Outrageous Love: The Hero System of Marc Gafni

Aiden Pink writes Jan. 21, 2018:

Marc Gafni, the rabbi-turned-New Age guru who has been accused of sexually assaulting minors, appeared on the “Dr. Phil” television show on Friday to defend himself.

Gafni was largely unrepentant when pressed by host Phil McGraw on past allegations, including that he coerced and had sexual relations with minors. Gafni claimed that his actions were consensual and blown out of proportion, and that he had taken polygraph tests that proved his innocence.

Gafni claimed that he was subject to an “ongoing smear campaign” that was a “form of name rape.”

One of his alleged victims, Judy Mitzner, repeated her allegations on the show. She said that when she was 16 and a frequent visitor to Gafni’s house, the then-24-year-old rabbi touched her under her nightgown despite her protestations. According to her, Gafni then said that “this never happened and would never happen again.” But two days later, she said, Gafni appeared again wearing only a robe, eventually resulting in her touching him naked.

Gafni admitted to having “brief sexual contact that didn’t involve intercourse” with Mitzner, but claimed in his defense that he had taken a polygraph test that purported to show that she had asked her to sleep with him.

McGraw also brought up another of Gafni’s alleged victims, Sara Kabakov, who first shared her story in the Forward in 2016. Kabakov claimed that Gafni repeatedly molested her when she was 13 and he was 19.

According to her, Gafni, who would sometimes sleep in her brother’s room, “started coming into my room after I had fallen asleep, and waking me up. I remember clearly that when he tried to touch me, I pushed him away, repeatedly. I remember saying ‘No!’ over and over again. No one had talked to me about sexual abuse, but I remember knowing intuitively, with every cell of my body, that this was wrong.”

Gafni responded to McGraw that Kabakov’s claims where “absolutely and categorically not true.”

“I was madly in love with Sara,” Gafni said. “There was never any sense whatsoever..that there was any sense of coercion.”

“She was a child, Marc. What do you mean, you were in love with her?” McGraw responded. “You were a 19-year-old man and you’re saying you were in love with a 13-year-old child. Does that not fit in your ear wrong? That’s a felony!”

McGraw noted that more than 100 rabbis signed a petition urging organizations to “cut all financial and institutional ties” with Gafni. He responded that he was the subject of a smear campaign.

Gafni has recently worked as a tantric sex guru and New Age sage whose work was supported by the co-founder and CEO of Whole Foods until reports about the scandals surrounding him resurfaced.

In December 2015 the New York Times runs a long profile of a rising spiritual teacher trailed by a troubled past. Marc Gafni (b. 1960) holds a doctorate from Oxford, a foreword from a famous philosopher, a shelf of award-winning books, and a movement that calls his teaching a path to enlightenment. The story recounts that two women have accused him of abusing them as teenagers in the 1980s, one of them a girl of thirteen when it began. Gafni answers in the press. She was, he says, “14 going on 35,” and he never forced her. The sentence carries a cosmology. Follow that cosmology to its root and you watch a man build a defense against death out of an accusation of rape and name the result love.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) argued that man lives pinned between two terrors. The first is the terror of the body, the animal fact of decay, the knowledge that the creature who writes books and wins awards is also meat that will stop. The second is the terror of insignificance, the dread of counting for nothing, of leaving the earth as if you had never crossed it. Culture answers both at once. It hands every man a hero system, a set of roles and sacred values through which he can earn the feeling that his life has cosmic weight, that he will not simply rot and vanish. The hero system is how a mortal animal arranges to feel eternal. Becker called the project of authoring that eternal self the causa sui, the wish to be one’s own father, to give birth to oneself and so escape the parents, the body, the grave.

Gafni inherits both terrors. He is born in 1960 in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, to Holocaust survivors. The death that hangs over the home is not the soft death of old age in America. It is the industrial death of the camps, the machinery built to subtract the Jew from the earth and leave no name. A boy raised in that shadow learns early that erasure is real and total, that a people can be unmade. The significance terror arrives with the same inheritance. To be a nobody, in such a home, is to side with the erasure. The cure is to count, to be marked, to leave something that the fire cannot reach.

The boy named Winiarz, Polish for vintner, becomes the rabbi named Gafni, from the Hebrew for the vine. The renaming is the causa sui in miniature. He fathers himself by language, plants himself in the soil of Israel, takes a name that grows. He gathers credentials the way another man gathers money. The doctorate from Oxford. The thesis on Mordechai Leiner of Izbica (1801-1854), the Hasidic master who taught that the deepest law lives below the written law, in the desire of the heart, and that a man who reaches that depth answers to God and not to the rule. Gafni reads his own warrant into the Izbicer. He takes Orthodox ordination from Shlomo Riskin (b. 1940). He takes Jewish Renewal ordination from Zalman Schachter-Shalomi (1924-2014). He builds Bayit Hadash in Jaffa. He hosts Tahat Gafno on Israeli television, trades scripture lines with a comedian, becomes a face the country knows. Each layer is another hedge against the grave. A man with this many names and titles and cameras cannot be subtracted. He has made himself too large to erase.

The doctrine forms around the same need. Gafni writes that the sexual is the supreme spiritual master. He builds a system he calls Eros, then outrageous love, then the Unique Self. The books carry the program. The Mystery of Love. Your Unique Self. Radical Kabbalah. A Return to Eros. The argument runs that religion lost its first fire, that the erotic current beneath all things is the divine current, and that the man who lives from that current lives larger than law, larger than the small self, larger than death. Becker would recognize the move at once. Sex, in Becker’s reading, is where the animal terror and the immortality wish meet, because the body that couples is the body that dies, and so men have always tried to turn the act that proves their creatureliness into the act that transcends it. Gafni does not bolt this onto Judaism from outside. He grows it from the Izbica root he chose at Oxford. The desire of the heart outranks the written rule. The man at the erotic depth answers to God alone. The doctrine and the warrant are one plant.

The teaching that makes Gafni feel eternal is the same teaching that reclassifies his crimes as sacraments. This is not lust dressed in theology after the fact. The theology is the form the lust takes. Eros defeats death and excuses the predation in a single stroke, because in the system there is no predation, only the current, only the master, only love arriving in its outrageous and lawless way. The girl is not a victim in this cosmology. She is a station on the path. That is why he can sit on a television set thirty years later and say she was 14 going on 35. Inside his hero system the sentence is doctrine.

This is the subtraction story, and Gafni tells two versions. The first is the one he speaks aloud. He is the man being erased. A smear campaign, run by rivals, strips him of ordination, of the center in Jaffa, of the television show, of the patrons, of the name. He posts a polygraph on his website to prove he is the one wronged. He writes for a men’s group about false facts that destroy lives. He casts every accuser as an instrument of his subtraction, every disavowal as another hand reaching to unmake him. For a man raised on erasure, persecution is the most familiar story available, and it has the further use of making him the hero of it. The second version he cannot speak, because his cosmology forbids him to see it. It is the girl the system removes from view. The hero system works by subtraction. It takes the thirteen-year-old out of the frame and leaves only the current, the love, the path. The two stories share the word. He fears his own erasure and performs the erasure of another, and the doctrine lets him feel righteous in both.

The persecution story finds its largest stage in 2018, on the set of Dr. Phil. He walks into a hero system not his own. Daytime television in America runs on a therapeutic creed, confession and accountability, the host as judge and healer, the studio audience as jury. Phil McGraw (b. 1950) holds that room the way Gafni once held the room in Jaffa. Gafni comes to perform his innocence inside a cosmology built to extract guilt.

Judy Mitzner tells her story first. She was sixteen, a girl who came often to the rabbi’s house, and he was twenty-four and her youth leader. She says he reached under her nightgown while she told him no, that he swore it would never happen again, that two days later he stood in her doorway in a robe. Gafni grants the contact and shrinks it to a phrase, brief, no intercourse, then reaches for the relic he carries everywhere, a polygraph he says proves the girl wanted him.

Then McGraw raises Sara Kabakov, thirteen when it began, and Gafni does the one thing his cosmology requires. He does not retreat to silence or to sorrow. He professes love. “I was madly in love with Sara,” he says, and insists there was never coercion.

McGraw will not let the word stand. She was a child, he says. You were a nineteen-year-old man saying you loved a thirteen-year-old child. That is a felony.

The collision is the scene. McGraw speaks the language of the civil sphere, where an adult and a child cannot love across that gap because the law and the body forbid it, where the only true name for the act is the crime. Gafni speaks the language of Eros, where the current runs above the law and love arrives where it will. Two hero systems meet under the lights and cannot translate. To McGraw, love between a grown man and a child is a contradiction that should make the ear flinch. To Gafni it is doctrine, the same doctrine that sells the books and fills the retreats. He cannot set it down on the set, because setting it down would not cost him an argument. It would cost him the self that does not die.

So he reaches past the accusers for the largest frame he has. The campaign against him, he says, is a smear, a form of name rape. The phrase tells you everything about the hero system under pressure. Charged with the rape of children, he claims the word rape for himself, for the wound done to his name. The name is the immortality project. To him the threat to the name is the violence in the room.

The center of all this is a single sacred value, and the value is Eros. Hold the word still and watch how it splits across the hero systems that surround Gafni, because the same syllable means a different thing in each, and means what it means only inside the world that holds it.

Take the Trappist in the abbey at dawn. For him eros is the longing that climbs toward God and burns away on the way up. He has given the body to silence and the bell. The current Gafni preaches is real to him, and he calls it desire, and he treats it as the rocket fuel of prayer, to be spent in adoration and never in the bed. Eros, for the monk, is the thing you offer back unconsumed. The man who acts on it has not reached the depth. He has fallen off the ladder.

Take the kallah teacher in a Jerusalem apartment, the woman who prepares Orthodox brides for marriage. Eros for her is holy and bounded together, sealed inside the laws of family purity, the count of days, the immersion, the return. The current runs strong in her teaching, stronger than the secular world guesses, but it runs through a channel of law, and the law is what makes it sacred rather than wild. Tell her that the man at the erotic depth answers to God and not to the rule and she will answer that the rule is how you reach God, that the banks are what make the river. Gafni’s reading of the Izbicer strikes her ear as the oldest heresy, the one that frees the appetite by calling it the soul.

Take the trauma clinician in a strip-mall office, the woman who sees, across the week, the grown children of men like Gafni. Eros for her is attachment, the bond that forms between bodies and minds, and its first law is the boundary. A thirteen-year-old cannot consent to a man, and the harm done is measurable in the nervous system years later, in the flinch, the dissociation, the broken trust that follows a child into middle age. Where Gafni hears a current she hears a wound. The same word names, for the teacher, a sacrament, and for the clinician, an injury with a clinical course.

Take the longevity founder in a glass office south of San Francisco, the man pouring a fortune into the literal defeat of death, the cold plunges, the blood panels, the supplements timed to the minute. Eros for him is not a path to eternity. It is an appetite to be optimized like the others, a lever for performance and bonding, a variable. He wants to beat death in the body, not in the symbol. He finds Gafni’s metaphysics quaint. He is solving the real problem. To him the rabbi is selling a story to people who lack the resources to buy the actual cure. Becker would tell both men they are doing the same thing in different currencies, that the founder’s clinic and the rabbi’s eros are two hero systems aimed at one terror, and that the founder’s literalism is its own vital lie.

Take the widow at the cemetery on the anniversary, the woman whose husband of forty years is under the stone. Eros for her is memory and fidelity, the love that does not end because the body ended, the proof she carries that a person can outlast death in another person’s keeping. She has no patience for outrageous love. Her love is the quiet kind that stays. If she heard Gafni’s doctrine she might think it the philosophy of a man who has never lost anyone and so has never learned what love is for.

And take the woman who was the girl. For her the word names the thing done to her at thirteen by a youth leader twice her age, the thing he later called a mutual expression of teenage love, the thing she has spent her life refusing to let him rename. When she reads that the sexual is the supreme spiritual master she reads the sentence of the man who used a child and built a religion on the right to do it. Her eros is the truth the whole apparatus exists to bury. She is the subtraction made flesh, the figure the cosmology removes so the path can stay clean. When she speaks she puts herself back in the frame, and that is why the system treats her speech as an attack. It is an attack. It attacks the erasure.

One word. Seven worlds. Each speaker certain that his eros is the true one, and each correct inside the hero system that gives the word its sense. Becker’s point is not that the values are merely relative. It is that men kill and die for these meanings, that the meanings feel like reality to the men who hold them, and that the holding is how each man arranges to feel that his life counts against the dark.

The transference runs in two directions. Becker described how men make heroes of the leaders who seem to have solved the death problem, how the disciple hands the guru the role of cosmic parent and feels safe inside the borrowed certainty. Gafni’s students do this. They give him the parent role, and in return he gives them the feeling that they are awakening, that their lives are touched by something that outlasts them. But the patrons do it too, and they have more to lose. The famous philosopher who writes the foreword has staked his own immortality project on a grand theory of everything, and Gafni is the charismatic proof that the theory produces saints. The grocery magnate who chairs the board has staked his on the idea that capitalism can carry a conscience, and Gafni supplies the spiritual depth the brand requires. When the accusations come, the philosopher takes a leave and returns to call Gafni a gifted teacher, a real spiritual leader. The magnate stands by him and says that loyalty and the presumption of innocence are values he holds. They are not only defending a friend. They are defending the structures that hold their own death at bay. To believe the worst about their friend is to crack the system that lets all of them feel eternal. So the subtraction becomes a group project. The crowd around the guru cannot afford to believe the accusations, because the truth would cost each of them his own arrangement against the dark. Only when the cost of staying flips, when the petitions and the lawsuits and the front pages make Gafni a liability to the immortality projects rather than an asset, do the patrons begin to peel away. The conscience arrives on the schedule of self-interest.

Gafni once wrote the truest sentence of his life (according to his critics, to his defenders the sentence was the ill-judged cry for help in a nasty situation). After he left Israel and the center closed he sent his congregation a letter and said that in these regards he was sick, that he needed help. The hero system could not hold the admission. A man who is sick is a creature, mortal and broken, the very thing the whole apparatus exists to deny. So the admission is withdrawn. The persecution story returns. The polygraph goes up. The new books come out. The movement reassembles under a new name, then another. Each rebuilding is the causa sui starting over, the man fathering himself again from the wreckage.

Without the withdrawn admission, he may not have produced the work he did over the past two decades and helped the people he helped. A man can be poison to one soul and a balm to another. The same man. Different results. We decide who we bring into our lives and who we hold close and defend.

Three coordinates close this.

The first concerns the doctrine and the deeds. They will never separate, because they were never two things. Anyone who hopes Gafni might keep the teaching and renounce the conduct misreads the plant. The eros that promises to defeat death is the same eros that could license harm, in addition to joy. A reckoning that leaves the metaphysics standing changes nothing, because the metaphysics is the engine. Watch whether any future rehabilitation touches the doctrine, or only the public relations around it. The doctrine is where the danger and salvation live.

The second concerns the patrons. Gafni’s hero system cannot run alone. It needs disciples to crown him and famous names to certify him, and it works on them by offering each a shortcut around his own death. The figure to watch is the accomplished man who needs the guru to be real, because his own eternity is wired to the guru’s. When such a man defends the indefensible and speaks of loyalty and presumption, he might be protecting a friend, and he might be protecting himself. The two motives wear the same words.

The third concerns the witness. One apparatus is built to glorify her and another to subtract her. Every time the woman who was the girl puts herself back in the frame and declines the rename, she does to the hero system the one thing it cannot survive, which is to be seen from outside. The cosmology calls this an attack and treats her as the aggressor. She is the aggressor, against the erasure, and the erasure is the crime. Watch where the culture places its sympathy when the next charismatic teacher offers a current that runs above the law. The placement tells you whose terror the culture serves.

From the perspective of 2026, Summer of ’42 is a movie about a heinous rape. It could not be made today. In 1971, it was a beautiful coming of age story.

The Charged Room: Marc Gafni and the Manufacture of Charisma

Begin in the room, because the room does the work. A weeknight in Jaffa near the turn of the century. Forty people sit on cushions in a hall called Bayit Hadash, the new home, the lights are low, and someone has a hand drum. They have come for the rabbi. When Marc Gafni (b. 1960) walks in he does not lecture. He pulls the attention of the room onto one point, himself, and then he hands it back to the people as feeling. The drum finds a pulse. Voices climb and drop together. An hour in, the bodies in the hall breathe near the same rhythm, and a man who came in tired leaves at midnight lit up, sure of things, larger than he was when he arrived. He will come back next week for more of that. He has tasted something the office and the marriage no longer give him.

Randall Collins (b. 1941) built a sociology to explain that room. He took it from Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), who watched tribal assemblies and saw that when bodies gather, fix on one thing, and share a mood, they throw off a heat he called collective effervescence, and they walk away believing in gods. Collins stripped the tribal dress and found the same engine running in a courtroom, on a sales floor, in a bedroom, at a rally. He named the parts. Bodies in one place. A barrier that marks who belongs and who does not. A focus of attention that everyone shares and everyone knows they share. A common mood that rises as the bodies fall into rhythm. When the parts lock, the gathering produces four things. It binds the group. It loads certain objects with the sacred, a flag, a name, a face. It arms the members with anger toward anyone who profanes those objects. And it pours into each body what Collins calls emotional energy, the confidence and warmth and drive that a good ritual leaves in a man and a bad one drains out of him.

Emotional energy is the currency of Collins’s world. Men move through the day from encounter to encounter, and they steer toward the ones that fill them and away from the ones that empty them. Each man carries his charge and his sacred symbols into the next room and spends them there. This is the chain in interaction ritual chains. A life is a sequence of rooms, and a man is rich or poor in the one currency that moves him.

Max Weber (1864-1920) called charisma a gift of grace, an extraordinary quality that sets a man apart and makes others follow. Collins moved the gift out of the man. Charisma is not a thing stored inside the leader. It is a position in a ritual. The charismatic is the man who stands at the focal point of high-energy gatherings often enough that the energy of the crowd collects on him and the crowd reads the glow as his own. He is an energy star, and the star is made by the assembly, recharged each time the room fills. Take away the room and the light goes out. Here is the first thing Collins tells us about Gafni. His charisma is a product, not a gift. He is good at building rooms.

Read his life as a sequence of rooms he learned to charge. As a young man he runs Jewish youth clubs, the small assemblies where a leader practices holding a circle of attention. He takes the pulpit in Boca Raton, then a settlement in the West Bank, then the hall in Jaffa. The Israeli television show, Tahat Gafno, gives him a thinner kind of room. Collins held that bodily presence is the strong form and the broadcast a weak one, because the screen cannot return the crowd’s energy to itself the way a hall can. Gafni used the weak room to feed the strong one. The face the country saw on Channel 2 drew strangers to Jaffa, where the real heat lived. Television was the doorway. The hall was the furnace.

The retreat is the hottest room he builds. A weekend or a week, a group sealed from the outside world, sleep and food and silence set by the schedule, the focus held on the teacher hour after hour with no competing pull. The retreat makes more emotional energy per hour than the weekly hall, because the barrier is total and the rhythm never breaks. By the time the integral movement takes him in, the famous philosopher writing the foreword and the famous CEO chairing the board, Gafni has spent thirty years learning how to run the assembly that leaves a roomful of accomplished adults feeling they have touched the source of their own lives. The sacred object loaded by all that focus is Gafni, or the doctrine with his face on it, the Eros, the Unique Self. The crowd believes the charge belongs to him. Collins says the crowd made it and hung it on him.

Now the private room. Collins treats sexual contact as an interaction ritual of its own, two bodies in the tightest co-presence there is, the mutual focus, a rhythm that builds and breaks, and a charge of solidarity and symbol left behind. The trouble according to the dominant ethos is that the ritual runs on a current the male leader controls (the men in these stories might say that the leader was the one with the most sexual power and the greatest freedom of choice, and that was not him). Collins separated power rituals from status rituals. In a power ritual the one who gives the orders takes on energy and the one who takes them loses it. Gafni’s encounters are power rituals dressed as communion and your view on who has the power in these rituals depends on where you stand. You might argue he is the sole source of the energy that the disciple has come to need, and in the sealed room he is the giver of every order. The disciple arrives already drained toward dependence by months of the public rooms, already taught that the rabbi is the door to the only feeling that lifts her. At that peak the capacity to refuse runs lowest, because refusal means exile from the source of emotional life. This is where Collins locates the abuse, at the top of the energy, where the follower has the least power to say no. That’s the only socially acceptable analysis. There might be more valid and more challenging ones that don’t separate teachers and disciples into the powerful and the powerless.

With the women of Bayit Hadash and the student at the integral retreat, that is the dominant narrative, the leader converting accumulated ritual power into private extraction. With the children it is not a ritual between persons at all, and the frame, used with honesty, refuses to pretend otherwise. Sara Kabakov was thirteen and Judy Mitzner sixteen. A child (and who is classified as a child and who is classified as an adult with agency depends upon time and place, the same act is a crime in one state and legal in another state) cannot enter a ritual as an equal partner who shares in the solidarity it throws off. There is one body drawing energy from another body that has no standing to leave. Gafni’s doctrine relabels this as the peak shared ritual, the outrageous love, the madly-in-love he still claimed on national television. The relabeling is the crime laundered into a sacrament. Collins might say the encounter produced solidarity for one man and injury for the child, and the talk of mutual love is the energy star describing the room as if the drained party had volunteered her own draining.

The career runs as a chain because Gafni produces energy, excitement and accusation everywhere he goes and the dominant narrative of what happens comes from those with the most power. A scandal does to an assembly what a profanation does to a sacred object. The charge collapses. The hall in Jaffa empties within days when the accusations land. The energy that filled it does not transfer to the accused. It curdles into the moral anger Collins predicts, the righteous fury of a group that has watched its sacred object defiled, turned now against the man who turns out to be the defiler. So Gafni does the only thing his trade allows. He moves. Orthodox Israel to the integral world in California, the integral world to a tantric school, each relocation a search for a fresh room full of people who need him, a crowd that can still load him with the sacred. The doctorate, the books, the awards, the foreword travel with him as portable symbols he carries into the next assembly to seed the charge. The chain is not a figure of speech in his case. It is the sequence of rooms he keeps finding as the old ones turn on him.

A reasonable man asks why a serious philosopher takes a ninety-day leave over the accusations and then returns to call Gafni a gifted teacher and a real spiritual leader. A reasonable man asks why a billionaire grocer stands by him and speaks of loyalty and the presumption of innocence while protesters mass outside his stores. The answer is not that these men weighed the evidence and found it wanting. The answer is that they have sat in the room. The room gave them a charge that no document can match, a feeling of access to depth and significance wired to the face of the man at the focal point. Evidence is propositional. It arrives as words on a page and competes for belief. Emotional energy arrives in the body and competes for nothing, because it is already installed. When the philosopher reads the accusations he is reading against the memory of the gathering, and the gathering wins, because the gathering is what made the sacred object he is now asked to throw away. To drop Gafni is to call the charge in his own body a fraud. Few men will do that on the strength of a newspaper.

The disavowals come, in the end, and Collins explains their timing too. They arrive when a rival assembly grows hotter than Gafni’s. The Times article, the petition signed by more than a hundred rabbis, the protests at the grocery store, the public letter from the former students, these are interaction rituals rewarding power, a counter-crowd building its own charge and its own sacred object, the protection of the abused. When that counter-assembly runs hotter than the rooms Gafni can still fill, standing near him starts to drain a man rather than fill him. The famous names that endorsed him read the shift in the only currency they track, and they leave, and they tell themselves it was conscience. Some of it is. The schedule is emotional energy.

What to watch is the next room. Collins predicts that a charismatic survives exactly as long as he can build fresh high-energy assemblies faster than scandal can poison the old ones. The man holds his standing not by winning the argument about his past, which he cannot win, but by finding the room where the argument has not yet arrived and lighting it up before the story and the power catches him. The whole of his future runs along that edge, the race between the next crowd and the reach of power. The teaching about Eros is real to the people in the room because the room is real and the charge is real and the body does not lie about what it felt. The harm is also real to some, and it lives in the same place the charge does, at the top of the ritual, in the sealed room, where there are no cameras and no objective record.

The Gafni Set: Authenticity, Eros, and the Forgiveness of Genius

The set has two main rooms and they overlap at the edges. The first is the Israeli world of post-Orthodox seekers who gather at Bayit Chadash, the study center Gafni opens in Jaffa near the turn of the century. Its board chairman is Jacob Ner-David, a social entrepreneur who first met Gafni at thirteen, at an American summer camp where Gafni was his counselor. Its melamed-in-residence is Avraham Leader, a founder of the Leader Minyan. Its educational director is Haviva Ner-David, a feminist rabbi and scholar. Its director on the ground is Or Zohar. Gafni’s wife at the time, Chaya Kaplan, runs at his side as his partner in the work. Nearby stands Ohad Ezrahi (b. 1965), the sexual-shamanism teacher who founds the desert commune Hamakom and co-writes with Gafni a book on Lilith and the feminine shadow, sold to the public as the male feminist view. Above them all hovers the sanction of Zalman Schachter-Shalomi (1924-2014), the founder of Jewish Renewal, who ordains both Gafni and Ezrahi, and the earlier sanction of Shlomo Riskin (b. 1940), the Modern Orthodox rabbi who first gave Gafni a pulpit’s authority and later took it back.

The second room is American and richer. Here Gafni co-founds the Center for World Spirituality, later the Center for Integral Wisdom, with the meditation teacher Sally Kempton (1943-2023) and the trauma clinician Lori Galperin. The philosopher Ken Wilber (b. 1949), the architect of integral theory, writes the foreword to Your Unique Self and seats Gafni at the head of a Wisdom Council whose roster carries the wattage the set runs on: the self-help impresario Tony Robbins (b. 1960), the men’s-movement author Warren Farrell (b. 1943), the futurist Barbara Marx Hubbard (1929-2019). The Whole Foods founder John Mackey (b. 1953) co-chairs the board and trades public dialogues with Gafni on the unique self of business. The integral scholar Zak Stein supplies the reviews that crown the books. Kristina Kincaid becomes Gafni’s partner and the co-author of A Return to Eros. Around this core sits a wider ring of New Age names who lend their endorsement and later take it back, the physician Deepak Chopra (b. 1946), the psychologist Joan Borysenko (b. 1945), the mystic Andrew Harvey (b. 1952), the human-potential teacher Jean Houston (b. 1937), the Shift Network founder Stephen Dinan.

What the set values, above everything, is authenticity, and they mean by it the freedom of the awakened individual to follow his own depth past the rules. They prize the erotic and want it back inside the holy, the body returned to the altar, desire treated as a door to God rather than a thing to be governed. They prize the genius teacher and the dazzling room. They prize transcendence of boundaries, the borrowing from yoga and tantra and Zen, the dual citizenship Gafni claims between a native tradition and a borderless world spirituality. They prize the personal over the collective, the school Gafni names the School of Personal Myth, the self over the nation, the unique over the inherited. In America they add evolution to the list, the idea that consciousness climbs and that they are its leading edge, and they add the conviction that commerce done from the awakened self becomes a spiritual practice. The institution, in this world, is the enemy. The rabbinic establishment broke Judaism, the corporate world deadened work, the conventional family flattened love, and only the outsider with the courage to break the dead forms can heal what the insiders ruined.

That conviction is the set’s hero system, the story in which the members get to be heroes. To belong is to be a pioneer of a renewed spirituality, brave enough to bring eros back to a frightened tradition, advanced enough to handle teachings that would scandalize the timid. The teacher is the genius-prophet ahead of his time. The followers are co-creators of a new world, a vanguard. The CEO is a sage who proves that a grocery chain can carry a soul. The hero of the story is the man living his unique self without apology, and the scorn of the establishment is not a warning sign in this story. It is a credential. To be attacked by the small people is evidence that you stand among the large ones. This is the trap built into the hero system, because it converts every accusation into proof of election, and it teaches the set to read the rising count of complaints as the rising envy of lesser men.

The status games follow from the values. The first prize is proximity to the genius. A seat near him at the table, an invitation to the private teaching, a name on the Wisdom Council, these mark a man as inner rather than outer. The second prize is the credential that association launders. Gafni carries an Oxford doctorate and a thesis on a Hasidic master, and he flashes both. Wilber’s foreword certifies him to the integral world, Stein’s review calls Radical Kabbalah a work that comes along once in a generation, the books take a USA Best Book award, and each honor reflects back on the people who granted it, because to discover a genius is to have genius enough to know one. The third prize is celebrity adjacency, the shine that Robbins and Chopra and Mackey throw on one another and on him. The fourth, and the ugliest, is the way advancement gets measured by what a member can stomach. To accept the teaching that the sexual is the supreme master, to sit unflinching while the teacher dissolves a boundary that would stop an ordinary man, is treated inside the set as a sign of one’s own attainment. The follower who feels the alarm and stays learns to read the alarm as her own immaturity. That conversion, alarm into evidence of one’s smallness, is where the set does its deepest harm, because it disarms the people most able to stop him.

The set’s normative claims, the oughts it lives by, run toward openness and away from the boundary. One ought to be authentic. One ought to honor one’s desire and integrate the erotic rather than fear it. One ought to transcend the petty conventions that bind smaller souls. One ought to be loyal to the visionary, and Mackey states the loyalty as a value when he speaks of loyalty and the presumption of innocence while protesters mass outside his stores. One ought to guard one’s speech, and the old prohibition on lashon hara, evil talk, becomes a reason not to pass the warning along, so that the duty to protect the community loses every argument to the duty not to speak ill of a teacher. The set moralizes the open hand and treats the raised hand of caution as the failing. It asks its members to be generous, and it spends that generosity on the man who needs it least.

The essentialist claims, the set’s account of what things really are beneath appearance, do the heavy lifting under all of this. Eros is held to be the ground of reality itself, the supreme master, the current beneath the world. The unique self is held to be a man’s true essence, waiting under the false one. Souls are ranked by nature into the advanced and the ordinary. There is an authentic Judaism, real and original, buried under the corrupt institutional one, and the masculine and the feminine are treated as essences to be balanced, the project of the Lilith book and of Farrell’s writing on men. The decisive essentialist sentence is the one Wilber speaks after his ninety-day leave, when he returns to call Gafni a gifted teacher and a genuine spiritual leader. The grammar of that sentence places the gift in the man’s nature, where conduct cannot reach it. If the teacher is essentially a genuine spiritual leader, then the accusations describe something accidental, a flaw on the surface of an essence that stays clean. The essence claim is what lets the set hold the brilliance and set the deeds aside.

You can hear the set’s moral grammar in the sentences its members speak when the truth arrives, because the grammar is built to keep the man and his harm in separate clauses. Or Zohar says he forgave the manipulation because Gafni, imperfect, does good in this world, the standard sentence that lets the good outweigh the girls. When the firing comes, Ner-David says they were deceived, that Gafni is a sick man who has harmed so many, and the illness grammar carries pity and exculpation in the same breath, since a sick man is to be treated rather than judged. Ner-David and Leader issue a joint statement that there is no place for such relations between a rabbi and his students, consensual or not, a clean line drawn at last, and the lesson Bayit Chadash takes from the wreck is that it must never let anyone become a guru, that it will not replace one guru with another. The American defenders run the same grammar in two beats. In 2004 the Modern Orthodox ethicist Saul Berman, the Renewal rabbi Tirzah Firestone, and the author Joseph Telushkin write that they have looked into the old allegations and found them unconvincing, and then, after the 2006 firing, they join the chorus of the deceived and announce that they too were manipulated. The grammar of the first beat assigns the accuser bad faith. The grammar of the second assigns Gafni all the agency and keeps the defender’s own judgment innocent. Across both rooms and three decades the sentence never quite gets spoken in the first person and the active voice, the sentence that would say I helped him reach them. The set reaches instead for the passive and the medical, deceived and manipulated and sick, because those words leave the speaker’s own discernment intact.

The thing that holds the set together is energy. Ner-David is an entrepreneur, Mackey built a company, Wilber writes systems, the women who staffed Bayit Chadash were activists and scholars. They are bright people, and an old acquaintance from the Florida years recalled Gafni saying that being a rebbe was the best job around. What binds them is a shared craving for a life that counts as awakened, plus a doctrine that tells them their craving is the highest thing in them, plus a status order that pays them in nearness to a man who feeds the craving and a moral grammar that hands them, when the bill comes due, a way to live forever. Ohad Ezrahi cut ties when Gafni fled Israel, and then, in 2023, said he regretted the break and meant to write with him again. That return is the set in one gesture. The pull of the genius outlasts the stories of the harm, because the genius is wired to the part of the self the members most want to believe in.

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Blake Bailey: A Life in Other Men’s Lives

In May of 2012 a tall man from Oklahoma climbs the stairs to an apartment on the Upper West Side. Blake Bailey (b. July 1, 1963) has written to Philip Roth (1933–2018) and said he hears Roth wants a biographer and asks if they might talk. Roth calls him. They meet. At that first meeting they barely touch the subject of the book. Roth tells him to come back Saturday.

When Bailey returns, Roth sits in a far grimmer mood. Bailey asks about his back. Roth cuts him off. “You didn’t come here to ask about my back,” he says. “Sit down.” Then Roth asks the question that decides everything. Why should a gentile from Oklahoma write the biography of Philip Roth?

Bailey has an answer ready. He is not a bisexual alcoholic with an ancient Puritan lineage either, he says, and he wrote the life of John Cheever. Roth presses him on the Jewish American tradition, on Bellow and Malamud, on where Roth stands in it, having just told Bailey he does not consider himself a Jewish American writer at all. Bailey decides this man will not daunt him. He answers. Roth grows impatient, finishes the answers for him, then recollects the finished thought as though Bailey had nailed it himself. Roth asks what he makes of the reputation for misogyny that trails him.

That afternoon Roth chooses his biographer. Six years later Roth is dead and the book is nine hundred pages and Bailey stands at the top of his profession. Three weeks after that, he stands nowhere at all.

The shape of Bailey’s life rhymes with the lives he chose to write. He spent two decades inside the records of gifted, damaged American men, asking how the same flaws that wrecked a life could also drive the work. Then the question turned on him.

Oklahoma

Bailey grows up in Oklahoma City in the shadow of his father. Burck Bailey is an eminent litigator, president of the Oklahoma Bar Association, a man who argues cases before the Supreme Court and carries among his colleagues the reputation of a real-life Atticus Finch. A 1989 citation praises his conduct, honesty, integrity, and courtesy as the highest standard of the profession. The father owns the courtroom. The younger son does not yet own anything.

There is an older brother, Scott, and Scott is the wound at the center of the family. Bipolar, addicted, in and out of institutions from the 1970s on, charming and destructive in the same hour, Scott absorbs the household’s fear and grief for thirty years and then, in 1999, in his thirties, kills himself. Blake is the favored younger son, the watchful one, the survivor with a notebook. He will write that story later and write it without flinching and without sentiment.

He attends Bishop McGuinness Catholic High School in Oklahoma City, where one of his friends is the future writer Dan Fagin. He goes to Tulane University and graduates in 1985. He wants to write fiction. He writes unpublished novels. An agent reads one, tells him he writes well and that she cannot sell it, and asks him to propose a nonfiction book about anything that grips him. What grips him at that moment is the question of whatever became of the novelist Richard Yates.

The classroom

Before the books, there is a classroom.

Through the 1990s Bailey teaches eighth-grade English at Lusher in New Orleans, a school run out of a repurposed courthouse Uptown. His room sits on the top floor. Big windows, high ceilings, more glamorous than the trailers some of his colleagues teach in. He gives gifted children serious literature and asks them to write with care, and they love him for it. On field trips a flock of them gathers around him while he keeps up a witty patter. A retired colleague, Steve Burt, watches it and finds it pleasant, nothing worse than that. It was kind of nice to see, he says.

The class reads Slaughterhouse-Five. Bailey sets an assignment. Each student writes a timeline of the good and bad things that have happened in a life. One girl, Eve Crawford Peyton, turns in her own: a brother’s suicide, her parents’ divorce, the rest of it, handed to a teacher for a grade and for his approval. Years later she describes what she thinks she handed him. Proof that she was easy pickings. Proof that she was damaged.

She is thirteen then. Decades later she and other women say the warmth in that room had a second purpose. They say Bailey stayed in their lives through high school and college under the cover of mentorship, that he asked about their love lives, that he tracked their virginity with a recurring question. Have you punched your V-card yet. Peyton says that at sixteen he greeted her with a spinning hug and a hand on her backside and a remark about her figure. These are accounts given in 2021, two decades after the events, and Bailey denies the conduct they describe. The denials and the accounts will collide in public later. For now the room is only a room with good light, and the man at the front of it is the best teacher many of these children will ever have. In 2000 the state names him Louisiana Humanities Teacher of the Year. Both things are part of the record. The biography of any life has to hold them at once, which is the problem Bailey spent his career solving for other men and never had to solve, in print, for himself.

The making of a biographer

Yates gives him his subject and his method. Bailey publishes a long critical profile arguing that a neglected novelist deserves a second reading, then persuades a publisher to let him write the life. A Tragic Honesty: The Life and Work of Richard Yates appears in 2003 and reaches the finals of the National Book Critics Circle Award. Bailey refuses the easy versions of Yates, the romantic martyr and the mere drunk, and gives instead a writer whose exacting standards keep colliding with his weaknesses. The collision is the story. It will be the story every time.

A Guggenheim Fellowship in 2005 carries him through the next book. Cheever: A Life (2009) draws on the family’s papers, the journals, the letters, and renders John Cheever (1912–1982) as a man split between suburban respectability and private chaos: the drinking, the buried desires, the religious hunger, the self-deception. It wins the National Book Critics Circle Award for Biography and the Francis Parkman Prize, reaches the Pulitzer finals, and stands as the definitive account. Bailey also edits Cheever for the Library of America. Cheever’s daughter Susan calls his work on her father thorough and intelligent and loving, and a hard road walked just about perfectly.

He rescues another forgotten novelist with Farther & Wilder: The Lost Weekends and Literary Dreams of Charles Jackson (2013). Charles Jackson (1903–1968), remembered for The Lost Weekend, returns under Bailey’s hand as a talented insecure man consumed by addiction and by his need for literary success.

The same period gives him his first memoir, The Splendid Things We Planned (2014). He turns the family camera on Scott. The book refuses both pity and judgment. Scott comes off destructive, magnetic, pitiable, beyond saving. A finalist for the National Book Critics Circle Award in autobiography, it shows the root of Bailey’s lifelong pull toward gifted men who break themselves. He had lived with one.

Roth

By 2012 Bailey is the obvious choice and not the first one.

Roth had spent years hunting for a biographer who might answer his ex-wife Claire Bloom and refute her memoir. He approached Hermione Lee and Judith Thurman, both friends, both accomplished, and landed instead on his friend Ross Miller, an English professor and nephew of Arthur Miller, who had never written a biography. Roth thought Miller’s prose no jeweled thing and cared more for sympathy than for style. He told Miller he did not want the book to become the story of his penis. He wanted the novels at the center.

It went wrong. Roth could not keep his hands off the project. He set up the interviews, drafted the questions, in one case steered Miller toward a dying friend to extract old gossip. He wrote the Library of America chronology himself and signed Miller’s name to it. By fax he declared himself too angry to speak to his own biographer. The friendship dissolved and the book died with it. At a luncheon Bailey hears that Miller has stopped returning Roth’s calls. He writes to Roth. The chair is open.

What Bailey brings to the chair is a rule he learned from the wreck of Miller. He tells Roth in those early meetings that he wants a professional relationship, not the intimacy that curdled the last one. He gets, in June of 2012, a collaboration agreement granting unrestricted and exclusive access to the archive, the unpublished work, the private correspondence. Roth, seventy-nine, makes himself available for years of interviews and leans on friends and family to cooperate. He hands Bailey a three-hundred-page chronology of his own life and a copy of an unpublished manuscript titled Notes for My Biographer. He inherits Miller’s taped interviews. Miller will not answer his letters.

For six years they are collaborators, friends, sometimes combatants. Bailey writes that their time together was complicated but rarely unhappy and never dull. One hour Roth cracks jokes and pages through a photo album of old girlfriends, of whom there are many. The next he seethes over Bloom. Bailey expects the lewdness and the tasteless jokes. What surprises him, he says, is the essential benevolence of the man. He sits at the deathbed in 2018, Roth surrounded by former lovers and old friends rather than a wife or children, and watches the end the way he watched everything, as material.

Philip Roth: The Biography publishes on April 6, 2021. It runs to nine hundred pages. On the front page of the New York Times Book Review, Cynthia Ozick (b. 1928) calls it a narrative masterwork. The book debuts at number twelve on the Times nonfiction list. David Remnick praises the literary genius who keeps getting it wrong, loving and then hurting, devoted past reason to his art. Not every notice glows. In the daily Times, Parul Sehgal faults Bailey for a sprawling fixation on Roth’s private life and a reticence about the work, and calls the result a narrow portrait of a wide life. Other reviewers argue that Bailey took Roth’s own version of his women too readily, that the sympathetic life makes its subject a spiteful obsessive rather than the wronged man he hoped to become. The argument over whether Bailey served Roth too well is, for about two weeks, the only argument anyone is having about the book.

The collapse

The second argument starts in a comment thread.

On April 16, 2021, several of Bailey’s former Lusher students post on a critical online review of the Roth biography and say he groomed them as minors. On April 18 his agency, the Story Factory, drops him. On April 20 the journalists Ramon Antonio Vargas and Edward Champion report the allegations in detail. Eve Crawford Peyton tells the Times-Picayune and The New York Times that Bailey raped her when she was twenty-two, on a book-tour night that began with drinks and an invitation she accepted because she thought she was spending an evening with a mentor. On April 27 a publishing executive, Valentina Rice, tells the Times that Bailey raped her in 2015, when both were overnight guests at the home of the Times critic Dwight Garner. Another former student, Caryn Blair, says he tried to rape her years after Lusher. In June the Virginian-Pilot reports allegations of harassment and abuse from four women who studied under Bailey at Old Dominion University, where he held an endowed chair in creative writing from 2010 to 2016.

Bailey denies all of it. He calls the claims categorically false and libelous. He has never been charged with a crime, much less tried or convicted. In an email to Peyton sent before the story broke, he writes that she was in her twenties and he in his thirties on the night in question, that he was never attracted to her as a student, that he never laid a glove on any student while she was his, and that he was suffering from an unspecified mental illness at the time of the encounter. The email concedes the encounter and disputes its character. Peyton, after Norton acts, says the news is disappointing but not surprising, that she told the truth, and that she has nothing more to add.

Norton moves fast. On April 21 the publisher pauses shipping and promotion pending further information. On April 28 it takes the book out of print. Recorded Books pulls the audio the same day. Then Norton goes further and announces it will pulp the biography and reverts to declaring its 2014 memoir out of print as well. Julia Reidhead, Norton’s president, says Bailey is free to seek publication elsewhere.

He does. His lawyers threaten action over the canceled contract. Norton pays out the remainder of his advance and reverts the rights. Skyhorse Publishing, an outfit with a taste for authors other houses drop, acquires both books and reissues the Roth biography in ebook and paperback within weeks. The defining publishing fight of the early 2020s ends in a settlement, not a courtroom, and the nine-hundred-page life of Philip Roth stays in print under a different imprint than the one that made it a bestseller.

The fight splits the literary world along a line that does not track the usual partisan one. The accusers and many readers see a predator finally named. Free-expression groups see a publisher punishing a book for the conduct of its author absent any finding. PEN America, the National Coalition Against Censorship, and the Authors Guild all object to the pulping. The argument is not whether the accusations are grave. The argument is who decides, and when, and on what proof, and what a publisher owes a reader who might want to weigh a contested life for himself.

The ghost

Bailey survives by going underground. A friend gets him work as a literal ghostwriter, which is the kind of irony he would have flagged in someone else’s biography. He learns the etiquette of social death. At weddings and large gatherings old acquaintances fix smiles and pretend they have not seen a ghost. A writer friend tells him the life he knew is over, forever, and that the sooner he accepts that the better.

In 2025 he answers with Canceled Lives: My Father, My Scandal, and Me, a short book, under two hundred pages, that braids three deaths and one disgrace. His father’s final illness. Roth’s. The drug-driven suicide of his brother Scott, which Bailey describes with a hard mercy as a favor Scott did himself and his family, sparing them the man he had become. And his own social erasure. The book defends him in places. He still calls the accusations false. But it reads less as a brief than as a study of grief and family loyalty, of a son measuring himself against a father who won his arguments in court while the son, a biographer rather than a litigator, can only set down a life and hope a reader weighs it fairly. The reviews are sparse. The strategy against him, Bailey tells one interviewer, has changed from attack to silence, and silence works. He says he will go away soon enough. In the meantime he has said his piece, and no one, he claims, has stood up to deny it.

He is at work on a biography of James Salter (1925–2015). The return to the form that made him is itself a kind of argument, made in the only court he trusts.

The unfinished life

Bailey’s biographies hold a settled place in American nonfiction. He builds from thousands of letters, journals, interviews, and unpublished pages, often won through unusual cooperation from estates and survivors, and he tells the result as story, chronological, scene by scene, the personality surfacing through what people said and did rather than through theory. Psychology sits where another writer might put criticism. His subjects are nearly always men whose talent shares a body with their wreckage, and he asks, book after book, how the achievement grows out of the frailty, whether the same flaw that ruined the man also fed the work.

He never had to answer that question about himself in one of his own books, and now he never can, because the standard he applied to the dead, the patient assembly of testimony toward a fair verdict, is the standard his accusers say the public skipped in his case, and the standard his defenders say his publisher skipped too. He spent a career insisting that a life is more than its worst chapter and also more than its best, that a man is the sum of the record and the record is large. His own record now carries a front-page review calling him a master and a front-page story calling him a predator, a teaching prize and a list of women, a pulped book and the same book back in print. Whether the reader files Blake Bailey under the finest literary biographer of his generation or under the publishing scandal of the decade, the file stays open. He built his life’s work on the belief that such files should stay open. He may have to live inside that belief for the rest of his life, with no one to write him.

Letting the Repellent In

Some time before the accusations go public, Blake Bailey writes to a woman he taught when she was a girl. Her name is Eve Crawford Peyton. He wants the record straight. He tells her she was in her twenties on the night in question and he in his thirties, just barely. He tells her he was never drawn to her when she sat in his eighth-grade classroom. He says he never laid a glove on any student while she was his student. He mentions an illness he was carrying at the time. The email concedes that a night happened and disputes everything about what the night was.

She files it away. When the story breaks she gives a short statement. She told her story. She told the truth. She has nothing to add.

Two people. One night. Two accounts, each offered as honesty, each meaning by that word something the other cannot use. This is where the life of Blake Bailey turns, and the turn runs deeper than scandal. It runs down to the question Ernest Becker (1924–1974) spent his life on in The Denial of Death, which is how a man makes his existence feel real against the certainty that it ends, and what he reaches for when the scheme that made it feel real turns on him.

Becker says man is the animal that knows it will die, and the knowledge is unbearable, so every culture hands its members a part to play in a drama that outlasts the body. The drama tells you what counts as a hero and what counts as nothing. Live by it and you earn a sense that your days add to something the grave cannot reach. Becker called these the immortality systems. The terror they hold off comes in two grades. The first is the body’s death. The second is worse, the dread of having left no mark, of being a man who passed through and counted for nothing. The first kills you once. The second can be done to a living man, and when it is done the world calls it disgrace.

Bailey built a hero system around the rendering of a dead man complete. He spent two decades inside the archives of gifted, ruined American writers, and he came out each time with the same offering. Here is the man entire. Here is the talent and the drinking and the cruelty and the tenderness, set down in order, withholding nothing, judging nothing. He took the phrase for it from Philip Roth, who told him to let the repellent in. The motto became the craft. To leave the repellent out was to lie about a life, and to lie about a life was the only sin the system named. Completeness was the form his honesty took. A man who had been reduced to his worst chapter had been, in this system, half murdered, and the biographer’s work was to undo the murder and give the dead back their full size.

Watch the work and you see what death-defiance looks like when a man does it for a living. Bailey sits at Roth’s bedside in 2018 and the novelist is dying and Bailey is taking it in as material. There is no cruelty in this for him. It is reverence. The body fails and the record does not, and the record is the part of a man that outlasts the body, so the biographer at the deathbed is the priest of his own faith, present at the one moment the work exists to defeat. He had done the same to his own family. His brother Scott killed himself in 1999, and Bailey turned the suicide into a book that refused to flatter Scott or pity him, and the refusal was the love. He gives the dead the only thing he has, which is accuracy, and accuracy is how he holds off oblivion for them and, in the holding, for himself.

His own bid for the part runs through the same channel. Get the lives right and become the man who got them right, the great biographer, consecrated by the institutions that decide such things. In April of 2021 the bid pays out. Cynthia Ozick calls his life of Roth a narrative masterwork on the front page of the Times Book Review. The book lands at number twelve on the nonfiction list. Nine hundred pages, a Guggenheim behind him, the Cheever already canonical. A man becomes, for about two weeks, exactly the hero his system promised he could become.

Then the same institutions perform the second death on him, and they do it fast.

The accusations arrive in a comment thread and move to the front pages within days. Former students say he groomed them as girls and pursued them as young women. Peyton says he raped her at twenty-two. A publishing executive named Valentina Rice says he raped her in 2015. Bailey denies all of it and calls the claims false and libelous, and no court ever tests them, because the trial happens somewhere else. His agency drops him. Norton pauses the book, then takes it out of print, then pulps it, and reverts his memoir too. The press, Julia Reidhead, says he is free to seek publication elsewhere. He becomes, in the word he later reaches for, a non-person. He runs into old friends at a wedding and watches their faces fix into smiles while their eyes register a ghost. Everybody knows. A writer friend tells him the life he knew is over, forever, and the sooner he accepts it the better.

This is the subtraction, and its cruelty is precise. Bailey is destroyed by the exact operation his craft existed to refuse. The world takes a man of many chapters and reduces him to one. It declines to let the talent and the teaching and the twenty years of careful work stand beside the worst thing said of him. It performs on Blake Bailey the half-murder he spent his life undoing for the dead. A man whose entire faith held that no one should be collapsed into his lowest act is collapsed into his lowest act, by the priesthood that had just crowned him, in the pages that had just blessed him.

He feels the symmetry and cannot make anyone else feel it. The reason sits at the center of Becker, and it is the reason these essays keep circling the same wound. The word that names the highest good does not carry across the border between hero systems. Honesty is not one thing that some people honor and others betray. It is a different sacrament in every faith, and the faiths do not recognize each other’s rites.

Consider the system Bailey was born into. His father, Burck, argued cases before the Supreme Court and ran the Oklahoma bar and carried among his colleagues the name of a real-life Atticus Finch, cited for conduct and integrity of the highest order. To the litigator, honesty is candor inside a contest. You take one side and argue it to the limit, and the other man takes his, and truth is the thing that survives the collision under rules a judge enforces. The verdict comes after the hearing. Never before. A litigator who pronounced a man guilty before the evidence was heard would have violated the only honesty his system knows. Bailey grew up watching this and absorbed its deepest assumption, that a full hearing precedes judgment, and he carried the assumption into a country that had stopped sharing it. His memoir of the disgrace sets his father’s courtroom against the tribunal that erased him and finds the second has no tribunal at all, only the accusation and the sentence fused into one act. To the son of the litigator this is the death of honesty. To the people who erased him it is honesty’s arrival, late and partial.

Because to the witness, honesty is testimony, and testimony is the breaking of a silence that protected a powerful man. Peyton hands her teacher a timeline of her own griefs when she is thirteen, a brother’s suicide, a divorce, and she says years later that she handed him proof she was easy to take. Her honesty is the act of saying, at last, in public, what was whispered for decades over wine by women who each believed she was the only one. In her system the complete account is the enemy. The complete man, the talented charming teacher rendered in full, sympathetic size, is the instrument that buried the harm in the first place. The demand to see the whole figure, to understand before judging, is to her the precise move that lets a predator keep his standing. She has heard the language of completeness all her life, and in her hearing it has always served the man and silenced the girl. So when Bailey asks for the courtesy he extended to Cheever and Roth, the full and unhurried account before the verdict, he is asking her to perform the rite that wronged her, and he cannot understand why she refuses, and she cannot understand how he dares.

The novelist held a third honesty, and Bailey served him for six years. To Roth, honesty was transgression, the exposure of the shameful self as the highest aim of the work, the willingness to wound the living and the dead alike in pursuit of the unsayable. Roth spent sixty thousand dollars to change a passage in a book and called his ex-wife’s memoir a slander and wrote rebuttals he never published, and none of this struck him as a betrayal of honesty, because in his system honesty is what you put on the page about the human animal, and the casualties are the cost of art. Bailey admired this without limit and built his sympathetic life of Roth on its terms, and the critics who turned on the book before they turned on the man said he had taken Roth’s honesty too far inside, that the biographer had caught the novelist’s faith and could no longer see his subject from any other church.

Set beside these the man who keeps the confessional seal. To the priest in the box, honesty is the penitent’s full confession, said once, to one hearer, under a silence that may never break. The completeness Bailey craves is sacred here too, total disclosure, the soul laid bare with nothing held back. But the disclosure exists to be buried, not published. Honesty and secrecy are the same act. A confessor who wrote a nine-hundred-page account of what he heard would have committed the gravest betrayal his system knows, and the same thoroughness that makes Bailey a hero in his faith would make him a monster in this one. The full account is holy. Printing it is damnation. Two systems, one value, opposite commands.

And there is the editor at the front page, whose honesty is the single line the public reads over breakfast. The headline cannot hold nine hundred pages. It holds a verdict. Completeness is its enemy, because a man rendered in full cannot be set in a headline, and a country that runs on headlines will always reduce the man to the chapter that fits the type. The same front page of the same paper consecrated Bailey in one season and erased him in the next, and both acts were honest by the editor’s lights, because the editor’s honesty is fidelity to the verdict the moment has reached, not to the man underneath it.

Lay these beside one another and the shape of Bailey’s catastrophe comes clear. He thought he and his accusers were arguing about whether he was honest. They were not. They were standing in different temples, each holding the word, each meaning a different god by it. To him the reduction of a man to one act is annihilation, the very crime his life opposed. To the witness the refusal to be reduced to a footnote in a great man’s sympathetic Life is survival, and naming the worst chapter and forbidding the charm to bury it is exactly the honesty he should have practiced on the men he wrote and never did. The operation is identical. Take the man, find the chapter, let it stand for the rest. In one temple it is murder. In the next it is justice. Bailey ran the operation on the dead for twenty years and called it love, and the world ran it on him and called it a reckoning, and neither side was lying.

So where does a reader stand who wants the truth and not the comfort.

He can stand inside Bailey’s temple, and from there Bailey is a man who told the truth about the dead with more care than anyone of his generation, and was destroyed by people who would not grant him the completeness he granted everyone, including the worst men he ever studied. The pulped book is a censor’s bonfire and the disgrace is a hearing held without a tribunal.

He can stand inside the witness’s temple, and from there Bailey is a man who spent his gift teaching the world to see charming predators in their full and sympathetic size, and whose erasure is a rough, late, incomplete justice, the first time the verdict came before the obituary instead of after, the first time the chapter was allowed to stand for the man while the man was still alive to feel it.

Or he can stand where Becker stood, above both temples, and see that neither congregation is lying and that this is the worst news of all. Each is a man or a woman holding off the dread of counting for nothing by serving the only honesty that makes a life feel real, and the words do not convert at the border, and there is no higher court to set the exchange rate, because the higher court is the thing every temple was built to replace. Bailey wanted the full hearing his father believed in. His accusers wanted the testimony their silence had denied them. Both wanted to be real, and to be real in this world a man has to be a hero in some story, and the stories were at war, and the war was fought over a single word that each side owned and neither could share. The same newspaper crowned him and buried him on the same kind of page, and if you imagine each front page held up to the light and asked whether it told the truth, the honest answer, in the only sense the word will bear, is that both of them did.

Watergate as Democratic Ritual & Cultural Trauma

On April 6, 2021, the literary establishment performs a consecration. On the front page of the New York Times Book Review, Cynthia Ozick calls Blake Bailey’s life of Philip Roth a narrative masterwork. The book lands at number twelve on the nonfiction list. Behind it stand a Guggenheim, a National Book Critics Circle Award, a place on the Pulitzer short list. Nine hundred pages. The institutions that decide who is a great American biographer have decided, and they say so on the page reserved for the purpose. A man stands at the symbolic center of his world, marked pure.

Three weeks later the same world marks him the opposite, in the same kind of place, on the same front pages, and within days he is a man no building will let in.

Jeffrey Alexander (b. 1947) spent his career on the question this reversal poses, and the answer he reached in The Civil Sphere and in his study of Watergate runs against the grain of common sense. The grain of common sense says the facts came out. New women came forward, the truth surfaced, the verdict followed. Alexander says facts do not speak. He says it of Watergate, where most of the damning material had already leaked and been printed before the election, while eighty percent of the country still found it hard to believe a crisis existed. The data barely changed across two years. The telling changed. A social fact has to be told by society, and the society that tells it can tell it pure or tell it polluted, and the telling is the event.

What happened to Blake Bailey was a telling. The raw material had been available for decades. Eve Crawford Peyton calls it an open secret, whispered over wine by women who each believed she was the only one, textbook grooming that no one ever named. Like the pre-election Watergate revelations, the facts were leaked and lying in plain sight and producing no crisis, because no one had yet told them as pollution. Then someone did, and the country generalized.

Generalization is Alexander’s word, taken from Parsons, and it names the ladder a society climbs when a routine fact turns sacred. At the bottom sits the level of goals and interests, the profane plane of ordinary life, where a publishing matter is a publishing matter. Above it sit norms, the conventions and rules of a trade. Above those sit values, the elemental commitments that hold a civil order together. Routine life keeps attention low, on goals. Crisis begins when attention climbs, when a particular act starts to look like a wound to the norms and then to the values themselves. A literary feud over whether a biographer flattered his subject is a goal-level quarrel. The grooming of girls is a value-level profanation. In three weeks the public conversation about Blake Bailey climbed the whole ladder, and at the top it found the sacred, and the sacred demanded a response.

The grammar of that response is the binary code Alexander places at the heart of civil society. A civil sphere divides the world in two and has no third category. On the pure side stand the qualities a democracy calls sacred in its members, the autonomous, the rational, the truthful, the open, the rule-bound, the trusting. On the impure side stand their opposites, the secretive, the calculating, the deceitful, the personal, the predatory, the arbitrary. The code is older than any case and waits for cases to fill it. Watergate filled it. The burglars and the money raisers and the dirty tricksters went to the polluted side, the courts and the watchdog agencies to the pure, and the whole structure was laid over the inherited American antithesis of corruption against honesty, power against law. The case of Blake Bailey filled the same code. The accounts of the former students placed him among the secretive and the predatory, the man who used the open warmth of a classroom as a cover for the private exploitation of trust. Once a man is sorted to the impure side, the code supplies the rest. It does not ask for proof. It asks for purification.

Alexander insists that this sorting is work, not weather. Scandals are not born, they are made, and the making requires what he calls a carrier group, the collective agent that broadcasts the claim. Carrier groups hold ideal and material interests, sit in particular places in the social structure, and own the discursive talent to make meaning in public. Bailey’s carrier group assembled fast. First the former students, posting in the comment thread under a hostile review, then the journalists Ramon Antonio Vargas and Edward Champion, who gave the accounts narrative shape and reach, then Valentina Rice, a publishing executive whose account moved the matter out of the classroom and into the industry itself. They arrived into a situation already prepared. The apparatus of the post-Weinstein years stood ready, the genre fixed, the audience trained to receive the claim. A carrier group needs the right moment and the right tools, and this one had both.

What the carrier group built is what Alexander says every trauma claim must build, a master narrative that answers four questions. What is the pain. Who is the victim. How does the audience stand to the victim. Who is the perpetrator. The pain was grooming and assault, the corruption of a teacher’s trust. The victims were the girls, then the women they became, then, by extension, everyone who ever handed a mentor a private grief and called it homework. The relation to the audience was wide, because the identification was easy. Alexander notes that a trauma claim spreads only when the audience can see its own valued identity in the victim, and almost every reader has been a student, has trusted a teacher, has a daughter or has been a daughter. The perpetrator was Bailey, and behind him a larger figure the narrative could reach toward, the protective male establishment that had crowned him, the misogyny his own subject was famous for, the machine that consecrates great men and looks past what they do. The narrative was complete, and it was compelling, and compelling is the test, because the trauma process is a persuasion and not a proof.

Then pollution does what pollution does. It spreads, and it threatens the center.

Mary Douglas (1921–2007) gave Alexander the idea that dirt is matter out of place and that a community polices its boundaries by treating the polluting thing as a danger to be contained. Edward Shils (1910–1995) gave him the center, the charged core of a society where its sacred authority lives. The peril of the Bailey case, for the institutions, was that the pollution had already reached the center before anyone named it. The Book Review had crowned him. Norton had published him. The prize bodies had honored him. The contaminated man was not at the margin. He was at the heart, holding the laurel, and the laurel was now a liability, because contagion in a civil sphere runs along association. Alexander calls the worst of it the liquid impure, the polluting substance that ruins whatever it touches. After Watergate the country built walls around Nixon, barred him from buildings, booed him in the street, and the contact alone was thought to bring ruin. Ford pardoned him and lost the contact’s stain and the next election with it. The same fear governs a publishing house. To keep selling the book is to keep touching the man.

So the institutions purify themselves by expulsion, and they do it in front of an audience, because purification that no one witnesses accomplishes nothing. Bailey’s agency drops him inside forty-eight hours. That is quarantine. Norton pauses the book, then takes it out of print, then pulps it, and reverts his memoir too. That is the rite proper, the destruction of the contaminated object, paper returned to pulp so the pollution cannot circulate. Julia Reidhead, the president of Norton, supplies the formal language of expulsion, the statement that Bailey is free to seek publication elsewhere. The sentence performs the boundary. It says he is outside now, and the house is clean. A man becomes, in his own later word, a non-person.

The non-person learns the etiquette of the polluted. He goes to a wedding and watches old acquaintances fix smiles on their faces and try to act as though they have not seen a ghost. Everybody knows. A writer friend tells him the life he knew is over, forever, and the sooner he accepts it the better. These are the behaviors Alexander’s frame predicts, the averted contact, the fear of the touch, the social death that follows the symbolic kind. The man is not in prison. No state has acted. He has been removed from the company of the pure by the only authority that can confer or withdraw such standing, which is the civil community telling the story of who he is.

Here the case parts from Watergate, and the parting is where it pays.

Alexander’s Watergate ran two years. The consensus had to build, the center had to be slowly implicated, the televised hearings had to create their liminal world out of time, the Saturday Night Massacre had to spread the pollution to the president himself before the body politic could expel him. The ritual was long because the resistance was real. Bailey’s ritual ran three weeks. The code filled, the carrier group broadcast, the institutions purified, and it was done before the liminal period could open at all. Speed is the modern condition of these rites, and speed has a cost that Alexander names in a different register. Modern rituals are never complete. A remnant always remains unconvinced. Watergate left a fifth of the country certain Nixon was the victim of his enemies. The faster the rite, the larger and the angrier the remnant, because the rite has skipped the slow work that converts the doubtful. Bailey’s remnant did not stay quiet. It became a countercenter.

And here the case offers what a reader who has watched the apparatus run ten times has not seen it do. It runs again, in reverse, in a second civil sphere, with the same grammar and the poles flipped.

The empty arena is the key to it. Alexander maps the institutional arenas through which a trauma claim must pass, and each disciplines the claim in its own way. The legal arena demands a definitive, binding judgment of responsibility, evidence weighed, punishment or reparation assigned. The scientific arena demands documentation by accepted method. The mass-media arena offers dramatization and reach under the rules of concision and the pressure of readership. In the Bailey case the legal arena never convenes. No charge is filed. No court sits. No evidence is tested under the rules built to test it. The arena that exists to establish responsibility stays dark, and the purification proceeds without it, in the publishing house and the newspaper, where the binary code governs and facts do not speak.

Blake Bailey grew up in the empty arena. His father, Burck, argued before the Supreme Court and ran the Oklahoma bar and carried among his colleagues the name of a real-life Atticus Finch, cited for conduct and integrity of the highest order. The father’s whole faith held that responsibility is established by a hearing, that the verdict comes after the evidence and never before, that a man is entitled to the slow machinery of proof. The son was judged in a forum that has no such machinery and was never meant to. To his accusers this is not a failure but the point. The legal arena, they would say, failed women for decades, dismissed them, ran out the clock, protected the famous, and the civil sphere is the only forum that ever held a powerful man to account at all. To Bailey a verdict without a trial is a profanation of the deepest value his father served. Both stand on sacred ground. Alexander gives me no instrument to rank them, and refuses to, because his concern is not the ontology of the claims or their morality but their epistemology, how and under what conditions they are made and with what results. The frame holds both temples at once and adjudicates neither.

From the empty arena the countercenter builds its own trauma claim, and it answers the same four questions. The pain is the pulped book, the burned record, the man unpersoned without a hearing. The victim is Bailey, and generalized outward, every author who might be next and every reader denied the right to weigh a contested life for himself. The perpetrator is the cowardly institution and the online mob, the publisher who pulps to protect a brand, the establishment that consecrates and then abandons. The relation to the audience is built for anyone who fears the speed of the new rite, who values reading and judging over deference to the verdict. The carrier group has its talents and its situation too. PEN America, the National Coalition Against Censorship, and the Authors Guild object to the pulping. The World Socialist Web Site marshals a defense and gathers writers who call the destruction of a book an act of censorship. A First Amendment lawyer praises Bailey’s account. A novelist on a long podcast gives him three uninterrupted hours. The countercenter has its organs, and through them it tells the story the other way.

It also has a center of its own. Skyhorse Publishing acquires both pulped books and puts them back into print. Skyhorse is the house that takes the dropped, the home of the memoir Woody Allen could not place and the books of the current health secretary, an alternative establishment whose sacred value is the refusal to pulp. Inside that sphere Bailey is a member in good standing and the methods used against him are the impure thing, the mob, the rush to judgment, the verdict without a trial. The same binary code runs. Only the assignment of the poles has flipped. The man who is matter out of place in one civil sphere is a persecuted truth-teller in the next, and the pulped text refuses to stay pulped, and the resurrection is itself a rite, the countercenter purifying what the center expelled.

There is an irony the frame lets me name without reaching outside it. Bailey’s trade is the telling of social facts about the dead. A biographer assigns the pain, identifies the victim, names the perpetrator, and builds from a life the master narrative that fixes a man’s standing for good. He spent two decades doing to Cheever and to Roth what a carrier group then did to him, sorting a life into the pure and the impure before an audience, letting the repellent in. He lived by narrative, by the power of the telling to make a man one thing rather than another, and he was unmade by the same power in other hands. The grammar that built his career is the grammar that ended it.

By 2025 the spiral flattens. Alexander’s last movement is routinization, the calming down, the moment the effervescence evaporates and liminality gives way to ordinary time. The affect cools. Bailey himself says the strategy against him has changed from attack to silence, that the approach now is to ignore him until he goes away. The expelled build their monument in the empty time. Canceled Lives is that monument, a short book that sets the father’s courtroom against the forum that erased the son and asks the reader to feel the difference between a hearing and a sentence with no hearing before it. The establishment builds the opposite monument, which is an absence, the unstocked shelf, the name that goes unspoken at the party, the great biography that the official record now declines to have published.

Return to the two front pages. Nothing in the man changed between the page that crowned him and the page that polluted him. The classroom accounts were as old on the first day as on the last. The biography was the same book pure and impure. What changed was the telling, and the telling is never finished, because a social fact does not tell itself and the society that tells it one way this year can tell it another way next year, and in one corner of the publishing world it already has. Scandals are made. The grammar that makes them can run forward or back, in this sphere or that one, and it leaves to the reader the one act the binary code holds sacred above the rest, which is the right to weigh the evidence and decide for himself. That right is the thing Bailey says the rite denied him. It is the same right his accusers say the courts denied women for a hundred years. The frame sets the two claims side by side on the same page, in the same code, and hands the verdict to no one.

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Antonya Nelson (b. 1961)

The books in the Nelson house stood open to the children. A girl could pull Valley of the Dolls off one shelf and Emma off the next, and no one stopped her. Both parents taught literature at Wichita State University. Her mother, Susan, wrote fiction of her own. The poet Allen Ginsberg (1926–1997) knew the family and set poems in their flat Kansas city. Antonya Nelson, born January 6, 1961, grew up inside that house, one of several children in a literary, countercultural home where books held the place that church or country held elsewhere. Two of her siblings became psychologists. She became the writer. Years later she gave the feeling to a woman in Nothing Right who “had faith in literature the way others had faith in God.” The line reads like a transcript of the household.

The same city held a man who bound and tortured and killed. From the mid-1970s the killer who signed himself BTK moved through Wichita and then went silent, and the police had no name for him. He turned out to be Dennis Rader (b. 1945), a city compliance officer and church council president who once sat in a class taught by one of her mother’s colleagues. Nelson was an adolescent through those years. She carried the city’s fear for three decades and then built the novel Bound (2010) on it, less a crime story than a study of marriage and memory with the murders set behind the house.

She took a degree in English from the University of Kansas in 1983, with a minor in art history, and an MFA from the University of Arizona in 1986. At Arizona she met Robert Boswell (b. 1953), a Missourian who stood over six feet, drove a pickup, listened to Springsteen, and answered to Boz. They married on July 28, 1984. They had two children, Jade and Noah, and built a durable two-writer marriage, rare in American letters, later sharing a single endowed chair at the University of Houston. For years they kept an adobe house near the Rio Grande outside Las Cruces.

The breakthrough came early. In her twenties she won the Mademoiselle fiction prize and saw the story in print, and she has said the prize convinced her she could make a life of the work. In 1988 Raymond Carver (1938–1988), the reigning figure of the American short story, picked her story “The Expendables” for first prize in the journal American Fiction. A collection under the same title won the Flannery O’Connor Award and appeared in 1990. The editors and judges she cared about had begun to read her.

The collections followed at a steady pace: In the Land of Men (1992), Family Terrorists (1994), Female Trouble (2002), Some Fun (2006), Nothing Right (2009), and Funny Once (2014). The novels came between them: Talking in Bed (1996), Nobody’s Girl (1998), Living to Tell (2000), and Bound (2010). The stories ran first in The New Yorker, Harper’s, Esquire, Ploughshares, and Redbook, then gathered into books, and turned up year after year in Best American Short Stories, the O. Henry Awards, and the Pushcart Prize.

Her subject is the marriage that holds and hides at the same time. Husbands and wives keep large secrets from each other and stay married anyway, and Nelson watches the arrangement without contempt and without sentiment. Love in her fiction runs as a long negotiation among desire, disappointment, loyalty, and private fantasy. Families work the same ground. Parents, children, siblings, and ex-spouses reopen old grievances across decades, and a pattern set in childhood still shapes a phone call at fifty. She grants her people sympathy and refuses to excuse them.

Her method has a rule. She sets a story inside the shortest stretch of time she can manage, an evening, a few hours, a single party, and trusts the small turn to carry the weight of a life. She resists epiphany and prefers recognition, the partial knowledge that rearranges a person without announcing itself. She takes her own life as raw material and then alters it, changing a job, a sex, a marriage, until the thing turns into fiction. She has put it this way: the fiction is as real to her as a dream is to the dreamer.

Picture the seminar room at Houston. A student’s story sits on the table, marked in her hand. The class waits for the verdict on the protagonist. Nelson turns instead to the man in the third paragraph, the brother-in-law who appears once and leaves, and asks what he wants and where he goes after the scene ends. The room reorganizes around the minor figure. She loves the secondary characters, the cousins and couples and siblings who crowd a family gathering, and she teaches her students to find the story running under the story being told. She reads the sentences aloud to hear where they break.

The marriage of two writers ran on parallel desks. Boswell published novels and stories of his own, taught beside her at New Mexico State University and then at Houston, and shared the Warren Wilson low-residency program with her for decades. The literary world treated them as a pair. When David Foster Wallace (1962–2008) wanted to do Nelson a good turn, he sent her his own literary agent, and she has worked with that agent since.

The honors gathered. The New Yorker named her in 1999 among twenty young fiction writers for the new millennium. Granta listed her among the best young American novelists. She won the Rea Award for the Short Story in 2003, took fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the National Endowment for the Arts, and served as a writer at large for Texas Monthly from 2007 to 2014. She holds the Cullen Chair in Creative Writing at Houston and divides the year among Houston, Telluride, and southern New Mexico, country that keeps turning up in the work.

No new book has come since Funny Once in 2014, though stories still appear in the magazines. After twenty-five years of steady publication the silence has a shape of its own. It lets a reader see the body of work entire, and the work holds together. She has described her career as a return to one room of people, seen from a new angle each time.

Her prose stays clear and lean. She writes conversational sentences that hide their craft and gather force as they go, and she keeps symbols and display out of the way, working through dialogue, gesture, and exact behavior. The humor runs dry and lifts the weight off hard material without making it light. The dramas she cares about do not arrive as catastrophe. They come in ordinary talk, in a quiet betrayal, in the slow accounting a person makes between the life imagined and the life received. She belongs in the line of psychological realists that runs through Alice Munro (1931–2024), Richard Ford (b. 1944), Lorrie Moore (b. 1957), and Ann Beattie (b. 1947), and the voice stays hers.

The Use of Attention: Antonya Nelson’s Hero System

A long table sits on a deck in the Colorado mountains, late in the summer. The host pours a cold white wine and counts the chairs again. A salad goes around with too much vinegar in it. A teenager keeps his phone in his lap and answers in single words. At the far end a brother-in-law says almost nothing, and the talk runs over him the way water runs over a stone. Nelson watches the brother-in-law. She watches the wife fill her own glass before her husband’s. She hears a woman say of the silent man, “He always gets like this,” and she keeps the word always, because the word holds a marriage inside it.

This is the room Nelson has worked across her career, the family gathering, the dinner, the couples and the children and the in-laws. She has said the clutter and the clatter pull the stories out of her. The party is her field and her subject. It is also, in the reading I want to try here, a ritual against death.

Ernest Becker (1924–1974) argued that man knows he will die and cannot live inside that knowledge, so he builds a scheme that lets him feel he counts. Becker called these schemes hero systems. A hero system tells a man what a heroic life looks like and hands him a way to earn a kind of immortality, in children, in a cathedral, in a balance sheet, in a book. Two terrors sit under every one of them. The first is the body that rots. The second is the suspicion that the life adds up to nothing, that a man can pass through sixty years of dishes and mortgages and Tuesday dinners and leave no mark the universe will keep.

Nelson inherited her hero system at the dinner table of her childhood. Her mother kept faith in literature the way other women kept faith in God. The house in Wichita held open shelves and visiting poets and the sense that a book outlives the hand that wrote it. The girl took the creed without the church. She does not believe a story saves a soul. She believes a story saves a person from going unnoticed, which in her scheme is the only death a writer can do anything about.

Her sacred value is attention. Watch how the word breaks apart once it leaves her hands.

For Nelson, attention is mercy. To notice the brother-in-law at the end of the table is to lift him out of the runoff and grant him a few minutes of significance he did not earn and cannot keep. Her curiosity has a confessor’s patience. She has said she unsettles people by wondering so hard about why they do what they do. The wondering is the sacrament. It is the closest a secular household comes to prayer, and it does the work prayer does in other systems. It says: you are seen, therefore you are real.

Carry the same word into a contemplative order and it inverts. For a nun in a silent house, attention is prayer in the full sense, and its object is not the brother-in-law but God. Simone Weil (1909–1943) wrote that attention raised to its highest pitch becomes prayer. The nun empties the self so that grace can enter. Nelson fills the self with the noticed particular and writes it down. Same discipline, opposite end. The nun attends to lose herself. The writer attends to keep someone.

Set the word in front of a homicide detective and attention turns hard. He reads the same surface Nelson reads, the wife’s hands, the husband’s story told twice with one detail moved, but he reads to convict. His noticing is an accusation held in reserve. Where Nelson watches the wife fill her own glass first and sees a small sad history, the detective watches the same gesture and files it. To attend, for him, is to suspect. The heroism is the case closed, the killer named. In Wichita a man bound and killed for years while the city watched the wrong things, and the failure of attention there was counted in bodies.

Hand the word to an air traffic controller and it becomes dread held level for eight hours. He attends so that two metal tubes full of strangers do not meet over the runway. A lapse is a fireball. His attention has no object he loves and no story he wants, only the radar and the next aircraft and the one after that. He is a hero when nothing happens. Nelson is a hero when something does, when the small turn at the table opens a life.

Give it to a man at a trading desk and attention becomes edge. He notices the mispriced thing, the tell, the seller who has to sell. His noticing converts to money by the close of business. The man he notices is a counterparty, which is a polite word for the man on the other side of the loss. Nelson’s noticed people are the point. His are the means.

Sit the word down in a meditation hall and it thins to bare awareness, the breath, the sound of the bell, no story attached. The practitioner attends to let the particular go. Nelson attends to hold it and shape it into a sentence that outlasts the evening. The monk’s attention dissolves the self and the world. The writer’s attention is acquisitive. She is a collector at that table, and the brother-in-law is going home in her notebook.

The word stays the same and the hero system underneath it changes, so the act changes. This is Becker’s hardest claim, that a value carries no fixed meaning of its own and takes its meaning from the scheme a man uses to feel he counts. Attention is not one thing. It is mercy, prayer, suspicion, vigilance, edge, and release, depending on whose death it answers.

Her second sacred value is staying. The marriages in her fiction hold and hide at the same time. Husbands and wives keep large rooms of themselves locked and stay married for thirty years anyway, and Nelson grants the arrangement her respect. In her scheme the heroic act in a marriage is not the wedding and not the affair. It is the morning after the affair, when both people come down to the kitchen and make the coffee and say nothing and stay. Endurance is the achievement. She lived it. She and Robert Boswell built a marriage of two writers and ended up sharing one endowed chair, two careers folded into a single line on a university budget.

To a man who measures his life by appetite and nerve, staying is the coward’s word. He hears in it the surrender of the self, the slow death by Tuesday dinner. Fidelity, in his hero system, is a failure to live, and the heroic life is the one that keeps moving and keeps wanting. Nelson’s quiet kitchen looks to him like a grave with two people in it.

To a hospice nurse, staying is the entire vocation. She sits with the dying through the last night when the family has gone to sleep in the waiting room, and her heroism is that she does not leave the bed. Fidelity here is presence at the threshold, the refusal to let a man die alone. She and Nelson share the word and almost share the act, except the nurse stays to the end of a life and Nelson stays to the middle of one, which is harder, because the middle has no drama to carry it.

To a Sicilian grandmother whose hero system runs on blood, fidelity is not a negotiation and not a mercy. It is law. You do not leave the family, you do not talk to the law, and the man who betrays the blood is dead while he still breathes. Nelson’s marriages negotiate. The grandmother’s bond admits no negotiation, and to her Nelson’s tolerant couples have no honor and no spine.

To a Carthusian monk, fidelity is the vow of stability, and he keeps it by never leaving the monastery until they carry him out. He stays in one cell for fifty years. His spouse is the silence and his beloved is God, and the staying takes the same shape as Nelson’s, a life inside four walls turned into the work, except his work is prayer and hers is the marriage of strangers who keep house.

Her third sacred value gives the most trouble, because she reaches it by lying. Nelson tells the truth by changing the facts. She takes a thing that happened to her, alters the job and the sex and the marriage until the man in the story is no longer her, and somewhere in the alteration the emotional truth comes clear. She has said the fiction is as real to her as a dream is to the dreamer. In her hero system the fact is raw material and the truth is what the made thing makes you recognize. The lie is the road to the true.

Say that sentence to an experimental physicist and watch his face. In his hero system truth is the measurement another lab can repeat, the number that holds when a stranger checks it. “Emotional truth” is a phrase with no referent. A claim you reach by altering the data is the one thing his vocation exists to prevent. He earns his immortality by adding a true line to a record that stands after he dies, and Nelson’s method is the contamination he guards against.

Say it to a trial lawyer and truth becomes what survives cross-examination, what twelve tired people in a box will believe past a reasonable doubt. Truth is the record. Fiction is perjury. The lawyer and the novelist both build a story that persuades, and both know a story persuades, and there the kinship ends, because the lawyer is bound to the facts in evidence and Nelson is free to move the body to the better room.

Say it to a war photographer and the offense is sharper. His one law is that he does not stage the frame. He does not move the dead child for the better composition. His heroism is the unaltered image, the proof that this happened, here, at this hour. To him Nelson’s free hand with the facts is the sin that ends a career. She alters to reach the true. He holds still to reach it, and each calls the other’s method a lie.

Becker’s last move is subtraction. Take the hero system away and look at what stands there. Nelson does this to her characters for a living. She removes the prop a person leans on, the marriage or the parent or the drink or the child, and she watches the creature stand in the kitchen without it. She does not give him an epiphany. She gives him a smaller thing, a recognition, the partial knowledge that he is not who he thought and the morning will come anyway. That is the most a person gets in her world, and she thinks it is enough, because it is true.

Run the subtraction on Nelson. Take away the sentences. Since Funny Once in 2014 she has published stories and no book, and the silence has a shape. The hero system she inherited at the dinner table promised that the made thing outlives the maker, and the made thing is there, eleven books of it, the same room of people seen from a new angle each time. But the first terror does not read fiction. The body her detective files and her nurse sits beside and her photographer freezes is the one death her scheme was built to look away from, and it is coming for the noticer too. She knows this. It is why she writes the dinner and not the funeral. The dinner is where the noticing still does some good.

Three things follow from reading her this way.

The first is that her hero system tells the truth about its own size. Most schemes promise to beat both terrors at once, the grave and the smallness, the cathedral that saves your soul and your name together. Nelson’s promises only the second. She cannot keep you from dying. She can keep you from going unwitnessed, and she has decided that is the part worth a career. There is a hard modesty in that. She took the high god out of her mother’s faith and kept the attention, which is the part a human can perform.

The second is that the words come apart because each system is a different bet on which death to fight. The controller fights the fireball. The nurse fights the lonely threshold. The physicist fights the erasure of his name from the record. The grandmother fights the dissolution of the blood. Nelson fights the suspicion that an ordinary evening among ordinary people signifies nothing, and attention is her one weapon, aimed at that one enemy. A value means what the war underneath it needs it to mean.

The third is the cost, which she pays and her work admits. The noticer is not in the evening. She sits across the table with the notebook open behind her eyes, and the brother-in-law she rescues from the runoff goes home inside her and not inside her life. The wondering that grants other people significance is bought with a standing distance from her own. She has spent a career proving the ordinary dinner is the deepest drama there is, and she has spent it watching the dinner rather than eating it. That is the writer’s bargain with death, and Nelson made it early, at a table in Wichita, with the books open on the shelves and a killer somewhere out in the dark city, doing his own terrible work to make sure no one would forget him.

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Alice Munro

The foxes pace behind the wire in the back lots of the Laidlaw farm outside Wingham, Ontario, and the smell of them carries to the house. Robert Laidlaw raises them for their pelts, then mink, then gives up the pens and takes work as a night watchman at the foundry and keeps turkeys in the yard. The money never holds. Inside, Anne Laidlaw, a schoolteacher before she married, watches her oldest girl read at the kitchen table. Anne’s hand has begun to shake. The doctors will name it Parkinson’s. The disease will take her speech and then her body across two decades, and the child at the table will grow up in a house arranged around a slow disappearance.

The Laidlaws sit between worlds. They are not the merchant families with brick houses on the good streets of Wingham, and they are not the poorest people on the river flats. The father reads books and keeps his accounts and loses money anyway. The mother carries the manners of a woman who once stood at the front of a classroom. The child learns early that a family can hold a position no one can quite name, and that a person can want two things at once: to rise above a place and to vanish into it. This doubleness becomes the ground of her fiction.

Alice Ann Laidlaw was born on July 10, 1931. She read before she understood what reading was for. She took in Anton Chekhov (1860-1904), Katherine Mansfield (1888-1923), Eudora Welty (1909-2001), William Maxwell (1908-2000), and William Faulkner (1897-1962), and she began writing stories as a girl. She published her first story, “The Dimensions of a Shadow,” while she held a scholarship at the University of Western Ontario. The scholarship ran two years. She left before a degree because there was no money to stay.

In 1951 she married James Munro. They moved to Vancouver, then to Victoria, British Columbia, and raised three daughters. A fourth child died shortly after birth. That loss enters the fiction without announcement, in the stories about grief that withholds its name.

In 1963 the Munros opened a bookstore.

Munro’s Books stands on a downtown street in Victoria, and on a wet afternoon the bell over the door keeps ringing. Jim shelves the new orders. A clerk works the till. Alice stands behind the counter with a child’s exercise book open beside the cash drawer, writing a sentence between customers, crossing it out, writing it again. A woman brings a novel to the counter and asks whether the author has written anything else, and Alice answers her, and the woman leaves, and Alice goes back to the sentence. The store does well. It will become one of the country’s finest independent bookshops. She writes in the gaps of the day, in the laundry room, in the hour before the children wake. She says later that the broken rhythms of a house suit the making of short stories. A story can be carried in the head while the hands do other work. A novel cannot.

The arrangement holds a truth about her whole method. She does not write toward a plot the way a builder lays a road. She circles a life and waits.

Her first collection, Dance of the Happy Shades, appeared in 1968 and won the Governor General’s Literary Award. The voice was already formed. Ordinary events gathered an extraordinary force. Beneath a plain surface lay class anxiety, sexual disappointment, the unfinished arguments of families. Lives of Girls and Women followed in 1971, a cycle of linked stories that readers often take for a novel. Del Jordan grows from a watchful child into a young woman who wants out of the small town and out of its expectations. Del is not Alice Munro, but she carries the writer’s hunger and the writer’s eye.

The marriage to James Munro ended in 1972. She returned to Ontario and in 1976 married the geographer Gerald Fremlin. They settled near Clinton, in Huron County, the country of her childhood. The land gave her what Faulkner found in Yoknapatawpha and Hardy found in Wessex, a local world wide enough to hold every question she cared about. She would write that country for the rest of her working life.

From the late 1970s she entered a long stretch of high achievement. The collections arrived one after another: Who Do You Think You Are?, published in the United States as The Beggar Maid, then The Moons of Jupiter, The Progress of Love, Friend of My Youth, Open Secrets, The Love of a Good Woman, Hateship, Friendship, Courtship, Loveship, Marriage, Runaway, The View from Castle Rock, Too Much Happiness, and Dear Life. More than fifty of her stories ran in The New Yorker. The magazine gave her room. Her stories stretched past the usual length and reached the scale of short novels.

Her method rejects the road and chooses the house. She said as much in her essay “What Is Real?” A reader enters a story the way a visitor enters a house, moving from room to room, learning how the spaces connect. This explains her handling of time. She sets a scene from one decade beside a scene from another, and each changes the meaning of the other. The drama lies less in what happens next than in how memory keeps revising the past. A chance meeting years later, an old photograph, a remark recalled across forty years, and a character’s whole understanding of a life turns over.

She grounds all of this in the body. Her stories carry the feel of cloth, the smell of a kitchen, the fatigue of caring for small children, the facts of illness and childbirth and aging. The revelations come through the flesh, not through abstraction. A reader believes the inner life because the outer life is so exactly observed.

She revised without rest. A story kept changing after it ran in a magazine. She rewrote endings, shifted the point of view, cut and added when she gathered the collections. The version of “A Wilderness Station” in Open Secrets differs from the one The New Yorker printed. For her a story stayed alive on the page.

The honors came steadily. Three Governor General’s Awards. Two Giller Prizes. The Man Booker International Prize in 2009 for the body of the work.

In October 2013 the telephone rings near Port Hope, where she lives close to her daughter Jenny. She is eighty-two and has Alzheimer’s and has put down fiction. The Swedish Academy has given her the Nobel Prize in Literature. She is the first Canadian to win it, and the prize goes to a writer of short stories, which the form’s defenders had waited a long time to see. The secretary of the academy praises a writer of the silent and the silenced, the people who do not choose and who understand their own lives only later, after the meaning has shown itself. The line will read differently within a year.

She died on May 13, 2024, near Port Hope, at ninety-two.

In July 2024, two months after the death, her youngest daughter Andrea Robin Skinner published a first-person essay in the Toronto Star. She wrote that Gerald Fremlin had sexually abused her, beginning in the summer of 1976, when she was nine and he was in his early fifties. She wrote that she told her stepbrother when she returned to her father’s house that summer, that word reached her father, James Munro, and that nothing followed. She told her mother directly years later, around the age of twenty-five. By Skinner’s account the disclosure came after Munro praised a short story about a girl who takes her own life after a stepfather’s abuse, and asked aloud why the girl in the story had not told her mother.

When the daughter answered that question with her own life, the mother did not respond as she had to the fictional child. Munro stayed with Fremlin until his death in 2013. By Skinner’s account her mother said she had been told too late, that she loved him, and that she could not be expected to “deny her own needs.” Fremlin denied the abuse and threatened retribution, and the family went back to acting as though nothing had happened. Skinner reported him to the police in 2005. He pleaded guilty to indecent assault and received a suspended sentence. The Nobel Prize came eight years after that guilty plea, and the silence held through it. “My mother’s fame meant the silence continued,” Skinner wrote.

She did not write the essay to erase the work. She wrote to put her account into the record alongside it, so that the story people tell about Alice Munro would carry the truth of her family.

In December 2024 Rachel Aviv published “Alice Munro’s Passive Voice” in The New Yorker. Aviv drew on letters and interviews and on the long memory of people around the family, and she read the abuse forward into the fiction, tracing how the trauma reshaped what Munro wrote and how she wrote it. The title carries a double charge. It names the grammar Munro favored, the sentence that lets a thing happen without naming who did it, and it names a habit of the woman herself. In an old interview Munro had said she let situations run far past the point where she should have stopped them, “just to see what will happen.” She called the watching the great passion of her life. Aviv set that beside a fact a reader cannot unsee, that the watching had its price, and that the daughter paid it.

The biographer Robert Thacker had known. Skinner had reached him before his 2005 book appeared, and he left the matter out. Margaret Atwood (b. 1939), reaching for some account of her friend, said Munro was not adept at the practical business of living. None of these explanations closes the case. They mark how many people knew something and how long the knowing stayed inside the family and the trade.

Munro changed what a short story could hold. She proved that a story need not be a small novel or a clever turn, that it could carry a whole life and show how memory keeps remaking a person. Few writers have found such depth in lives that look, from outside, uneventful. Her influence runs through Jhumpa Lahiri, Elizabeth Strout, Lauren Groff, Lorrie Moore, Claire Keegan, and many others who study her sentences.

The reassessment after her death has a strange symmetry, and the symmetry is hers. Her great subject was the way a later fact reorganizes an earlier life, the way a single disclosure can turn a remembered scene inside out, so that nothing means what it meant before. Readers now perform that operation on her. The 2024 essay is the late scene set beside the early ones, and it changes them. The woman who wrote with such patience about secrets kept inside families kept one. The writer praised for her sympathy with the silenced had silenced her own child.

The work stands. The achievement is real and large, and pretending otherwise would be its own kind of evasion. The life is harder. Any honest account of her place in modern letters now holds the art and the betrayal in the same hand, and refuses to let go of either. She left it to her daughter to tell the part of the story she would not. In one of the last things she tried to write, the sentences breaking down, she put it this way: “I am a writer or used to be a writer.” The record she left is the work. The record she withheld came from someone else, and it belongs in the same book.

Just to See What Will Happen

A wildlife cameraman lies in the reeds at the edge of a river in the dry season and films a crocodile take a wildebeest calf at the ford. He keeps a rule older than himself. He does not put down the camera. He does not throw a stone or shout or wade in. The calf belongs to some cow standing off in the herd, in the way that calves belong, and the man’s whole body wants to move, and he holds still and keeps the lens level, because the record is the thing, and a record the recorder has touched is worth nothing. His honor lives in his stillness. That night at the lodge a guide who hauls tourists hears what he watched and says he could never have held the shot, and the cameraman tells him the work would be impossible any other way. Both men speak the truth. They serve different gods.

This is an essay about a writer who served the cameraman’s god, and about a child who was not a calf.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) argued that human culture is a long defense against the knowledge that we die. The animal knows fear. The man knows that he will end, and that the ending is total, and that the body which carries him is meat. Two terrors run under everything he builds. One is the plain terror of annihilation, the dark with no one in it. The other is quieter and worse, the terror of insignificance, the suspicion that a life can pass and leave no mark, that he is one more creature the earth takes back without a record. Against these terrors a person builds what Becker called a hero system, a local arrangement of meaning that lets him feel he has earned a place in something that does not die. The artist earns it through the work. The believer earns it through the covenant. The father earns it through the son. Becker added a hard corollary in Escape from Evil (1975). The appetite for permanence is the root of most human evil. The hero buys his own duration, and someone else often pays.

Alice Munro knew both terrors young and at close range. Her mother, Anne, a schoolteacher before her marriage, began to shake when Alice was a girl, and the shaking became Parkinson’s, and the disease took the woman’s speech first and then her body across two decades. Alice grew up in a house arranged around a slow erasure. She watched a person disappear by degrees, the literal terror made domestic, spread thin over years so that no single day held the death. Around the house lay the second terror, the one her whole region wore like weather. Wingham, Ontario, and the fox farm on its edge, and the Scots-Presbyterian families who held that a person should not put himself forward, who suspected ambition and praised the one who stayed small. A place like that swallows people. They are born and they work and they die and the township forgets them inside a generation. Munro felt the pull of that oblivion and refused it.

Her refusal became her hero system. She would watch the overlooked life so closely that it could not vanish. She would take the farm wife, the spinster aunt, the girl ashamed of her family’s poverty, the man dying in a back bedroom, and she would fix them on the page with such fidelity that they outlasted the people who lived them. The work answered both terrors at once. It defeated the township’s forgetting, and it gave her a place in the one thing she trusted to endure, literature, the company of Chekhov and Welty and the masters who had done the same for their own forgotten provinces. Her cosmic heroism ran through the sentence. To miss nothing was to save everything.

A hero system needs a discipline, and hers was watching. Not the glance, not the look that turns away. The held look. She said in an old interview that she let situations run far past the point where she should have stopped them, just to see what will happen, and she called this the great passion of her life. The phrase is a confession and a creed. For the writer the held look is the highest fidelity. To intervene is to falsify the material, to substitute the comfort of the watcher for the truth of the event. The cameraman in the reeds keeps the shot. The writer keeps the scene. Eyes open, hands still. This is the posture of her art, and Rachel Aviv found it in the grammar too, in the passive constructions that let a thing occur on the page without naming the hand behind it. The withheld agent is the withheld hand. A sentence built that way is the native tongue of a hero whose heroism is to see and not to stop.

Hold the posture steady, eyes open and hands still, and carry it from one hero system to the next, and watch the same act change its name.

To the documentarian it is fidelity, and the still hand is honor. To a night nurse in an intensive care unit it is the worst thing a person can do. Her watching exists for the sake of the hand. The monitor, the chart, the slow drip counted by the hour, all of it coils toward the moment she moves, and a nurse who watches the numbers fall and keeps her hands in her lap has committed the central sin of her calling. For her, eyes open and hands still is a death. The act is identical. The god is not.

To the Jewish ethical tradition the held look carries a commandment against it. Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor. To see the wrong and remain a watcher is the sin, and the seeing is what conscripts you. The eye that finds the victim has already enlisted the hand. The bystander who saw and said nothing does not get to plead the artist’s detachment, because in that system there is no detachment to plead. Sight is summons.

To a forest monk in the Theravada line the held look looks almost like Munro’s, and the resemblance is the trap. He too sits and watches and does not move. He lets the thought arise and pass, lets the sensation come and go, and the whole discipline is non-interference with the contents of the mind. But he watches to be free of grasping, and she watched to grasp. He lets the world go. She kept it, every gesture of it, in the exercise book by the cash register at the bookstore in Victoria, writing between customers, saving the day’s small evidence from loss. Same stillness, opposite aim. One empties the hand to be released. The other keeps the hand still to fill the page.

And to a small child the held look means something no theory survives. To be watched is to be safe. The eye on you is the promise that someone will catch you. A child cannot tell the watcher who is poised to move from the watcher who will only record the fall. She reads the steady gaze as love and waits inside it.

Andrea Robin Skinner was nine in the summer of 1976 when her stepfather, Gerald Fremlin, began to abuse her. She spent school years with her father in Victoria and summers with her mother and Fremlin near Clinton, in the Huron County country her mother had made famous, the geography of a divided child. She told her stepbrother that summer, and word reached her father, and nothing followed. She told her mother directly years later, near the age of twenty-five. By Skinner’s account, published in the Toronto Star on July 7, 2024, the disclosure came after Munro praised a short story about a girl who kills herself after a stepfather’s abuse, and asked aloud why the girl in the story had not told her mother. The daughter answered the question with her own life. The mother, who had wept for the invented girl, had no such feeling for the real one. By Skinner’s account Munro said she had been told too late, that she loved Fremlin, and that she could not be expected to deny her own needs. She stayed with him until his death in 2013. The family went back to acting as though nothing had happened. Skinner reported Fremlin to the police in 2005, and he pleaded guilty to indecent assault and received a suspended sentence. The Nobel Prize came eight years after the guilty plea. The silence held through it.

Becker would not call this monstrous, which is the unsettling part. He would call it the ordinary cost of an immortality project that had grown large enough to consume the nearest flesh. The clue sits in the story that triggered the disclosure. The fictional child got the sympathy. The fictional child lived in the realm where Munro was a hero, the realm of the work, and there her mercy flowed without limit. The real child made a claim from the creatural world, the world of bodies and obligations and inconvenient need, the world the hero system exists to rise above. Munro’s reported words about her own needs are the words of a person defending the project against the body. To stop, to leave Fremlin, to choose the daughter over the marriage, would have meant becoming the nurse, the one who puts down the camera and wades into the water. It would have meant abandoning the posture on which the whole edifice stood. She kept the posture. Eyes open, hands still. She watched, by her daughter’s account, the way she had trained herself to watch everything, just to see what will happen, and a child waited inside the steady gaze and read it wrong.

The subtraction had a long history. To become the hero she was, Munro had subtracted before. She left the dying mother’s house for the university and the writing. She subtracted the first marriage. She protected the hours and the freedom and the undenied needs the work required, and these were real subtractions of real claims, and they bought real books. The pattern is not hidden once a reader looks for it. Each ascent took a withdrawal of the hand. The last subtraction took a child, and the child survived to name it.

There is a final turn, and it belongs to Munro’s own method. She held that a story is a house, not a road. You enter and move from room to room, and a fact discovered in a late room changes the meaning of every room you walked through to reach it. Her deepest subject was that operation, the way a thing learned at the end reorganizes the beginning, so that a remembered scene turns over and shows its other face. In July of 2024 her readers received the late fact, and now they perform on her the operation she perfected. The patient watcher of family secrets kept one. The grammar that withheld the agent withheld a hand. The phrase she offered as her artistic credo, just to see what will happen, reads now as the epitaph of a particular evil, the evil Becker named, the human readiness to let the world run for the sake of the watcher’s project while a body it could have saved goes under at the ford.

Carry three things out of this.

The first is that a culture decides which watchers are heroes and which are accomplices, and the eyes and the still hands can be identical in both. The cameraman and the bystander hold the same posture. What separates them is the hero system that frames the stillness, and a person can spend a life certain he is the cameraman while the people nearest him are drowning in the shot.

The second is that every immortality project keeps a ledger, and the honest reader asks who paid it. The books are extraordinary, and the achievement is large, and the price appears nowhere in the prizes. It appears in a daughter’s essay written after the death. Look for the ledger early. It is usually held by the smallest person in the house.

The third is the one Munro taught without meaning to teach it about herself. The late fact reorganizes the early scenes. It will do so for everyone we admire, and the work survives the reorganization or it does not, and we owe the dead and the living the same thing we owe a Munro story, which is to keep reading into the back rooms even when we know what we will find there, eyes open, and this time the hands ready to move.

Strange Bedfellows: The Alliance Around Alice Munro

Years before the public knew, a journalist sat at a literary dinner and leaned toward Carole Munro, the wife of Alice Munro’s first husband, and asked whether the rumor was true. She told him it was. By her account to the Toronto Star, that was the shape of the thing for a long stretch of years. People with the standing to ask already knew enough to ask, and the asking changed nothing. Everybody knew, she said. Two words hold the whole case.

This essay reads the long silence around Munro through a single lens, the Alliance Theory that David Pinsof, David O. Sears, and Martie G. Haselton set out in “Strange Bedfellows: the Alliance Theory of political belief systems,” forthcoming in Psychological Inquiry. They built the theory for political belief, and they extend it past politics themselves, to the two sides of a story that emerge from any private dispute, to office cliques and friendships and the loyalty tests that hold them together. The Munro affair is such a dispute, made public after a death. It rewards the reading.

Alliance Theory makes a spare claim. The moral narratives people tell do not flow from deep values held in the abstract. They flow from whom a person has taken as an ally and whom as a rival. People choose allies by similarity, by transitivity, where an ally’s allies become mine and an ally’s enemies become mine, and by interdependence, where two people rise and fall together. Then they defend the ally with a standard kit. They run perpetrator biases, shrinking the ally’s offense and padding the excuses. They run victim biases, swelling the ally’s injuries. They run attributional biases, crediting the ally’s wins to character and the ally’s losses to bad luck. The biases belong to everyone. They are species equipment, even across political lines, and they switch on by allegiance and not by virtue. Pinsof and his coauthors offer a test for the whole apparatus. Hold the act fixed and change who did it, and watch the judgment move. When the judgment moves, the value was never doing the work. The allegiance was.

Munro’s first alliance was the marriage. She left southwestern Ontario, then returned to it, and in 1976 married Gerald Fremlin and settled with him near Clinton. The pair-bond is the oldest alliance there is, and it ran ahead of every other claim on her. When her youngest daughter, Andrea Robin Skinner, told her around the age of twenty-five that Fremlin had abused her as a child, Munro faced a choice between two allies, the husband and the daughter, and she kept the husband. She stayed with him until his death in 2013.

Read her reported words as propaganda in the theory’s sense, the defense an ally mounts for an ally. By Skinner’s account in the Toronto Star on July 7, 2024, Munro said she had been told too late, that she loved him, that she could not be expected to deny her own needs. Each line does a job the theory names. Told too late shrinks the window of responsibility. I loved him supplies the mitigating circumstance. My own needs converts the perpetrator’s defense into the speaker’s grievance, which is the victim bias arriving where it has no business, competitive victimhood run by a mother against her own child. The mother’s injury crowds out the child’s. Alliance Theory predicts this exact substitution whenever the transgressor is the ally a person has decided to keep.

The family around the marriage formed a cluster, and the cluster held the shared loyalties and shared silences that transitivity produces. Skinner told her stepbrother the summer the abuse began, and word reached her father, James Munro, and her father did close to nothing. The household went back to acting as though nothing had happened after Fremlin denied it and threatened retribution. Within the cluster the daughter who would not let the matter rest moved toward the position of the rival, the one whose grievance threatened the alliance everyone else had agreed to protect. She left the family for a time. She reported Fremlin to the police in 2005, and he pleaded guilty to indecent assault and took a suspended sentence, and even the guilty plea did not break the silence. A court had named the act. The alliance outranked the court.

Robert Thacker wrote the authorized life of Munro, and his case shows interdependence at work. A biographer who holds the access, the cooperation, the trust of his subject and her circle shares an interest with them. Skinner reached him before his 2005 book appeared, and he left the abuse out, and he explained later that he did not want to overstep in a sensitive family matter and that his was not that kind of book. Treat the explanation as sincere and the theory still reads the choice by its function. The biographer was interdependent with the figure he chronicled. His standing rose with hers. Telling the daughter’s story would have damaged the asset on which his own work stood. Discretion is the word allegiance uses when it does not want to be called allegiance.

Now widen the frame to the literary field, because the field ran the same engine the family did. Munro was the field’s own, the Canadian Chekhov, the woman who turned the short story into a form that could carry a life. Similarity bound the field to her. Transitivity bound it tighter, since her allies were the institutions that consecrate, The New Yorker that ran more than fifty of her stories, the Swedish Academy that gave her the prize in 2013, the prizes and the syllabi and the bookstores. And interdependence bound it tightest of all. Her prestige was a shared asset. She had won the country its first Nobel in literature. To defect from Munro was to defect from a holding the whole field drew on.

Here are the strange bedfellows the title promises. The readers whose stated values stood most squarely against the abuse of a child, the critics and teachers who had praised Munro for her unflinching honesty about the inner lives of women, the very constituency a person would expect to rally to a daughter, were among the slowest to move. Andrea Skinner reached out to a number of journalists over the years and got no response. The field that built its authority on believing women would not, while Munro lived, spend its capital on this one. Alliance Theory does not find that puzzling. The field’s allegiance ran to the consecrated figure, and the professed value, believe the survivor, gave way to the allegiance the moment the two pulled in opposite directions. The bedfellows look strange only if a reader expects values to predict behavior. Allegiance predicts it without strain.

The clearest proof sits in a single contrast, and it is the theory’s own test, the swap of the target with the act held fixed. By Skinner’s account the disclosure came after Munro read a short story about a girl who kills herself after a stepfather’s abuse, wept for the fictional girl, and asked why the girl had not told her mother. The fictional child cost Munro nothing. No alliance stood behind the fictional stepfather, so the value flowed free, and the sympathy was real. Then the real child made the same claim, and the real abuser was Munro’s own ally, and the sympathy vanished. Same act, different perpetrator, opposite judgment. The value did not change. The allegiance did, and the allegiance decided everything.

Then Munro died, on May 13, 2024. Within two months Skinner published. The timing is the tell. The facts had been available for decades, sayable in a courtroom in 2005, known at dinner parties before that, and they became sayable in public only when the cost of saying them dropped, which is to say only when the central ally was no longer alive to be defended or to punish defection. With the node removed the propaganda reversed across the whole network. Munro’s Books, the store she founded in Victoria, declared that it stood with Andrea. Her siblings, Andrew and Jenny and Sheila, aligned with their sister in a public statement. The press that had consecrated her now investigated her, and in December of 2024 Rachel Aviv published a long reckoning in The New Yorker that traced the abuse into the fiction. None of the underlying facts were new. What changed was the alliance structure, and the moral narrative changed to match it, exactly as the theory expects when a realignment removes the reason for the old silence.

Alliance Theory carries a sting that separates it from the easy reading of this story. The easy reading makes Munro a monster and the silent friends cowards and stops there. The theory declines the comfort. The biases it describes belong to the species, symmetrical across everyone, and the people who protected Munro ran the same equipment that the people who later turned would have run in their place, and the same equipment the reader runs about his own allies. Pinsof and his coauthors hold that humans are moral beings and that the trouble comes from dressing allegiance in the clothes of morality, which hides both. The family’s silence was a loyal signal. The field’s silence was a loyal signal. Loyalty of that kind is not a failure of reasoning. It is the proof of membership. A person who will not trust his ally’s side of the story is not counted a true ally, and a critic who will not protect the figure his standing depends on is not counted one of the faithful.

When a consecrated figure is accused by someone near and small, watch the alliance structure rather than the speeches about values, because the speeches will run whichever way allegiance points. Watch who is interdependent with the figure’s prestige, and expect them to find the conduct smaller and the accuser less reliable than the facts warrant. Watch for the realignment, and date it, because the moment the moral narrative flips is usually the moment the cost of telling the truth fell, and the new candor is no braver than the old silence. Both served the alliance of the day. Munro spent a lifetime showing that a thing learned late rewrites everything that came before it. Her readers learned the late thing in the summer of 2024, and the speed with which the verdicts turned, on facts that had sat in plain view for years, is the measure of how little the values had ever been steering.

The Capital of Alice Munro

In the Stockholm Concert Hall on December 10, 2013, under white tie and the gold of the royal box, the King of Sweden handed the Nobel medal and diploma to a woman in a new dress, and the woman was not the laureate. She was Jenny Munro, the daughter, the stand-in. Her mother sat an ocean and a continent away on a sofa at another daughter’s house in Victoria, too frail to fly, watching the webcast. The permanent secretary of the Swedish Academy, Peter Englund, read the citation and praised a style so spare that reading it felt to him like watching a cat cross a laid table. The hall rose for a body of stories. The body that wrote them stayed home. The prestige changed hands anyway, through a proxy in a borrowed evening, because the prestige had never lived in the woman. It lived in the field.

This essay reads the long protection of Alice Munro through a single lens, the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). Bourdieu held that cultural life unfolds in fields, structured arenas with their own currency and their own rules, semi-independent of the market and the state. The literary field is such an arena. Its currency is symbolic capital, the recognition and honor and legitimacy that the field’s institutions confer and withhold. A prize, a review in the right magazine, a place in the pantheon, an authorized biography, a spot on the syllabus, each is an act of consecration, a transfer of symbolic capital from the institution to the consecrated. The theory carries one more term that does the heavy lifting here. Misrecognition. The field experiences symbolic capital as the natural light of genius rather than as a social product manufactured by its own consecrating machinery, and that misreading is what gives the capital its force and hides how it was made.

Munro accumulated as much symbolic capital as the field can grant a living writer. Three Governor General’s Awards, two Giller Prizes, the Man Booker International, more than fifty stories in The New Yorker, which named her the country’s Chekhov, and then the Nobel, the field’s supreme rite, after which her sales jumped at home and abroad as the symbolic converts to the economic on contact. The novelists who guard the gates placed her at the summit. A.S. Byatt (1936-2023) called the announcement the happiest of her life. The Associated Press writer Hillel Italie caught the texture of the consecration in a single observation, that to dislike Munro had come to seem almost a heresy. Heresy is the word a field reaches for when its valuations have hardened into the sacred.

Symbolic capital, once accumulated around a figure, stops being that figure’s private holding and becomes a joint asset of everyone whose position derives from her. The Academy that crowned her, the magazine that ran her, the prize juries that anointed her, the critics whose taste she ratified, the nation that received through her its first literature Nobel, the biographer whose standing rests on his access to her, all of them hold a stake in her value. To lower Munro is to lower their own position in the field. From this a prediction follows, and the prediction is the whole case. The field will protect the capital it has stored in her, and it will do so without a meeting, without a plot, without anyone deciding to. Each agent, defending his own position, defends hers, and the silence falls out of the structure the way water finds the low ground.

Watch the biographer first. Robert Thacker wrote the authorized life and published it in 2005. Andrea Robin Skinner reached him before the book appeared and told him what Fremlin had done. He left it out. He explained later that he did not want to overstep a delicate family matter, that his was not that kind of book. Take the explanation as sincere and the theory still reads the choice by its position in the field. The authorized literary biography is a consecrating genre, and its rules screen out the kind of fact that deconsecrates. Not that kind of book is a statement about genre, about the boundaries a field polices to keep its categories intact, and it is also a statement about interest, because the biographer’s capital is bound up with the subject’s. The book that destroyed Munro’s standing would have destroyed the standing of the man who had built his on proximity to her. The boundary that kept the daughter out was the same boundary that kept the biographer’s holding safe. He need not have felt the second thing to have served it.

Watch the gatekeeping next, because it shows the harder edge of the theory, what Bourdieu called symbolic violence, the power of a field’s categories to make some truths legible and others impossible to say. Skinner reached out to journalist after journalist over the years and got no answer. Read the non-answers through the field. Skinner held no position in the literary field. She owned no symbolic capital. She was the laureate’s daughter, outside the circle of consecrated speakers, and her account, however true, could not enter the field’s discourse while the capital it threatened stood at its peak and could not be challenged without cost. The editors and writers who declined her were not, in the main, villains weighing a cover-up. They were agents who could not see a story there, because the field’s own scale of value had rendered her unsayable. That is symbolic violence working as designed. It does its work through the categories of perception, so that the people enforcing it experience themselves as exercising ordinary judgment.

Now the timing. The facts were old. A court had heard them. Fremlin pleaded guilty to indecent assault in 2005 and took a suspended sentence, and the guilty plea moved nothing in the field. The dinner parties knew. The family knew. And the silence held for two more decades, until two months after Munro’s death on May 13, 2024, when Skinner published in the Toronto Star. The death is the variable. While Munro lived, her capital sat at its zenith, maximally valuable to everyone holding a share, and the field’s appetite for the story that would destroy it ran near zero. Her death changed the position of the asset. A reputation can be revised at lower cost once its holder is gone, and, more to the point, a new position opened, because deconsecration is itself a consecrating act when performed well. In December of 2024 Rachel Aviv published a long reckoning in The New Yorker, the same magazine that had called Munro the country’s Chekhov, and the reckoning traced the abuse into the fiction and won wide praise. The magazine that crowned her now uncrowned her, and both operations produced capital, for the venue and for the writer who carried them out. The field had not discovered a conscience. The field had found a new and better-paying use for the same facts.

The principle the field invokes at moments like this, that the art must be judged apart from the life, deserves a place in the analysis, because Bourdieu would read it as a boundary the field maintains to protect its autonomy and, through that autonomy, its capital. The principle can be held in good faith and serve interest at the same time. It lets the field keep the asset while professing to keep faith with art. The separation of work from life is a real intellectual commitment and a convenient wall, and the convenience does not announce itself, which is the point of misrecognition.

A word on the woman. Munro’s habitus formed in the between-classes world of Huron County, in a Scots-Presbyterian culture that praised the one who did not put himself forward. She kept a low profile and granted few interviews and wore the down-to-earth manner the obituaries loved. In field terms the self-effacement was not only character. It was a position, and a profitable one, the disavowal of display that accrues distinction at the autonomous pole where art disdains the market. The writer who seems to want nothing from the game is rewarded by the game. How much of this she calculated and how much she simply was, the theory cannot say, and should not pretend to.

When a consecrated figure is accused by someone who holds no capital, do not expect the field to weigh the charge on its merits, because the field does not perceive charges on their merits. It perceives them through the value of the asset at risk. Watch who is positioned near the figure and expect them to find the accuser unpersuasive and the conduct smaller than it was, not from cowardice in each case but from the structure that aligns their perception with their holdings. Watch the consecrating institutions defend their own product. Watch the principle of art-apart-from-life appear exactly when the field needs a wall. And watch the reversal when it comes, and date it against the capital rather than against the truth, because the moment a reputation becomes safe to attack is usually the moment attacking it began to pay. The reckoning will feel, to the field and to the public, like the arrival of justice. Bourdieu would suggest looking once more, with the harder eye, at who is being consecrated now, and for what, and by whom.

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Grace Paley

Grace Paley (1922-2007) reshaped the American short story by showing that ordinary talk could carry the heaviest emotional and moral freight. She published three collections of stories across more than four decades, and those three slim books changed what American fiction could do. Her prose catches the rhythms of working-class New York, and above all its Jewish neighborhoods, through dialogue that sounds spontaneous while answering to a poet’s discipline. She also built a second career as poet, essayist, teacher, and political activist, and she held that literature and civic duty fed one another rather than competing for a writer’s attention.

She was born Grace Goodside on December 11, 1922, in New York City. Her parents, Isaac and Mania Goodside, were Jewish physicians and socialist revolutionaries who fled Tsarist Russia after political persecution. Their home joined intellectual seriousness to political idealism. Russian governed much of her childhood at home, while English belonged to the streets of the Bronx. She came of age during the Depression among immigrants from many backgrounds, and she developed there the ear for overlapping voices that became the defining feature of her fiction.

She attended Hunter College and later the New School for Social Research, where she studied poetry with W. H. Auden (1907-1973) in the early 1940s. Auden pressed discipline, rhythm, and compression on his students, and those lessons stay visible across Paley’s career. Even when her prose reads as conversational or improvised, its cadences carry the training of a poet. She enrolled for a time at New York University and left without a degree, finding observation and lived experience worth more to her than the classroom.

Her literary debut came late. After years given largely to family, she published The Little Disturbances of Man in 1959. Critics recognized the originality of her voice at once. Rather than lean on elaborate plot, Paley built stories from conversation, fragments of memory, neighborhood encounters, and moments of quiet revelation. Her characters interrupt one another, contradict themselves, drop one subject for another, and let deep truths slip out in passing. Under the surface ease lies hard technical control.

In 1942 she married the filmmaker Jess Paley. The couple had two children and divorced in the early 1970s. Motherhood sat at the center of both her life and her fiction. She refused to treat domestic duty as an obstacle to serious writing. Family life, neighborhood friendship, and political work became connected parts of one life, and she wrote many of her earliest stories at the kitchen table while she raised her children.

Many of her finest stories turn on Faith Darwin, a recurring figure who serves as a fictional counterpart without sliding into a simple autobiographical stand-in. Across many stories Faith grows older, raises children, passes through divorce, joins political protests, and faces illness and death. Paley never wrote a conventional novel. She assembled instead an evolving mosaic whose cumulative effect produces a rich portrait of postwar urban America.

Her second collection, Enormous Changes at the Last Minute (1974), set her among the leading short-story writers in the country. Stories such as “Faith in a Tree,” “Living,” and “Wants” take up marriage, divorce, motherhood, aging, and friendship while they hold questions of war, inequality, and civic duty in view. Her final collection, Later the Same Day (1985), pressed these concerns further. It carried a stronger sense of mortality and kept the wit and generosity that mark her work.

Paley remained a poet across her life. The collections Leaning Forward (1985), New and Collected Poems (1992), Begin Again: Collected Poems (2000), and the posthumous Fidelity (2008) show the same compressed language, moral seriousness, and attention to ordinary speech that distinguish her stories. Her mixed collection Long Walks and Intimate Talks (1991) moves between prose and poetry, and it shows how the two forms answered each other in her imagination. Where her fiction lodges politics inside everyday talk, her poetry addresses war, aging, justice, and moral duty head on. The later anthology The Grace Paley Reader (2017) gathers stories, essays, poems, and interviews, and it shows the unity of her literary vision.

Dialogue defines Paley’s prose. Many writers use conversation to move a plot forward. Paley makes speech the subject. Her narrators step back and let characters reveal themselves through interruption, misunderstanding, gossip, jokes, and unfinished thought. The prose reads as effortless and reaches a high emotional density. Her style draws on Yiddish storytelling, on modernist experiment, and on American vernacular speech.

She refused sentimental pictures of domestic life. Marriage in her fiction often wobbles. Parenthood mixes affection with exhaustion. Friendships among women often outlast romance, and women sustain one another through conversation, practical help, childcare, and shared experience rather than grand declaration. Long before talk of work and family balance grew common, Paley drew women who improvise across family duty, creative ambition, and political commitment.

Jewish identity informs nearly all of her fiction. She turns from theology and ritual toward Judaism as an inherited moral culture carried in humor, argument, memory, family obligation, and neighborhood life. Her characters argue about almost everything, and that argument reflects both democratic politics and the Jewish intellectual tradition. Immigration stays present in the background even where she leaves it unspoken.

Political activism took up as much of her life as writing. From the 1960s she gave herself to opposition to the Vietnam War. She refused to pay war taxes, joined civil disobedience, traveled on peace delegations, and accepted repeated arrests as the cost of democratic citizenship. She later campaigned for nuclear disarmament, women’s rights, environmental protection, and social justice. In 1978 the authorities arrested her after an anti-nuclear protest on the White House grounds, and she treated the arrest as an ordinary civic duty rather than a personal sacrifice.

Her activism carried the same democratic values that shaped her teaching. Alongside appointments at Sarah Lawrence College and City College of New York, she led writing workshops in community centers, public schools, and prisons. She held that storytelling belongs to everyone and not to a literary elite. Students recalled that she pressed listening before writing and insisted that honest fiction starts with close attention to the way men and women speak.

After her divorce from Jess Paley, she married the poet and playwright Robert Nichols (1919-2010) in 1972. Nichols shared her artistic interests and her political commitments. The couple took part in peace work and traveled abroad for human rights causes. In her later decades they lived in Thetford, Vermont, and the quieter country landscape entered her late poems and stories without loosening her hold on national and international politics.

Her nonfiction appears most fully in Just As I Thought (1998), a volume of essays, lectures, interviews, and political reflection. Across these writings she argues that literature and citizenship cannot come apart. Writing, for Paley, asked for sustained attention to voices that power tends to ignore.

Her complete fiction appears in The Collected Stories (1994), a single volume that became a finalist for the National Book Award. The collection shows how her three slim books form one continuous portrait of postwar New York and trace decades of social change through recurring families, neighbors, and friendships.

Paley took many honors in her lifetime, among them the Rea Award for the Short Story and a National Book Award citation in 1997. She served as the first official New York State Author from 1986 to 1988. After her death the filmmaker Lilly Rivlin directed the documentary Grace Paley: Collected Shorts, which carried her writing and her activism to new audiences. Her name continues through the Grace Paley Prize for Short Fiction, awarded each year to an emerging writer.

Critics have set Paley beside Anton Chekhov (1860-1904) for her compassion, James Joyce (1882-1941) for his rendering of city life, and Bernard Malamud (1914-1986) and Philip Roth (1933-2018) for her place in Jewish American letters. Her achievement stands apart. She showed that a writer could build a major reputation without large novels and rely instead on brief stories that gather into an expansive social history.

Her influence reaches well past the small number of stories she published. Lorrie Moore (b. 1957), Amy Hempel (b. 1951), George Saunders (b. 1958), Jhumpa Lahiri (b. 1967), and Deborah Eisenberg (b. 1945) drew on her proof that compression, voice, and ordinary speech can reach a deep emotional complexity. Her poetry shaped writers drawn to the meeting of the personal and the political. More broadly, she widened the range of feminist fiction by letting women speak on the page with the interruptions, contradictions, humor, anger, and resilience of real life.

Grace Paley died on August 22, 2007, at her home in Thetford after a long illness with breast cancer. Her body of work stays compact, and few twentieth-century American writers reach such influence with so little published fiction. She showed that the deepest drama unfolds not only in historical crisis but in conversation between neighbors, between parents and children, between old friends, and between strangers who try to understand one another. Her writing lasts because it treats those everyday exchanges as the true substance of democratic life.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

David Pinsof argues that intellectuals blame the world’s troubles on misunderstanding because the story flatters them. If ignorance and bias cause our problems, then the people whose trade is correcting ignorance and bias become the saviors of mankind. Pinsof rejects the premise. Humans are savvy animals who understand what they have an incentive to understand. Stupidity is strategic. Our problems come from bad motives, not bad beliefs. The work of the analyst, on this view, is to stop confusing stated motives with actual ones, mission statements with goals, the words a man says about himself with the deeds that feed him.

Grace Paley built a life and a body of work on the opposite premise. She held that literature and citizenship feed one another, that fiction starts with listening, that storytelling belongs to everyone and not to a literary elite. She treated attention to ignored voices as a moral act and arrest at an anti-war protest as ordinary civic duty.

Start with the credo. Honest fiction begins with attention to the way men and women speak. Listen first, then write. Power ignores certain voices, and the writer who hears them restores them. This is a theory of repair through understanding. The world goes wrong because some voices go unheard, and the writer who hears them does redemptive work. Pinsof’s reply runs straight at it. This is the writer’s mission statement, and a mission statement makes the writer the hero of the story. Starbucks nurtures the human spirit one cup at a time and also maximizes profit. Paley restores ignored voices and also climbs.

Climbs toward what. The literary field rewards distinction, and Paley found a fresh source of it. She took the gossip and interruption of working-class Jewish women in the Bronx and made canonical art of it. The move reads as humility, the elevation of the low, and it functions as a claim of discovery. She heard what others had walked past. The reward followed the claim. A National Book Award finalist, the first New York State Author, a short-fiction prize that carries her name. The democratic aesthetic doubles as a ladder, and the writer who insists that storytelling belongs to everyone collects the credit for saying so. Pinsof would note that the insistence costs her nothing and earns her the canon.

Consider the slim output. Three collections across more than four decades. Her admirers turn the scarcity into a virtue and repeat the line that few writers reach such influence with so little. Pinsof’s endowment effect applies to reputations as well as to objects. The scarcity becomes an asset. A writer who published twelve fat novels would have to defend twelve fat novels. Paley defends three slim books, and the slimness itself signals that every sentence earned its place. The legend of doing more with less is a status holding, and her readers manage it for her.

Then the activism. Vietnam, war-tax resistance, nuclear disarmament, women’s rights, peace delegations, repeated arrests. The frame asks what coalition rewarded these acts, and the answer is the postwar literary Left that staffed Sarah Lawrence, City College, the little magazines, and the peace committees. Paley did not defy that milieu. She paid its membership dues. Arrest on the White House grounds reads as cost only to an outsider. Inside her coalition it reads as a credential, and the credential converts to standing among the people whose esteem she needed. She fought in the direction her incentives pointed.

The disavowal seals it. Paley called the 1978 arrest an ordinary civic obligation rather than a personal sacrifice. Pinsof has a name for this. Denial and embellishment are weapons. The savvy player downplays his own cost, because the man who refuses the medal looks worthier than the man who pins it on. Modesty about sacrifice raises the honest-signal value of the sacrifice. She declined the credit in the one manner that secures it.

Her socialism descends from revolutionary parents, and her enemies were capital and the war state. Pinsof predicts something sharper than stated enemies. Antiracist elites resent millionaires and billionaires because the rich are their nearest rivals in the hierarchy, not their farthest. The literary Left runs hot toward adjacent targets, the sell-out, the careerist, the insufficiently committed peer, more than toward the distant tycoon it never meets. The record on Paley here stays thin, and I will not manufacture a quarrel she did not have. The frame flags the prediction and leaves the evidence where it is.

Her feminist fiction draws the same reading. She let women speak with their contradictions and their anger, and she refused the sentimental picture of domestic life. The refusal of sentimentality is a distinction move against rival women’s writing, a way of marking her work as the unsentimental and therefore serious kind. The theme of female friendship outlasting romance bonds the in-group. Pinsof reads the alliance under the art. The art builds a coalition and derogates a softer rival school in the same stroke.

And the reputation for compassion. Critics set her beside Chekhov for tenderness. She spoke of universal love, the human spirit, peace. Pinsof’s account of cynicism explains the payoff. Cynics read as meanies, so we spout idealism to signal we are sweeties, and it works. Paley spoke warmth and the field returned warmth to her. The signal cleared.

Paley the artist rendered savvy, self-deceiving, status-jockeying social animals with great accuracy. Her characters gossip, deny, embellish, argue to position themselves, and disclose their real aims by accident. The dialogue knows what the essays deny. On the page she draws men and women who understand their incentives all too well. In the lectures she preaches consciousness-raising and the rescue of the misinformed. The novelist saw clearly. The activist looked away. Pinsof would say the activist had incentives the novelist could suspend, because fiction pays for clear sight and politics pays for the flattering story.

Paley understood her incentives and served them, and her admirers manage her legend because it serves theirs, and Pinsof builds his audience by saying so, and I add value to this small conversation by saying it after him. The only misunderstanding is that Paley misunderstood anything. She listened, she climbed, and the two were the same act.

The Chorus Against the Silence: A Hero System for Grace Paley

The kitchen table comes first. Before the three slim books, before the arrests, before the prize that carries her name, a woman sits at a table in the Bronx with two children pulling at her sleeve and a pot going cold on the stove, and she listens. Grace Paley writes there, between the demands, on the backs of envelopes and in the margins of the afternoon. The talk in the room moves fast. A neighbor leans in the doorway with a complaint about her husband. A child interrupts to report an injustice. Nobody finishes a sentence. The radio carries news of a war somewhere. Paley, who studied compression with a poet, hears in the half-talk the thing she spends forty years saving.

What she saves it from is the terror under the table.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) gave us the frame in The Denial of Death. A man lives under two terrors. The first is annihilation, the plain fact that he dies. The second is insignificance, the suspicion that his life leaves no mark, that he passes and the world closes over him as water closes over a stone. Every culture hands its members a hero system, a scheme of action that promises a man he counts, that some part of him survives the grave inside a project larger than his body. The soldier earns it through valor. The merchant earns it through the fortune that bears his name. The father earns it through the son. The terror never leaves. The hero system holds it at arm’s length.

Paley’s terror has a particular shape. She does not fear only her own death, though the breast cancer comes for her in the end. She fears the death of the voice. She fears the silence that swallows the woman at the kitchen table whose talk no one writes down, the immigrant mother whose argument with her daughter counts for nothing in the books of state, the neighbor whose gossip and grief and joke vanish the instant they leave her mouth. Power keeps a record of generals and presidents. The table keeps no record at all. The terror is erasure, and the people it erases are the people Paley loves.

Her hero system answers the terror with a single move. She makes the record. Literature, for Paley, is the ledger that saves the ordinary life from the silence. Not the heroic life. The ordinary one. The half-finished sentence, the interruption, the joke that dies on the air becomes, on her page, the permanent thing. And because the talk in her stories never ends, because her characters break off and resume across three books and forty years, the conversation she builds outlasts any single speaker in it, including her. She beats death by refusing to be a soloist. She dissolves herself into a chorus, and the chorus does not die.

This is her subtraction. To make the chorus carry her, she gives up the monument of the self. She refuses the novel, the great house of one consciousness. She publishes three thin collections, The Little Disturbances of Man, Enormous Changes at the Last Minute, and Later the Same Day, and lets the slimness stand. She refuses the pose of the solitary genius and teaches in prisons and public schools, handing the trade to anyone who will listen. She refuses theology, takes Judaism as a moral inheritance carried in argument and memory rather than a promise of heaven, and so denies herself the oldest consolation of all. She removes every prop that lets a writer feel like a hero alone. What remains is the gamble that the chorus will hold her up after she lets go. The gamble pays. Lorrie Moore and George Saunders and the others carry the line forward, and the prize keeps her name in circulation, and the talk continues.

Now the harder question. Paley’s life turns on a few sacred words. Voice. Witness. Peace. Fidelity. These words feel universal. They are not. Each one means what it means only inside her hero system, and a man in another hero system hears the same word and reaches for something else. Walk the words through their rooms.

Start with voice.

In a stone abbey before dawn, a Trappist novice wants to speak and a bell forbids it. The abbot has told him that speech is the thing they offer up, that a man comes closer to God by withholding the noise of himself. Here voice is what you surrender. Significance arrives through silence, and the self counts by going quiet before a presence that fills the room when the talking stops.

In a glass conference room on the fortieth floor, a senior partner runs a young litigator through a mock cross. “Drop your voice at the end of the question,” he says. “You lose the jury when you plead.” Here voice is a weapon. It wins the verdict, and the verdict is the only thing that survives the trial. Significance arrives through victory, and the self counts by prevailing over another self in open combat.

In a courtyard in Senegal a griot tunes a kora and begins to name the dead. He recites a lineage of kings going back twelve generations, and the names are accurate, and the village leans in. Here voice is a vessel. It carries the ancestors forward, and the griot’s own throat matters only as the channel through which the dead keep speaking. Significance arrives through memory, and the self counts by becoming the instrument of a line older than itself.

Paley’s voice is none of these. It is not surrendered, not weaponized, not ancestral. It is the ordinary speaking self, the woman at the table, restored against the power that would let her vanish. When Paley says voice she means the thing the monk gives away, the thing the lawyer aims, the thing the griot lends to the dead, and she means it as none of them mean it. The word is the same. The hero systems do not touch.

Take witness.

A man sits all night in a cold room beside a body, a shomer guarding the dead until the burial, reading psalms aloud so the deceased is not alone. For him witness is company. The dead must not lie unattended, and the living man’s task is presence, not record. He writes nothing down. He stays.

A photographer crouches in a doorway in a burning city and frames a wounded child against the smoke. For him witness is indictment. The image goes out so the world cannot later claim it did not know. The point of his presence is the document that accuses.

Paley witnesses in a third way. She attends to the ignored and writes them into the permanent text so the silence does not get them. Company, indictment, record. Three men use one word and stand in three different relations to the same dead.

Take peace.

A Roman general surveys a valley the morning after the legion has finished its work. The smoke rises straight in the still air and no dog barks. He calls this peace, and he is not wrong by his lights. Pax is the quiet that follows total force, and significance for him arrives through the conquest that produces the quiet.

A city patrolman walks a corner at midnight, nightstick loose in his hand, radio low. Peace for him is order held in place by the credible threat behind his belt. Significance arrives through control, and the self counts by keeping the lid on.

A Carthusian hermit kneels alone in a cell he will not leave. Peace for him is the stilled mind, want extinguished, the interior noise gone quiet. Significance arrives through cessation, and the self counts by emptying out.

Paley spends her peace on none of these. She refuses war taxes, joins the disarmament marches, lets the police arrest her on the White House grounds in 1978, and calls the arrest an ordinary civic duty rather than a sacrifice. Her peace is the absence of the war state’s violence, won by bodies placed in its path. The general’s peace is the war state perfected. The same word names a thing and its opposite, and each speaker feels the cosmos behind him.

Take fidelity, which she set as the title of her last poems.

A vassal kneels and puts his hands between the hands of his lord and swears to keep faith unto death. Fidelity for him is loyalty up the chain of rank, and a man who breaks it forfeits his name and his place in the order of things. Significance arrives through the bond freely given and never withdrawn.

A widow keeps the bed she shared for fifty years and speaks to a husband three years in the ground. Fidelity for her is the vow outliving the man, a loyalty that has no living object and asks for none. Significance arrives through constancy that death cannot cancel.

Paley’s fidelity runs sideways rather than up or back. She stays true to the ordinary voice, to the friend across the decades, to the cause that wins nothing, to the unspectacular thing pursued for forty years without a monument at the end. The vassal binds upward. The widow binds backward. Paley binds across, to the chorus and the table, and her constancy is the long refusal to trade the small true thing for the large false one.

So the words do not travel. Voice, witness, peace, fidelity sound like the common property of mankind, and they belong instead to the rooms that give them sense. This is what Becker saw and what Paley shows without saying. A sacred value is the local currency of a hero system. Carry it across the border and it buys nothing.

Three coordinates locate her, and they are best left in plain sentences.

She places her immortality in the continuing talk. Not in heaven, which she set aside, and not in the single great book, which she refused to write, but in the chorus of ordinary voices that breaks off in one story and resumes in the next and goes on after the author is gone. Where another writer builds a tomb, Paley joins a conversation and trusts it to keep talking. That trust is her answer to the terror, and the line of writers who carry her forward shows the answer held.

She pays for it with the self as monument. She surrenders the novel, the genius pose, the theology, every device by which a writer feels heroic alone, and she gambles that the chorus will hold her weight once she lets go of the props. A man in another hero system reads the surrender as humility. Becker reads it as strategy. Both are right. Humility is the form her denial of death takes, and the form is real, and so is the denial under it.

And the limit. Each room in this essay regards the others as confused. The general thinks Paley naive about force. Paley thinks the general a servant of erasure. The monk thinks both of them loud. None of them misunderstands. Each understands the cost of his own scheme and the comfort it buys, and each calls the comfort by a sacred name. Paley’s chorus is her shelter against annihilation, dressed in the clothing of attention to the poor, and the dressing does not make the shelter less true or less needed. She built a good one. She knew what she was building. The talk goes on, and she is somewhere inside it, which is the only kind of forever her hero system ever promised.

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It Just All Comes Out Like One – A Lorie Moore Biography

Lorrie Moore (b. 1957) ranks among the leading American fiction writers of the past four decades. Her reputation rests on the short story, the form she has refined across four collections and forty years, though her novels and her criticism extend the claim. Readers and critics return to the same set of attributes when they describe her: comic intelligence, emotional accuracy, and a command of the sentence that compresses a long life into a few pages. The comparisons reach for the masters of the compressed form. Critics place her beside Anton Chekhov (1860-1904), Grace Paley (1922-2007), and Alice Munro (1931-2024), writers who built large reputations on small canvases. Her fiction returns to loneliness, to marriages that fail, to illness and death, to the fear that attends parenthood, and to the gap between what people say and what they feel.

She was born Marie Lorena Moore on January 13, 1957, in Glens Falls, New York. The household was middle class and bookish. Her father worked in insurance after a training in science; her mother worked as a nurse, a teacher, and a community activist. The first name came from a maternal grandmother, the middle name from a nineteenth-century song, and the household ran on reading rather than television. Moore has described the home as religious and intellectually curious, a combination that left its mark on a body of work attentive to moral seriousness without the apparatus of belief.

Moore attended St. Lawrence University and graduated summa cum laude in English. The literary recognition arrived early. At nineteen, still an undergraduate, she won the national fiction contest run by Seventeen with a story called “Raspberries.” The prize confirmed a talent but did not open a career. After graduation she spent two years in Manhattan working as a paralegal, then entered the MFA program at Cornell University in 1980. She finished the thesis in little more than a year under the novelist Alison Lurie (1926-2020). Lurie carried the manuscript to the literary agent Melanie Jackson, who sold the thesis collection to Alfred A. Knopf. The relationship with Knopf has lasted Moore’s whole career. Jackson, married to the novelist Thomas Pynchon (b. 1937), also placed Moore near the center of a distinguished literary circle at the start of her professional life.

The debut collection, Self-Help (1985), arrived with the voice already formed. The stories borrow the grammar of the self-improvement manual, the second-person imperative of the how-to guide, and turn it against itself to examine romantic disappointment, dependency, and the terms of female identity. “How to Be an Other Woman” and “How to Become a Writer” became among the most anthologized stories of the late twentieth century. The book made an argument by example: irony could deepen feeling rather than hold it at a distance.

She followed with a novel, Anagrams (1986). The book runs the same characters through shifting versions of their lives, a structure that unsettled some early reviewers and that later readers recognized as an early instance of techniques the next two decades would make familiar. The novel studies alternate lives, the roads not taken, and the instability of any single narrative account of a person.

A children’s book, The Forgotten Helper (1987), sits at the edge of the major work. It tells the story of an elf whom Santa Claus leaves behind at the home of the worst child on his list, and it shows the comic invention of the fiction turned to a younger audience.

In 1990 she published a second collection, Like Life. It holds some of her finest work, including “You’re Ugly, Too,” her first story to run in The New Yorker and one John Updike (1932-2009) later chose for The Best American Short Stories of the Century. By this point the critical consensus had settled. Many readers considered her the finest American short story writer of her generation.

She returned to the novel with Who Will Run the Frog Hospital? (1994). A middle-aged woman, Berie, on a trip to Paris with her husband, looks back on an intense adolescent friendship in an upstate New York town. The book turns from the urban isolation of Anagrams toward memory, nostalgia, and the border between childhood innocence and knowledge.

Her widest popular success came with Birds of America (1998). The collection reached the New York Times bestseller list, a rare destination for literary short fiction. Its center is “People Like That Are the Only People Here,” first published in The New Yorker in 1997 and later given an O. Henry Award. The story draws on Moore’s experience after her infant son received a cancer diagnosis, and it set off a long argument about the border between autobiography and fiction. The story turns private terror into something a stranger can feel, and it does so without surrendering irony or losing control of its form. Many critics name Birds of America the defining American story collection of its era.

Moore built an academic career alongside the books. She joined the faculty of the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1984 and taught creative writing there for close to three decades. A generation of younger writers passed through her workshops. In 2013 she moved to Vanderbilt University as the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of English. She has also taught at Princeton, New York University, the University of Michigan, and Cornell.

After more than a decade given mainly to stories, she returned to the novel with A Gate at the Stairs (2009). The book follows a college student who takes work as a nanny for an adoptive family in a Midwestern college town in the months after the September 11 attacks. It takes up race, terror, family, and a national mood of fear, and it keeps her comic register through all of it. The novel reached the shortlists for the Orange Prize for Fiction and the PEN/Faulkner Award.

Her fourth collection, Bark (2014), turns from the uncertainties of youth to the disappointments of middle age. The characters here face divorce, the dating that follows it, aging, and the narrowing of expectation. Critics noted that after thirty years she still produced emotional insights that read as new.

Moore is also a critic of the first rank. Her essays and reviews have run in The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, The Atlantic, and other leading publications, and a selection appeared as See What Can Be Done (2018). The pieces range across Margaret Atwood (b. 1939), Updike, and Joan Didion (1934-2021), and out into politics, culture, and the craft of fiction. She has kept up the criticism, including a long 2025 review of Miriam Toews‘ (b. 1964) memoir A Truce That Is Not Peace in The New York Review of Books.

In 2020 Everyman’s Library published her Collected Stories. The series rarely admits living short story writers, and the volume confirmed her place in the American canon. In the spring of 2023 she held the Mary Ellen von der Heyden Fellowship in Fiction at the American Academy in Berlin, where she worked on material drawn from her father’s boyhood visit to Nazi Germany in 1935.

Her fourth novel, I Am Homeless if This Is Not My Home (2023), broke from the realism of her earlier work. The book braids a ghost story, a road novel, a romance, and a meditation on death. A man named Finn travels with the reanimated body of a former lover while letters written by a woman named Lily in the Reconstruction-era South run alongside the journey. The novel takes up mortality, grief, memory, and the persistence of love through a structure closer to hallucination than to report. It won the National Book Critics Circle Award for Fiction.

The fiction carries a recognizable surface. Moore writes with puns, with metaphors that surprise, with comic reversals, and with dialogue that hides pain inside a joke. Her characters speak in a stylized language that never loses its psychological credit. Under the comedy runs a steady melancholy. Failed marriages, terminal illness, the fear a parent carries, the facts of aging, the loneliness that survives company: these recur, and sentimentality almost never enters. The comedy does the work that sentiment does in lesser writers. It lights the suffering rather than softening it.

Many of her protagonists are educated women at work on careers, on the aftermath of romantic loss, on motherhood, and on the daily terms of adult life. She writes with authority about the distance between what the culture promises and what a life delivers. Critics often call her a feminist writer, though the fiction rarely argues a position. It studies the single consciousness, the way identity will not hold still, and the way language at once shows and hides the truth of feeling.

Her influence on American prose is large. George Saunders (b. 1958), Lauren Groff (b. 1978), Karen Russell (b. 1981), and a long line of younger story writers have named her as a source. Her mix of comic command, formal risk, and emotional depth widened the range of what literary realism could hold across the turn of the century.

The honors gather the career into a list: the National Book Critics Circle Award, the PEN/Malamud Award, the Rea Award for the Short Story, several O. Henry Awards, the Rome Prize, a Guggenheim Fellowship, election to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and membership in the American Academy of Arts and Letters. Translators have carried the work into more than a dozen languages.

Moore is the revered writer among the novelists I know. Many authors have sold more. Few have shaped the craft of the contemporary American story as she has. The 2023 novel and its award show a writer still willing to take formal risks late in the work. The achievement rests on a single discovery she has pressed for forty years. Wit and compassion are not rivals. In her hands each one feeds the other, and the short story becomes a form large enough to hold the absurdity, the loneliness, and the brief grace of a modern life.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

David Pinsof argues that intellectuals run on one story. Everything wrong in the world comes from misunderstanding, and the people whose job is understanding, the intellectuals, are therefore the ones who can fix it. Pinsof throws the story out. He holds that the human mind works about as well as the hawk’s eye, that selection built it to climb hierarchies, hold coalitions, take resources, and seize the state’s coercive power, and that it wraps these aims in moral language. The split he cares about runs between the motive a person states and the motive that drives the conduct. The first is the mission statement. The second is the product. Confuse the two and you get the misunderstanding myth, the flattering belief that bad beliefs, not bad motives, cause our trouble, and that a clever enough class can clear the bad beliefs away.

Moore makes a hard case for the frame, because she preaches no cure. She writes no policy. She raises no consciousness. She offers no reader a program for fixing a marriage or a country. The primary target of Pinsof’s essay, the savior intellectual, has no purchase on her. If anything she stands on his side of the line. Her fiction encodes his view of the animal rather than the view he attacks.

Start with the people in the stories. Moore’s characters talk in jokes, and the jokes hide pain. The standard literary reading calls this the comedy of failed connection, two souls who cannot reach each other across the table. Pinsof reads the same scene and finds no failure to understand. The characters understand each other well enough. They are competing, defending, withdrawing, scoring. The wit is a weapon and a wall. When a Moore marriage comes apart, no better communication would have saved it, because the trouble was never a signal lost in transmission. The trouble was two strategic creatures pursuing aims they will not name. Moore declines the therapeutic ending. She leaves her people in the hole and lets them make jokes about the dirt. That refusal puts her closer to Pinsof than to the consciousness-raisers he mocks.

The comedy carries a second load. Verbal cleverness is a status display, inside the fiction and outside it. Her characters out-talk each other for position. Her sentences out-perform the competition for the reader’s regard, and the critic who praises the sentences buys a share of the same prestige by showing he can tell the good ones from the merely clever. The literary field is one of Pinsof’s marketplaces. Taste is the currency. Reading Moore signals membership. The signal travels whether or not a single heart is changed.

Then the reception. Critics hand us the sweet account. Wit and compassion light each other. Suffering turns into universal art. One profile praises her characters for seeing the world in all its ugliness and also its tenderness. The word doing the work is also. Pinsof predicts that word. Cynicism is icky, and consecration needs sweetness, so the establishment cannot canonize a cold instrument as a cold instrument. It adds tenderness, grace, wisdom, love. The tenderness is the mission statement. The product is an accurate rendering of strategic animals, sold to readers who want to feel like the kind of person who reads tender and wise fiction. The compassion framing lets the buyer enjoy a hard book while believing he has bought a kind one.

The clearest test is “People Like That Are the Only People Here.” Moore took her infant son’s cancer, made it a story, placed it in the magazine, won the O. Henry, and entered the canon. The stated motive is art and witness. Pinsof’s lens finds the operating motive in plain view: a writer mines a private catastrophe for professional capital. The story knows this about itself. Its center is a mother who is also a writer, and a husband who keeps telling her to take notes, because they will need the material, because notes are money. The piece accuses its own maker and prospers anyway. That self-knowledge is the most Pinsofian feature in all of Moore. Here is the savvy animal that understands its own motive, says so on the page, and collects the prize. No misunderstanding. Understanding all the way down.

Her position on the feminist label runs the same way. Readers claim her for the coalition. Her fiction argues none of its cases. She keeps the prestige of the association and the prestige of independence at once, and pays the argumentative cost of neither. Pinsof would call that savvy positioning rather than a considered refusal of ideology, and the record gives him room. She lets herself be claimed. She declines to be conscripted. Both moves raise her standing with different audiences.

Pinsof ends by saying the world does not want to be saved, that the study of human nature is too often the study of the hole we are stuck in. Moore’s fiction agrees with him, scene by scene. Her people sit in the hole and crack wise about the walls. The difference lies in the form. Pinsof writes the conclusion as argument and takes the icky hit for it. Moore writes it as scene and lets the reader keep the warm feeling that anyone who renders despair this well must love the people she renders. The love is the reader’s purchase. The text never promised it. That is where the misunderstanding lives. Not in Moore, and not in her characters, who understand their incentives well enough. In us, who need the comfortable story about why we keep reading her, and who will pay a premium for the writer who lets us believe the cold thing on the page is kindness.

The Sentence Against Death: Lorrie Moore’s Hero System

Lorrie Moore will not use email. She gave one interviewer a year of letters and faxes instead, and when a transcript of their talk came back to her she threw most of it out. She said she could not hear herself in its sentences. Read that twice. A machine had recorded her actual words, and she rejected them, because the words on the page did not carry the thing she counts as herself. The self lives in the sentence she would have written, not in the sentence she happened to say. Fix the sentence and you fix the soul. That is a strange place to keep a soul. It is also the center of her hero system, and once you find it the rest of the work lines up behind it like iron filings.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) argued that a man builds his life as an answer to two terrors he will not name. The first is the body, which dies and knows it. The second is insignificance, the dread of passing through the world without leaving a mark the world remembers. Culture hands out standard answers. Join the nation, the church, the firm, the movement, and your small death gets folded into something that outlasts you. Becker called these answers hero systems, and he said we hold their central terms as sacred because the terms are load-bearing. Pull one and the tower comes down. The artist, in Becker’s account and in Otto Rank’s (1884-1939) before him, takes the hardest road. He tries to build a private heroism, a self-made monument, and then he has to talk a culture into validating it, or it stays a neurosis with no congregation.

Moore’s two terrors sit in plain sight across forty years. The body that fails fills the work. A child gets cancer in the magazine. Illness, divorce, aging, the corpse that walks beside a grieving man through her last novel, I Am Homeless if This Is Not My Home. The second terror has a date. She was a skinny, quiet child who felt she registered with almost no one. The biographers reach for the same word. Insubstantial. Hold the insubstantial child beside the woman who throws out her own recorded voice and you have the subtraction story whole. The wound is that she did not register. The answer is the sentence no one can forget. Verbal brilliance is not her gift. It is her defense against vanishing. The pun, the reversal, the joke that lands a half second before the grief, these are the armor a child built so that a room would have to notice her, and the armor became the cathedral.

So her sacred words are a writer’s words. Voice. Wit. Honesty. The small perfect thing. Each one holds up her tower. The trouble, the part worth the reader’s time, is that other people hold the same words sacred and stand inside other towers, and the word means something different depending on the death it is built to deny.

Take wit. For Moore wit is survival. The joke proves the self is present and quick and cannot be ignored, and it lets her walk up to the dying child without being crushed, because the comic eye stays open where the sentimental eye shuts. Now carry the word into a Cistercian monastery where the men keep silence and a brother hoes the bean rows in the bottoms before the office of None. To him wit is the ego’s last noise, the chatter the self makes so it will not have to go quiet and meet God in the silence where the self dissolves. His heroism is erasure. He wants his name burned off so that only the Order and the Lord remain. Moore wants her name cut into the stone. Same faculty, opposite vow. Her joke is his temptation.

Carry the word again into a deposition. A litigator sits with a chronograph on his wrist and a court reporter at his elbow, and he uses wit to open a witness, to plant the line the jury will repeat in the box. For him wit is a tool that wins, and a verdict is the mark that outlasts him, the published opinion with his argument inside it. Moore’s wit resolves nothing and wins nothing and points at the floor of the grave. To him she leaves the ammunition in the magazine. To her he has confused a weapon with a soul.

Carry it a third time onto a night shift in a hospice. A nurse sponges a man’s mouth and he makes a joke about the morphine, and she laughs because she has heard the dying joke before and she knows the joke is the last dignity a body has. She would recognize Moore at once. The comic stance toward death is true, she has watched it be true. Then she would set the books down, because her heroism is the hand she holds and the breath she counts, and Moore writes the joke and does not hold the hand. The nurse eases the passage. Moore records it and keeps the record. One of them will be in the room. The other will be in the canon.

Honesty splits the same way. Moore holds honesty sacred and calls sentimentality the sin. To lie about death, to hand a reader a consolation the facts do not support, is the one thing she will not do, and her refusal of the warm ending is the spine of her seriousness. A storefront Pentecostal pastor holds honesty sacred too. For him honesty means confessing the sin and then proclaiming the cure, because the good news is the point and a truth that stops short of grace is a truth abandoned halfway down the road. Moore’s honesty, the honesty that names the wound and offers no Christ and no healing arc, reads to him as a man who has seen the disease and refused the physician. His hero system runs through the flock and the throne of God. Hers runs through a self that will accept no rescue, because accepting rescue means handing the authorship of her life to someone else, and the authorship is the entire project.

Set beside the pastor an Army flight medic who has filled out the after-action report. For him honesty is what happened and who died and no spin laid over it, and he would read Moore’s refusal of consolation as the only adult posture a person can take toward the dead. He and Moore agree on the surface and part underneath. His honesty serves the unit, the men who depend on an accurate count. Her honesty serves the sentence and the single consciousness, and there is no unit, and there never was. That absence is the cost she pays for the grandeur, and we will come back to it.

Then the small. Moore built her name on the short story, the compressed thing, and the critics handed her the sentence she will wear in the obituaries, the great writer without a great novel. The jab assumes a hierarchy of forms with the big book on top. Inside her hero system the small form is the higher thing, because the small form can be made perfect and the perfect thing is the one that lasts. A cathedral architect holds the opposite faith. His heroism is scale, the named building, the mass that throws a shadow across the square for six hundred years, and to him the minor form is a failure of ambition dressed up as taste. A startup founder holds the same faith in newer clothes. His sacred word is scale and his obscenity is the lifestyle business, the small good thing that stays small, and he would tell Moore she had product-market fit and refused to raise. But hand the word to a woman who repairs watch movements under a loupe, the jeweled escapement smaller than a fingernail, and she would understand Moore at once, because she knows the small thing carries the whole burden of time and either keeps it or does not. And hand it to a field ornithologist banding warblers at dawn, who named no theory and built no monument and only added one careful small life to the record, and you find the title of Moore’s most loved book looking back at you. Birds of America. The heroism of the small accurate observation that joins the long record and outlives the observer.

Here is the engine under all of it. A value is sacred because it is the load-bearing beam of an immortality project, and the same word names a different beam in a different building. Two people can both kneel before honesty and mean things that cannot stand in the same room, because each honesty holds up a different denial of death. This is why argument across hero systems goes nowhere. The monk and the novelist are not disagreeing about wit. They are defending different ways of not dying.

Rank saw the corner the artist paints herself into, and Moore stands square in it. The standard hero systems come with a congregation. The monk has the Order. The soldier has the unit. The pastor has the flock that says amen. The founder has the cap table and the market that prices his worth each morning. The artist who locates her soul in the sentence has none of that. She has readers she will never meet and a self she keeps in prose she fears she cannot hear. Moore refused email, refused the coalition, declined to argue the feminist case the culture wanted to hand her, kept the heroism private and self-authored down to the comma. That is the purest version of Becker’s causa sui, the project of fathering yourself, owing your meaning to no nation and no God. It is also the most exposed, because when the validation wobbles there is no congregation to catch the fall, only the next sentence and the fear that it might not sound like her.

Three things to carry away from the tower. The system is strongest where the terror is sharpest. She writes death better than almost anyone alive because she built her instrument to look straight at it, and the comic armor lets her hold the gaze a beat past the point where a softer writer flinches. The system costs her the congregation. She traded the unit and the flock for the freedom to author herself, and the trade leaves her alone with the work in a way the monk and the medic never are, which might be why the late novel reaches for ghosts, for the dead kept walking and talking, the dead refused permission to leave. And the system cannot give her the one thing the others get for free. The monk surrenders the self and is comforted. The pastor hands his death to God and sleeps. Moore keeps the self entire, perfects it sentence by sentence, and earns the canon, the chair, the Collected Stories in the durable series, every external sign that the gamble paid. What she cannot earn by these means is the rest that comes from belonging to something larger than the work. She built a soul out of sentences. The sentences will last. She has to live, meanwhile, as the only member of her church.

The Economic World Reversed: Lorrie Moore in the Literary Field

Everyman’s Library prints its books on paper meant to outlast the buyer and binds them in cloth. The series is a cemetery for the consecrated, and it rarely takes the living. In 2020 it took Lorrie Moore. Her Collected Stories went into the durable format reserved for authors whose place is settled, an honor handed to almost no living writer of short fiction. Read that as a sentence about prose and you miss most of what happened. Read it as a transaction in a market for prestige and the career snaps into focus. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) built the instrument that reads it, and Moore is close to an ideal object for the instrument. The frame eats the subject.

Bourdieu treats literature as a field, a structured arena where players compete for a capital the arena alone can mint. The field of cultural production runs on two opposed principles of rank. One principle is heteronomous. It measures success by sales, by reach, by the numbers the wider market returns, and the players who win by it are the ones the field of power favors. The other principle is autonomous. It measures success by the esteem of peers, by formal difficulty mastered, by the refusal of the market’s rewards, and it runs on a strange accounting Bourdieu named the economic world reversed. At the autonomous pole, losing money can read as winning, and the appearance of indifference to money is the costliest thing a player can buy. Around these two poles sit the kinds of capital a writer accumulates. Cultural capital arrives embodied as taste and disposition, objectified as the books on the shelf, and institutionalized as the degree and the chair. Social capital is the network. Symbolic capital is the recognition the field confers when it consecrates a name. The whole structure rests on an illusion the field cannot do without, the charismatic story that the artist is the uncaused source of his own value, a gift dropped from nowhere. Bourdieu spent The Rules of Art and Distinction dismantling that story and showing the field that manufactures the gift.

Moore’s trajectory tracks the structure stage by stage. She comes from a bookish middle-class home, a father in insurance who had studied science, a mother who nursed and taught and organized. The household ran on reading and ran short on television, which is a sentence about the transmission of cultural capital. The dispositions formed there pointed her toward letters and away from commerce, the habitus of a girl who would convert reading into standing rather than money. The early token came at nineteen, the national fiction prize from Seventeen. The prize was real and the organ was minor, a magazine for teenage girls, capital with a low exchange rate in the field she was entering. Then a detour through the market proper. Two years at a desk in Manhattan paralegal work, the economy she would spend the rest of her life keeping at arm’s length, and out of it into the place where the field reproduces itself.

She entered the Cornell MFA in 1980 and studied under Alison Lurie. The workshop is the American literary field’s central engine of consecration and the credential it issues is institutionalized cultural capital, the stamp that says a newcomer has been admitted to the game. Lurie carried the thesis to the agent Melanie Jackson, and Jackson sold it to Knopf. Set the gift-story aside and look at the transfer. Jackson was married to Thomas Pynchon. The entry that placed Moore inside a consecrated literary circle at the start of her career came through social capital she inherited rather than earned, the network reaching her before the work had earned its own. The charismatic account erases this. Field theory keeps it on the page, not to deny that the stories delivered, but to name the conditions that let them be read.

Self-Help arrived in 1985 and took a position. The how-to parody, the second-person imperative bent against itself, carried the credibility of formal play and the accessibility of a joke a reader could follow. The next move was the autonomous gamble. Anagrams in 1986 ran the same characters through shifting versions of their lives, a structure that puzzled reviewers and bid for the esteem of the few who prize difficulty, restricted production aimed at peer consecration and willing to pay the price of confusing the larger audience. Like Life in 1990 consolidated the position, and consecration by a consecrated figure followed when John Updike chose “You’re Ugly, Too” for his century anthology. A canonized author reaching down to canonize a story is the field’s machinery working in plain view.

Then the rare event. Birds of America in 1998 reached the New York Times bestseller list, a destination literary story collections almost never see. This is the crossing of the two poles, autonomous capital converted to heteronomous reach, and the conversion usually taxes a writer’s standing, since the market’s embrace can read at the autonomous pole as a stain. Moore mostly escaped the tax, and the route of her escape is worth marking. The book’s center, “People Like That Are the Only People Here,” ran first in The New Yorker, an organ that bridges the two poles and launders mass reach through prestige, and the story’s subject, a child with cancer, carried a gravity no one could mistake for commercial calculation. She sold in numbers and kept the disinterested posture intact. The field let her have both.

She joined the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1984 and stayed close to thirty years. The salary is the base that funds the refusal of the market. A writer with a chair does not need the next book to sell, and that freedom is the material ground of the disinterested stance the autonomous pole rewards. The post did more than pay her. It handed her the power to consecrate, since the teacher of the workshop admits and shapes the entrants, and the lineage that runs through her classrooms toward George Saunders and Lauren Groff and Karen Russell is social capital reproduced down a generation. In 2013 she moved to a named chair at Vanderbilt, the Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of English, institutionalized symbolic capital worn as a title. She took a seat at the New York Review of Books and gathered her criticism into See What Can Be Done in 2018, and the reviewer’s chair is consecration power exercised, the right to assign and withhold legitimacy from other names.

The American hierarchy of genres puts the novel above the story, and a critic pressed the point by calling her the great writer without a great novel. The line names the genre hierarchy in seven words, and it cuts because she chose to perfect the subordinate form. The sharpest reading of the line is that Moore knew the hierarchy from the inside, because she had wielded it herself. She had said a version of it about Updike, the writer without the single towering book, and a critic turned her own instrument back on her. The hierarchy of genres is a shared weapon in the field, and players reach for it to place rivals and to place themselves. Her novels keep climbing toward the dominant form. A Gate at the Stairs in 2009 reached the shortlists for the Orange Prize and the PEN/Faulkner without winning. I Am Homeless if This Is Not My Home in 2023 took a formal risk and won the National Book Critics Circle Award, the laurel of the dominant genre claimed at last, the trajectory closing on the prize the short story could not deliver.

The charismatic story says the voice is the uncaused signature of a singular gift, and the whole apparatus exists to protect that story because the apparatus profits from it. Field theory prices the voice as the product of a trajectory, the Seventeen prize and Lurie and the Jackson network and Knopf and The New Yorker and the anthologies and the chair, the long chain of recognitions that built the name a reader now experiences as genius arriving from nowhere. The reticence reads the same way. The refusal of email, the interviews conducted by mail, the withholding persona, all of it accrues symbolic capital at the autonomous pole, where the appearance of standing apart from the market is the market’s most valued good. None of this requires calculation. The habitus makes the disinterested posture sincere, which is what lets it work, since a posture a player had to fake would not pay.

Three coordinates to carry away. The career is a near-perfect demonstration because Moore accumulated across both principles of rank, the autonomous esteem of the difficult small form and the heteronomous reach of the bestseller, and then converted both into the institutional consecration of the chair, the series, and the prize. The conversion ran through the university, the base that funds the American writer’s freedom from the market and reproduces the field through her students, so that her standing rests as much on the institution that paid her as on the books she wrote. And the thing the frame cannot reach, the value of the prose, is the same thing the charismatic story exists to assert, which means the reader who wants to defend Moore against Bourdieu has to defend the very illusion Bourdieu set out to expose, and has to do it on ground the sociology has already declared off its map.

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Forgiveness Without Sentiment: The Fiction of Richard Russo

Richard Russo (b. July 15, 1949) stands among the leading American novelists of working-class life and small-town decline. His fiction tracks the inner lives of ordinary people caught between economic stagnation, family obligation, and the receding promise of postwar America. Critics often file him under comic writers, yet his humor rarely exists for its own sake. Humor lets his characters keep their footing as they face disappointment, failed ambition, and the slow hollowing of towns that once held industrial life. He joins social realism to psychological insight, and the combination has made him the foremost portraitist of the blue-collar Northeast since the generation of Bernard Malamud (1914-1986), John Updike (1932-2009), and John Cheever (1912-1982).

Russo was born in Johnstown, New York, and grew up in nearby Gloversville, a glove-manufacturing town whose fortunes collapsed during his childhood. The decline of the leather-tanning trade marked his imagination for good. The smell of the tanneries, the polluted creeks, the shuttered factories, and the thinning neighborhoods entered the physical landscape that returns in novels such as Mohawk and Empire Falls. His grandfather worked in the tanning trade, which gave Russo a direct line to the laboring world he would spend a career depicting. His mother, Jean, raised him for the most part after his parents’ troubled marriage ended, and he learned early the financial fear, the pride, and the tangled feeling that run through his fiction. His father moved in and out of his life and became the model for a recurring Russo man: charming, quick, and unreliable, a figure whose failures sound across generations.

Education gave Russo his exit from the limits of his hometown. At the University of Arizona he began in geography before he turned to English literature, and he earned bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees there. The early pull toward geography anticipated one of the strengths of his fiction. Few living novelists hold so sharp a sense of place, or watch so closely how streets, rivers, factories, and hills shape the relations among people in a town. His dissertation examined the fiction of Charles Brockden Brown (1771-1810), an early sign of his interest in the meeting of psychology and narrative. After graduate school he taught at Southern Illinois University, then joined the faculty at Colby College in Maine. In 1996 he left teaching to write full time.

His first novel, Mohawk (1986), set down the features of his literary world at once. In a declining upstate New York town, families struggle against decay while they stay loyal to the communities that formed them. Russo does not romanticize blue-collar America. He presents it as nurturing and suffocating at the same time, a home people dream of leaving while they remain bound to it.

The Risk Pool (1988) deepened these concerns through Ned Hall and his charming, irresponsible father. Drawing on his own upbringing, Russo set out a central theme: the complicated inheritance a father leaves his children. His men disappoint those around them without turning into villains. Their weakness comes less from cruelty than from insecurity, pride, and the narrowing pressure of limited opportunity.

National recognition arrived with Nobody’s Fool (1993). Its protagonist, Donald “Sully” Sullivan, shows Russo’s gift for binding humor to feeling. Sully is stubborn, irresponsible, generous, and set against change. Russo offers no tidy redemption. He uncovers, by degrees, the loyalty and affection beneath the rough surface. The 1994 film, with Paul Newman (1925-2008) as Sully, carried Russo’s work to a far wider audience. Russo later worked with the director Robert Benton (1932-2025) on the screenplay.

His academic satire Straight Man (1997) moved from the dying factory town to the disorder of higher education. Through the comic ordeals of the English professor William Henry Devereaux Jr., Russo showed that bureaucratic absurdity and private disappointment flower as readily on a campus as in a failing mill town. AMC adapted the novel as the series Lucky Hank (2023), with Bob Odenkirk (b. 1962) in the lead.

His masterwork, Empire Falls (2001), won the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for Fiction. Around the diner manager Miles Roby, in a fading Maine mill town, Russo set class division, domestic violence, adolescence, religion, and economic decline within a wide and intimate portrait of community. He does not explain social trouble through ideology. He shows how history settles into family relations and individual character. The HBO adaptation, with Ed Harris (b. 1950), Helen Hunt (b. 1963), Philip Seymour Hoffman (1967-2014), and Newman, drew wide praise.

Later novels widened his emotional and thematic reach while they held to his central concerns. Bridge of Sighs (2007) follows lifelong friendship, memory, and artistic ambition through another struggling town. Nearly two decades after publication the book found a second life when Oprah Winfrey (b. 1954) chose it for her book club in August 2025 and introduced a new generation of readers to that long and crowded novel. That Old Cape Magic (2009) turns toward marriage, aging, and family inheritance through a middle-aged academic. Everybody’s Fool (2016) and Somebody’s Fool (2023) return to Sully’s North Bath decades after Nobody’s Fool and show how a community changes while it keeps its deepest patterns. Chances Are… (2019), built around three aging college friends reunited on Martha’s Vineyard, proved he could leave his industrial settings without leaving his subjects of regret, memory, and loyalty.

Russo has also written distinguished short fiction, among it The Whore’s Child and Other Stories (2002) and Trajectory (2017). His memoir, Elsewhere (2012), opens the clearest view of the autobiographical roots of the fiction. It traces his hard, loving bond with his sharp and ambitious mother, whose drive made his education possible and also created lasting strain. The book does more than recount a life. It shows how experience turns into fiction through memory and imagination.

His essays, gathered in The Destiny Thief (2018) and Life and Art (2025), set out the thinking under the fiction. Russo argues that a writer must meet even his most flawed characters with affection rather than judgment. Honest realism, he holds, rests on compassion. Humor again serves a serious end. It lets a character keep his dignity as security, family, or ambition starts to slip.

Alongside the fiction, Russo has built a substantial career as a screenwriter. Beyond the adaptations of Nobody’s Fool and Empire Falls, he worked with Benton on films including Twilight (1998), and later co-wrote The Ice Harvest (2005) and Keeping Mum (2005). Screenwriting sharpened an already fine ear for speech and strengthened his habit of revealing character through talk rather than long exposition.

Across his career Russo has resisted easy political and cultural narratives about the American working class. Economic decline shapes his fictional worlds, yet it never fully explains how people behave. Character, family history, local custom, chance, and moral choice carry equal weight. His towns are poor in money and rich in psychology, peopled by men and women whose flaws cannot be separated from their virtues. This refusal to reduce people to symbols has let readers across political and cultural lines see themselves in the work.

Russo stands within the line of nineteenth-century realism rather than postmodern experiment. His prose is clear and patient, simple in a way that hides its craft. He favors dialogue, observed detail, and slow emotional accumulation over display or trickery. Even his longest novels hold their shape because each scene deepens character instead of pushing plot along.

Certain themes recur through most of the work. Fathers disappoint sons and remain objects of lasting love. Mothers join sacrifice to emotional dominance. Bright children dream of escaping a small town and find themselves tethered to it. Marriage offers refuge and confinement together. Economic decline shapes identity without fixing it. Above all Russo returns to forgiveness, not as sentiment but as an acknowledgment of human limit. His characters rarely grow heroic. They grow more honest about themselves and more forgiving of others.

His honors reach beyond the Pulitzer to France’s Grand Prix de Littérature Américaine in 2017, a sign of the international standing of the work. He and his wife, Barbara, have long made Maine their home, a landscape now nearly as central to his fiction as the upstate New York of his boyhood.

His forthcoming novel, Under the Falls (2026), arrives from Knopf on August 11 and marks his most direct turn toward crime fiction. It follows Tyler Sinclair, a rock musician who returns after nearly twenty years to his small upstate New York hometown for a benefit concert honoring a boyhood friend left paralyzed by an accident. The homecoming uncovers old resentments, betrayals, and a chain of violence that reaches back to the reason for his flight. Rather than abandon his territory, Russo sets the pace of a thriller inside the moral landscape he has built across four decades, and joins suspense to his usual psychological depth and his sympathy for flawed people.

Russo holds a distinct and increasingly rare position in contemporary American letters. He sits at the meeting of literary realism and popular storytelling, and he joins psychological depth to broad accessibility. Few novelists of his generation have rendered ordinary American lives, above all those shaped by economic decline, family duty, and the stubborn hold of place, with more generosity, humor, or moral precision. Four decades after Mohawk he refines rather than reinvents his world. Under the Falls suggests he remains willing to test new forms while he keeps the qualities that have long set his work apart: emotional honesty, unsentimental compassion, and a steady faith that the most ordinary life holds inexhaustible drama.

Whom Russo Forgives

Richard Russo states a creed. The writer must meet even his most flawed characters with affection rather than judgment. Honest realism rests on compassion. He has said it in his essays and shown it across forty years of fiction, and readers take it as the mark of his generosity. A principle, though, falls on everyone. Russo’s compassion does not. It falls on some men and skips others, and the pattern of who receives it and who does not holds steady from book to book. Alliance Theory gives a way to read that pattern.

David Pinsof, David O. Sears, and Martie Haselton argue that political belief systems do not grow from abstract values like equality or authority. They grow from alliances. A man supports his allies and opposes his rivals, and the moral standards he reaches for are the tools he uses to do it. The theory runs on two assumptions. People possess a psychology for choosing allies, and people use a set of biases to support those allies in conflict. The first sorts the world. The second narrates it. Pinsof and his colleagues make one move worth holding onto here. They drop ingroup and outgroup for ally and rival, because a man can ally with a group without joining it. He can feel allegiance to police officers without being one, or resentment toward the rich while poor. A novelist allies with kinds of men. He need not be them. He needs only to take their side.

Russo chooses his allies by the cues the theory names. Similarity comes first. His sympathetic men share an origin: the dying mill town, the tannery street, the family with more pride than money. Sully in Nobody’s Fool, Sam Hall in The Risk Pool, Miles Roby in Empire Falls, Lou Lynch in Bridge of Sighs. They come from the same few blocks and carry the same wounds. Transitivity comes second. The men Russo loves stay loyal to the town’s people and stand against the town’s owners. They take no part with the developers, the bankers, the families who hold the deeds. Side with the town’s rivals and you forfeit the warmth. Interdependence comes third. Russo’s good men live inside a web of small mutual aid, the loaned twenty, the patched roof, the ride to the hospital, the job handed to a man who needs one. Sully and his crew survive on this traffic of favors. The web is the proof of membership. A man who needs no one, and whom no one needs, stands outside it.

The rivals are as consistent as the allies. The owner and the controller, Francine Whiting in Empire Falls, who holds the town through the river and the mill her family dammed and shuttered. The climber who looks down on where he came from, Clive Peoples Jr. in Nobody’s Fool, the bank man with his plan for an Ultimate Escape theme park, embarrassed by his mother and her tenants. The vain self-improver who takes another man’s wife, Walt Comeau, the Silver Fox with his health club and his whitened teeth. The careerists of Straight Man, climbing the small ladder of a failing English department. The parents of That Old Cape Magic, two academics who spent their lives certain they deserved a finer address than the one they got. These men and women leave, rise, or align with money, and the narration cools the moment they do.

Once the sides are set, Russo narrates the way the theory predicts an ally narrates. Pinsof and his colleagues describe three biases. Each appears on the page as a habit of Russo’s sympathy.

The first is the perpetrator bias. A man rationalizes his ally’s transgressions, downplays the harm, and supplies the mitigating circumstance. Sully neglects his son, skips his rent, walks off jobs, and bets money he does not have. Russo gives the reader a brutal father behind the man, a body wearing out, a pride that reads as dignity, a town that offered him nothing better. The neglect arrives wrapped in its reasons, and the reader forgives before he has finished judging. The rival’s smaller sins travel without that escort. Walt’s vanity is simply Walt. Clive’s ambition is simply Clive. The owner’s control is character, not circumstance. Russo extends the mitigating circumstance to one side of the ledger and withholds it from the other.

The second is the victim bias, and with it competitive victimhood. An ally’s grievance gets embellished and moved to the front of the story, and the blame gets laid at the rival’s feet. The town is the wronged party in nearly every Russo novel. The factories closed, the river was dammed and diverted, the work went away, and the men who stayed were left holding a place that the owners had used and discarded. The Whitings did this. The mill families did this. The grievance is real, and Russo presses it hard, and he presses only the town’s. The owners keep no diary of their own losses on his pages. One side’s injury is the engine of the book. The other side’s injury does not exist.

The third is the attributional bias, and here Russo’s memoir gives the clearest case. A man credits his ally’s virtues to character and blames his ally’s failures on circumstance, then reverses the accounting for his rival. Sully’s loyalty and Miles’s decency are simply who these men are, native and uncaused. Their poverty and their stalled lives come from outside, from luck and history and other men’s choices. The rival earns the opposite treatment. Whiting wealth is inheritance and control, never merit. The climber’s rise is folly by nature. In Elsewhere Russo writes his mother, Jean, a hard and demanding woman who shaped and strained his whole life, and late in the book he reaches the understanding that recasts her: she was ill, and the behavior he might have charged to her character belonged to a sickness she could not govern. The reattribution is an act of love. It is also the attributional bias in its purest form, the external cause that turns a difficult woman into a wronged ally and lifts the verdict the disposition would have earned.

Pinsof and his colleagues separate morality from politics. Morality is about cooperation and impartiality. Politics is about conflict and loyalty. They argue that partisans dress loyalty as principle, because calling your side moral and the other side immoral is how you draw the bystander to your side. Russo’s creed is that framing performed at the level of art. He calls his distribution of sympathy compassion, and compassion is a moral word, and the word converts a loyal act into a principled one. He forgives his allies and withholds from his rivals, and then he names the withholding clear sight, the realist’s refusal to flatter. The charge here is not bad faith. The theory assumes every man runs this psychology, the novelist no more and no less than his reader. A writer who claimed to spread his sympathy evenly across owner and worker, climber and stayer, the one who left and the one who stayed, would be the one to distrust. Russo at least aims his warmth where his loyalties lie, and aims it well.

A reader brings his own loyalties to the book, and a reader whose rivals are Russo’s rivals finds the distribution just. He supplies the transitivity himself. The mercy reads to him as wisdom about human nature, because the men receiving the mercy are the men he was already prepared to love, and the men denied it are the men he was already prepared to resist. The novel recruits him as a third party to the town’s side, and he joins without noticing he has chosen. A reader who came in with the other set of loyalties, who admired the strivers and the ones who escaped and made something the town could not give them, would feel the partiality as a draft under the door. He would see that the climber never once gets the mitigating circumstance, that the woman who leaves is drawn thinner than the man she leaves, that the owner is denied the interior life the failure is granted in full. He would call the warmth selective, and he would be right, in the exact degree that the congenial reader is right to call it wisdom.

So the compassion is real, and it is aimed, and the two facts do not cancel. Russo loves the men he loves with a steadiness few novelists reach. He built that love along a line, the line between the rooted and the risen, the loyal and the gone, the town and its owners, and he wrote the side-taking so well that taking the side feels like understanding people. A reader who finds the books congenial has been told, accurately, whose side he is on.

A conservative magazine has claimed him: City Journal ran a long appreciation titled “Tales of the Deplorables,” praising Russo as the rare serious writer who took the left-behind blue-collar town seriously when literature treated such men as rednecks and buffoons, and reading Straight Man as a road map to what college campuses have become. The right reads him as theirs. So the stigmatized populist reader does find his own dignity restored on the page, and the work draws no censure from his coalition.

Russo does not smuggle the Trump voter past the guard. He launders him, and he does it in the open. After 2016 he went on NPR and said he was heartbroken that the people he loved had lined up with Trump, and that the slogan he heard was Make America white again. He told another interviewer that Sully and Miss Beryl would never have been fooled by Trump. Read through Alliance Theory, that is a perpetrator bias turned on his own allies. His working men get the full dignity and get cleared of the sin in the same breath. The good ones would have seen through it. The bad vote belongs to a fooled subset offstage. This is how the establishment reader is licensed to love the population: Russo hands him a White working class scrubbed of the 2016 ballot, so the affection costs him nothing with his own side.

The deeper reason both coalitions can hold him is where the venom lands. Pinsof’s account splits the American upper class into two warring factions, the business elite and the intellectual elite. Russo aims contempt at both. The owner who dammed the river and shut the mill, Francine Whiting, is the business elite, and savaging her reads as anti-capital, which the left can sign. The careerist academics of Straight Man are the intellectual elite, and savaging them reads as anti-PMC, which the right can sign. He fires at each upper-class camp, so the reader in either lower coalition takes the half that flatters his side and forgives the rest. That double aim is what makes him claimable twice.

The master device, though, is that Russo is the defector, and he flagellates the class he climbed into from the inside. He has said outright that he became one of those elites Trump voters despise. He is the Gloversville boy who got the PhD and the professorship, and he turns the knife on the academy as a member of it. That self-implication buys him the license. The populist reads an insider exposing the elite. The establishment reads a member doing healthy self-criticism. Neither side can call him a traitor, because the man attacking the professional class is paying his own dues to do it. The defector who confesses escapes the punishment the defector who denies would draw.

The nationalist reader keeps the restored dignity and discards Russo’s editorial about who got fooled. He supplies his own transitivity, the same move City Journal makes when it reads Straight Man as a prophecy of campus rot Russo never wrote. The author’s disclaimer travels worse than the affect. People remember the love Russo built for the men. They forget the paragraph where he votes.

Russo is a bridging figure two super-alliances each read as their own property, which is exactly why no one stones him.

Russo’s work aligns with the observations of sociologist Stephen P. Turner in his books The Social Theory of Practices, Understanding the Tacit, Explaining the Normative, Liberal Democracy 3.0, and The Politics of Expertise.
Turner’s lifelong subject is the gap between two kinds of competence. One is tacit, embodied, picked up by exposure and habituation, carried in the hands and the ear, never fully stated. The other is explicit, codified, taught as rules, administered by people whose standing comes from holding the codes. Turner spent three books arguing that the tacit cannot be packed into the explicit without remainder, and he spent the expertise books arguing that a knowledge class governs more and more of life by converting tacit local competence into explicit rules it then certifies and enforces. Explaining the Normative is the deflationary heart of it. The “normative,” the realm of correctness and ought, is not a special substance the experts have discovered. It is a practice of holding men accountable, dressed as moral knowledge.
Now read Russo through that. The end of Straight Man puts a room full of academics in a space they cannot escape, and the narrator notes that any bricklayer or plumber would have been out in a minute. That is the whole Turner contrast in one joke. The tacit, practical man solves the room. The explicit, theorizing class cannot believe what happened to it. Russo credits the competence that lives in the hands and finds comedy in the competence that lives in the seminar. His towns run on tacit know-how and a web of local practice. The university, the bureaucracy, the HR office run on codes. When the two meet, the codes look absurd, because Russo is standing where the tacit stands and watching the explicit try to govern what it cannot see.
The PMC apparatus, the speech code, the training, the DEI module, the ever-finer adjustment of what may be said, is exactly the explicit-normativity machine Turner describes, and Russo’s world precedes it and is illegible to it. Good. That is the alignment, and it is strong.
Russo is not “strongly heteronormative” the way a man holds a position. His towns are heteronormative the way water is wet, without anyone proposing it, a tacit setting nobody in the book has been asked to defend. Call that an ideology and you have done precisely what the normativist does when he reads a settled practice as a stated claim and then demands the speaker account for it. The force of the Turner reading is that Russo makes no normative case at all. He inhabits. The instant you list him as anti-feminist, anti-DEI, anti-this-and-that, you have turned him into a position-holder in the explicit game, which is the game his fiction sits outside.
Russo’s rootedness is communal, economic, biographical, the attachment of a man to the mill town that made him and the people who stayed. It is not the ethnic-territorial mysticism that phrase names, and Russo himself put distance between his men and the racial version of populism when he said the slogan he heard in 2016 was make America white again and called it heartbreaking.
Russo is knowledge-class, the Gloversville boy who took the PhD and the chair, he became one of the elites Trump voters despise. His stated politics are liberal. Russo writes from inside the knowledge class with his loyalty pointed at the form of life that class cannot codify.
There are few contemporary novelists my male friends can read with joy, Russo is one of the tiny few. In fact, I can’t even think of another. Perhaps Jonathan Franzen.
Russo never calls the male reader to the stand. He hands him a man who drinks and skips out and lets his son down, renders him with affection, and asks the reader to laugh and forgive rather than judge. Much of the celebrated fiction a man picks up now does the reverse. It puts him on notice. It wants him aware, accountable, examined. He reads that the way he reads a performance review. Russo reads like a place where someone is glad he came in.
The reason the living version is rare ties back to the reigning apparatus, the prize committees, the review pages, the workshops, the people who decide which working novelist counts, come out of the same class that runs the refining of correct speech. That system rewards the book that performs the accounting and overlooks the book that credits a flawed man and moves the plot. So the joy-for-men novelist tends to come from one of two places. Either he is older, his persona set before the turn and grandfathered into the canon the way Russo is, or he lives in genre, where the prestige police patrol less and a man can write loyalty and appetite and violence and dialogue without apologizing for them.
Closest to Russo’s own ground are William Kennedy, the Albany novels and Ironweed, upstate working men and drink and ghosts; Russell Banks, Affliction and Continental Drift, blue-collar New England decline in a darker key; Kent Haruf, Plainsong, plain decent men on the Colorado plain told with almost no narration at all; and Richard Ford, the Frank Bascombe books, a rueful comic male interior a man recognizes in himself.
For the larger appetite, the men who write hunger and the physical world, try Jim Harrison, Legends of the Fall and the Brown Dog stories and Dalva, food and dogs and rivers and women with no apology in him anywhere; Larry McMurtry, Lonesome Dove above all, which a great many men name as the one book they would take to the island; and Pete Dexter, Train and Paris Trout, hard and spare.
The genre houses provide masculine joy. Richard Price, Clockers and Lush Life, writes the best male dialogue going. Dennis Lehane, Mystic River, gives you loyalty and class and grief in working Boston. Elmore Leonard is pure pleasure and not a wasted word. Daniel Woodrell, Winter’s Bone, is Ozark country rooted to the bone.
If you want the rooted-and-porous strain in particular, the membership-in-a-place strain, Wendell Berry and the Port William novels, Jayber Crow and Hannah Coulter, go deeper into it than Russo does, though Berry trades the comedy for elegy and asks more patience of you.
Look at how many of those dates close. That is your answer about why the shelf felt empty. The living, celebrated, joy-for-men novelist sits close to a contradiction in the present prestige economy, and Russo holds the slot nearly alone because both sides agreed, each for its own reasons, to let him keep it.

The Same Word for Different Gods

Sully is sixty and his knee is finished. A man with that knee takes the disability money, signs the form, lets a doctor in Schuyler Springs certify him broken, and spends the settlement at the bar. Sully will not sign. He enrolls instead in a community college class that might qualify him for a partial claim, fights with the instructor, half-attends, and goes back to the work his knee cannot do, hauling and lifting and climbing ladders he should not climb, for a contractor who underpays him and a town that has nothing left to build. He steals Carl Roebuck’s snowblower again as a matter of principle. He rents a room from his old eighth-grade teacher and lets her think she is looking after him while he is looking after her. He owes money he means to pay and does not. He failed his son and will not say so. Watch him from the better town across the valley and you see a man defeating himself on purpose. Stand where he stands and you see the only thing he has, kept whole at the cost of everything that would have made his life easier.

Call the thing dignity. Sully would not call it anything. The word is mine and the reader’s, and the argument here is about what the word holds, because it does not hold the same cargo for any two men who use it.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) gave us the apparatus for the question. In The Denial of Death he argued that a man lives under two terrors he cannot face directly. The first is death, the body’s certain end. The second is the smaller and crueler one, the terror of insignificance, the dread that the life adds to nothing, that a man is a brief animal who suffers and is forgotten. Against both terrors a culture hands him a hero system, a project of significance large enough to outlast him, so that by living inside it he can feel his days count against the dark. The hero system tells him what counts as a life well spent. It converts his fear into a program. Becker’s hard point is that the program is a fiction we cannot live without, a causa-sui project, the attempt to father one’s own worth. Take a man’s hero system away and you do not free him. You leave him naked in front of the two terrors with no word for what his suffering was for.

A sacred value is the load-bearing word inside such a project. It points at whatever that project has made into significance. This is why men who share a language do not share their values though they share the words for them. The word is a finger. It points at the god of the system that uses it. Dignity in Sully’s mouth points at one god. The same word in other mouths points at others, and the gods do not agree, and from each god’s vantage Sully is a different man.

Inside Sully’s system dignity is subtraction. It is built from what he refuses. He refuses to be certified broken, because the certificate would make official what the terror whispers, that he is finished, that he does not count. He refuses to leave North Bath, because leaving would be a verdict on the whole life, a confession that the town and the trade and the men in it were a mistake a smarter man would have escaped. He refuses the pity of the prosperous, the soft concern of people whose money lets them be kind, because their kindness reclassifies him as a problem and a problem is a thing, not a man. He owes no one anything he cannot pay in his own currency of showing up, taking the hit, and not complaining. His father, Big Jim, was a brutal drunk Sully spent his life refusing to become, and the refusal is its own monument, a life shaped as the photographic negative of another life. Sully’s heroism has no positive content you could write on a plaque. It is the integrity of a man who has declined every offer to be something other than what he is. The town is dying around him, the factories gone, the work gone, the young gone to the spa town or to cities, and Sully stands in the ruin keeping faith with a code that built it. That is the dignity. It is real, and it is doomed, and the second fact does not cancel the first.

Now hand the same word to other men and watch the god change.

A Benedictine looks at Sully and sees the deadliest sin wearing the mask of a virtue. The monk rises at two for Vigils, sings the Hours in a cold choir, eats what he is given, owns nothing, and obeys an abbot he did not choose. His dignity is the dignity of the creature, and it is found by subtraction of a different organ, the will. To him a man who will not be helped, who will not be dependent, who authors his own worth by refusing every hand, is not dignified. He is proud, and pride is the first sin and the root of the rest. “He thinks he made himself,” the monk says, “and so he worships the maker.” Sully’s whole project, the causa-sui, the self-fathering, is to the Benedictine the precise shape of damnation. True dignity for the monk lies in receiving, in being a son and not a maker, in letting grace and the brothers carry what the self cannot. The act Sully reads as keeping his soul, the monk reads as losing it.

The founder in the glass office reads the same act as cowardice. He wears the vest and drinks the cold brew and keeps a term sheet open in another tab. His dignity is optionality, the freedom never to be trapped, the right to exit. To stay nineteen years in a dead town doing dying work is to him not a tragedy but a moral failure, a refusal of agency dressed up as loyalty. “Why would anyone choose that?” he asks, and the question is sincere, because in his system choosing your cage is the one unforgivable thing. Ambition is not a vice to him. It is the substance of dignity. A man who will not scale, who will not move, who lets a bad knee and a bad town define the size of his life, has failed the only test his hero system sets. Where Sully sees fidelity the founder sees surrender.

The gunnery sergeant gets half of Sully and rejects the other half. He has the high-and-tight and the bearing and twenty years of never quitting a post, and he honors the part of Sully that takes the hit and does not whine. But his dignity belongs to the unit and the chain, the men on his left and right, the colors. A man’s worth in his system flows from subordination to something larger than the man, and Sully is loyal to no chain. He answers to no one and stands beside no one in formation. “You don’t get to opt out, Sullivan,” the sergeant would say, and mean it as the deepest charge he knows. The lone man keeping a private code is to him a half-formed thing, dignity without a flag, courage spent on nothing bigger than himself.

The grandmother in the apartment with the plastic on the sofa reads dignity through the line. Her husband’s photograph hangs over the rice cooker. She absorbed forty years of insult and labor so the grandson could go to a school whose name she cannot pronounce, and the envelope of cash she presses on him is the visible shape of her worth. Her dignity is what she suffered and gave for the people who come after. By her measure Sully’s account is overdrawn at the one ledger that counts, because he failed his son, drifted out of the boy’s life the way his own father drifted out of his, and a man who breaks the line has no dignity left to refuse anything with. “What did he do it for, then,” she asks, “if not for the children.” In her system the answer Sully gives, that he did it for nothing but to stay himself, is no answer.

The ethicist in the clinic reads dignity as autonomy, and Sully’s knee horrifies her. She has the advance directive and the morphine pump and the language of patient self-determination, and her sacred value is the right of a man to be free of avoidable suffering and to set the terms of his own body. A man grinding a ruined joint up a ladder he should not climb, refusing the help and the relief on hand, calling the refusal pride, is to her the negation of dignity, a person denied options who has confused the denial with virtue. Her dignity wants Sully comfortable, supported, and in control. His wants none of those things, and would name all three as the soft cage the founder names differently.

Only the Stoic comes close, and the closeness shows the gap. The Stoic’s dignitas is inner sovereignty, the worth that no loss of fortune can touch, the soul standing upright while the body and the city fall. He alone would look at Sully and almost see a brother, a man indifferent to the verdicts of the prosperous, keeping his bearing in the ruin. But the Stoic locates the sovereign self in the reasoning mind, detached from the world’s wreckage, and Sully locates it in the body’s stubborn fidelity to a place and a trade. The Stoic rises above the dying town. Sully goes down with it on purpose. The Stoic’s dignity is freedom from the world. Sully’s is the refusal to be free of his. They use the one word and point at opposite heavens, and the near-miss is sharper than any of the clean misses, because it shows that even agreement on the word is agreement on nothing.

Here is the part the other essays leave out. A hero system answers the death-terror by promising to outlast the man. The monk’s order has stood fifteen centuries and will bury him and continue. The founder’s system worships a future it is racing toward. The sergeant’s colors pass to the next class of recruits. The grandmother’s line is the future, by definition. Each of these gods has somewhere to go. Sully’s does not. The working man’s dignity-in-staying is staked on a town with no tomorrow, a trade no one will inherit, a code the young have already left for the cities and the screens. He is the last practitioner of an immortality project with no heir. This is the cruelty and the grandeur Russo found and kept returning to. Becker’s whole theory rests on the hero system being able to promise duration, and Sully runs the program with the duration visibly draining out of it, keeping faith with a god he half-knows is dying. There is no purer denial of death than that, and none more exposed. The comedy and the tenderness in the books live at that exact spot, the man and the dying world he will not abandon, the snowblower stolen one more time on principle from a system that has already won.

Which returns the question to the reader, where Becker says it always ends. To find Sully’s refusals legible as dignity rather than as folly, a man has to share enough of the system to read the subtraction as significance. The founder cannot. The monk cannot. The grandmother cannot. Each loves a different god and so each sees a different Sully, fool or sinner or coward or saint, and never twice the same. The reader who closes the book warmed rather than exasperated has told on himself. He runs a compatible project. He needs the word to point where Sully points, toward a worth made of fidelity and refusal and staying put, because some part of him is also keeping faith with a god that the smart money has written off. That is not a literary judgment. It is kinship, in the only sense Becker allowed the word, two men sheltering under the same fiction against the same two terrors, calling it by the same name, and meaning, for once, the same thing.

The Convertible Life

A man is born in Gloversville to the smell of the tanneries. His grandfather works the hides. The town makes gloves until the work goes south and overseas, and the creeks run colored with the runoff, and the boy grows up inside the taste of necessity, where you eat what there is and want what you can get and learn the price of everything early. Then the boy leaves. He takes a degree at Arizona, switches from geography to literature, earns a master’s and a doctorate, writes a dissertation on the fiction of Charles Brockden Brown, and stands in front of a classroom at Colby College in Maine drawing a salary for the possession of a thing his grandfather never had a word for. He has converted a childhood of scarcity into the rarest and most legitimate currency the culture mints. Then he quits the classroom in 1996 and spends the rest of his life writing about the world he climbed out of, and a country of readers who never smelled a tannery hands him a Pulitzer for it.

Richard Russo is the case study before he is the author of any. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), the son of a postal clerk in a Béarn village in the southwest of France, climbed the same ladder, through the elite school and the agrégation to a chair at the Collège de France, and spent a career building the instruments to anatomize his own ascent. He had a name for the man this climb produces. The habitus clivé, the cleft habitus, the disposition split down the middle by a passage between two worlds, at home in neither, carrying the village in the body while wearing the consecration of the academy on the back. Bourdieu turned the instrument on himself. The thing that makes Russo a textbook case also makes him a useful one, because the cleft is a wound and a lens at once, and a man who has lived in both fields can read the comportment of each. He writes the world that formed his body using the tools of the world that certified his mind, and the friction between the two is the subject under all his subjects.

Begin with the body, because Bourdieu does. The habitus is history turned into nature, the durable set of dispositions a man takes in before he can name them, the feel for the game that tells him without thinking what to want, how to stand, what to find funny, what to fear, what is for the likes of him and what is not. It is laid down in childhood and it does not wash out. Income changes. The habitus is slower. This is why Russo can write Sully, a man with no money at sixty and a finished knee, as a man whose dignity is fixed and unmistakable, while he writes the climbers as men whose acquired capital never fully covers the origin in the hexis, the walk, the way the hands sit at a table they were not raised to sit at. The diner and the country club sort men by a hundred small tells, the brand of beer, the make of truck, the cut of a joke, the distance a man keeps from another man’s trouble. The prosperous in Schuyler Springs practice the taste of liberty, the aesthetic distance that a cushion of money buys, the freedom to treat life as a thing to be appreciated rather than survived. The men in North Bath practice the taste of necessity, the virtue made of what there was no choice about. Russo renders both registers from inside, because he carries both, and the rendering is the cleft habitus put to work.

The clearest map is in Bridge of Sighs, where Thomaston sorts itself by the sides of the tracks and the children learn the geography of their worth before they learn anything else. The novel splits the working-class boy into two and follows both fates. Lucy Lynch stays, keeps the corner store, marries the girl, builds his life inside the taste of necessity and calls it good, and his optimism is the misrecognition Bourdieu described, the dominated man accepting the map that places him, finding the placement natural and even kind. Bobby Marconi gets out. He becomes Robert Noonan, the consecrated painter in Venice, the boy who converted the wrong side of the tracks into symbolic capital at the dominant pole of an international field. The two of them are the alternative endings of one trajectory, the stayer and the migrant, and Russo, who is Noonan in his biography and writes with Lucy’s tenderness, splits himself across the pair. The town’s spatial order is symbolic violence rendered as scenery. Where a family lives, which street, how near the tannery stink, tells every child what he may want, and the cruelty is that the order presents as the way things are rather than as a thing done to anyone.

Bourdieu has a name as well for what happens to North Bath, and it is the sharpest tool the frame lends Russo’s subject. A field is a game with stakes and a feel for those stakes, and the habitus is the body tuned to a particular game. Close the game and the bodies remain, tuned to nothing. Hysteresis, Bourdieu called the lag, the Don Quixote effect, the dispositions formed for a world that has shut. The mill economy made men whose pride, skills, and sense of a life well spent all pointed at work that no longer exists. Sully knows in his hands how to do a hundred things the town will never again pay a man to do. His habitus is not wrong. It is stranded. The disposition that would have made him a solid provider in 1955 makes him a comic anachronism in the present, a man swinging at a game that has left the field, and the comedy and the ache both come from the gap between the body’s tuning and the world’s. Russo’s whole territory, the deindustrialized town and the men marooned in it, is hysteresis given streets and faces. The economy that gave their habitus its sense withdrew, and left the habitus running.

Then there is the field he climbed into, and in Straight Man he turns the instrument on the academy with the accuracy of a man who knows the game from the inside and has lost the illusio, the belief that the stakes are worth the war. A field runs on that belief. The players must hold that the prize is real, the chair worth seizing, the slight worth avenging, or the whole structure goes slack. Hank Devereaux is the disabused insider, the man with the full cultural capital and none of the faith, and his refusal to take the department’s blood feuds seriously is itself a position in the field, the stance of the consecrated man who can afford contempt for the game that made him. The comedy of the novel is the comedy Bourdieu found in every autonomous field, ferocious investment in stakes that look like nothing from outside, a war of all against all over a line in a budget, a course release, a parking space, because the value of those things is internal to the game and invisible to anyone not playing it. The English department is the literary field in miniature, and Russo, who left it, can see the smallness of the stakes and the size of the passion at once.

Which brings the frame to its double payoff, the turn that makes Russo more than a man who writes about class. He writes the taste of necessity from a position at the dominant pole, for an audience seated beside him there. The reader of a Russo novel is, by the brute statistics of who buys hardcover literary fiction and joins a televised book club, far more likely to summer in a Schuyler Springs than to wait tables in a North Bath. The working-class life on the page is an object in the field of cultural production, and its consecration, the Pulitzer, the prize in France, the selection by Oprah Winfrey, certifies the taste of the consumers as much as it honors the dignity of the subjects. Bourdieu demanded that the analyst objectify his own position, account for the desk he writes from, because the scholastic point of view, the view of the man whose ease lets him treat the world as a spectacle, distorts what it sees. Russo’s compassion is produced from accumulated and consecrated capital. The boy from the tanneries turned the tanneries into the rarest currency there is, and the conversion is the achievement and the problem together, because the men he renders with such love cannot read the rendering, and the men who can are buying a feeling about a life they have arranged never to live.

Hold both halves, because Bourdieu held both about himself. The cleft habitus is the wound that produces the lucidity. A man who had only ever stood at the dominant pole would write North Bath as charity or as zoo. A man who had never left would lack the instruments to write it as anything. Russo carries the village in the body and the academy on the back, and the friction is the source of the sight. He sees the taste of necessity from inside because it is his, and he sees its conversion into distinction because he performed the conversion himself, and the second sight is the one that keeps the books honest, the faint awareness running under the warmth that the warmth is a product, refined and sold at the pole his characters will never reach. The convertible life is the whole subject. A man takes the one capital his origin gave him, the knowledge of how the unprosperous actually live and what their dignity is made of, and he converts it into the capital his destination rewards, and he grows famous and decorated for the conversion, and the people whose lives supplied the raw material remain exactly where the map of the tracks placed them. Russo knows this. The knowing is the cleft, and the cleft is the gift.

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What the Clinician Knows: The Career of Amy Bloom

Amy Bloom (b. June 18, 1953) writes fiction, memoir, essays, and television scripts, and she trained and practiced as a psychotherapist for more than twenty years before she built her literary reputation. The sequence reverses the usual one. Most novelists come to psychology, if at all, through reading. Bloom came to fiction through the consulting room, and the consulting room shaped the prose that followed.

She was born Amy Beth Bloom in New York City into a home where storytelling and psychological inquiry sat side by side. Her father, Murray Teigh Bloom, wrote for a living. Her mother, Sydelle Cohen, practiced psychotherapy. In an interview with me in 2009, Bloom described a household that placed an unusual premium on literacy and almost no premium on the markers of middle-class striving. Her parents bought no braces and arranged no nose jobs, and nobody, she recalled, drummed achievement into the children. The unspoken message from her father, she said, ran something like this: anyone who could read and write well would be fine, and his worries ended once his children were literate. That early indifference to credentialing produced a writer who measures her work against an internal standard rather than against applause.

She attended Wesleyan University, graduated magna cum laude with degrees in theater and political science, and earned election to Phi Beta Kappa. As a child she wanted, in her own words, to be a reader and to be left in peace. She entertained a brief fantasy of becoming a warrior, a Joan of Arc without the auditory hallucinations and the fire, and then set ambition aside. Through most of college she waited tables and tended bar. She considered law, partly because her oldest sister practiced it well, and abandoned the idea after watching her sister defend a man Bloom judged guilty. She thought she might direct in the theater. None of these paths held.

After Wesleyan she earned a Master of Social Work from Smith College and opened a psychotherapy practice in Connecticut that she kept for more than two decades. The clinical years gave her the raw material of her imagination and a method of attention. She learned to watch the gap between what a person says and what a person feels, to let people finish their own sentences, and to treat behavior as evidence rather than as occasion for verdict. She has said that her training reinforced an inclination she already had toward observation.

Her transit from therapy to authorship has the quality of an accident she did not resist. On the drive home from a meeting with the analyst who might have supervised her training as a psychoanalyst, she found herself working out a plot for a murder mystery. She passed the college where she had tended bar, where her last task at each alumni party had been to wake the old graduates and confirm they were still alive, and she imagined how it might play if one of them were dead. By the time she reached home she had fifteen pages of notes. She telephoned the analyst and told him she would not begin training. His reply, as she recounts it, was practical: neither of them was getting any younger, and she should not dawdle. The mystery served as a warm-up. Halfway through it she began writing short stories.

Bloom entered American letters with the story collection Come to Me in 1993. The book reached the finals for the National Book Award and announced a writer who could render ordinary lives with exact emotional pressure. At a moment when literary minimalism set the terms for much short fiction, her stories carried warmth and psychological range while holding to a spare line. Her recurring subjects appeared at once: divorce, illness, grief, sexual identity, and families assembled outside the conventional pattern. She treats behavior as evidence rather than as occasion for verdict. She tends to withhold explanation and to let dialogue and observed gesture carry the emotional freight.

Her first novel, Love Invents Us, followed in 1997 and tracked Elizabeth Taube from a starved girlhood on suburban Long Island through the loves that form her. Her second story collection, A Blind Man Can See How Much I Love You (2000), reached the finals for the National Book Critics Circle Award and fixed her standing among the country’s leading practitioners of the form. She has remained loyal to the short story across her career on the conviction that the large transformations of a life often occur in small moments rather than at obvious turning points.

Her nonfiction book Normal: Transsexual CEOs, Crossdressing Cops, and Hermaphrodites with Attitude (2002) examined transgender and intersex lives with the same clinical curiosity she brings to her characters, and it did so years before such subjects moved to the center of public argument. The book trades sensation for close attention.

Away (2007) widened her canvas. The novel follows Lillian Leyb, a Russian Jewish immigrant who survives anti-Jewish violence in Eastern Europe and crosses the continent in search of her lost daughter. Bloom joined archival research to an intimate narrative line and treated immigration as an experience of grief and endurance rather than as a parable of triumphant arrival. The book won the Janet Heidinger Kafka Prize and drew praise for its prose and its handling of displacement. A third story collection, Where the God of Love Hangs Out, appeared in 2010.

She kept moving between the family chronicle and the historical novel. Lucky Us (2014) follows two half sisters through the Depression and the Second World War. White Houses (2018) imagines the interior of the relationship between Eleanor Roosevelt and the journalist Lorena Hickok, a choice that reflects her long attention to attachments that form outside the sanctioned categories.

In 2022 Bloom published her most personal book, the memoir In Love. It recounts her husband Brian Ameche’s diagnosis with early-onset Alzheimer’s disease and the couple’s decision to travel to the Swiss organization Dignitas, where he ended his life through accompanied dying. Ameche was her husband of twelve years, a former Yale football player who practiced architecture for four decades. The narrative opens with their trip to Zurich in January 2020. Bloom writes with restraint about autonomy, marriage, and the obligations a spouse carries through a terminal illness, and the memoir became a New York Times bestseller and opened a public conversation about assisted dying and caregiving.

She returned to the family saga with I’ll Be Right Here (Random House, 2025), a multigenerational novel that follows an unconventional Jewish family from prewar Paris into postwar America and gathers her standing themes: chosen kin, resilience, displacement, the persistence of love after loss. The following year she entered a new genre. Blunt Instrument (Mysterious Press, June 2, 2026) opens the Dell Chandler mystery series, with a failed English professor turned private investigator drawn into the death of a professor at a Connecticut college. Reviewers received it as an assured genre debut that kept her wit and her command of character intact.

Her career has run beyond books. In 2007 she created and wrote State of Mind, a Lifetime drama starring Lili Taylor as a psychotherapist managing her practice and her tangled private life. She published a children’s book, Little Sweet Potato, in 2012. Alongside the writing she built an academic career, teaching creative writing for years at Yale University before moving to Wesleyan, where she served as the Kim-Frank Family University Writer in Residence, then as the Shapiro-Silverberg Professor of Creative Writing, and as director of the university’s Shapiro Center. Her classroom doctrine favors observation over theory. She presses students to find character through attention to behavior and language rather than to impose a theme on a story.

Bloom occupies a settled place within the literary community. She edited The Best American Short Stories 2014, and her own stories have appeared in that series and in The O. Henry Prize Stories. She won a National Magazine Award for fiction, and her essays have run in The New Yorker, The New York Times Magazine, The Atlantic, Vogue, Slate, Salon, and New York Magazine.

In 2009, she told me that God has never held currency for her, that her parents identified strongly as Jews while professing atheism, and that she entered a synagogue as a child only to accompany her grandparents so the family would keep the peace. She likened the condition of being Jewish to the condition of a fish asked to describe water. She also named, without melodrama, the casual anti-Semitism she has met outside heavily Jewish settings, the remark that she does not seem Jewish, the surprise that she seems so nice.

She revises a piece many times, sometimes past thirty drafts, reads it aloud, and stops when it reaches the best she can manage. The verdict is mostly internal. External praise pleases her without governing her. She holds that her obligation runs to the work, that she should not publish what she judges to be poor, and that in writing she has no one to blame but herself. She quotes Swift on the folly of wanting to meet the writer because one admires the book, the way a man might wish to know the chicken because he likes the eggs.

A few commitments run through the body of work. Bloom declines to sort people into heroes and villains and prefers characters whose virtues and faults hold at the same time. She returns to chosen families, on the view that love often grows through deliberate attachment rather than blood. She writes about sexuality, aging, illness, and death as ordinary features of a life rather than as exceptional conditions, and her years as a therapist give her dialogue a documentary authenticity. Her line is compressed and confident. She builds scenes and trusts the reader to draw the emotional inference from a gesture. Humor sits beside grief in her pages, and acts of care interrupt suffering. Across more than three decades she has resisted cynicism and kept her interest fixed on resilience, forgiveness, and the small decisions through which people go on caring for one another.

Hero System

Her titles keep returning to one word. A Blind Man Can See How Much I Love You. Love Invents Us. Where the God of Love Hangs Out. In Love. Four books, one word, and the word reads like a password into a faith her readers assume they share with her. Most of them do not share it. They recognize the spelling and miss the doctrine.
Ernest Becker (1924-1974) argued in The Denial of Death (1973) that a man arranges his life against the knowledge that he will die, and that he buys significance by serving something he treats as deathless. The deathless thing changes by culture. The warrior serves the tribe, the monk serves God, the maker serves the work. Each calls his own version sacred and finds the rest strange or small. A sacred word crosses between these worlds and loses its meaning at every border. For Amy Bloom the border runs through the word love, and her love would be unrecognizable to most of the people who use it.
In 2009 she told me that her parents identified as Jews and professed atheism, that she entered a synagogue as a girl only to spare her grandparents. Her love cannot point upward. It has no heaven to climb toward and no judge to satisfy. It travels sideways, mortal to mortal, and then it ends, because the people end.
Twenty years in a Connecticut consulting room gave her the discipline the fiction runs on. She watches the space between what a person says and what he feels. She lets people finish their own sentences. She withholds the verdict. In her stories the hero and the villain collapse into the same flawed person, observed without flinching and without flattery. To love, in her cosmos, is to look at a man clearly and tell the truth about him. The heroic act is attention.
Two threats stalk this faith. The first is the body’s end, which she refuses to dress up or postpone with comforting talk. The second is the consoling lie, the flattering sentence, the moral cartoon that turns a person into a saint or a monster. Each is a death. The first kills the man. The second kills the truth of him, and for a writer with no afterlife the truth of him is the only part that lasts. She revises past thirty drafts and will not publish what she judges poor. She says she has no one to blame but herself. The well-made sentence is the closest thing to permanence she lets herself want. A physician near seventy once approached her in Amsterdam and said of a character, she is me, the way she lived is the way I have lived, thank you. That recognition is the only resurrection she claims.
Carry the word into other rooms and watch it turn into something else.
A Trappist rises for the night office at three. He wears the white cowl, takes oatmeal in silence, keeps the hours that have not changed in centuries. For him love empties the self toward God. The brother in the next stall is the occasion of love, not its object. To fix his whole heart on one mortal man, with no reference above, would steal from the love owed to Him. He hears Bloom’s devotion to a single dying husband as tender and unfinished, a candle lit in a room with no window.
A gray-bearded elder sits on a charpoy in Khost and pours green tea into a glass. At the meal he seats the guest above his own sons. For him love is loyalty to blood and the debt that loyalty carries, the welcome owed a stranger and the vengeance owed an insult. Love that failed to answer harm done to kin would be a counterfeit. He hears the phrase chosen family as a contradiction in the grammar. You do not choose your family. Your family is chosen for you, before your birth, by blood that has nothing to ask of your preferences.
A young man in Berkeley works at a standing desk with a tab open to a cost-effectiveness estimate and a glass of oat milk going warm beside the keyboard. For him love that spends months and savings escorting one husband through a private death, while children die of malaria for the price of a bed net, is love misallocated. Love must scale. Love kept impartial does the most good, and love kept partial is favoritism wearing better clothes. He admires her prose and mourns her arithmetic.
A surgeon works a field hospital under canvas, the cots ordered by who can still be saved. He loves the wounded by sorting them. The corpsman points to a man and asks, this one, and the surgeon lays a hand on the shoulder, says he’s gone, and moves to the next cot. Love that lingered over the dying would cost the living man his leg. To love here is to keep moving and to keep deciding.
The list runs on. The widow in forty years of black, for whom love is grief that never stops, since to stop grieving would be to stop loving. The patriot, for whom love is the readiness to die for a flag. The parent, for whom love is the hand that will not let go. The same five letters, a dozen incompatible religions, and the worshippers in each find the others sentimental, cold, fanatical, or naive.
Bloom’s love is what survives the subtraction. Charles Taylor (b. 1931) calls the secular self-account a subtraction story, the claim that we stripped away God and superstition and consoling fiction and reached the world underneath. Take away the heaven the monk climbs toward. Take away the blood-debt the elder honors. Take away the spreadsheet, the flag, the black dress. What remains is a flawed mortal you must look at with clear eyes and love regardless, knowing he will die and stay dead. That is all of it. The astonishing thing is that she finds it enough.
The faith meets its trial in In Love. Zurich, January 2020, a car service to the airport, business-class pods her sister has paid for, two travelers who are polite to the flight attendants and happy to be going somewhere together. They are going to Dignitas. Brian Ameche (d. 2020), her husband of twelve years, a big man who played football at Yale and designed buildings for forty years, has early-onset Alzheimer’s and has told her he would rather die standing than live on his knees. She researches the options at his direction. She manages the interviews and the paperwork. She sits in the room and lets him go.
Here her love must do what no other faith on the tour will ask of it. The monk’s love keeps the man alive for God to gather in His own time. The elder’s love never delivers the beloved to strangers in a foreign suburb. The surgeon triages bodies he means to save. The widow nurses to the final breath and grieves four decades after. Bloom books the flight, holds his hand, and helps him stop existing, because she has defined love as fidelity to what the person wants and the refusal to lie to him about what is coming. The book is the test and the cost of the definition. It asks whether a love with no heaven behind it can carry the weight of a death, and she stakes the answer on the prose holding steady, which it does.
So she can be located. The sacred sits inside the human, in the quality of attention one mortal pays another, with nothing above it and nothing after. The cost is consolation. She surrenders the afterlife, the verdict, and the comforting story, and keeps the clear look in exchange. And the limit. Her love saves no one. It could not save Brian. It could sit in the room with him and refuse to look away. For a writer who believes the body ends and nothing follows, sitting in the room and refusing to look away is the largest thing a hero can do, and she has spent a career insisting it is large enough.

The Voice

Bloom writes in the present tense and trusts it to do the work that other writers hand to drama. The present tense keeps her level with her characters. She is not reporting a settled past from a height. She stands inside the moment and watches it the way she once watched a patient, alert to the distance between what a person says and what the person feels. The composure is the first thing you notice and the hardest to account for, because the material underneath it is rarely calm.
Her diction sits on a plain Anglo-Saxon floor and rises from there by surprise. She builds a sentence out of small ordinary words, then lets one literary lift or one piece of Yiddish or one flat vulgarism drop into it, and the collision carries the charge. The opening of In Love treats the trip to an assisted death as a couple’s familiar pleasure, travel and shopping, a car service so they can feel fancy and skip the park-and-shlep. The Yiddish noun lands in the middle of the gravest errand of her life and does not lighten it so much as humanize it. She seasons high feeling with the kitchen vocabulary of a marriage. The effect is intimacy, the sense that you are hearing a private register most writers clean up before publication.
The wit runs on a single move, repeated across decades. She offers the romantic or the tender image and then amputates it with a clinical detail. She told me that as a child she thought she might be a warrior, a Joan of Arc, and then cut the line with the hallucinations and the burning. She gives you the silk and then names the thread count. In Blunt Instrument (2026) the detective rates her own body in tailored clothes and then in ruffles, where she compares herself to a beribboned side of beef. The sentence builds on a flat declarative rhythm and saves the deflating simile for the end. That is her comic architecture in miniature, the periodic sentence that withholds its sting until the last beat.
Notice what the wit is for. It guards against sentiment. Bloom feels deeply and distrusts the prose that announces deep feeling, so she lets comedy arrive a half second before the emotion can curdle. The joke is the breakwater. Behind it the grief sits at full height, undiminished, because she never used the joke to deny the grief, only to keep it from spilling into bathos. Most writers who are funny about death are running from it. Bloom is funny about death while looking straight at it, and the two operations holding at once is the rarest thing she does.
Her rhetoric is the rhetoric of withholding. She declines the verdict. She lets dialogue and observed gesture carry the meaning and trusts the reader to draw the inference she refuses to state. The hero and the villain dissolve into the same flawed person, watched without flattery and without contempt. This is the therapist’s neutrality turned into a literary method, the discipline of letting people finish their own sentences. She does not explain her characters. She arranges the evidence and steps back, which puts an unusual demand on the reader and pays the reader an unusual respect.
She favors the catalog. The list is her instrument for getting the texture of a life onto the page fast, the modes of travel, the clothes that flatter and the clothes that do not, the small consumer facts of business class. The list also lets her hide feeling inside inventory. She will name six ordinary things and let the seventh carry the weight the first six were softening you to receive. When she breaks a parallel series, she breaks it on purpose, and the broken beat is where the truth usually sits.
Her aphorisms close like a lid. No one loves business class more than people who always fly coach. The line about wanting to know the writer because you admire the work, which she borrows from Swift, the chicken and the egg. She reaches for the compressed general statement at the moment a lesser writer reaches for explanation, and the compression does more than the explanation could. The aphorism is her way of ending a passage without summarizing it.
Asked what she writes out of, she named a kind of love and a kind of loneliness and then a third thing she said she could not identify. She will push a description as far as language takes her and then report the point where language stops rather than fake the last yard. That refusal to oversell the inner life reads, on the page, as trust. You believe her about the feelings she names because she tells you when she has run out of names.
The manner, finally, is the manner of a clinician who became an artist and kept the bedside composure. She does not raise her voice. She does not flatter the reader or herself. She told Ford she will not publish what she judges poor and that in writing she has no one to blame, and that severity shows in the finished line, which has been revised past thirty drafts to the point where nothing decorative survives. What remains is compression, plain words set in varied rhythm, comedy carrying grief, and a steady refusal to look away from the person in front of her. The voice is the sound of someone who spent twenty years being trusted with what people could not say, and who learned to write it down without breaking the trust.

The Set

Picture the room. A converted barn or a brownstone parlor, good light, more books than wall. The wine is decent and nobody comments on it, because commenting on it would be the wrong kind of noticing. The people in the room have published, taught, edited, judged, or reviewed, and they can place one another within a sentence or two of conversation by the names they drop and the names they withhold. This is the world of the consecrated American literary writer at the turn of the millennium and after, and Amy Bloom sits near its center.

Name the set. The peers and near-peers are the writers of literary realism who came up through the story collection and the small magazine and the prize: Alice Munro (1931-2024) as the patron saint of the form, Lorrie Moore (b. 1957), Antonya Nelson (b. 1953), Andrea Barrett (b. 1954), Tobias Wolff (b. 1945), Richard Russo (b. 1949), Michael Cunningham (b. 1952), Jennifer Egan (b. 1962), Ann Patchett (b. 1963). The forebears they invoke are Chekhov first and always, then Grace Paley (1922-2007), John Cheever (1912-1982), Mavis Gallant (1922-2014), Eudora Welty (1909-2001). The institutions that hold the set together are The New Yorker fiction pages, the editorship of an editor like the late Bill Buford or his successors, the Iowa and Bread Loaf and Sewanee circuits, the Best American and O. Henry anthologies, the National Book Award and the National Book Critics Circle, the endowed chair at Yale or Wesleyan or Bennington. Bloom holds the Shapiro-Silverberg chair, directed the Shapiro Center, edited The Best American Short Stories 2014, and reached the finals for both the major prizes. She has the full set of credentials the set recognizes.

What they value comes down to attention, control, and the refusal of cheap effect. The highest praise in this world is that a writer sees clearly and tells the truth about ordinary people without flattering them or condemning them. The sentence must be earned. The feeling must be controlled. Sentiment is the cardinal sin, and so is its opposite, the cold cleverness that performs intelligence at the expense of warmth. The set wants both heat and discipline, the deep feeling held inside the well-made line. Bloom’s own credo fits the room exactly. She revises past thirty drafts, refuses to publish what she judges poor, and measures the work against an internal standard rather than the market.

The hero of this world is the writer who serves the work and not the reward. The economic rewards come and go, as Bloom told me, and saying so out loud is part of the performance, because the hero is supposed to be indifferent to money and devoted to the sentence. The deathless thing they serve is the work that lasts, the story a stranger will recognize himself in years later, the physician in Amsterdam who told her she is me. With no shared religion in the room, the work carries the weight a faith would carry elsewhere. To make a true sentence is the nearest thing to permanence.

The status games are subtle and constant. Open prestige-seeking is forbidden, so prestige is sought sideways. You signal by what you have read, by the obscurity and rightness of your enthusiasms, by the writers you decline to praise. You accrue capital through the right magazine, the right prize shortlist, the blurb you give and the blurb you receive, the anthology that selects you and later the anthology you get to edit. The editorship is the move that announces arrival, because the one who was selected now selects. Teaching at the right program ranks you. Being asked to judge ranks you. The set polices a boundary between art and the marketplace, and the policing is itself a status game, since the writer who needs the money least can disdain it most convincingly. Bloom plays this from a secure position and breaks one of its rules on purpose. She is candid about money where the room prefers discretion, the detective’s daily fee turned into a joke, the author photo calibrated so readers recognize her in the bookstore. The candor is a small flex. Only the secure can be that frank.

Their normative claims, the shoulds, run like this. A writer should observe before judging. A writer should grant every character interiority, including the unlikable one, because withholding it is a failure of craft and of decency at once. A writer should resist the moral cartoon, the saint and the monster, and should let dialogue and gesture carry meaning rather than explain. A writer should extend recognition to lives the wider culture has refused to see, which is why Bloom’s Normal on trans and intersex lives, and White Houses (2018) on a hidden same-sex attachment, read inside the set as exemplary rather than daring. A writer should be honest about sex, illness, aging, and death and should treat them as ordinary rather than scandalous. And a writer should never, under any circumstance, be sentimental.

Their essentialist claims, the deep beliefs about what people are, sit underneath the norms. People are mixed, never pure, virtue and fault holding in the same person at once. Character is revealed in behavior and in the gap between what a person says and what he feels, which is why the trained ear ranks so high. Love is the central human fact and it is mortal, horizontal, and unsponsored by heaven, at least in the secular wing where Bloom lives. The family you choose can outweigh the family you were born to. And ordinary life, not the grand event, is where the real transformations happen, which is the creed that justifies the short story as a form equal to the novel.

The moral grammar of the room is the grammar of empathy disciplined by craft. Judgment is suspect. Curiosity is sacred. The worst thing you can say of a writer is that she is cruel to her characters or, just as bad, that she loves them too easily. The right relation to a character is the therapist’s relation to a patient, close attention without verdict, and the set treats that stance as both an aesthetic and an ethic, the two fused so the good sentence and the good act become the same gesture. Cynicism is permitted in the work only if compassion survives it. Bloom is the set’s clean case here, funny about death while looking straight at it, the comedy guarding the grief rather than denying it.

Two tensions run through the world. The first is the tension between the autonomous claim, that they write for the work alone, and the apparatus of prizes, chairs, and anthologies that they plainly want and compete for. The set resolves this by making the wanting unspeakable, and Bloom strains the resolution by speaking it. The second is the tension between the duty to extend recognition to the marginal and the high-cultural register that keeps the work legible mostly to people already inside the room. They write generously about lives at the edge in a prose style that the edge is unlikely to read. Bloom’s late turn to the detective novel with Blunt Instrument (2026) reads, against this, as a quiet reach across the boundary, the consecrated writer spending some prestige to be read more widely, a move the set tolerates from her because she banked enough standing to make it without losing caste.

That is the social world. A room of secular humanists who replaced God with the well-made sentence, who treat clear-eyed attention as the highest virtue and sentimentality as the gravest sin, who compete fiercely while forbidding the appearance of competition, and who hold, as their bedrock belief, that the truest thing you can do for another person is to look at him without looking away. Bloom did that for twenty years in a consulting room before she did it on the page, which is why the room regards her as one of its own and one of its best.

Amy Bloom and the Knowledge That Will Not Be Stated

Stephen Turner (b. 1951) spent a career arguing against a comfortable idea, the idea that beneath our skills lies a body of tacit knowledge, a hidden rulebook we follow without knowing it. In The Social Theory of Practices (1994) he pressed the question that the phrase tends to dodge. Where does this knowledge sit, and how does it pass from one person to another? If a master has internalized rules he cannot state, and a student acquires the same competence, what exactly moved between them? Turner’s answer is that nothing was transmitted, because there was no shared hidden object to transmit. Each person grows his own habits, by his own history, and the habits happen to produce similar performances. The talk of transmitted tacit knowledge is a hopeful fiction we tell to explain a likeness we cannot otherwise account for. Run this skeptical instrument over Amy Bloom, a writer whose whole method lives below the level of statable rule, and watch what it exposes.
Bloom describes her craft in terms that all point downward, away from articulation. She told me that her psychotherapy training reinforced an inclination she already had, that by nature she likes to observe, that she pays attention to the gap between what a person says and how he feels. Read that sentence as Turner would. The training did not install a procedure. It met a disposition already present and strengthened it. Two decades in a Connecticut consulting room did not give Bloom a transferable technique so much as deepen a habit she brought with her, the habit of watching. Turner would press the point. The training cannot have transmitted the watching, because the watching was there first. What the training did was give a private disposition more occasions to run, more hours of practice, until it hardened into the thing reviewers later call her ear.
The ear is the crux. Critics reach for it constantly, the authenticity of her dialogue, the accuracy of her emotional registration, and they explain it by pointing to the twenty clinical years, as though the practice deposited a knowledge that then surfaced in the prose. Turner would call this the explanation that explains nothing. There is no portable object called the ear that passed from the therapy into the fiction. There is a woman who got very good at one performance, attending to the distance between speech and feeling, through long repetition, and who turned out to be good at a second performance that draws on the same disposition. The continuity is real. The transmitted substance is a fiction we use to name the continuity. Bloom did not carry knowledge from the office to the desk. She carried herself, the same nervous system trained on the same task, and the likeness between the clinician and the novelist is the likeness of one person doing what she has always done.
Now the hardest case, the revisions. Bloom revises a piece past thirty drafts. She reads it aloud. At some point she stops and says this is the best she can do as she intended it. Ask her for the rule that tells her when to stop and there is no rule. There is a judgment she cannot reduce to a procedure, a recognition that the sentence has arrived, arrived at a standard she carries but cannot write down. This is the exact place where the tacit-knowledge story wants to plant its flag. Surely, the story goes, she follows an internalized standard, a hidden rulebook of the well-made sentence, even if she cannot recite it. Turner’s challenge bites here. If the standard cannot be stated, in what sense is it a rule she follows? A rule you cannot formulate, cannot teach as a rule, and cannot check your work against except by the very judgment in question, is not a rule operating in secret. It is a trained capacity to feel that a thing is right, grown in one person over one history of practice, and the word standard dignifies it with a structure it does not have. Bloom stops at draft thirty-something because the disposition she built over decades fires a signal of completion. She is not consulting a code. She is the code, and the code cannot be extracted from her.
Carry the instrument into her classroom. Bloom teaches creative writing, at Yale for years and then at Wesleyan, and her doctrine is anti-doctrine. She favors observation over theory. She presses students to find character through behavior and language. She refuses to let them impose a theme on a story. Notice what she does not do. She does not hand them a method, a set of statable rules that would produce her kind of fiction. She cannot, because she does not possess her craft in that form. What she offers instead is exposure and correction, this works, this does not, watch how this writer does it, look harder at what your character actually does. Turner would read the whole pedagogy as proof of his thesis. If tacit knowledge were a hidden rulebook, the master could in principle dictate it, however laboriously. Bloom cannot dictate it. She can only arrange conditions under which a student might, through his own practice and his own history, grow a disposition that produces similar performances. She is not downloading her competence into them. She is hoping they build their own.
This is why her teaching looks like the apprenticeship to a trade. The student does not learn Bloom’s ear. The student, watched and corrected over time, develops an ear, which may resemble hers in output and shares nothing with hers in substance, because there is no shared substance to share. The program that trains writers operates on a fiction the program cannot afford to examine, the fiction that the master holds a transmissible knowledge of the craft. What the program supplies is the one thing Turner grants does the work, repeated practice under the eye of someone whose own dispositions have been shaped long enough to recognize the difference between the live sentence and the dead one. The recognition cannot be packaged. It can only be grown, slowly, in each writer separately.
Bloom names the inclination that preceded the training. She reports the judgment that ends the revision without claiming a rule behind it. She teaches by exposure because she has nothing else to teach. The continuity from therapist to novelist, the famous ear, the thirty drafts, the wordless click of completion, all of it tempts us toward the language of hidden mastery passed from practice to practice and from teacher to student. Turner’s skepticism strips the temptation away and leaves the plainer fact. There is a woman who watched people closely for a very long time, who built a disposition no sentence can hold, and whose finest performances issue from a knowledge that exists nowhere except in the act of her doing it. When she dies the disposition dies. The books remain, but the thing that made them does not transfer, and the students who resemble her will resemble her the way one craftsman resembles another, by having done the same work long enough to grow the same wordless feel for when it is finished.

Buffered and Porous Selves

Charles Taylor draws the line in A Secular Age (2007). The porous self lives open to a world charged with forces outside it, spirits, grace, meanings that come from beyond the skin and can enter, possess, heal, or curse. The boundary between inside and outside is thin, and the self is vulnerable because it is not sealed. The buffered self, the modern achievement, draws the boundary firm. Meaning originates inside the mind. The world out there is neutral matter. Nothing crosses the wall without the self’s consent, and the self is safe because it is closed. Taylor’s claim is that the West moved from one to the other, and that the buffered condition, for all its mastery, carries a cost, a felt flatness, a suspicion that the disenchantment went too far. Hold Amy Bloom against this distinction and she comes out as the buffered self, with one pressure point where the wall is tested.
Start with the unbelief. God holds no currency for her and never has. There is no porous opening upward in her world. Nothing descends into it. Grace does not enter, because there is no grace and no aperture for it to enter through. Meaning is made, by mortals, inside their own heads, and then offered across to other mortals. This is the buffered self stated at the level of doctrine. The wall is up, and she does not pretend otherwise or mourn the loss in religious terms.
Her method confirms the structure. The therapist watches the gap between what a person says and what he feels. She attends to interiors, hers and her characters’, as the place where meaning lives. The world supplies behavior, gesture, the observable surface, and the self does the work of reading it and assigning sense. Nothing speaks to her from outside the human. No omen, no sign, no voice. The whole apparatus of her fiction assumes that significance is generated within persons and transmitted between them through attention, which is the buffered account of where meaning comes from. She is a maker of meaning in a world that holds none on its own.
Watch how this organizes her relation to death, the place where the porous self historically found its widest opening. For the porous self death is a passage, the soul crossing to somewhere, the dead remaining present and reachable. Bloom closes that door. In In Love (2022) her husband Brian Ameche ends his life at the Swiss organization Dignitas, and she helps him do it. The book contains no afterlife, no consolation that he persists, no sense that he has gone somewhere rather than stopped. He dies and stays dead, and her love, which was horizontal and mortal all along, has nowhere to follow him. The buffered self meets death as termination, not transit, and Bloom meets it that way without flinching and without reaching for the porous comforts she does not believe in. The restraint of the memoir is the restraint of a sealed self refusing to leak.
The buffered self can find the closed world flat, drained, too small. Bloom’s defense against the flatness is not enchantment. It is attention raised to the pitch of devotion. She cannot let grace in, so she compensates by looking at the mortal surface harder than almost anyone, until the ordinary yields more than it seemed to hold. The physician in Amsterdam who told her she is me, the recognition a stranger feels reading her, is as close to communion as her cosmos allows, and it travels mortal to mortal, self to self, never down from above. She has taken the buffered condition and made a discipline of it, turning the closed self’s only resource, attention, into something that does the work enchantment once did. The well-made sentence revised past thirty drafts is her bulwark against the flatness, the made thing that holds meaning because she put it there.
Bloom reports a feeling that strains the model, though she keeps it inside the buffered frame. She says a character can come alive in her mind, that on a good day the voice unfurls like a bolt of silk, that she writes out of a love and a loneliness and a third thing she cannot name. The language of a character coming alive, of a voice arriving rather than being built, edges toward the porous, toward meaning that comes to her rather than from her. A porous writer would call this inspiration, a visitation, the muse entering the open self. Bloom does not. She holds it inside the buffered account. The character lives in her mind, her phrase, located firmly inside the wall, a product of her own faculties even when it feels like arrival. The honesty about the third thing she cannot identify is the honesty of a buffered self acknowledging that the inside is deeper than introspection reaches, not that anything got in from outside. The wall holds. She just admits she cannot see all the way to its base.
So Bloom is the buffered self with the cost paid down and converted. She built the wall, accepts the flat closed world it produces, and refuses the porous consolations of God, afterlife, and visitation that she does not believe. What she does with the buffered condition is the interesting part. She does not lament the disenchantment and she does not try to reverse it. She takes the one power the sealed self retains, the power to make meaning by attending, and she practices it hard enough to fill the space a faith would fill. The closed self looking at a dying husband and refusing to look away, making one true sentence about him because nothing else will outlast him, is the buffered self at full stretch, doing with attention what the porous self once did with prayer.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

Mainstream social scientists and self-help architects frequently peddle the myth that human unhappiness is merely a misunderstanding—a cognitive glitch that can be ironed out if humans simply practice positive psychology, meditate, or adjust their expectations.
Bloom’s clinical background informs a fictional world that rejects this comforting premise. Her short stories and novels, such as Love Invents Us (1997) or her recent sprawling family epic I’ll Be Right Here, refuse to treat emotional pain as a temporary error in calculation. Her characters do not stumble into ruinous affairs, messy found-family arrangements, or intense attachments because they lack access to a rationality handbook. They act out of deep, unapologetic Darwinian imperatives: the pursuit of resources, intimacy, control, and social status. Love, in Bloom’s view, is often lawless, chaotic, and driven by raw desires rather than polite, logical “mission statements”.
By portraying these unvarnished motivations, Bloom’s narratives validate Pinsof’s assertion that the human mind is not broken and in need of an “intervention”; it is a finely tuned device optimized to chase its actual goals under whatever pretext works.
Pinsof notes that humans form coalitions and alliances not out of universal altruism, but to protect themselves, climb hierarchies, and find leverage in a competitive social marketplace. Bloom’s historical fiction, like White Houses, which chronicles the intimate, high-stakes relationship between Lorena Hickok and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, lays bare this competitive undercurrent.
Polite history often presents Eleanor Roosevelt’s circle through a lens of high-minded public service and moral altruism. Bloom’s exploration strips away the pure idealism to highlight the acute status politics, defensive self-preservation, and zero-sum operations within elite Washington circles. The characters are highly savvy actors manipulating their public images and private alliances to maintain control near the coercive apparatus of the state.
The transition in Bloom’s latest work highlights the competitive friction built into intellectual life. Her academic murder mystery, Blunt Instrument, shifts from the dreamy empathy often championed by literary elites to a droll, sharp-tongued look at the brutal world of higher education.
While universities loudly proclaim their devotion to higher learning, truth, and the cooperative expansion of human knowledge, Bloom treats the campus as a gladiatorial arena. The faculty members do not clash over simple misunderstandings or intellectual disagreements. They are locked in savage, zero-sum competition for prestige, resources, tenure, and dominance. Stupidity and moral posturing on campus are exposed as purely strategic levers used to down rivals and justify personal advancement. Bloom’s shift to a detective framework matches Pinsof’s perspective perfectly: beneath the feel-good bullshit of elite institutions lies a rational, highly competitive primate hierarchy where actors understand their true incentives all too well.

The Great Delusion

In her memoir In Love, Bloom chronicles her husband’s diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease and her journey to help him end his life on his own terms at an assisted suicide clinic in Switzerland. The book frames marriage, caregiving, and the end of life as a profound, intimate partnership driven by unconditioned love and individual choice.
If John J. Mearsheimer’s anthropology is correct, Bloom misinterprets the functional engine of the domestic unit. Human beings did not develop intense familial bonds to facilitate emotional fulfillment or customized exits from life. Throughout evolutionary history, the family unit has functioned as a primary optimization tool for group survival, designed to manage resource scarcity and protect vulnerable members within a hostile environment.
Love is the psychological armor used to bind the unit together so it can withstand external pressure. When a long-term illness or a structural crisis hits the home, the family behaves not as an open-ended therapeutic seminar, but as a defensive coalition marshaling its remaining material assets to secure its perimeter. Bloom treats the marriage as a sovereign emotional canvas, but realism reveals it as a biological survival arrangement.
Bloom’s early nonfiction book, Normal, profiles individuals who step outside conventional gender boundaries to fashion lives aligned with their true inner selves. She treats these unconventional identities with compassion, positioning the self as a plastic, expressive entity that can challenge rigid cultural myths through personal authenticity.
Mearsheimer’s hierarchy of human preferences places independent self-curation and complex lifestyle texts last among human motivations, falling far behind the unreflective drive for group conformity and survival. The fluid, customized identities Bloom profiles are luxury items available only during rare historical windows of absolute state security and material abundance.
The human mind is programmed during early childhood socialization to accept strict group boundaries and codes long before an individual can develop a stylized identity. When a dominant state secures the perimeter and maintains order, individuals can afford the illusion that their primary identity is a matter of independent choice. The moment that baseline protection fractures, the social animal drops its tailored lifestyle variations and returns instantly to primary, mass tribal alignments to secure physical protection.
In her historical novel Away, Bloom follows a young Russian Jewish immigrant who survives a horrific pogrom and treks across America to find her lost daughter. The narrative celebrates the endurance of the human spirit, showing how a marginalized individual uses grit, passion, and personal relationships to survive exile and rebuild a meaningful life from scratch.
Mearsheimer’s anthropology grounds this narrative of resilience in the brutal logic of relative power and coalition building. An isolated individual does not survive displacement through sheer interior depth or emotional connections.
In an anarchic arena, a displaced person survives by finding or bargaining his way into a protective collective vehicle. The language of hope and personal attachment used during these migrations is a tactical instrument used to manage reputations and secure allies. Bloom mistakes the psychological coping mechanisms of the immigrant for the material cause of her survival, while realism shows that without the armor of a cohesive group or a stable state structure, the lone individual is at the mercy of predatory forces.

My April 29, 2009 Interview With Author Amy Bloom

From AmyBloom.com: "Author of two novels, two collections of short stories, and a nominee for both the National Book Award and the National Book Critics Circle Award. Her stories have appeared in Best American Short Stories, Prize Stories: The O. Henry Awards, and numerous anthologies here and abroad. She has written for the New Yorker, the New York Times Magazine, the Atlantic Monthly, among many other publications, and has won a National Magazine Award. Her latest novel, Away, is an epic story about a Russian immigrant.  She lives in Connecticut and teaches at Yale University."

I talk to Amy Tuesday afternoon after rushing out of my two-hour appointment with physical therapist Lyn Paul Taylor. I’ve got a sore butt, aching feet, shin splints, and the worst TMJ he’s ever seen.

I sit in my car on Normandy and do the interview via my cell phone. I fear getting a parking ticket and I fear getting robbed and it would be just too embarrassing to have happen to me while talking to Amy Bloom.

What would she think?

Luke: "Amy, when you were a child, what did you want to be when you grew up?"

Amy: "A reader. I just wanted to read and be left in peace."

Luke: "Did you have any vocational ambitions as a child?"

Amy: "None at all. I think for a little while I thought it might be nice to be a warrior, a Joan of Arc without the auditory hallucinations and the burning, but I don’t remember having any other ambitions."

Luke: "And what about as you moved through your teens and into college?"

Amy: "I hoped to be employed. I worked pretty hard. I was a waitress through most of college. I had thought about being a lawyer. My oldest sister is a lawyer. She was very good at it. I went to watch her one day and I realized that the person she was defending was guilty and I was horrified. I thought I would be a director in theater. It was one of my majors in college (along with Political Science)."

Luke: "What did your parents most want from you?"

Amy: "Want from me or for me?"

Luke: "Both."

Amy: "What they wanted from me, I don’t know. What they wanted for me, for me to be safe and happy and successful in some line of work."

Luke: "What was your place in the social pecking order in high school?"

Amy: "I was a complete little weirdo and outsider with pink Harlequin glasses until ninth grade when suddenly all of my weirdness and grumpiness and sarcasm became extremely fashionable and then I was very cool, much to my astonishment, having not spoken to anybody for 14 years."

Luke: "When you enter a room full of strangers today, where do you go? Are you the life of the party?"

Amy: "I usually go into the kitchen and see if I can help to lay out hor’doeuvres."

Luke: "Were there any signs in childhood that you were going to become a professional writer?"

Amy: "That seems unlikely to me, though I spent a tremendous amount of time in the library. I did write poetry as a child, but it was of the rhyming kind. There was such a high value on literacy in my family that it wasn’t considered unusual or even worthy of comment. Of course you read widely. Of course one was engaged with the things one read. It wasn’t worth remarking upon."

Luke: "What were the most sterling things people said about you as a child and as a teenager when they were predicting your future place in the world?"

Amy: "Startling things?"

Luke: "Sterling things."

Amy: "I have no idea what people said about me when I was a kid. I don’t mean to be recalcitrant, I don’t remember anybody making any remarks to me as a child about my place in the world. I don’t remember anybody being at all interested in my place in the world. I think the unspoken message, certainly from my father, was that anybody who could read and write well would be fine. That his worries were over once we were literate. As a teenager? People said the kinds of things they say to young women who are argumentative and reasonably nimble intellectually. ‘Oh, you’d be a good lawyer. You like to argue and you’re bossy.’ My father, I think, had hoped that I might go to medical school."

Luke: "Who was the first serious person to tell you that you were going to be a professional writer?"

Amy: "Nobody ever told me I was going to be a professional writer… I knew that it was going to be possible for me to be a professional writer after I signed my first professional contract with Harper Collins to publish my first collection of short stories."

Luke: "How did you become a writer? You were a psycho-therapist."

Amy: "I had been thinking about becoming a psycho-analyst and had gone from meeting with the guy who would’ve been my training analyst and on the way home, I found myself thinking about a plot for a murder mystery. I drove past my college where I used to bartend. It was always my job as a bartender to wake up the old alumni at the end of the party just to make sure they weren’t dead. I remember thinking, it would be funny if they were dead. It’d be a good mystery. And so I made some notes and I started writing up the story and by the time I got home, I had about 15 pages of notes, and I called the guy who would’ve been my training analyst and I said, I don’t think I’m going to do this right now. I think maybe there’s a story I’d like to tell. He said to me very sensibly, ‘Neither of us is getting any younger. Don’t dawdle.’

"I started working on the mystery. It was like warm-up exercises for me. And then about halfway through the mystery, I started writing short stories."

Luke: "How do you realize you’ve done well with a piece of writing? Is it overwhelmingly something that comes from within you or are there external sources of validation?"

Amy: "The first feeling when you have finished a piece is, ‘Thank God I’m finished.’ And then, ‘Am I really finished?’ And then for me, ‘I’m probably not finished.’ This will be after a number of revisions. Do I need one more revision? This will be number 37. Then I might read it aloud yet again and go, ‘That’s OK. That’s the best I can do as I intended it.’

"It’s mostly internal. It’s always nice when people like what you have done, but that is not always the best gauge."

Luke: "Have you always had the sense that you are a pretty good gauge of yourself and know what you are doing?"

Amy: "Well, my marital history suggests otherwise, but I think that on the whole, I have mostly felt like I’m a reasonably reliable gauge for myself, which doesn’t mean I don’t make huge mistakes, but even then, I tend to be conscious of them."

Luke: "Did you have a sense as a child and a teenager that you had something wonderful to give to the world?"

Amy: "No, I didn’t. Mostly when I was a child, I hoped that the world would leave me alone because it was pretty clear to me that I was kind of an oddball. I had a pretty good time as a teenager. I don’t remember feeling like I had anything particular to contribute. I observed that I was a good teacher. I did a lot of tutoring of younger kids. I observed that I was good with kids and that I liked them and they liked me. I don’t remember concluding anything else about my talents."

Luke: "Are you a better therapist or a better writer?"

Amy: "I’ve had my days as both. I don’t practice any more as a therapist, but probably a better therapist. First of all, I’ve been doing it longer. Also, you have a partner as a therapist. That increases your chance of doing well. On the other hand, there have been times as a writer when I feel like I hit it out of the park. Whether you are a psycho-therapist or a writer, you only get a certain number of those."

Luke: "Out of which emotions do you do your best writing?"

Amy: "Is that like love or fear or is that just all of the emotions?"

Luke: "I do my best writing out of anger, so…"

Amy: "I see. I don’t do my best writing out of anger, though sometimes in essays the pleasure of the polemic is apparent, but not usually my fiction. I think I tend to write out of a very strong wish to tell a story and to see people come alive in my mind. That is probably a certain kind of love and a certain kind of loneliness and some other thing that I’m not really sure how to identify."

"I don’t find that much it [the writing] comes easy, unfortunately, though sometimes you have a really good day and the character is apparent and the voice unfurls like a bolt of silk."

Luke: "How has being Jewish affected your sense of where you are in the world?"

Amy: "It’s a difficult question for me to answer because I don’t know what it would be like to not be Jewish. I never went through a period of my life where I thought I wasn’t Jewish or other people thought I wasn’t Jewish. I think this is one of those ‘How do fish describe water?’ questions. I’m sure that the immigrant experience and the experience of hearing Yiddish spoken a great deal during my childhood, and the experience of hearing multiple languages spoken, and my parents’ very particular relationship with Judaism, which is on the one hand they certainly identified strongly as Jews, on the other hand they were both atheists and I was never in synagogue unless I was sent to accompany my grandparents so my grandparents wouldn’t be upset with the family, but all of those things have created all sorts of interesting nooks and crannies in my way of being and seeing, all of which I am very grateful for in much the same way I feel that being a woman has had much affect on my ways of being and seeing and being a mother has also had those affects."

Luke: "Have you ever experienced anti-Semitism?"

Amy: "Sure. Unless you stay only in the heart of a very Jewish community and never venture outside, you will…experience what I usually think of as casual anti-Semitism in which people say, you don’t seem Jewish, or you don’t sound Jewish or I’ve never known anyone Jewish like you, you seem so nice, or, oh, that’s why he was asking about the price? Because he’s Jewish.

"It’s not like being dragged off to the ovens, but it’s unmistakably a particular response to a group you are a member of, even if they don’t actively wish you harm."

Luke: "Has God ever been important to you?"

Amy: "No. I was not raised in a family in which that idea has had any currency and it has not changed for me over the years."

Luke: "How did you develop your quality control?"

Amy: "In what way?"

Luke: "I’m struck by how all of your writing is first-class. I read in one of your interviews that you bought back a mystery novel. Did your parents drum it into you that everything you do professionally must be first rate?"

Amy: "No. My parents for being middle-class Jewish parents were remarkably indifferent were remarkably indifferent to a lot of the things you would’ve thought they’d pay attention to. We didn’t have braces, nose jobs. Nobody ever drummed it into us about achievement. I don’t know what they were doing, but they weren’t doing those things.

"I think I’m a good editor. I edit my work. I don’t think the point is to be published but to write the best thing I can write. If it gets published, great. One of the things that I can control is the work I put out. I feel strongly it is my obligation to the work to not publish stuff I think is crap."

Luke: "Is there any other area of your life where you take the same care?"

Amy: "I take the same care with other things but it isn’t the same because in writing, I have no one to blame but myself. It’s not that way in relationships, for example. I am conscious of being the best mother I knew how to be but there are a lot of people involved. In writing, you have to take responsibility for every sentence, whether or not your editor said it was good enough. If you knew it wasn’t good enough and you let them publish it, shame on you."

Luke: "What do you love and hate about being interviewed?"

Amy: "Most of the bad things about being interviewed are located entirely within myself. Nobody ever puts a gun to your head and says, ‘You must be interviewed.’ I am subject to attacks of diffidence. One time I had an interview with somebody and the person, her style was to make these leading statements, which I understood later were designed to elicit responses from me, but I’m actually a pretty good listener, so she would make her leading statement and I would say, ‘I suppose you could look at it that way’, or ‘That’s an interesting point.’ I could hear her become more exasperated. Finally, two minutes before the end of the interview, I understood that all of those things were not designed for me to be politely interested but for me to say, ‘Oh, on the contrary…’

"Sometimes I feel comfortable entering into semi-personal chats with people I don’t know and other times I get this wet bathing suit feeling and find it more difficult. It’s not anybody else’s fault."

Luke: "But flattering is not one of the things you feel?"

Amy: "Good point. I should feel flattered. I guess it doesn’t occur to me. Sometimes I feel disbelieving."

Luke: "Most people love to talk about themselves, but not necessarily you."

Amy: "It’s not the thing I find easiest."

"I don’t mind having a chat. I’m a good conversationalist. Mostly I feel like it would be boring for people to have to hear, which is why I won’t write a memoir."

Luke: "Hostility is not one of your immediate reactions to a bad interviewer?"

Amy: "Oh no, because I’ve interviewed people. As a therapist, I spent a fair amount of time having conversations with people who found it difficult or found it easy…"

Luke: "Do you read biographies of great writers and if so, does it speak to you in a particular way?"

Amy: "I love the [David] Nokes biography of Jane Austen. And that one of Oscar Wilde by [Richard] Ellman. So, very randomly and very occasionally. Yeah, they speak to me in that I have gone out of my way to look for the biography because the writer speaks to me. Or, Noel Coward’s correspondence, which I liked very much. Oh, when I read Jane Austen’s letters to her sister Cassandra and think about the kind of reviews she had to endure. There’s something very moving to me about it, that a writer like that would be dismissed as a country lady writing a mild amusement. It’s still distressing. Or, you read about Oscar WIlde’s terrible errors of judgment again and again and again. It breaks my heart that somebody should be so willfully self-destructive and self-deceiving on the one hand and so wonderfully clever on the other."

Luke: "I am often struck when I read these books that most of these writers write out of their failures in real life to communicate, so therefore they take up the pen. This doesn’t seem to fit with you."

Amy: "I suppose for anybody’s life there will be a certain level you get to where you could say, wouldn’t it have been better if such-and-such had worked out? It’s not that I feel my life has been a seamless floral print of successes going from one little flower to another. It was more of a wish to tell a story and to enter other lives. The first stories I wrote… I married young and started raising kids young, and perhaps there was some wish to go, what is it like to live other lives?"

Luke: "What are the principle rewards for you for writing?"

Amy: "The economic ones come and go. A good sentence and a good story are really a pleasure to me. It’s like building something. It’s solid and it’s there and it works every time you look at… I’m always very touched when readers say, this meant so much to me. I remember I was giving a lecture in Amsterdam and this guy, this probably 70 year old physician, came up to me, I had just published my first novel, and he said of the central character, ‘She is me. I understood her completely. The way she has approached her life is the way I have approached my life. Thank you.’

"I was so pleased that somebody so different from that character, and so touched that he would take the trouble to tell me… It’s lovely of people to be so engaged with the work."

Luke: "I have this fantasy that one of the great things about being Amy Bloom is that you can arrange dinners and coffees with other great writers."

Amy: "Well, that would be a terrible disappointment to you. In theory, sure, but I live in the middle of nowhere. It’s a tremendous pain in the ass for me to go see anyone or for anyone to come see me, but it’s nice to be friends with people who I can talk to about my kind of work. Mostly we are not talking about each other’s sentences. In theory, it would be nice to have coffee with a great writer but in fact the great writer may turn out to be an awful person and you’d be happy to not have coffee with them. You’d be happy to just read their book and be done with it. It was Swift who said that wanting to know the writer because you like the work is like wanting to know the chicken because you like the eggs."

Luke: "How is your writing different because you trained and practiced as a psycho-therapist?"

Amy: "I’m a better listener… I’m inclined to let people finish their own sentences. I’m trained to pay attention to people’s perceptions and notice the gaps between what they say and how they feel. My training reinforced my inclinations. I am by nature someone who likes to observe what is going on. I find people fascinating."

"I’m basically happy… I haven’t had any shortage of ups and downs and bad s—. People are born with certain kinds of dispositions. I feel things very deeply. I’ve had more than my share of thunderstorms but that hasn’t changed my sense of myself as being happy."

Luke: "How do you choose the photo for your books?"

Amy: "You don’t want to look homely… That’s about it. That’s a standard. You don’t want to look so good in the picture that when you walk into the book store, people have no idea who you are. You want to look good but if it will at least, please God, have a passing resemblance to yourself."

At the end of our interview, Amy says, "Thank you for bearing with me."

Related Links:

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Yosef Abramowitz Edward Alexander Michael Berenbaum Sally Berkovic James Besser Reuven Blau Stephen Bloom Andrew Silow-Carroll Shmuley Boteach Benyamin Cohen Debra Nussbaum Cohen Robert Cohn Ami Eden Rob Eshman Larry Cohler-Esses Frances Dinkelspiel Matt Dorf Ami Eden Charles Fenyvesi Eric Fingerhut Amnon Finkelstein Sue Fishkoff Samuel Freedman Stephen Fried Robert I. Friedman Heshy Fried Jonathan Friendly Neal Gabler Evan Gahr J.J. Goldberg Ari Goldman Yossi Klein Halevi Malcolm Hoenlein Wayne Hoffman Hollywood Jews Mickey Kaus Eve Kessler Michael Kinsley Amy Klein Marc S. Klein Lisa S. Lenkiewicz Gene Lichtenstein Jason Maoz Jonathan Mark Deborah Dash Moore Alana Newhouse Gustav Niebuhr Ori Nir Steve Rabinowitz Gary Rosenblatt Jennie Rothenberg Debra Rubin Neil Rubin Walter Ruby Douglas Rushkoff Jonathan Sarna Cathy Seipp Rabbi Avi Shafran Mark Silk Sheldon Teitelbaum Jonathan Tobin Tom Tugend David Twersky Teresa Watanabe Steven I. Weiss Leon Wieseltier Paul Wilkes Lauren Winner Yori Yanover Larry Yudelson

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Steven Pinker: Language, Human Nature, and Progress

Steven Pinker (born September 18, 1954) is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, psycholinguist, and public intellectual. His work spans language acquisition, the architecture of the mind, the evidence for an evolved human nature, the long history of violence, the conditions for reasoned thought, and the structure of shared social knowledge. Over four decades he carried the cognitive revolution from the laboratory to a wide reading public, and he became one of the most visible interpreters of how the sciences of mind bear on the largest questions about human conduct and human history. He writes for specialists and for general readers in roughly equal measure, and he holds the Johnstone Family Professorship of Psychology at Harvard University.

Pinker grew up in Montreal, Quebec, in the city’s English-speaking Jewish community. His father, Harry Pinker (1928-2015), worked as a salesman, a small landlord, a manufacturer’s representative, and a lawyer. His mother, Roslyn “Rose” Wiesenfeld Pinker (1934-2023), began as a homemaker and later served as a guidance counselor and vice-principal at Bialik High School in Montreal. His grandparents had emigrated from Poland and Romania in the 1920s and set up a small necktie factory in the city. His younger sister, Susan Pinker (b. 1957), became a psychologist, a columnist for The Wall Street Journal, and the author of The Sexual Paradox and The Village Effect. His younger brother, Robert, works as a policy analyst for the Canadian government. Pinker has described the argumentative habits of the community he grew up in as a spur to his own critical bent. He adopted atheism in his early teens and has at times called himself a cultural Jew.

He took a Diploma of College Studies at Dawson College in 1971 and a Bachelor of Arts in psychology at McGill University in 1976. At McGill he encountered the work of Donald O. Hebb (1904-1985), whose account of neural assemblies and learning shaped much of postwar neuroscience. Pinker then moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, and earned a Ph.D. in experimental psychology at Harvard in 1979 under Stephen Kosslyn (b. 1948), a leading student of mental imagery and visual cognition. His dissertation work on visual representation set themes that later joined his interest in language.

A postdoctoral year at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology followed the doctorate. Pinker held a one-year assistant professorship at Harvard in 1980-81 and a second at Stanford University in 1981-82. In 1982 he joined the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, where he stayed for twenty-one years. He co-directed the Center for Cognitive Science from 1985 to 1994, became a full professor in 1989, and directed the McDonnell-Pew Center for Cognitive Neuroscience from 1994 to 1999, with a sabbatical year at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 1995-96. In 2003 he returned to Harvard as the Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology, and he held the additional title of Harvard College Professor from 2008 to 2013 in recognition of his teaching.

Pinker came up as a representative of the cognitive revolution, the movement that displaced behaviorism’s focus on observable response with the study of internal computation and representation. He drew on the theory of universal grammar associated with Noam Chomsky (b. 1928), on evolutionary biology, on information theory, and on early artificial intelligence, and he assembled from these sources a picture of the mind as a set of specialized computational systems shaped by natural selection to solve recurring adaptive problems.

His first sustained research concerned how children learn language. In Language Learnability and Language Development (1984) he asked how children build a grammar from input that is partial and full of error. He arguments, with Chomsky, for an innate language faculty, and he held that children construct grammatical systems rather than copy adult speech. These technical arguments reached a broad audience in The Language Instinct (1994), among the defining popular science books of its decade. Pinker presented language not as a cultural artifact on the order of writing or arithmetic but as a biological adaptation that develops in children along a regular course. He gathered evidence from linguistics, developmental psychology, anthropology, genetics, and neuroscience to support the claim that language belongs to human nature.

During the 1990s Pinker entered one of the central disputes in cognitive science. Connectionist researchers held that a single associative network could account for the whole of language learning, including the inflection of verbs. Pinker advanced a dual-route account in Words and Rules (1999). On his model the mind generates regular forms such as “walked” through symbolic grammatical rules and retrieves irregular forms such as “went” and “brought” from associative memory. The mind uses both systems at once. The debate over rules and networks became a defining controversy of the field, and it placed Pinker among the leading defenders of symbolic approaches to cognition. He pursued the empirical side of the question in collaborative work with the linguist Alan Prince on the inflection of regular and irregular verbs.

His broad synthesis appeared in How the Mind Works (1997), which treated perception, emotion, family life, sexuality, art, humor, religion, and consciousness through the lens of evolutionary psychology. Pinker argued that the mind comprises many specialized adaptations that evolved to meet challenges faced by ancestral humans, and the book carried that program to millions of readers. It made the case that much of human conduct has deep evolutionary roots, and it became a standard popular reference for the field.

His most contested book, The Blank Slate (2002), took aim at three assumptions he traced through twentieth-century thought: that the mind begins empty, that culture alone fixes behavior, and that human nature can be reshaped without limit. Drawing on genetics, neuroscience, behavior genetics, and anthropology, Pinker argued that inherited dispositions operate alongside learning and culture. He held that an account of what humans are does not license social inequality or political resignation, and that institutions work better when they are built with evolved psychology in view rather than against it.

The book drew heavy fire. Critics charged Pinker with biological reductionism and with slighting culture and historical contingency. He answered by separating descriptive claims about human nature from moral and political conclusions: a statement about what people are tells us nothing on its own about what they ought to do or become. The line between description and prescription became a recurring theme in his replies to critics across his career.

His most prominent scientific opponent in these years was the paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould (1941-2002). Gould attacked evolutionary psychology for spinning speculative and untestable stories about the adaptive origins of mental traits. Pinker defended the field on the ground that many psychological capacities show signs of functional design and that hypotheses about their origins can be tested against comparative data, developmental evidence, genetics, neuroscience, and anthropology. Their exchange became a reference point in the larger argument over evolutionary accounts of the mind.

From the 2010s Pinker turned from the structure of human nature to the trajectory of human history. In The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) he marshaled evidence from archaeology, criminology, history, and political science for the claim that violence has fallen across the long run. Homicide, war, torture, and domestic abuse have all declined over centuries, he argued, against a widespread public sense that the world grows more dangerous. He credited the decline to stronger states, expanding commerce, literacy, cosmopolitan contact, a widening circle of empathy, and the spread of Enlightenment ideas about reason and universal rights.

He extended the argument in Enlightenment Now (2018), which held that humanity has made large gains in health, longevity, education, wealth, democracy, and knowledge through institutions grounded in reason, science, and humanism. He stressed that progress is neither automatic nor guaranteed, and he located its source in liberal institutions that can correct their own errors. The book found a wide readership and drew sharp criticism, both for its handling of historical causation and for the politics some readers heard in it.

Pinker then took up the psychology of reasoning. In Rationality (2021), based on a Harvard course, he examined logic, probability, statistics, Bayesian inference, and causal reasoning as tools that help people overcome cognitive bias and choose well. He argued that individuals reason imperfectly on their own, and that institutions such as science, a free press, democratic deliberation, and markets supply the error-correcting structure that individuals lack.

He also brought cognitive science to bear on writing. In The Sense of Style (2014) he set aside much traditional prescriptive grammar in favor of advice rooted in linguistics and psychology. He traced a great deal of bad prose to what he called the curse of knowledge, the difficulty a writer has in imagining a reader who does not already know what the writer knows. Clear writing, on this account, demands the hard mental work of recovering the reader’s ignorance.

His most recent major book, When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows: Common Knowledge and the Mysteries of Money, Power, and Everyday Life (2025), takes up common knowledge in the technical sense: not information that many people hold, but information that everyone knows that everyone else holds, in an open-ended regress of mutual awareness. Pinker argues that this recursive form of shared knowledge underwrites social coordination across a wide range of cases, among them financial markets, political authority, diplomacy, etiquette, and ordinary conversation. He draws on psychology, economics, game theory, philosophy, and linguistics, and the book continues his long effort to connect the science of mind to the organization of social life.

Across his career Pinker has argued for reason, scientific inquiry, and liberal democracy as the institutions best able to find and fix error, and he has held that evidence should take precedence over ideology in social questions. These commitments led him into the politics of higher education. He has argued that an intolerant climate took hold on parts of the academic left, and he helped found the Council on Academic Freedom at Harvard to resist what he described as a spread of censorship at universities. In 2021 he joined the founding advisers of the University of Austin, an institution created to promote open inquiry and intellectual diversity. He chaired the Usage Panel of the American Heritage Dictionary from 2008 to 2018, and he has served on editorial and advisory boards for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the National Science Foundation, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Psychological Association, and the Linguistic Society of America. He writes often for The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, The Atlantic, Time, and The Free Press on language, the mind, education, free speech, artificial intelligence, and contemporary cultural argument.

His public positions have drawn controversy from several directions. In January 2005 he defended remarks by Harvard’s then-president Lawrence Summers (b. 1954) on the sources of the gender gap in mathematics and science, and in a public debate with the psychologist Elizabeth Spelke he argued that biological differences in average temperament and aptitude, interacting with socialization and bias, help account for differences in representation at elite levels. In 2020 an open letter signed by hundreds of academics asked the Linguistic Society of America to remove Pinker from its lists of fellows and media experts, charging that his public statements minimized racist and sexist harm; the letter cited several of his posts on social media. Pinker replied that the campaign threatened younger and less protected scholars and amounted to a regime of intimidation in the realm of ideas. The society took no action against him.

In December 2024 Pinker resigned from the honorary board of the Freedom From Religion Foundation after the foundation retracted an article by the evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne (b. 1949) that defended a binary account of biological sex. Pinker charged that the organization had abandoned reasoned inquiry and taken on the features of a creed, with its own dogma and heretics. Coyne and Richard Dawkins (b. 1941) resigned in the same days, and the foundation then dissolved its honorary board. In June 2025 Pinker drew criticism for an appearance on the podcast of Aporia, an outlet whose owners advocate for what they call human biodiversity, which critics describe as a relabeling of older claims about racial hierarchy. Researchers and commentators argued that his participation lent legitimacy to the outlet; Pinker’s defenders cast the episode as another instance of his readiness to discuss contested questions in venues others avoid. The Aporia appearance fit a longer pattern of criticism over his proximity to advocates of race-linked theories of intelligence, a charge he has rejected while maintaining his commitment to colorblind equality and open debate.

Pinker has exchanged ideas, in agreement and in dispute, with many of the leading thinkers of his generation, among them Daniel Dennett (1942-2024), Richard Dawkins, Daniel Kahneman (1934-2024), Edward O. Wilson (1929-2021), Jared Diamond (b. 1937), and Noam Chomsky. He owes a deep debt to Chomsky’s linguistics and has broken sharply with Chomsky’s politics, while keeping his regard for the older man’s foundational work.

His scientific work has won wide recognition. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2016 and received the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award in Humanities and Social Sciences for 2022. His research drew the Early Career Award and the Boyd McCandless Award from the American Psychological Association, the Troland Research Award from the National Academy of Sciences, the Henry Dale Prize from the Royal Institution of Great Britain, and the George Miller Prize from the Cognitive Neuroscience Society. He has been a Pulitzer Prize finalist twice, for How the Mind Works in 1998 and for The Blank Slate in 2003, and he has received honorary doctorates from universities in several countries. Time named him among the hundred most influential people in the world, and Foreign Policy and Prospect have placed him on their lists of leading global thinkers.

Pinker is an avid cyclist and has expressed sympathy for effective altruism and its stress on evidence in the service of human welfare. He married the psychologist Nancy Etcoff in 1980 and divorced in 1992, and he married Ilavenil Subbiah in 1995 and divorced in 2006. Since 2007 he has been married to the philosopher and novelist Rebecca Newberger Goldstein (b. 1950). They divide their time between the Boston area and Truro, Massachusetts. Through the marriage he became stepfather to the novelist Yael Goldstein Love and the poet Danielle Blau.

Pinker’s standing rests on his range and on his reach. He has drawn psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, philosophy, economics, and history into connected accounts of human conduct and human history, and he has written those accounts for readers far outside his field. Whether the subject is the acquisition of grammar, the decline of violence, the discipline of reasoning, or the architecture of shared knowledge, he returns to a single conviction: the careful use of scientific method offers the surest path to self-understanding and to the improvement of human life. Few scholars of his time have done as much to shape the public standing of cognitive science, and few have argued as persistently for reason and free inquiry as the load-bearing values of a decent society.

What Steven Pinker Means by Reason

The slide goes up and the line comes down. It starts high on the left, in the centuries of feud and pogrom and the breaking wheel, and it falls across the screen toward the present, where it runs near the floor. Pinker stands beside it with a laser pointer. His hair catches the stage light, silver and curled. He favors cowboy boots and has ridden a bicycle to the hall. He reads the good news in the even voice of a man who sees it from a long way off and knows it will hold. “The numbers are not in dispute,” he says. The room is full of people who came on airplanes and will sleep in clean beds, and they believe him, and they are right to. Homicide has fallen. Death in childhood has fallen. The line is real.

Watch what the line does for the man beside it.

Pinker took God out of his life at thirteen and never put Him back. No soul, then. No country past the grave, no reunion, no ledger kept by anyone who loves him. A man in that position has to find another author for the story, because the alternative is to admit the story has no author and goes nowhere and adds to nothing. Pinker found his author in the species. The falling line is providence without a provider. It says history has a direction, that the suffering on the left of the graph buys the safety on the right, that a life spent charting the descent counts toward something larger than the life. His name rides the line. That is the closest thing to forever a man can have once he has closed the older door.

Behind the curls and the level voice sit two fears, and the line answers both. One is the old animal fear, the grave with nothing after it. The other is the fear that the line could turn and climb again, that the dark he charts on the left could come back over the right. His grandparents left Poland and Romania in the 1920s and built a small necktie factory in Montreal, and the century that followed showed the whole world what the climb looks like. So the descending curve is not only data. It is a wall against two deaths, his own and the world’s.

Reason is the name he gives the thing that builds the wall. By reason he means the impersonal procedure, the method that corrects the gut and the tribe, the discipline that lets a man be right against his own side and know it. His book on the subject carries the word as its title, Rationality, and the argument of Enlightenment Now and The Better Angels of Our Nature is one argument: reason, worked through institutions over centuries, is what bent the line down, and only reason keeps it down. To Pinker reason is salvation with no church. It is the way up and the way out.

A sacred value holds its weight only at home. Carry the word into another man’s world and it changes weight, because each world makes a different thing holy and hands reason a different rank. Pinker hears one music in the word. Others hear something else, and each of them is answering the same two fears with a different wall.

Take the man whose son is dead.

He is at his kitchen table. There is a photograph held to the refrigerator by a magnet shaped like a sunflower, and a casserole on the counter that a neighbor brought and that he will not eat. He has heard the good news. Someone who meant well has told him that fewer young men die now than in any year of the old wars, that the trend is his friend, that history is on the side of life. To him it is an insult with a graph attached. His son is not a rate. The boy was the whole of a world, and the world is over, and no curve drawn across other people’s children touches the one fact in the room. In this man’s order the dead stay with us because we grieve them and name them and refuse to hand them to the aggregate. The refusal is the rite. Reason that files the boy under a falling line is the breaking of the one rite that holds the floor up under him. Same word. To him it is the enemy.

Here is the heart of it. Pinker’s defense against the grave runs through the aggregate, and the father’s runs through the particular, and the aggregate is built by erasing the particular. The two men cannot share the word. They are not arguing about the data. They are defending two ways of refusing death, and each way unmakes the other.

Take the sergeant at the forward base.

War is Pinker’s great unreason, the thing on the left of the graph, and good riddance to it. The sergeant has met the reasoning that frightens him, and it wears a tie and sits far from the fire. It prices men. It runs the model and publishes that casualties are down and calls the falling number progress. The holy thing on the base is none of that. It is the bond, the man beside you, the death that one man dies so another man lives. No model prices it, and a model that tried would prove it did not understand what it was looking at. To the sergeant reason is the cold voice that spends the sacred and totals the spending and presents the total as good news. The word names the thing that betrays his dead.

Take the preacher under the tent.

To Pinker reason is the lamp that burns off superstition and leaves a clean room. To the preacher reason is the serpent’s own line. Ye shall be as gods. The faculty that makes a man his own final authority is the first sin in a lab coat, the oldest pride with new credentials. Pinker offers the falling curve and then, at the end of it, the grave and nothing. The preacher offers Him and life without end. The same faculty is the road out of the dark to one man and the road down into it to the other, and they are not confused about each other. Each sees the other’s salvation as the other’s damnation.

Take the monk in the zendo.

Pinker holds reason as the crown of the animal, the thinking that frees us. The monk has spent thirty years learning that the thinking, ranking, narrating mind is the veil over the real, and that the work of a life is to set it down and let it go quiet. Pinker’s salvation keeps the self running inside the project. The monk’s salvation is the self seen through and dropped. To exalt reason, in the monk’s world, is to polish the bars of the cage and call the shine a window.

Take the man on the trading floor.

Pinker holds reason as disinterested, the servant of truth wherever it leads. On the floor reason is edge. It is the model that beats the tape, thought bent to the number on the screen, and a reason that served no advantage would strike the trader as a man leaving money on the table for the pleasure of it. His world makes the score holy, and the score is kept in money, and reason that does not pay is decoration.

Even the poet has his version. Explain the rainbow and Pinker loses nothing; he gains a second beauty, the beauty of the cause. Explain it to the poet and the rainbow goes gray, and the graying is the one murder his world forbids. John Keats (1795-1821) called it unweaving the rainbow. He meant that the cold faculty, turned on the bright thing, kills it. Pinker would say the bright thing survives the knowing and shines brighter for it. Both men are telling the truth about their own worlds.

So there is no neutral reason waiting above all these men to settle their quarrel. There is Pinker’s reason, which is the god of his world wearing the mask of no-god, and there is the father’s grief and the sergeant’s bond and the preacher’s God and the monk’s silence and the trader’s score, and each of them ranks reason where its own holy thing leaves room for it. The man on the stage cannot see this. He thinks he is offering the one tool every world needs. He is offering the local deity of one world and is puzzled, every time, when another world declines it.

The sharpest knives do not come from the worlds he expects. The preacher and the sergeant he can name and hold at arm’s length. The cut that draws blood comes from inside his own house. In 2020 hundreds of fellow academics signed a letter asking the linguists’ society to strike his name from its rolls. In 2024 he quit a board he had served for twenty years after it pulled an essay on the sexes, and in 2025 critics said he had carried reason onto the wrong stage and handed it to the wrong men. To these people Pinker is the heretic. He took the holy word and gave it to the enemy. They worship his god and have tried him for treason against it.

Becker saw this coming a long way off. The bloodiest wars run between the nearest worlds, because the close rival threatens the absolute claim in a way the distant stranger never can. The preacher and the scientist can leave each other be. Two men who both worship reason and disagree about whom it serves will fight to the wall, because each is the living proof that the other’s god can be read another way, and a god that can be read another way is not yet a god.

The tell came when they pulled the essay. Pinker resigned and wrote that the body had become “the imposer of a new religion, complete with dogma, blasphemy, and heretics.” The great disenchanter, cornered, reached for the oldest vocabulary on earth. He did not say they were mistaken. He said they were a church. A man defends an altar in the language of altars, even a man whose life’s work is the explaining-away of altars, and the reach for the word blasphemy is the proof that something holy is under attack. The holy thing is reason, and reason is his.

Read him forward on three lines.

Watch where he puts death. He keeps it in the aggregate and out of the particular, because the falling curve is his whole wall against the grave, and the single grave pulls a brick from the wall. He answers the bereaved with the trend. He loses them every time, and he does not see why, because to see why he would have to feel the one death the curve cannot hold, and the curve exists so that he never has to.

Watch his words when the project is hit. The even voice breaks and the sacred vocabulary comes up, religion and dogma and heresy, and that is where the hero system shows through the science. The man is steadiest discussing other men’s faiths and least steady defending his own, which he does not call a faith.

Watch the house of reason from the inside. The next assault on Pinker comes not from the altar he expects but from men who claim his own god and name him the apostate. That is the war he is least armed for, because to fight it he would have to grant that there is an altar in the house worth fighting over, and the grant is the one thing his world cannot spend. So he rides on, even-voiced, beside the falling line, and tells the room the numbers are not in dispute, and the room believes him, and the men in the other worlds put down the word he hands them and pick up their own.

Steven Pinker and the Party of Reason

Steven Pinker tells a clean story about himself. He follows reason. He follows the evidence. He holds the positions a careful man holds once he sets the tribe aside and lets the data speak, and he stays willing to be right against his own side. The positions hang together because reason hangs together. That is the story, and he tells it well, in Rationality and Enlightenment Now and in a steady column from the front of the educated press.

David Pinsof, David O. Sears, and Martie Haselton offer a different account of where a man’s positions come from. In “Strange Bedfellows: the Alliance Theory of political belief systems,” forthcoming in Psychological Inquiry, they argue that belief systems do not grow from abstract values such as equality or tolerance or reason. They grow from alliances. A man chooses allies, supports them in their fights, opposes their rivals, and his beliefs assemble themselves around those loyalties. The thread that ties a set of positions together is seldom a principle. It is a coalition. On this account reason is not the engine. Reason is one of the tags a man flies to mark which side he is on, the way the paper treats markers and identities as devices that sort the likeminded and broadcast commitment.

Run Pinker through that account and the clean story bends.

Start with the choosing of allies. Pinsof and his coauthors hold that men pick allies by similarity, by transitivity, and by interdependence, and that the choices then snowball into a structure that looks principled from inside and accidental from outside. Pinker’s coalition is easy to name. It is the heterodox center: the New Atheists, the defenders of free inquiry on campus, the founders and friends of the University of Austin, the writers gathered at The Free Press, the part of Silicon Valley that prizes IQ and contrarianism, the readers who fear the activist academy. The tags that sort this set are the words Pinker has made his own. Reason. Evidence. The Enlightenment. Biology is real. Sex is binary. Colorblind equality. A man who speaks these words is reading the marker, and the marker says which cluster he belongs to before any argument begins.

Transitivity does the rest, and the paper states the rule in the old proverbs: the enemy of my enemy is my friend, any friend of yours is a friend of mine. Watch the Freedom From Religion Foundation in December 2024. The biologist Jerry Coyne, a friend and a fellow New Atheist, writes an essay on the sexes. The foundation pulls it. Pinker resigns within days. He does not litigate the biology in public, on the merits, the way his story would predict. He sides with his ally against the body that struck his ally, and Richard Dawkins follows the same line on the same day. The enemy of his friend became his enemy overnight. Watch the other direction in June 2025, when Pinker sits for the podcast of Aporia, an outlet built around race-linked theories of intelligence, and voices agreement with Charles Murray (b. 1943) on family breakdown. Murray and the milieu around Steve Sailer’s old human-biodiversity list are not mainstream science. They are fellow targets of the same rival, the censorious left, and that shared rivalry pulls them inside the circle. The paper names this pattern directly when it discusses the New Atheists, Murray, and the Sailer list. Transitivity, not the evidence on heritability, predicts who gets the benefit of Pinker’s time.

Interdependence holds the cluster together once it forms. The coalition trades benefits. Blurbs, platforms, mutual citation, the standing column, the advisory seat at a new university, the invitation to the next stage at Davos. Each member is more valuable to the others for staying loyal, and loyalty pays in attention and position. None of this requires a cynical Pinker. The paper insists the alliance systems run in everyone, below awareness, and feel from inside like simple agreement among reasonable people.

The second half of Alliance Theory concerns how a man supports his allies once chosen, through what the authors call propagandistic biases. Three of them map onto Pinker without strain.

The first is the perpetrator bias, the rationalizing of an ally’s transgression. When Coyne writes that trans women are more likely to be predators, or when an outlet built on race science books a Harvard name, the ally’s act gets recast as a minor lapse, a brave inquiry, a man only following the science. The same act by a rival gets the full weight. The paper predicts this exactly: men extend to their allies the same excuses perpetrators extend to themselves.

The second is the victim bias, and Pinker offers a clean specimen. He is a tenured professor at Harvard with bestsellers, a column, and a chair, and he casts himself and his heterodox friends as the censored, the intimidated, the embattled. When hundreds of academics signed a 2020 letter asking the linguists’ society to strike his name, he answered that younger and less protected scholars faced a regime of intimidation that narrows the theater of ideas. The paper notes that victim claims sit badly with the older idea that bias exists to flatter the self, because a victim claim advertises weakness. They make sense as calls for reinforcement. Pinker’s alarm at his own persecution, voiced from a position of high security, reads as a summons to the coalition, and competitive victimhood is the paper’s term for two sides each insisting it suffers the greater wrong.

The third is the attributional bias, the habit of crediting an ally’s standing to inner worth and a rival’s to inner fault. Pinker attributes his own side’s positions to reason and courage, qualities of character, and his rivals’ positions to fanaticism, tribalism, and the failure to think. The sharpest version is what the authors call the linguistic attributional bias, the bending of word choice toward allies. Pinker’s lexicon does the work in plain sight. His side gets reason, evidence, Enlightenment, free inquiry, heterodoxy. His rivals get dogma, mob, moral panic, intimidation, and, in the resignation letter, a body that has become “the imposer of a new religion, complete with dogma, blasphemy, and heretics.” The behaviors he describes are the same on both sides, the drawing of moral lines and the policing of speech. The words split by ally status.

The paper’s strongest move is a test, and the test transfers. Hold the value fixed, swap the group, and see whether the value holds or bends toward the coalition.

Take free inquiry. Pinker treats censorship as the great campus sin. When the censored party is an ally, a heterodox professor, a friend whose essay got pulled, the alarm runs hot and the language reaches for the mob and the inquisition. When the censored party is a rival, an activist scholar shouted down from the other direction, the same social pressure reads to him as the rot to be resisted rather than as the rival’s own expression. The paper’s finding is that both sides favor protecting their allies’ speech and restricting their rivals’, and that neither side is the free-speech party in general. Pinker’s commitment, swapped across groups, leans toward the people his coalition wants heard.

Take following the evidence. On vaccines, on climate, on the long fall of violence, Pinker defers to mainstream consensus, and those consensus findings happen to flatter the story of progress through liberal institutions that his coalition prizes. On race and intelligence he lends his time and his Harvard name to outlets and figures who sit against that same consensus. The instruction “defer to the best science” does not predict both choices. Ally status predicts both. The heterodox coalition reads the race-and-IQ contrarian as a fellow traveler hunted by the shared enemy, so the contrarian draws sympathy that the structural sociologist, a rival, never gets.

Take the line between description and prescription, the is and the ought, which Pinker has guarded for forty years. Against a rival who moves from a fact about inequality to a demand to redistribute or dismantle, Pinker raises the firewall and reminds the rival that no ought follows from an is. For his own side he walks from a description, liberal institutions lowered violence and raised welfare, to a prescription, defend those institutions and resist their critics, and the firewall comes down. The boundary holds where it costs a rival and softens where it serves the coalition.

Set these beside one another and the strange bedfellows appear, which is the paper’s title and its point. Pinker is a universalist liberal who now shares a coalition with the populist right that his earlier self had little to do with, because both sides face the same campus rival. He is a defender of scientific consensus who lends standing to men contesting consensus on the one topic where his coalition feels besieged. He is the scourge of censorship who quit a board and named his former allies heretics the week they censored his friend. A principle does not generate this set. A network of loyalties does.

Underneath all of it sits the move the paper saves for last, the masquerade. Politics dresses as morality, the authors write, because casting your side as the good side draws in third parties and frees your allies to strike. Pinker performs a finer version. His politics dresses as epistemology. He does not say his coalition should win. He says reason should win, and presents his coalition as reason’s party. That frame is the most powerful recruiting tool an intellectual can hold, because it offers the undecided a way to join a side while believing he has joined no side, only the truth. The paper observes that each camp calls itself the reasonable one and calls the other the church, and that both labels are mobilization rather than diagnosis. Pinker says his rivals are a religion and he is reason. His rivals say he is ideology in a lab coat. Alliance Theory reads these as mirror images, two war cries, neither of them the thing that actually moved the men who shout them.

The paper ends without a sneer, and the Pinker reading has to end the same way to stay honest to the frame. Motivated reasoning, the authors say, is not a defect so much as a signal of loyalty, and ideological belief may be as deep in us as friendship. The biases run in everyone, symmetrically, across every line. So this is not a charge against Pinker alone. The academics who signed the letter against him ran the same alliance psychology. The writers who call him a race-science launderer run it too. So does the reader, and so does the man writing this. Pinker’s distinction is not that he escaped the pattern. His distinction is that he wears it in the finest available costume, and the costume is stitched from the one value the theory says is never the driver.

Read him forward on three lines. Watch the group, not the value: when he reaches for reason or free inquiry or the evidence, ask first who is helped and who is hurt by the reaching, and the principle will resolve into a roster. Watch the words: the split between his glossary for allies and his glossary for rivals is the alliance showing through the argument, and the reach for blasphemy and heresy marks the spots where a loyalty is under attack. And watch the masquerade hold or break: the day Pinker spends his reason against an ally and for a rival, on a question where it costs his coalition something real, is the day the costume comes off and the value underneath, if there is one, can be measured.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

If David Pinsof is right, Pinker’s entire brand of optimistic techno-liberalism is a massive masking operation. He frames the current dominance of his own political and intellectual class as a universal civilizational triumph, translating a highly successful coalitional victory into a neutral victory for human reason.

In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Pinker demonstrates that violence of all forms—warfare, homicide, torture, and domestic abuse—has plummeted over centuries. He credits this pacification to historical engines like the “Leviathan” (the state monopoly on force), commerce (which turns zero-sum raids into positive-sum trade), and the “Escalator of Reason” (the expansion of human empathy through literacy and education).

From Pinsof’s perspective, this pacification is not an abstract triumph of human empathy over ignorance. It is a description of a highly successful, long-term resource consolidation by a dominant coalition.

The state monopoly on force did not emerge because human primates had a sudden, rational realization that killing each other was inefficient; it emerged because powerful rulers crushed their local rivals, secured their turf, and built judicial and administrative apparatuses to police internal cheaters. By framing this brutal, centralized lockdown as a benevolent civilizational shift toward “better angels,” Pinker’s theory serves a protective function. It makes the absolute power and stability of the modern state look like an objective moral achievement rather than the spoils of an entrenched ruling class.

In Enlightenment Now, Pinker defends the ideals of the Enlightenment—reason, science, humanism, and progress—against what he views as irrational, backward-looking populist movements on both the political Left and Right. He treats populism and nationalism as cognitive glitches—an outbreak of tribal psychology and media-fueled pessimism that ignores the clear, data-driven reality of human progress.

Pinsof’s logic shows that this defense is a classic coalitional counter-raid wrapped in the language of science. The working-class populists Pinker mocks are not suffering from an analytical error or an ideological virus. They are acting completely rationally to protect their local labor markets, borders, and cultural status from a globalized, cosmopolitan establishment that has used its technocratic leverage to outsource industrial jobs and devalue local communities.

Pinker uses his charts and progress metrics as rocks to throw at these political enemies. By framing political resistance to globalism as a simple failure to look at the statistics, he avoids acknowledging his rivals’ actual grievances, ensuring that his own tribe—the secular, university-educated elite—retains the supreme moral high ground and the final word over policy.

A central pillar of Pinker’s worldview is that education, intelligence, and cognitive flexibility expand the “circle of empathy,” allowing humans to treat out-groups with universal dignity. He argues that as a society becomes more educated, it naturally abandons zero-sum tribal fighting in favor of cooperative, positive-sum problem-solving.

Under Pinsof’s frame, this “Escalator of Reason” is a luxury belief and a highly effective sorting tool. Mastering the style of abstract, data-driven, context-free reasoning that Pinker champions requires immense social capital and elite university credentials.

Primate groups do not navigate the world through dispassionate statistical analysis; they navigate it through local loyalties and zero-sum competitions for resources. By branding his own class’s cognitive style as the ultimate endpoint of human evolution, Pinker creates a permanent justification for their rule. If global crises are complex management problems that can only be solved by data science and elite institutional design, then the public is completely dependent on the Harvard clerisy to steer the ship. Pinker did not write his manifestos to change the underlying Darwinian reality of human nature; he constructed the most sophisticated, chart-filled telescope available to study the global hole, ensuring that the progressive technocrat remains firmly seated at the absolute apex of the institutional hierarchy.

The Great Delusion

If John J. Mearsheimer is right, his anthropology demolishes the historical optimism and evolutionary psychology of Steven Pinker.

Mearsheimer’s realism cuts through Pinker’s data and evolutionary framework, transforming his era of peace into a dangerous, temporary illusion.

Pinker places immense structural weight on what he calls the “Long Peace”—the unprecedented period since the end of World War II where great powers have not fought one another directly. He attributes this shift to a moral evolution in human consciousness, where state leaders have gradually come to view war as obsolete, irrational, and counterproductive.

If Mearsheimer is right, Pinker mistakes the temporary balance of power for a permanent moral awakening. The absence of direct war between great powers since 1945 was not driven by the spread of Enlightenment text or a rejection of violence. It was driven by the structural reality of a bipolar international system, followed by a brief unipolar moment, both frozen into place by the terrifying material reality of nuclear deterrence.

States did not stop fighting because their “better angels” won; they stopped because the distribution of material power made direct conflict an existential risk. The peaceful cosmopolitan order Pinker celebrates is an artificial byproduct of American hegemony. The moment that hegemony contracts and multi-polar anarchy returns, the thin veneer of rational cosmopolitanism is dropped, and great powers will re-mobilize for raw relative power competition.

Pinker’s evolutionary model argues that humanity can gradually expand its “inner circle” of empathy. He claims that through literacy, commerce, and global travel, humans can overcome their primitive, localized tribal instincts and extend moral concern to the entire human race, treating the global population as a single cosmopolitan community.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology reveals that the human animal cannot expand its circle of empathy to include the entire world. Humans are hardwired to form bounded, exclusionary groups to survive in an environment with no sovereign referee. Independent reason and universal empathy rank last among human faculties, falling far behind the unreflective drive to protect the immediate group.

The cosmopolitan empathy Pinker documents among global elites is a luxury product of high security and material abundance. The intense value infusion an individual receives during childhood socialization hardwires the brain for blind group loyalty long before independent reason can develop. You cannot expand the circle to everyone because an in-group requires an out-group to exist. The permanent reality of human nature is group competition, meaning Pinker’s global neighborhood is an anthropological mirage.

In Enlightenment Now, Pinker positions science and reason as autonomous, progressive forces that naturally civilize human relations by replacing dogma and tribal superstition with objective data and shared problem-solving.

Mearsheimer’s hierarchy of human preferences counters that science and independent reason do not operate as neutral, sovereign forces above human conflict. In a competitive, anarchic world, technological innovation, data collection, and scientific inquiry are instantly captured and used by the dominant state vehicle or domestic elite coalitions to maximize their relative power, protect their material assets, and manage their reputations.

The universalist language of science is frequently weaponized as an ideological standard to enforce conformity within an alliance or to police the behavior of external rivals. Pinker treats reason as an escape hatch from human nature, but realism shows it is the most sophisticated instrument the human animal uses to wage its permanent struggle for survival.

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No Lessons: The Fiction of Melvin Jules Bukiet

Melvin Jules Bukiet (born 1953) is an American novelist, short-story writer, anthologist, and critic who teaches creative writing at Sarah Lawrence College. His fiction returns to the same ground across four decades: the Holocaust and what it does to the people born after it, Jewish identity stripped of religious belief, and the distance between memory and invention. He belongs to the second generation, the children of survivors, and he has built a career on a single question. How does a man inherit a catastrophe he did not live through, and what does he owe a past that shaped him before he could consent to it?
Bukiet was born in New York City. His father came from a shtetl near Cracow and was born in August 1923. He saw more death before twenty than almost anyone alive. His mother and younger children were sent to relatives, gathered, and gassed at Belzec. The father and his own father stood in the Cracow ghetto when it was liquidated on March 13, 1943, and three thousand Jews were killed. They reached Auschwitz the next day. From there the Germans marched them to Buchenwald and then to Theresienstadt, where the war ended for them. Bukiet’s grandfather died the day the fighting stopped in Europe, of typhus. The father reached the United States in 1948. The mother’s story ran the other way. Her family had fled the czar a generation earlier, and she grew up in Norma, a small Jewish farming town in New Jersey. She was American-born, not a survivor, a distinction Bukiet keeps clear in his own accounts. His parents married about a year before he was born, and he arrived as the first child of an entire clan that had nearly ceased to exist. He describes uncles staying up all night to build a life-size fire engine for his third birthday and a household charged with the wonder that he existed at all.
He took his bachelor’s degree at Sarah Lawrence College, the school where he now teaches, and his MFA at Columbia University. During Bernard Malamud’s (1914-1986) last years Bukiet worked as his research assistant, and he has written with admiration about Malamud’s slow revision and refusal to lower a standard. He joined the Sarah Lawrence faculty in 1993 and has taught writing there since.
His first published book, the novel Sandman’s Dust (1985), showed a writer ready to fold fantasy and grotesque comedy into realism. Stories of an Imaginary Childhood (1992) won the Edward Lewis Wallant Award for Jewish American fiction. The book rebuilds the vanished Polish shtetl of Proszowice, the town his family came from, and places a boy named for the author inside a childhood the author never had. The move is deliberate. For the descendants of survivors, Bukiet suggests, the lost world arrives only through imagination, never through memory. While the Messiah Tarries (1995) collected his stories. After (1996) became a defining work. Set in Germany in the months after liberation, it follows survivors who rebuild their lives through black-market trade, smuggling, and choices that carry no moral comfort. By refusing to make survival ennobling, Bukiet argued that catastrophe leaves ethical confusion behind, not redemption.
The books that followed widened the range. Signs and Wonders (1999) retells the Gospels as a dark fable set at the close of the twentieth century. Strange Fire (2001) satirizes Israeli politics, religious zeal, and messianic hope through a blind speechwriter inside the country’s political elite. A Faker’s Dozen (2003) gathered interconnected stories and drew notice as a book of the year from the San Francisco Chronicle. Across these works his method holds. He blends biblical material, Jewish folklore, and surrealism while keeping the moral questions in front: responsibility, survival, the cost of historical truth.
Bukiet has been candid about how he writes. He does little research and trusts invention over reporting. He set books in a Germany he had never seen and a Washington he did not know, and he defended the practice without apology. He does not separate imagination from experience, and he holds that imagination often feels more real. Asked once whether a Washington insider might find such a novel false, he granted the point and said he did not write for insiders. If he could render the Washington of his own mind, he would count the book a success. Emotional truth, he argued, carries the work. Flaubert (1821-1880) was not a woman and wrote Madame Bovary; Dostoevsky (1821-1881) was no murderer and made Raskolnikov. When a journalist pressed him that readers want the texture of a real place, the kind Tom Wolfe (1930-2018) packs into a best seller, Bukiet answered that best sellers often serve a non-fictional appetite, the wish to know what goes on behind the scenes, and that this taste reflects a literalism he does not respect. He calls the novel a theological medium. Men can make worlds too, and creation is the novel’s first aim.
Editing forms a second body of work. Bukiet assembled Neurotica: Jewish Writers on Sex, a book that began as a phone joke with his agent and went to auction two days after he drafted a few pages of nonsense to quiet her. He followed it with Nothing Makes You Free: Writings by Descendants of Jewish Holocaust Survivors (2002), among the first major anthologies of second-generation voices, and Atonement for a Sinless World, on guilt and secular Jewish identity. With David G. Roskies (b. 1948) he co-edited Scribblers on the Roof: Contemporary Jewish Fiction. The collections helped set the terms for a conversation about post-Holocaust memory and the changing shape of Jewish writing in America.
His criticism carries the same convictions as his fiction. He has written for The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Paris Review, the Los Angeles Times, and The American Scholar. In his 2007 American Scholar essay “Wonder Bread” he attacked the literature of wonder he associated with Dave Eggers and the McSweeney’s circle, a writing he read as self-congratulating sentiment dressed as innocence. He argued that real tragedy resists tidy closure and that fiction should hold the unsettling weight of suffering rather than soften it into therapy. The same skepticism toward consolation runs through his work on the Holocaust. In the PBS documentary Auschwitz: Inside the Nazi State he said we learn nothing from it. He called the impulse to draw a lesson dangerous, because a lesson is one inch from a silver lining, and a silver lining is one inch from justification. He named the second-generation writers, himself among them, viciously unredemptive.
That refusal grows from how Bukiet holds his Judaism. He describes himself as a secular Jew, and he means something exacting rather than diluted: a rigorous hold on Jewish ethics, culture, and history without belief in God. His father went to shul most Saturdays and said he came for the gossip, though he knew the prayers. The father’s rule was minhag k’din, custom becomes law, and Bukiet inherited the form without the faith. He has called his own relationship to God antagonistic and assumes God will kill him in the end. He allows that some creative force may exist, not the man with the long beard. Pressed on whether he is a good Jew, he answered yes, and defined the good Jew as a man who takes a long-enduring ethos into himself, not one who attends services. He likes Jews and stays ambivalent about Judaism, and he doubts that a secular Jewishness can carry the people across the generations, yet he refuses to fake belief for the sake of continuity. Each generation, he says, does as it must.
He guards the word genocide with the same care. Bukiet rejects the claim that descent from survivors grants wisdom or privilege. He has said the inheritance conveys proximity to enormity and nothing more, and he resents writers who use the Holocaust to lend their work gravitas or to win a moral free pass. After the Hamas attack on Israel of October 7, 2023, he became a loud opponent of describing Israel’s military response as genocide. He argued that the term, coined by Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) for the destruction of European Jewry, loses its meaning when stretched for political use, a distortion of both language and history. Once he signed a copy of one of his novels to the German chancellor Helmut Kohl (1930-2017) with the number 108016, his father’s camp number.
His temperament matches his prose. Bukiet admires outrage and certain kinds of hatred, fears weakness in himself and in others, and accepts a reputation for being difficult. He says the things he is hard on deserve it. He keeps a study buried in paper and arrives on time without fail, and he claims he had not missed a class in twelve years. He has been married for more than two decades and has three children. In 2023 he wrote Runts, a satirical play drawn from the Sarah Lawrence sex-cult scandal, staged at the New York Summer Theater Festival, and said tenure would protect him from any administrator he annoyed.
Bukiet still teaches at Sarah Lawrence and remains a figure in American Jewish letters. His fiction, his criticism, and his anthologies share one purpose. They insist that catastrophe will not resolve into a clean story, that memory comes to us broken, and that literature owes its readers truth rather than comfort.

What Survives the Body

In the mid-1980s Vice President George H. W. Bush (1924-2018) stood before five thousand survivors and their children at the Washington Monument and gave a speech. Melvin Jules Bukiet walked out on it, for his politics, and took a seat in the first of several dozen waiting buses. An old woman had gotten there before him. A few more came after. They had calculated right: the first bus filled would be the first to leave. Then a young woman with a clipboard arrived and told them the front bus was held for VIPs and they would have to clear out and go to the back of the line. The old woman began to curse. Hitler didn’t beat us, she said, and you won’t. Bukiet egged her on. He was ready to link arms and go limp, and he could see the headline forming in twenty-point type, survivors arrested at the Washington Monument. Authority gave way. They kept the bus. As it looped the Mall the old woman was still muttering, how dare they, and Bukiet leaned forward and said, but we had fun, didn’t we, and she gave him a smile bright as sunshine. They had never met. They knew each other.
The scene holds the man. He has contempt for the ceremony and relish for the fight, an eye for the story even as he lives it, and a quick blood-tie to anyone tough enough to spit at the clipboard. Ernest Becker (1924-1974) argued that every culture hands its members a way to not die, a scheme of significance that lets a man feel his life will outlast his body, and that men cling to the tokens of that scheme because the tokens hold off the terror underneath. Becker called it the hero system. Most men take the vehicle their culture offers and ride it without looking. Bukiet looked, and refused almost all of them, and bet everything on one.
He refused God first. He calls his relations with God antagonistic and assumes God will kill him in the end. He allows there might be some creative force, not the man with the long beard. The afterlife, the oldest immortality-vehicle, he leaves on the lot. He refused the lesson next. In the PBS film on Auschwitz he said we learn nothing from it, and named the search for a lesson dangerous, because a lesson sits one inch from a silver lining and a silver lining one inch from justifying the thing. He refused the consoling story, the redemptive arc, the healing. And he refused the soft capital handed to a child of survivors, the moral authority that descent confers. He says the inheritance conveys proximity to enormity and no wisdom, no privilege, and he resents the writer who cashes it for gravitas, or for sex.
That leaves him one vehicle. The made thing. He calls the novelist’s fame forever and the journalist’s fame good until the dog needs walking. He wanted, in his own words, his blood cascading down the ages, and when adoption came up he said the beautiful thing was not for him, he wanted the blood. He was the first child of a clan the Germans had nearly erased, and the uncles stayed up all night to build him a fire engine, and the house carried the wonder that he was there at all. So his death-denial runs on two engines turning the same way. Children of his blood. Books of his making. The line continues where the murder almost cut it.
Watch the sacred words, then, and watch them mean other things in other hands.
Take memory. For Bukiet memory is a wound kept open on purpose, and the closing of it is the betrayal. The sacred token inside the word is genocide, Raphael Lemkin’s coinage, which Bukiet guards for the dead and which he fought to keep precise after October 7, 2023. Now set him beside the people for whom memory is also holy. The hospice chaplain leans over the bed with her laminated badge and asks the dying man if there is anyone he needs to forgive, because for her a memory completed is a good death and an open wound is a thing to be dressed and closed. The genealogy hobbyist prints the family tree on archival paper and frames the crest, because for him memory is lineage and a flattering one, the dead enlisted to dignify the living. The founder in the gray vest archives the quarter and moves on, because for him the past is friction and the legacy lives forward, in the product, in the next round. Each holds memory sacred. None would keep the wound bleeding the way Bukiet keeps it, because none has built his survival on honest witness against the lie. The word is shared. The terror underneath is not.
Take truth. Bukiet wants the ugly fact kept ugly, truth over comfort, and in fiction he wants the emotional truth that lets Flaubert (1821-1880) write a woman and Dostoevsky (1821-1881) write a murderer he never was. The grief author on the morning show speaks of your truth and means the empowering version, the story that serves growth, truth with a payload of uplift. The oncologist titrates the truth, manages what the patient can hear this week, doses it, because in his system the fact is a drug and the dosage is the art. The monk on the cushion treats the truth as wordless, beyond the story, and the ego’s little narratives as the illusion to release. Bukiet’s truth carries no uplift and reaches no union. It stays in the room. It stings, and the sting is the point of it.
Take strength. Bukiet fears weakness as suicidal and admires outrage and the man willing to say anything. The wellness coach unrolls her mat and tells the class that vulnerability is the bravest thing, that softening is the work, so that for her the shared weakness is the strength. The pastor preaches power made perfect in weakness, the meek inheriting, the cheek turned, surrender as the higher force. The drill instructor on the yellow footprints means by strength the suppression of the self for the unit, discipline under fire, obedience. Bukiet’s strength is none of theirs. It will not soften and it will not obey. It stands alone and refuses to flinch, a near-aesthetic of toughness he learned from a father who survived by it.
Take the keystone, the made thing, and the words around it, creation and the line. Here the clash runs sharpest, and the documents stage it. The reporter believes a man earns his world by going to it, by the status detail won on the ground, and that a Washington invented at the desk is a cheat. Bukiet wrote a Germany he had never set foot in and called imagination more real than experience. Pressed, he answered as Flaubert. Empathy, the power to imagine oneself as someone else, is the precondition of art. For the reporter immortality comes through fidelity to the real. For Bukiet it comes through the world of the mind that feels true. Set him beside the Orthodox man, and the same word turns again. Only God creates. The human task is service and the keeping of the covenant and the child raised in the law, and the line continues through the mitzvah and the grandchild, not the book. Set him beside the father who wants only grandchildren, for whom a novel is no answer to an empty chair at the table. Bukiet wants both, the blood and the books, because he reads the secular life as circular, ending in annihilation, and so the made thing has to carry the weight God will not.
This explains the heat. Becker held that a threat to a man’s sacred value reads to him as a threat to his defense against death, so he answers with a rage out of scale to the offense. When Bukiet went after Dave Eggers (b. 1970) and the wonder writers in his 2007 essay “Wonder Bread,” the charge ran deeper than taste. He read them as sellers of a counterfeit immortality, a death-denial built on a lie, and the lie desecrates the dead whose memory is the ground he stands on. The silver lining, the healing arc, the cult of innocence, the stretched word genocide, all of it is the same enemy to him, the soft story laid over the wound. He is a connoisseur of other men’s death-denials, and his own heroism runs partly in the negative, in the stripping away of every comfort his neighbors use to get through the night.
The family scenes show where he learned it. At his father’s funeral the rabbi said a few touching things and several lies about the father’s faith in God, of which he had none, and the lie at the graveside is the whole enemy in miniature, consolation painted over a man who believed nothing. In the hospital the father leaned over after the rabbi promised a prayer for the sick and whispered that the prayer helps the living the way the prayer for the dead helps the dead. Custom becomes law, the father said, minhag k’din, faith emptied of belief and kept as form. Bukiet took the father’s clarity and hardened it into a vocation.
Once he gave one of his novels to the German chancellor Helmut Kohl (1930-2017) and signed it 108016, his father’s number from the camp. The whole system stands in that act. The made thing carries the memory, the number, into the hand of the man’s nation, witness and aggression and continuity in one motion, the dead inscribed by the son who turned down God and the lesson and the soft inheritance and bet that the line would run on in ink and in blood. He wanted it cascading down the ages. He is still writing it down.

The Set

Bukiet sits where three worlds overlap, sharing members and a common temper. The first is the cohort of second-generation Holocaust writers, the children of survivors who made inherited catastrophe their subject: Art Spiegelman (b. 1948), Thane Rosenbaum (b. 1960), Helen Epstein (b. 1947), Eva Hoffman (b. 1945), and the contributors he gathered in Nothing Makes You Free. The second is the line of serious Jewish American novelists. Above him stand the elders, Saul Bellow (1915-2005), his own teacher Bernard Malamud (1914-1986), Philip Roth (1933-2018), and Cynthia Ozick (b. 1928), and behind them Isaac Bashevis Singer (1902-1991) and Kafka. Beside him work the contemporaries: Steve Stern (b. 1947), Pearl Abraham (b. 1960), Rebecca Goldstein (b. 1950), Allegra Goodman (b. 1967), Dara Horn (b. 1977), Nicole Krauss (b. 1974), Nathan Englander (b. 1970), Jonathan Safran Foer (b. 1977), Michael Chabon (b. 1963), Gary Shteyngart (b. 1972), and Shalom Auslander (b. 1970), with the Israelis A. B. Yehoshua (1936-2022), Aharon Appelfeld (1932-2018), and Etgar Keret (b. 1967) at the edge. The third world is the apparatus that confers standing: the magazines, The Paris Review, The American Scholar, The New York Times, The Washington Post; the writing programs at Sarah Lawrence and Columbia; the prize committees behind the Edward Lewis Wallant Award; the anthologists and co-editors such as David G. Roskies (b. 1948); the critics whose jacket praise certifies a book; the critic-novelists like Daphne Merkin (b. 1954). The survivor-witnesses Primo Levi (1919-1987) and Elie Wiesel (1928-2016) hover over all of it as ancestors, revered and, in Bukiet’s wing, held at arm’s length.

The set defines itself first by what it refuses. It values seriousness and treats consolation as the enemy. The good book tells the truth about suffering and declines the lesson, the silver lining, the healing arc. It values craft and slow revision, the inheritance Bukiet took from Malamud, and it values difficulty, the sentence that asks something of the reader. It prizes a Jewishness made of history, ethics, memory, and peoplehood, often without God. It honors irony, dark comedy, and the grotesque as the honest replies to horror, and it holds the novel as a high calling, a way to make worlds, set against entertainment and commerce. Memory carries an obligation. The catastrophe must be kept accurate, guarded from sentiment and from political use.

The hero in this world is the unconsoling witness, the writer who looks at the worst and refuses to soften it. Strength is the cardinal trait and weakness the disgrace; Bukiet calls weakness suicidal and admires outrage and the man willing to say anything. The hero earns his place through talent, not through what happened to his parents. Bukiet states this without hedging. He wants the nod for his gift and not for his inheritance, and he sets himself against any honor handed out for an accident of birth. The deeper stake runs under the talk of craft. The writer makes a thing that outlives him. Bukiet says the novelist’s fame lasts forever and the journalist’s lasts until the dog needs walking, and he confesses he wants his blood cascading down the ages. For a man born first in a clan the Germans had nearly erased, the book becomes the line that continues where the people were almost cut. That is the heroic bid of the set: work that survives the body and answers annihilation with creation.

The status games run on a few axes. The first is seriousness against sentiment. To write wonder, healing, or redemptive Holocaust kitsch is the low move, and to name another writer sentimental is a kill shot. Bukiet swung it in his 2007 essay “Wonder Bread,” where he went after Dave Eggers (b. 1970) and the McSweeney’s circle for a self-admiring innocence dressed as art. The second axis is the literary against the commercial. The best seller is suspect, and the small, difficult book admired by a few carries more rank than the popular one. Bukiet would rather build the Germany of his own mind than chase the reported realism that sells, and he reaches back to the old contempt of the intelligentsia for the crowd-pleasing novel, the contempt Tom Wolfe (1930-2018) attacked and Bukiet half embraces. The third axis is authenticity, and here the knives come out within the set. Bukiet faults Steve Stern for English faked to sound like Yiddish. I fault the novelists for skipping the research that would make their worlds true, and a friend faults Yehoshua for an India spun out of his head and Krauss for a Singer imitation cut loose from the people it describes. The charge of phoniness is a weapon, and each camp aims a different version of it. The fourth axis is the moral authority of the dead. Standing flows to the child of survivors, and Bukiet resents the man who cashes that inheritance for gravitas, or for sex, while the set keeps trading in it anyway. The last axis is the gate. To edit an anthology is to say who belongs to a conversation, and Bukiet has done it three times, drawing the borders of second-generation writing and of contemporary Jewish fiction. To blurb a book, to seat it in The Paris Review, to hand it the Wallant Award, is to confer membership. Descent from Roth, Malamud, Bellow, Singer, and Kafka is a claim worth making, and Bukiet’s apprenticeship to Malamud is itself a title of craft.

The normative claims are sharp. One must not sentimentalize suffering. One must refuse the lesson, since a lesson sits one inch from a silver lining and a silver lining one inch from justifying the thing. One must write with moral seriousness and historical rigor, and on this point Bukiet moved over his career, from holding that only survivors and their children had the standing to write the Holocaust to allowing that anyone may, given rigor and respect for the event’s singularity. One must guard the words. Genocide means what Raphael Lemkin meant by it, and stretching it for present politics is a wrong against precision and against the dead, which is why Bukiet fought the term after October 7, 2023. One must be tough and tell the ugly truth. One owes the Jewish people continuity, yet one must not fake belief to secure it. Honesty outranks piety.

The essentialist claims define the group’s sense of what things are. Jewish suffering is held to be a different order of suffering, continuous enough to shape the people’s consciousness; Bukiet says, with discomfort and without retracting it, that the Jews hold the crown, and that the Irish know the famine happened but do not fear its return the way Jews fear theirs. The Holocaust is unique, not one atrocity among many, and its language belongs to it. The novel is a theological medium whose nature is creation. Empathy, the power to imagine oneself as another, is the precondition of all art, which is how a man writes a woman and a Frenchman and a German he has never met. A Jew is a man who has taken a long ethos into himself, defined by that ethos rather than by belief or observance, so that a secular Jew can be fully and rigorously Jewish. One essentialist claim splits the set rather than uniting it: whether descent from survivors confers anything real. Bukiet says it conveys proximity to enormity and no wisdom, no privilege. Others build careers on the opposite premise. A second, harder claim circulates at the edges, about readers themselves, whether audiences will follow a writer across the lines of sex or race or only stay with their own kind; Bukiet answers it with the empathy doctrine, while the reporter’s wing doubts that most readers behave that well.

The moral grammar follows from all this. The cardinal sin is false consolation, and the cardinal virtue is unflinching witness. Authenticity works as a moral category, not an aesthetic one alone, so that the faked Yiddish, the unresearched country, and the redemptive uplift register as kinds of lying. To distort memory, by sweetening it or by bending the word genocide, is an offense against the murdered. Comedy and the grotesque are licensed, even sanctified, while piety and uplift draw suspicion. Strength reads as near-virtue and weakness as near-vice. God plays almost no part in the reasoning. Bukiet says God offers no answer to the need for morality, that he cannot build a system to ground the wrongness of cruelty and feels it wrong anyway, and the set’s ethics float free of any commandment, anchored instead to truth, to the people’s history, and to the craft. The good man here keeps faith with the dead, refuses comfort, and earns his standing by the work.

The portrait would lie if it showed one mind. The set divides along live seams. Dara Horn writes a theological Judaism on every page; Bukiet writes none and says the historical and cultural awareness made him who he is. Those who want status detail and lived texture, like me, quarrel with the writers who trust the world of the mind. The wonder school and the unredemptive school read each other as frauds. And the question of who may speak for the catastrophe, settled for no one, keeps reopening. What holds the set together is not agreement but a shared refusal of the easy story and a shared belief that the work outlasts the worker.

Novelist Melvin Jules Bukiet: Signs and Wonders, Nothing Makes You Free: Writings by Descendants of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, While the Messiah Tarries, After, Strange Fire

Melvin writes for American Scholar magazine:

…I'm fifty years old and have never really encountered death before. This is the most notable difference between my youth and my father's. He was born in a shtetl outside Cracow in August 1923 and saw more death before his 20th birthday than nearly anyone in history. His mother and younger siblings were sent away to hide with relatives with whom they were gathered and gassed at Belzec. My father and his father were in the Cracow ghetto when it was liquidated on March 13, 1943 and 3,000 Jews were slaughtered. A day later they arrived at Auschwitz where they slaved until the Russians approached from the east. They were marched to Buchenwald where they remained until the Allies approached from the west and they were marched to Theresenstadt where they were liberated. My grandfather died the day World War II ended in Europe, presumably of typhus.

…The rabbi says a prayer and then speaks. His address is primarily boiler plate, partially touching anecdote and several lies about my father's faith in God – of which he had none. My uncle and cousin (who worked with my father) speak and then come a representative of the Cracow Society and a local Congressman who surprisingly uses his time without oratory or agenda.

…"Minhag k'din," my father said the few times we got into a theo-logical discussion. The sentence is an aphorism, "Custom becomes law," and it defined his religious life.

He went to shul most Saturdays, claiming that he was there for gossip rather than worship though I suspect that he said a few prayers. He certainly knew the words despite a decades-long lapse in using them. As he never sat shiva, he never bothered to attend shul in post-War Europe or later in the United States. The official explanation for this is that he was too busy creating a life, but in truth he wasn't inclined. Genocide had obliterated any faith he ever had.

One day in the hospital, the rabbi who visited him regularly promised that he would say a mi sheberakh or prayer for the sick the next Shabbos. After the rabbi left, my father leaned over and whispered to me, "A mi sheberakh helps the living like El Malei Rachamim (a prayer said for the first time at a funeral and repeated yearly on the yahrzeit or anniversary of the death) helps the dead."

…My suburban Hebrew school education was a pathetic mishmash of white-washed Bible stories, unthinking Zionism (as opposed to the thoughtful Zionism I prefer), rote language study practically designed to kill any appreciation for the tongue, and, mostly, rules. And most of the rules were negative. We know who we are because we don't eat pork. We know who we are because we don't turn on lights on Shabbos. We know who we are because we don't celebrate Christmas. Actually, I know who I am because the idea of God repels me. More than that, however, I know who I am because I'm my dead father's son.

…I have inherited from him and my uncle their distaste for religion, and like them I am profoundly Jewish. What sort of Jew I am, however, is hard to define. I suppose that my faith is what some people call "secular Judaism" – not merely a watered-down version of the real thing that eludes the rigors of traditional forms of belief, but an equally or, I'd argue, more rigorous adherence to Jewish ethics, culture and history.

Like my father, I didn't belong to a shul throughout my twenties though I'd sit beside him in his shul for Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur services and visit my parents' house for Passover seders. Also like him, I joined a shul when it came time to inculcate my own children. In this, I was more fortunate than I deserved because the after school program they attended, chosen for geographical rather than pedagogical reasons, happened to be the kind of place that confronted the paradoxes and difficulties inherent in much of the Bible and encouraged the students to ask questions and therefore created a more potent attachment to Jewishness than any other institution I know. Instead of seeing their Bar and Bat Mitzvah graduations as I did my own, a release from prison, my children begged to continue, so their teacher established a post-grad class.

…I am entirely willing to eat illegal cheeseburgers or lobsters while I find a sacramental savor in the customary folk foods of pastrami and smoked fish.

We talk by phone Monday, July 31, 2006.

Luke: "I'm rolling tape. I want to ask you some questions."

Melvin: "OK. But first, who are you? Where are you? What are you doing? Why are you doing it?"

Luke: "I live in Los Angeles. I'm a convert to Judaism. I have most of the characteristics of the convert. I should've majored in English Literature. My mother wanted me to."

Melvin: "You're making it up at a late stage in life."

Luke: "I wanted to be tougher. I majored in Economics."

Melvin: "I admire that."

Luke: "Once I started studying Calculus and immersed myself in math, I lost the ability to write creatively."

Melvin: "I'm not sure it necessarily follows."

Luke: "Let's just say…"

Melvin: "It occurred even though there wasn't necessarily a cause and effect."

Luke: "I was writing short stories when I was 20, 21, but once I got into calculus and other things happened, I've never written a short story since, but literature was always my love. I read an enormous amount of Jewish fiction. This project is a natural joining of two of my biggest interests.

"I don't have a thesis statement for what I'm doing. That's one of the weaknesses of my writing, or strengths."

Melvin: "More likely the latter."

Luke: "I feel it out as I go along. I know I've got some good material when it surprises me."

Melvin: "Don't you think that some of the qualities you ascribe to interviewing are some of the qualities one seeks in fiction?

"There are two elements in narratives — familiarity and surprise. They are both necessary. All surprise with no familiarity would be incomprehensible. Like a foreign language. All familiarity and no surprise would be tedious."

Luke: "I've been reading a lot of crap for this project. Prior to this, I only read [fiction] for pleasure."

Melvin: "I wish I had the strength to put things down more quickly. I tend to finish almost everything. Sometimes Sigmund [Freud] helps me and I inadvertently lose books."

Luke: "Let's tackle 'child of Holocaust survivors.'"

Melvin: "Could you be a little more explicit?"

Luke: "Once we know that somebody is a child of Holocaust survivors, do we know anything else?"

Melvin: "No. We know that they have been in proximity to people who have experienced historical enormity, but it does not convey any special wisdom or any special privilege."

Luke: "That's what I wanted to find out. I find it obnoxious when people use that mantle to claim moral insights."

Melvin: "Writing is not just. It is not a fair pursuit. Good writing comes from where it does, not from who you are. You can say that about children of Holocaust survivors and about people who use the Holocaust to give gravitas to their work."

Luke: "Yeah! I resent that."

Melvin: "I resent it in some and I'm humored by others."

Luke: "In some writing, people are claiming a moral free pass because their parents went through the Holocaust."

Melvin: "Using it for personal benefit."

Luke: "Yeah, getting laid because you're the child of the Holocaust."

Melvin: "Then again, I'm not against using anything for personal benefit."

Luke: "Is it fair to say that compassion by definition is selective? If you are compassionate to everyone, you aren't compassionate to anyone."

Melvin: "Sounds like you are leading the witness."

Luke: "Do we have to treat children of Holocaust survivors any different than we treat anyone else?"

Melvin: "Do we have to treat retards any differently than we have to treat anyone else?"

Luke: "Should we?"

Melvin: "No. I don't believe that exterior conditions of identity require any notice. For the same reason, I'm not particularly in favor of affirmative action. I'm not in favor of anyone nodding to me as an accident of inheritance. I damn well want them to nod to me anyway because of my extreme talent. Even though I am often identified as the child of Holocaust survivors, I never write about them because they don't interest me too much."

Luke: "When you were a kid, what did you want to be when you grew up?"

Melvin, who was born in 1953: "Alive.

"When I was in third grade, I imagined the presidency.

"I never felt any occupational proclivities until I started writing in college. Nonfiction. I remember going to a 1972 demonstration against the Vietnam War in Washington D.C. I had read Normal Mailer's Armies of the Night. I decided I would do for my era what Mailer had done for his (1965).

"I wrote 17 pages in which I fully explored all of the evils of American foreign policy as well as my thoughts about my parents, religion, and various girls I'd been involved with and then ran out of anything to say. Clearly nonfiction did not sustain me. Then I realized I could make things up. And that I could keep doing for the rest of my life."

Luke: "What did your parents expect from you?"

Melvin: "They were so astonished at having young that all they expected was that I live… I was the first, not only of my mother and father, but of an entire clan. I heard stories about my uncles staying up all night to build me a life-size fire engine for my third birthday. There was a Christchild atmosphere.

"My parents worried that writing would not lead to solvency. There were no artistic indulgences in their life. They were practical."

Melvin's parents married about a year before he was born. "My father arrived in the U.S. in 1948. My mother's family had been lucky enough to run away from the czar a generation earlier. She grew up in a small town in New Jersey, Norma, that was a shtetl.

"My parents didn't know each other more than a year before marriage."

Luke: "What was your parents attitude towards Judaism and being Jewish?"

Melvin: "They simply were Jewish and didn't need to question it."

Luke: "What attitude were you raised with towards Judaism?"

Melvin: "It was an empty faith for me but then again I don't believe in anything.

"After my bar mitzvah, I went to shul occasionally, mostly to 'young people's services.' I found nothing in that.

"Years later I realized that my lack of satisfaction with any religious culture had to do with my lack of satisfaction with any idea of the deity."

Luke: "Did you believe in God as a kid?"

Melvin: "I didn't think much about Him. I thought more about God as I got older and more existential. It is probable that I believe in some cosmic demiurge. Like any 12 year old, I'm driven mad by infinity.

"God has no answer whatsoever to the necessity of morality in life.

"You can believe in God and say, 'You've done nothing for me.'

"If there is some sense of Jewish continuity, then God has unilaterally violated the covenant and we ought to have nothing to do with him.

"Is this the type of attitude that leads to Jewish continuity?

"I feel perfectly Jewish without a religious basis to my experience. I find satisfaction in things human rather than beatific. I find satisfaction in a historical Judaism, in a cultural Judaism, in an ethical Judaism.

"Is this enough to continue [the Jewish people] through the ages? Probably not.

"Should I therefore advocate a hypocritical faith merely for the sake of continuity? No. Each generation does as it must."

Luke: "Do you belong to a synagogue?"

Melvin: "Yes. Ambivalently."

Luke: "You do believe in God?"

Melvin: "I believe in some force with creative intent. Not the man with the long beard obviously."

Luke: "You've not had a relationship with God?"

Melvin: "I have. It's been entirely antagonistic. Eventually He's going to kill me."

"I find myself really afraid of weakness — in others and in myself. I squash it in me and shun it in others. Weakness seems suicidal."

Luke: "Where are you on the organized vs. chaotic spectrum?"

Melvin: "What? This is a spectrum I wasn't aware of.

"My study is Augean — masses of paper everywhere that the world would find incomprehensible. I don't mind living amongst filth.

"I'm absurdly on time. Though there are not many responsibilities in my life, I fulfill them with insane diligence. I don't think I've missed a class in twelve years."

"God bless you. You haven't yet asked any questions about why I write what I write."

Melvin's children are 22, 20, and 18. He's been married for 23 years.

Melvin leaves me a message at 9:20 a.m., Aug. 1. "Luke, I don't know if you've come to realize anything about me yet but I've come to learn something about you."

I call him back. "What have you learned about me?"

Melvin, who has a strong clear professorial voice: "Suddenly, the nature of your inquiries has come together. The first manner in which you identified yourself was as a convert. I think you're trying to get usme, Steve [Stern], Pearl [Abraham], whoever, to justify your faith."

This makes me examine myself. Until now, everything had been so easy. Now I turn my faith round and round in my mind and examine my assumptions through the steely gaze of reason. Finally, I come to the conclusion that I believe in Dennis Prager.

Is that so wrong?

I want to abandon my work, lie on my floor, and have my back rubbed by a chick while we listen to Pragerradio.com. You can catch all of the great man's shows without commercial interruption.

Dennis even has a blog.

I'd like to think I inspired it.

Melvin and I chat about the Holocaust.

Melvin: "I've noticed a change [in the past decade] in the way people respond to all things connected to the Holocaust. I think they're getting tired of the Holocaust. It's connected with Israel and events in the Middle East. As people grew frustrated with Israel, those feelings moved backwards to all things Jewish and Jewish suffering… The Holocaust and the [birth] of Israel are inextricably linked in people's minds and in historical fact."

Luke: Tell me about Neurotica: Jewish Writers on Sex.

Melvin: "It was just a joke. I was on the phone with my agent about ten years ago. She tells me about some anthology she sold — black women on romance. I glibly said, 'Jews have sex too. What about that?' She said, 'Melvin, you should do that.' I kept joking. 'What would we call it? Neurotica?'

"A lightbulb went on over her head. She said, yes, yes, yes. Give me a proposal. She bugged me for months for a proposal. I had never done a proposal in my life. Finally, to shut her up, I spent about 45 minutes one afternoon knocking out three or four pages of nonsense, thinking I would finally put it to bed.

"Two days later, the thing was at auction.

"She hated the original title — 'The Dirty Jew.'"

Luke: "Is she Jewish?"

Melvin: "Nominally."

Melvin: "I enjoyed it because I think of myself as the most chaste writer in the country. I never use dirty words. My idea of sex scenes is laughable."

Luke: "I wanted to call my memoir 'The Kinky Kike.'"

"How is it different when Jews have sex and when the goyim have sex?"

Melvin: "We think about it more."

On his Neurotica book tour, Bukiet was often asked about the Jewish male's fascination with shiksas. One the last leg of his tour, he blurted out: "They've been f—ing us for thousands of years. We just want to know what it is like once."

Luke: "How has having kids affected your writing?"

Melvin: "It's affected my soul which affects my writing. It's made me a mench."

Luke: "Do you think the novel's a bourgeois medium whose primary purpose is entertainment?"

Melvin: "No. I think the novel's a theological medium. We can make worlds too. The novel's primary aim is to create."

"I don't like the tough on the outside, soft on the inside image but…"

Luke: "It's true."

Melvin: "I'm capable of generosity but I admire [some expressions of] hatred. Outrage pleases me. Loose cannon might not be an inappropriate term. One friend says the reason he's willing to see me again is that at some point I'm willing to say anything."

Luke: "You have a reputation for being a bit difficult, even nasty."

Melvin laughs. "Yes. So? Is ease a virtue? The things I'm nasty about deserve it.

"I'm not very good when I see weakness. Weakness frightens me."

Luke: "How do you determine what is right and wrong?"

Melvin: "You're asking a philosophical question that is beyond me to answer."

Luke: "Don't you wish that there was something wrong with gratuitous human cruelty other than that you don't like it?"

Melvin: "Yes, I do think there is something wrong beyond that I don't like it but I'm not smart enough to propound a system that could find it wrong."

Luke: "Has anything happened in the past twenty years that's made you think you don't understand the world around you?"

Melvin: "The World Trade Center made me think that I understand the world too well. That this is what I had been expecting. This is the shape of the future. I wish I was wrong."

Luke: "How would you feel if your kids intermarried?"

Melvin: "Less upset than I would've been two years and four months ago when I would've been upset on my father's behalf. He would have been devastated. The pain it would've brought him would've been excruciating to me.

"I do believe that Judaism is deeply engraved in my children's souls. Whether they will feel an obligation to make a match with someone who also has it ingrained, I'm not sure. Certainly it would be better to marry a smart, funny rich person than a bland suburban Jew."

"Dara Horn's theological Judaism is evident on every single page. That isn't there for me, but the historical cultural awareness has helped to make me who I am.

"What depresses me [about Jewish life]? Not much. I'm clearly ambivalent about Judaism but I like Jews."

Luke: "Are you a good person and a good Jew?"

Melvin: "Yes."

Someone leaves a message on Melvin's answer machine.

Melvin: "Oh God. She's such a dope. Let her leave her message. Maybe she'll leave us alone now."

Luke: "Let me press you on the good Jew bit."

Melvin: "I don't think that going to shul is the definition of a good Jew. Fulfilling oneself and awareness of the world around one defines oneself as a good person. What makes one a good Jew is if one embodies Judaism, an incorporation into oneself of a long-enduring ethos."

Luke: "How is that ethos different than any other Western ethos?"

Melvin: "Created out of a different history. Jewish tragedy has shaped Jewish consciousness. Although all people have suffered. I don't want to compare suffering which is clearly repugnant, but I think we have the crown. It has happened to us more continuously, continuously enough to define us. The Irish potato famine? They know it happened but they don't fear it will happen again."

Luke: "What do Jews have to teach the world?"

Melvin: "I'm not sure I buy the 'light unto the nations' concept. We're just obliged to be holy."

Luke: "What's Daphne Merkin like?"

Melvin: "Daphne's loony. Really smart. She's deeply conflicted. Paradoxical.

"I ended up hanging out for several hours with Daphne and her mom. I can imagine no other sophisticated adult who would be so at ease with sitting on a sidewalk for three hours. Her life is an open book for all the stupid things that life consists off. She's parlayed her flaws into virtues."

viewed by the media with regard to the tremendous "growth" and "healing" you've personally witnessed. Show them your "A Current Affair" reel so that they know you can handle yourself on TV.

Know this: whatever money you would need to justify whoring yourself out like this is probably less than what the kid who runs the copy machine in Gibson's production company is making. So act now, and be driving a decent car by the end of the month.

Off The Record With Melvin Jules Bukiet

We had a nice chat Wednesday Aug. 2 that was off the record. Then I successfully begged him to let me use the following approximation:

Luke: Pearl Abraham's The Seventh Beggar. For 70 pages, she had a ripping good story. Then she went nuts.

Melvin: I appreciate the nutsiness of it. It's courageous. Her publisher would probably have preferred it if she had done The Romance Reader VII. She goes off into this mystical etherium that I'm not capable of understanding but I admire her for the flight.

Luke: Only a tiny intellectual elite are going to follow that.

Steve Stern can tell a good story but his novels aren't linear and he always gets crazy trying to imitate Yiddish in his English.

Melvin: That's where the fun is.

Luke: Only an elite is going to find that fun. Nobody's going to buy him.

Melvin: Who buys anyone? We live in a post-aural culture.

Luke: He could tell a commercial story. Why write English like its Yiddish? He primarily reads Yiddish in translation so his Yiddish thing seems faux.

Melvin: It's where the spark is.

Where does authenticity come from? The novel I'm working on now is set in Washington D.C. I know nothing about Washington D.C. and its political culture. Any Washington insider will know my novel is entirely bogus. But I'm not writing for that elite audience of Washington insiders. If I can truly create the Washington of my mind… Some of my books are set in Germany where I've never set foot. I did no research. It was the Germany of my mind. I don't distinguish between imagination and experience. If anything, imagination seems more real. If I get my Washington correct, I will feel successful and will be able to communicate it to someone else.

Luke: You'll feel successful but you're not going to communicate it to a lot of other people…

Melvin: Most people don't have experience in Washington either.

Luke: I know but if they read a novel about Washington they will want to feel like…

Melvin: If I convey my vision, it will feel true even if it bares little resemblance to the real Washington. I had a student who wrote a story about what it was like to experience a forest fire. I had no idea whether he had spent summers fighting forest fires or just made it all up. If you convey emotional truth… Emotional truth is necessary. The rest…

Luke: That's not going to work for a large number of readers.

Melvin: It will if you get the emotional truth out. Was Dostoevsky a murderer? No. Was he able to create Raskolnikov? Yes. Was Flaubert a female? No. But Madame Bovary…

Luke: Why wouldn't you go to Washington D.C. and do research?

Melvin: I may a little bit. I'm lazy. I'm more interested in writing than research.

Luke: Because my background is in journalism and your background is in literature, maybe that's why we differ.

I'm thinking of these mega-best sellers by Tom Wolfe, you feel like you are in Atlanta, New York and Duke University.

Melvin: I think you are right in terms of best sellers. Best sellers often fulfill a non-fictional purpose. They tell you what it is really like behind the scenes at a movie studio or a modeling agency… But it's not necessarily art. That speaks to the sad literalism and lack of faith in the American readership.

Luke: You're blaming the reader.

Melvin laughs. "And the culture. I'll blame anyone."

'So What Do You Do With This Cosmic Responsibility?'

Melvin Bukiet writes in his book Nothing Makes You Free: Writings by Descendents of Jewish Holocaust Survivors:

You were born in the fifties so you smoked dope and screwed around like everyone else. But your rebellion was pretty halfhearted, because how could you rebel against these people who endured such loss?

In the PBS special Auschwitz: Inside the Nazi State, Bukiet says:

I think we learn nothing from it [the Holocaust]. Michael, you use the word "learn" and that's one of the many problems with the Holocaust. It is simultaneously endlessly fascinating, because it does embody the extremes of human behavior. But it is also endlessly exhausting, because it provides no reward whatsoever.

There is a tendency, however, on behalf of many people to try and impute some lesson to it. I find that incredibly dangerous. The second you find a lesson, you are moving one inch towards finding a silver lining, towards actually justifying it. And that seems as repugnant as the experience itself.

How depressing. It is one thing to suffer, but suffering without meaning is the worst. Yet Bukiet can find no lessons in the Holocaust nor in anything because he has a fundamentally secular view of life. A secular life is circular. It doesn't go anywhere except to annihilation. Judaism says history must go forward to the Messian age. That Jews are God's chosen people, a pilot project for humanity, who are to embody ethical monotheism.

In Bukiet's secular worldview, nothing makes you free because all we are are atoms, bio-chemistry, and learned survival instincts. Only if there is a God who gives us a soul is there free will, meaning and the opportunity for redemption through good works.

Dennis Prager's open letter to Elie Wiesel.

Bukiet calls Second Generation Holocaust writers "viciously unredemptive."

He writes:

No one — not a German and not a Jew — who isn't a child of survivors can begin to understand the bottomless depths of rage inside those born into the Khurbn [Holocaust]. No one can understand how we can hold collectively guilty not only the octogenarian perpetrators but the rest of the nation that saw nothing for the twelve-year reign of the Thousand Year Reich…

What about the children of other genocides such as the Armenian or Ukrainian or Cambodian or the Chinese?

Bukiet presented one of his novels to German chancellor Hermut Kohl. Melvin signed it 108016, his father's camp number.

I find the following the most revelative story about Melvin Jules Bukiet (in his own words from the book Nothing Makes You Free, pg. 18-19):

I remember one "gathering" many years ago where the then Vice President George H. Bush was adressing about five thousand survivors and their offspring in front of the Washington Monument. I left, because of my politics, and sat in the first of several dozen waiting buses. One elderly women had preceded me, and a few others followed us. For them, leaving the Mall was a matter of practicality; the first bus filled would be the first to depart.

Unfortunately, there was a problem. The first bus had been reserved for VIPs. As soon as the speech ended and a multitude of survivors swarmed toward the buses, an officious young woman told us we had to vacate the vehicle. We who had been so clever would be consigned to the back of the line. The elderly woman in front of me started bitching. She was saying things like, "Hitler didn't beat us, and you won't," and I egged her on. We were ready to link arms and go limp. I could see the bad press take shape in twenty-point type in my mind: "Survivors Arrested in Protest at Washington Monument."

Eventually, authority caved in and told us we could have our damn bus, but the elderly woman was still muttering and cursing, "How dare they?" As the bus looped around the Mall, I leaned forward and said, "But we had fun, didn't we?" and she gave me a smile as bright as sunshine. We had never met before, but we knew each other.

In the dedication to his collection Neurotica: Jewish Writers on Sex, Melvin writes:

To Jill,
the mother of Madelaine, Louisa, and Miles
(I hope they're mine)

Melvin replies to my inquiry: "Luke, Jill thought the dedication was charming since it implied that she could theoretically have an exotic other life. No word from the kids; they know to expect any outrage from their father. As for difference, it's shabby because adoption is a beautiful thing, but I wanted my blood cascading down through the ages."

The Return Of Eros To Academe

…And while Professor Stone tried to reassemble himself, she continued to coo, "Life needn't be nasty, brutish and short. Just act as if all of your actions could be universal principles."

…Trish cornered him, and opened the hastily bunched robe. "Oh, gee," she said. "It looks just like Karl Marx."

In his short story, "Paper Hero," Melvin Bukiet writes: "…[A] journalist's fame lasts until the dog needs walking while the novelist's lasts forever."

The Best Books On Jewish Life

I email the Editor of the Jewish Journal: "Rob: Do you read much fiction about Jewish life? I'm interviewing a bunch of Jewish novelists and developing the thesis that they aren't doing enough research and reporting… That perhaps the best books on Jewish life now are non-fiction."

Rob replies:

I read mostly non-fiction. I find that being in the midst of "Jewish life," most contemporary Jewish fiction has a kind of flat, self-consciousness to it. I read fiction for entertainment, and a lot of the people you mention don’t entertain me.

Here’s who does: Philip Roth, Gary Shteyngart, Shalom Auslander, Michael Chabon, Etgar Keret.

They’re all men, they all write frequently in a comic vein, they all know how to tell a great story. I suppose the problem is I’m not deep enough to appreciate the serious new Jewish novelists.

A friend replies:

I thought Nicole Krauss's The History of Love sounded like an imitation of Isaac Bashevis Singer disconnected from any real interaction with the people or the culture written about.

Your critique is even more true of Israeli fiction. A. B. Yehoshua wrote a book about an anesthesiologist who goes to India that has not one shred of connection to India, medical practice, it was all spun out of his head and at the time there were a lot of essays about that.

The best work of Jewish fiction I know, loosely science fiction, is by R. Nachman of Breslov (R. Nachman’s stories, the Aryeh Levine version is probably best). Kafka apparently liked them.

I Want To Be Swept Away

When I read a story, I want to be swept away.

For that to happen, I usually need:

* Linear scene-by-scene construction.
* Status details. I want keen insights into life, into the way we struggle to avoid humiliation and to advance ourselves.

Much of the best writing on Jewish life comes from such works of non-fiction as The New Rabbi (Stephen Fried), Stephen Bloom's Postville, Jew vs. Jew (Samuel Friedman) as well as Robert J. Avrech's novel for kids — The Hebrew Kid and the Apache Maiden.

Jewish novelists don't do enough research to make their work compelling. I just finished Melvin Jules Bukiet's realistic novel Strange Fire (a Brokeback Mountain story set amongst Israel's political elite) which is overwhelmingly linear and composed in scenes, just as I like it, and yes the sentences are often smart and witty and it's all very literary, but the details of Israeli life aren't sharp and true enough. It needed more realistic status details. I wanted to experience more "Ah ha!" moments.

If Melvin wanted his protagonist to be more convincing, he should've turned gay for a few weeks and done the hard work necessary for sublime art.

On August 2nd, Bukiet told me: "The novel I'm working on now is set in Washington D.C. I know nothing about Washington D.C. and its political culture. Any Washington insider will know my novel is entirely bogus. But I'm not writing for that elite audience of Washington insiders. If I can truly create the Washington of my mind… Some of my books are set in Germany where I've never set foot. I did no research. It was the Germany of my mind. I don't distinguish between imagination and experience. If anything, imagination seems more real. If I get my Washington correct, I will feel successful and will be able to communicate it to someone else."

Strange Fire was too damn cynical. I didn't care about any of the characters. Perhaps I'm homophobic, but it puts me off my supper to read about a deformed old man who wants to bugger boys.

Publishers Weekly liked Strange Fire because P.W. likes nothing better than a good buggering. My first book was slammed in P.W. for, among other things, not writing about gay porn (and for perpetuating negative stereotypes about Jews).

Have there been any bestselling novels with a homosexual as the protagonist? My hunch is that most heterosexuals are not into reading about the sexual adventures and libidinous desires of gays.

My favorite essay on modern literature was by Tom Wolfe — "Stalking the billion-footed beast; a literary manifesto for the new social novel." Harper's Magazine 279.n1674 (Nov 1989).

The truth was, as Arnold Hauser had gone to great pains to demonstrate in The Social History of Art, the intelligentsia have always had contempt for the realistic novel — a form that wallows so enthusiastically in the dirt of everyday life and the dirty secrets of class envy and that, still worse, is so easily understood and obviously relished by the mob, i.e., the middle class. In Victorian England, the intelligentsia regarded Dickens as "the author the uneducated, undiscriminating public." It required a chasm of time — eighty years, in fact — to separate his work from its vulgar milieu so that Dickens might be canonized in British literary circles. The intelligentsia have always preferred more refined forms of fiction…

I remember how funny Allegra Goodman was in her first collection of short stories (The Family Markowitz) and how dull she's become since she's turned to churning out refined novels.

Strange Fire

I email author Melvin Jules Bukiet: "Do you think heterosexuals are going to read books with a homosexual protagonist?"

He replies:

Dear Mr. Flaubert,

Do you think that males will read books with a female protagonist?

Do you think that Americans will read books with a French protagonist?

Reader

………..

Dear Reader,

Empathy, the ability to imagine oneself as someone else, is the precondition for art.

Gustave

One. Notice that neither Gustave nor Melvin answered my question about how people act. I didn't ask about how people should act.

Two. Nobody can dispute that men and women are happy to read about each other. What I asked is whether heteros will read books with a homo protagonist. From my sense of things, they generally will not.

Only under duress will I read a book or watch a movie with a homosexual male protagonist who is explicit in his homosexual desires. I find buggery (and the use of hard drugs) more disturbing than almost anything short of murder.

I also suspect that most whites won't read many books with a black protagonist. Certainly box office figures and rating prove that whites watch few movies and TV shows with leads who are black (Denzel Washington, Will Smith aside, and Eddie Murphy at one time crossed the color line).

Signs and Wonders by Melvin Jules Bukiet

This dark retelling of the Gospels is set in late 1999 and contains Bukiet's trademark homosexual rape (this time of a boy) and pissing on holy places.

I experienced strong emotions as I read the books. At first I was disgusted, and then intrigued, exhilarated, amused, repelled, and finally disgusted.

One thing that usually prevents me from enjoying Bukiet's novels is the lack of a likable protagonist.

From Publishers Weekly: "Sparing no sensibilities in this searing, bitterly satirical novel, Bukiet reflects on the hypocrisy, venality, depravity, corruption and folly of which the human race is capable, and produces a harrowing story that is an eerie reprise of both the biblical account of Jesus' life and the Nazi extermination policy against Jews. …Bukiet (After) handles language with supple skill, using sardonic humor and a jocular vernacular in his supremely ironic assessment of humanity's capacity for wickedness. Throughout the narrative he adroitly clothes his tragic message in the raiments of black comedy and farce. Some readers may find Bukiet's conviction that Jews will always suffer the fate of scapegoats too pessimistic. However, his message about spiritual rebirth destroyed by hatred rings with moral conviction."

Steven writes on Amazon.com: "The Messiah is vague as a character. He is virtually absent from the book. He has little to say and there is no background info for him that might have given his coming more impact."

I email Bukiet: "There are few heroes in your writing. Your protagonists are not easy to like.

"And there's an awful lot of homosexual rape."

He replies:

Not sure about third observation. Yes, in Signs and Wonders; it's a prison book. And certainly the scene in Strange Fire because I'd set myself homosexuality as a kind of otherly identity for my protagonist: along with national (Israeli), occupational (speech writer), and mostly physical (blindness). I don't think this phenomenon exists elsewhere.

Point two: Why should protagonists be any easier to like than most people?

As for point one, heroes, that's much more interesting, but I can't speculate on it now. Busy. Feel free to take your own shots at an answer.

I guess Bukiet's protagonists are, at least in this respect, like Bukiet.

I suspect that unlikable protagonists deny a book or movie commercial success. I find that I have to push myself to read a book with an unlikable protagonist, such as one who urinates on an altar.

Related Links:

Pearl Abraham Elisa Albert Steve Almond Jonathan Ames Shalom Auslander Aimee Bender Karen Bender Amy Bloom Danit Brown Melvin Jules Bukiet Tamar Fox Naama Goldstein Rebecca Goldstein Yael Goldstein Laurie Graff Lauren Grodstein Ehud Havazelet Joanna Hershon Dara Horn Molly Jong-Fast Mitchell James Kaplan Binnie Kirshenbaum Sana Krasikov Adam Mansbach Tova Mirvis Gurumurthy Neelakantan Alana Newhouse Jon Papernick Rachel Resnick Thane Rosenbaum Elizabeth Rosner Wendy Shalit Ilana Stanger-Ross Laurie Gwen Shapiro Rochelle Shapiro Andrea Seigel Robert Siegel Terrie Silverman Margot Singer Leora Skolkin-Smith Yuri Slezkine Diana Spechler Steve Stern Ayelet Waldman Katharine Weber Tamar Yellin People of the Book Festival 2006

Yosef Abramowitz Edward Alexander Michael Berenbaum Sally Berkovic James Besser Reuven Blau Stephen Bloom Andrew Silow-Carroll Shmuley Boteach Benyamin Cohen Debra Nussbaum Cohen Robert Cohn Ami Eden Rob Eshman Larry Cohler-Esses Frances Dinkelspiel Matt Dorf Ami Eden Charles Fenyvesi Eric Fingerhut Amnon Finkelstein Sue Fishkoff Samuel Freedman Stephen Fried Robert I. Friedman Heshy Fried Jonathan Friendly Neal Gabler Evan Gahr J.J. Goldberg Ari Goldman Yossi Klein Halevi Malcolm Hoenlein Wayne Hoffman Hollywood Jews Mickey Kaus Eve Kessler Michael Kinsley Amy Klein Marc S. Klein Lisa S. Lenkiewicz Gene Lichtenstein Jason Maoz Jonathan Mark Deborah Dash Moore Alana Newhouse Gustav Niebuhr Ori Nir Steve Rabinowitz Gary Rosenblatt Jennie Rothenberg Debra Rubin Neil Rubin Walter Ruby Douglas Rushkoff Jonathan Sarna Cathy Seipp Rabbi Avi Shafran Mark Silk Sheldon Teitelbaum Jonathan Tobin Tom Tugend David Twersky Teresa Watanabe Steven I. Weiss Leon Wieseltier Paul Wilkes Lauren Winner Yori Yanover Larry Yudelson

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