Luke Ford

Iran’s primary protest against Israeli and American attacks is that they violate international law. This shows weakness. If Iran had something more powerful to say, it would say it. If someone had sex with your wife or punched you in the face, would you reply with invocations of the law? If a bad driver hit your car, would you respond by quoting the California Vehicle Code?

Grok says:

Global South Appeal: Iran’s legal arguments resonate with non-aligned and Global South countries, many of which are skeptical of U.S. and Israeli actions and view international law as a shield against Western dominance. By framing the attacks as violations of sovereignty, Iran seeks to rally diplomatic support from nations like China, Russia, and members of the Non-Aligned Movement, as seen in its calls for UN Security Council action.

Moral High Ground: The legal argument allows Iran to portray itself as a victim of aggression, contrasting its restraint with the “rogue” actions of Israel and the U.S. This is particularly important for domestic audiences, where the regime faces criticism over economic mismanagement and repression. By invoking international law, Iran’s leaders can deflect internal dissent and rally nationalist sentiment around a narrative of external injustice.

Precedent for Retaliation: Citing international law, particularly Article 51 of the UN Charter, provides Iran a legal basis for potential future retaliation (e.g., through proxies like Hezbollah or cyberattacks) while maintaining that it is acting within its rights. This keeps its options open without committing to immediate, costly military action.

Iran’s focus on international law signals a pragmatic, long-game approach. The regime has survived decades of sanctions, isolation, and proxy wars by avoiding direct confrontations with stronger powers. Its legal rhetoric masks a strategy of asymmetric warfare, leveraging proxies (e.g., Hezbollah, Houthis) and cyberattacks to respond indirectly while denouncing its enemies in global forums.

By framing itself as a victim of illegal aggression, Iran turns its relative weakness into a diplomatic asset. This contrasts with a hypothetical “more powerful” Iran, which might respond with direct force, as Iraq did under Saddam Hussein in 1990 by invading Kuwait. Iran’s leaders know that overt aggression could unify their enemies and justify further strikes, so they opt for a narrative of victimhood and legal righteousness.

Unlike a military counterstrike, legal arguments don’t project strength or deter future attacks.

Limited Enforcement: International law lacks teeth without enforcement, and Iran knows the U.S. and Israel face little consequence from the UN due to U.S. veto power and Western support. This makes Iran’s appeals to the UN Security Council or IAEA appear futile, reinforcing the perception of weakness.

Cultural Lens: In some cultures, invoking law over action may be seen as passive or bureaucratic, especially when compared to Israel’s bold preemptive strikes or the U.S.’s decisive follow-up. Iran’s rhetoric, however, aligns with its historical strategy of endurance and defiance through non-conventional means.

Iran’s primary defense against Israel was American pressure on Israel, says Mike Doran from Hudson. Iran’s a paper tiger. Israel could destroy Iran’s economy by taking out its oil refining in a few hours. It hasn’t.

It’s weird to view this war through the primary lens of America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. Armchair “generals are always fighting the last war.” This is nothing like that war. Neither Israel nor the US intend to put boots on the ground. This is not another Vietnam. It’s not Munich 1938.

Grok says:

Each situation has unique strategic, political, and military dynamics. The Iraq War involved a full-scale invasion, regime change, and prolonged occupation, none of which seem to align with current discussions around Iran, where the focus appears to be on targeted strikes, likely against nuclear or military infrastructure, without ground forces.

Key differences:

Intent: Current rhetoric suggests precision strikes to degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities or retaliate for specific actions, not occupation or nation-building.

Scale: No evidence points to plans for a ground invasion. Air and missile strikes, possibly with cyberattacks, are more likely, resembling operations like Desert Fox (Iraq, 1998) or Syria strikes (2017-2018).

Actors: Israel’s involvement shifts the calculus. Its proximity, intelligence capabilities, and existential concerns about Iran’s nuclear program make it a primary driver, unlike the US-led coalition in Iraq.

Iran’s capabilities: Unlike Iraq in 2003, Iran has robust air defenses, ballistic missiles, and proxy networks (Hezbollah, Houthis), raising risks of escalation and asymmetric retaliation.

It’s weird how the news takes the comments of politicians literally and seriously. When Trump said he would make up his mind whether or not to bomb Iran in two weeks, and the media took the time table literally and seriously. That’s ridiculous. People rarely say what they mean and mean what they say. You’ll get a keener sense of reality by noting the personalities and the situation rather than rely on official pronouncements. The news relies on the pronouncements of bureaucracies. It’s about “the passage of bureaucratically recognized events through administrative procedures.” That is not the same as reality.

Iran tried for more than 50 years to push the US out of the Middle East and to strangle Israel. In response, Iran has been flattened.

Don’t fear regime change. In reality, all regimes are constantly changing as different groups move up and down in power.

Iran’s had a nuclear program since the 1950s. They’re not exactly masters of their domain.

Israel’s stock market keeps going up. Grok says:

Israel’s stock market reaching all-time highs, as seen with the Tel Aviv 35 Index, reflects strong investor confidence despite the ongoing conflict with Iran. This resilience suggests several implications for Israel’s future and how investors perceive the war:

Economic Strength and Stability

Robust Economy: The upward trend in Israel’s stock market, particularly in sectors like technology and defense, points to a perception of economic resilience. Israel’s economy has historically weathered regional conflicts, supported by innovation-driven industries and strong global demand for its tech exports. Investors seem to view the economy as capable of sustaining growth even amid geopolitical tensions.

Market Performance: In 2024, Israel was the top-performing nation in the MSCI All Country World Index, with a 38.3% return, far outpacing the index’s 17.5%. This suggests that investors see limited disruption to corporate earnings from the current conflict.

Investor Perception of the Israel-Iran Conflict

Containment Expectations: The market’s strength indicates that investors believe the Israel-Iran conflict is unlikely to escalate into a broader regional or global war that would significantly disrupt Israel’s economy. Historical data shows that Middle Eastern conflicts, like the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict or the 2014 Gaza War, often lead to short-term volatility but not sustained market declines unless accompanied by major economic shocks (e.g., oil embargoes).

De-escalation Optimism: Posts on X and market analyses suggest investors are betting on a contained conflict or even a potential de-escalation, possibly driven by diplomatic efforts or Israel’s strategic advantage. Some speculate that a weakened Iranian regime or a “no-nukes Iran” outcome could reduce geopolitical risks in the region, benefiting Israel’s markets.

Confidence in Military Superiority: The market’s bullish behavior aligns with sentiment that Israel holds a military edge, supported by U.S. and allied assistance in countering Iranian attacks. Investors may see Israel’s actions, such as strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as reducing long-term threats, thus boosting confidence.

Broader Implications for Israel’s Future

Geopolitical Positioning: A strong stock market signals that investors view Israel as a stable regional power, potentially gaining influence if the conflict weakens Iran’s regime or nuclear ambitions. This could attract further foreign investment and strengthen economic ties with allies like the U.S.

Domestic Sentiment: Posts on X highlight that ordinary Israelis are actively investing, reflecting domestic optimism about the country’s prospects. This grassroots participation could foster economic resilience and social cohesion, countering the psychological toll of the conflict.

Energy and Defense Opportunities: Rising oil prices and defense stock gains (e.g., Lockheed Martin up 3.7% globally) suggest that Israel’s defense sector could see increased demand, further bolstering its economy. However, sustained high oil prices could pose inflationary risks if the conflict disrupts global supply chains.

Mar. 29, I posted:

Are we closer to bombing Iran now than a week ago?

Grok says: As of today, March 29, 2025, the U.S. appears to be closer to a potential military confrontation with Iran compared to a week ago, based on observable military movements and escalating rhetoric.

On the same day, I posted:

What stunning thing will Trump do next?

Grok: Research suggests Trump may order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, given recent tensions and military buildup.
It seems likely this action would be in response to Iran’s nuclear program, with B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia indicating preparation.

US Appears Poised To Attack Iran (6-11-25)

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is playing Secretary. Other people are running the Pentagon. Pete is good at TV.

Grok says:

Pete Hegseth, as Secretary of Defense, has faced scrutiny over his leadership and influence within the Pentagon. Reports suggest that President Trump has at times bypassed Hegseth, consulting directly with four-star generals like Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine for military advice, particularly on critical issues like Iran. This has led to perceptions that Hegseth’s role may be more symbolic, with others wielding significant influence behind the scenes. His background as a Fox News host and lack of high-level military command experience have fueled criticism about his qualifications, with some, like Sen. Tammy Duckworth, calling him “unqualified and dangerous” for the role. Additionally, controversies like the “Signalgate” scandal, where he allegedly shared sensitive information, have raised questions about his decision-making and effectiveness.
On the other hand, Hegseth has been praised by supporters for aligning the Pentagon with Trump’s “peace-through-strength” agenda and focusing on warfighting readiness. He’s described as dedicated to depoliticizing the military, with some outlets like National Review claiming he’s already improved Pentagon priorities. His public persona, honed on TV, has been a double-edged sword—effective for rallying support but criticized as lacking the gravitas needed for managing a $900 billion department with 3 million personnel.
The reality likely lies in a mix: Hegseth’s media skills make him a visible figurehead, but the Pentagon’s complex operations rely heavily on seasoned military leaders and bureaucrats. Claims of others “really running” the Pentagon are plausible given the department’s structure and Trump’s reported reliance on generals, but no definitive evidence confirms Hegseth as merely a figurehead. The situation reflects a broader tension between political appointees and entrenched military expertise.

How will the Houthis keep firing off missiles if Iran is weakened?

Grok says:

The Houthis’ ability to continue firing missiles despite a weakened Iran depends on several factors, including their existing arsenal, local production capabilities, and alternative supply networks. Here’s a breakdown:

Existing Stockpiles: The Houthis have amassed a significant arsenal of missiles and drones, largely supplied by Iran since at least 2009. As of mid-2024, they possessed missiles with ranges up to 2,000 km and drones with ranges up to 2,500 km. Even if Iran’s support diminishes, the Houthis can continue using these stockpiles for some time, though the intensity and frequency of attacks may decrease as reserves dwindle.

Local Production and Innovation: The Houthis have developed some capacity to assemble and modify weapons domestically, using Iranian-supplied components and commercially available parts. They claim to produce some missiles and drones locally, though their dependence on Iranian technology remains significant. This capability allows them to stretch their arsenal, but advanced systems like ballistic missiles still rely on Iranian designs and parts.

Alternative Supply Routes: If Iran’s ability to supply weapons is curtailed, the Houthis could seek alternative sources, such as black-market networks or other sympathetic actors. However, Iran’s role as the primary supplier of advanced weaponry makes it challenging to fully replace. The Houthis’ isolation and international sanctions limit their access to sophisticated arms from other states.

Operational Resilience: The Houthis have shown resilience under sustained airstrikes, maintaining their arsenal despite years of Saudi-led and U.S. operations. Their experience in evading interdictions and hiding weapons in Yemen’s rugged terrain allows them to preserve capabilities even under pressure.

Reduced Iranian Support: A weakened Iran, due to Israeli strikes or internal issues, may reduce but not eliminate support. Posts on X suggest Iran has already lessened military aid to the Houthis, yet some supplies continue. The Houthis’ role as Iran’s “first line of defense” against Israel could incentivize Tehran to maintain minimal support, even if strained.

Strategic Shifts: If missile stocks run low, the Houthis might shift to asymmetric tactics, such as naval drones or smaller-scale drone attacks, which are less resource-intensive. Their history of targeting Red Sea shipping with limited but disruptive strikes shows they can maintain pressure with fewer resources.

Limitations: The Houthis’ missile capabilities are heavily tied to Iranian technology, particularly for advanced systems like the Palestine-2, which resembles Iran’s Fattah missile. A significant reduction in Iranian support would likely degrade their ability to conduct long-range or high-precision attacks over time. Claims of hypersonic missiles, such as the Palestine-2, are likely exaggerated, and their effectiveness against advanced defenses like Israel’s is limited.

Conclusion: The Houthis can continue firing missiles in the short term using existing stockpiles and local assembly, but a weakened Iran would gradually erode their ability to sustain long-range, high-intensity attacks. They may adapt by relying on simpler weapons or alternative tactics, but their strategic impact would diminish without consistent Iranian backing.

The rule of law does not mean that everything in life can or should be decided on the basis of law. There is a meta-legal reality that guided Trump for good or for ill. The rule of law is great, but there is no one narrative sufficient for reality. The American president has all the foreign policy power of King George III.

A 2010 law review essay by two Yale professors noted:

John Yoo, the author of the notorious “torture memos,” has argued that, despite American objections to King George III, the President still enjoys the powers possessed by the English monarch at the time of the American Revolution. Although Parliament retained the powers of the purse, Yoo explains, the King possessed unbounded discretion over the use of military force…

The most obvious elements of presidential dictatorship tend to be concentrated in areas of foreign policy, intelligence gathering, covert operations, and warfare. Presidents exercise far less unilateral control in domestic politics…

President Bush began to lose political momentum precisely because he failed to act swiftly or deftly in the face of a domestic disaster, Hurricane Katrina. Since the Calling Forth Act of 1792, Congress has repeatedly created framework statutes that authorize presidents to respond to domestic emergencies.

Grok says:

The rule of law, while a cornerstone of American governance, is not an all-encompassing framework for every decision or action, particularly in the realm of presidential power. Your prompt highlights a meta-legal reality—a practical, often discretionary domain where presidents, like Trump, operate, guided by political instincts, necessity, or expediency, for better or worse. This reality is especially pronounced in foreign policy and emergency powers, where the presidency wields authority akin to that of King George III, as argued by John Yoo in the referenced essay, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design. Below, I explore the tension between the rule of law and this meta-legal reality, focusing on the expansive foreign policy powers of the president, the constraints of domestic governance, and the implications of emergency powers, as illustrated by historical and contemporary examples.

Presidential Power and the Legacy of King George III

John Yoo’s argument, as noted in your prompt, is that the U.S. president retains the foreign policy and military prerogatives of the English monarch at the time of the American Revolution. Despite the Constitution’s checks and balances, the president’s authority in areas like foreign policy, intelligence, covert operations, and warfare remains largely unbounded. This stems from the executive’s role as commander-in-chief (Article II, Section 2) and the practical need for swift, decisive action in matters of national security. Unlike Parliament, which controlled the purse, Congress has limited ability to micromanage military decisions, leaving presidents with significant discretion.

Historically, this has manifested in actions like Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, or more recently, the use of drone strikes and surveillance programs under Bush, Obama, and Trump. Yoo’s controversial “torture memos” during the Bush administration further illustrate this, justifying expansive executive power in the name of national security, even at the cost of legal and ethical norms. The meta-legal reality here is that presidents often act first and justify later, relying on broad interpretations of their authority or emergency conditions to bypass legal constraints.

Trump’s presidency exemplified this dynamic. His foreign policy decisions—such as the airstrike on Qassem Soleimani in 2020 or withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal—were executed with little congressional oversight, reflecting the monarch-like discretion Yoo describes. These actions, while polarizing, were largely within the president’s constitutional purview, underscoring the gap between the rule of law and the practical realities of executive power.

Domestic Constraints and the Limits of Dictatorship

In contrast, the president’s unilateral power is significantly curtailed in domestic affairs, where Congress, the courts, and public opinion impose stronger checks. Your prompt notes that Bush’s political momentum waned due to his sluggish response to Hurricane Katrina, a domestic disaster that exposed the limits of executive authority without swift congressional or public support. Similarly, you argue that Trump’s failure to act decisively during the early stages of COVID-19 in 2020 cost him political capital. These examples highlight a key distinction: while presidents can act as “constitutional dictators” in foreign policy, domestic crises require coordination with other branches and stakeholders, diluting their authority.

The Calling Forth Act of 1792 and subsequent framework statutes, as mentioned, grant presidents authority to respond to domestic emergencies, but these powers are not absolute. For instance, the Stafford Act (1988) allows presidents to declare national emergencies and allocate federal resources, but it requires coordination with state governments and Congress. Trump’s handling of COVID-19, including his invocation of the Defense Production Act to compel production of medical supplies, was constrained by federalism and bureaucratic inertia. His reluctance to impose a national mask mandate or lockdown, citing state authority, further illustrates the limits of presidential power in domestic emergencies. Unlike foreign policy, where the president can act unilaterally, domestic governance demands consensus, exposing the fragility of the “dictatorship” model in these contexts.

Emergency Powers and Public Health

Your prompt references the Public Health Service Act, which empowers the Surgeon General, under the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to enact regulations to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. This authority, rooted in the need to detain or quarantine individuals posing public health risks, exemplifies the dictatorial elements of executive power during emergencies. During COVID-19, this framework underpinned federal actions like travel bans and quarantine measures, though implementation often fell to agencies like the CDC or state governments.

The meta-legal reality here is that emergencies—whether public health crises, natural disasters, or national security threats—often require presidents to act beyond strict legal boundaries, detaining threats to public safety or bypassing normal procedures. Lincoln’s detention of Confederate sympathizers, FDR’s internment policies, and even Trump’s travel bans on certain countries reflect this pattern. However, such actions are not without consequence. Courts, as seen in cases like Korematsu v. United States (1944) or Trump v. Hawaii (2018), may uphold emergency powers but often face public and scholarly backlash, highlighting the tension between law and necessity.

Trump’s COVID-19 response, as you note, faltered not because he lacked legal authority but because he failed to project decisive leadership. His administration’s reliance on the Public Health Service Act and other statutes was overshadowed by inconsistent messaging and delays in testing and resource distribution. This underscores a broader truth: while the law provides tools for emergency action, political skill and public trust are equally critical in wielding them effectively.

The Rule of Law vs. Meta-Legal Reality

The rule of law, while essential, is not a universal solvent for governance. As your prompt suggests, no single narrative—legal or otherwise—captures the complexity of reality. Presidents operate in a meta-legal space where political, moral, and pragmatic considerations often outweigh strict legality. This is not to dismiss the rule of law but to acknowledge its limitations in moments of crisis or high-stakes decision-making. Trump’s presidency, with its blend of bold foreign policy moves and domestic missteps, illustrates this divide. His supporters saw his defiance of legalistic norms as a strength, while critics viewed it as a threat to democratic principles.

Yoo’s concept of a “constitutional dictatorship” is provocative but not without merit. The presidency was designed to balance democratic accountability with the need for decisive action, particularly in emergencies. However, this balance is precarious. Unchecked power risks abuse, as seen in the torture controversies under Bush, while excessive restraint can paralyze leadership, as with Katrina or COVID-19. The meta-legal reality, then, is a double-edged sword: it enables presidents to act when the law is too slow or ambiguous but exposes them to criticism when those actions falter or overreach.

The No Kings crowd didn’t assemble a coherent critique of presidential power. They just don’t like this power when it is wielded against them. They love it when it is wielded for them. Every county in California has a public health officer who can shut down any business or gathering if he deems it a threat to the public health. I suspect the No Kings crowd loves this type of power when it was wielded against Covid.

Why does the media keep describing Putin’s war on Ukraine as “illegal” but doesn’t use that description on Israel and America’s war on Iran? The legalization of war reflects a secular elite preference for moving as much of the political into the hands of supposedly neutral disinterested experts, a trend that began after the 17th Century’s 30 Year War.

Grok: “The media’s frequent use of “illegal” for Russia’s war on Ukraine versus its rarer application to Israel and U.S. actions against Iran reflects differences in legal clarity, geopolitical alignments, and narrative framing. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is seen as a clear violation of sovereignty, while the Israel-Iran situation is muddied by mutual hostilities and strategic debates.”

Grok says:

The Thirty Years’ War, a devastating conflict rooted in religious and political rivalries, exposed the dangers of unchecked ideological warfare. It culminated in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which established principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, laying the groundwork for modern international relations.

Westphalia shifted the justification for war away from divine or religious mandates toward secular, state-centric rationales. This marked the beginning of a legal framework for war, where states sought to regulate conflict through treaties and norms, reducing the chaos of arbitrary violence.

The war’s brutality (millions dead, widespread destruction) fueled skepticism of dogmatic authority, paving the way for Enlightenment ideals of reason, secularism, and governance by rational principles.

Legalization of War:

The “legalization” of war refers to efforts to codify when and how states can use force, replacing divine or moral justifications with secular, rule-based systems. This began with early international law thinkers like Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), who argued for universal principles to govern war, and evolved through treaties like the Hague Conventions (1899, 1907) and the UN Charter (1945).

The UN Charter, for example, restricts war to self-defense (Article 51) or Security Council-approved actions, aiming to create a neutral, legal framework. This reflects a secular preference for rules over ideology, with international bodies like the UN or International Criminal Court (ICC) acting as arbiters.

However, this legalization can be seen as a tool of secular elites—state leaders, diplomats, and legal scholars—who claim neutrality but often serve powerful interests. Critics argue that “neutral” frameworks like the UN disproportionately reflect Western values or great-power politics (e.g., Security Council vetoes).

Secular Elites and Technocratic Governance:

Post-Westphalia, the decline of religious authority empowered secular elites—bureaucrats, jurists, and later technocrats—who positioned themselves as disinterested experts capable of managing complex political issues, including war. This aligns with the Enlightenment’s trust in reason and expertise over tradition or divine will.

By the 19th and 20th centuries, this trend intensified with the rise of professionalized bureaucracies and international organizations. Figures like diplomats or UN officials claim to act as neutral arbiters, but their decisions often reflect the biases of dominant powers or ideologies.

The preference for moving politics into the hands of experts is evident in modern institutions like the ICC, which prosecutes war crimes, or think tanks that shape foreign policy. These bodies frame their work as apolitical, but critics, including some X users, argue they serve secular, globalist agendas, sidelining populist or local perspectives.

Critique of Neutrality and Expertise:

The notion of “neutral, disinterested experts” is contested. Neutrality often masks power dynamics—e.g., Western-dominated institutions like the UN or NATO set global norms, marginalizing non-Western perspectives. Russia and China, for instance, challenge these frameworks as tools of U.S. hegemony.

The legalization of war can depoliticize conflict, framing it as a technical issue for lawyers and diplomats rather than a moral or ideological struggle. This can obscure accountability, as seen in debates over “illegal” wars (e.g., Iraq 2003, Ukraine 2022), where legal arguments often serve political ends.

Some X posts echo this, criticizing global elites for using legalism to justify interventions while ignoring violations by allies (e.g., Israel’s actions versus Russia’s). This reflects distrust in technocratic systems that claim impartiality but appear selective.

Connection to the Original Question:

The selective labeling of wars as “illegal” (e.g., Russia-Ukraine vs. Israel-Iran) ties into this trend. Secular elites, through media and international institutions, use legal frameworks to shape narratives, often aligning with strategic interests. The “neutral” language of international law can obscure biases, as technocrats and experts frame certain conflicts as lawful (self-defense) and others as unlawful (aggression).

This reflects the post-Westphalian shift toward secular, expert-driven governance, where war’s legitimacy is debated in legal terms rather than moral or religious ones. Yet, the application of these laws remains inconsistent, fueling accusations of hypocrisy.

In summary, the legalization of war since the Thirty Years’ War reflects a secular elite preference for rational, rule-based systems managed by experts. This shift, rooted in Westphalia and amplified by modern institutions, aims to tame conflict but often serves powerful interests under the guise of neutrality. The trend toward technocratic governance continues to shape how wars are justified and criticized, with lingering tensions over whose rules apply.

Leading Democratic politicians such as Hillary Clinton and the MSM supported Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq because they remembered the humiliation of opposing President H. W. Bush’s successful 1991 Gulf War. Now they are stuck in their humiliation of supporting the 2003 Iraq invasion, so they reflexively oppose Trump’s bombing of three Iranian nuclear power plants.

Grok says:

the Iraq invasion under George W. Bush was a different beast. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed 77-23 in the Senate, with prominent Democrats like Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and John Kerry voting in favor. The rationale hinged on claims of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ties to terrorism, post-9/11 fears, and intelligence that later proved flawed. Support wasn’t just about avoiding 1991’s perceived embarrassment; it was driven by:
Post-9/11 security paranoia: The public and politicians were primed to prioritize preemptive action.

Political pragmatism: Opposing a popular president’s war risked being labeled soft on terrorism, especially with midterm elections looming (2002).

Faulty intelligence: Many Democrats, including Clinton, cited classified briefings suggesting Iraq’s WMD threat was real.

The mainstream media (MSM) largely amplified the administration’s case, with outlets like The New York Times and The Washington Post publishing stories (some later criticized as overly credulous) about Iraq’s supposed WMDs. However, framing Democratic support as purely a reaction to 1991 oversimplifies things. The political climate, intelligence failures, and Bush’s high approval ratings (peaking at 70% in 2002-03) were bigger drivers. Clinton herself later called her vote a mistake (2014 memoir Hard Choices), reflecting regret over flawed intelligence, not some lingering 1991 trauma.