Luke Ford

R. H. S. Stolfi (1932–2012) held a distinctive and contested place in late twentieth-century military historiography. Russel H. S. Stolfi served as a colonel in the United States Marine Corps Reserve and taught modern European history for many years at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He brought the operational habits of a professional officer to the work of a revisionist historian, and he aimed that combination at what he took to be the settled and complacent orthodoxies of his field. His subjects were mechanized warfare, German operational doctrine, NATO strategy, and the relation between political command and military decision. Across his career he returned again and again to the moments when a military system stands at the edge of collapse or breakthrough, and above all to the German campaigns on the Eastern Front in the Second World War.
Stolfi came out of the Cold War military-academic world that formed after 1945. Once NATO existed, the American defense establishment poured resources into the study of German operational methods as preparation for a possible armored war against the Soviet Union in Europe. Former Wehrmacht officers became consultants and lecturers, and through programs such as the Foreign Military Studies project the United States Army absorbed German accounts of mobile warfare, decentralized command, and anti-Soviet strategy. In that setting the close study of the Wehrmacht read as institutional necessity rather than sympathy. Stolfi belonged to this world without reservation. His collaboration with the former Wehrmacht general Friedrich von Mellenthin (1904–1997) on NATO Under Attack tied German operational experience to containment doctrine and Western defensive planning.
His method followed from this formation. He treated war first as an operational system and gave his attention to logistics, command structure, mobility, morale, fuel, communications, and tempo. He read campaigns as problems in operational design rather than as social or cultural phenomena, and his prose carried the imprint of professional military education rather than the civilian humanities. In German Panzers on the Offensive he argued that German battlefield success grew from a synthesis of concentrated armor, decentralized initiative, rapid exploitation, and psychological shock. He resisted the easy reductions, the view that mechanized success came down to better machines and the view that it came down to ideological zeal. He pointed instead to the institutional culture of the German army, and in particular to Auftragstaktik, the doctrine of mission-oriented command that pushed junior officers to improvise within broad aims.
This placed him in an older line of military history associated with Basil Liddell Hart (1895–1970) and J. F. C. Fuller (1878–1966), and among the postwar American strategists who admired German operational craft while holding apart the political ends it served. The separation of operational analysis from moral judgment became the signature of his work and the root of the controversy around it.
The decisive turn in his reputation came with Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted in 1991. There he advanced the contested claim that Germany might have defeated the Soviet Union in 1941. He held that the Wehrmacht came near strategic victory in Operation Barbarossa and that Hitler threw the chance away by diverting armor toward Kiev and Leningrad rather than driving on Moscow. The capture of Moscow, in his reading, might have broken Soviet command cohesion and brought the state down before Soviet industry reached full strength.
The argument set him against the rising consensus on the Eastern Front. David Glantz (b. 1942), Richard Overy (b. 1947), and John Erickson (1929–2002) rejected it as operational romance. Some called the tendency Panzeritis, an over-reading of German flexibility that slighted the material realities of industrial war. They argued that the German army lacked the fuel, spare parts, rail capacity, and motor transport for a conquest of the Soviet Union whatever its tactical brilliance, and that Soviet depth, the relocation of industry beyond the Urals, and the attrition of mechanized war made German defeat likely well before the first snow. Critics added that Stolfi had taken over the explanatory frame built by German generals after 1945, the memoirs that laid defeat at Hitler’s door while passing over the deeper failures of the Nazi war economy and German planning. Historians came to see this as part of the broader Clean Wehrmacht myth, which cast the army as a detached professional body undone by Hitler rather than as a participant in ideological war and mass killing.
His position grew more exposed as the discipline changed. The operational history of an earlier generation gave way to a new military history that folded ideology, economics, occupation, race, and genocide into the study of war itself. Omer Bartov (b. 1954) struck at the line Stolfi most wanted to hold, arguing that German cohesion in the East rested in part on indoctrination and on participation in racial violence. On that account the decentralized aggressiveness Stolfi admired could not be cut loose from the exterminatory aims of the state. The war in the East had been a war of annihilation set inside a racial and colonial project, not a campaign of maneuver that one might assess on its own.
These quarrels prepared the ground for the storm around his last book, Hitler: Beyond Evil and Tyranny, published in 2011. There he set out to read Hitler not as a madman or a demon but as a consequential actor with strategic vision, charismatic authority, and organizing skill, and he charged the major biographers with weakening explanation by reducing the man to pathology. Reviewers answered that he had confused explanation with rehabilitation and had pushed the centrality of antisemitism and mass murder to the margins of his account. Defenders read the book as an effort to restore analytical seriousness to the study of leadership and mass mobilization. The exchange exposed a standing tension in the discipline, the question of whether understanding a catastrophic figure demands a degree of empathetic reconstruction that carries its own risk of moral distortion.
His temper sharpened every dispute he entered. He wrote as a polemicist conducting a campaign against the reigning interpretations, and he favored direct assertion, operational detail, and institutional critique over the theoretical vocabulary of later academic writing. He distrusted bureaucratic caution and often painted modern institutions as timid. The same cast of mind shaped his teaching at Monterey, where by report he treated military history less as antiquarian study than as training in decisive thought.
His career marks the long divide between operational military history and the broader social study of war. He kept faith with the belief that military systems and strategic choices hold explanatory weight of their own, and he held to it even as colleagues knit genocide, racial ideology, and occupation policy into the account of warfare. To his admirers this was discipline and independence. To his critics it was an abstraction that cut military performance loose from the political and moral truth of the Nazi state. His legacy stays unsettled because he stood on the seam between two eras of his field, an heir of the Cold War study of the Wehrmacht who went on defending its frame at the moment historians set about tearing the frame apart. For that reason his work holds a place in the story of how military history changed, and in the record of how the priorities of one age shape the writing of history in the next.

Hitler: Beyond Evil and Tyranny

Stolfi wrote a book that fails at the thing it claims to do, and it fails for reasons built into its method. He spent his career on the German military, on panzers and the Eastern Front, and he knew that material. Here he reaches past his ground and lands in apologetics dressed as revision.
Start with his opening move, because everything rests on it. He says the major biographers, Alan Bullock (1914–2004), Joachim Fest (1926–2006), and above all Ian Kershaw (b. 1943), wrote from antipathy, and that their loathing produced half a portrait. He treats moral revulsion as a research defect, a bias in the initial disposition of forces that can never be made good. The trick sits right there. Kershaw’s judgments rest on documents and testimony, not on mood. By recasting evidence-based conclusions as emotional prejudice, Stolfi gets to wave them away without refuting any of them. He never shows that Kershaw got a fact wrong. He shows that Kershaw disapproved, and he asks you to mistake disapproval for error.
The prophet thesis is the next problem, and it does no work. Stolfi says Hitler was not a politician but a messiah on the model of Muhammad, a man living several feet above the ground in his own revelation. Call a man a prophet and you have renamed him, not explained him. The label moves Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) outside ordinary moral assessment by definition, which is the whole purpose it serves. The Muhammad comparison tells you nothing about why a German party in the 1920s grew, why elites handed Hitler the chancellorship, or why the army swore to him. Stolfi waves at charisma and daemonia and Caesar and lets the reader supply the awe.
The rotten core is the Churchill equivalence. Stolfi sets the murder of the European Jews beside the wartime blockade of Germany and Winston Churchill’s (1874–1965) expulsion of Germans from the east, counts the dead on each side, and finds the quality of cruelty similar. He writes that the killing of 7.6 million unarmed people stands as harsh necessity rather than conscious cruelty. That sentence is the book. Deliberate, planned, industrial extermination is not the moral twin of deaths that follow from blockade or forced flight, and a historian who flattens that difference is not correcting a bias. He is performing one. Stolfi insists intent must be weighed, then uses intent to soften rather than to convict, since Hitler did not believe himself wicked. By that standard almost no one is ever guilty of anything.
His causal story is old Versailles grievance with the serial numbers filed off. France wanted the war, France planned it, the Allies wrote a recipe for disaster, Hitler lost the war the Allies did not win. There is a real point buried here, that the postwar settlement fed German revanchism, and serious historians have said so for a century. Stolfi inflates it into near determinism and uses it to shrink Hitler’s agency at exactly the moments agency matters most. He also calls the seizure of power virtually bloodless, which requires you to forget the SA, the street violence, and what followed within months.
Is anything in the book defensible? One thread. Demonization can flatten a subject and block understanding, and Kershaw himself worried about turning Hitler into an unperson so empty that his rise becomes a riddle. That is a fair caution. Stolfi then confuses understanding with rehabilitation, which is the line a serious historian holds and he does not. He also trades on a slippage in the word greatness, sliding from impact on history to something close to praise, and counts on the reader to feel the second while he claims only the first.
The prose is confident and the erudition is real, which is what makes the book effective on the people it persuades. It found its audience among readers who want the contrarian thrill of being told the experts are cowards and the monster was a misunderstood visionary. The Prometheus imprint gave it a respectable jacket. Reviewers in the field treated it as special pleading, and they were right.
My judgment: skilled rhetoric, a method designed to reach its conclusion, and a moral evasion at the center that no amount of military detail redeems. If you want Hitler the man rendered without flinching and without worship, Kershaw still does it better in two volumes than Stolfi does in one. Read Stolfi to study how apologetics gets built, how it borrows the vocabulary of fairness, recasts evidence as bias, relabels the subject to lift him above judgment, and then balances the books with corpses that do not balance. As a case in the manufacture of sympathy for the indefensible, it repays attention. As a biography of Hitler, it misleads.
The Austrian childhood of Adolf Hitler looks ordinary. There was friction with his father and grief at his mother’s death, and his school record was poor, but nothing in it points toward what came later. The Vienna years from 1908 to 1913 are the ones people scan for the seed of the monster, and they do not find much. He was poor, he sold painted views of the city, he drifted through a men’s home. Brigitte Hamann (1940–2016), in her study of those years, went looking for the rabid antisemite of legend and could not document him. Hitler dealt with Jewish picture buyers and a Jewish frame dealer and seems to have gotten on with them. The fervent conversion-in-Vienna story comes mostly from Mein Kampf, and Mein Kampf is a campaign document written backward from the conclusion the author wanted. It is the worst kind of source for his inner life, since he had every reason to invent an early, heroic awakening.
The war years tell the same story. He served as a dispatch runner on the Western Front, took real risks, and won the Iron Cross First Class, an unusual decoration for a man of his rank, on the recommendation of a Jewish adjutant named Hugo Gutmann. Thomas Weber (b. 1974), who went through the records of Hitler’s regiment, found a soldier his comrades regarded as odd and solitary but not as a fanatic and not as cruel. No atrocity attaches to him. No early violence. If you had met him in 1917 you might have found a strange, friendless man with strong opinions. You would not have found obvious evil.
The murderous antisemite took shape in Munich in 1919, fast, in the army’s anti-Bolshevik propaganda work after the collapse and the short-lived Soviet republic in Bavaria. The radicalization was late and it was rapid.
Stolfi’s framing of “No obvious evil before 1919” is true. An obscure, poor, unrecorded man leaves few traces of anything, cruelty included, so part of the silence is just the silence of a life no one was watching. More important, the timing of a man’s corruption says nothing about its depth. Late evil is not lesser evil. Stolfi leans on this true fact to suggest the later horror was situational, almost a product of the times acting on a blank man, as if a monster who arrives at thirty is less culpable than one formed at fifteen. That does not follow. A man who chooses his hatreds as an adult, with a working mind and a war behind him, owns them at least as fully as one raised into them.
Stolfi writes:

? One fundamental disparagement laid by biographers of Hitler is that he was an “unperson.” Kershaw, for example, asks his readers: “How do we explain how someone with so few intellectual gifts and social attributes, someone no more than an empty vessel outside of his political life…could make the entire world hold its breath?” He continues in an unequivocal
judgment that “[Hitler] was as has been frequently said, tantamount to an ‘unperson!’”

Kershaw does call Hitler a kind of unperson, and he does open his biography by asking how a man of such ordinary surface, so empty outside his political role, made the world hold its breath. Stolfi reports the words straight. The distortion comes in the next step, where he treats the words as disparagement, as contempt leaking from a hostile pen. That reading misses what the phrase does for Kershaw.
For Kershaw the unperson idea is the thesis, not an insult. His whole reading of Hitler runs on charismatic authority and on what he calls working toward the Führer. The power, in that account, sits less in Hitler the man than in what Germans projected onto him and in the structures that grew around the projection. So when Kershaw says Hitler was strikingly hollow outside politics, he is not failing to explain the man. He is explaining him. He poses the riddle of the unremarkable figure with world-shaking effect and then answers it by locating the force outside Hitler’s personal substance, in the relationship between leader and led. Stolfi pretends Kershaw asks the question and leaves it open. Kershaw asks it and gives an answer Stolfi does not like.
The strong form of empty vessel does overstate. Hitler had real and consuming interests. The architecture was not a pose. Albert Speer (1905–1981) testified that Hitler sketched in accurate perspective, lay awake over building plans, and thought about monuments with the seriousness of a man who might have made a career of them. The Wagner enthusiasm was deep and lifelong. The man was not a blank who liked nothing. If you read empty vessel to mean a person with no inner content at all, the evidence breaks it.
Kershaw’s point is that Hitler lacked the roundedness of an ordinary human life, the friendships, the reciprocity, the capacity for conversation rather than monologue, the give and take that makes a person a person among persons. The aesthetic passions do not refute this. They confirm it, because they were not a private life standing apart from the mission. They fed the mission. Speer said it himself, that the sense of political destiny and the passion for architecture were inseparable in Hitler. The monumental building was the thousand-year Reich rendered in stone. The Wagner worship was the same megalomania set to music. So the interests Stolfi parades as proof of a full private man turn out to be the public obsession wearing other clothes. They do not open a window onto a rounded human being. They show the same narrow flame burning in three rooms.
Kershaw does not say Hitler was stupid. He grants the prodigious memory, the tactical cunning, the platform genius. He says Hitler had no cultivated or systematic intellect, the autodidact’s certainty without the discipline, half-formed opinions on everything delivered as revelation. That is a defensible portrait, and it is not contempt. It is a description many of Hitler’s own associates left behind.
Stolfi writes:

Notably, however, the writers in these established democracies and others like the United States denigrate Hitler for his lack of formal education, his rude family environment, and his exaggerated dreams of success. Ironically, these characteristics read like the semi-mythical “American dream” wherein the young man with limited formal education, rude background, and dreams of success triumphs.

Stolfi notices something real and then uses it to smuggle in something false.
The real part first. A strain of class snobbery does run through some writing on Hitler. The vulgar upstart, the uncultured man passing judgment on culture, the half-educated autodidact with opinions on everything, this language carries a whiff of the well-bred sneering at the parvenu. Kershaw himself reaches for phrases of that kind. So Stolfi is not inventing the tone. Educated writers have at times looked down on Hitler the way a certain class looks down on the striver who never went to the right schools. If that were all Stolfi claimed, he would have a point about manners.
But the American dream parallel is a trick, and it works only by emptying both terms of content. The story Stolfi invokes runs humble origins, little schooling, big dreams, triumph. State it as bare form and you can drop almost any riser into the slot, the immigrant who builds a business, the boy from the farm who reaches the Senate, and Hitler. The form is the same. The content is everything, and the content is opposite. The Horatio Alger (1832–1899) figure rises by work and within the law to a success that harms no one. Hitler rose by wrecking a republic, building a dictatorship, and launching a war that murdered millions. To say his traits read like the American dream is to praise the shape of a life while looking away from what filled it. By that logic any tyrant with a hard youth becomes an inspirational tale.
The parallel also breaks on its own terms, which is the part Stolfi hopes you will not check. The American dream rewards industry. It is a story about effort. Yet the same biographers Stolfi attacks describe a young Hitler marked by indolence and bohemian habits, a man who avoided steady work in Vienna and lived at the edge of the men’s home. Stolfi grants this himself elsewhere when he writes of Hitler’s lazy indolence. So the figure does not even fit the Alger mold he is being fitted to. He is not the striving self-made man. He is a drifter who later found a mission.
Stolfi implies the writers would cheer these traits in an American and condemn them in Hitler, which would make their judgment a matter of prejudice rather than evidence. No serious biographer condemns Hitler for being poor or unschooled. They record the poverty and the missing schooling as facts, and they use the modest surface to sharpen the puzzle of the impact. The condemnation attaches to the deeds, not the background. Stolfi blurs the line between describing where a man came from and despising him for it, then treats the blur as proof of bias.
Stolfi writes:

Hitler’s biographers have also broadened his historical shoulders to unrealistically large proportions. This broadening has taken place in a pattern that has prevented effective interpretation of the more important foreign policy events of the 1930s and the outbreak and course of World War II. A historical entity, “the German people,” has been indicted accurately and plausibly for its role in the rise of Hitler. Another historical entity, “the German generals,” has been accused by writers of having deflected blame for the loss of World War II away from itself and onto Hitler. Most important, however, yet another historical entity, “the Allies,” has rendered itself historically invisible, escaping with little blame for the approach and outbreak of World War II except for the standard picture of naïveté and patient endurance of diplomatic aggression. As a noted British historian has described: “It was Hitler’s war, he wanted it, planned it, and he started it.” This remarkable statement has lain unchallenged for decades even though it must be evident that “it was France’s victorious peace, France wanted it, France planned it to dominate continental Europe and it led directly into World War II.”

This is the heart of the revisionist case, and it mixes a true premise with a false one to reach a conclusion that does not hold.
Start with what is sound. The peace of 1919 mattered. The settlement and the interwar order fed German grievance and helped make the ground in which Nazism grew, and serious people have said so since the ink dried. John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) made the economic version of the argument the same year the treaty was signed. The Allies handled the twenty years badly, lurching between punishment they would not enforce and concession they made too late. Appeasement has its own large literature of blame. So if Stolfi only said the Allies share responsibility for a botched peace and a botched diplomacy, he would be standing on solid and crowded ground.
He says much more, and the more is where it breaks.
Take the claim that biographers broadened Hitler’s shoulders to unrealistic size. There was an older school that did this, the master planner working a blueprint from Mein Kampf to Poland. But the dominant modern scholarship runs the other way, and Kershaw is its leading figure. His whole frame, working toward the Führer, exists to cut Hitler down from sole author to focal point of a cumulative radicalization driven by many hands. So Stolfi aims this charge at a position his chief target has spent two volumes dismantling. The man who supposedly inflates Hitler’s agency is the man who did most to deflate it.
Now the France premise, which carries the whole argument and cannot bear the weight. France did not get the peace it wanted, and it did not dominate the continent. France wanted the Rhineland stripped away and Germany held down hard. Britain and the United States blocked that, and what came out was a compromise France found too weak, not a triumph it engineered. The years that followed show a frightened France, not a dominant one. It built the Maginot Line out of dread of German recovery. It stood by when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936. A power that planned to rule Europe does not spend two decades digging defensive concrete and flinching at every German step. Stolfi’s slogan needs a confident, scheming France. The record gives an anxious, hesitant one.
Then the word directly, which does the quiet work in “led directly into World War II.” Between 1919 and 1939 lie the Depression, the choice of German elites to hand Hitler the chancellorship, and Hitler’s own decisions to rearm, to remilitarize, to annex Austria, to take the Sudetenland, to swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia, and at last to invade Poland. Call the line from the treaty to the war direct and you erase all of that, every fork where men chose. A peace can shape conditions without scripting the deeds done inside them. Stolfi treats a background cause as the proximate one and lets the proximate actor walk.
The slogan itself is the tell. “It was Hitler’s war” set against “it was France’s peace” reads as balance, and it is sleight of hand. Blame is not a fixed sum where charging France must discharge Hitler. Both can stand. The peace can be unjust and the man can still choose the war. By posing the two as rivals for a single seat, Stolfi quietly moves the moral weight from the leader who ordered the invasions to the diplomats of a generation before.
Stolfi says the line about Hitler wanting, planning, and starting the war has lain unchallenged for decades. The opposite is true. That proposition has been among the hardest fought in the whole field. A.J.P. Taylor (1906–1990) attacked it head-on in The Origins of the Second World War in 1961, arguing Hitler was more opportunist than architect, and set off a controversy that ran for years. The intentionalist and structuralist camps have battled over exactly this question for half a century. Stolfi presents a settled orthodoxy where there has been open war.

Convenient Beliefs

Stephen Turner’s question is whether the man who holds his belief has any reason to find out it is false. A convenient belief is one that pays to hold and costs to challenge, and so it survives in the absence of any force that might test it. That is the lens to put on Stolfi.
Stolfi’s convenient belief is that military performance can be studied as a thing in itself, that operational excellence, maneuver, command culture, tempo, can be assessed apart from the character of the war the army fought. Call it the autonomy of the operational. The Clean Wehrmacht myth is the historical body this belief lives in. The German army was a professional instrument, brilliant at its craft, undone by the amateur meddling of Hitler and the criminal excess of the Party. Study the craft. Bracket the rest.
The evidence does not force this. It permits it, which is a different thing. Omer Bartov showed that German cohesion in the East drew on indoctrination and on complicity in racial killing, that the maneuver and the murder ran through the same units and the same men. Once you grant that, the separation Stolfi needs becomes a choice rather than a finding. Where the evidence underdetermines, something else decides, and that something is convenience.
Look at whom it serves. The belief paid the German generals first. It turned them from participants in a war of annihilation into defeated professionals betrayed by a corporal with no feel for armor. It lifted the weight of guilt and, in the years of the trials, the weight of the rope. The belief then paid the American defense establishment. To prepare for an armored war against the Soviets, the United States needed the Wehrmacht’s operational lessons, and a clean Wehrmacht is a teachable one. A genocidal Wehrmacht is an embarrassing teacher. The whole apparatus of the Foreign Military Studies program, the consulting careers of the ex-officers, the doctrine carried over into NATO planning, all of it rested on the premise that you might take the operational craft and leave the crimes on the floor. The belief paid Stolfi last and most personally. His craft is operational analysis. If the operational cannot be cut loose from the genocidal, the value of what he knows how to do drops, and his subject loses its standing. The belief protects his method. It lets his life’s work remain serious.
Inside the Cold War military-academic world, no one had an incentive to falsify the autonomy belief. The institution funded operational study and rewarded it. The men best placed to correct the record, the former Wehrmacht officers turned consultants and collaborators, were the men the record exculpated. Stolfi trained inside this reward structure, taught inside it at Monterey, and wrote a book on NATO defense with one of its German generals. The belief faced no test it might fail, because the community that held it also set the tests. Correction came only from outside, from Bartov and the new military history, a different community with different rewards. That is the shape of a convenient belief. It is not defended. It is simply never put at risk by the people who hold it.
Stolfi probes German fuel, rail capacity, the diversion of armor to Kiev, the road not taken to Moscow. He does not probe the link between the cohesion he admires and the violence that cohesion served. He cannot, because that inquiry threatens the belief that underwrites his method. A convenient belief is marked less by what it asserts than by what it refuses to look at, and Stolfi’s refusal is precise and total.
Hitler’s Panzers East takes the autonomy belief and applies it to the campaign. The professionals nearly won. The amateur ruined it. That is the generals’ convenient belief rendered as scholarship. Twenty years later Beyond Evil and Tyranny applies the same separation to Hitler the person. Pry the competence and the vision loose from the crimes, study the world-historical personality, set the murder aside as harsh necessity. The second book is the first book’s premise carried to its only possible subject. Once the separation cleans the army, it cannot stop at the army. The same cut that spares the Wehrmacht must eventually spare the commander, because it is the same cut. The convenient belief has an internal trajectory, and the trajectory ends at the Führer’s desk, because that is where the logic was always headed.

Alliance Theory

Run the work through Alliance Theory and you stop reading Stolfi as a philosophy of history. Social belief systems are not philosophies. They are collections of ad hoc justifications, rationalizations, and rhetorical tactics that mobilize support for one’s allies and opposition to one’s rivals. The question is never what abstract value a man holds. The question is whom he is fighting for. So ask it of Stolfi. What ties his beliefs together is not a theory of greatness or a doctrine about evil. The thread is an alliance.
Stolfi is not a Nazi and the frame does not need him to be one. His allies are the German professional officer corps, the Wehrmacht as a craft institution, and behind them the Cold War American strategic community that took the German army as its model. He sits inside the second group and allies with the first by transitivity. Pinsof’s cue of similarity does the work. Stolfi is a Marine colonel and an operational historian. The German officer is a fellow soldier, a fellow practitioner of maneuver and mission command, a man whose craft Stolfi shares and admires. The enemy of his rival becomes his friend. His rivals are the new military historians, Bartov and his school, the civilian academics who fold ideology, race, and genocide into the study of war and who scorn the operational guild as naive or complicit. The Wehrmacht earns Stolfi’s loyalty in part because his rivals despise it. That is transitivity, the ally of my ally and the enemy of my enemy, working exactly as the paper describes.
Now the alliance becomes a super-alliance held by interdependence. The ex-Wehrmacht officers supply the operational knowledge. The American establishment supplies the platform, the funding, and the rehabilitation. Each reliably provides benefits to the other. Stolfi’s collaboration with a former German general on a NATO defense book is the bond made visible. Pinsof’s point is that such coalitions are not built on shared principle. They are built on shared use, and they generate strange bedfellows. A retired Marine defending a genocidal army’s reputation is a strange bedfellow. The frame predicts him.
Then comes the part where Pinsof’s apparatus maps onto Stolfi’s prose almost line for line, because the propagandistic biases are the same ones Stolfi runs.
Start with perpetrator biases. Pinsof says people defend their allies’ transgressions by downplaying responsibility, stressing mitigating circumstances, embellishing good intentions, and minimizing the harm. Read Stolfi on the murder of the Jews. He recasts it as harsh necessity rather than conscious cruelty. He stresses the circumstance, the irreconcilable enemy, the framework of a great war. He embellishes the intention, the messiah serving a vision of German salvation rather than a man doing evil. He minimizes by relativizing. Every move in the textbook is present. He runs the same bias for the officer corps, adopting the generals’ postwar story whole, that defeat in the East was the amateur Hitler’s interference and not the institution’s failure or complicity. The generals deflected their own responsibility, and Stolfi, their ally, rationalizes the deflection precisely as the paper says allies rationalize allies.
Next, victim biases. Pinsof says people embellish their allies’ grievances, emphasize the rival’s culpability, and stage competitive victimhood, the contest to show that one’s own side suffered more injustice. This is the Versailles material and the Churchill ledger. Stolfi embellishes the German grievance, the wound of the treaty, the 800,000 dead of the blockade, the 2 million dead of the expulsion. He builds an explicit accounting, German dead set against Jewish dead, so that the suffering of his allies stands level with the suffering they caused. Noor’s competitive victimhood is not an analogy here. It is the thing itself, a man assembling a balance sheet so his side’s wounds match the other’s. He extends the victim bias to Hitler the man, the underestimated figure, the target of antipathy, branded unfairly by hostile writers. The whole introduction is a grievance narrative filed on behalf of the misjudged.
Pinsof says we attribute our allies’ advantages to internal causes and their setbacks to external ones, and we run the mirror against rivals. Watch Stolfi assign causes. German success, the early victories, the operational brilliance, comes from internal disposition, genius, vision, the command culture of the army. German failure comes from outside, from Hitler’s meddling, from French scheming, from sheer Allied material weight. Now the mirror. The Allied victory is denied an internal cause. The Allies did not win, Hitler lost. France came out on top by some mix of skill and luck. The United States merely tipped the balance. The rival’s triumph is reattributed to circumstance and fortune, never to competence. That is the self-serving attributional bias pointed both ways at once, and Stolfi points it with discipline.
If Stolfi runs alliance propaganda, so do the biographers he attacks. Kershaw and the others apply victim biases for the Jews and the democracies, and they apply perpetrator biases that maximize Hitler’s responsibility, deny him every mitigating circumstance, and attribute his acts to irrational malevolence, which is the victim bias’s signature move. By the letter of the theory, the unperson is propaganda too, a narrative that serves the liberal civil order and its dead. So Alliance Theory does not crown Stolfi a uniquely biased man. It says everyone in the fight carries the same alliance psychology, and the only difference is the alliance. Kershaw fights for the democratic order and its victims. Stolfi fights for the soldier’s guild and the defeated.
Alliance Theory explains the shape of Stolfi’s beliefs, why these particular convictions cluster together in one man, why admiration for an army’s craft sits beside a shrug at its genocide. It does not certify that the shape is accurate.
Alliance Theory dissolves the puzzle that the moral reading leaves standing, the puzzle of how a serious scholar can praise the maneuver and bracket the murder in the same book. There is no coherent principle that joins those two beliefs. There is only a coalition that makes them sit together, the transnational guild of professional soldiers and operational historians and its Cold War patron, against the civilian moralists who threaten its standing. Stolfi’s portrait of Hitler is a patchwork narrative, in Pinsof’s exact sense, mobilizing support for that guild and opposition to its rivals, stitched from perpetrator biases for the army, victim biases for the defeated, and attributional biases that gild his allies and discount his enemies.

The Banality of Evil

Arendt’s claim is sharper than the slogan. She said the man in the glass booth was not a monster, not an Iago, not a Macbeth, not a demon with a grand and twisted will. He was hollow. He thought in clichés and stock phrases. He could not think from the standpoint of another person. His defining trait was thoughtlessness, which she took pains to separate from stupidity, the absence of the inner dialogue in which a man weighs his acts against the reality of other men. The horror she reported was the gap between the size of the deeds and the shallowness of the doer. Banal did not mean common. It meant without depth. Only the good, she held, has depth and can be radical. Evil spreads like a fungus across the surface and has no roots. Adolf Eichmann (1906–1962) administered mass death and remained a small man, and the smallness was the terror.
Stolfi and the demonologists he attacks share a single hidden premise. They both believe the doer must match the deed in stature. The demonologists make Hitler a titan of evil, a figure of monstrous depth equal to the catastrophe. Stolfi makes him a titan of greatness, a prophet, a world-historical personality, an artist of brilliance, a man whose inner size accounts for the breath the world held. The two camps quarrel over the sign, plus or minus, and agree on the magnitude. Arendt cuts beneath both. The deeds were enormous. The man need not have been. That single move dissolves the premise Stolfi builds on, because his whole book is the inference she showed to be false, the inference from the scale of the effect to the scale of the soul.
See what this does to the unperson. Stolfi treats Kershaw’s empty vessel as a slur, half a portrait, a failure of nerve dressed as judgment. Read it through Arendt and the empty vessel is not the missing half. It is the finding. The hollowness is the thing to be explained, not the thing to be filled in. Kershaw, who never cites her here, stands closer to Arendt than Stolfi does, because the unperson takes the measure of the horror without inflating the man, while Stolfi flees the hollowness into myth. When he charges the biographers with leaving the canvas half blank, he mistakes a conclusion for an omission. The blankness is what they found when they looked.
Then the aesthetic clutter, which is the heart of Stolfi’s case for depth. He marshals the Wagner, the architecture, the painting, the consuming vision of a perfect Reich, and asks how a man with such passions could be called empty. Arendt’s category answers him. Enthusiasm is not thinking. A vision is not judgment. A man might love opera and monumental form, might lie awake over building plans, might carry a sense of historic mission, and remain radically unable to think, unable to hold the reality of another person in mind. The interests are not the depth Stolfi takes them for. By her measure they sit on the surface with everything else, the surface where evil grows. The lack of proportion he names as a mark of greatness she might name as the absence of the faculty that checks a man against the world. The grandiosity is not depth inverted. It is thoughtlessness with a stage.
Watch too where Stolfi reaches for Hegel. The world-historical personality is Hegelian furniture, the great individual through whom the World-Spirit works, whose crimes the cunning of reason redeems as the cost of historical advance. Arendt spent her life against exactly this, the philosophy of history that swallows the person into necessity and lifts him above the reach of judgment. The world-historical frame is not an analytic gain. It is the apparatus that places a man beyond the question of right and wrong by folding him into History’s plan. Stolfi’s elevation of Hitler is, in her terms, a flight from judgment into metaphysics, and the flight is the oldest one there is.
Greatness consoles in the same way demonization consoles. Both set the evildoer apart from us. A titan of evil is comforting because he is not our neighbor, and a titan of greatness is comforting because his horror reads as the dark edge of a rare and singular grandeur we will never meet. Both quarantine the catastrophe inside an exceptional man. Arendt refused the quarantine, and the refusal is what made Eichmann in Jerusalem unbearable to so many readers. They wanted a monster, because a monster keeps evil at a safe and grand distance. She gave them a clerk, and the clerk implicated the rest of us. Stolfi, for all his contrarian noise, performs the most conventional consolation of all. He makes the man big enough to be safely other. The shuddering admiration he quotes with approval is precisely the romance Arendt named as an escape from the harder truth.
Arendt did not call Hitler banal. The thesis was built on the desk killers, the administrators, the men who made the system run, and she treated the leader differently, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, as the functionary of a movement and a mass rather than as a romantic genius. So I am not claiming Hitler was a hollow clerk. I am claiming Stolfi commits the fallacy Arendt exposed, the inference from magnitude of effect to magnitude of person, and that her work is the cleanest instrument for naming it. Even her reading of the leader cuts against him, since she denied the great-man romance from the other direction, locating the power in the movement and the masses rather than in the titan’s soul.
So the foundation cracks, and it cracks at the first stone. Stolfi asks how an unperson made the world hold its breath and treats the question as a refutation of the unperson. Arendt asked the same question and let the answer stand. The man who made the world hold its breath did not have to be great to do it. The breath the world held says everything about the deeds and the movement and the millions who worked toward him, and it certifies nothing about the depth of the figure at the center. Stolfi spends a book supplying a grandeur the horror never required, and in doing so he gives the catastrophe the one thing Arendt warned against handing it, a hero at its core.

The Historikerstreit

The Historikerstreit was the quarrel West Germany had with itself in the summer of 1986 over how to place the Nazi crimes in history, and it gives you the precise name for what Stolfi does, along with the precise refutation. The argument turned on one word, relativization. Could you set Auschwitz beside other mass crimes, compare the ledgers, and in the comparing dissolve the singular weight of the German case? The conservatives said yes and called it scholarship. Their opponents said the comparison was apologetics wearing a scholar’s coat, and they mostly carried the day. Stolfi, writing a quarter century later, marches back onto the field the relativizers lost and fights the battle again without seeming to know it was fought.
Begin with Ernst Nolte, since his move is the template. In his June 1986 newspaper essay on the past that will not pass, Nolte proposed a causal nexus. The Bolshevik class murder, the Gulag, the Asiatic deed of Lenin and Stalin, came first, and the Nazi race murder was in some sense a reaction to it, a copy, a defensive answer by men who feared they might be its next victims. Auschwitz had a prius, an earlier and originating horror, and once you grant the prius the German crime shifts from origination to response. Nolte went further and floated Chaim Weizmann’s (1874–1952) 1939 declaration that Jews would stand with Britain, as if it licensed Hitler to treat German Jews as enemy combatants. The aim across all of it was to historicize the Nazi past, to lift its exceptional moral burden, to let Germans hold a more ordinary national identity.
Andreas Hillgruber (1925–1989) supplied the other half, and he is the closer mirror to Stolfi. In Zweierlei Untergang he paired two catastrophes, the destruction of the European Jews and the destruction and expulsion of the Germans from the East, and he urged the historian to identify with the German troops on the Eastern Front as they fought to shield the German population from the Red Army. Set the two ruins side by side. Stand, as the writer, with the soldiers holding the line. That is the operational sympathy and the balanced ledger of German and Jewish suffering, proposed by a professional historian in 1986.
Jürgen Habermas answered in July, and his charge is the category you want. He called these efforts apologetic tendencies and named the function with a cold word, Schadensabwicklung, the settling or liquidation of damages, the closing of a moral account. The relativizing comparison, he argued, does not illuminate. It discharges a debt. By dissolving the singularity of the crime into a series of comparable crimes, it normalizes the past and frees a national identity from the burden the past had rightly laid on it. Michael Stürmer (b. 1938) had supplied the motive on the conservative side, the wish for a history that gives the nation meaning and orientation. Habermas saw the scholarship and the wish as one thing. Saul Friedländer pressed the deeper answer, that the extermination was a rupture in civilization whose specificity, the planned and total murder of a people for being that people, resists the ledger that would make it one entry among many.
Now lay Stolfi over the template and the tracing is exact.
His France argument is Nolte’s prius in military dress. Where Nolte found the originating horror in Bolshevik Russia, Stolfi finds it in France and the peace of 1919. France wanted the war, France planned it, the victorious peace led directly to 1939, and the German catastrophe becomes a reaction to a prior French one. The Allies did not win, Hitler lost. The structure is identical. Locate an earlier cause, make the German deed a response, and the origination dissolves into the causal nexus. Stolfi even shares Nolte’s empirical weakness, since the prius does not hold. France got a compromise it found too weak and spent twenty anxious years failing to enforce it, just as Nolte’s Soviet-first chronology never carried the causal weight he loaded onto it.
His Churchill ledger is Hillgruber’s Zweierlei Untergang. Stolfi sets the murder of the Jews beside the expulsion of the Germans, counts the dead on each side, four and a half million against two million, and finds the quality of cruelty similar. This is the paired ruin, the balanced account, the competitive suffering that Habermas named as the heart of the apologetic move. And Stolfi’s whole admiring stance toward the Wehrmacht, the operational brilliance, the warrior prince of the trenches, is Hillgruber’s call to identify with the troops in the East, extended into a full book. His final chapter, the siege of Germany, frames the nation as the besieged party, which is the besieged-Germany picture Hillgruber painted of the front.
His harsh necessity is Nolte’s defensive reaction. Hitler’s order that the Jews must disappear becomes, in Stolfi’s hands, prudent action against an irreconcilable enemy, harsh necessity rather than conscious cruelty. That is the Weizmann move, the recasting of a targeted people as a wartime foe whose removal answers a threat. The extermination is reframed as response, and response is the relativizer’s whole game.
Here I owe you the distinction that keeps this honest, because the easy version of the charge is wrong. Comparison is not the crime. Historians compare constantly, and they must, and Friedländer himself did not forbid it. The line runs between comparison that illuminates and comparison that equalizes to exculpate. A comparison that sharpens what was distinctive about the German case is history. A comparison built to flatten the cases into one another so that no one bears singular responsibility is Schadselsabwicklung. Stolfi’s ledger is built for the second purpose. He does not compare to understand the murder of the Jews better. He compares to settle the German account against the Allied one, to reach a balance in which Hitler and Churchill stand as twin devils loose in Europe. That is the side of the line Habermas and Friedländer marked off, and Stolfi plants his flag on it.
The yield is the pedigree, and the pedigree is damning. Stolfi presents himself as the lone brave revisionist breaking a cowardly orthodoxy, and the truth is that his central moves were made by abler men in 1986 and refuted in public by the leading philosopher and the leading Holocaust historian of the age. He is not original. He is late. He recapitulates Nolte’s prius and Hillgruber’s pairing without citing the quarrel that produced them, and so he never answers Habermas’s diagnosis or Friedländer’s reply, because he writes as if neither happened. The field already has a name for his method, relativization, and a name for its function, the settling of damages, and a standing rebuttal that he does not engage. A revisionist who does not know he is repeating the losers of a famous debate is not breaking an orthodoxy. He is reviving an exhausted one.
Nolte was a serious scholar before 1986. His Three Faces of Fascism was a real contribution, and the man was not a crank when he began. The Historikerstreit also ended without anyone signing a surrender, and the questions it raised about comparison and singularity remain open at the edges. None of that rescues Stolfi. Habermas won the argument that mattered, the relativizing program was discredited as apologetics, and the burden of singularity held. Stolfi reaches for the discredited program two decades on, with less rigor than Nolte and a frank admiration for the army that Hillgruber only urged the reader to feel.