David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory holds that complex moral systems exist primarily to disguise the self-interest of a coalition by presenting its goals as universal truths. Peace Studies fits this logic well. It gives a specialized vocabulary to the diplomacy-restraint coalition, converting its strategic preferences into what sounds like an objective science of human welfare.
The field enables elite gatekeeping. High-prestige credentials in conflict resolution or human security ensure that only those who speak the coalition’s language can participate in serious policy discussions at the UN or within major NGOs. This shuts out the rival hawkish coalition, whose vocabulary of deterrence gets framed as primitive or scientifically discredited by the weight of academic authority.
Peace Studies also serves as what Pinsof might call a moral decoupling agent. Groups routinely try to strip the category of violence from their own aggressive actions while hyper-focusing on the violence of their rivals. The field helps this along by expanding the definition of violence to include structural violence. Economic sanctions or military posture become forms of aggression. The actions of anti-hegemonic groups become mere responses to structural injustice. One side receives moral cover. The other loses it.
This produces a victimhood signal. By aligning with the marginalized, the Peace Studies scholar claims a moral high ground that turns any criticism of their policy recommendations into an attack on the vulnerable. Critics face a forced choice: join the compassionate coalition or be labeled an apologist for militarism.
The field’s survival depends on ignoring the efficacy of coercive force. If a Peace Studies scholar acknowledged that a specific military intervention prevented a genocide more effectively than dialogue, they would signal support for the rival coalition. To maintain alliance purity, the framework redirects attention to long-term blowback or failures to address root causes. This ensures the diplomacy-restraint coalition remains the only morally serious option within the academic ecosystem, regardless of what happens on the ground.
In the current war with Iran, the diplomacy-restraint coalition has deployed this reframing immediately. It centers the narrative on the strike in Minab and the displacement of over 100,000 Iranians, framing the war as a pathology of militarism rather than a calculated response to nuclear proliferation. The goal is to recruit uncommitted observers by making the hawkish coalition appear indifferent to civilian suffering.
The vocabulary markers are already visible. The U.S. and Israel use terms like regime change, surgical strikes, and Epic Fury. The Peace Studies ecosystem counters with regional destabilization, cycle of violence, and unconstitutional aggression. These terms function as alliance signals. When scholars at the Stimson Center or Brookings argue that the war kills diplomacy, they make a claim but also signal membership in a coalition that treats negotiation as the only legitimate path. This lets them coordinate a delegitimizing narrative across NGOs and the UN, regardless of whether the strikes actually degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Reputational shielding runs alongside this. The restraint coalition frames the war as a product of American hubris and the limits of airpower, which protects its own past preference for the failed February negotiations. If the IRGC’s command structure collapses, the coalition will argue the war only incentivizes future nuclear pursuit, denying the rival coalition any recognizable victory.
The blind spots Pinsof predicts appear here too. Peace Studies analysis of the 2026 conflict tends to downplay the internal Iranian protests that preceded the strikes. Acknowledging that the regime had lost domestic legitimacy might suggest that military pressure could facilitate a popular uprising, a point that strengthens the hawkish coalition. The diplomacy-restraint framework focuses instead on how the strikes might unite Iranians against a foreign aggressor, a narrative that conveniently supports the case for a ceasefire.
The vagueness of Peace Studies terminology, words like justice and harmony, is not a flaw. It lets people coordinate against common enemies without committing to specific, costly actions. Claiming to seek peace is a defensive posture that protects the speaker from accusations of aggression while casting opponents as obstacles to that peace. The academic structure of the field formalizes these moral intuitions into a system of expertise, and that expertise gives its practitioners authority over social conflicts while they use the language of neutrality to advance the interests of their own alliance.
Peace Studies is bullshit to the extent that it ignores the underlying logic of conflict—which is often about power and alliance formation—in favor of high-status rhetoric about universal values. The field is more about the “symmetry” of social signaling than the mechanics of ending war.
On Dec. 15, 2025, David Pinsof wrote: “War? Misunderstanding. If only people knew that war is pointless and evil, a product of bigotry and misinformation, there would be world peace.”
On Jan. 22, 2024, David Pinsof wrote:
[W]e prefer to think in stories. We see the world as revolving around a colorful cast of characters—often representing warring tribes—whom we either like or dislike. There’s a path to utopia, and we can get there if the likable heroes use their “free will” powers to save the day. There’s also a path to dystopia, and we’ll get there if the unlikable villains use their “free will” powers to ruin everything. The heroes must stop the villains, or the world will go to shit…
War is caused by evil people who don’t recognize that war is bad. Homelessness is caused by heartless people who don’t care about the plight of others. We don’t need to think about the economic, social, and legal incentive structures that lead to cancel culture, homelessness, poverty, war, or wealth inequality. Booooring! We just need to point the finger at the baddies, and our work is done.
On Apr. 12, 2023, David Pinsof wrote:
If you think morality is all about cooperation and being nice, then you’ve got a lot of explaining to do:
Why is morality the leading cause of violence around the world and throughout history?
Why is moralizing the best way to reduce compassion for a person’s suffering?
Why does morality make us more biased and tribal?
Why is morality uniquely associated with hatred?
Why does morality prevent groups from compromising and making peace?
Why are moral rules so often in the self-interest of their creators (1, 2, 3)?
Why do people care so little about whether their moral preferences actually make the world better?
Why is morality so full of grandstanding, performative altruism, and holier than thou sanctimony?
Why are so many horrific things—pogroms, purges, holy wars, honor killings, caste systems—done in the name of morality?
…Morality is mean, but it can still cause nice things to happen. As an analogy, consider nuclear weapons—they’re mean. Yet according to some scholars, nuclear proliferation made nuclear-armed countries afraid to go to war with one another, out of fear of destroying themselves and the rest of the planet. Nuclear weapons may have caused peace (a nice thing), even though they were designed for war (a mean thing).
The big names currently deploying the vocabulary of the diplomacy-restraint coalition include long-standing figures in the realism and restraint ecosystems, alongside newer institutional voices. Following the February 28 strikes, these individuals have coordinated narratives that emphasize the “betrayal of diplomacy” and “structural instability.”
Trita Parsi and the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft are the most prominent. Parsi has been vocal on media outlets like Middle East Eye, arguing that the war was a choice, not a necessity, and that it has effectively “squandered a chance for diplomacy” that existed just weeks prior. Parsi is the primary signal-booster for the restraint coalition, framing the U.S.-Israeli action as a strategic failure that will only incentivize future Iranian nuclear pursuit.
Barbara Slavin at the Stimson Center remains a central node in this network. She recently participated in a high-profile George Washington University webinar where she analyzed the strikes through the lens of failed engagement. Slavin represents the “NGO-academic” bridge, providing the moral and intellectual framework that identifies the current “cycle of violence” as a byproduct of abandoning the Future of Iran Initiative and other diplomatic tracks.
Robert Malley, former Special Envoy for Iran and now at Yale’s Jackson School, provides the coalition with high-prestige, “insider” legitimacy. His recent book talks and public comments frame the conflict as a march to war that could have been avoided, reinforcing the “reputational shielding” function. By positioning himself as the voice of lost expertise, he helps the diplomacy-restraint coalition maintain its status as the “serious” alternative to what they label as the “maximalism” of the Trump administration.
Sina Azodi has emerged as a frequent commentator across BBC, Al-Jazeera, and Sky News, specializing in the “pathology of militarism” narrative. He often focuses on how the strikes on the IRGC command structure and the death of Khamenei have led to “regional destabilization” and “humanitarian catastrophe,” shifting the focus away from the military’s stated success in degrading nuclear infrastructure.
Within the UN ecosystem, António Guterres serves as the coalition’s ultimate moral witness. His recent statements to the Security Council, describing the day’s events as a “grave threat to international peace and security” and calling for an immediate “return to the negotiating table,” provide the high-level moral language that the rest of the coalition uses to coordinate its narrative.
These figures form an interlocking network where the academic output of someone like Abbas Milani at Stanford (who provides the nuanced political science) is translated into policy restraint by the Quincy Institute and then echoed as moral necessity by UN special rapporteurs like Ben Saul or Mai Sato.
