Ezra Klein talks to Yuval Levin and argues that Trump hasn’t accomplished much.
I think they undersell Trump’s changes.
If you define consequence by the number of bills passed, the first year of this second term might look thin on paper. But for someone watching the actual movement of power, it is clear that the presidency is being used as a tool of atmospheric and cultural transformation that legislation simply cannot capture.
The focus on the Federal Register or the Congressional Record can be a form of blindness. When the administration issues an executive order targeting university funding or sends masked agents into the streets for immigration enforcement, the primary goal often is not a long-term statutory change. The goal is the immediate exercise of will. This creates a chilling effect that functions as a new set of rules without a single vote being cast in the Senate.
The institutionalists like Yuval Levin argue that because these actions are retail—meaning they are one-off deals or executive threats—they are not durable. They believe the system will simply snap back once the current personality is gone. However, that view ignores how much of American life is built on the invisible subsidy of stability.
The Power of the Signal: When a university president changes their policy because of a threatening letter from the White House, the culture of that institution has shifted. It doesn’t matter if the Higher Education Act was never amended. The fear of executive retribution becomes the new operating reality.
The Erasure of Norms: Once a president uses the Insurrection Act for domestic enforcement or attempts to unilaterally close the Department of Education, those ideas move from the unthinkable to the precedential. Even if the courts stop a specific action, the psychological threshold has been permanently lowered for the next person in the Oval Office.
Beyond the formal mechanisms of legislation, the presidency is being used to rewire the social and institutional expectations of American life. The “noise” of the administration serves as a cultural signaling device that forces private and public entities to adjust their behavior out of anticipation rather than legal obligation.
This cultural shift is visible in how the “rules of the game” are changing for institutions that once considered themselves insulated from the executive branch.
The most immediate change is the use of the executive branch as a “deal-maker” rather than a rule-maker. By targeting individual entities, the administration has created a culture where institutions self-regulate to avoid becoming the next target.
Higher Education: In 2025, the administration used the threat of federal funding cuts to influence university policies. Institutions like Brown University and others have faced pressure to adjust admissions or campus speech policies through individual “retail” deals. The goal is often not to pass a new law, but to create an environment where university presidents feel they must “pre-comply” with the administration’s cultural expectations.
The Private Sector: Through executive orders targeting “underperforming” defense contractors and proxy advisors, the administration has signaled that corporate behavior—specifically stock buybacks and ESG/DEI initiatives—is now subject to executive scrutiny. This has forced CEOs to weigh their financial and social strategies against the risk of a public rebuke or an investigation by a new “Food Supply Chain Security Task Force” or similar entities.
The administration has utilized the symbolic power of the office to redefine what “American” culture looks like in the public square.
Public Media and Arts: The Corporation for Public Broadcasting faced federal funding cuts that led to its official dissolution in early 2026. This marks a significant retreat of the federal government from the funding of public media like NPR and PBS. Simultaneously, the renaming of institutions—such as adding the president’s name to the exterior of the Kennedy Center—serves as a physical marker of a new era, often sparking intense cultural pushback and boycotts from the artistic community.
Patriotic Education: Executive orders aimed at “Ending Radical Indoctrination” in K-12 schools have encouraged a shift toward “patriotic education.” While the federal government cannot directly dictate local curricula, the threat of withholding grants has empowered local school boards to mirror the administration’s rhetoric, effectively nationalizing local school board battles.
The visual culture of the country has shifted through the increased visibility of federal force.
Immigration as a Spectacle: The deployment of National Guard troops and “masked federal agents” on American streets for immigration enforcement has fundamentally changed the feeling of safety for many communities. This has led to a cultural normalization of a visible federal police presence that was previously rare in domestic life. For many residents, the mere presence of these agents acts as a “wholesale” policy of deterrence and intimidation, regardless of whether the specific legal status of an individual has changed.
The implementation of Schedule F and the dismantling of the “Administrative State” are not just personnel moves; they are a cultural rejection of the “expert” class. By reclassifying career civil servants as “at-will” employees, the administration has messaged that loyalty to the executive’s vision is more important than institutional memory or technical expertise. This shift erodes the public’s trust in non-partisan agencies, from the NIH to the EPA, making science and data themselves feel like extensions of political will.
There is a persuasive argument that the noise is not a distraction from the policy; the noise is the policy. The elite chattering class waits for the wholesale legislation that will remake the tax code or healthcare. Meanwhile, the administration is busy with a different kind of project:
The Administrative State: By reclassifying thousands of civil servants as at-will employees under Schedule F, the administration is fundamentally altering the internal culture of the government. This is a structural change that replaces institutional memory with political alignment, and it is much harder to fix than simply passing a new law.
Economic Realignment: The aggressive use of tariffs and the threat of individual deals with CEOs like those at Nvidia or in the pharmaceutical industry turn the economy into a series of negotiations. This removes the predictability that businesses rely on, creating a world where success depends on your relationship with the executive branch rather than your adherence to standing law.
Ultimately, the disagreement comes down to how you measure power. If you believe the machinery of the Constitution is the only thing that lasts, then the lack of massive new laws suggests a weak presidency. But if you believe that the culture of a country and the fear of its leaders are what actually drive history, then the current administration is unleashing forces that will be felt for a generation.
While every presidency brings policy shifts, several actions taken during Donald Trump’s second term have altered the structural and economic DNA of the country in ways that may persist well into the 2030s.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed in July 2025, fundamentally rewrote the rules for the American safety net and immigration. This massive legislative package created legal moats. The bill stripped many lawfully present immigrants of access to health insurance and nutrition aid while tying $45 billion to immigration detention through September 30, 2029. Because it was passed through the reconciliation process, these changes are baked into federal spending projections. Reversing them would require a supermajority of 60 votes in the Senate or a similarly complex reconciliation process by a future administration.
The administration’s aggressive use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose a minimum 10% tariff on all imports has triggered a permanent shift in global economics. Multinational corporations spent billions in 2025 moving supply chains from China to Mexico and Southeast Asia. These capital investments are sticky. Companies that built new factories in Mexico to avoid 2025 tariffs are unlikely to move back to a previous model regardless of future policy changes. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is currently deciding on the legality of these tariffs. If they uphold the president’s authority, it will permanently expand the executive’s power to tax without Congress.
While the first term focused on the Supreme Court, the second term has focused on clearing the deck in the appellate courts. By early 2026, Trump was on track to confirm enough judges to surpass Reagan’s total record of 383 appointments. Data from 2025 shows these appellate judges voted in favor of the administration’s agenda 92% of the time. These judges hold lifetime appointments and will spend the next 20 to 30 years interpreting laws that govern the post-2028 era.
The combination of the 2025 tax cuts and increased spending on enforcement has locked the United States into a specific fiscal path. Federal spending was 4% higher in 2025 than in 2024. Projections show the national debt path is now increasing faster than GDP. By the time a new president is inaugurated in 2029, the interest on the debt may be one of the largest items in the budget, effectively preventing any new large-scale social or environmental programs. As of January 2026, the administration has faced 573 federal cases regarding its executive actions. While it has lost 57% of these, the wins have often occurred at the Supreme Court level, establishing new, high-level constitutional precedents for presidential authority.
The conversation between Ezra Klein and Yuval Levin offers a nuanced perspective on the first year of the second term. Levin’s central thesis is that while the perception of activity is at an all-time high, the durable policy output is surprisingly low compared to historical norms. Levin argues that Trump governs in retail, focusing on individual deals and news cycles, rather than wholesale through broad legislation or regulation. Despite the Big, Beautiful Bill, Trump signed fewer pieces of legislation in his first year than any modern predecessor. Economically significant rule-making is moving slower than it did under Biden, Obama, or Bush.
The administration often uses the threat of government power to force behavioral changes in specific entities, such as individual deals with universities like Brown or companies like Nvidia, rather than changing laws. Despite the high-profile nature of the Department of Government Efficiency, the actual math of the federal government has remained remarkably stable. The federal government actually spent 4% more in 2025 than in 2024. Early in 2025, NIH spending was withheld, appearing to signal a massive cut. However, by the end of the fiscal year, 100% of the appropriated money was spent. To avoid a legal fight over impoundment, the administration accelerated spending in June and July, often forcing multi-year grants into a single year.
Levin notes that immigration and trade are the two areas where the administration is acting with wholesale durability. Immigration is the only sector where the administration is using the full weight of the traditional bureaucracy, new legislative authorities, and regulation. Tariffs are being used both as broad policy and as specific leverage against individual companies and countries.
Levin expresses concern about the unpredictability of the federal government. He argues that a predictable government acts as a subsidy for American life. When the government becomes a retail deal-maker, institutions like universities and foreign allies stop making long-term plans because they can no longer assume a steady relationship. Levin also observes a move among young conservatives away from constitutionalism and toward a populist view of power rooted in fear and opposition rather than conservation.
Trump has replaced broad policy with individual deals. Instead of reforming the Higher Education Act, the White House intimidates individual universities into one-off concessions. Instead of broad drug-pricing legislation, he cuts specific deals with pharmaceutical CEOs.
Levin argues this is a short-termist strategy. It gives the illusion of a strong executive, but it is actually a sign of weakness because it does not create permanent laws that a future president cannot simply ignore. Speaking as a traditional institutionalist, Levin is most concerned about the loss of predictability. He describes the federal government as an invisible subsidy to American life because you used to be able to plan a 10-year business or research project because the rules of the game would not change on a whim. By turning the presidency into a retail operation where anyone can be targeted or dealt with individually, that stability vanishes.
Levin provides metrics to suggest the constitutional order is holding better than critics think. The administration has lost 57% of its federal court cases that reached a decision. Even with a friendly majority, 54 presidential nominations were withdrawn in 2025, a sign that the Senate is quietly blocking appointments it finds too extreme or incompetent.
Levin’s view is an institutionalist conservative take. He says that Trump is playing a character on TV, but the bureaucracy and the Constitution are mostly winning the actual war. The counter-argument is that the noise itself is the policy. If agents in masks and the threat of criminal probes against people like Jerome Powell create a chilling effect, then the culture has changed even if the law has not. Levin might be underestimating how much intimidation functions as a form of governance that does not show up in a spending report.
This discussion is a quintessential example of the elite chattering class dilemma. Both Ezra Klein and Yuval Levin are institutionalists by trade and temperament. Their world revolves around the idea that the machinery of government is what ultimately determines reality. Whether they are too hung on words depends on how you view power. Levin’s primary argument is that the administration’s wholesale impact is small because they are not passing massive amounts of durable legislation. To a populist or a critic on the street, this sounds like a technicality.
Levin looks at the Federal Register and the Treasury Statement. He sees that the NIH budget was fully spent by the end of the year and concludes that the assault on science was mostly performative. However, a researcher who spent six months in a hiring freeze or a university president who changed their admissions policy because of a single threatening letter does not care if the wholesale law didn’t change. The intimidation was the reality.
The core of their conversation is a debate over whether atmosphere is more important than statute. Klein pushes Levin on the idea that things like masked agents or criminal probes create a chilling effect. This suggests that words do not matter as much as the signal sent to the public. Levin insists that because these actions are retail, they are not durable. He believes that once the personality leaves the office, the system snaps back. A critic would say he is over-relying on the idea that the words of the Constitution are more powerful than the culture of the people running it.
Levin makes a striking point near the end by arguing that the administration is losing because their democratic metrics are down to 40%. The elite view is that success is measured by building a 55% coalition and passing laws that the courts uphold. The autocratic view is that success is measured by whether your opponents are too afraid to protest and whether you have successfully cowed the bureaucracy. By focusing on the democratic metrics, Levin and Klein might be analyzing a baseball game using the rules of cricket. They are looking for home runs in the form of legislation, while the administration might be playing a completely different game of power consolidation that does not require a majority.
For many elites, the focus on words is the last line of defense. If the words of a statute still have the power to stop a deportation or a tariff in court, then those words are the only thing that actually matters.
If you believe that culture and fear are the primary drivers of history, then Klein and Levin are likely over-analyzing a paper tiger bureaucracy. However, if you believe that institutions are the only thing that makes a country stable over a 20-year span, then their focus on the absence of action is a necessary reality check against the daily panic of the news cycle. While many news stories focus on immediate chaos, the long-term influence of 2025 will likely be defined by wholesale changes that are difficult to undo.
The 2025 policy shift from a free trade consensus to a protectionist one may be permanent. By implementing broad 10% to 60% tariffs, the administration has fundamentally altered global supply chains. Companies that moved manufacturing out of China in 2025 are unlikely to move back after 2028. Projections suggest that the combination of tax cuts and increased spending will increase the debt-to-GDP ratio to between 132% and 149% by 2035. This will severely constrain the fiscal space for any president elected in 2028.
The aggressive enforcement actions of 2025 have already begun to shift the American demographic and economic trajectory. Mass deportation efforts and stricter visa requirements have created labor shortages in agriculture and construction. Economists project that even if these policies are paused in 2029, the reduction in the potential labor force could drag on real GDP growth through 2040. Attempts to challenge birthright citizenship and the use of the Insurrection Act for domestic enforcement have created a new library of legal arguments that will be debated in constitutional law for a generation.
Perhaps the most subtle long-term change is the loss of the invisible subsidy of stability. By cutting deals with individual universities and companies rather than following uniform laws, the administration has sent a signal that the rules of the game depend on who is in power. After 2028, investors and international allies may demand a risk premium for doing business with or in the United States, assuming that any long-term agreement could be voided by the next executive.
