Ann Coulter Was Right?

A friend says: Politics can only be interesting if there is a win here and there for both teams. Trump might have appeared to be a big win, but increasingly just look like a meaningless anomaly. Culturally the left is in turbo charged domination. It’s a blowout game, and I’m turning the channel. It’s over. To live in reality means accepting as normative whatever is offered. You can crack jokes or snark on twitter for a year or so but reality sets in.

Trump was delighted by the mob he’d unleashed on the Capitol, but according to sources, appalled by how badly dressed they were. He “expressed disgust on aesthetic grounds over how ‘low class’ his supporters looked,” one Trump adviser told New York magazine, adding, “He doesn’t like low-class things.”

Ann Coulter is spot on, and should not hold back in the slightest. She is still somewhat in the Overton window and disavowed his hucksterism long ago. He was as lazy and disingenuous as she claimed. Drudge looks like a big winner too, sized up Trump and ran away. Ann’s column is so biting, so accurate in my view. ‘The Dems despise the working class and Trump uses them.’ Luke a good question is, is better to be despised or used?

She seem inordinately fixated on Israel though. Seems like a non sequitur. Evangelicals wanted it, and Trump delivered for those voters.

Ann doesn’t like working class people either, or lower class people, no one who has money wants to hang out with them. I have the good sense to be a nihilist in that I don’t assume anyone is truly authentic, myself included.

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NYT: White Riot – How racism, grievance, resentment and the fear of diminished status came together to fuel violence and mayhem on Jan. 6.

Thomas Edsall writes in the New York Times:

There is evidence that many non-college white Americans who have been undergoing what psychiatrists call “involuntary subordination” or “involuntary defeat” both resent and mourn their loss of centrality and what they perceive as their growing invisibility.

Andrew Cherlin, a sociologist at Johns Hopkins University, wrote by email:

They fear a loss of attention. A loss of validation. These are people who have always had racial privilege but have never had much else. Many feel passed over, ignored. Trump listened to them and spoke their language when few other politicians did. He felt their pain and was diabolical enough to encourage their tendency to racialize that pain. They fear becoming faceless again if a Democrat, or even a conventional Republican, were to take office.

Cherlin pointed to the assertion of a 67-year-old retired landscaper from North Carolina who joined the Trump loyalists on Jan. 6 on the steps of the Capitol: “We are here. See us! Notice us! Pay attention!”

White supremacy and frank racism are prime motivators, and they combined with other elements to fuel the insurrection: a groundswell of anger directed specifically at elites and an addictive lust for revenge against those they see as the agents of their disempowerment.

It is this admixture of factors that makes the insurgency that wrested control of the House and Senate so dangerous — and is likely to spark new forms of violence in the future. Each of the forces at work has helped drive millions of white voters to the right: working in tandem, they collectively provide the tinder for the destructive behavior we saw last week in the chambers of the United States Congress.

“It is very, very difficult for individuals and groups to come to terms with losing status and power,” Cameron Anderson, a professor at Berkeley’s Haas School of Business, wrote by email. While most acute among those possessing high status and power, Anderson said,

People in general are sensitive to status threats and to any potential losses of social standing, and they respond to those threats with stress, anxiety, anger, and sometimes even violence.

Dacher Keltner, a professor of psychology at Berkeley, agrees in large part with Anderson, describing the fury and disappointment contributing to the takeover of Congress as concentrated among whites who see their position in the social order on a downward path. In an email, Keltner wrote:

The population of U.S. Citizens who’ve lost the most power in the past 40 years, who aren’t competing well to get into college or get high paying jobs, whose marital prospects have dimmed, and who are outraged, are those I believe were most likely to be in on the attack.

When pressed to give up power, he added, “these types of individuals will resort to violence, and to refashioning history to suggest they did not lose.”

In a September 2020 paper, “Theories of power: Perceived strategies for gaining and maintaining power,” Keltner and Leanne ten Brinke, a professor of psychology at the University of British Columbia, argue that “lower class individuals experience greater vigilance to threat, relative to high status individuals, leading them to perceive greater hostility in their environment.”

This increased vigilance, Brinke and Keltner continue, creates

a bias such that relatively low socio-economic status individuals perceive the powerful as dominant and threatening — endorsing a coercive theory of power. Indeed, there is evidence that individuals of lower social class are more cynical than those occupying higher classes, and that this cynicism is directed toward out-group members — that is, those that occupy higher classes.

In other words, resentment toward successful white elites is in play here, as evidenced by the attack on Congress, an overwhelmingly white seat of power.

Before Trump, many of those who became his supporters suffered from what Carol Graham, a senior fellow at Brookings, describes as pervasive “unhappiness, stress and lack of hope” without a narrative to legitimate their condition:

When the jobs went away, families fell apart. There was no narrative other than the classic American dream that everyone who works hard can get ahead, and the implicit correlate was that those who fall behind and are on welfare are losers, lazy, and often minorities.

In a December 2020 Brookings Paper, Graham and Sergio Pinto, a doctoral student at the University of Maryland, wrote that

Despair — and the associated mortality trends — is concentrated among the less-than-college educated and is much higher among whites than minorities. The trends are also geographically dispersed, with populations in racially and economically diverse urban and coastal places more optimistic and with lower premature mortality.

What, however, could prompt a mob — including not only members of the Proud Boys and the Boogaloo Bois but also many seemingly ordinary Americans drawn to Trump — to break into the Capitol?

One possible answer: a mutated form of moral certitude based on the belief that one’s decline in social and economic status is the result of unfair, if not corrupt, decisions by others, especially by so-called elites.

In “The Social and Political Implications of Moral Conviction,” Linda J. Skitka and G. Scott Morgan, psychology professors at University of Illinois-Chicago and Drew University, wrote that “although moral conviction motivates any number of normatively positive behaviors (e.g., voting, political engagement), moral conviction appears to also have a potential dark side.”

Skitka and Morgan argued that:

The terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Weatherman bombings in protest of the Vietnam War, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, or the assassination of abortion providers, may be motivated by different ideological beliefs but nonetheless share a common theme: The people who did these things appear to be motivated by strong moral conviction. Although some argue that engaging in behaviors like these requires moral disengagement, we find instead that they require maximum moral engagement and justification.

Alan Page Fiske, a professor of anthropology at U.C.L.A., and Tage Shakti Rai, a research associate at the MIT Sloan School of Management, make a parallel argument in their book “Virtuous Violence,” in which they write that violence is:

considered to be the essence of evil. It is the prototype of immorality. But an examination of violent acts and practices across cultures and throughout history shows just the opposite. When people hurt or kill someone, they usually do it because they feel they ought to: they feel that it is morally right or even obligatory to be violent.

“Most violence,” Fiske and Rai contend, “is morally motivated.”

A key factor working in concert to aggravate the anomie and disgruntlement in many members of Trump’s white working-class base is their inability to obtain a college education, a limitation that blocks access to higher paying jobs and lowers their supposed “value” in marriage markets.

In their paper “Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage From 1940 to 2003,” Christine R. Schwartz and Robert D. Mare, professors of sociology at the University of Wisconsin and the University of California-Los Angeles, wrote that the “most striking” data in their research, “is the decline in odds that those with very low levels of education marry up.”

In the bottom ranks of educational achievement, they continued, trends in inequality are

consistent with the decline in the odds of marriage between high school dropouts and those with more education since the 1970s, a period over which the real wages of men in this education group declined.

Christopher Federico, a professor of political science and psychology at the University of Minnesota, described the key roles of education and employment opportunity in the right-wing mobilization of less-educated white men:

A major development since the end of the “Great Compression” of the 30 years or so after World War II, when there was less inequality and relatively greater job security, at least for white male workers, is that the differential rate of return on education and training is now much higher.

In this new world, Federico argues, “promises of broad-based economic security” were replaced by a job market where you can have dignity, but it must be earned through market or entrepreneurial success (as the Reagan/Thatcher center-right would have it) or the meritocratic attainment of professional status (as the center-left would have it). But obviously, these are not avenues available to all, simply because society has only so many positions for captains of industry and educated professionals.

The result, Federico notes, is that “group consciousness is likely to emerge on the basis of education and training” and when “those with less education see themselves as being culturally very different from an educated stratum of the population that is more socially liberal and cosmopolitan, then the sense of group conflict is deepened.”

Bernard Grofman, a political scientist at the University of California, Irvine, put it this way in an email:

We would not have Trump as president if the Democrats had remained the party of the working class. The decline of labor unions proceeded at the same rate when Democrats were president as when Republicans were president; the same is, I believe, true of loss of manufacturing jobs as plants moved overseas.

President Obama, Grofman wrote,

responded to the housing crisis with bailouts of the lenders and interlinked financial institutions, not of the folks losing their homes. And the stagnation of wages and income for the middle and bottom of the income distribution continued under Obama. And the various Covid aid packages, while they include payments to the unemployed, are also helping big businesses more than the small businesses that have been and will be permanently going out of business due to the lockdowns (and they include various forms of pork.

The result, according to Grofman, was that “white less well-educated voters didn’t desert the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party deserted them.”

At the same time, though, and here I will quote Grofman at length:

More religious and less well-educated whites see Donald Trump as one of their own despite his being so obviously a child of privilege. He defends America as a Christian nation. He defends English as our national language. He is unashamed in stating that the loyalty of any government should be to its own citizens — both in terms of how we should deal with noncitizens here and how our foreign policy should be based on the doctrine of “America First.”

He speaks in a language that ordinary people can understand. He makes fun of the elites who look down on his supporters as a “basket of deplorables” and who think it is a good idea to defund the police who protect them and to prioritize snail darters over jobs. He appoints judges and justices who are true conservatives. He believes more in gun rights than in gay rights. He rejects political correctness and the language-police and woke ideology as un-American. And he promises to reclaim the jobs that previous presidents (of both parties) allowed to be shipped abroad. In sum, he offers a relatively coherent set of beliefs and policies that are attractive to many voters and which he has been better at seeing implemented than any previous Republican president. What Trump supporters who rioted in D.C. share are the beliefs that Trump is their hero, regardless of his flaws, and that defeating Democrats is a holy war to be waged by any means necessary.

In the end, Grofman said,

Trying to explain the violence on the Hill by only talking about what the demonstrators believe is to miss the point. They are guilty, but they wouldn’t be there were it not for the Republican politicians and the Republican attorneys general, and most of all the president, who cynically exaggerate and lie and create fake conspiracy theories and demonize the opposition. It is the enablers of the mob who truly deserve the blame and the shame.

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Theories of Power: Perceived Strategies for Gaining and Maintaining Power

Here are some highlights of a recent study noted in the New York Times today:

* What does it take to gain and maintain power? Aristotle believed that power was afforded to individuals that acted in virtuous ways that promote the greater good. Machiavelli, nearly 2,000 years later, argued to great effect that power could be taken through the use of manipulation, coercion, and strategic violence. With these historical perspectives as a conceptual foundation, we validate a 2-factor measure of theories of power (TOPS; Study 1), which captures lay theories of how power is gained and maintained among family members, at work, and in international politics (Study 2). We differentiate TOPS from other established measures of power, highlighting that these beliefs about power are conceptually distinct
from widely used measures of dominance and prestige, and uniquely predict social outcomes. Turning to social class, we find that participants who make upward social comparisons perceive themselves to be of lower class and endorse less collaborative and more coercive theories of power, relative to those who make downward comparisons and report themselves to be higher in the class hierarchy (Studies 3a and 3b). Building upon these findings, we identify theory of power endorsement as a correlate of interpersonal trust, and a mediator of how lower class individuals, who endorse less collaborative views of power, report less trust of institutions and individuals (Study 4). Theories of power provide a novel construct for understanding power dynamics at multiple levels of analysis.

* Influencing others is the crux of power. People rise to power to the extent that they influence others’ thoughts, emotions, actions, and well-being. The powerful—in interpersonal, organizational, and political arenas—regularly make decisions that impact the lives of others. How, then, do people gain and maintain power through influence?

As social theorists have grappled with the nature of power over the millennia, two contrasting theories have emerged. A first finds its origins in Aristotle, who defined the qualities of an ideal political leader in 350 B.C., emphasizing virtues such as courage, justice, and temperance. A second found its chief voice some 2,000 years later in Machiavelli, who countered in his influential book, The Prince, that power is found in force, fraud, manipulation, and strategic violence. Recent research and theorizing provide support for both perspectives. Acts of social coordination and collaboration in pursuit of the greater good do lead to increased social influence via freely conferred deference. However, dominance, force, threat, and manipulation can also lead to rises in power within groups of different kinds.

We define power as the capacity to influence other individuals’ states…

While power is commonly defined as influence rooted in the control over valuable resources, there is considerable evidence to suggest that influence can spring from many sources. Studies have highlighted identity-based sources of power, including wealth, knowledge, title, education, physical attributes, and social skills, to name a few. For example, power is distinct
from prestige—the esteem an individual receives from others, which is sometimes based on one’s occupation. However, prestige affords the opportunity to influence others by sharing thoughts, opinions, and advice. In a similar vein, power is differentiated from social class, the mixture of prestige of work, family wealth, and education, which combines into the objective and subjective sense of one’s status in society. Yet, the wealthy are often afforded social influence, either freely by others wishing to copy their path to success or more forcefully, via resource control. In short, gaining power—that is, social influence— can derive from a variety of facets of social identity.

… power is distinct from dominance, a set of interpersonal strategies by which the individual exerts coercive control over others. However, physically formidable men are often afforded power in cooperative groups. Divergent strategies to achieving power lie at the heart of writings by Aristotle and Machiavelli, who famously wrote of their theories about how power is gained and maintained.

…people’s theories about academic achievement—as essentialist or incremental—predict responses to failure and students’ grades in challenging courses (Dweck, 2006). Similarly, lay beliefs about emotions as changeable (or not) predict the use of different emotion regulation strategies…

Collaborative theory of power. Aristotle reasoned that, above all, virtuous actions are the surest pathway to power (Aristotle, 350 B.C./1962). The virtuous leader was likely to gain and maintain social influence through acts of temperance, courage, humility, and magnanimity. Once occupying a position of power, he believed that a person of virtue would bear in mind the interests of all, rather than resorting to the gratification of narrow self interest or catering to a privileged minority. This early reasoning has found support in social scientific studies, guided by the central claim that groups, acting in their own collective self-interest, grant power to individuals who act in ways that advance collective interests. In a review of who rises to power in schools, organizations, and military units, it proved to be the individual with a more collaborative mixture of traits; the individual who is enthusiastic toward others, focused on goals and tasks, and open to new ideas. That groups give power to individuals who advance the greater good through collaborative action is a social regularity in hunter gatherer societies.

In a review of studies of 48 such societies living in the conditions of our social evolution, Christopher Boehm (1993, p. 233) describes the individual who rises in power as follows: “generous, brave in combat, wise in making subsistence or military decisions, apt at resolving intragroup conflicts, a good speaker, fair, impartial, reliable, tactful, and morally upright,” and “strong and assertive” but “humble.”

We will call this the collaborative theory of power and note its resemblance to two recent theses about the acquisition of power. The first is prestige-based power. Rooted in evolutionary theorizing about social groups, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) proposed that power is based in social information transmission, such that prestige is freely given to individuals that possess superior knowledge or skill. Prestige-based power, like collaborative power, is freely conferred by subordinates. The original description of prestige-based power, as rooted in competence, does not emphasize social coordination, nor a concern for the welfare of subordinates and the greater good, which is central to the collaborative
theory of power. That said, the conceptualization of prestige-based power has evolved in recent years to include virtue as a component of this route to attaining social influence (e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 2014) and recent research suggests that virtue alone can provide a third pathway to social influence in social groups (Bai, Ho, & Yan, 2020).

We also note the similarity between a collaborative theory of power and the “guilt-prone leader.” The latter is based on the assumption that individuals with a strong sense of responsibility to others gain power These individuals do not grab power, but rather, are given power by others; they put the needs of others above their own and receive others’ respect in return… In this vein, a study of 161 employees in a large organization found that people rise in status to the extent that they are perceived as generous to others.

Thus, while contemporary conceptualizations of prestige-based power and guilt-prone leadership share virtuous characteristics with a collaborative theory of power, the former describe routes to achieving power. The collaborative theory of power, in contrast, refers to beliefs about power that favor social coordination and concern for the well-being of others, rather than one’s own pursuit, desire, or experience of power through these means.

Coercive theory of power. Machiavelli (1532/1961) was deeply hostile to Aristotle’s prescriptions for gaining power To Machiavelli, power was a resource to be grabbed—taken at will and ultimately without concern for others. He advised
aspiring rulers to feign convictions, often of a religious kind, that would appeal to the masses and to cripple rivals with strategic violence. His views are summarized in one well-known Machiavellianism; that it is better to be feared than loved. Although he conceded that it might be useful to appear virtuous, he believed that to be genuinely kind would be unwise. And to maintain power, he advocated the use of force, fraud, manipulation, and strategic violence (Machiavelli, 1532/1961). Gaining power, this theory holds, requires coercion.

This coercive theory of power overlaps in important ways with the dominance-based route to power put forward by Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, and Henrich (2013) and others (Buss & Duntley, 2006). This route to power is based in evoking fear and the use or threat of force. Through intimidation and coercion, individuals gain influence over others. Building on the dominancebase route to power, the coercive theory of power emphasizes the amoral nature of Machiavelli’s strategy. Central to this theory of power is the utmost importance of gaining and maintaining the sole position of power in a group and the use of whatever tactics are necessary to do so.

In sum, while the dominance-based route to power overlaps conceptually with the coercive theory of power, the former describes actions that can be taken to achieve power. The coercive theory of power, in contrast, refers to beliefs about how power is gained and maintained. In short, while much empirical attention has been paid to studying power as a psychological state and to delineating the various actions that can cultivate power, theories of power are novel in that they pertain to cognitions about power that people develop and adhere to, perhaps at times independent of actions taken to gain power.

Moral foundations. Although Aristotle (350 B.C./1962) championed the idea that gaining and maintaining power is rooted in the pursuit of social good through moral action, Machiavelli (1532/1961) described power and morality as largely independent. Machiavelli advocated a pragmatic approach to moral behavior; that appearing virtuous can be valuable, but that deception, manipulation, and strategic violence should be deployed when necessary, as the context demands. Consistent with these early perspectives on power, the moral underpinnings of collaborative and coercive theories are likely to diverge significantly. Specifically, we expect that endorsing a collaborative theory of power will be positively associated with each of the five moral foundations: reducing harm, pursing fairness, in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity (Haidt & Graham, 2007). In light of Machiavelli’s pragmatic approach to morality, we did not expect coercive theories of power to covary with moral foundations, with the exception of authority, which concerns the maintenance of strict hierarchies.

Moral sentiments. Certain emotions such as compassion, awe, and gratitude are moral as they promote prosocial actions
including altruism, cooperation, the sharing of resources, and social coordination. These actions are critical components of collaborative power and, consistent with our predictions about moral foundation endorsement, we expect that the experience of moral emotions will be associated with collaborative, but not coercive theories of power. Relatedly, Melwani, Mueller, and Overbeck (2012) found that individuals who expressed compassion and contempt were both ascribed leadership
qualities. To the extent that compassionate individuals are enacting collaborative theories of power and contemptuous individuals are enacting coercive theories of power, the dispositional experience and expression of these sentiments may be part of dual routes to achieving social influence. Accordingly, we predicted that positive emotions would correlate positively with collaborative beliefs and negatively with coercive beliefs about power.

Personality. The Dark Triad of personality traits— comprised of Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism—is often attributed to a compromised or dysfunctional sense of morality.. Specifically, Machiavellianism is characterized by manipulation and cynicism, psychopathy by callousness and aggression, and narcissism by vanity and grandiosity… Generally speaking, individuals with these traits tend to privilege their own interests strongly over others and act accordingly… These traits are also reflected in their moral cognitions and sentiments. For example, psychopathic personality traits are characterized by a diminished capacity to experience empathy (Hare, 2006), and are associated with decreased endorsement of all moral foundations, with the exception of authority (Glenn et al., 2009). Psychopathic individuals also cheat, lie, and
engage in instrumental aggression more than individuals without these traits… In management positions, individuals with Dark Triad traits tend to bully subordinates, create social divisions, and misbehave in the workplace. These dominance-based actions may be complimented by a coercive theory of power. Indeed, psychopathic personality traits are associated with a competitive worldview, including the overperception of conflict in negotiation scenarios and the biased attribution of negative personality traits to others. Consistent with these cognitions, we expect that psychopathy, and the related traits of Machiavellianism and narcissism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002), will be positively associated with coercive and negatively associated with collaborative theory of power endorsement.

* Across measures, it is clear that individuals of lower social class backgrounds enjoy less power in the world… A recent study Belmi and Laurin (2016) suggests that theories of power may in part be at play in this dynamic: Lower class individuals report being more reluctant to “play politics”— that is, enact Machiavelli’s theory of power. Building on the
findings of Belmi and Laurin (2016), we suggest that salient social experiences can predict theory of power endorsement. Social class, or socioeconomic status (SES), is a cultural lens through which people see and relate to their social world.

Lower class individuals experience greater vigilance to threat, relative to high status individuals, leading them to perceive greater hostility in their environment. Research…finds that low SES individuals experience more hostile emotional reactions to ambiguous social scenarios, and when being teased by a friend. This increased threat vigilance may create a bias such that relatively low SES individuals perceive the powerful as dominant and threatening— endorsing a coercive theory of power.1 Indeed, there is evidence that individuals of lower social class are more cynical than those
occupying higher classes…and that this cynicism is directed toward out-group members—that is, those that occupy higher classes…

The notion that powerful people are likely to engage in manipulation is central to the coercive theory of power, and accordingly, would suggest that lower class individuals would hold a more coercive and less collaborative theory of power.

This latter prediction also lies at the intersection of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), which suggests that people will engage in biased reasoning to maintain a positive self-image, and social dominance theories, which suggest that the powerful will harbor more hierarchy legitimizing beliefs while the powerless will harbor more delegitimizing beliefs (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Specifically, we predict that higher class individuals and those with a greater sense of power will be motivated to think positively of their position—as a station achieved by beneficent means, deserved, and legitimate. In contrast, lower class individuals and those who feel relatively powerless are likely to see the powerful and those occupying higher classes as having achieved their position illegitimately, through fear and manipulation. That is, higher class and powerful individuals are likely to hold Aristotelian beliefs about power, while lower class and powerless individuals will be more aligned with the views of Machiavelli. Indeed, it is among the lower class and relatively powerless that beliefs about how power is and ought to be achieved are likely to diverge, resulting in a loss of trust in the powerful.

* Trust is defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of others—romantic partners, political leaders, social institutions—with the expectation that the trusted party will act in ways that benefit the trustee… Human societies are built on cooperation (Ostrom, 2000), with trust being the social glue that keeps us embedded in a social network of people we depend on, seek counsel from, and trade value with (Kramer, 1999). Americans’ trust in powerful institutions, including the government, remain near record lows (Pew Research Center, 2019). Historical patterns of trust in institutions are linked to poverty rates (Twenge, Campbell, & Carter, 2012) and Elgar (2010) found that income inequality was negatively associated with interpersonal trust across 33 different countries. Similarly, a
large-scale study using the World Values Survey found that interpersonal trust was positively associated with income and education level (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Lower class individuals, then, trust others less. What is less well understood are possible mediators of the relation between class and trust. We propose that one is theories of power. Indeed, one’s beliefs about power—as a collaborative or coercive endeavor—reflect perceptions about how powerful individuals and institutions are likely to act and whether those actions are guided by moral principles that favor collaboration or coercion in the pursuit of self-interest. Previously cited evidence that low SES individuals distrust politicians who present themselves as interpersonally warm is consistent with the notion that the relationship between social class and trust is mediated by the belief that power is attained through manipulation and deceit (Tan & Kraus, 2018). That is, we expect that lower class individuals will endorse more coercive and less collaborative theories of
power, leading to decreased trust.

* feeling powerful was associated with greater collaborative theory of power endorsement and less coercive theory of power endorsement. In other words, people who feel powerful tend to believe that power is achieved and maintained through collaborative tendencies, whereas the relatively powerless believe that power is gained and maintained by dominating, threatening, and coercing others (see Table 3). The same pattern of findings occurs with respect to one’s social class.
Subjective SES was positively associated with both dominance and prestige, yet we found that subjective SES was positively
correlated with collaborative, and negatively correlated with coercive, beliefs about power.

Although these findings suggest that one’s sense of power is associated with more collaborative and less coercive theories on power, findings also indicate that people generally endorse the beliefs about power that are consistent with their personal experience of dominance- or prestige-based power. That is, coercive beliefs about power were positively associated with feelings of dominance and negatively associated with feelings of prestige while collaborative beliefs about power were positively associated with feelings of prestige and negatively associated with feelings of dominance.

* Beliefs about how power is gained and maintained were also associated with dispositional emotional experience. Consistent
with the literature linking subjective well-being with concern for others, holding a collaborative theory of power was associated with the experience of all positive emotions measured by the DPES (dispositional positive emotions scale) (Shiota et al., 2006); coercive beliefs about power were related to the experience of fewer of these emotions…

* psychopathic and Machiavellian personality traits were positively associated with coercive theories of power, and negatively associated with collaborative theories. Narcissism was also positively associated with coercive theories of power, but unrelated to collaborative theories (see Table 6). Coercive theories of power were also more strongly held by less agreeable, and less conscientious individuals, whereas collaborative theories of power were held by more agreeable, more conscientious, and more extraverted individuals.

* …people who feel powerful tend to believe that power is achieved and maintained through collaborative tendencies, whereas the relatively powerless believe that power is gained and maintained by dominating, threatening, and coercing others (see Table 3). The same pattern of findings occurs with respect to one’s social class. Subjective SES (socio-economic status) was positively associated with both dominance and prestige, yet we found that subjective SES was positively correlated with collaborative, and negatively correlated with coercive, beliefs about power. Although these findings suggest that one’s sense of power is associated with more collaborative and less coercive theories on power, findings also indicate that people generally endorse the beliefs about power that are consistent with their personal experience of dominance- or prestige-based power. That is, coercive beliefs about power were positively associated with feelings of dominance and negatively associated with feelings of prestige while collaborative beliefs about power were positively associated with feelings of prestige and negatively associated with feelings of dominance.

* people who held collaborative theories of power also reported a greater internal locus of control, a weaker social dominance orientation, and both dominance and respect/admiration related achievement motivations (Cassidy & Lynn, 1989). There was also a small, but significant, positive correlation between collaborative theories of power and right-wing authoritarianism beliefs (Aletmeyer, 1996). In the context of findings that relatively high SES and powerful individuals endorse collaborative theories of power, it may be these same individuals who endorse the hierarchy-legitimizing beliefs captured by the RWA scale. People who endorsed a more coercive theory of power also reported a greater external locus of control and were more likely to endorse a social dominance orientation and modern sexist beliefs…

* Consistent with Aristotle’s (350 B.C./1962) belief that gaining and maintaining power is rooted in the pursuit of social good through moral action, we found that collaborative theories of power were positively associated with the endorsement
of all five moral foundations, measured by the MFQ20: authority, fairness, harm, in-group, and purity.

* One’s sense of power was positively associated with feeling greater dominance and prestige. However, feeling powerful
was associated with greater collaborative theory of power endorsement, and less coercive theory of power endorsement…

* one’s subjective SES decreases when people compare themselves upward to higher status individuals, leading to perceptions of unfairness, hostility, and aggression. Similarly, social dominance theories would suggest that individuals occupying a lower class position will hold hierarchy delegitimizing beliefs while higher class individuals will perceive their position— and the means used to achieve it—in a positive, legitimizing light. Consistent with the correlations reported in Study 1, and H4, we expected that making upward (vs. downward) social comparisons would decrease participants’ subjective experience of social class, decrease collaborative, and increase coercive beliefs about power.

* collaborative theories of power were positively associated with interpersonal trust, while coercive theories of power were negatively associated with interpersonal trust (see Table 8). Interpersonal trust was also positively associated with
feelings of power and social class, but unrelated to feelings of dominance and prestige.

* For centuries, political scholars have theorized about how to gain and maintain power, with two opposing accounts first established in the writings of Aristotle (350 B.C./1962) and Machiavelli (1532/1961). The findings presented here suggest that these theories live, not only in historical texts, but in the minds of ordinary citizens. Consistent with Aristotle’s writing, the collaborative theory of power presupposes that rising in hierarchies is rooted in human virtues, social coordination, and concern for the greater good. In contrast, coercive theories of power hold that power is to be found in threat, force, and dominance over others.

* Given that lower social class leads to a more coercive and less collaborative view of power, it is perhaps unsurprising that lower social class is also associated with distrust of others. Specifically, individuals of a lower social class report less trust in powerful individuals and institutions (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Twenge et al., 2014), and theories of power offer a novel account of this relationship. We find that coercive theory of power endorsement was associated with decreased trust in others, and collaborative theory of power endorsement trust—increased trust… Further, we find that individuals of lower social class hold less collaborative theories of power and this mediates their reduced trust. Alternatively stated, individuals of higher social class hold more collaborative theories of power and trust more.

* feeling dominance and prestige—while both positively associated with power— have divergent effects on trust, and that
theories of power that mediate these effects. Specifically, we find that feelings of prestige were positively associated with trust, via collaborative theories of power. However, feelings of dominance were negatively associated with trust, via coercive theories of power.

* time and context may play a role in theory of power endorsement; Machiavelli (1532/1961) proposed his formula for gaining and maintaining power in a particularly turbulent time, characterized by war and overthrown, short-lived governments. Conflict also appears to influence more modern preferences for leadership; participants preferred more masculine faces in leadership judgments during simulated wartime versus peacetime contexts (Re et al., 2013). As such, theories of power may become increasingly coercive when faced with real or perceived threats.

* This possibility, that lower status individuals assume power is to be attained through coercive strategies, is echoed also in the recent political past. Donald Trump’s coercive approach to gaining power in the 2016 Presidential Election was favored primarily by low SES voters, while high status individuals— even Republicans— denounced his tactics and candidacy (Graham, 2016; Silver, 2016). Moreover, Donald Trump often touted that he would “drain the swamp” in Washington, DC—presumably, playing on the perception of these same voters that powerful individuals in government were selfish, corrupt, and dishonest (Overby, 2017). Taken together, recent empirical findings and voting trends suggest that low (vs. high) status individuals will endorse a more coercive, and less collaborative, theory of power.

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QANON Woke Up The Deep State (1-12-21)

00:00 Robert Stark interviews me about the Capitol Hill riots
46:15 Lesson from History: Transgender Mania is Sign of Cultural Collapse – Camille Paglia, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8BRdwgPChQ
54:00 QAnon Woke Up the Real Deep State, https://arcdigital.media/qanon-woke-up-the-real-deep-state-72bbfcb79488
57:00 RCI: A Big Move to Ban Realtor ‘Hate Speech.’ At Work. Anywhere. 24/7.
1:03:00 Scottsdale Prosecutors Seek to Revoke Baked Alaska’s Release Due to Capitol Livestream, https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/baked-alaska-scottsdale-prosecutors-seek-to-revoke-release-due-to-capitol-riots-11524889
1:17:00 Ali Alexander’s downfall
1:27:30 Democratic Hegemony and the Legitimacy Crisis, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_K1Lb27pG4
1:30:45 Former white nationalist Matt Heimbach talks to a Jewish lefty, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCiAfD2EDvY
1:34:00 The story behind internet troll Baked Alaska, https://jewishinsider.com/2021/01/baked-alaska-anthime-gionet/

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RCI: A Big Move to Ban Realtor ‘Hate Speech.’ At Work. Anywhere. 24/7.

From Real Clear Investigations:

In what some consider one of the most far-reaching social policy moves in the corporate world, the National Association of Realtors, called the nation’s largest trade organization, has revised its professional ethics code to ban “hate speech and harassing speech” by its 1.4 million members.

The sweeping prohibition applies to association members 24/7, covering all communication, private and professional, written and spoken, online and off. Punishment could top out at a maximum fine of $15,000 and expulsion from the organization…

NAR’s decision, allowing any member of the public to file a complaint, has alarmed other real estate agents, and also some legal and ethics experts, who say the hate speech ban’s vagueness is an invitation to censor controversial political opinions, especially on race and gender. While that’s not the association’s stated intention, the skeptics say their fears are justified by the hyperactive “cancel culture” online that has jettisoned hapless workers for posting “all lives matter” and objecting to gay marriage…

NAR’s hate speech policy is noteworthy because it sweeps up 1.4 million people under an ethics standard that explicitly places limits on private speech, to be adjudicated through formal procedures. The organization’s new policy provides an avenue for the NAR to investigate, fine – and potentially expel – real estate agents who insult, threaten or harass people or social groups based on race, sex, gender or other legally protected characteristics.

“It is taking something that’s been happening on a kind-of informal and occasional basis – indeed, people do sometimes end up losing jobs because of their political expression – and shifting it to something that’s institutionalized, that’s bureaucratized, and that’s being enforced through quasi-legal tribunals,” said Eugene Volokh, a UCLA law professor who specializes in the First Amendment.

Volokh said such policies pose significant risks for abuse, and should be assessed not for their good intentions but for their potential to misfire.

“What we’re talking about is a new blacklist,” Volokh said. “One of the things that’s troubling about the National Association of Realtors’ position is that it is trying to deploy the organized economic power of this group in order to suppress dissenting political views among members.”

In the current climate of cancel culture and vigilante justice on Twitter, where a single misdeed can become amplified into the defining act of one’s life, some real estate agents fear the new speech code will be used to censor agents who express disapproval of affirmative action, gay marriage, transgender pronouns, Black Lives Matter, undocumented immigrants or other politicized issues. Such concerns were validated last month by a federal judge who struck down an anti-discrimination speech code imposed on Pennsylvania lawyers, saying that the ban’s vagueness amounted to open season on politically unpopular opinions.

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How Judaism, Christianity & Islam Confront Modernity (1-11-21)

00:00 Big Tech censorship
12:00 10 Times Democrats Urged Violence Against Trump And His Supporters, https://thefederalist.com/2021/01/08/10-times-democrats-urged-violence-against-trump-and-his-supporters/
39:20 Richard Spencer’s rant vs Luke’s Friday rant
46:15 Matt Christman from Chapo Trap House on the Capitol Hill riot and reactions, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ateerfqHbr0
50:20 ICED EARTH’S JON SCHAFFER IS WANTED BY THE FBI AFTER U.S. CAPITOL RIOTS, https://www.altpress.com/news/iced-earth-jon-schaffer-wanted-by-fbi/
52:00 How the major religions confronted modernity
53:00 Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History, https://www.amazon.com/Changing-Immutable-Orthodox-Judaism-Rewrites/dp/1904113605
54:00 Early History of the University of Oxford, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiXwLUf8lj4
56:00 A (very) brief history of Oxford Uni!!, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnU7usnZR_k
1:00:00 Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Martin_Leberecht_de_Wette
1:02:00 David Friedrich Strauss, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Strauss
1:38:45 Christine Hayes: Lecture 5. Critical Approaches to the Bible: Introduction to Genesis 12-50, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBSOn0MSrk8
1:49:45 Spiritual Mamzer joins from Holland
1:55:00 Islam confronts modernity
2:04:00 Islam and Religious Studies Post-9/11, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=133478
2:42:30 RS & HW on MAGA’s Joker moment, https://www.spreaker.com/user/altright/magas-joker-moment
2:45:00 The moment Officer Brian Sicknick was dragged into a mob and beaten
3:14:00 Nick Fuentes says “invade the capitol” was only ironic
3:19:00 The weaknesses of livestreaming your life ala Baked Alaska
3:20:00 When the hyper-real digital world bites back
3:22:00 Baked’s cry: Content!
3:24:00 When the chase for content lands you in prison
3:32:00 Trump doesn’t protect his supporters even when they die for him
3:34:00 Lin Wood says Ashli Babbitt was an Antifa plant, and her timeline was filled with her retweeting Lin Wood
3:34:40 The Daily Stormer went Q-Anon

Posted in America | Comments Off on How Judaism, Christianity & Islam Confront Modernity (1-11-21)

Nothing To Hide About The 2020 Election?


https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/11/police-beating-capitol-mob/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/cumulus-radio-conservative-election-fraud/2021/01/11/e12ec46e-537c-11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/11/trump-twitter-ban/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/09/amazon-parler-suspension/

Posted in America | Comments Off on Nothing To Hide About The 2020 Election?

Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W. M. L. de Wette, Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical Consciousness

Here are some highlights from this 1999 book:

* IT is LARGELY TAKEN FOR GRANTED today that a greater historical sense or historical consciousness is a distinguishing feature of modern Western thought. To a large extent, this heightened sensitivity to history and to the “constructed” character of one’s ideas and beliefs – historicism as it is generally called and as I shall call it – first developed among German scholars, in universities and academies, at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. At this time, it is said, a secular historical consciousness freed itself from long-standing theological conceptions of history.

* “A gradual reversal of roles” occurred by the nineteenth century, notes Jarausch, from “history as a handmaiden of theology” to history as a “dominant form of humanistic scholarship.”6
At the University of Gottingen in the eighteenth century, such scholars as Johann Christoph Gatterer and August Ludwig von Schlozer, began a melting down of historia sacra into secular world history.7
The tradition of universal history (Universalgeschichte), originally based on the four monarchies of the seventh chapter of Daniel and expressed best in the lectures of the Reformation humanist Philip Melanchthon and in Jacques-Benigne Bossuet’s Discours sur Vhistorie universelle, gradually separated itself from theological assumptions and biblical chronology.8
This process of secularization, which was largely complete by the early nineteenth century, paved the way for history’s
institutionalization and professionalization. In short, history became an autonomous Wissenschaft, and perspectives and methods drawn from history began to affect other areas of inquiry, notably theology and biblical criticism.

* Commenting on the emergence of “the modern secular personality,” Mircea Eliade makes a relevant observation: “Nonreligious man descends from homo religiosus.. . . [H]is formation begins with the situation assumed by his ancestors. . . . [H]e is an inheritor. He cannot utterly abolish the past, since he is himself the product of his past.”

* Historicism: “The Last Religion of the Educated” In nineteenth-century Germany, historical ways of understanding reality – or historicism (Historismus) – triumphed on an unprecedented scale.42 Although historicism cannot be defined as a strictly German phenomenon, as Friedrich Meinecke attempted to do in his Die Entstehung des Historismus,43 the German experience during the nineteenth century is nonetheless of crucial importance in understanding the historicization of human thought and its far-reaching influence on humanistic discourses in the Western world.44 Historicism bespeaks a “Weltanschauung,” observed Karl Mannheim, “which came into being after the religiously determined medieval picture of the world had disintegrated and when the subsequent Enlightenment, with its dominant idea of a supra-temporal Reason, had destroyed itself…. Historicism alone .. . provides us with a world view of the same universality as that of the religious world view of the past.”45 Historicism is not easily defined.

* This form of historicism, states Iggers, implies a certain epistemological idealism that posits the world as a concrete, meaningful whole. The general meaning of the world may be discovered by historians, but ascertaining the general proceeds by scrutinizing the individual.48

A second important meaning of historicism, and the one more relevant to the present study, grew out of the “crisis of historicism” literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historicism in this sense has come to be identified with relativism and the loss of faith in the values of modern Western culture. Ernst Troeltsch was the key delineator of this conception of historicism. In his Historismus und seine Probleme (1922), Troeltsch accepted historicism as a valid scholarly approach to cultural reality, yet believed that the study of history, far from constituting the key
to the acquisition of meaning (as in classical historicism), progressively showed the relativity and hence invalidity of the values and beliefs of Western culture. Nonetheless, Troeltsch accepted the conviction that all human ideas and values are historically conditioned and subject to change; he deemed this attitude the dominant and inescapable result of Western
thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.49

“Historical Wissenschaft” wrote Troeltsch, “has so fully and thoroughly worked out the genesis of our civilization, and has made all present conditions intelligible by tracing the history of their development, that all thinking is obliged to
become in some measure historical…. The consequence of this is, of course, a certain relativism, a mental complexity.”50
In the present study, I am primarily concerned with Troeltsch’s understanding of historicism, which I shall call “crisis historicism.” I should point out, however, that a strong interrelationship exists between crisis historicism and classical historicism.51

To a large degree, Troeltsch’s acceptance of insights and methods drawn from classical historicism led him to believe
that his own field, theology, could no longer postulate ahistorical, eternal verities. Moreover, when Burckhardt experienced a “crisis of historicism” – that is, when he decided that de Wette’s historical-critical approach to the
Bible had undermined his religious heritage – he turned to classical historicism, while at the University of Berlin, to authorize a new worldview.52 Simply put, in the 1830s Burckhardt experienced (as an emotional-religious crisis) precisely what Troeltsch described in the 1920s (as an intellectual inevitability).

* In 1886, the philosopher Henry Sidgwick stated the matter succinctly in the journal Mind: “It seems to me that the historical study of human beliefs in some very important departments of thought – such as ethics, politics, and theology – does tend to be connected with a general skepticism as to the validity of the doctrines studied. . .. [Skepticism] partly tends to result from the historical study, because of the vast and bewildering variety of conflicting beliefs . . . which this study marshals before us. The student’s own most fundamental and most cherished convictions seem forced, as it were, to step down from their secure pedestals, and to take their places in the endless line that is marching past. . . . Thus to the historian . . . the whole defiling train of beliefs tends to become something from which he sits apart, every portion of which has lost power to hold his own reason in the grip of true conviction: for peace’s sake, he accepts the beliefs that are pressed on him by public opinion in his own age and country; but in his heart he believes in nothing but history.”

Yet even belief in history must be sacrificed to history. The conception of history that emerged from post-Enlightenment, elite European culture has no privileged observer status. The inevitability of cultural relativism articulated by Troeltsch and others, moreover, is logically – if not epistemologically – self-destroying: if all truth is culture-specific, so is
the truth of cultural relative analysis. Hence it cannot be said to be true. This is certainly not to undervalue the insights of historical analysis but rather to point out that its underlying attitude toward history is, by its own criteria, itself a product of its times, thereby demonstrating the inescapability of its own historical relativity. This contention should raise a significant hesitation concerning the universality and long-term relevance of the modern historicist attitude.

* Secularization, Modernity, and Theology. Historians are confronted with a Janus-like phenomenon when they attempt to interpret the nature of religion in nineteenth-century Europe.70 On the one hand, the nineteenth century was a time in which religious devotion played a vital role in the social world, especially in education and politics. At the same time,
however, the era witnessed unprecedented processes of secularization, chiefly in urban areas and among the intelligentsia.71 Put differently, the nineteenth century may be closer to the Middle Ages than the present is, but it was certainly not the Middle Ages.

The case of Protestantism is of particular significance. The sociologists Peter L. Berger and James D. Hunter have noted that of all the world religions, Protestantism has confronted modernity more intensely and for a longer time. “In theology,” notes Hunter, “the Protestant case is paradigmatic; throughout the nineteenth century and indeed to the present, Protestant theology has attempted to come to grips with secular intellectual thought, the diffusion of secular consciousness among the wider population, and the churches’ increasingly limited role in the social world.” If one
concedes this point, Protestantism’s protracted struggle against (and accommodation to) modernity may be exemplary for understanding the theological enterprise generally in the modern world.7

* the intellectual legacy of the Reformation already carried the seeds of secularization. Not only did the Reformation
question ecclesiastical control and diminish sacerdotalism and sacramentalism, but on a cognitive level the importance of independent inquiry into the Bible (sola scriptura and ad fontes) set the precedent for a later, more pervasive, faith-threatening conception of Kritik.74 Nearly all nineteenthcentury liberal German theologians saw themselves not as debunkers of religion but as faithful torchbearers of the Reformation. Schleiermacher claimed that the Reformation had first suggested an “eternal treaty” between living Christian faith and independent scientific research.75 De Wette praised the Reformation for its “scholarly striving” and legitimized his own criticism because “Protestantism in its first appearance placed historical criticism in the service of genuine faith.”76

The secularizing consequences of nineteenth-century criticism should thus be regarded not as arising outside of Protestantism but rather as profoundly and problematically embedded in it. “Teachers in the Protestant theological faculty,” noted Berlin historian Friedrich Paulsen in 1902, “assume a fundamentally different attitude [from their Catholic counterparts]: they do not aim to be servants of the church, but first of all servants of science (Wissenschaft), servants of the church only through science (Wissenschaft).”

Yet, throughout the nineteenth century, theological faculties of both confessions experienced a general decline in prestige and student interest. The fate of theology in this respect is a telling testimony of secularization. At Protestant universities in Germany, for example, the number of theology students declined from nearly one-third of the student body in 1830 to only 13.6 percent in 1892. Catholic universities witnessed a proportional drop: from 11.4 percent in 1830 to a meager 4.8 percent in 1892.78 At the University of Berlin, theology professors made up 22 percent of the total professoriate in 1810, but only 4 percent a century later.79 Considering the previous cultural supremacy of theology in the Middle Ages, its ebbing prestige in modern times – both as a general form of knowledge and as a fixture in university curricula – suggests a truly momentous cultural transformation.80

* Revelation-based claims were increasingly overshadowed by scientific and historical treatments of the social world. In 1902, Berlin historian Paulsen assessed the beleaguered situation of theology in Germany: “But it is more than doubtful whether modern times would give it [theology] that place [of honor among the sciences.] It is now scarcely mentioned in the same breath with the sciences, the peculiar pride of the present day. Numerous representatives of a scientific radicalism are inclined to exclude it all together, or to relegate it to the past. Theology, they assert, is a science of things of which we know nothing….”

* After World War I, there even arose a movement in Germany to abolish theological study in the university altogether. The theologian Adolf Harnack was the key figure who challenged this view and fought for the continuing legitimacy of theology. Interestingly, Harnack’s defense was strongly conditioned by his own cultural-epistemic situation. Instead of defending theology qua theology, Harnack argued that theology should be maintained because of the weight of its historical significance. In Harnack, Peter Berger once noted, theology became “a primarily historical discipline.”

* As theology diminished in the university setting, so did the plausibility of worldviews legitimized by religious presuppositions. As Berger has noted, institutions of knowledge in modern societies have played a crucial role in the secularizing process, initiating a general crisis of theology, in which religious institutions and individuals face the problem of “how to keep going in a milieu that no longer takes for granted their definitions of reality.”89 The German scene confirms this picture. “Just as theology has lost the first place among the sciences,” noted Paulsen in 1902, “so also has the clerical position forfeited its former position as the chief profession, to which the supervision of all human affairs .. . [was once] trusted.”

* the fissuring of Christianity’s cultural hegemony in the late early modern period opened up, in Blumenberg’s view, a cultural space for the emergence of more compelling solutions to problems posed by history.9

* Just as much of Christian thought developed from Judaic and Greek ideas and beliefs, so also has modernity developed from Christianity.

* “There we saw the giants, the sons of Anak, and we were in our own sight as grasshoppers, and so we were in their sight.”
– American theologian, commenting on his impressions of German academic theology, c. 1835.

* Old Testament scholar Julius Wellhausen was fond of arguing that biblical criticism operated by and large independently of philosophical concerns. “Philosophy,” Wellhausen wrote, “does not precede but follows [biblical criticism], in that it seeks to evaluate and systematize that which it has not itself discovered.” Wellhausen’s own positivism led him, I believe, to regard his own field as the truly scientific field of discovery and the vaguer field of philosophy as derivative.

* In Theodor, de Wette writes: “The result of the theological studies of the first year was, in Theodor’s case, that his former convictions concerning the origin of Christianity were shattered. The holy atmosphere of glory, which had hitherto surrounded the life of Jesus and the whole evangelical history, disappeared; but instead of satisfactory historical insight, he had acquired only doubt, uncertainty, and incoherence of opinion.”

* He learned to translate the doctrines of his youth – conversion, rebirth, grace, the love of God and Christ, and so on – into Kantian philosophical language.

* “So went our friend [Theodor],” de Wette continues, “forward upon the path of doubt. He often felt dizzy when he looked down, from the steep summit which he had reached, into the narrow, quiet valley of his childhood’s faith . . . [But] a bold spirit kept up his heart.”

* In Das Leben Jesu (1835), D. E Strauss explained the miracles of Jesus as culturally conditioned “myths” with a hitherto unheard-of skeptical consistency and literary elegance. He argued that historical-critical exegesis must be wholly prior to dogma and that the latter must be based on the former’s independent findings.

* The Pentateuch was Israel’s “national epic,” which de Wette likened to the epics of ancient Greece and Rome. As literature (Dichtung), the Old Testament was a poor historical source (Geschichtsquelle) in de Wette’s judgment: “one cannot learn history from it.. . [but] can learn about the spirit and character of the poet.

* De Wette argued instead that the Old Testament is nothing more than a collection of myths and traditions; its authors were completely uninterested in presenting history “as it actually was.” “The Hebrew storyteller,” writes de Wette,
“is not a historian in an actual sense; he is a prophet and seer looking into the past.” Such a storyteller presents historical material only to awaken and animate religious concerns: “A complete and thoroughgoing criticism will show that not one of the historical books of the Old Testament has any historical value, and that they all more or less contain myths and traditions; and that we do not have from among any of the books of the Old Testament any real historical witnesses.”

* While criticizing the historical approach of the mythical school, de Wette importantly did not cast complete doubt on the possibility of historical knowledge. Rather, he claimed that the only method suitable for apprehending historical consciousness in the Old Testament was to approach it in its own terms – which were religious (and patently not historical) ones made accessible to the modern reader through poetry, art, and, above all, myth… he raised this antihistorical conception of Old Testament historical consciousness to a more general scholarly principle and asserted that when handling
history, modern theologians should only strive to awaken others to past forms of religious consciousness; they should not worry about pedantic facts. Moreover, since all of human history, according to de Wette, was a revelation of God, the goal of the historical interpreter should be to present the past as an ongoing religious poem. In short, only in aesthetic terms did de Wette deem it possible to understand the changing historical manifestations of the Hebrew religious spirit in the Old Testament.107
In his Dissertatio critica qua a prioribus Denteronomium pentateuchi libris diversum alias cuiusdam recentioris auctoris opus esse monstratur,108 de Wette investigated the book of Deuteronomy following the principles he laid down in the Aufforderung. He posited that Deuteronomy represented a religious meditation – not a historical account – and sought to demonstrate that it was written much later than the rest of the Pentateuch. He claimed that his findings refuted the orthodox notion of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.109 For subsequent Old Testament scholarship, the most important part of the dissertatio came in a lengthy footnote, in which de Wette suggested that a law book discovered in the temple by Josiah in 622 B.C. (II Kings 22) might have been Deuteronomy or a document on which Deuteronomy was based. De Wette reasoned that the later origins of Deuteronomy made sense because the command to sacrifice at a single sanctuary was unique to Deuteronomy. In Exodus 20:24-25, for example, a multiplicity of altar sites is implied. Deuteronomy also contradicted the behavior of Samuel, Saul, David, and Solomon, who sacrificed wherever necessary without incurring divine disfavor. This practice continued after the completion of the temple by Solomon, until the reign of Josiah, when the law book (perhaps
Deuteronomy?) was discovered. Since Deuteronomy reflects the command to sacrifice at a single altar, this would date the book in the seventh century B.C., much later than the rest of the Pentateuch.110

De Wette concluded the dissertatio by pointing out that the paraphrased verses at the opening of Deuteronomy contradicted earlier passages in the Pentateuch. This demonstrated, according to de Wette, that Deuteronomy might have been written to correct earlier works in light of a new understanding of religion, one that reflected state centralization (in sacrificing
practices and in other matters) because of the completed temple in Jerusalem.111 Although de Wette was not the first scholar to suggest that important developments in Judaism took place after Moses, his dissertation was later acclaimed because he was the first to hint at a picture of Israel’s history that differed markedly from that offered in the Old Testament itself.

* de Wette sought to demonstrate that the fragments that made up the Pentateuch, especially the parts that suggested that Moses had introduced the laws and practices of sacrifice, were a composite of myths whose purpose was to express and legitimize the Hebrew religious outlook in the time of the late monarchy. The Pentateuch, like the stories of Homer or Ovid, according to de Wette, was a rich mythological account of Israel’s later religious identity and one largely devoid of verifiable factual history.

* “Facts [about many Old Testament personalities],” writes de Wette, “cannot be investigated; one can only observe
how they have been narrated.”

* Thus, de Wette ceased to treat the Pentateuch as a semi-accurate historical account. Instead, as Rogerson notes, he investigated the narrative structure of its “myths” for clues to make sense of Israel’s later history; he did this primarily by asking internal, textual questions.

* De Wette saw the Pentateuch as one might view Virgil’s Aeneid. Although there is little evidence for the historical veracity of this epic poem, it still offers important information about Roman political sensibilities during the time of Augustus. Likewise, through his appeal to myth, de Wette pointed out that the Pentateuch had (historical) implications for another period, namely that of the later Hebrew monarchy. Other scholars followed de Wette’s lead. Indeed, in attempting, through appeals to Romantic notions of poetry and myth, to safeguard the Bible from eighteenth-century rationalist criticism, de Wette in effect laid the groundwork for a radical shift in biblical criticism toward history’, but history of another kind – namely, the history of the texts themselves and their authors/editors and no longer of the events and the people which the texts narrated.

* Finally, one would be hard pressed to extricate de Wette’s biblical critical concerns and methods from their immersion in broader intellectual and historical currents. Kant prompted de Wette to reject supernatural explanations; Schelling, and perhaps earlier Herder, equipped him with an aesthetic and mythical approach to the Old Testament. Biblical criticism in
the early nineteenth century (and today) was not an autonomous field of gradual scientific accretion, but a time-conditioned enterprise predicated on the attitudes and concerns of a specific cultural environment.

* To satisfy the sensibilities of lay listeners, a preacher, de Wette told Liicke, will inevitably compromise his absolute commitment to truth.

* History is an abyss in which Christianity has been catapulted quite against its will.
– Franz Overbeck, Christentum und Kultur

* once in Basel, de Wette accepted preaching and public speaking engagements. By doing so, in a reversal of his earlier Berlin views, he gradually arrived at the conviction that the interests of Christian truth were not served by confusing lay
audiences with sophisticated theological speculation. He therefore chose phrases that had common ground with orthodox views; he spoke of the nature of Christ simply as mysterious (geheimnisvoll). His more candid positions were reserved for university lectures and publications.

* de Wette argues that the doctrine of atonement – the view that Christ bore the guilt of human sin to fulfill the demands of Old Testament law – arose only after Christ’s death: “The Atonement cannot be proven based on Jesus’ statements. His death is only raised to such importance by the apostles.” That a historical Jesus suffered and died a blameless death, de Wette accepts. However, Jesus’ death should be understood in aesthetic terms. De Wette invokes his aesthetic subcategory of resignation (Resignation): Christ’s death was a beautiful example of virtue and submission to the will of God.

* The eternal ideas embedded in the Gospels, not the temporal details of the story, were what was essential for the “religious outlook.” In regard to the resurrection, de Wette writes that a “miraculous element remains even if we do not believe that Christ actually lived again.” Further, when one envisions the crucified Christ, this should not call a historical event or dogma to mind; rather one should see “an image of humanity purified by self-sacrifice.”

* The mythical worldview of the Gospel narrators, their traditions, religious sensibilities, and expectations rendered
genuine historical knowledge impossible. Strauss does not deny that historical events may lie behind the myths, but the narratives themselves are not to be regarded as historical formulations. Thus, Christianity cannot be traced to one individual. This conclusion, he claims, should effect an “internal liberation” from history and allow Christianity – finally – to be constructed on purely philosophical grounds.

* Contemporaries reacted to Strauss’s book with almost wholesale condemnation. As one commentator has noted, Das Leben Jesu was “thrown like a fire-bomb into the tinder-dry pietistic forest of Wiirttemberg.”100 But not only pietists were alarmed: Strauss’s book triggered critical responses from practically every theological outlook in Europe – orthodox, rationalist, and Hegelian alike. The book cost Strauss his teaching position at the University of Tubingen and in 1839 it cost him another at Zurich. De Wette was unique among established biblical critics in his positive reaction to Strauss.101
De Wette not only recognized the legitimacy of Strauss’s work but actually praised it…

* de Wette believed that the question of divinity was independent of historical criticism; the divine could be grasped only subjectively according to the principle of Ahnung, which equated history with symbol. To the end of his life, de Wette never wearied in his conviction that this Friesian concept could insulate the content of Christianity from historical criticism.

* Theologians of various stripes have attributed a certain inevitability to the appearance of Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu in 1835. Although critical of Strauss, Hans Frei has argued that Strauss represented the decisive climax of eighteenth-century criticism by his reduction of the meaning of the Gospels to a historical understanding of its authors’ intentions.124
William Neil, more sympathetic to Strauss, noted that Strauss was the figure who finally cut the Gordian knot between rationalism and orthodoxy and “change [d] the entire direction of New Testament study for the rest of the century.”1

* Friedrich Vischer claimed in 1838 that the publication of Das Leben Jesu made Strauss one of those “representative men” who crystalize the collective consciousness of their generation… When dismissed from the Tubingen seminary, he stated to the director of studies that the views expressed in his book were “not merely the notions of one individual, but the conclusions of a whole direction of theological scholarship.” Abandoned by his peers, Strauss complained of being “vexed by my isolated position and annoyed with my friends that now, when the situation becomes serious, they suddenly leave the cart standing which for so long we all pulled together.”

* The controversies that ensued were indeed of major proportions. Theological leaders throughout Germany engaged in a polemical warfare of a magnitude rivaling the period after the Reformation. In many ways the 1830s were even more dramatic, because Christianity itself – and not simply the question of which form of Christianity – was taken as one of the main
points under discussion. Further, the conflict was by no means confined to elite circles. Educated laypeople and average parishioners also became engaged in the knowledge-faith dilemma of their time. Horton Harris rightly remarks that “not only in the theological seminaries did the book produce a great sensation and continuing controversy over the problems which it raised, but [also] in every church, in every town, in an age when the church [still] formed the central position in the lives of the majority of the populace.”13

* The second quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed an unprecedented increase in the pursuit and prestige of Wissenschaft. German research and German university teaching rose during this time to the pinnacle of esteem. The founding of the University of Berlin and the attendant ideals of Humboldt, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and others were a catalyst in this process, for practically all German-speaking universities quickly adopted the “Berlin model.” Indeed, scholars felt a new, nonclerical sense of “calling” – ” Wissenschaft for the sake of Wissenshaft” as Max Weber would later describe it. The development of the new ideal of Wissenschaft, deeply rooted in neohumanist ideas and in quasi-Romantic notions of the power of human intelligence and creativity, had two principal characteristics: (1) the elevation of scholarly work to a form of moral obligation, and (2) a belief in the insufficiency of past forms of knowledge, and confidence in the individual scholar to improve and create new knowledge.

* “Wissenschaft became even the new measure for the question of meaning in life and happiness; the path of Wissenschaft
became the path to truth, freedom, and humanity.” “The ever expanding scope of truth .. . [and] the accumulation of knowledge was raised to the highest moral duty and became one of the highest forms of human existence, even something holy, a piece of immortality; it became the dominating passion, which disciplined the rest of one’s life ascetically.”135
McClelland writes that “scholars in Germany . .. were convinced that the knowledge of their predecessors was superficial at best, and that bold acts of intelligence and will by the single scholar could uncover the profound secrets of the human world and the universe beyond.”

* However important new institutional and scholarly imperatives may have been in shaping theology, the discussants at the time were by and large unconcerned with what many today might assume to be the socially dependent character of knowledge. Theologians saw themselves as pursuing truth, pure and simple. Their goal was to depict the world and God’s relation to
it in terms that reflected how things really were, even if this meant engaging in a rarefied scholarly idiom and disturbing the theologically timid. In this respect, mid-nineteenth-century debates are justifiably viewed as an autonomous realm of discourse and thus are best approached with an eye toward shedding light on the underlying intellectual presuppositions of the time…

… the correspondence theory of truth is perhaps the oldest theory of truth, owing its most common understanding to Aristotle. Truth consists of some form of correspondence between the world of thought and the world of things or between mind and matter. Nature is “out there,” completely independent of the mind that attempts to know it. To establish the truth of an assertion about the world, one must show a correlation between the rational categories about which the assertion is made and the apprehension of nature given in experience. This must be done apart from one’s own prejudices and beliefs. As the Dutch physiologist Jacob Moleschott wrote in 1867, “The scientist does not give in to the belief that he has created the law; he feels in his innermost being that the facts imposed it on him.”

* The correspondence theory of truth requires one to assume that what the mind conceives about the world is ontologically real. As both Karl Popper and Hilary Putnam have noted, it is a theory for the realist, since it allows one to speak of a reality apart from the theory and the theorist conceptualizing it. It entails, in other words, a strong metaphysical claim:
stating the truth is nothing less than establishing what actually exists. Accurate knowledge of nature is simultaneously the truth of nature.

* Jacob Burckhardt: “from our point of view Christianity has entered the realm of purely human periods of history.”

* Jacob: “the state incurs debts for politics, war, and other higher causes and ‘progress’…. The assumption is that the future will honor this relationship in perpetuity. The state has learned from the merchants and industrialists how to exploit credit; it defies the nation ever to let it go into bankruptcy. Alongside all swindlers the state now stands there as swindler-in-chief.”

* what one sees in Burckhardt is…a deep-seated historical and cultural pessimism inherited from the idea of original sin.

* Scholars often note that Burckhardt’s cultural pessimism made him an anomaly among nineteenth-century historians and philosophers of history. In a century when progressive, evolutionary models of history reigned supreme, Burckhardt maintained that “progress .. . is intrinsically ridiculous, for greed and desire know no limits; one will always encounter a dissatisfied humanity.” Concerning Hegelian philosophy, Burckhardt warned his students that “this bold assumption of a world plan leads to fallacies because it starts out from false premises.” Similarly, Burckhardt doubted Rousseau’s “moral dream,” the “assumption that all men are by nature good.”

Although out of place in his own century, Burckhardt’s legacy has found a home in ours. I would even suggest that what Ranke has come to represent for the foundations of modern political historiography, Burckhardt has become for more recent cultural history, with its anti- or postmodern tendencies. His lack of system, his characteristic irony, his zeal for knowledge but willingness to voice epistemological shortcomings, and his preference for culture over politics have earned Burckhardt a near hagiographical status in the eyes of historians, philosophers, and others in Europe and America since the mid-twentieth century. Jorn Rusen, for instance, has celebrated Burckhardt’s moderate postmodernism, which, unlike the radical postmodernism of Nietzsche, should be “used as an historical mirror in which we can see what is wrong with our time.” Other critics have thought similarly; all agree that Burckhardt somehow transcended his time and became precociously critical of modernity.

* the encounter with de Wette profoundly disturbed Burckhardt, forcing him to confront his situation: he could neither
return to orthodoxy nor accept de Wette’s liberal Protestantism. As we have seen, Burckhardt sought to escape his predicament by not choosing between them and by turning instead to historical studies as his new “calling.”14
Yet the theological unrest never completely dissipated; Burckhardt retained an inclination to think in categories and language derived from the biblical-cultural heritage of “pious Basel.” His vow to remain an “honest heretic” even suggests a residual allegiance to his childhood faith – a faith no longer held, but one whose deep-seated presence revealed itself
in Burckhardt’s refusal to allow any compensatory teleological vision of history to fill its absence. The ruins of his faith, ramifying throughout his subsequent career, furnished him with an incredulity toward the optimizing tendencies and the epistemological confidence characteristic of Rankean, Hegelian, Comtean, and Marxian approaches to history alike –
in a word, to the very foundations of modern historical thinking.

* Christianity cannot be reduced to its eschatology. An equally important aspect of Christianity (especially in its orthodox Protestant expression) is its thorough pessimism concerning the things of this world.

* A particular understanding of history informed Burckhardt’s new calling in its nascent stages: his turn to history reflects predominantly an a posteriori (historical) appreciation of the individual rather than an idealist a priori (philosophical) preoccupation with the general or the speculative.

* As A THEOLOGY STUDENT at the University of Basel (1837-9), Jacob Burckhardt encountered the thought of de Wette. Burckhardt embraced wholeheartedly de Wette’s esprit critique, but soon came to question his reconstruction of Christian belief. Deeming it unintelligible on many points, Burckhardt vowed to be an “honest heretic” {ehrlicher Ketzer) instead.2
Indeed, the encounter with de Wette unsettled the young Burckhardt to such an extent that he experienced an intellectual and emotional “crisis” (his word) of faith, gave up theology altogether, and resolved to pursue historical studies at the University of Berlin. Significantly, his decision against theology was made at about the time that his father (Jakob
Burckhardt, Sr.) was elected Antistes, the highest ecclesiastical office in Basel, at the city cathedral.

* Burckhardt never found an “inner call.” “There is no revelation, that I know,” he wrote to Riggenbach, expressing a desire to “leave dogma and revelation on one side” and devote himself only to the historical aspect of theology.

* Burckhardt believed that the nineteenth century was awash with cheap optimism, an uncritical confidence in progressive forces reshaping history. He could not accept this optimism, convinced that progress was defined by political and economic leaders, who, despite allegiance to such ideals as popular sovereignty and social reform, were ultimately concupiscent human beings, inclined to the abuse of power.

* Burckhardt was equally critical of modern Christianity’s embrace of progress. By adapting itself to progressive ideologies, Christianity had compromised its pessimistic appraisal of human nature.

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When Nationalism Attracts Bad People

Richard Spencer tweets yesterday: “For decades, the “Nationalist Right” has been a shit magnet—that is, an attraction for unhinged, mentally ill, and self-deductive people. I’m beginning to wonder if “nationalism” isn’t better understood as “magnetized to shit.” Whenever there’s a shitty individual who does shitty things, moments later, without fail, “nationalists” fall over themselves to defend him, begging him to join their cause: *This is your home, shithead. Together, we will build a world of shit! It’s worth asking if these self-declared “nationalists” have any concept of a nation at all. An actual nation includes varieties, levels, and hierarchies. To paraphrase Jesus, we will always have the shitty among us. But building a shit movement wasn’t what he had in mind.”

Jason Kessler, the organizer of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, tweets: “This is a time to remain nonviolent, 100% & morally upright in everything we do. We should remove all vices from our lives, except political dissent, because everything else will be used against us. Remove all bad influences who can lead you astray. This is a dangerous time.”

Is it that nationalism is inherently a shit magnet or do we have an ability to present nationalist ideas in ways that are more likely to attract productive people than unproductive people? Is there often a synthesis of globalism and nationalism wherein national sovereignty is preserved where necessary and where global cooperation is preserved where necessary? Think about cricket (ICC) or soccer (FIFA) or the Olympics. They have global governance boards to facilitate, among other things, the nationalism of international competition. The UK, for example, did not just leave the EU, it negotiated an exit so as to preserve its free trade with the EU.

A friend says: “Elites will overwhelmingly always reject nationalism. For corporations globalism is better for business. For academics, as you’ve pointed out, they tend to be least nationalist of any sub group. If banks, corporations, academics, all skew globalist, than most aspirational/productive people will want to follow that lead.”

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The Last Days Of Trump (1-8-21)

00:00 The problems with pursuing your dreams
04:00 Finding your mission in doing God’s will
22:00 Answering chat questions
28:00 WP: Video shows fatal shooting of Ashli Babbitt in the Capitol, https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/01/08/ashli-babbitt-shooting-video-capitol/
38:45 Richard Spencer: THE 18TH BRO-MAIRE, https://www.bitchute.com/video/gLVy6foLuplA/
1:12:00 Tucker Carlson: Who will stand up for everyday Trump voters facing retribution from the left?, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-republican-party-trump-voters-left-revenge
1:18:00 Alt Right Talk (Mike) joins
1:26:30 Should everyone take politics seriously?
1:27:00 Should everyone take religion seriously?
1:50:00 Michael Tracey: Donald Trump’s ruinous legacy, https://unherd.com/2021/01/donald-trumps-ruinous-legacy/
2:11:00 Blind hatred of elites
2:22:00 Your mind on /pol/
2:29:00 The search for external validation, https://www.tmswiki.org/ppd/TMS_Recovery_Program
2:43:45 Where do you feel the anxiety?
2:51:00 Haftorah for Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Posted in America | Comments Off on The Last Days Of Trump (1-8-21)