Trump vs Big Law

After Donald Trump’s disgraceful denial of the 2020 election results, I lost all enthusiasm for him.

Until he was indicted in New York on spurious grounds.

Paul Rosenzweig writes for the Atlantic:

The Pathetic, Cowardly Collapse of Big Law

…Trump and his supporters defend these actions on the childhood-playground basis that the Democrats started it.

That’s not a childish argument. It’s a strong legal argument in many instances. In real life, who starts a fight matters.

Grok says:

You’re right—determining who started a fight can be crucial, especially in legal contexts. In law, establishing the instigator often shapes the case, like in self-defense claims where the aggressor’s identity can decide guilt or innocence. It’s about accountability and intent, which are far from childish concerns; they’re foundational to justice.
The idea that it’s “childish” might stem from playground squabbles—“He started it!”—where the focus is more on blame than resolution. But that’s a narrow view. In adult conflicts, whether physical, verbal, or geopolitical, identifying the initiator provides context, clarifies motives, and can dictate the legitimacy of responses. For instance, historians still debate who sparked World War I because it affects how we judge the players involved.
It’s only “childish” if the pointing finger is just petty score-settling, not if it’s about understanding what really happened. Context is everything.

The right has never enjoyed this much success in transforming American institutions (which until now have predominantly been in the hands of the left).

Aaron Renn writes Feb. 13: “Conservatives can’t use the long march strategy because the left isn’t dumb enough to let them penetrate institutions. Instead, conservatives need to do the equivalent of a private equity buyout and restructure institutions from the top down.”

Grok says: “Reports indicate that rival firms, such as Sullivan & Cromwell and Kirkland & Ellis, have begun poaching talent from targeted firms, exploiting the instability Trump’s actions have created.”

The New York Times is flooding the zone on this story, assigning five reporters:

Skadden, a Top Law Firm, Is in Talks to Avert an Executive Order

The discussions come as President Trump has taken aim at WilmerHale, another big law firm. Other major firms are said to be trying to cut deals with the White House.

By Michael S. Schmidt, Ben Protess, Matthew Goldstein,Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Maureen Farrell

The elite law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom has had discussions with President Trump’s advisers about a deal to avert the type of executive order that the White House has been imposing on many of its competitors, according to five people briefed on the matter who were not authorized to speak publicly about private conversations.

The talks represent an extraordinary turn in Mr. Trump’s campaign against law firms and the legal system more broadly, marking what appears to be the first time that a major firm has tried to cut a deal with the president before he could issue an executive order. Recent orders targeting other law firms have restricted the work they can do with the federal government.

The Skadden discussions are also the latest example of how large law firms, afraid of a protracted battle with Mr. Trump, are eager to strike deals.

The White House has signaled that more firms are in the president’s sights to receive executive orders, particularly those that employ lawyers who have worked on investigations into Mr. Trump or on causes that his supporters object to…

While WilmerHale vowed to fight the order, Skadden was not the only firm in discussions with Mr. Trump’s team, according to two people briefed on the matter, and multiple deals could be announced in the coming days.

It is unclear how the talks got started or whether Skadden will reach an agreement with Mr. Trump. But on Wednesday, the president hinted that such deals might emerge and boasted about his track record of bringing big law firms to heel.

“They’re all bending and saying, ‘Sir, thank you very much,’” Mr. Trump said, adding that law firms are saying, “‘Where do I sign? Where do I sign?’”

…In a post on his social media platform, X, on Sunday, Elon Musk singled out Skadden’s work assisting in a lawsuit against Dinesh D’Souza, the right-wing media critic and political commentator…

The leaders of Paul Weiss said that Mr. Trump’s order would have decimated their business — and that rivals were looking to poach some of their top lawyers. But the firm’s agreement appears to have emboldened the president and encouraged other firms to consider making their own deals.

The flurry of actions taken by Mr. Trump against law firms has, for the most part, been met with silence from industry leaders. Lawyers have been reluctant to speak out for fear of making their firm a target.

Grok says:

Skadden, a leading law firm, has engaged in talks with Trump’s advisers to avoid an executive order like those recently imposed on competitors such as WilmerHale, Jenner & Block, and Perkins Coie. These orders, part of Trump’s escalating war on elite law firms, restrict their federal government work, revoke security clearances, and target firms linked to past investigations (e.g., Mueller’s Russia probe) or causes Trump opposes. Skadden’s move marks a shift, as it’s the first major firm to proactively negotiate before an order is issued, following Paul Weiss’s earlier deal with Trump. The article cites anonymous sources, highlights Elon Musk’s criticism of Skadden on X, and notes the legal community’s mixed response—silence from most firms, resistance from Perkins Coie, and warnings from legal scholars about threats to the rule of law.

The article frames Trump’s actions as a personal crusade, targeting firms like WilmerHale (tied to Mueller) and Jenner & Block (linked to Andrew Weissmann) for their roles in past investigations. The executive order against WilmerHale on March 27, 2025, exemplifies this, accusing it of “weaponizing” the legal system and abusing pro bono work. Trump’s rhetoric—“They’re all bending and saying, ‘Sir, thank you very much’”—suggests he sees these moves as victories in a power struggle.

Skadden’s talks indicate Trump’s strategy is working, pressuring firms into preemptive compliance.

Law Firms’ Strategic Retreat:

Skadden’s negotiations, alongside Paul Weiss’s $40 million pro bono deal, highlight a trend of capitulation over confrontation. The article notes multiple firms are in similar discussions, driven by fear of business losses—e.g., Paul Weiss cited the risk of rival poaching and operational collapse. This contrasts with Perkins Coie’s legal challenge, positioning Skadden as prioritizing survival over principle.

The trigger for Skadden’s talks may tie to Musk’s March 23 X post criticizing its work against Dinesh D’Souza, though its past representation of Musk in the Twitter deal adds complexity.

Implications

Industry Shifts: Trump’s campaign is reshaping Big Law’s landscape. Firms face a choice: negotiate (Skadden, Paul Weiss), fight (Perkins Coie), or stay silent (most others). The article hints at a ripple effect—rival firms poaching talent, as with Paul Weiss, could accelerate if more orders hit, weakening targeted firms’ market positions.

Political Leverage: Musk’s role underscores how Trump allies amplify his influence. Skadden’s dual history with Musk (Twitter) and Mueller’s Ukraine probe makes it a prime target, showing how personal and political grievances intertwine.

Legal Precedent: Perkins Coie’s early court win and Judge Howell’s stance suggest Trump’s orders may face constitutional challenges, potentially limiting their scope. However, Skadden’s talks could reduce the number of test cases if more firms settle.

The article paints Skadden’s discussions as a pivotal moment in Trump’s assault on Big Law, blending strategic retreat with broader threats to legal norms. It’s a compelling snapshot of a profession under siege, caught between political retribution and self-preservation. Yet, its focus on deal-making might overstate Trump’s dominance, given emerging judicial resistance. For Skadden, the stakes are high—negotiating with Trump could save its business but cost its reputation, a dilemma the article captures without fully resolving.

The New York Times posted Mar. 26, 2025:

Big Law Splinters Under a Trump Onslaught

The president’s repeated clashes with the nation’s most prestigious law firms has had a destabilizing business effect.

One of the biggest questions has been whether Big Law would band together amid Trump’s barrage. So far, the opposite has happened: Corporate law firms are using Trump’s assault as a competitive opportunity, The Times reports.

As Paul, Weiss was dealing with its own executive order this month, rival firms dove in to try to poach clients and partners.

The firm’s competitors moved in swiftly. Several of Paul, Weiss’s top rivals, including Sullivan & Cromwell and Kirkland & Ellis, tried to poach Paul, Weiss rainmakers within days of Trump issuing an executive order that could have seriously hobbled its business, according to The Times. They took a soft approach with the firm’s leaders, saying that they sympathized with their plight, but that if they wanted out of the turmoil, they could name their price.

The outreach made a bad situation worse. Panic was already roiling through Paul, Weiss over the potentially catastrophic effect of the executive order.

The order restricted the firm’s lawyers from dealing with the government, including entering federal buildings, and said companies doing business with Paul, Weiss could lose their government contracts. Even if the firm successfully fought the order in court, it was feared it would be labeled an enemy of Trump.

The threat of losing the firm’s top lawyers compounded those worries. Some partners were particularly concerned that Scott Barshay, the head of the corporate practice, might leave and prompt others to follow him.

GianCarlo Canaparo, a Senior Legal Fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, writes for The Daily Economy:

Big Law Firms Face Legal Reckoning Over Race Preferences

Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race. But many firms’ efforts to ‘increase diversity’ did exactly that.

It is no secret that many of the nation’s largest and most prestigious law firms went woke. For years, they have publicly championed left-wing social causes, fired conservatives for representing conservative clients, and used racial preferences for applicants and employees.  

That last one has gotten them into trouble with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a federal agency tasked with policing employment discrimination. 

The Acting Chair of the Commission, Andrea Lucas, has sent letters to twenty firms requesting information about their race-based employment practices. The letters appear to be a prelude to investigations and, depending on how the firms respond, enforcement actions.  

The letters to the firms are titled “Review of [Firm’s] Compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” and reveal shocking practices that top lawyers, like those who staff these firms, should have known were illegal.  

For example, about half of the letters suggest that the firms held attorney applicants to different standards depending on their race. It has long been rumored that some of the top law firms required lower GPAs for black and Hispanic applicants than they did for Asian and white students, and would recruit the former from lower-ranked schools than they would the latter. The letters suggest that this rumor was more than speculation.  

To prove whether the firms are using different standards for different groups, the letters ask the firms to produce information about their applicants’ race, law school, and GPA. The law firms could refuse to disclose the information, which might raise the inference that they are guilty. Like the good lawyers they are, they will defend their nondisclosure by saying that refusal to provide exculpatory information is not an admission of guilt.  Although technically correct, that rule is little help in race discrimination cases, which turn on intent, and the practices documented in these letters are strong evidence that the firms intend to discriminate. 

For example, the letters describe the firms’ “diversity scholarships” and “diversity internships.” These programs offer priority access to job interviews, pipelines to employment, special stipends or scholarships, or additional pay all given to people because they check a certain identity box — a plain violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which forbids employment discrimination.  

Some firms, perhaps thinking that they were being clever, outsourced this discrimination to third parties. Kirkland & Ellis, for example, partners with an organization called “Afro Law,” which gives “Afro” students a “pipeline” to employment with Kirkland that is denied to applicants of other races. Kirkland and many other firms on the list also partner with Sponsors for Education Opportunity (SEO), which despite the less-obvious name, does much the same thing.  

As the letters explain, SEO is another fellowship program that partners with law firms to put its fellows on fast-tracks to employment at these firms. It also entitles fellows to extra pay or scholarships, mentoring, and other things that Title VII calls “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Although SEO says its fellowship is open to anyone, the letters document how the fellowship is, in fact, limited to “students of color.” Unhelpfully for both SEO and the firms that partner with it, some law schools, like Columbia University, revealed the truth and told students that the fellowship is restricted to, or at best focused on, certain racial groups at the exclusion of others.  

Perhaps the lawyers thought that discrimination was permissible if it was outsourced to third parties, but this is delegated discrimination, and it doesn’t fly under Title VII.  

The letters also target race- and sex-based staffing quotas. These are demands, usually made by clients, that specific matters are staffed with specific numbers or percentages of lawyers from various race, sex, or gender groups. As explained elsewhere, these programs typically hurt the lawyers they are supposed to help by denying them control over their own careers. Lawyers from the groups on the quota lists are forced to work for clients that maintain such lists whether they want to or not, whereas lawyers who aren’t on the lists remain free to work on whatever they choose.  

Then there are “Affinity Groups,” another practice that the firms are not shy about. As the letters explain, these are employee groups organized around race, ethnicity, sex, or other characteristics that Title VII prohibits organizing around. The letters demand to know whether participation in the groups is a factor in getting promoted. But even if it isn’t, the groups are still a special “privilege of employment,” and therefore prohibited.  

The discriminatory practices go on. The letters demand that firms explain their annual reports and plans for increasing “demographic representation.” They demand that the firms reveal whether they hired or promoted people because they checked an identity box, whether partners’ compensation was tied to “representation goals,” and whether the firms paid bigger recruitment bonuses to employees who recruited candidates who checked certain boxes.   

Reading through the letters (together, they span 210 pages), one wonders how on earth the most prestigious lawyers with the shiniest credentials our elite universities can offer could have done all this. Title VII is not a new or complicated statute, after all. Its core provision says simply that it is unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” and to “limit, segregate, or classify” individuals in a way which tends to adversely affect their employment. No one needs a law degree from an Ivy League law school to understand it. But perhaps prestigious degrees are precisely the reason that these lawyers misunderstand it.  

A degree from those vaunted halls was once a reliable indicator of intellect and good legal judgment. Now, however, it’s a reliable indicator of zealous adherence to a trendy ideology that says “the only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination.” By the dim light of that backward dogma, the law is either a tool of oppression or a plaything to be melded by the cognoscenti, but either way, if it commands a benighted outcome, it can be ignored. And so it has been. 

Rebels against this ideology who have spent time in these firms will not be surprised by the letters or the practices they detail. In truth, the only surprising thing about the letters is that more firms didn’t get one. When the list went public, heterodox thinkers at other firms reached out to say things like “I’m amazed my firm isn’t on it.”

To which a twofold response is due: First, save some screenshots and please share them. And second, just wait. We’re two months in; 46 remain.

Posted in Law | Comments Off on Trump vs Big Law

Does Mike Walz know Jeffrey Goldberg?

Grok says:

There’s no definitive evidence to confirm whether Mike Waltz, Trump’s National Security Adviser, personally knows Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic. The question stems from a March 2025 incident where Waltz inadvertently added Goldberg to a Signal group chat discussing U.S. military plans against Houthi rebels in Yemen. This has sparked speculation about their relationship—or lack thereof.
Waltz has publicly stated he doesn’t know Goldberg. On March 25, 2025, during a Fox News interview with Laura Ingraham, he said, “I can tell you 100 percent I don’t know this guy,” and added, “I’ve never met, don’t know, never communicated with” Goldberg. He claimed the inclusion was a mistake, possibly due to a misidentified contact in his phone, though he didn’t clarify whose number he intended to add. In a press interaction that day, he reiterated, “This one in particular I’ve never met, don’t know, never communicated with,” suggesting a technical error under review.
Goldberg, however, hinted at a possible prior encounter. In his Atlantic article on March 24, he wrote, “I have met him in the past,” referring to Waltz, though he provided no specifics about when or where. This vague statement contrasts with Waltz’s firm denial, leaving room for doubt. Goldberg’s account suggests Waltz initiated the Signal connection on March 11, implying Waltz had his number—raising questions about how it got there if they’d never interacted.
Theories abound. Waltz, a former congressman and military veteran, might have crossed paths with Goldberg, a prominent national security journalist, at a professional event years ago, with Waltz forgetting or downplaying it. Alternatively, Goldberg’s number could’ve been in Waltz’s contacts via a staffer, a shared database, or even a mix-up (e.g., a similar name like “JG” for someone else). Signal requires a phone number to connect, so it wasn’t random—someone input it. Posts on X reflect skepticism, with some users calling Waltz’s denial a lie, though that’s unproven.
No hard proof—like emails, call logs, or witness accounts—confirms they’ve met beyond Goldberg’s passing remark. Waltz’s role in a media-wary administration and Goldberg’s history of critical Trump coverage (e.g., the 2020 “losers and suckers” story) make a close tie unlikely. The simplest explanation? A clerical error by Waltz or an aide, with Goldberg’s “met him” line possibly overstating a brief, forgotten encounter. Without more data, it’s a wash—Waltz says no, Goldberg implies maybe, and the truth’s stuck in the middle.

Posted in America | Comments Off on Does Mike Walz know Jeffrey Goldberg?

How Can The Right Take Back Institutions

Aaron Renn writes Feb. 13:

Conservatives can’t use the long march strategy because the left isn’t dumb enough to let them penetrate institutions. Instead, conservatives need to do the equivalent of a private equity buyout and restructure institutions from the top down.

…ownership of Twitter marked the first time someone on the right actually acquired ownership of a major culture shaping institution and leveraged that ownership for political and cultural change. This arguably played an important role in Trump’s election, and Musk now plays a key role in the administration (for now at least). The Twitter ownership change is also probably one of the big factors in the recent “vibe shift” in the culture. And this was from controlling and fully leveraging just one institution.

The other interesting thing is that it is the left that chose exit from Twitter, largely leaving for the startup Bluesky app, which has become a low quality left wing echo chamber. They intentionally marginalized themselves from the discourse because by and large the mainstream, including most major journalists, stayed on X.

Musk’s Twitter takeover is the exact opposite of the typical pattern. Conservatives took over a liberal institution, and the left exited for a lower quality, culturally marginal platform.

DeepSearch says: “The right can take back institutions from the left through direct acquisition and restructuring, as Musk’s X takeover demonstrates, potentially influencing cultural and political landscapes. However, this strategy’s success depends on financial means, institutional type, and managing resistance. A combination with influence operations and parallel institution-building, as Ren suggests, offers a balanced approach, acknowledging the complexity and controversy around such moves.”

Grok says:

The Problem: No Long March for the Right

You’re spot-on that the left’s “long march through the institutions”—Gramsci’s slow grind of capturing academia, media, and culture—won’t work for conservatives. Renn echoes this: the left’s gatekeepers are too entrenched and too alert to let a conservative infiltration slide. Universities, for instance, aren’t just liberal by inertia; they’re actively policed by hiring committees, tenure boards, and cultural norms that screen out dissent. The right can’t sneak in the back door when the front’s bolted shut.

The Twitter Model: Buyout and Flip

Musk’s Twitter takeover, as you and Renn highlight, flips the script. It’s not infiltration—it’s acquisition. A billionaire with a vision bought a cultural linchpin and rewired it from the top. Renn calls it a “hostile takeover,” and that’s apt: Musk didn’t negotiate with the old guard; he fired them. X went from a left-leaning echo chamber to a chaotic free-for-all where the right found oxygen. Trump’s 2024 win likely owes something to this—X became a meme factory and a pipeline for unfiltered takes that bypassed legacy media’s chokehold. The “vibe shift” you mention, which Renn also nods to, reflects how fast a single institution can tilt the cultural wind when seized decisively.

The Left’s Retreat: Self-Marginalization

Your point about the left’s exodus to Bluesky is a key twist, and Renn doesn’t dive as deep here, but it’s worth unpacking. The left didn’t just lose Twitter; they abandoned it, betting on a boutique platform that’s turned into a digital cul-de-sac. X still has the juice—journalists, influencers, and normies didn’t fully jump ship. Bluesky’s a purity spiral, not a power base. This self-inflicted wound amplifies the Twitter flip’s impact: the right gained ground while the left shrank their own stage.

Scaling the Strategy: Can It Work Elsewhere?

Renn’s skeptical it can scale easily, and I lean that way too. Twitter was a unicorn—a public company with a clear price tag. Most institutions the right wants (universities, Hollywood, legacy media) aren’t for sale in the same way. You can’t buy Harvard’s board or CNN’s newsroom with a check. Renn suggests parallel institution-building (think PragerU or Daily Wire) as an alternative, but that’s slow and niche—it doesn’t hit the cultural jugular like owning a mainstream pillar does. Your private equity analogy still holds, though: the right needs high-leverage plays, not just grassroots grinds. Think targeted buyouts (a struggling newspaper chain, a floundering streaming service) or hostile moves (stacking boards, pressuring donors).

What’s Next?

Musk’s success hinged on three things: cash, timing, and guts. The right needs more of that trifecta. Renn points to the donor class as a weak link—conservatives have moneyed backers, but they’re too timid or unfocused. Imagine a coordinated fund targeting distressed media assets or tech platforms; it’s not crazy. X showed the proof of concept: one big swing can shift the board. But without more Musks—or at least more players willing to bet big—the right risks stalling out. The left’s not unbeatable; they’re just better at holding turf. The right’s got to learn to take it.

Posted in America | Comments Off on How Can The Right Take Back Institutions

NYT: ‘Law firms are sometimes aligned with a political party.’

This strikes me as a disingenuous frame. Big Law is overwhelmingly on the side of the Democrats.

The New York Times story has six bylines:

At Paul Weiss, Panic, Poachers and a Fight for the Bottom Line

Fears that competitors could take its top rainmaking talent added to the law firm’s worries about a Trump executive order that targeted it.

By Matthew Goldstein, Michael S. Schmidt, Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Lauren Hirsch, Rob Copeland and Ben Protess

Law firms are sometimes aligned with a political party. But Paul Weiss’s involvement in litigation against the first Trump administration on issues like immigration policy stood out. Also, when the Manhattan district attorney’s office investigated some of Mr. Trump’s business dealings, Paul Weiss lent out two associates to the office to help build a potential case.

So far, Paul Weiss appears not to have lost any partners or big clients.

One client who wanted to leave was Steven Schwartz, a lawyer facing federal foreign bribery charges in New Jersey. Mr. Schwartz quickly hired defense lawyers from Sullivan & Cromwell to represent him out of concern that Mr. Trump’s executive order would make it impossible for Paul Weiss to represent him.

But since the executive order was lifted last week, Mr. Schwartz has indicated that he may have second thoughts about changing counsel, according to court filings in the case.

On Sunday, Mr. Karp insisted in his email to the firm that the deal was necessary for Paul Weiss’s survival.

“No one in the wider world can appreciate how stressful it is to confront an executive order like this until one is directed at you,” he wrote.

By Tuesday, another law firm was in the president’s cross hairs.

Mr. Trump issued an executive order against Jenner & Block, which had employed a top lawyer who worked with the special counsel Robert Mueller on the investigation into whether Mr. Trump had invited Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

Grok says:

You’re right to question the framing. The NYT’s statement—“Law firms are sometimes aligned with a political party”—is technically true but underplays a clear pattern. Big Law, meaning the top-tier, high-revenue firms like Paul Weiss, Skadden, or Latham & Watkins, does lean heavily Democratic. Data backs this up: campaign contribution records from lawyers at these firms, as tracked by OpenSecrets, show a consistent skew toward Democrats, often by margins of 70-90% in recent election cycles. For instance, in 2020, Paul Weiss lawyers donated over $2 million to Democratic candidates and PACs, dwarfing the $50,000 or so that went to Republicans.
This isn’t just a “sometimes” thing—it’s a structural tilt. The legal profession overall, especially at the elite level, draws from urban, coastal, highly educated circles that tend to vote blue. A 2021 American Bar Association survey found 68% of lawyers identified as liberal or moderate-leaning-liberal, compared to 25% conservative. Big Law amplifies that: its culture, client base (think tech, finance, media), and recruitment pipeline (Ivy League grads) align with progressive priorities.
The NYT piece you linked is about Paul Weiss advising Trump on a deal, which might suggest some ideological flexibility. But that’s less about politics and more about business—firms chase prestige and billable hours, not just party loyalty. Still, calling it “sometimes aligned” feels like a dodge when the data shows a lopsided reality. Professions like law, academia, and journalism don’t just “lean left”—they’re overwhelmingly so, and Big Law’s no exception.
The White House fact sheet from 1:21 PM PDT yesterday claims Jenner & Block “abandoned the profession’s highest ideals” and cites Weissmann’s “dishonesty,” but no bombshell documents or leaks have surfaced yet. The firm’s response, issued late yesterday, notes that a similar order against another firm was already ruled unconstitutional, hinting at a looming legal fight. Posts on X reflect a mix of outrage and speculation, with some suggesting discovery could expose corruption, though that’s unconfirmed.
This fits Trump’s pattern: hit firms tied to his legal foes (Weissmann left Jenner in 2021, but the association sticks), pressure them into submission (Paul Weiss cut a deal), and widen the net. Jenner’s work challenging Trump policies—like a successful injunction on transgender healthcare cuts—likely fueled this. The story’s still fresh; expect more details, like the order’s full text or firm counter-moves, to drop today.

Most Vulnerable to Losing Clients, Employees, and Trump’s Assault

Perkins Coie

Why Vulnerable: Perkins Coie has been a primary target since Trump’s March 6 executive order, which suspended its lawyers’ security clearances, restricted access to federal buildings, and directed agencies to sever ties with the firm and its clients. This stemmed from its work for Hillary Clinton in 2016, notably hiring Fusion GPS for the Steele dossier. The firm’s lawsuit to block the order (temporarily halted by a federal judge on March 12) shows it’s fighting, but the damage is severe. Clients needing government-related work—think tech giants or defense contractors—may jump ship to avoid losing federal contracts themselves. Employees, especially those reliant on clearance for their practice, could flee to safer firms.

Impact: The firm’s leadership has called this “life-threatening,” with potential contract losses in the hundreds of millions. Its heavy Democratic alignment (e.g., representing Biden-era officials) makes it a political lightning rod, amplifying client and talent flight risks.

Jenner & Block

Why Vulnerable: Hit by Trump’s latest executive order on March 25, Jenner & Block faces similar sanctions—suspended clearances and contract reviews—due to its past employment of Andrew Weissmann (Mueller probe) and its representation of clients challenging Trump policies (e.g., transgender healthcare cases). Its client base, including corporations needing government access, could balk at the risk. Associates may hesitate to stay at a firm under such scrutiny, especially if pro bono work dries up or prestige takes a hit.

Impact: Less entrenched in Trump’s crosshairs than Perkins, but its defiance (hinting at legal pushback) could prolong the assault, straining resources and morale.

Covington & Burling

Why Vulnerable: Targeted in February for representing Jack Smith post-Trump investigations, Covington lost clearances for some lawyers and faces ongoing pressure. Its sports law practice (e.g., NFL clients) and corporate heavyweights might tolerate short-term turbulence, but prolonged restrictions could push clients to rivals like Kirkland & Ellis. Employee retention’s at risk too—top talent won’t stick around if their government-facing work stalls.

Impact: Its size and diverse portfolio offer some buffer, but Trump’s vendetta against Smith keeps it exposed.

Paul Weiss

Why Vulnerable: After a March 15 order tied to Mark Pomerantz’s Trump investigation, Paul Weiss cut a deal on March 20, dropping DEI policies and pledging $40 million in pro bono work for Trump causes. This capitulation saved it from immediate ruin but alienated clients and employees who value its progressive stance. Major corporations (e.g., tech, finance) might see it as a liability if Trump demands more concessions, and associates like Rachel Cohen (who quit Skadden over similar issues) could spark an exodus.

Impact: Client loss is moderate—its deal buys time—but employee morale and recruitment could suffer long-term.

Most Likely to Go Out of Business

Perkins Coie

Why: The firm’s at the epicenter of Trump’s wrath, with an “existential threat” acknowledged in its lawsuit. Losing federal contracts and clearance-dependent clients (e.g., aerospace, cybersecurity) could gut its $1.2 billion revenue base. If courts don’t fully overturn the order, or if Trump escalates (e.g., via Bondi’s DOJ targeting “frivolous” suits), it might not survive the financial hemorrhage. Posts on X from mid-March echo this, with lawyers calling it a “tsunami” that could “spell the end.”

Odds: High—unless legal victories or client loyalty hold firm, it’s teetering.

Jenner & Block

Why: Freshly targeted, Jenner’s smaller size ($900 million revenue) and reliance on government-adjacent work (e.g., regulatory, litigation) make it less resilient than Perkins. If clients ditch it over clearance issues and Trump doubles down (e.g., Weissmann’s Mueller link), it could spiral. No deal-making like Paul Weiss suggests it’s banking on courts, a risky bet.

Odds: Moderate to high—early days, but the pattern’s ominous.

Covington & Burling

Why: Its $1.6 billion revenue and broad client base (e.g., NFL, Big Tech) give it more cushion, but sustained attacks could erode its government practice. Unlike Paul Weiss, it hasn’t cut a deal, and unlike Perkins, it’s not suing (yet). If Trump’s March 21 memo to Bondi flags it for more sanctions, it’s in trouble—but not imminent collapse.

Odds: Moderate—resilient, but not invincible.

Paul Weiss

Why: The deal with Trump likely staves off bankruptcy, preserving its $2 billion revenue stream. But if clients or partners balk at its concessions, or if Trump reneges, it’s vulnerable. Still, its size and prestige make outright failure unlikely.

Odds: Low—compromised, not doomed.

Less Vulnerable Firms

Firms like Kirkland & Ellis, Latham & Watkins, and Goodwin Procter—big, profitable, and less politically entangled—face lower risk. Kirkland’s Trump-friendly ties (e.g., ex-partners in his admin) and corporate focus insulate it. Latham and Goodwin, while left-leaning, haven’t drawn direct fire, keeping clients and staff stable.

Bottom Line

Perkins Coie and Jenner & Block are the most likely to lose it all—clients, talent, and existence—due to Trump’s unrelenting assault and their exposure. Covington’s at risk but has breathing room; Paul Weiss dodged the worst by bending. The rest of Big Law watches, hoping courts or Congress intervene before Trump’s “off with their heads” spree claims more casualties.

Posted in Law | Comments Off on NYT: ‘Law firms are sometimes aligned with a political party.’

Is America about to bomb Iran?

I notice this story trending on X:

The United States has significantly increased its military presence at the Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean by deploying seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers along with several support aircraft. This deployment, which includes bombers from the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, suggests either a strategic positioning against regional threats or routine military exercises, given the base’s proximity to Iran and Yemen where the Houthis, backed by Iran, have been active. The buildup has sparked speculation and discussions about potential U.S. military intentions in the area.

Grok says:

What Might a U.S. Bombing of Iran Look Like?
If the U.S. were to launch a military operation against Iran, several scenarios could unfold based on historical precedent, military strategy, and current tensions (particularly over Iran’s nuclear program and its influence in the region). Here’s a hypothetical outline:
Targeted Airstrikes on Nuclear Facilities
Objective: Disrupt Iran’s nuclear program, which the U.S. and allies view as a threat.

Execution: Precision strikes using stealth aircraft (e.g., F-35s) and cruise missiles launched from naval assets in the Persian Gulf or Arabian Sea. The focus would likely be on sites like Natanz or Fordow, known for uranium enrichment.

Scale: Limited to key facilities to minimize escalation, though Iran’s deep underground bunkers might require specialized “bunker-buster” bombs (e.g., GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator).

Outcome: Temporary setback to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but potential retaliation via proxies (e.g., Hezbollah) or direct missile strikes on U.S. bases or allies like Israel.

Broader Campaign Against Military Infrastructure
Objective: Weaken Iran’s broader military capabilities, including missile stockpiles and Revolutionary Guard bases.

Execution: A multi-day operation involving drones, fighter jets, and possibly B-2 bombers, targeting air defenses, command centers, and missile launch sites across Iran.

Scale: More extensive than nuclear-focused strikes, risking a larger regional conflict.

Outcome: Significant damage to Iran’s military, but heightened risk of Iranian counterattacks, including closing the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting global oil supplies.

Proxy-Led Conflict with U.S. Support
Objective: Avoid direct U.S. involvement by empowering Israel or other allies to strike.

Execution: U.S. provides intelligence, weapons, and political backing while Israel conducts airstrikes, as suggested in some X posts referencing a U.S. “package” to dissuade Israel from hitting certain targets.

Scale: Smaller and more deniable, but still escalatory.

Outcome: Iran might retaliate against Israel directly, pulling the U.S. into a supporting role regardless.

Posted in Iran | Comments Off on Is America about to bomb Iran?