How Bodies Read and Write: Dostoevsky’s Demons and Coetzee’s Master of Petersburg

Michael Kochin wrote a chapter in the 2013 book, Dostoevsky’s Political Thought:

The writer must give up his soul in order to write. He must give up his soul to become the body writing.

To write Stavrogin, then, the writer must be open to possession; he must be willing to be seduced by the loss of personality necessary to produce writing that is of other than personal value. The moral danger for the writer-for the writer writing with the body-is this possession. Stavro­gin, after all, is not a writer, but he is a rapist. Pyotr/Nechaev is not a writer, but he is a murderer. To write the possessed, the writer himself must allow his body to be possessed by their demons. He cannot appease these demons with mere blood-as we have seen, the writer must “give up his soul.”

Both novels show us this close relation between literature and the extreme mistreatment of bodies at the hands of governments, terrorists, criminals, the self, and demons. Coetzee’s Nechaev recognizes this, say­ing to Dostoevsky in a dripping cellar with two hungry children feeding on a loaf of bread earned by their streetwalker mother: “I suppose you want to hurry home and get this cellar and these children down in a notebook before the memory fades.” The suffering of children, he rec­ognizes, is precisely the sort of thing that motivates the writer. Suffering children, like the budding breasts of the young girl Matryona, inspire the writer, that is, both suffering and erotic passion open the writer to posses­sion by demonic spirits. Suffering offers the writer the occasion for in­dulging the transgressive pleasure of possession. Suffering, or its Latin equivalent, passion, licenses the writer to divest himself of the controlling subjectivity of his non-writer self.

The possession invoked by the spectacle of suffering can motivate the writer and the reader to suffer with the suffering-it can instill compas­sion. Yet the spectacle of suffering can also move the writer and the reader to revel in the delight in his own power felt by the deliberate perpetrator of suffering. Indeed, the writer thus can present us with the torturer as clearly as he or she can present us with the tortured. Coet­zee’s Dostoevsky knows well and puts to work in writing Stavrogin’s confession that there is generally more “real life” in fictional rapists than in fictional victims.62 The question that remains is whether U1e writing itself is conducive to the alleviation of this suffering, or whether it merely affords the reader a view of the spectacle of that suffering from a safe aesthetic distance. Faced with a choice between vitality and morals, every writer will choose vitality-and every serious man will choose morality. One would like to believe that the writer suffers with his victims, and thus his art encourages the serious reader to get out of his easy chair and act to alleviate human suffering. But the real Dostoevsky wrote Stavro­gin’s confession, and the real J. M. Coetzee wrote The Master of Petersburg.

How_Bodies_Read_and_Write

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From Argument To Assertion

Michael S. Kochin writes in Argumentation 23, No. 3 (August 2009).:

There are, however, two fundamental rhetorical difficulties with laying out one’s premises, reasoning, and conclusions. Since arguments are anticlimactic if they are explicit, the speaker who is excessively explicit in his or her reasoning is liable to fall into what one may call “the arguer’s dilemma,” with its two horns, the horn of banality and the horn of incomprehensibility. Either the audience can see where you are going before you get there (first horn), or they can’t (second horn). If they can see where you are going, they will lose attention, since to quote Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969 §98, 469), “an anticipated argument is a banal argument,” and the arguer has impaled himself on the horn of banality. If the audience can’t see where you are going, that is, in all likelihood, because they can’t follow the thread of your argument, and the arguer loses their attention as he squirms gored and suspended on the horn of incomprehensibility. If the audience can’t follow your argument, this means that even if you have managed to persuade them, we cannot say that they are persuaded to adopt your conclusion by accepting the argument you have offered for it.

So if you want to argue, you have to find some way out of the arguer’s dilemma: either you have to compose an argument that your audience is able to follow but not to anticipate—an extraordinary achievement—or you have to aim in arguing at some effect other than persuading your audience of the truth of your conclusion through their following and accepting your argument…

…outside mathematics, and certainly in practical affairs, the facts are never all on the table: the question is whether one has the resources to challenge the factual assertions that lead to the conclusions one wishes to reject—whether one can find the key or pick the lock. The issue is what the sociologist of science Bruno Latour has called a “trial of strength”: can you muster the resources required to overcome your opponents’ facts? This can be done by disputing the truth of your adversary’s facts, that is, by arguing, since, The New Rhetoric puts it, “recourse to argumentation is unavoidable whenever… proofs are questioned by one of the parties” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 8). More often, one puts the adversaries’ strength to the trial by offering alternative facts that make your opponents’ claims seem irrelevant—that is, if one has not been bludgeoned into aporia or absence of recourse by the force of the adversaries’ assertions into accepting their arguments.

…Gerald Rafshoon, Jimmy Carter’s principal advertising man in Carter’s 1980. Presidential reelection campaign: “If we had to do it all over again, we would take the 30 million dollars we spent in the campaign and get three more helicopters for the Iran rescue mission” (Popkin 1991, 4). One could claim, with Samuel Popkin, that Rafshoon’s statement shows the limits of image-making as against political reality. But we will better understand the gravity of Carter’s and Rafshoon’s problem if we remind ourselves that the most effective image of President Carter would have been a news broadcast of him receiving the freed hostages.

…In our life together discussion is instrumental to action: discussion is a cost, not a benefit, and so we can only afford some discussion, whether that discussion consists of facts or of arguments. Any new factual assertion threatens the solidarity we have achieved, and thus the ability to act which that solidarity has fostered.

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Trust & Evidence on the Internet

Michael S. Kochin published this essay in Rhêtorikê: Revista Digital de Retórica 0 (March 2008):

First, newspapers and television don’t have footnotes. Even newspaper science reporting and editorials, both of which almost always rely on other reporting, do not use footnotes to direct us to that reporting [while] political blogs are rich in hyperlinks, the internet equivalent of footnotes.

…online newspapers, the Guardian in England or Ha’aretz in Israel, frequently provide links for further information. Such links are not generally source links but exit links: I cannot recall a single instance in which the link was to the specific sources for the factual claims in the article2. So my second observation is that blogs, and in particular public affairs blogs, have footnotes, that is to say, they source their claims through hyperlinks…

Third observation: public affairs blogs and online communities of other sorts have already played crucial roles in politics in the United States….

As Walter Lippmann puts it[,] “a code of right and wrong must wait upon a perception of the true and the false.” Insofar as political institutions see truth or correctness, they are largely engaged in sifting claims of fact rather then assessing arguments. As Lippmann writes, “useful discussion … instead of comparing ideals, re-examines visions of the facts.”

Some examples: what mattered in the period immediately before the second Gulf War was whether Saddam Hussein had chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. What matters is what are the expected net costs of global warming…

Persuasion, then, is largely a matter of getting one’s claims of fact seen as true and relevant… To quote Walter Lippmann again, “Except on a few subjects where our own knowledge is great, we cannot choose between true and false accounts. So we choose between trustworthy and untrustworthy reporters.”

…When do we resort to argument? Real speeches heavy on arguments seem to aim to present the speaker as calm, serious, and knowledgeable. In public life, one argues not in order to demonstrate the claim for which one is arguing, but firstly, to show that one possesses homonoia, that one shares the common prejudices or values that appear in the presuppositions and conclusions of one’s argument, or, secondly, to demonstrate phronesis, to show mastery of the subject matter by displaying relevant knowledge in coherently organized detail. Arguing is thus a way of presenting facts and principles so as to show one’s character as worthy of trust.

To be trusted is to be trusted as a knowledgeable, unbiased source of relevant facts. “Trust me” is a comparatively rare appeal.

Thus we need guidance on the ocean of facts. This point was explored at length after the First World War by Walter Lippmann, and his set of solutions was institutionalized into the American policy Establishment. This establishment rests on three components: first, think-tanks and government research bureaus; second, objective reporting in newspapers
and broadcast media; third, editorialists in that media who draw out the consequences of what is reported for their readers and instruct them which politicians or issues ought to be supported…

What we can see now about the Lippmannite establishment is that the primary mediation is institutional. Not the official who wrote or complied it, but the bureau or think tank stands behind the report. Not the reporter, but the newspaper, wire service, or television network stands behind his or her reportage. In that respect the Lippmannite establishment is quite different from the academic and scientific establishments. In the case of “the media,” it is made as difficult as possible for the viewer, reader, or consumer to get behind the institution to the sources. The print reporter “protects his sources. ”The television news network sequesters the raw footage from which the broadcast report is cut and edited. The wire editor for the local paper edits down the wire report without even an ellipsis mark to note what has been deleted. We, the consumer of these mediated reports, have no choice but to rely on the institutional reputation of the newspaper or television network that the factual claims in the report as presented are correct and representative.

…Small countries like Israel have disproportionately large establishments, simply because of the inverse of economies of scale. After all, it takes a certain number of people to run an establishment, and those are going to be a higher proportion of the well-informed and hyperliterate in a smaller country. To present facts other people have not considered is to threaten the way things are going on. Faced with these facts the established elite has a conflict of interest: on the one hand that elite needs correct facts
in order to go on, and on the other hand they cannot go on pursuing their projects if these projects are perpetually being called into question.

…New facts that threaten our picture changes the action by a kind of backwards induction, since we cannot carry out the action if we cannot hold to the picture that rationalizes them. The Establishment media of the Lippmannite era, say 1919-1999, engaged in a kind of gatekeeping of facts that allowed policy Establishments to maintain solidarity and the integrity of their projects.

Now conformity to established opinion is always and everywhere the price of being or remaining within the Establishment. Yet simply by the numbers small countries have less room for a counter-establishment which presents facts uncongenial to the establishment, or for any kind of informed opinion outside the establishment. In the United States so many people are excluded from the policy establishment by sheer force of numbers, that any hyperliterate person interested in public affairs can find a job as an academic, reporter, or think-tank researcher.

In small countries it is more-or-less impossible to have influence on the course of affairs from outside the establishment, given the higher relative reward to anyone who might pay attention to ignore you and keep in good with “The Powers that Be.” In Israel, disagreeing with the mainstream of elite opinion guarantees that one will have no influence, and unless one is fortunate to have landed an academic position, no income.

…In small countries, or at least in Israel, there is less room for counterestablishment mediators, largely because there are fewer hyperliterate people to do the job. In Israel there are no influential political blogs, and there is no influential nationalist media outlet, no Israeli right-wing equivalent to Fox News or Rush Limbaugh. The Israeli media still speaks truth to power, but it speaks only those truths with which the established media is comfortable. Nobody in Israel is speaking truth to the established “old” media after the fashion of the pro-Bush bloggers in the Rathergate scandal.

Smallness, I conclude, has a perverse consequence for foreign policy. The Taoist strategy manual “The Master of Demon Valley” teaches “To be small means there is no inside; to be large means there is no outside.” This has two consequences: First, small countries have no inside: their affairs are more determined by what goes on outside of them than are those of big countries. Second, small countries have no inside: they don’t have inside of them a counterestablishment, including public affairs blogs, that can present uncomfortable facts about the challenges coming from outside.

I am always astonished by how much better Americans understand Israel than Israelis understand America, even though Israeli national survival depends, in great part, on a successful understanding of America. Small countries, having no inside, have a greater need to be guided by accurate information about what is outside, but in fact they have less accurate information about what is outside. We need to keep in mind Cass Sunstein’s observation that “blunders are significantly increased if people are rewarded not for correct decisions but for decisions that conform to the decisions made by most people”. Establishments may sometimes heed mavericks, but they never reward them.

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Donald Trump – The President Of Vice (12-4-24)

01:00 Vice is bad, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/04/opinion/donald-trump-vice-voters.html
03:00 Commentary mag: There Are Nations in Crisis—Just Not Ours, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqSB6OeDxow
08:20 Among Transition hiccups, Trump survives stuff that no political mortal could survive, says Mark Halperin, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/among-transition-hiccups-trump-survives-stuff-that/id1573813504?i=1000679240142
12:00 Humor & Morality, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=158042
19:00 Variations in Moral Concerns across Political Ideology: Moral Foundations, Hidden Tribes, and Righteous Division, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=158050
24:20 Does Hunter Biden need a pardon to save himself from triggers? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sme1_gt4GJM
29:00 Covid & Epistemic Coercion, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=158056
55:10 Kip joins to talk about the horror of editing one’s own thoughts
1:00:00 The SS St Louis ship is denied entry to the USA in 1939, but was it welcomed by anyone?, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS_St._Louis
1:26:00 Asabiyyah, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asabiyyah
1:30:40 Israel’s elite is quite different from the Israel majority, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkKsENN0S2M
1:34:14 The primacy of military power
1:36:30 What’s going on in Syria?

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Epistemic Coercion

Stephen Turner writes in Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2024, vol. 61, no. 3:

“Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on are incomprehensible if one does not exactly who is to be affected, combatted, refuted, or negated by such a term. Above all the polemical character determines the use of the word political regardless of whether the adversary is designated as non-political (in the sense of harmless), or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce him as political in order to portray oneself as non-political (in the sense of the purely scientific, purely moral, purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on the basis of similar purities) and therefore superior.”
[Carl Schmitt, (1932) 1996, pp. 31–32].

* …the regimes of science and expertise are ineradicably political and coercive. But if regimes of science and expertise are ineradicably political and coercive, what remains
is the problem of our choice of regimes, and how to accommodate them in a democratic order. We must come to a reckoning with the disillusion from the idea of the purity of science and the neutrality of expertise. We cannot simultaneously valorize “the science” as a real institutional fact and insist on “following the science,” and ignore the practical meaning of the imperfect institutional processes that make it up, and the value choices that are made within science, which may diverge from the values that derive from democratic processes.

* …The Covid pandemic saw the development and widespread use of actual means of knowledge suppression and epistemic engineering, both within science and with respect to expert claims, within nominally free societies….The rationale for the use of these means was that malinformation, misinformation, and disinformation were sufficiently pervasive in the digital world that they produced harms that justified not merely correction or disagreement but intervention to alter the cognitive climate. The reasoning produced a novel concept, “cognitive security,” as well as a plethora of new jargon terms, many of which were designed to conceal the partisan nature of the technical interventions under such bland terms as “curation” and treating interventions as forms of cybersecurity.

* New revelations about the role of governments and drug companies in these interventions, and their extent, occur almost daily. And in each case they show that the interventions cross whatever line still exists between partisanship and scholarship, fact and value, and claims warranted by sufficient evidence as distinct from plausible assumptions that might warrant policy preferences, and any line between coercion and persuasion. And under Covid, in medicine, we have seen unambiguously direct coercion: taking the licenses of doctors for failing to abide by problematic guidelines, or censorship based on definitions of misinformation which were themselves based on policy agendas with little evidence behind them. What is especially important in the presence of novel technologies of persuasion is the question of whether these are novel instruments of epistemic control or coercion, and whether they require new forms of control, and new forms of resistance, in order to serve the purposes we expect discourse, either in science or the public sphere, to achieve.

* Power also comes in two basic forms: commands which are enforceable and hegemonic power which takes the form of pervasive conditions of constraint that are unconsciously internalized as normal and then serve as self-imposed limits on thought and behavior that are not even recognized as such.

* we can find examples of explicitly coerced personal experiences that generate largely inarticulable knowledge: a paradigm case would be Eisenhower’s decision at the end of the Second World War to force Germans to watch films of the concentration camps by making it a condition of getting stamps to obtain food.

* Most of our explicit knowledge comes from others. We judge what we are told by a combination of two variables: our assessment of their trustworthiness (and motives) and our assessment of their competence to speak and their access to the subject.

* The mechanisms of power in science are familiar: they include exclusion, article rejection, failure to endorse, to fund, to employ, to allocate scarce resources to, failure to attend to, and so forth. There are also many rewards for cognitive conformity and conforming to standards of achievement. All of these are forms of censorship, in the sense that they are, like overt censorship, means of controlling and manipulating the cognitive environment.

* Changing minds is difficult. Silencing and excluding is not. The easiest point of coercive entry into the epistemic environment is at the moment of transmission. Preventing publication, delegitimating the sources, threatening the speakers, are all common means of exercising this kind of coercion. They were lavishly employed during the Covid pandemic.

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