May 17, 2025 War, Dictatorship & International Relations Luke Ford No sacred cows.

War, Dictatorship & International Relations

Posted on May 17, 2025 by Luke Ford

Please analyze the 2010 essay Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design and Clinton Rossiter’s book on Constitutional Dictatorship in the light of the new John J. Mearsheimer essay on war.

Grok says:

To analyze the essay “Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design” by Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, alongside Clinton Rossiter’s book Constitutional Dictatorship (as referenced in the essay), in light of John Mearsheimer’s essay on war and international politics, we must examine the interplay between the concepts of emergency governance, executive power, and the realist perspective on international politics and war. Below, I provide a comparative analysis that integrates the key arguments from these texts, focusing on their treatment of power, emergency, and the structural dynamics of governance and conflict.
Overview of Key Texts
Levinson and Balkin’s “Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design”
Core Argument: The essay explores the concept of “constitutional dictatorship,” a framework where extraordinary executive powers are temporarily granted during emergencies within a constitutional democracy. Drawing on historical examples like the Roman Republic and modern cases, the authors argue that such mechanisms are necessary but inherently risky, as they can erode democratic accountability and slide toward authoritarianism if not carefully designed. They propose structural reforms to mitigate these dangers, such as votes of no-confidence, legislative oversight, and independent emergency councils.
Key Themes:
Emergency powers are a feature of constitutional democracies, not their antithesis, but they require careful institutional design to prevent abuse.
The American presidency has evolved into a form of constitutional dictatorship, particularly post-World War II, with expanded executive discretion in national security and economic crises.
Accountability mechanisms (e.g., no-confidence votes, supermajorities for emergency declarations, sunset provisions) are essential to balance power.
The essay critiques the U.S. system for allowing presidents to both declare and act on emergencies, drawing on Carl Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty and the risks of unchecked power.
Clinton Rossiter’s Constitutional Dictatorship (as referenced in Levinson and Balkin)
Core Argument: Rossiter’s 1948 book examines the historical use of emergency powers in democracies, particularly in the U.S., France, Germany, and Britain. He argues that constitutional dictatorship—temporary, legally sanctioned executive authority during crises—is a necessary tool for state survival but must be constrained to avoid degeneration into permanent authoritarianism.
Key Themes (as cited in the essay):
Constitutional dictatorship is inevitable in modern states facing crises (e.g., war, economic collapse).
It should be initiated only when indispensable, and the decision to institute it should not rest with the “dictator” (i.e., the executive).
Rossiter advocates for clear limits, such as fixed terms for emergency powers and legislative oversight, drawing from Roman practices where consuls could not self-appoint as dictators.
The book reflects post-World War II concerns about the National Security State and the growth of executive power.
John Mearsheimer’s Essay on War and International Politics
Core Argument: Mearsheimer presents a realist perspective, arguing that international politics is inherently competitive and anarchic, with war as a constant threat due to the absence of a global authority. States prioritize survival, leading to security competition and the potential for escalation from limited to total wars. Political passions, military preferences, and war dynamics drive this escalation, challenging political control.
Key Themes:
Politics is a “contact sport,” inherently conflict-prone, and in the anarchic international system, this translates into perpetual security dilemmas and war risks.
Great powers prioritize survival, making preventive wars and wars of opportunity possible when security is at stake, often overriding legal or moral constraints.
Escalation is a significant risk in great power wars, fueled by political ideologies (e.g., nationalism), military preferences for decisive victories, and war’s inherent dynamics (e.g., “victory disease,” inadvertent escalation).
Political control over war is essential but difficult, particularly in the nuclear age, where escalation could lead to catastrophic consequences.
Comparative Analysis
The analysis below synthesizes the texts by examining how they address emergency governance, executive power, and war and escalation, with Mearsheimer’s realist lens illuminating the international context that shapes the need for constitutional dictatorship.
1. Emergency Governance and the Anarchic International System
Levinson and Balkin/Rossiter: Both texts argue that emergencies—wars, economic crises, or internal threats—necessitate temporary concentrations of power in the executive to ensure state survival. Levinson and Balkin cite historical examples like the Roman dictatorship and modern cases (e.g., post-9/11 U.S. policies, 2008 financial crisis) to show that constitutional democracies incorporate such mechanisms. Rossiter, as referenced, emphasizes that these powers must be legally sanctioned and temporary, with clear institutional checks to prevent abuse. Both works stress the need for deliberate design to balance efficacy with accountability, warning against the risk of “Caesarism” (permanent authoritarianism).
Mearsheimer’s Contribution: Mearsheimer’s realist framework explains why emergencies are so prevalent and why states require mechanisms like constitutional dictatorship. In an anarchic international system, states face constant security threats, as survival is never guaranteed. The “security dilemma” (where one state’s defensive actions threaten others) and the potential for great power wars create a world where crises are inevitable. Mearsheimer’s emphasis on war’s ever-present threat aligns with Levinson and Balkin’s observation that no democracy can avoid emergencies (p. 1794). His argument that states prioritize survival over legal or moral norms (p. 14) underscores why executives may need extraordinary powers to act swiftly in crises, as delays (e.g., waiting for legislative approval) could jeopardize the state (p. 1863).
Synthesis: Mearsheimer’s realism provides the international context for Levinson and Balkin’s and Rossiter’s focus on emergency governance. The anarchic system, with its persistent risk of war and shifting alliances (e.g., U.S.-Soviet relations post-1945, p. 14), creates the conditions necessitating constitutional dictatorship. However, Mearsheimer’s view that political considerations trump legal constraints (p. 36) highlights a tension: while Levinson and Balkin advocate for legal and structural checks (e.g., no-confidence votes, p. 1860), Mearsheimer suggests that in dire crises, leaders may bypass these to ensure survival, potentially exacerbating the risks of unchecked power.
2. Executive Power and Political Control
Levinson and Balkin/Rossiter: The American presidency, particularly since the National Security State’s emergence, exemplifies a form of constitutional dictatorship, with expanded powers in national security and domestic crises (pp. 1810–1840). Levinson and Balkin critique the U.S. system for allowing presidents to declare emergencies and act unilaterally (p. 1862), echoing Rossiter’s concern that the “dictator” should not control the decision to institute emergency powers (p. 1862). They propose reforms like legislative votes to activate emergency powers (e.g., South African model, p. 1862) and independent councils (p. 1864) to ensure accountability. Rossiter’s Roman-inspired model, where consuls appointed dictators, emphasizes external authorization to limit self-aggrandizement (p. 1865).
Mearsheimer’s Contribution: Mearsheimer’s essay highlights the tension between political control and military autonomy, which parallels the executive-legislative tension in Levinson and Balkin. He argues that war, as a political act, should remain under political control (p. 10), but military commanders often resist civilian interference, favoring decisive victories over limited wars (pp. 32–33). This mirrors the executive’s tendency to seek unilateral power in crises, as seen in the U.S. presidency’s expansion (e.g., George W. Bush’s assertion of not needing to explain decisions, p. 1790). Mearsheimer’s point that political passions (e.g., nationalism) can undermine control (p. 29) suggests that domestic political dynamics, like those driving executive overreach, may resist the checks proposed by Levinson and Balkin.
Synthesis: Mearsheimer’s analysis of civil-military relations illuminates the challenges of constraining executive power in a constitutional dictatorship. Just as military leaders resist political oversight in war (p. 33), presidents may resist legislative or judicial checks during emergencies, especially when national survival is at stake. Mearsheimer’s realism suggests that the competitive, survival-driven nature of politics (p. 11) could undermine Levinson and Balkin’s proposed reforms, as leaders prioritize immediate security over long-term accountability. For example, a no-confidence vote (p. 1860) might be politically unfeasible in a crisis fueled by nationalist fervor, as Mearsheimer notes with hypernationalism’s rally-around-the-flag effect (p. 30). Rossiter’s insistence on separating the decision to declare an emergency from the “dictator” aligns with Mearsheimer’s call for political control but faces similar obstacles in an anarchic, crisis-prone world.
3. War, Escalation, and the Risks of Constitutional Dictatorship
Levinson and Balkin/Rossiter: The essay and Rossiter’s book focus on war as a primary trigger for constitutional dictatorship, citing historical examples like Lincoln’s Civil War powers and post-9/11 policies (pp. 1821–1836). They warn that emergencies, particularly wars, expand executive power and risk normalizing “distributed dictatorship” across agencies (e.g., Federal Reserve, CDC, p. 1840). Levinson and Balkin emphasize designing institutions to prevent escalation into permanent authoritarianism, such as sunset provisions and supermajorities (p. 1864). Rossiter similarly stresses limited terms for emergency powers to avoid degeneration (p. 1862).
Mearsheimer’s Contribution: Mearsheimer’s analysis of escalation in great power wars provides a critical lens for understanding the stakes of emergency powers. He argues that limited wars tend to escalate into total wars due to political passions, military preferences, and war dynamics (e.g., victory disease, inadvertent escalation, p. 29). This escalation risk amplifies the dangers of constitutional dictatorship, as prolonged or intensified wars could justify extended emergency powers, undermining democratic norms. Mearsheimer’s nuclear-age caution (p. 35) about catastrophic escalation underscores the urgency of Levinson and Balkin’s call for checks, as unchecked executive power in a nuclear crisis could lead to disastrous decisions.
Synthesis: Mearsheimer’s escalation dynamics highlight the high stakes of constitutional dictatorship during wartime. The tendency for wars to spiral (p. 29) could pressure executives to expand their powers beyond initial emergencies, as seen in the U.S. post-9/11 (p. 1821). Levinson and Balkin’s proposed checks (e.g., escalator clauses, p. 1864) aim to limit this, but Mearsheimer’s realism suggests that political and military pressures might overwhelm such mechanisms, especially in a multipolar world where great power competition is intensifying (p. 7). Rossiter’s Roman model of temporary dictatorship is challenged by Mearsheimer’s observation that wars are hard to keep limited (p. 10), potentially prolonging emergency regimes. The nuclear dimension adds urgency, as a president with unchecked powers could escalate a crisis inadvertently, aligning with Mearsheimer’s concern about nuclear risks (p. 35).
4. Designing Institutions in a Realist World
Levinson and Balkin/Rossiter: Both texts advocate for deliberate institutional design to manage emergency powers, drawing on Hamilton’s call for “reflection and choice” (p. 1865). Levinson and Balkin propose structural reforms like no-confidence votes, opposition-led oversight committees, and independent emergency councils (pp. 1860–1865). Rossiter suggests Roman-inspired principles, such as external authorization and limited terms (p. 1862). Both emphasize preventing the slide toward Schmittian sovereignty, where the executive unilaterally declares exceptions (p. 1866).
Mearsheimer’s Contribution: Mearsheimer’s realism challenges the feasibility of these designs in a world driven by survival and competition. His view that political considerations trump legal constraints (p. 36) suggests that leaders may bypass institutional checks in crises, especially when survival is at stake. The anarchic system’s pressure for rapid decision-making (p. 1863, as noted by Levinson and Balkin) aligns with Mearsheimer’s point that states act decisively to counter threats (p. 14). Moreover, his analysis of nationalism and ideological fervor (p. 30) indicates that domestic political dynamics could undermine reforms like no-confidence votes, as publics may rally behind strong leaders in crises.
Synthesis: Mearsheimer’s realist lens reveals the fragility of Levinson and Balkin’s and Rossiter’s proposed designs in the face of international anarchy and domestic political passions. While their reforms aim to constrain power, Mearsheimer’s emphasis on survival-driven politics suggests that executives may exploit crises to sidestep checks, as seen in historical U.S. examples (e.g., Bush’s post-9/11 actions, p. 1790). The multipolar world Mearsheimer describes (p. 7), with heightened great power competition, increases the frequency and severity of crises, making robust institutional design both more necessary and more challenging. The tension between Hamilton’s deliberate design and Schmitt’s inevitable sovereignty (p. 1866) is amplified by Mearsheimer’s view that politics is inherently conflict-prone and resistant to legal limits.
Key Insights and Implications
Necessity and Danger of Emergency Powers: Levinson and Balkin, Rossiter, and Mearsheimer agree that emergencies, particularly wars, require concentrated power to ensure state survival. Mearsheimer’s realism explains the inevitability of these crises in an anarchic system, while Levinson and Balkin and Rossiter highlight the domestic institutional risks, particularly in the U.S. presidency’s evolution.
Challenges of Control: Mearsheimer’s analysis of escalation and civil-military tensions parallels Levinson and Balkin’s concerns about executive overreach. Both suggest that political passions and institutional dynamics (military or executive) can undermine control, necessitating robust checks. However, Mearsheimer’s realism casts doubt on the efficacy of legal and structural constraints in high-stakes crises.
Nuclear Age Urgency: Mearsheimer’s focus on nuclear risks (p. 35) amplifies the stakes of Levinson and Balkin’s call for accountability. Unchecked executive power in a nuclear crisis could lead to catastrophic escalation, making institutional design critical yet challenging.
Realism vs. Constitutionalism: Mearsheimer’s realist view that survival trumps all contrasts with Levinson and Balkin’s and Rossiter’s constitutionalist emphasis on legal limits. This tension suggests that while institutional design is essential, it must account for the anarchic, competitive realities of international politics.
Recommendations for Further Analysis
Case Studies: Apply the combined framework to specific historical cases (e.g., Lincoln’s Civil War powers, Bush’s post-9/11 policies) to test how Mearsheimer’s escalation dynamics interact with constitutional dictatorship mechanisms.
Comparative Systems: Examine parliamentary systems (as Levinson and Balkin suggest, p. 1858) through Mearsheimer’s lens to assess whether they better manage emergency powers in a realist world.
Nuclear Scenarios: Explore how proposed reforms (e.g., emergency councils) could mitigate nuclear escalation risks, given Mearsheimer’s concerns (p. 35).
Conclusion
Levinson and Balkin’s essay and Rossiter’s book highlight the necessity and risks of constitutional dictatorship, advocating for institutional designs to balance emergency powers with accountability. Mearsheimer’s realist perspective enriches this analysis by explaining the international conditions— anarchy, security competition, and escalation risks—that necessitate such powers while challenging the feasibility of proposed checks. Together, they underscore the delicate balance between effective crisis response and democratic preservation, particularly in a multipolar, nuclear-armed world where survival remains paramount. The challenge lies in designing institutions that can withstand the competitive, conflict-prone nature of politics both domestically and internationally.

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Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests (2001)

Posted on May 17, 2025 by Luke Ford

Ralph Gomory, the former IBM chief scientist and Sloan Foundation president, and William J. Baumol, former American Economics Association president, wrote:

* In [David] Ricardo’s time trade is estimated to have constituted about 1 percent of world GDP. Since then, despite exploding world output, the volume of trade relative to GDP has risen more than thirteenfold.
* Advantages based on natural resources still exist, as they did when England specialized in wool and Portugal in wine, but more dominant today are advantages that can be acquired. These can be the advantages conferred by being established in an industry and gaining thereby either specialized knowledge or economies of scale or scope. There is also the possibility, in industries where knowledge is easily transferred, and where economies of scale are not significant, of dispersing production around the world to use cheap labor or other special advantages, and then to exploit the cheapness of modern transportation to deliver these goods to global markets.
* one might conclude that the location of economic activity today no longer matters since international companies can repatriate their profits from whatever part of the globe houses their actual economic activities. However, in almost all cases, most of the economic benefit stays where the value is added. Profits are usually only a small portion of the value added through economic activity, and most of the value added, such as wages, remains local. It matters to a country to be the site of an economic activity, whoever may own the company.
Although the countries do not compete directly, in the way companies do, the amount of economic activity actually taking place within their borders is vital. As we will see in this book, it is vital not only for those engaged in a particular industry who may experience the up and downs of activity directly but also for the country as a whole.
* Some of the truths most dear to the hearts of economists are those that clash with the practical intuition of those not trained in the field. It does not require special training to see that foreign competition can put some domestic jobs in danger, or that once vibrant home-grown industries sometimes succumb to foreign competitors who can make the goods they once produced more cheaply or better. International trade sometimes leads to the contraction or even loss of some industries, even significant ones such as automobiles or consumer electronics, and can therefore cause hardship and unemployment. But economists generally maintain that such localized pain is more than compensated for by the availability of better automobiles or compact disc players to the large consuming public.
* improvement in one country’s productive capabilities is attainable only at the expense of another country’s general welfare. An improvement in the productive capability of a trading partner that allows it to compete effectively with a home-country industry, instead of benefiting the public as a whole, may come at the expense of that home country overall. And this harm is not the localized damage previously mentioned, loss of jobs in the immediately affected industry, but an adverse effect that is felt throughout the home
country.
* Why should a country be satisfied with the current state of affairs if it can see a way to do better?
* among the multitude of stable outcomes, those that are best for one country tend to be disadvantageous for its trading partner.
* And we mean that it is disadvantageous for its trading partner in a very wide sense. It is a sense that takes into account not only the local effects on individual industries but also the wider effects on the entire national population. It is in this sense that we find that there is inherent conflict in international trade.
* Thus countries today can change their circumstances and can acquire (or lose) industries through rapid alterations of their capabilities in industries that do not have high entry costs. This can lead to a new outcome in international trade. The possibility of such changes and such new outcomes is another and different source of multiple
outcomes.
Remarkably enough, the resulting different outcomes obey the same simple laws as those that govern the case of high entry cost and largescale operations. Once again, we will find inherent conflict in the countrywide interests of trading partners. Once again, the outcome that is best for one country tends not to be good for another. Once again, a
multitude of possible outcomes become a possible source of conflict in international trade.
* If the operation of free markets in the global economy always produced a unique and relatively predictable outcome for the interrelated economic affairs of nations, then there would be little that anyone could do to change it. That predestined balance of economic forces would represent our unavoidable destiny. Directed by the market’s Invisible
Hand, we would be fated to produce, trade, and prosper, all in a strictly choreographed international pattern. We could study, describe, and write about the details of that fate, but in the end we would either have to accept it or fundamentally reject the guidance of the free market. If, in addition, there were grounds for believing this destiny to be dependably beneficial—always serving not only the economic interests of the world as a whole but also each of the countries that compose it—then the uniqueness and inevitability of that outcome would be reassuring rather than inhibiting or threatening. This fortunate state of affairs, in which we are only deprived of the ability to tinker with something that is already for the best, is just what classical trade theory may lead us to expect.
* The development of a new industry is slow, involves a long time and large-scale effort, and is beset with risk.
* Retainability means that a country with many industries can hold on to them even though the wage in this many-industry country may be very high. As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, if a country is producing more than its population’s share of the world’s commodities, it will have a high income and, usually, a high standard of living. If it produces a large share of the world’s goods, it has much to consume and much to trade. It becomes a high-wage, high-consumption country.
* a country that finds itself frozen out of most industries and is unable to enter will find itself with little to consume that is produced at home and little to trade to obtain goods from abroad.
* When a significant number of industries are retainable, there are always equilibrium outcomes that leave some countries worse off than they would be if they were to seal themselves off from trade altogether.
* the patterns of industrial production resulting from international trade affect the standard of living of everyone in the countries involved. The success or failure of an industry shifts the equilibrium outcome. The result is not of parochial interest only to the companies or the industry directly involved, but, also, to the country as a whole because of its effect on national income.
* While the governments of some nations have successfully organized, cajoled, and even forced their home enterprises into entering existent retainable industries, most such efforts have not succeeded. Those that have achieved their goals are countries with a strong tradition of powerful government and an unambiguous history of industrial policy,
plus a skilled and prestigious bureaucracy, able to carry out that policy. This is a set of circumstances that seems far from the conditions that prevail in the United States. Indeed, the U.S. tradition runs in the opposite direction: It has had no conscious industrial policy, and its government bureaucracy has, with some exceptions, never aspired to a
close, cooperative relationship with industry outside of the arena of national defense. Even if it were desirable, a path of very active government guidance of and collaboration with industry is probably unworkable for the United States.

Grok says:

To analyze Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests by Ralph E. Gomory and William J. Baumol (2001) in light of John J. Mearsheimer’s essay on war, we need to explore how the economic arguments in Gomory and Baumol’s work intersect with the realist perspective on international politics and war articulated by Mearsheimer. Both texts address the competitive nature of international relations, but they focus on different domains: Gomory and Baumol examine economic trade dynamics, while Mearsheimer emphasizes security and military conflict. Below, I will compare their core arguments, highlight synergies and tensions, and assess how their perspectives illuminate the interplay between economic competition and the potential for war in a multipolar world.
Overview of Key Arguments
Mearsheimer’s Essay on War
Mearsheimer’s essay, rooted in realist international relations theory, argues that international politics is inherently competitive and conflict-prone due to the anarchic structure of the international system, where no higher authority exists to protect states. Key points include:
War as a Central Feature of International Politics: War is a perennial danger because states prioritize survival in a self-help system. The absence of a global enforcer means states must compete for power to ensure security, leading to security dilemmas where one state’s gain in military capability threatens others.
Politics as Competitive and Potentially Violent: Politics, both domestic and international, is a “contact sport” driven by clashing interests and values. In international anarchy, these conflicts can escalate to war, as states fear existential threats and shifting power balances.
Escalation Dynamics: Limited wars tend to escalate into total wars due to political passions (e.g., nationalism), military preferences for decisive victories, and the dynamics of war itself (e.g., victory disease, inadvertent escalation). This is particularly dangerous in the nuclear age.
Realist Lens: Mearsheimer critiques liberal theories that downplay military factors, arguing that survival concerns trump economic, legal, or moral considerations. States may initiate wars (preventive or opportunistic) if they perceive threats to their security, regardless of international norms.
Gomory and Baumol’s Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests
Gomory and Baumol challenge classical trade theories (e.g., Ricardo’s comparative advantage) by incorporating modern economic realities like economies of scale and rapid productivity changes. Their key arguments include:
Multiple Trade Outcomes: Unlike classical models that predict a single, mutually beneficial trade equilibrium based on natural advantages, modern trade produces multiple stable outcomes due to economies of scale, high entry costs, and acquired skills. These outcomes vary in their impact on national welfare.
Inherent Conflicts in Trade: The best economic outcomes for one country often harm its trading partners. For instance, a developed country benefits from aiding underdeveloped nations until they reach a competitive threshold, after which their industrial gains reduce the developed country’s welfare.
National Interests and Competition: A country’s prosperity depends on the success of its industries in global trade. Developed nations must compete vigorously against peers (e.g., the U.S. against Japan or Germany) to maintain economic advantages, as losing industries to rivals diminishes national welfare.
Policy Implications: Countries can influence trade outcomes through policies like protecting infant industries or investing in infrastructure. The authors are not protectionist but argue that strategic interventions can secure better outcomes in a world where market forces alone do not guarantee optimal results.
Synergies Between the Two Works
Both Mearsheimer and Gomory/Baumol emphasize the competitive nature of international interactions and the centrality of national interests, albeit in different spheres. Their arguments align in several ways:
Competition as a Core Feature:
Mearsheimer views international politics as a zero-sum struggle for power, where states compete to ensure survival. Similarly, Gomory and Baumol argue that global trade is not always a positive-sum game; one country’s economic gain can come at another’s expense, especially among developed nations.
Both reject liberal assumptions of harmony. Mearsheimer critiques liberal theories that predict the obsolescence of war, while Gomory and Baumol challenge the classical trade model’s assumption that free trade always benefits all nations equally.
National Interests Over Global Good:
Mearsheimer asserts that states prioritize survival over moral or legal norms, leading to actions like preventive wars. Gomory and Baumol argue that countries pursue trade outcomes that maximize national welfare, even if it harms trading partners, suggesting a parallel focus on self-interest.
For example, Mearsheimer notes that states may violate international law to enhance security (p. 10). Similarly, Gomory and Baumol suggest that countries may use protectionist measures or industrial policies to secure retainable industries, prioritizing national prosperity over free-market ideals (pp. 8, 65-67).
Structural Constraints:
Mearsheimer’s anarchic international system, lacking a higher authority, drives security competition (p. 13). Gomory and Baumol’s trade model, where market forces preserve multiple outcomes rather than selecting a single optimal one, creates a structural environment where countries must actively compete to avoid unfavorable equilibria (pp. 7-8).
Both frameworks highlight the absence of an automatic mechanism ensuring mutual benefit, whether in security (no global enforcer) or trade (no guaranteed optimal trade outcome).
Potential for Conflict:
Mearsheimer explicitly links political competition to war, noting that disputes can escalate due to nationalism or military dynamics (pp. 29-35). Gomory and Baumol imply that economic competition can strain relations, particularly when a country’s industrial losses threaten its economic base, potentially escalating into broader conflicts (pp. 24, 41-42).
For instance, the loss of key industries (e.g., U.S. semiconductors to Japan) could weaken a state’s economic power, which Mearsheimer would argue translates into reduced military capability, heightening security concerns and the risk of conflict.
Tensions and Differences
While there are synergies, the two works diverge in focus, assumptions, and implications, revealing tensions when applying economic trade dynamics to a realist security framework.
Domain of Analysis:
Mearsheimer focuses on military power and war, viewing economic factors as secondary to security concerns. He argues that political considerations “invariably trump economic, legal, and moral considerations” (p. 36). Gomory and Baumol focus exclusively on economic welfare, with no direct discussion of military conflict.
This creates a tension: Mearsheimer might argue that economic competition, as described by Gomory and Baumol, is subordinate to security imperatives. For example, a state might sacrifice economic gains to bolster military alliances or avoid dependence on a rival for critical industries.
Conflict Outcomes:
Mearsheimer sees conflict as potentially catastrophic, culminating in war that threatens state survival (pp. 13-14). Gomory and Baumol’s conflicts are economic, resulting in reduced national welfare (e.g., lower GDP per capita) but not existential threats (pp. 24-26).
However, economic losses could indirectly fuel Mearsheimer’s security dilemmas. For instance, if the U.S. loses its semiconductor industry to China, as Gomory and Baumol warn (pp. 67-68), this could weaken its technological edge, prompting a security-driven response, such as trade restrictions or military buildup, aligning with Mearsheimer’s escalation dynamics.
Role of Cooperation:
Mearsheimer acknowledges limited cooperation among great powers (e.g., U.S.-Soviet nonproliferation efforts) but emphasizes its fragility in the shadow of security competition (p. 15). Gomory and Baumol highlight cooperative potential in trade, particularly when developed nations aid underdeveloped ones, creating mutual gains until a competitive threshold is reached (pp. 37, 59-60).
This difference suggests that economic cooperation might mitigate tensions in Mearsheimer’s framework, but only temporarily. For example, U.S. aid to India (a zone of mutual gains, per Gomory and Baumol, p. 61) could strengthen bilateral ties, but as India’s industries grow, Mearsheimer’s logic predicts rising security competition if India becomes a great power.
Policy Prescriptions:
Mearsheimer implies that states should prioritize military preparedness and strategic alliances to deter threats, with economic policies serving security goals (e.g., avoiding dependence on rivals). Gomory and Baumol advocate for economic policies like government support for retainable industries (e.g., U.S. Sematech, p. 67) to secure favorable trade outcomes.
These prescriptions can conflict. For instance, Gomory and Baumol’s call for competing vigorously against developed rivals like Japan (p. 5) might lead to trade wars, which Mearsheimer would see as risking escalation into military conflict, especially if economic losses threaten a state’s power base.
Interplay Between Economic Competition and War
Combining the insights of both works reveals a deeper understanding of how economic competition in trade can intersect with the potential for war in a multipolar world, as outlined in Mearsheimer’s essay.
Economic Power as a Foundation for Military Power:
Mearsheimer notes that great powers like China and Russia emerged by 2017 due to their “sufficient economic and military capabilities” (p. 7). Gomory and Baumol’s analysis suggests that economic strength, driven by industrial success in global trade, is a prerequisite for such capabilities.
For example, China’s rise as a great power, which Mearsheimer attributes to its economic growth (p. 7), aligns with Gomory and Baumol’s observation that countries can acquire industries through productivity gains (pp. 9-10). However, this growth can harm trading partners like the U.S., creating economic tensions that, per Mearsheimer, could escalate into security competition or war if the U.S. perceives China as an existential threat.
Trade Conflicts as Catalysts for Security Dilemmas:
Gomory and Baumol’s “zone of conflict” (pp. 37, 60), where one country’s industrial gains harm another, mirrors Mearsheimer’s security dilemma, where one state’s military buildup threatens others (p. 14). Economic losses in key industries (e.g., U.S. steel or semiconductors) could prompt protectionist measures or sanctions, which rivals might interpret as hostile, triggering a spiral of retaliation.
For instance, U.S. efforts to retain its semiconductor industry (Gomory and Baumol, p. 67) could lead to trade restrictions on China, which China might counter with cyberattacks or military posturing in the South China Sea, aligning with Mearsheimer’s escalation dynamics (pp. 29-35).
Nationalism and Economic Competition:
Mearsheimer highlights nationalism as a driver of escalation, fueling hatred and pushing states toward total war (pp. 29-30). Gomory and Baumol’s emphasis on national welfare and industrial success can amplify nationalist sentiments, especially if a country perceives foreign competition as a threat to its economic identity.
For example, Japan’s dominance in automobiles (Gomory and Baumol, p. 17) in the 1980s sparked U.S. nationalist rhetoric about “saving American jobs,” which could have escalated into broader political or military tensions if Japan were a strategic rival, as Mearsheimer’s framework suggests.
Strategic Implications in a Multipolar World:
Mearsheimer’s multipolar world (post-2017, p. 7) increases the likelihood of great power competition, as China, Russia, and the U.S. vie for dominance. Gomory and Baumol’s analysis suggests that economic competition among these powers will intensify, as each seeks to secure retainable industries and avoid unfavorable trade outcomes.
This dual competition (economic and military) could create flashpoints. For instance, Russia’s economic dependence on energy exports, if threatened by U.S. or Chinese industrial policies, could prompt aggressive actions (e.g., in Ukraine), aligning with Mearsheimer’s view of war as a response to perceived threats (p. 10).
Critical Assessment
The synergy between Mearsheimer’s and Gomory/Baumol’s frameworks highlights the interconnectedness of economic and security competition in international relations. Economic losses in trade, as Gomory and Baumol describe, can weaken a state’s power base, triggering security concerns that Mearsheimer argues drive war. However, their differing focuses create blind spots:
Mearsheimer’s Oversight of Economic Drivers: Mearsheimer’s realist lens downplays economic competition as a direct cause of conflict, focusing instead on military power. Gomory and Baumol’s work suggests that trade conflicts can independently strain relations, even absent immediate security threats, by undermining national welfare and fueling political unrest.
Gomory and Baumol’s Silence on Security: Their economic model does not address how trade disputes might escalate into military conflict, a gap Mearsheimer fills. For example, their recommendation for vigorous competition among developed nations (p. 5) could exacerbate tensions in ways they do not explore, such as through trade wars or resource competition.
Together, the works suggest that economic and security policies must be integrated to manage risks in a multipolar world. For instance, the U.S. could pursue Gomory and Baumol’s strategy of supporting retainable industries (e.g., semiconductors) while aligning with Mearsheimer’s emphasis on maintaining military superiority to deter rivals. However, this dual approach risks escalation if not carefully managed, as aggressive economic policies could provoke retaliatory actions that spiral into conflict.
Conclusion
Gomory and Baumol’s Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests complements Mearsheimer’s essay by illustrating how economic competition in global trade mirrors the security competition central to realist theory. Both works underscore the zero-sum elements of international relations, where national interests drive states to prioritize their own welfare or survival, often at the expense of others. While Gomory and Baumol focus on economic outcomes and Mearsheimer on war, their arguments converge on the need for strategic action to navigate a competitive world. However, their integration reveals that economic disputes can amplify security dilemmas, increasing the risk of escalation in a multipolar system. Policymakers must balance economic and military strategies to secure national interests while minimizing the potential for conflict, a challenge made more acute by the complex interplay of trade and war in the modern era.

The case for protecting certain industries for national well-being reminds me of the case for raising children in a safe space, sheltered for their first 18 years in a type of cocoon, like Orthodox Jews do. Parents can choose their children’s likely peers by where the parents choose to live, the lives they lead, the schools they send their kids to. This might be the most profound way that parental choices shape kids. Some kids might be best off raised in a cocoon. Many of the NBA’s best white players grew up without much childhood black competition that might have shattered their confidence early on as the black players matured more quickly and possibly bullied them.

Grok says:

Parents, by choosing where to live, what schools to send their kids to, and what values to instill, create a controlled environment to nurture their children’s development. This is especially pronounced in communities like Orthodox Jews, where cultural and religious practices tightly regulate social interactions, education, and peer groups. The goal is to foster confidence, skills, and identity in a safe space, shielding kids from external pressures—whether societal, cultural, or competitive—that might derail their growth.
Just as nations protect retainable industries to ensure long-term economic success, parents may shelter children to build resilience, self-esteem, or specific talents before they face the broader, often harsher world. The trade-off is similar: too much protection might limit adaptability, but too little could expose them to overwhelming challenges too soon.
The NBA Example: Confidence and Competition
Your point about white NBA players growing up in environments with less early competition from Black peers is a compelling case study. Basketball is a sport where physical maturity, athleticism, and confidence play massive roles, especially during adolescence. Black players, on average, may mature physically earlier (due to genetic or environmental factors), potentially dominating youth competitions. This could intimidate or discourage white players who might otherwise develop into elite talents, especially if they face bullying or social pressure in hyper-competitive settings.
By growing up in a “cocoon”—say, suburban or less diverse communities with strong youth programs but less intense early competition—some white players may have preserved their confidence and honed their skills in a supportive environment. Players like Dirk Nowitzki (Germany), Steve Nash (Canada), or Nikola Jokić (Serbia) often developed in systems emphasizing fundamentals over raw athleticism, allowing them to build unique skill sets (e.g., shooting, playmaking) without being overwhelmed by physical competition early on. Once mature, these players could compete at the highest levels, their confidence intact.
This mirrors the retainable industry argument: shielding a developing entity (an industry or a child) from premature competition allows it to cultivate strengths that enable it to thrive later in a global or adult arena. However, the cocoon must eventually open—industries must face global markets, and kids must navigate the broader world. The key is timing and preparation.
Broader Implications and Trade-Offs
Both cases highlight the tension between protection and exposure:
Protection’s Benefits: For industries, it preserves jobs, innovation, and national wealth. For kids, it builds confidence, skills, and identity. Orthodox Jewish communities, for instance, produce tightly knit, high-achieving individuals by controlling peer groups and environments. Similarly, less competitive youth sports settings can nurture talents who might otherwise be discouraged.
Protection’s Risks: Over-sheltering can stunt adaptability. Industries overly reliant on subsidies may fail when exposed to global markets. Kids raised in too insular an environment might struggle with diverse or high-pressure settings later (e.g., college, professional sports). The NBA example suggests that while a cocoon helped some players, they still needed to develop resilience to compete at the professional level against diverse, elite talent.
National vs. Individual Choices: Nations choose which industries to protect based on strategic interests (e.g., tech over agriculture). Parents choose environments based on values or goals (e.g., academic success, athletic development). Both involve prioritizing certain outcomes over others, often with long-term consequences.
Addressing Your Point About Peer Selection
You’re absolutely right that parental choices about peers—via location, schools, or lifestyle—are among the most profound ways to shape kids. Peers influence behavior, aspirations, and self-perception. In the NBA case, parents who moved to areas with strong basketball programs but less intense racial or physical competition may have inadvertently (or deliberately) given their kids a developmental edge. This isn’t unique to race; it’s about matching a child’s environment to their needs. A musically gifted child might thrive in a performing arts school but flounder in a rough public school where arts are deprioritized.
The Orthodox Jewish example is apt: by living in tight-knit communities and sending kids to yeshivas, parents ensure peers reinforce shared values and academic rigor. This can produce exceptional outcomes (e.g., high representation in professions like law or medicine) but may limit exposure to diverse perspectives, just as protected industries may struggle with global innovation if too insular.
Conclusion
The case for protecting retainable industries parallels the case for raising kids in a sheltered environment. Both aim to nurture strengths in a controlled setting to ensure long-term success against tougher competition. Your NBA example illustrates how avoiding early, potentially confidence-shattering competition can allow talents to flourish, much like protecting an industry from foreign rivals until it’s ready to compete globally. However, both require balancing protection with eventual exposure to ensure adaptability. Parental choices about peers and environments are indeed a powerful tool, shaping kids’ trajectories just as national policies shape economies. The challenge lies in knowing when to open the cocoon—too early, and the entity falters; too late, and it may lack resilience.

Is it true that the more east-asian a school becomes in the US, some white kids don’t want to compete with asians in the hard sciences, and they leave the school for a less-challenging, less-asian one?

Grok says:

Some studies and anecdotal reports suggest that in highly competitive schools with significant East Asian student populations, academic pressure can intensify, particularly in STEM fields. East Asian cultural emphasis on academic achievement, rigorous study habits, and parental expectations often leads to high performance in math and science. For example, a 2018 study from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that Asian-American students are disproportionately represented in advanced STEM courses and competitions, often outperforming peers due to cultural and systemic factors like supplementary education (e.g., tutoring or after-school programs).
This environment can create perceptions of heightened competition. Some white students (or parents) might feel discouraged if they believe they can’t keep up, though this is more about individual responses to pressure than race inherently. A 2014 article in Education Week noted that in some diverse, high-achieving districts, white families occasionally transfer to less competitive schools, citing “stress” or “fit,” but the data didn’t explicitly tie this to East Asian demographics. It’s also worth noting that school choice often correlates with socioeconomic factors, not just academic rigor.
On the flip side, many white students thrive in these environments, and diversity can foster resilience and collaboration. The “white flight” narrative risks oversimplification—students leave schools for various reasons, including lifestyle preferences, cost, or broader cultural discomfort, not just academic competition.

What typically happens when a public school or neighborhood tips east-asian? Is there white flight?

Grok says:

When a public school or neighborhood in the U.S. becomes predominantly East Asian, several dynamics can emerge, influenced by socioeconomic, cultural, and academic factors. The concept of “tipping” refers to a demographic shift where a group, in this case, East Asian residents or students, becomes a significant or dominant presence, potentially altering the area’s character or perception. Below, I outline what typically happens, addressing the question of “white flight” and other outcomes, based on available evidence and patterns.
1. Demographic and Cultural Shifts
Neighborhood Changes: As East Asian families move into a neighborhood, often drawn by strong schools, affordable housing, or cultural networks, the area may develop ethnic enclaves. For example, places like Cupertino, CA, or parts of Flushing, NY, have seen significant East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Indian) populations, leading to businesses, restaurants, and community centers catering to these groups. This can enhance cultural vibrancy but may also change the neighborhood’s identity, which some long-term residents might find jarring.
School Composition: Public schools in these areas often reflect the neighborhood’s demographics. Schools may see an influx of East Asian students, who frequently excel academically due to cultural emphasis on education, parental involvement, and supplementary learning (e.g., tutoring, Kumon). For instance, a 2019 report from the U.S. Department of Education showed that Asian-American students made up over 50% of enrollment in some high-performing California districts like Fremont and Irvine.
2. Academic Environment
Increased Competition: East Asian students often perform strongly in STEM subjects, advanced placement (AP) courses, and extracurriculars like math or science competitions. A 2018 National Bureau of Economic Research study highlighted that Asian-American students are overrepresented in STEM fields and selective programs, often due to rigorous preparation. This can raise the academic bar, creating a perception of intense competition.
School Reputation: Schools may gain reputations as “high-achieving” or “rigorous,” attracting more ambitious families (including non-Asian ones) but potentially intimidating others who feel their children can’t compete. This perception can influence enrollment decisions.
3. White Flight: Does It Happen?
The term “white flight” historically describes white families leaving areas due to the arrival of minority groups, often tied to racial or economic concerns. In the context of East Asian demographic shifts, the evidence is mixed and nuanced:
Limited Evidence of Classic White Flight: Unlike historical white flight driven by Black or Hispanic integration, East Asian influxes are less likely to trigger mass exodus. East Asian families often move into middle- or upper-middle-class areas with strong schools, where property values remain stable or rise. A 2017 study in Urban Studies found that Asian population growth in suburban areas was associated with increased property values, reducing economic incentives for white families to leave.
Selective Out-Migration: Some white families may leave, but it’s often tied to specific concerns rather than overt racial animus. These include:
Academic Pressure: Parents might perceive the school environment as too competitive or stressful. A 2014 Education Week article noted that in some diverse, high-achieving districts, white families occasionally transferred to less rigorous schools, citing “stress” or “better fit,” though this wasn’t explicitly linked to East Asian demographics.
Cultural Discomfort: Some families may feel out of place if the school or neighborhood culture shifts significantly (e.g., dominance of Asian languages in parent groups or cultural events). This is anecdotal but mentioned in community discussions on platforms like X.
Socioeconomic Factors: East Asian families often have high educational attainment and income levels (e.g., 54% of Asians in the U.S. have a bachelor’s degree or higher, per 2021 Census data), which can drive up housing costs, indirectly pushing out lower-income families, including white ones.
Counter-Trends: Many white families stay or even move into these areas for the strong schools and economic stability. For example, districts like Montgomery County, MD, with significant Asian populations, remain diverse and desirable. A 2020 Brookings Institution report noted that diverse, high-achieving suburbs are increasingly attractive to white families seeking quality education.
4. Other Outcomes
Diversity and Integration: Schools and neighborhoods often become more diverse, not just East Asian. For instance, areas with growing Asian populations may also attract South Asian, Hispanic, or other groups, fostering multiculturalism. A 2022 study from the Journal of Urban Affairs found that Asian-heavy suburbs often maintain stable diversity compared to racially polarized urban areas.
School Policy Changes: Schools may adapt to the demographic shift by offering more AP/STEM courses, bilingual programs, or cultural events. However, this can lead to tensions if resources are perceived as favoring high-achieving (often Asian) students over others.
Social Dynamics: Some students (of any race) may feel marginalized if they struggle to keep up academically or socially in a high-pressure environment. Conversely, diversity can foster cross-cultural friendships and resilience. A 2016 American Educational Research Journal study found that diverse schools with strong academic cultures often produce better long-term outcomes for all students.
5. Data Gaps and Context
No Nationwide Data on Tipping and Flight: There’s no comprehensive study directly linking East Asian demographic “tipping” to white flight in schools or neighborhoods. Most evidence is localized (e.g., California, New York) or anecdotal.
Regional Variations: Outcomes depend on the area. In affluent suburbs, white flight is less common due to economic incentives. In less wealthy areas, demographic shifts might amplify existing tensions.
Perception vs. Reality: On platforms like X, some users in high-Asian districts (e.g., Cupertino, Arcadia) complain about “too much competition” or cultural shifts, but these are often individual sentiments, not evidence of mass flight. Conversely, others praise the academic rigor and diversity.
Conclusion
When a school or neighborhood “tips” East Asian, the area often becomes more academically competitive, culturally diverse, and economically stable, with rising property values and strong schools. While some white families may leave due to perceived academic pressure, cultural discomfort, or cost-of-living increases, classic “white flight” is rare, as East Asian influxes don’t typically trigger the economic or social decline associated with historical flight patterns. Many white families stay or are attracted to these areas for their quality of life.

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Dan Senor’s State of World Jewry Address

Posted on May 15, 2025 by Luke Ford

I’ve just started listening to this talk and as he recites Jewish woes, I’m wondering if he asks — compared to whom?

Spoiler alert — no he doesn’t.

Over the past 800 years, Jews have consistently enjoyed more prosperous lives than the non-Jews around them.

Compared to the state of the working class, the state of Jewry is blessed.

I suspect there’s not much of a demand in ethnic life for speakers to come in to tell them how they have it good.

Jews currently enjoy more prosperous, higher quality lives than the non-Jews around them.

Would Jews pay for a speaker to tell them, “Let’s develop the attitude of thank you America!”?

Would Jews pay for a speaker to tell them, “Please consider the effect of your words and actions on the non-Jews around you”?

Dan calls Douglas Murray a friend and quotes him saying that Jews “are prominent but weak.”

Compared to whom? In many areas of life, Jews are strong. Nobody is strong everywhere.

Dan’s approach reminds me of a story in the Torah. “The Israelites claimed that the Canaanites were giants, specifically the Anakim, primarily during the period when they were scouting the Promised Land and preparing for conquest. This claim is rooted in the Book of Numbers, where the spies sent to scout the land reported the existence of “men of great size” and “giants,” including the Anakim.” (Google)

There’s zero sense of proportion in this Dan Senor speech.

I listen to almost every episode of Dan’s podcast, Call Me Back.

Dan extolls all the great things that German Jews did but shows no awareness that different groups have different interests. He displays zero understanding of those for whom Jewish power diminished their power. He decries anti-Jewish sentiments but doesn’t mention anti-Gentile sentiments. As Israel gets stronger, its neighbors get comparatively weaker.

Dan quotes Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. Dan loves quoting the glib.

Grok says:

Dan Senor’s 2025 State of World Jewry Address at the 92NY focuses on the challenges and resilience of Jewish communities, particularly in the U.S. and Israel, but he doesn’t explicitly compare Jews to other groups in terms of socioeconomic status, well-being, or other metrics. To address your question about how Jews are doing compared to other groups, I’ll draw on Senor’s key points from the address and supplement with available data, focusing on the U.S. context where comparisons are more feasible. Since the address emphasizes identity, antisemitism, and community strength, I’ll frame the comparison around these themes, as well as socioeconomic and demographic factors where relevant.
Senor’s Perspective
Senor highlights a contrast between Israeli and American Jews:
Israeli Jews: He’s optimistic about Israel’s future, citing its resilience, strong sense of identity, and national agency despite ongoing conflicts like the Gaza war and internal divisions. He believes Israel will “be fine” due to its cultural and societal “shock absorbers” (e.g., community ties, military service).
American Jews: He expresses concern about their future, describing them as “prominent but weak” due to assimilation, low engagement with Jewish institutions, and rising antisemitism. He urges American Jews to rebuild identity through Jewish day schools, summer camps, and gap years in Israel, noting that only 11% of charitable giving by wealthy Jewish Forbes 400 members goes to Jewish causes.
Senor doesn’t directly compare Jews to other ethnic or religious groups, but his focus on antisemitism and identity suggests a unique vulnerability for Jews, particularly in the Diaspora, amid a “fraught time” globally (e.g., Gaza war, 58 hostages still held, 9,000+ antisemitic incidents in the U.S. in 2024).
Comparing Jews to Other Groups
To provide a meaningful comparison, I’ll look at U.S. Jews (6–7.5 million, ~2.4% of the population) versus other religious or ethnic groups in terms of socioeconomic status, discrimination experiences, and community cohesion, using data from Pew Research, the Anti-Defamation League, and other sources.
1. Socioeconomic Status
American Jews: Jews are generally well-educated and affluent compared to the broader U.S. population. According to Pew’s 2020 Jewish Americans study:
58% of Jewish adults have a college degree or higher (vs. 33% of all U.S. adults).
28% have household incomes of $150,000+ (vs. 10% nationally).
Jews are overrepresented in high-status fields like finance, medicine, academia, and media.
Senor notes their prominence but argues it hasn’t translated into communal strength, citing underinvestment in Jewish causes.
Comparison Groups:
Asian Americans: Similar to Jews, Asian Americans (6% of the population) have high educational attainment (54% with a bachelor’s degree or higher) and median household incomes ($94,903 vs. $81,060 for Jews, adjusted for 2020). They also face stereotypes of success but experience discrimination, with 45% reporting bias incidents in 2020–21 (Stop AAPI Hate).
Black Americans: Black Americans (13% of the population) face systemic disparities, with only 26% holding a college degree and a median household income of $48,297. They report higher rates of discrimination (64% say they’ve experienced it regularly) than Jews (14% report offensive name-calling or snubbing).
Hispanics: Hispanics (18% of the population) have lower educational attainment (18% with a bachelor’s degree) and a median household income of $56,113. About 50% report discrimination based on ethnicity, higher than Jews but lower than Black Americans.
Takeaway: Jews outperform most groups socioeconomically, rivaling Asian Americans, but Senor argues this prominence masks vulnerabilities in community cohesion and identity, unlike groups with stronger cultural or religious ties (e.g., Orthodox Jews or certain immigrant communities).
2. Experiences of Discrimination
American Jews: Antisemitism is a growing concern, with the ADL reporting over 9,000 incidents in 2024, the highest on record, including assault, harassment, and vandalism. The AJC’s 2023 State of Antisemitism report found:
63% of Jews feel less secure than a year ago (up from 41% in 2022).
46% altered behavior (e.g., hiding Jewish symbols) due to fear, compared to 38% in 2022.
24% of Jewish college students felt unsafe at campus events.
Senor references campus protests (e.g., Columbia University, where signs targeted Jewish students as “Hamas’s next target”) as evidence of a hostile environment.
Comparison Groups:
Muslims: Muslims (1% of the population) face significant Islamophobia, with 48% reporting discrimination in a 2017 Pew survey. Post-9/11 surveillance and recent Gaza-related tensions have heightened insecurity, though incident counts are lower (~2,000 annually, CAIR).
Black Americans: 64% report regular discrimination, and hate crimes against Black individuals (~3,500 annually, FBI 2023) are high, though not as sharply rising as antisemitic incidents.
LGBTQ+ Americans: About 59% of LGBTQ+ individuals report harassment or discrimination (Gallup 2023), with hate crimes (~2,500 annually) comparable to antisemitic ones but less tied to global events like the Gaza war.
Takeaway: Jews face a unique spike in discrimination tied to global events (e.g., October 7, Gaza war), with antisemitic incidents outpacing those against other groups in raw numbers. However, Black Americans and Muslims report higher baseline discrimination rates in daily life. Senor’s concern about Jews as “sitting ducks” in the U.S. reflects this acute, event-driven insecurity.
3. Community Cohesion and Identity
American Jews: Senor argues that American Jews lack the “clarity, purpose, and deep sense of identity” he sees in Israelis, citing low engagement with Jewish institutions (e.g., only 27% of Jews under 18 live in Orthodox households, which are more cohesive). Assimilation and intermarriage (58% of Jews marry non-Jews) dilute communal ties, though millennials show some “new middle” engagement with Jewish identity.
Comparison Groups:
Evangelical Christians: Evangelicals (20% of the population) have strong communal ties, with 70% attending church regularly and 80% identifying religion as “very important” (Pew 2020). Their cohesion contrasts with non-Orthodox Jews’ lower synagogue attendance (24%).
Haredi Jews: Within Jewry, Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jews (~9% of U.S. Jews) have high birth rates, low intermarriage, and strong community structures, resembling Evangelicals more than Reform or secular Jews.
Asian Americans: Cultural identity varies by subgroup (e.g., Indian vs. Chinese), but community organizations (e.g., temples, cultural centers) foster cohesion for some. Intermarriage rates (~30%) are lower than for Jews, but assimilation pressures exist.
Takeaway: American Jews, outside Orthodox circles, have weaker communal cohesion than groups like Evangelicals or Haredi Jews, aligning more with secular or assimilated minorities like Asian Americans. Senor’s call for emulating Israeli identity reflects this gap.
4. Global Context
Globally, Jews (~15.8 million, 0.2% of the world population) are a small minority concentrated in Israel (7.2 million) and the U.S. (6–7.5 million). Senor’s address doesn’t compare Jews to other global minorities, but:
Jews face antisemitism in 94 countries (Pew 2020), more than most religious groups except Christians (155 countries) and Muslims (145).
Unlike larger minorities (e.g., Muslims, ~1.9 billion), Jews’ small numbers and historical persecution (e.g., Holocaust, expulsions from Arab countries) amplify their vulnerability, a theme Senor echoes in referencing The Pity of It All about German Jews’ pre-Holocaust prominence.
Groups like Roma or Yazidis face similar targeted persecution but lack the institutional support (e.g., Israel, Jewish organizations) that Jews have, which Senor sees as underutilized in the Diaspora.
Critical Notes
Senor’s Bias: His optimism about Israel and pessimism about American Jews reflect his Zionist perspective and may overstate Israeli resilience (e.g., ignoring economic strains from prolonged war) or understate American Jewish adaptability (e.g., millennial “new middle”).
Data Gaps: Direct comparisons are limited by differing metrics (e.g., antisemitism vs. racism) and the unique geopolitical role of Jews tied to Israel, which amplifies their visibility and vulnerability unlike most groups.
Contextual Nuance: Antisemitism’s recent spike is tied to specific events (October 7, Gaza war), unlike the more systemic discrimination faced by Black or Muslim Americans, making trend comparisons tricky.
Conclusion
Compared to other groups in the U.S., Jews excel socioeconomically, rivaling Asian Americans, but face a sharper rise in event-driven discrimination (antisemitism) than Muslims, Black Americans, or LGBTQ+ individuals, though baseline discrimination may be lower. Their communal cohesion lags behind Evangelicals or Haredi Jews, aligning more with assimilated minorities.

Grok says:

To analyze Dan Senor’s essay The Future of American Jewry After October 7 using the tools provided by John J. Mearsheimer’s War and International Politics, I will apply Mearsheimer’s realist framework, focusing on the competitive and potentially violent nature of politics, the anarchic structure of the international system, and the implications for state and group survival. Mearsheimer’s essay emphasizes that politics, both domestic and international, is inherently competitive, often leading to conflict, and that survival in an anarchic world drives state behavior. I will use these concepts to interpret Senor’s arguments about the challenges facing American Jewry, their historical and current vulnerabilities, and his proposed solutions for strengthening Jewish identity and resilience.
1. The Competitive Nature of Politics and Jewish Vulnerability
Mearsheimer argues that politics is a “deeply competitive and potentially violent enterprise” where disagreements over fundamental values can escalate into conflict (p. 11). In domestic politics, the state mitigates violence through its monopoly on force, but in the international system, anarchy means no higher authority exists to protect states—or groups—from threats (p. 13). Senor’s essay reflects this competitive dynamic in the context of American Jewry, portraying Jews as a group facing existential challenges within a competitive and increasingly hostile political environment.
Senor highlights the post-October 7, 2023, surge in anti-Semitism, noting that American Jews were shocked by the betrayal of institutions they had supported, such as universities and cultural organizations (Senor, para. 5). He cites Amos Elon’s The Pity of It All to illustrate how German Jews’ contributions to society were weaponized against them, a pattern he sees repeating today (para. 6-8). This aligns with Mearsheimer’s view that political competition can turn deadly when groups’ visibility or success provokes resentment (p. 11). For Mearsheimer, domestic politics requires a state to prevent violence, but for diaspora Jews, no such centralized authority exists to shield them from anti-Semitic hostility, mirroring the anarchic vulnerability of states in the international system.
Senor’s observation that Jewish prominence in society makes them “prominent but weak” (para. 5) echoes Mearsheimer’s security dilemma, where efforts to enhance security (e.g., Jewish contributions to societal institutions) can be perceived as threatening by others, prompting backlash (p. 14). The “Can You Believe!?” WhatsApp groups Senor describes reflect a heightened awareness of this competitive dynamic, as Jews react to media and institutional betrayals (para. 3). Mearsheimer’s framework suggests that this resentment is not merely ideological but rooted in the competitive nature of politics, where groups vie for influence and survival.
2. Anarchy and the Absence of a Protector
Mearsheimer emphasizes that the anarchic international system, lacking a “night watchman,” forces states to prioritize survival and compete for power (p. 13-14). Senor’s essay implicitly applies this logic to American Jewry, portraying them as a vulnerable group in a domestic and global environment without a reliable protector. He argues that Jewish philanthropy to non-Jewish institutions, such as universities, has not secured safety, as these institutions have turned against Jews (para. 5, 13). This mirrors Mearsheimer’s point that in anarchy, states cannot rely on others for protection and must prepare for conflict (p. 14).
Senor’s historical examples—German Jews, Spanish Jews, and others—illustrate a recurring pattern where Jewish communities, despite integration and contributions, faced existential threats without a sovereign protector (para. 8). In Mearsheimer’s terms, this reflects the absence of a higher authority to enforce order, leaving Jews exposed to the whims of competitive politics (p. 13). Senor’s skepticism about winning the “information war” against anti-Semitism (para. 12) further aligns with Mearsheimer’s realist pessimism: in a competitive world, moral or legal appeals (e.g., better storytelling) are unlikely to trump power dynamics (p. 10). Just as Mearsheimer notes that great powers prioritize survival over moral considerations (p. 10), Senor suggests that anti-Semitic narratives persist because they resonate in a competitive political landscape, not because of a lack of Jewish advocacy.
3. Survival Strategies: Building Jewish Resilience
Mearsheimer argues that states in an anarchic system ensure survival by maximizing power, often through military capabilities or alliances (p. 14). Senor, addressing a non-state group, proposes a different but analogous strategy: strengthening Jewish identity through immersive communal institutions to ensure cultural and social survival. He advocates for Jewish day schools, summer camps, adult education, gap years in Israel, and reoriented philanthropy as tools to build “Jewish muscle memory” and resilience (para. 17-27). These initiatives can be seen as a form of “soft power” to counter assimilation and external hostility, akin to how states build capabilities to deter threats.
Mearsheimer’s concept of the security dilemma is relevant here: Jewish efforts to strengthen identity (e.g., through day schools or pro-Israel advocacy) may be perceived as threatening by others, potentially fueling anti-Semitism (p. 14). Senor acknowledges this risk implicitly, noting that Jewish prominence has historically backfired (para. 5). However, he argues that retreating from Jewish identity is not the answer; instead, Jews must “lead Jewish lives” to sustain their community (para. 15). This aligns with Mearsheimer’s view that survival requires proactive measures, even if they provoke competition (p. 14).
Senor’s emphasis on Jewish day schools as “living, breathing Jewish communities” (para. 17) parallels Mearsheimer’s point that states need internal cohesion to compete effectively (p. 12). Schools and camps foster a shared identity, much like a state’s institutions unify its citizens. Senor’s data—day school alumni being twice as likely to feel connected to Jewish identity and four times as likely to feel connected to Israel (para. 17)—suggests these institutions build the social capital needed for group survival, akin to a state’s military or economic power. His call for increased philanthropy to fund these programs (para. 27-29) reflects Mearsheimer’s argument that resources are critical for prevailing in competitive politics (p. 12).
4. Escalation and the Risks of Identity-Based Mobilization
Mearsheimer warns that political passions, especially nationalism, can drive escalation in wars, pushing conflicts toward total war (p. 29-30). Senor’s essay, while not about war, touches on a parallel dynamic: the post-October 7 “surge of interest” in Jewish life, driven by outrage and adrenaline, risks fading without sustained effort (para. 2-4). Mearsheimer’s insight that political intensity can undermine control (p. 29) applies to Senor’s concern that the “Jewish adrenaline” may wane, leaving Jews vulnerable again (para. 4). Senor’s solution— institutionalizing Jewish identity through schools and camps—aims to channel this passion into lasting resilience, preventing a return to complacency.
However, Mearsheimer’s framework suggests a risk: heightened Jewish mobilization could escalate tensions with other groups, especially in a polarized domestic environment. Just as nationalism fuels hatred in wartime (p. 30), a stronger Jewish identity might be perceived as exclusionary or threatening, exacerbating anti-Semitism. Senor’s focus on internal community-building rather than external confrontation mitigates this risk, but Mearsheimer’s realism implies that any group’s self-strengthening efforts can provoke a competitive response (p. 14).
5. Implications for American Jewry’s Future
Mearsheimer’s essay concludes that war’s ever-present threat shapes international politics, requiring states to prioritize survival over moral or economic considerations (p. 36). Senor similarly argues that American Jewry must prioritize survival by investing in Jewish identity, given the persistent threat of anti-Semitism (para. 29). His call to “recalibrate” philanthropy toward Jewish causes (para. 28) reflects Mearsheimer’s logic that resources must align with survival needs, not diffuse goodwill (p. 12). Senor’s invocation of Israeli resilience—exemplified by figures like Hersh Goldberg-Polin and Agam Berger—parallels Mearsheimer’s view that a clear sense of purpose (a “why”) enhances a group’s ability to endure threats (p. 36).
However, Mearsheimer’s realism highlights a challenge Senor does not fully address: the limits of non-state actors in an anarchic world. While states can build armies, Jewish communities rely on cultural and social tools, which may not fully counter physical or political threats. Senor’s optimism about a “Jewish renaissance” (para. 24) contrasts with Mearsheimer’s sober view that conflict is endemic to politics (p. 36). A realist lens suggests that while Senor’s strategies may strengthen Jewish identity, they cannot eliminate the competitive dynamics driving anti-Semitism.
Conclusion
Using Mearsheimer’s realist framework, Senor’s essay can be understood as a call to address the competitive and anarchic realities facing American Jewry. The post-October 7 surge in anti-Semitism reflects the competitive nature of politics, where Jewish success provokes resentment, and the absence of a protector mirrors the anarchy of the international system. Senor’s proposed solutions—day schools, camps, gap years, and reoriented philanthropy—aim to build Jewish resilience, akin to a state’s efforts to maximize power for survival. However, Mearsheimer’s insights highlight the risks of escalation and the limits of non-state strategies in a competitive world. Senor’s vision of a Jewish renaissance is compelling, but realism suggests that sustained effort and vigilance are necessary to navigate the perennial threats to Jewish survival.

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Where Am I Lying?

Posted on May 14, 2025 by Luke Ford

Google says: “AI is demonstrating promising accuracy in lie detection, often surpassing human capabilities. Studies have shown AI models can identify deception with 66% to 84% accuracy. This is significantly better than the average human’s ability to detect lies, which is only around 54%, according to Psychology Today.”

I asked Grok to point out where I might be deceptive in my essay “Decoding Dennis Prager.” Grok said:

* The quoted statements are verifiable, as Ford provides specific sources (e.g., podcast episodes, lectures). Prager’s public persona—marked by bold, definitive assertions—aligns with Ford’s portrayal, and critiques like Gottfried’s corroborate the view of Prager as intellectually shallow in some contexts. However, Ford’s framing risks deception by selectively highlighting Prager’s most grandiose claims without acknowledging instances where Prager qualifies his views or engages with complexity (e.g., in debates or longer writings). This selective presentation paints Prager as more reckless than he may consistently be. No outright lie is evident, but the omission of counterexamples could mislead readers about the breadth of Prager’s approach.
* Ford’s narrative is subjective but plausible, given Prager’s polarizing Covid stance, which drew criticism for minimizing risks (e.g., PragerU videos questioning lockdowns). His shift from admiration to critique mirrors a common arc of disillusionment with public figures. However, Ford’s emphasis on his own “desperation” and Prager’s “quasi-religious” hold over him may exaggerate Prager’s influence to dramatize the story. In his earlier work (e.g., “My Dennis Prager Story”), Ford admitted to grandiose tendencies and a need for validation, suggesting he might amplify his personal stakes for effect. There’s no evidence he’s lying about his experience, but the heightened emotional framing could deceive readers into overestimating Prager’s cult-like impact on followers generally.
* Prager’s Covid skepticism is well-documented, as he publicly questioned mask mandates and lockdowns, aligning with conservative talking points. Ford’s examples are grounded in real statements, and his critique of their oversimplification is supported by scientific consensus at the time (e.g., CDC’s 2020 mask guidance). However, Ford’s portrayal risks deception by implying Prager’s views were uniquely harmful without comparing them to similar conservative voices (e.g., Ben Shapiro, Tucker Carlson), which dilutes the specificity of the critique. Additionally, Ford doesn’t acknowledge Prager’s audience context—conservatives skeptical of government overreach—potentially exaggerating the claims’ recklessness. No lies are apparent, but the selective focus could mislead by overstating Prager’s singularity or intent.
* The guru framework is a subjective lens, but Ford applies it consistently, tying Prager’s style to documented traits (e.g., confidence, simplification). His analysis of Prager’s delivery is grounded in observable traits, as Prager’s slow, deliberate speech is a hallmark of his media presence. However, Ford’s application of the term “guru” risks deception by implying a cult-like intent that may not fully align with Prager’s role as a commentator. Prager’s influence, while significant, operates within mainstream conservatism, not a fringe movement. Ford’s failure to distinguish Prager from other charismatic pundits (e.g., Jordan Peterson, as Ford himself noted elsewhere) weakens the claim’s precision. No lie exists, but the loaded term “guru” could mislead readers into viewing Prager as more manipulative than evidence fully supports.
* Ford quotes philosopher Paul Gottfried’s 2020 statement: “[Dennis Prager is] an intellectual vulgarian of a kind I have rarely encountered… He has said such ridiculous things about history, fascism, democracy, that it is hard for me to bestow any respect on his intellectual accomplishments.” Ford uses this to bolster his argument that Prager’s intellectual credibility is questionable.
Evaluation: The quote appears accurate, as Gottfried, a paleoconservative scholar, has publicly criticized Prager’s historical and political assertions (e.g., in American Greatness articles). Ford’s use of it is fair, as it aligns with his thesis. However, presenting Gottfried’s view as a definitive indictment risks deception by not noting Gottfried’s own ideological bias (paleoconservatism vs. Prager’s neoconservatism), which could frame their disagreement as personal or factional rather than purely intellectual. Ford doesn’t lie, but the lack of context might mislead readers about the critique’s objectivity.
Prager’s Books and Broader Influence
Ford argues that Prager’s books, like The Rational Bible series, are “harmless” on their own but dangerous for “desperate” followers swayed by his charisma, leading them down a “wrong path” of oversimplified thinking. He ties this to Prager’s broader influence via PragerU, which he claims promotes polarizing narratives.
Potential Deception: This claim is speculative, as Ford provides no evidence (e.g., studies, follower testimonials) that Prager’s books or PragerU content directly harm vulnerable readers. While PragerU’s videos are known for concise, conservative framing, Ford’s assertion of harm relies on his personal disillusionment rather than data. His use of “desperate” followers echoes his own self-description but may not generalize. This borders on deceptive exaggeration, as it implies a causal link without substantiation. No outright lie is present, but the claim’s weight exceeds the evidence.
Where Is Ford Lying or Being Deceptive?
Ford doesn’t appear to lie outright, as his claims about Prager’s statements, style, and influence are grounded in verifiable sources (e.g., podcasts, videos, Gottfried’s quote). However, he engages in deception through:
Selective Framing: Ford highlights Prager’s most grandiose or polarizing claims (e.g., Covid, Torah) without acknowledging instances of nuance, exaggerating Prager’s recklessness.
Exaggerated Personal Narrative: His portrayal of Prager’s “quasi-religious” hold over him and other “desperate” followers dramatizes the guru dynamic, potentially misleading readers about Prager’s broader impact.
Unsubstantiated Harm: Claiming Prager’s books and PragerU lead followers down a “wrong path” lacks evidence, relying on speculation and Ford’s own experience, which borders on deceptive exaggeration.
Loaded Terminology: Using “guru” and “epistemic corruption” implies manipulative intent that may overstate Prager’s role as a mainstream commentator, misleading readers about his influence’s scope.
Conclusion
Ford’s essay is a mix of factual critique and subjective interpretation, with no clear lies but several deceptive elements. His selective focus, dramatic narrative, and unsubstantiated claims about harm inflate Prager’s flaws, potentially misleading readers about the scale and intent of Prager’s influence.

I asked Grok to investigate my biography of Dennis Prager for lies. Grok said:

Key Points
It seems likely that Luke Ford’s pages about Dennis Prager contain accurate factual details, such as birth date and education, based on available research.
The evidence leans toward Ford’s interpretations of Prager’s views being consistent with public statements, though some claims may lack direct sourcing.
There is no clear evidence of lying, but Ford’s history of controversial reporting suggests potential for exaggeration, especially in subjective interpretations.
Factual Accuracy
Ford’s biographical details about Prager, such as his birth date (August 2, 1948), parents (Max Prager and Hilda Friedfeld), and education (Yeshiva Rambam, Yeshiva of Flatbush, Brooklyn College), are accurate and corroborated by reliable sources like Wikipedia: Dennis Prager. Personal anecdotes, like Prager’s circumcision complication, align with his public writings, suggesting Ford’s factual reporting here is reliable.
Views and Interpretations
Ford’s claims about Prager’s views, such as his involvement in the Baby Richard case (1995), support for mass immigration for demographic reasons, and downplaying IQ’s importance, are generally consistent with Prager’s public record. For instance, Prager’s focus on the Baby Richard case is documented in a 1995 Los Angeles Times article, and his immigration views are reflected in a column on his website
While no clear lies were found, Ford’s history suggests a risk of selective framing or dramatization. For example, his emphasis on Prager’s “guru-like” influence in other writings might overstate their relationship, but this isn’t evident in the provided pages. The interpretations of Prager’s views may be subjective, potentially misleading readers without additional context, but they don’t appear to be intentionally false.
Conclusion
Based on the analysis, it seems likely that Ford’s pages contain accurate factual details, with interpretations generally aligning with Prager’s public statements.

I asked Grok where I might be lying in my Dennis Prager story.

Grok said:

* Ford may overstate the closeness or importance of his relationship with Prager. The narrative doesn’t provide evidence that Prager reciprocated any personal regard, and Ford’s self-described “grandiose” tendencies (e.g., seeing himself as a “hero” or “truth-teller”) suggest he might inflate his role in Prager’s world.
* Ford’s transparency about his psychological struggles and motivations lends credibility to his self-reflection but raises questions about the objectivity of his account. If he was driven by a need for validation or attention, as he suggests, his portrayal of events might be colored to cast himself as a protagonist in a larger drama. For example, his claim of being a “critic” of Prager might overstate the intellectual weight of his blogging, which often focused on personal anecdotes and gossip. There’s no direct evidence of lying, but the self-aggrandizement could distort the narrative.
* Ford’s claim of being a principled journalist might be misleading if his primary goal was attention or provocation, as his past suggests. His narrative doesn’t explicitly lie about his actions, but framing them as heroic truth-telling glosses over the ethical gray areas of his reporting style.

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The Main Points from Donald Trump’s Epic Speech on May 13, 2025

Posted on May 14, 2025 by Luke Ford

Batya Ungar-Sargon (my favorite lefty along with Dan Turrentine) posts: “Anyone hoping to understand President Trump’s foreign policy should watch his whole speech, probably the most momentous foreign policy address of my lifetime. Trump is building a new world order. I would encourage our allies to watch it closely so as not to miss out on what could turn out to be a once in a lifetime opportunity.”

Grok says: President Donald Trump delivered a speech at a U.S.-Saudi investment forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 13, 2025, during his first overseas trip since his reelection. The main points of the speech, as reported, include:

Lifting Sanctions on Syria: Trump announced the U.S. would remove all sanctions against Syria, stating they had served their purpose but it was now time for Syria to “move forward and shine” and have a “chance at greatness.” He expressed optimism for Syria’s new government post-Assad regime.

Praise for Saudi Arabia: Trump lauded Saudi Arabia’s leadership and transformation, highlighting their partnership with the U.S. He emphasized the kingdom’s commitment to invest $600 billion in U.S. deals, covering defense, infrastructure, and other sectors, nearly double Saudi Arabia’s 2025 defense budget.

New Vision for the Middle East: Trump articulated a shift in U.S. foreign policy, promoting a “you be you” approach, suggesting countries should prosper without U.S. interference in their governance. This was framed as a departure from past U.S. policies of dictating to other nations.

Regional Diplomacy: While not detailed in the speech itself, posts on X suggest Trump offered an “olive branch” to Iran while warning against nuclear ambitions, indicating a balanced approach to Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Economic and Trade Focus: The speech underscored economic partnerships, aligning with Trump’s broader agenda of securing trade and investment deals, as seen in the Saudi investment announcement and his recent trade agreements with the UK and China.

Importance of the Speech

The speech was significant for several reasons:

Foreign Policy Shift: Announcing the end of Syrian sanctions marked a notable policy change, potentially reshaping U.S.-Syria relations and signaling a less interventionist stance in the Middle East. This aligns with Trump’s campaign promises to prioritize peace over “endless wars.”

Economic Impact: The $600 billion Saudi investment deal is a major economic commitment, potentially boosting U.S. industries like defense and infrastructure. It reinforces Trump’s focus on leveraging foreign investment to strengthen the U.S. economy.

Geopolitical Messaging: By praising Saudi Arabia and advocating for regional autonomy, Trump positioned the U.S. as a partner rather than a hegemon, which could influence alliances and rivalries in the Middle East, especially with Iran and Syria.

First Overseas Trip: As the kickoff to Trump’s first international tour since reelection, the speech set the tone for his second term’s foreign policy, emphasizing economic deals and diplomatic pragmatism.

Why It Received Little News Coverage

Despite its significance, the speech appears to have garnered limited attention in mainstream media. Several factors likely contributed:

Competing News Stories: On May 13, 2025, other stories may have dominated headlines. For instance, NPR reported on the Supreme Court upholding Trump’s transgender military ban, a $500 million universal flu vaccine project, and the end of protective status for Afghans in the U.S., all of which are divisive domestic issues likely to draw more attention.

Foreign Policy Fatigue: U.S. audiences often prioritize domestic issues like the economy, immigration, or cultural debates over foreign policy, especially in a region like the Middle East, where public interest has waned since the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The speech’s focus on Syria and Saudi Arabia may have seemed less urgent to news outlets catering to domestic concerns.

Media Bias or Framing: Some sources suggest Trump’s speeches are underreported if they don’t fit certain narratives. An X post claimed the speech was “monumental” but made only a “minor splash,” possibly due to media reluctance to highlight Trump’s diplomatic successes or his critique of past U.S. policies. However, this claim is speculative and not independently verified.

Event Context: The speech occurred at an investment forum, not a high-profile summit or crisis event, potentially reducing its perceived urgency. The celebratory tone, ending with “YMCA” playing and photo ops with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, may have framed it as more ceremonial than substantive.

Information Gaps: Specific details about the speech’s content are sparse in major outlets, with more focus on the Saudi investment deal or Trump’s arrival in Riyadh. This could indicate limited press pool access, a focus on outcomes (e.g., the $600 billion deal) over rhetoric, or reliance on wire services like Reuters, which provided brief coverage.

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