The rise of the “substackademic”

Chris Bickerton writes:

A successful academic entrepreneur must make themselves their primary focus. In an odd way, the academic entrepreneur is the realisation of Foucault’s call for a “cultivation of the self”. The constant curation of one’s status as a source of insights is the route to success…

To whom do academic entrepreneurs address themselves exactly? Instead of creating a new public through the elaboration of a distinctive body of thought, academic entrepreneurs more often than not address each other and a small quasi-public drawn from a narrow social elite, such as those who will pay for the insights the academic entrepreneur provides. The “substackademic” will struggle to go beyond a relatively closed conversation with like-minded individuals, one where the conversation itself is driven by the search for Likes and Up-votes.

The final and perhaps greatest danger is that by breaking free from the academy, the academic entrepreneur is exposed to all the vagaries of corporate and political power. Political and social elites are the core audience for the academic entrepreneur, making them dependent upon their interest and goodwill. Speaking truth to power when one is entirely dependent upon its munificence is a perilous enterprise.

…research in the social sciences is dominated by lots of little dots; what is missing are the threads to bring these dots together. Many of today’s thinkers are not from within the academy at all. They are professional writers, or occasionally journalists who have risen above the cut and thrust of chasing news to devote themselves to writing.

News and intellectual labor rarely pay for themselves.

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Decoding the Trump Transition (12-3-24)

04:00 Hunter Pardon, Day 2, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sme1_gt4GJM
11:00 The “If You Like Your Doctor, You Can Keep Your Doctor” Pardon and Kash Patel,
https://ewerickson.substack.com/p/the-if-you-like-your-doctor-you-can
17:30 Say Nothing tv show, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_Nothing_(TV_series)
19:30 Americans used to be known for their plain speech, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0arXVZ72hvI
24:20 Inflation was the result of Biden’s failed attempt to buy off voters, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0arXVZ72hvI
27:00 Joe Biden’s Ukraine catastrophe
31:20 Donald Trump & Gaza, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ViqsVFGazLs
34:20 Jesse Waters
43:00 Are Democrats too nice? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ViqsVFGazLs
47:20 If you’ve met one Irishman, one Aussie, one Brit, one Frenchman, one Jap, you’ve met them all, but not with Americans, https://decoding-the-gurus.captivate.fm/episode/supplementary-material-19-critic-o-rama-with-extra-trans-dimensional-alien-demons
51:20 Jordan Petersen’s lazy Christian apologetics
59:00 Are there are any proud Biden Democrats?
1:08:00 Kip joins to discuss morality in America
1:17:30 Mike Benz does not optimize for truth
1:21:00 What is the nature of truth?
1:28:00 My different experiences with God, Christianity & Judaism
1:40:00 Why We Don’t Change (and what you can do about it) | Dr. Ross Ellenhorn, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTzA15BQzHo
1:42:00 The buffered identity, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=149512
1:43:00 The Embodied Expression Of The Elite Attitude, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=157628
1:48:00 Smart people ‘especially prone to tribalism, virtue signaling and self-deception’, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=158031
1:52:00 ‘Trump Is De-Stereotyping Republican Foreign Policy’, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=158024

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Smart people ‘especially prone to tribalism, virtue signaling and self-deception’

Musa Al-Gharbi writes:

We pay attention to, easily recall, and feel positive emotions towards things we deem interesting or useful. We dismiss, downplay, dump, and have negative emotional reactions to information that is threatening to our objectives or our self-image, or that conflicts with our expectations or pre-existing beliefs. Things that don’t seem particularly significant in either direction, we largely ignore (even though these neglected details often prove to be quite important in retrospect).

…When good things happen that could be plausibly laid at our feet, we attribute those positive outcomes to stable and internal factors that are within our control – i.e. positive characteristics we possess and wise actions we took. When bad things happen, we tell the opposite story. Adverse outcomes are attributed to contingent and fleeting circumstances – things external to us and outside of our control.

…Most business fail within six years. An overwhelming majority of romantic relationships end in less than a year. Most employment relationships end up not working out for one or more parties eventually (relative to the alternatives) – typically leading to resignations or termination within five years. Social movements rarely achieve their stated ends. Most innovations are maladaptive. The modal result of publication submissions is rejection. An overwhelming majority of published scientific findings are wrong, trivial, and/or non-impactful. If we allowed these types of probabilities to govern our attitudes and behaviors, we’d rarely invest ourselves in anything.

In reality, however, people defy the odds all the time. Ostensibly irrational levels of confidence, conviction, resilience and optimism often play an important role in these outcomes. Our biases and blindspots are, therefore, not just a product of our cognitive limitations – they empower us to accomplish things we otherwise may not.

…people who are highly educated, intelligent, or rhetorically skilled are significantly less likely than most others to revise their beliefs or adjust their behaviors when confronted with evidence or arguments that contradict their preferred narratives or preexisting beliefs. Precisely in virtue of knowing more about the world or being better at arguing, we are better equipped to punch holes in data or narratives that undermine our priors, come up with excuses to “stick to our guns” irrespective of the facts, or else interpret threatening information in a way that flatters our existing worldview. And we typically do just that.

In a decades-long set of ambitious experiments and forecasting tournaments, psychologist Philip Tetlock has demonstrated that—as a result of their inclinations toward epistemic arrogance and ideological rigidity—experts are often worse than laymen at anticipating how events are likely to play out . . . especially with respect to their areas of expertise. What’s worse, cognitively sophisticated people tend not to be very self-aware about our error rates either, because we excel at telling stories about how we were “basically right” even when we were, in fact, clearly wrong – inhibiting our ability to learn from mistakes and miscalculations.

In a similar vein, experts have been shown to perform a bit worse than laymen at predicting the likely effects of behavioral science interventions. Political practitioners have been found to be no better than laypeople at predicting which political messages are persuasive. Comparative and longitudinal studies have found that highly educated political leaders perform no better than less educated ones, and may even be a bit worse in some respects.

Rather than becoming more likely to converge on the same position, people tend to grow more politically polarized on contentious topics as their knowledge, numeracy, reflectiveness increases, or when they try to think in actively openminded ways.

These empirical patterns would be shocking and difficult to explain while operating under the assumption that humans’ cognitive and perceptual systems are primarily oriented towards objective truth. However, these tendencies are exactly what one might expect if we instead work from the premise that our cognitive capacities are fundamentally geared toward group building and coalitional struggles, and that we typically reason in ways that help us achieve our goals with and through other people.

On this understanding of how our brains work, we might likewise expect that the kinds of people the symbolic professions select for (cognitively sophisticated, academically high-performing, highly educated) may be especially prone to tribalism, virtue signaling and self-deception.

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‘Trump Is De-Stereotyping Republican Foreign Policy’

Stereotypes are useful when they correlate with reality (such as different groups have different gifts). Stereotypes are not useful when you insist that different groups have inherent qualities that explain all of their actions. Regarding an out-group as inherently evil, be it communist, Iranian, Islamic, ethno-nationalist, is stupid. All groups respond to incentives and the essential qualities of a group usually vary depending on context.

There’s nothing inherently evil and untrustworthy, for example, about China, Russia, Iran and Palestinians. You can make deals with them. You are usually better off by not going to war with them.

Glenn writes:

No matter how much evidence can be produced that countries like China and Iran, for example, are defensive realist powers primarily concerned with their own security — that accept many institutions of the international order while rejecting others — the Republican hawks are utterly convinced that they’re hell-bent on world domination. Congressman Mike Waltz, Trump’s incoming national security advisor, warns that the Chinese “seek to dominate the world [and establish] a new world order with America subservient to China.” Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, believes the United States and China are hopelessly locked in a New Cold War — something that would likely come as a surprise to Chinese leadership.

Waltz, Rubio, and virtually all the rest of the Republican establishment also contend that Iran is compelled by an irrational hatred of the United States and Israel to relentlessly pursue nuclear weapons. This is despite U.S. intelligence having known since at least 2007 that Iran has not had an active nuclear weapons program since 2003, and Iran having vowed in 2015 that “under no circumstances will [it] ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,” while severely curtailing its civilian nuclear program. In fact, even though the 2015 nuclear deal had more than quadrupled the time it would have taken Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, while international authorities repeatedly verified Iran’s compliance, Rubio declared in 2018 that the deal had “pave[d] the Iranian terror regime’s path to nuclear weapons.”

Trump is surprisingly not a stereotypical foreign policy thinker. Stereotyping requires having strong, inflexible beliefs about the inherent characteristics of others. Trump’s beliefs, to the contrary, are subject to change based on how useful he assesses someone to be for advancing his personal interests at any particular moment.

This is why Trump’s apparent beliefs and actions toward many foreign states and leaders have changed rapidly in a relatively short period of time.

…when aggression against Iran has carried a significant political cost, Trump has pulled back from military action, even as more orthodox Republicans have continued to agitate for it. This occurred at least four times during Trump’s first administration, including during repeated near-miss scenarios in which the United States and Iran teetered on the brink of war…

On each occasion save the last, Republican hawks agitated for war with Iran because they believed Iran was evil, irrational, duplicitous, or could be dealt with only by using force. Meanwhile Trump, after initially following his advisors, became increasingly hesitant to attack Iran as he realized they behaved rationally in response to incentives and could impose unacceptable costs on the United States that would hurt his chances of winning re-election. Once he lost the 2020 election and he no longer had anything to lose but potentially much to gain by attacking Iran, however, he changed his position again and supported military action.

This is not a pattern of behavior you would expect from a policymaker engaged in stereotyping. Stereotypes are fixed. They don’t change based on extraneous factors or things that are true and false about the world. Yet, Trump changes his assessment of other actors all the time based on how useful he thinks they are for helping him fulfill his goals and how nice he thinks they’re being to him. Basically his entire governing philosophy is organized around inducing and coercing others to bolster his own status, while leeching as much money as possible through extortion and petty corruption. When your interests are so simplistic and dependent on being able to manipulate others, you don’t really have the latitude to cling to false images about others’ interests and character.

The conceit of Trump’s foreign policy is that, even though it’s mostly instrumentally rational, it’s also driven by Trump’s own provincial self-interest. Sometimes this coincides with the national interest, as when he avoided escalating with Iran for fear that it would lose him the election. Much of the time, however, Trump’s interests are tangential or directly opposed to the national interest.

The first time around, Trump was constrained by public opinion. The second time around, he’ll likely be much less preoccupied with such things as poll numbers because he won’t be running in any future elections. His interests will lie primarily in settling personal scores: that is, exacting revenge on his enemies and returning favors to the elites of the Republican Party who accommodated his hostile takeover of its institutions, who now do the grunt work of making his administration function, who cling to fanciful notions about Chinese and Iranian designs on world domination, and whose true-blue, red-blooded American hearts swell with jingoistic fervor at the prospect of burning flesh on the other side of the world. Many of these elites also believe, as it was put by neocon godfather Michael Ledeen — whose daughter was the Pentagon’s point woman for the Middle East during the last year of Trump’s first administration — that: “Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.”

….As for the Iranians, Trump likely won’t ever forgive them for being the problem child of his first administration. In another universe, Trump could have done with Iran what he did with North Korea and declared himself the Dealmaker of All Dealmakers. But the Iranians — who, like the Americans, engage in stereotyping — foolishly turned down Trump’s offer to meet without preconditions and got on his bad side instead. It’s probably fair to assume that he holds a grudge against them due to their alleged attempts on his life, for example. Whether this means Trump would opt for military action is hard to tell, but to paraphrase Michael Tracey, if Trump does indeed live out the decades-long Republican fantasy of bombing Iran, we can rest assured that the bombs will have been dropped by a non-stereotyper.

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The Right: The Hundred-Year War for American Conservatism

Matthew Continetti writes in this 2022 book:

* Isolationists paid no price for opposing intervention before Pearl Harbor. One scholar identified 115 isolationist candidates headed into the 1942 midterm elections; only 5 lost. By the last year of the war, Republicans had won a net twenty – one seats in the House and fifteen in the Senate. And the Right had new heroes: Generals Douglas MacArthur, who commanded US forces in the Southwest Pacific; George S. Patton, who led troops in the Mediterranean and European campaigns; and Curtis LeMay, who organized the strategic bombing of Japan.

* In 1944 a pair of America Firsters, Frank Hanighen and Felix Morley, founded Human Events, a free market, antiwar weekly newsletter inspired by Albert Jay Nock’s Freeman. Human Events carried on the anti – Roosevelt tradition of denying any difference between American liberalism and European totalitarianism. The next year the duo became a trio when an Illinois businessman named Henry Regnery joined the enterprise.

* In March 1945 [Friedrich] Hayek arrived in New York to begin his book tour. His publishers told him that his speaking engagements would send him as far west as Oklahoma City. His first appearance, however, was scheduled for the next morning at town hall in Manhattan. Hayek was mortified. He had never lectured in public. The audience had been told he would speak for an hour on law and international affairs. It was a subject to which he had given little thought. “And then I discovered that American audiences are extremely grateful audiences,” Hayek recollected. “You can watch on their faces their interest — completely different from, say, an English audience; and gradually I worked them up into great excitement, and I got through this lecture with great success.” When he returned to England in May, Hayek was an academic celebrity.

* On April 10 the [Mont Pelerin] conference adopted a “Statement of Aims.” It left no doubt that these beleaguered liberals felt themselves engaged on the losing side in a battle of ideas that had been raging for more than a century. “Over large stretches of the earth’s surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared,” the statement began. “The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power.” Together the participants resolved to study, among other things, “the problem of the creation of an international order conducive to the safeguarding of peace and liberty and permitting the establishment of harmonious international economic relations.”

[LF: “Freedom” has no meaning without reference to a particular hero system.]

* Taft was a lone voice in opposition to Truman. NATO, for example, was exactly the sort of permanent entanglement in European affairs that Taft had dreaded ever since his experiences with Hoover after World War I. He argued that NATO would make American foreign policy not less but more venturesome. “It is easy to slip into an attitude of imperialism,” he said, “where war becomes an instrument of public policy rather than its last resort.” He was among thirteen senators to oppose NATO when the treaty came to a vote in 1949.

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