well. It gives a specialized vocabulary to the diplomacy-restraint coalition, converting its strategic preferences into what sounds like an objective science of human welfare.
The field enables elite gatekeeping. High-prestige credentials in conflict resolution or human security ensure that only those who speak the coalition’s language can participate in serious policy discussions at the UN or within major NGOs. This shuts out the rival hawkish coalition, whose vocabulary of deterrence gets framed as primitive or scientifically discredited by the weight of academic authority.
Peace Studies also serves as what Pinsof might call a moral decoupling agent. Groups routinely try to strip the category of violence from their own aggressive actions while hyper-focusing on the violence of their rivals. The field helps this along by expanding the definition of violence to include structural violence. Economic sanctions or military posture become forms of aggression. The actions of anti-hegemonic groups become mere responses to structural injustice. One side receives moral cover. The other loses it.
This produces a victimhood signal. By aligning with the marginalized, the Peace Studies scholar claims a moral high ground that turns any criticism of their policy recommendations into an attack on the vulnerable. Critics face a forced choice: join the compassionate coalition or be labeled an apologist for militarism.
The field’s survival depends on ignoring the efficacy of coercive force. If a Peace Studies scholar acknowledged that a specific military intervention prevented a genocide more effectively than dialogue, they would signal support for the rival coalition. To maintain alliance purity, the framework redirects attention to long-term blowback or failures to address root causes. This ensures the diplomacy-restraint coalition remains the only morally serious option within the academic ecosystem, regardless of what happens on the ground.
In the current war with Iran, the diplomacy-restraint coalition has deployed this reframing immediately. It centers the narrative on the strike in Minab and the displacement of over 100,000 Iranians, framing the war as a pathology of militarism rather than a calculated response to nuclear proliferation. The goal is to recruit uncommitted observers by making the hawkish coalition appear indifferent to civilian suffering.
The vocabulary markers are already visible. The U.S. and Israel use terms like regime change, surgical strikes, and Epic Fury. The Peace Studies ecosystem counters with regional destabilization, cycle of violence, and unconstitutional aggression. These terms function as alliance signals. When scholars at the Stimson Center or Brookings argue that the war kills diplomacy, they make a claim but also signal membership in a coalition that treats negotiation as the only legitimate path. This lets them coordinate a delegitimizing narrative across NGOs and the UN, regardless of whether the strikes actually degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Reputational shielding runs alongside this. The restraint coalition frames the war as a product of American hubris and the limits of airpower, which protects its own past preference for the failed February negotiations. If the IRGC’s command structure collapses, the coalition will argue the war only incentivizes future nuclear pursuit, denying the rival coalition any recognizable victory.
The blind spots Pinsof predicts appear here too. Peace Studies analysis of the 2026 conflict tends to downplay the internal Iranian protests that preceded the strikes. Acknowledging that the regime had lost domestic legitimacy might suggest that military pressure could facilitate a popular uprising, a point that strengthens the hawkish coalition. The diplomacy-restraint framework focuses instead on how the strikes might unite Iranians against a foreign aggressor, a narrative that conveniently supports the case for a ceasefire.
The vagueness of Peace Studies terminology, words like justice and harmony, is not a flaw. It lets people coordinate against common enemies without committing to specific, costly actions. Claiming to seek peace is a defensive posture that protects the speaker from accusations of aggression while casting opponents as obstacles to that peace. The academic structure of the field formalizes these moral intuitions into a system of expertise, and that expertise gives its practitioners authority over social conflicts while they use the language of neutrality to advance the interests of their own alliance.

Peace Studies is bullshit to the extent that it ignores the underlying logic of conflict—which is often about power and alliance formation—in favor of high-status rhetoric about universal values. The field is more about the “symmetry” of social signaling than the mechanics of ending war.

On Dec. 15, 2025, David Pinsof wrote: “War? Misunderstanding. If only people knew that war is pointless and evil, a product of bigotry and misinformation, there would be world peace.”

On Jan. 22, 2024, David Pinsof wrote:

[W]e prefer to think in stories. We see the world as revolving around a colorful cast of characters—often representing warring tribes—whom we either like or dislike. There’s a path to utopia, and we can get there if the likable heroes use their “free will” powers to save the day. There’s also a path to dystopia, and we’ll get there if the unlikable villains use their “free will” powers to ruin everything. The heroes must stop the villains, or the world will go to shit…

War is caused by evil people who don’t recognize that war is bad. Homelessness is caused by heartless people who don’t care about the plight of others. We don’t need to think about the economic, social, and legal incentive structures that lead to cancel culture, homelessness, poverty, war, or wealth inequality. Booooring! We just need to point the finger at the baddies, and our work is done.

On Apr. 12, 2023, David Pinsof wrote:

If you think morality is all about cooperation and being nice, then you’ve got a lot of explaining to do:

Why is morality the leading cause of violence around the world and throughout history?

Why is moralizing the best way to reduce compassion for a person’s suffering?

Why does morality make us more biased and tribal?

Why is morality uniquely associated with hatred?

Why does morality prevent groups from compromising and making peace?

Why are moral rules so often in the self-interest of their creators (1, 2, 3)?

Why do people care so little about whether their moral preferences actually make the world better?

Why is morality so full of grandstanding, performative altruism, and holier than thou sanctimony?

Why are so many horrific things—pogroms, purges, holy wars, honor killings, caste systems—done in the name of morality?

…Morality is mean, but it can still cause nice things to happen. As an analogy, consider nuclear weapons—they’re mean. Yet according to some scholars, nuclear proliferation made nuclear-armed countries afraid to go to war with one another, out of fear of destroying themselves and the rest of the planet. Nuclear weapons may have caused peace (a nice thing), even though they were designed for war (a mean thing).

The big names currently deploying the vocabulary of the diplomacy-restraint coalition include long-standing figures in the realism and restraint ecosystems, alongside newer institutional voices. Following the February 28 strikes, these individuals have coordinated narratives that emphasize the “betrayal of diplomacy” and “structural instability.”

Trita Parsi and the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft are the most prominent. Parsi has been vocal on media outlets like Middle East Eye, arguing that the war was a choice, not a necessity, and that it has effectively “squandered a chance for diplomacy” that existed just weeks prior. Parsi is the primary signal-booster for the restraint coalition, framing the U.S.-Israeli action as a strategic failure that will only incentivize future Iranian nuclear pursuit.

Barbara Slavin at the Stimson Center remains a central node in this network. She recently participated in a high-profile George Washington University webinar where she analyzed the strikes through the lens of failed engagement. Slavin represents the “NGO-academic” bridge, providing the moral and intellectual framework that identifies the current “cycle of violence” as a byproduct of abandoning the Future of Iran Initiative and other diplomatic tracks.

Robert Malley, former Special Envoy for Iran and now at Yale’s Jackson School, provides the coalition with high-prestige, “insider” legitimacy. His recent book talks and public comments frame the conflict as a march to war that could have been avoided, reinforcing the “reputational shielding” function. By positioning himself as the voice of lost expertise, he helps the diplomacy-restraint coalition maintain its status as the “serious” alternative to what they label as the “maximalism” of the Trump administration.

Sina Azodi has emerged as a frequent commentator across BBC, Al-Jazeera, and Sky News, specializing in the “pathology of militarism” narrative. He often focuses on how the strikes on the IRGC command structure and the death of Khamenei have led to “regional destabilization” and “humanitarian catastrophe,” shifting the focus away from the military’s stated success in degrading nuclear infrastructure.

Within the UN ecosystem, António Guterres serves as the coalition’s ultimate moral witness. His recent statements to the Security Council, describing the day’s events as a “grave threat to international peace and security” and calling for an immediate “return to the negotiating table,” provide the high-level moral language that the rest of the coalition uses to coordinate its narrative.

These figures form an interlocking network where the academic output of someone like Abbas Milani at Stanford (who provides the nuanced political science) is translated into policy restraint by the Quincy Institute and then echoed as moral necessity by UN special rapporteurs like Ben Saul or Mai Sato.

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Energy Analysts Make For The Best Geostrategic Forecasters

The efficiency of this analytical circle comes from its focus on settlement rather than sentiment. While traditional geopolitical shops track the optics of a diplomatic summit, energy-macro analysts track the insurance premiums on a Suezmax tanker. That shift from narrative to physics explains why they identified the decoupling of the U.S. economy from Middle Eastern volatility long before it appeared in diplomatic cables.
The U.S. shale revolution transformed the Strategic Petroleum Reserve from a reactive emergency buffer into an active tool of statecraft. Previously, the reserve served as a shield against physical scarcity. Now it functions as a liquidity provision for the global oil market. Analysts like Pozsar and McNally recognized that the U.S. could effectively short the geopolitical risk premium by releasing barrels into a spiking market, forcing speculators to retreat and protecting domestic gasoline prices, which historically served as the transmission mechanism between a desert war and an American recession.
Energy specialists also categorize states not as equal actors in a narrative but by their fiscal break-even price. A country that needs $90 per barrel to fund its social programs is more fragile and more predictable than one that balances at $60. Those financial redlines tell you when a regime will escalate and, more importantly, when it bluffs because it cannot afford a disruption.
The integration of dark fleet tracking has separated elite analysts from generalists. Those who correctly predicted the resilience of Russian and Iranian exports did so by monitoring aging, uninsured tankers through ship-to-ship transfers in the Laccadive Sea. They ignored the official sanctions rhetoric and followed the AIS signals. Political speeches cannot obscure that kind of ground truth.
Energy flows are the nervous system of the global order. When that system changes, through the U.S. becoming a net exporter or the rise of the petroyuan, old geopolitical playbooks become obsolete. The analysts who found the alpha stopped reading the history of the 1973 embargo and started studying the current pumping capacity of the Permian Basin.
The leading figures in this field share a common method. They don’t look at what leaders say. They look at what the energy infrastructure allows them to do.
Helima Croft, formerly of the CIA and now at RBC Capital Markets, is the most influential voice at the intersection of oil markets and statecraft on Wall Street. She specializes in OPEC+ policy, U.S. sanctions, and the internal stability of petro-states like Iran and Venezuela, with particular attention to how regimes use energy as a weapon and how the U.S. uses the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a counter-tool.
Bob McNally, who advised the White House on energy before founding Rapidan Energy Group, treats oil volatility as a function of geopolitical risk. His forecasts predict how specific conflicts will move prices based on the technical and political realities of oil infrastructure, not on ideology or historical analogy.
Jason Bordoff, director of the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia and a former Obama administration advisor, bridges academic geostrategy and market reality. He focuses on the geopolitics of the energy transition, arguing that the shift to renewables will create new vulnerabilities and electro-states that might replace traditional petro-states in the global hierarchy.
Amy Myers Jaffe, now at NYU and affiliated with the Baker Institute, has spent decades on what she calls the militarization of energy. Her work addresses long-term geostrategy, particularly China’s quest for energy security and how emerging technologies like hydrogen or carbon capture might shift the global balance of power.
Amrita Sen of Energy Aspects works primarily as an oil market analyst, but her deep knowledge of physical flows sets her apart from generalist forecasters. Her firm tracks tanker movements, refinery runs, and storage levels, providing the microstructure data that political analysis consistently lacks.
Zoltan Pozsar, technically a macro strategist, has redefined how many people understand energy’s role in the global financial system. His framework of commodity-encumbered reserves and what he calls Bretton Woods III argues that we move into an era where money is collateral and collateral is commodities, placing energy at the center of currency competition between the West and the BRICS.
Peter Zeihan represents the more public-facing side of the field. His analysis rests on geography, demographics, and energy independence. He argued early that the shale revolution would insulate the United States from global disorder and push U.S. foreign policy toward isolationism as the global maritime order frays.
What unifies these analysts is discipline. Politics can be ambiguous. Oil flows are not. A country that produces five million barrels per day can move markets. One producing two hundred thousand cannot. Ports, pipelines, tankers, and refineries are visible and measurable. Every time an analyst misreads the physical data, traders lose money immediately. That feedback loop creates strong incentives to refine models and abandon outdated assumptions, which is more than most geopolitical commentary shops can say.

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China Hasn’t Been In A Hot War Since 1979

The U.S. has a deep reservoir of officers who understand how to manage the friction of war, which Clausewitz identifies as the force that makes the simple difficult. This means managing the psychological toll of casualties and the breakdown of communication. China lacks this. No simulation fully prepares a commander for the moment a plan disintegrates.
That said, the U.S. military often defaults to a specific brand of power projection. For two decades, American forces operated from secure forward bases with total air supremacy and reliable satellite links. Logistics followed a just-in-time model because the enemy could not intercept supply lines. In a conflict with China, those assumptions vanish. The U.S. might find itself fighting blind and disconnected for the first time in eighty years.
There is also the matter of selection bias in leadership. During the counterinsurgency era, the officers who rose were often those best at political maneuvering, tribal negotiations, and small-unit tactics. A high-intensity maritime and aerospace war requires a different set of traits, such as expertise in electromagnetic spectrum management and long-range fires. The U.S. might have spent years promoting the wrong specialists for a fight in the Pacific.
China treats its lack of experience as a blank slate. Its Short-Range Battle doctrine and System Destruction Warfare focus on the specific vulnerabilities of the American way of war. Chinese planners do not have to unlearn the habits of patrolling Afghan villages. They focus on the physics of sinking a carrier or disabling a GPS constellation.
A final factor is industrial endurance. Combat experience teaches how to use weapons, but it does not prepare a nation to replace them. The U.S. defense industry operates on a peacetime footing with long lead times for sophisticated munitions. China has integrated its civilian and military industrial bases to allow for rapid scaling. Experience wins battles, but industrial capacity tends to win long wars.
Armies with combat experience often adapt quickly once a new war begins because they already understand how wartime learning works. Officers who have fought tend to improvise better when plans collapse. The German army in World War II adapted tactics rapidly in the opening months of campaigns. The U.S. military adapted after early setbacks in Korea and Iraq. War creates fast feedback loops, and militaries that already understand those loops often learn faster once the shooting starts. China has studied American warfare closely, but the real test is whether its command culture allows fast adjustment once reality diverges from doctrine.
Western militaries traditionally stress decentralized decision-making. Junior officers improvise when plans fail, an idea rooted in the Prussian concept of Auftragstaktik, where subordinates receive objectives rather than detailed instructions. The U.S. military inherited much of that philosophy. The Chinese military has relied on a more centralized structure tied to Communist Party oversight, which can slow decisions under chaotic combat conditions. The People’s Liberation Army has worked to loosen that rigidity, but how flexible Chinese commanders would be under real battlefield pressure remains an open question.
The United States has also spent decades refining how its services fight together, running air force targeting, naval missile defense, space coordination, and special operations intelligence through continuous real-world operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. China has built similar capabilities but has never executed them in actual combat. Coordinating large-scale joint operations under fire is hard, and no exercise fully replicates it.
The U.S. military has grown highly dependent on satellite communications, GPS, long-range precision weapons, and real-time intelligence feeds. These worked well against weaker opponents. Against China, many of them face disruption through cyber attacks, anti-satellite weapons, and electronic warfare. American forces might have to revert to navigation and communication methods that younger officers have rarely practiced. China, meanwhile, has invested heavily in realistic training designed around exactly these scenarios, rehearsing missile attacks on bases, carrier battles, and satellite disruption. The U.S. has shifted its training in the same direction after years focused on counterinsurgency. The result is a race between two different learning systems, one shaped by real wars against weaker enemies, the other by long preparation for a specific opponent.
Geography also matters. A conflict near Taiwan or in the western Pacific puts China close to its own territory, with shorter supply lines, land-based missile coverage, faster reinforcement, and industrial support nearby. The United States projects power across an ocean. Wars fought near one side’s home territory tend to favor that side regardless of experience or technology.
The U.S. holds advantages in operational experience, joint command, and leadership under pressure. China holds advantages in focused preparation, geographic proximity, and industrial scaling. Which set of advantages matters most depends on how quickly each side adapts once the unpredictable reality of war replaces the plans written in advance.

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Are Elites Paying Stratfor Type Intelligence Firms For Insight Or For Cover?

When elites purchase the information products of Oxford Analytica, Stratfor, and similar firms, they buy two things that are easy to confuse: insight and cover. Different clients buy them in different proportions, and both functions operate at the same time.
These products also serve as tools for internal power struggles. In a large bureaucracy, information is a weapon. A mid-level executive who wants to kill a project in an emerging market can use a negative report from Eurasia Group to provide an apparent objective basis for opposition. It lets them bypass internal office politics by citing an external authority.
The analogy to soothsayers is useful but only partial. A more modern comparison is the legal opinion. When a general counsel hires an outside law firm to write a memo on a specific regulatory risk, he does not always expect a breakthrough in legal theory. He wants a signed document that shifts the burden of error. If the regulator sues, the company points to the memo. Geopolitical reports function as intellectual insurance, similar to a reasoned opinion in law or an audit in finance.
The focus on alpha is worth expanding. In the world of high-stakes investing, the value of a report lies not in its general accuracy but in its non-consensus accuracy. Most first-tier firms provide a polished version of the consensus. The genuinely unique value often comes from boutique firms that specialize in dark data or forensic accounting in opaque markets. These firms do not just map political risk. They track the tail numbers of private jets and the shipping manifests of sanctioned entities.
The difference between curated intelligence and secret intelligence is also a matter of timeframe. A firm like Oxford Analytica provides a slow look at structural trends. The value there is not being first but being right about the direction of travel over five years. A firm like Teneo or Kroll provides fast intelligence. They get paid to know what happened in a private meeting in Riyadh three hours ago. The insight-versus-cover ratio shifts depending on that temporal scale. The faster the information, the more the client pays for the insight.
One can judge the performance of these firms by looking at the major shock of early 2026: the U.S. military capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela on January 3. Eurasia Group demonstrated its first-tier status by having its Top Risks report ready on January 5, two days after the event. They contextualized the capture not as a fluke but as the beginning of a Donroe Doctrine, a more aggressive U.S. stance in the Western Hemisphere. Their insight value was high because they could immediately mobilize former government officials like Gerald Butts and Cliff Kupchan to explain the policy machinery behind the move. They correctly identified that while the capture was the easy part, the true risk lay in the ensuing governance vacuum.
Stratfor leaned into its third-tier role of strategic synthesis. Their 2026 forecast focused on political calculations and how the Maduro capture might influence U.S. midterm elections. The analysis was logically sound but felt like cover. It provided a structured narrative for executives to cite in boardrooms while offering little on the ground-level intelligence of how Colombian border areas might destabilize.
Oxford Economics showed its strength in the year-end review of 2025. They admitted to missing the scale of the tariff measures, having expected a six percent effective rate when reality went much higher, but they were right about U.S. growth exceptionalism. Their value lies there: less in predicting the black swan and more in accurately modeling the grey rhinos, like inflation and GDP growth. Their 2025 track record was accurate on world goods trade and industrial production. For a client, this is high-quality insight for fiscal planning, even if it lacks the thrill of geopolitical drama.
The 2026 Iran War, which began with U.S.-Israeli strikes on February 28, clarified the insight-versus-cover divide. Oxford Analytica placed a sixty-five percent probability on a major conflict within a six-month window ending March 2026, published in October 2025. They correctly identified the 2025 ceasefire as a fragile pause rather than a resolution. While they missed the exact start date by a few weeks, their economic modeling allowed clients to treat the February 28 strike as a buy-the-dip volatility event rather than a structural collapse.
Eurasia Group led on direct insight. While other firms analyzed satellite imagery, Eurasia translated the political shift following Ali Khamenei’s death on the first day of the war. They were first to pivot to what they called the Mojtaba Era, correctly identifying that the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei would signal an existential commitment to the conflict rather than immediate capitulation. They focused on how the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would hit Asian manufacturing harder than U.S. consumers, which gave multinational clients the fast insight needed to reroute supply chains before conflict surcharges hit the shipping industry on March 5.
Stratfor’s performance has been the most astrological. Their 2026 Annual Forecast predicted a year of attrition and calculated escalation. They accurately predicted that Netanyahu would seek a major military victory to secure his 2026 election prospects, but much of their current reporting leans on strategic frameworks that explain why the war is happening rather than what happens next. This provides excellent institutional cover but little unique alpha for a trader or logistics manager.
The real alpha in this conflict has come from firms that did not just predict a war but predicted how the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve might be used to decouple the U.S. economy from the Persian Gulf shock. Those who relied on the old oil shock equals global recession playbook were wrong.
The most valuable proprietary insights in this context fall into categories structurally invisible to the public. The public sees the news of Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise. The proprietary insight maps the private loyalties of IRGC commanders, detailing which generals believe in a long-term decentralized war and which privately signal willingness to negotiate for the sake of their own business interests. For a corporate client, that is the difference between preparing for a ten-year insurgency and a three-month transition.
The presence of three U.S. carrier groups is public knowledge, but specialized firms likely provide an interceptor burn-rate analysis, estimating how many SM-3 and SM-6 missiles remain in the theater after heavy Iranian retaliatory barrages. A client who knows that the U.S. and its allies are running low on these munitions can predict a forced ceasefire long before the White House announces it. Public reporting focuses on visible explosions in Tehran or Isfahan. Firms like Kroll provide granular assessments of non-kinetic incapacitation, informing clients that certain Iranian oil refinery systems were not just struck by missiles but bricked through hardware vulnerabilities months ago, meaning Iranian production is structurally dead for years regardless of a ceasefire.
The public narrative suggests a unified front between the U.S., Israel, and Gulf allies. Proprietary insight exposes the fragmentation. Behind closed doors, Qatari officials may threaten to cut LNG exports to the West if the U.S. does not force Israeli de-escalation in Lebanon. A client who knows that can trade energy stocks based on political leverage rather than military success.
The public pays for the what. Elite clients pay for the how long and the under what conditions.
Certain intellectual fads in 2026 cater to these elite vulnerabilities by dressing up simple social maneuvering in the language of science or morality. One is the obsession with predictive empathy models, high-priced software suites that claim to use AI to map the emotional states of foreign populations. The problem is the assumption that a machine can quantify the spiritual motivations of a population. It offers the illusion of control while ignoring the tacit knowledge a local observer would carry.
Another is purification auditing, where large firms hire consultants to scan their corporate history for associations with disfavored political figures or movements. The elite client is not buying a more efficient business model. He is buying the appearance of virtue to protect himself from an internal coup by younger, more ideological staff.
There is also expertise laundering, which involves creating new credentials for tasks that used to require common sense. A company hires a certified narrative resilience officer instead of a sensible communications director. This lets the elite leader outsource responsibility for a difficult decision to a credentialed specialist, reducing personal liability if things go wrong.
The persistent lure of grand unified theories of risk completes the picture. Elites gravitate toward any thinker who claims to have found the one logic that explains all geopolitical movement, whether geography, demographics, or a theory of history. These theories provide a sense of order in a chaotic world but fail because they treat human beings as predictable units rather than agents with their own complex alliances and motivations. They provide the cover of sophistication while missing the actual interplay of power on the ground.

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