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Larry McMurtry and the Death of Book Culture
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Hobbes v Locke
The two philosophers I think about the most these days are Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes argues for the absolute regime and Locke for the liberal state.
Overall, my worldview is more aligned with Hobbes. In the state of nature, you most often find: “No arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
In dangerous situations, a Hobbesian hierarchical corporate top-down society is more adaptive while in times of peace, a rights-based cooperative open society works better. Sometimes people are better off with an intense in-group identity and at other times, such as in Western big cities today, you’re usually better off operating with a Lockean moderate in-group identity with considerable openness to some types of strangers (such as those who share your profession and preferences).
In dangerous situations, a Sparta-like military state is most adaptive, and in other situations, an Athenian-empire approach works better. For most nations, nationalism is more adaptive than empire building. For most people most of the time, an above-average in-group identity is more adaptive.
In every community, there are obvious truths you should not say out loud if you want a happy life.
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The Women of the Far Right (Swimsuit Edition) (1-28-24)
01:00 Three U.S. soldiers killed in Jordan
20:40 How Europeâs growing far-right populism will affect Ukraine and the war | Ivan Rogers
25:00 Could Israel Cost Biden the Election?, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3n7F88DQHlQ
47:00 The Women of the Far Right: Social Media Influencers and Online Radicalization, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=154090
49:00 Curious Gazelle joins
59:00 How Luke prepares his shows
1:16:00 Claire Khaw analysis
2:00:00 Richard Spencer
2:10:00 Dickson Sidah joins, https://twitter.com/DicksonSidah
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Larry McMurtry’s Struggle Against Anti-Gentile Prejudice
Here’s an excerpt from the new biography, Larry McMurtry: A Life by Tracy Daugherty:
She [McMurtry’s literary agent Dorothea Oppenheimer] gave [Editor Michael Korda] an earful about how East Coast reviewers just didn’t get McMurtry though to be fair he had been generally well received, not just as warmly as she wished. It was, she thought, a question of urban prejudice. They just couldn’t take seriously a novelist who’d been born in Archer City, Texas and was raised as a cowhand and wrote about life in Texas. Korda conceded there was a good deal of truth in this. The prevailing tone of American fiction at the time was urban, Jewish and Eastern. The West was seen in the eye of the literati as a colossal mistake… Publishers by and large lived in New York City…and most of them were progressive… Liberal… McMurtry’s focus on the past and certain, largely white, American traditions tended to puzzle Eastern book people or it left them cold.
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Irony and Outrage: The Polarized Landscape of Rage, Fear, and Laughter in the United States
Political scientist Dannagal Goldthwaite Young writes in this 2019 book:
* In their 2014 book The Outrage Industry, Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj chronicle the growth of a new genre of political programming through the 2000s; programming that places a charismatic host at its center and employs tactics like hyperbole, sensationalism, ad hominem attack, and extreme language to âproveâ that political opponents are hypocrites and like – minded viewers are morally superior…
They write: âoutrage has been propelled by a synergistic confluence of economic, technological, regulatory, and cultural changes that converged to create a media environment that proved unusually nurturing for outrage – based content.â 3 In other words, outrage programming did not just appear out of nowhere in the 1990s. It was made technologically possible by cable and media fragmentation. It was made economically viable by political polarization and a drop in public faith in news. And was made permissible by regulatory changes that arose during that same era.
* several conservative outrage personalities, including Fox Newsâs Tucker Carlson and Laura Ingraham, as well as conservative pundit Ann Coulter, started their cable news careers at MSNBC. After about a decade without a clear programming niche and trailing in the cable news ratings war, in the mid – 2000s the network pivoted to the left and positioned itself as a liberal alternative to Fox.
* By creating programming focused on charismatic people who shared the networkâs ideological worldview, [Roger] Ailes had created an entire network [Fox News] to explore and cultivate the genre of âoutrage.â Ailes wasnât interested in A – list hosts. Ever the populist, Ailes, as Sherman writes, âvalued authenticity over talent.â
* successful outrage hosts tell stories that allow them to âposition themselves or their political compatriots in the role of the hero or to taint enemies, opponents or policies they dislike as dangerous, inept, or immoral.â 61 Hence, outrage is designed to be âreactiveâ â to respond to the events, topics, and people of the day. Naturally, the Obama presidency proved to be an exceptional foil â and fuel â for Foxâs outrage – centered business model.
* for all of Jon Stewartâs substantive critiques of the failures of journalism, he never actually explored the systemic reasons for those failures. His critiques often suggested that journalistic failures were the responsibility of journalists or the fault of âthe cable networks.â But he didnât explore why cable news fails in the ways it does. He never tackled media deregulation or the consolidation of media ownership. He never discussed the conundrum posed by journalism being charged with serving the public good and simultaneously being squeezed for corporate profit. He never discussed the democratic threat posed by five megacorporations owning the nationsâ entire media landscape, or the fact that his own network, Comedy Central, was owned by one of them (Viacom).
* According to humor scholar George Test, satire is defined by four characteristics: aggression, play, laughter, and judgment. 1 âAggressionâ is the notion that satire embodies the spirit of attack. âPlayâ refers to the fact that humor operates like a riddle that must be solved, often including allusions to silly or strange constructs (think: giraffe, spatula, Chihuahua, rutabaga). âLaughterâ captures the mirth anticipated by, and derived from, a satirical message. âJudgmentâ is the notion that satire presents a valenced, evaluative argument aimed at a target â usually an institution, a policy, a practice, or society as a whole. According to Test, aggression and judgment are the two criteria that distinguish satire from other kinds of humor: âsatire ultimately judges, it asserts that some person, group, or attitude is not what it should be. However restrained, muted, or disguised a playful judgment may be, whatever form it takes, such an act undermines, threatens, and perhaps violates the target, making the act an attack.â 2 The targets of satire, and the judgments it levels, are broad â aimed at society, systems, and the audience itself. Rachel Caufield proposes that âmost political humor is aimed to entertain the audience by poking fun at outsiders â political candidates, government officials, or public figures. In contrast, satireâs target is broader â it is meant to attack political institutions, societyâs foibles, or public vices. Put simply, conventional political humor is often geared at making the audience laugh at others, while satire is designed to make the audience laugh at itself as well as others, therefore allowing the audience to realize a larger set of systemic faults.â
* surprising violation of expectations is at the core of what makes things funny.
* Political satire is frequently presented through irony â literally stating one thing while meaning the opposite. Bergson described ironic juxtapositions as contrasting âthe real and the idealâ or âwhat is and what ought to be.â 11 Simply put, when you describe things that are obviously bad as though they are good, or describe things that are obviously good as though they are bad, you are inviting your listener to question why things are bad in reality or, conversely, why things are not good in reality.
* irony includes five elements: evaluativeness, incongruity, valence, a target, and relevance to the current context. 16 First, irony is evaluative in that it issues a valenced judgment (good or bad) about something. Second, irony relies on an incongruity between the literal and actual meanings of a text. Third, it also requires an inversion of valence (meaning positive assessments are really negative and negative ones are really positive). Fourth, irony is always aimed at some target. Finally, irony must be directly or indirectly relevant to the situation or context in which it is introduced.
Put simply: irony is a relevant, context – specific form of judgment, aimed at a target; and its literal and intended meanings are at odds with one another.
Irony is a way of saying something really harsh by saying something kind…* Human beings use humor (and irony) to look good, to signal cognitive sophistication, to make each other feel good, to make society work more easily, and to tackle difficult subjects without making others angry (more on that in a minute). 18 Humor is an advanced form of communication that fulfills social and status – related needs and gratifications. Being able to successfully use humor is a sign of leadership, authority, and intelligence. 19 Itâs a way of promoting social cohesion among small groups of people, allowing groups to thrive and work productively together. Humor also creates temporary feelings of happiness â also called mirth â among audience members. These feelings often get projected onto the speaker or the person who created the humor, creating what is known as a âhalo effect,â through which audience members feel good about the person who made them feel good. (Like the opposite of the âshoot the messengerâ effect.)
* arguments made through jokes elicit less resistance than arguments made through regular serious discourse. …the âdiscounting cueâ hypothesis. It says that people perceive humor differently from serious discourse and choose to apply different rules when processing it. Instead of treating it seriously, people see humor as âjust a joke,â in which case scrutinizing the message or challenging the speaker about what the speaker is saying is not âappropriate.â The discounting cue hypothesis is based on the idea that people choose whether or not to scrutinize messages â and in the case of jokes, usually decide not to.
* the cognitive processing required to make sense of even the most basic joke is quite burdensome.
* The meaning of a joke is implicit, forcing the listeners to add the appropriate information from long – term memory to make sense of it themselves. If you are spending so much cognitive energy just getting and appreciating appreciating a joke, I thought, how on earth are you going to have the mental energy left over to scrutinize or challenge whatever argument the joke is suggesting?
* When understanding humor, Coulson and Marta Kutas suggest, the listener engages in a process of frame – shifting, âin which the listener activates a new frame from long – term memory to reinterpret information already active in working memory.â 24 Their findings highlight the unique and complex brain functioning that occurs in the context of humor. 25
This process of suppressing information that was just activated in working memory and then replacing it with a different schema (or frame of reference) that the listener has to retrieve from long – term memory is hard work, a contention with which many neuroscientists agree. âJokes presuppose the speakerâs ability to interpret language against background knowledge.”* The resource allocation theory proposes that because humor requires so much work aimed at comprehension and appreciation, people become less able to actively argue against whatever is being proposed in the joke itself. In essence, your cognitive resources have been allocated to getting the joke, so you have few resources left over to scrutinize or critique the argument made in that joke.
* The premises of the resource allocation theory, like much work on information processing, are that (1) people are âcognitive misers,â unlikely to expend more cognitive energy than is absolutely necessary, and (2) the capacity for information processing in working memory is limited. 29 In the context of humor, in anticipation of the reward of âmirthâ from getting a joke, it may seem worth it to expend enough cognitive energy to get the payoff of the punchline, but itâs unlikely to seem worth it to think much beyond that. People are both not very motivated to think hard and not particularly able to think about multiple things at the same time. As it turns out, and as multitasking experts can attest, humansâ brains have a limited capacity to process information, which leaves people unable to think about and actively process multiple things simultaneously.
* There are two tasks that are incompatible with one another: (1) getting and appreciating a joke (processing the funny stuff), and (2) scrutinizing and critiquing the argument presented through that joke (processing the serious stuff).
* The more invested the audience members are in the funny component of what youâre saying, the less likely they are to judge the underlying strength of the argument. Imagine that: the more engaged they are with (the humorous part) of your message, the less likely they are to critique it.
* âcomplexity seems to increase the degree of perceived humor so that if a joke contains several hidden violations, and claims for more reasoning efforts, it will be funnier than if fewer are noticed and less intellectual efforts are devoted to the incongruity resolution.â 3 But this only works up to a point. Research in the 1960s and 1970s concluded that the relationship between humor complexity and humor appreciation could be represented by an âinverted – U shapeâ: the more difficult the joke, the funnier people find it until the joke becomes too difficult to comprehend, at which point, appreciation decreases.
* professional comics cannot afford to tell jokes of such complexity that they leave the audience baffled.â
* a humorous text will be perceived as humorous if the incongruity/resolution is: non – threatening, not too complex or too simple, based on available scripts/knowledge, unexpected, surprising, and occurs in a playful mode (the situation must be framed as humor).â
* People with different levels of need for cognition tend to differ in countless other ways as well. People low in need for cognition are more likely to be dogmatic and are more aware of social comparison cues. They are more likely to place a high value on attractiveness or popularity; more likely to engage in processes of selective attention, perception, and avoidance; more likely to be high in need for closure (a psychological trait indicating an aversion to ambiguity and uncertainty); and more likely to prefer order and predictability. People high in need for cognition tend to be more curious, more willing to dedicate long periods of time to a dedicated task, more open to new ideas, and more likely to see social and political issues as affecting them personally.
* People who enjoy thinking are more likely to appreciate humor than those who donât. Given that joke comprehension is akin to a playful form of riddle-solving, the notion that people who enjoy thinking are more appreciative of jokes makes sense.
* that the link between need for cognition and humor appreciation works when the humor is predominantly rooted in incongruity resolution (which, as Iâve discussed, is cognitively taxing). However, when a joke is disparagement – oriented (making fun of someone or something, as in the âYo mamaâ jokes discussed earlier), the effects of need for cognition disappear. It seems that when incongruities are high, as they are in ironic texts, need for cognition is an important predictor of enjoyment.
* humans encounter the world through various motivational states. Apter suggests that people vacillate between states depending on their personalities, their psychological profiles, and cues in their environment. For example, sometimes people operate in a more serious, goal – driven, âtelicâ state and other times in a more playful, spontaneous, âparatelicâ state. It is in the paratelic state that people are able to experience and appreciate humor. In order to enter the state of play, Attardo argues, the audience must perceive the environment and the joke itself as nonthreatening.
* During my junior year studying abroad in France, I found myself at a loss when French people made jokes. I quickly learned that there was one kind of joke that I had to get on board with relatively quickly: âstupid Belgianâ jokes. In France, Belgians are the source of endless comedy for their supposed stupidity.
* Satire is most likely to be appreciated by people who â due to personality, psychology, and aspects of the environment â can get it and are willing to get it. These are people who possess the requisite knowledge to reconcile the incongruity. Their openness to and enjoyment of thinking increase their motivation to try to get the joke. And they are willing and able to entertain the topic in the state of play.
* Need for cognition also tends to be high among people who are tolerant of ambiguity. Tolerance for ambiguity is another key trait that contributes to artistic and aesthetic preferences. Tolerance for ambiguity, also known in association with its converse, need for closure, refers to how comfortable an individual is with novelty and uncertainty. 7 People who are high in tolerance for ambiguity adapt easily to new situations, are open to new experiences, and tend to reject structure, order, and predictability. Those low in tolerance for ambiguity, who are high in need for closure, are less comfortable with new experiences and tend to prefer routines, order, structure, and predictability.
* the need for closure scale includes several different underlying dimensions, including need for order, need for predictability, need for decisiveness, intolerance for ambiguity, and closed – mindedness.
* Studies conducted in the emerging field of political neuroscience point to differences in brain structures between liberals and conservatives â differences that map onto their unique psychological traits and orientations to the world. For instance, studies of the neurological structures of conservativesâ brains indicate that conservative individuals have larger amygdalas â the region of the brain that responds to threat. 29 The size and activity in your amygdala predicts your likeliness to react in a more emotionally charged way when responding to threatening situations. 30 This evidence from brain science fits with the finding that conservatives report high âmortality salience,â that is, they are significantly more cognizant of their own deaths. They also report greater fear of threat and loss than liberals do.
In contrast, liberals have bigger anterior cingulates â the region of the brain involved in conflict monitoring. 32 Conflict monitoring is the process through which you determine whether your automatic response matches with the response that would be most appropriate for the situation at hand. 33 Hence, with a larger anterior cingulate, liberals are more likely to change how they react to certain events, as they tend to devote cognitive resources to choosing the most suitable responses to various situations. 34 Whereas conservatives are commonly monitoring their environments for threats, liberals are evaluating information and verifying that the data coming in matches their attitudes and judgments.
* Increasingly, political scientists are acknowledging the role of genetics in shaping peopleâs political ideologies and their individual political beliefs.
* The more conservative the participants, the higher the likelihood that they would prefer solid edges and lines â and pictures in frames. Conservatives were literally more likely than liberals to agree with the sentiment âGood solid frames are very important for a picture or a painting.â To extrapolate to todayâs political reality, it seems that the same people who support the building of a physical boundary (a literal wall) along the United Statesâ southern border to keep out illegal immigrants probably also want a physical boundary (a frame) to visually separate their artwork from the drywall around it.
* People who opposed mixed marriage, euthanasia, abortion, and smoking pot showed a preference for readily reconciled jokes over the more incongruous, complex ones.
So if you vote Republican, you not only want frames for your artwork; apparently, you also want your jokes to have really clear punchlines.* Whereas irony requires that the listener invert the literal valence of the speaker to infer what the speaker actually means, in hyperbole/exaggeration, the listener has much less cognitive work to do.
* Humor is a deliberately inefficient form of communication. Rather than explicitly communicating information with the goal of being clear and understood, humor transforms the act of communication into a game â a riddle.
* Daniel Howrigan at the University of Colorado at Boulder sought to understand the relationship between general intelligence, personality traits, and humor production: What kinds of people are funny? 30 To a sample of undergraduate participants from two colleges in California, Howrigan and his colleague Kevin MacDonald administered questionnaires that measured various personality traits, including extravertedness and openness. The researchers also used a complex measure â Ravenâs Progressive Matrices Test â to capture general intelligence.
The results showed that general intelligence is a strong predictor of humor production. Smart people are funnier than not – smart people. In view of the complexity of humor as a form of implicit and incongruous communication, this makes a lot of sense. The findings also point to an important social dimension that factors into humor production: extraversion. Extraverts are more adept at the production of funny jokes. Finally, and consistent with other work in this area, Howrigan and MacDonald did find support for the idea that openness (a dimension of tolerance for ambiguity) is related to humor production as well.
* Political scientist Alison Dagnes writes: âthe poverty – paved road to thespianism is riddled with tricky potholes that serve as obstacles from continuing in a profession with wildly uneven work schedules and paychecks.â 34
In her book A Conservative Walks into a Bar , Dagnes explores the political and psychological characteristics of political satirists through qualitative interviews with comedians and comedy writers. Her sense throughout the book is that the liberal nature of satire is a function of the personality of the satirist as âunconventional,â âartsy,â âfreethinking,â and âunpredictable,â traits that are more prevalent among liberals than conservatives…âBeing a comic,â he argues, is about âcomfort with ambiguity and chaos.â 37 Ashley Black, a writer for Full Frontal with Samantha Bee, 38 agrees with the underlying premise: âin order to get good at [comedy] you have to be part of a community. And that community is very much centered on hanging out and drinking, and not having children. Having children is a huge barrier to entry… A lot of things conservatives want to do like get married early, have kids, show up early, go to church on Sundays ⊠thereâs none of that [in comedy].â Instead itâs âget a shitty job that you know is shitty and beneath you so that you can devote every working hour to your jokes, staying up until 3 in the morning.â
* Comics (professionals, amateurs, and writers) are significantly more open to experience (tolerant of ambiguity) than noncomics. This relationship was particularly noteworthy among comedy writers, among whom openness was the highest of all the participants in the study.
* The process of creating humor itself involves complex cognitive processing. As discussed earlier, tolerance for ambiguity, openness to experience, and need for cognition are all correlated with a more liberal ideology (particularly on social and cultural issues). So, just as appreciation of complex humor â like satire and irony â ought to be greater among political liberals than among political conservatives, successful humor production ought to be greater among political liberals than political conservatives.
* The most successful left – wing [Facebook] posts were those that used humor. The most successful right – wing posts were those that made reference to an explicit out – group. The scholars conclude: âthese findings therefore suggest that these features of humor and out – group reference are distinctive to left – wing and right – wing settings, respectively.â
* Aesthetics conservatives most appreciate should have hard lines â both literally and figuratively. One should expect conservative political commentary to say what it means and mean what it says. It should offer clear, explicit, descriptive, and prescriptive arguments about the way the world is and the way the world should be. And it should do this not through ironic implication or subtlety but through direct, unambiguous, emotionally charged argumentation. This would satisfy conservativesâ high need for closure and tendency toward heuristic (instinct-based) processing.
* Consider recent conservative calls for celebrities in the entertainment or sports industries to stop speaking out about politics. In February 2019, Fox News host Laura Ingraham criticized the political expressions of professional athletes like the Cleveland Cavaliersâ LeBron James. âItâs always unwise to seek political advice from someone who gets paid $100 million a year to bounce a ball,â she said. âKeep the political comments to yourselves. ⊠Shut up and dribble.â 48 In an interview about the Academy Awards, Republican National Committee spokesman Steve Guest told Variety in February 2018: âAmericans arenât interested in Hollywood liberals blabbing about politics to a room full of Hollywood liberals.â 49
Undoubtedly, much of this belief that celebrities ought to âstay in their laneâ is a reaction to the fact that athletes, actors, and artists tend to come from the left. 50 But I would also argue that conservativesâ discomfort with celebrity political expression is broader than that. It seems to reflect an aversion to hybridity that is consistent with a low tolerance for ambiguity. To operate in the world with a high need for certainty requires sharp distinctions between categories, between people, and between concepts. Are you an actor or are you an activist? Are you an athlete or are you a political figure?* the moral certainty with which outrage hosts speak is palpably different from the self-deprecation with which satire hosts speak. Outrage as a genre bills itself as important, as explicitly political, and as a vehicle for the dissemination of truth. Satire bills itself as playful, as designed to entertain, and as a vehicle for laughter. These distinct frames surrounding the two genres illustrate the two unique psychological profiles… And humor as a form of political discourse has another disadvantage for audiences who prefer clarity, closure, certainty, and efficiency. Humor is inherently inefficient.
…humor is created through incongruous juxtapositions. …the audience must go through a complex series of cognitive activities to access the first frame of reference, activate a second seemingly disconnected frame of reference, and then make a cognitive leap.* the aesthetic of hybridity is more compatible with a liberal ideology, as strong liberals are comfortable both turning to comedy programming for political views and opinions and admitting that they do. Conservatives, meanwhile, were significantly less likely to label outrage programming a source of entertainment. They might enjoy watching these programs, and might even find the experience entertaining, but when asked why they turned to them, they overwhelmingly reported watching for âinteresting views and opinions.â
* Viewers of political satire programs are, on average, more educated and politically interested than the general population…
* one of the main features of outrage programming is the central role a showâs solo host plays. The host drives the show. The hostâs personality and perspective are the show. Yet from the start, Air America execs and programmers seemed to treat the question âWhoâs hosting?â as an afterthought.
* when they have tried to dabble in the preferred genre of the âother side,â liberals and conservatives have often struggled. Liberals brought play, experimentation and collaboration to their attempt at outrage at Air America. Conservatives brought straightforward insult, directness, and very little humor to their attempt at satire at the œ Hour News Hour . Under the Trump administration, though, as liberalsâ high tolerance for ambiguity has most certainly been tested by conservative social and cultural policy and rhetoric, some liberal comics have eschewed humor, at times invoking the tropes of outrage. But if the characteristics of the outrage genre are indeed better suited to a conservative orientation to the world, perhaps liberals should proceed with caution before substituting funny with angry.
* satire thrives outside the system and emerges from the bottom up largely through experimentation and improvisation.
If outrage is a well – trained attack dog that operates on command, satire is a raccoon â hard to domesticate and capable of turning on anyone at any time.
In his work in progress, Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression, Rony Guldmann notes:
* [Bill] OâReilly concedes that TV political humor targets the whole ideological spectrum. But the total âbody countâ reveals that it is conservatives who bear the brunt of the mockery. The âcumulative effect of print and TV commentary that largely denigrates conservative thought and traditional values cannot be overestimated,â46 because the final message is always that â[l]iberals are smart and conservatives are dense.â
* Popular culture celebrates liberals as cosmopolitan, debonair, and edgy88 while stereotyping conservatives as humorless, uptight, and stiff.
* Michelle Malkin describes a Democratic Fundraiser in Chelsea where one comic attacked President Bush as âthis piece of living, breathing shitâ and others âtook to savaging Vice President Dick Cheneyâs family,â calling his lesbian daughter âa big lezzie.â159 Yet the media gave this outrage a free pass. Why? âItâs like an Upper West Side Manhattan left-wing Ku Klux Klan mentality,â explains Republican Congressman Peter King of New York: â[I]f some Southern redneck talked like this about a liberal, everyone would denounce it. But because itâs Upper West Side humor, somehow itâs supposed to be chic.â160 Enjoying this Upper West Side privilege, liberal comedians can issue mock death threats against prominent conservatives and expect everyone to take this in stride. Malkin observes that liberals fantasized about the assassination of George W. Bush and then pleaded that this was an âironicâ joke.161 But conservatives who would turn the tables and wish the same upon prominent liberals cannot expect the same understanding, as they are not members of the culture of irony.
* “âPrudesâ are always the subject of jokes and ridicule. One of the central themes of American movies and television is the glamorization of adultery. Adultery is almost always portrayed sympathetically, so that if a woman cheats on her husband, the husband is generally shown to be vicious, unscrupulous, abusive, impotent, or in some way deserving of the fate that befalls him.”
* With social status now hinging on words rather than swords, â[s]tylistic conventions, the forms of social intercourse, affect-molding, esteem for courtesy, the importance of good speech and conversation, articulateness of languageâ all assume a newfound importance.107 âGood tasteâ acquires a new prestige value, as members of courtly society listen âwith growing sensitivity to nuances of rhythm, tone and significance, to the spoken and written word.â108 Every plebian banish coarseness and vulgarity from his life.100 But with the court having become a kind of âstock exchangeâ in which the his value was being continually assessed and reassessed, he could no longer afford this former freedom.101 Gone were the days in which joking could lead to mockery and from there to violent disagreement and violence itself in the span of a few minutes. Gone were the days in which one could leap from the most exuberant pleasure to the deepest despondency on the basis of slight impressions. What mattered now was othersâ impressions, not oneâs own, and the foremost task became impression-management, which also meant self-management.
* The tone of outrage is emotional, angry, and fearful. The content is âpersonality centered, with a given program, column, or blog defined by a dominant charismatic voice.â 2 And the tactics? Simultaneously engaging and ruthless. The specific tactics of outrage include hyperbole, sensationalism, ad hominem attacks, ridicule, extreme language, and âprovingâ that an opponent is a hypocrite.
* Outrage as a genre is focused on âunveiling enemies.â 3 It does this explicitly by pointing out institutions (media), individuals (Hillary Clinton), and policies (Obamacare) that are threatening. Since conservatives have a higher threat and mortality salience than liberals, one should expect them to be drawn to information that monitors for threats.
* Outrage appeals to people not because of the information it delivers but because of the experience it provides. Outrage helps viewers feel validated in their opinions and allows them to avoid belief – disconfirming points of view. It seems reasonable to assume that for people who are low in tolerance for ambiguity, it would be far more comfortable to swim in a sea of like – minded opinion than to have to entertain the possibility (that exists when viewing mainstream news) that occasionally your side may be incorrect. Outrage also helps audience members feel like they are part of a clear like – minded in – group. âWhereas political conversation generates fears of social exclusion,â Berry and Sobieraj write; âoutrage programs incorporate and include viewers and listeners. The host presents as a kindred spirit who âgets youâ even when other folks donât.â 5 Outrage hosts make viewers feel smart â especially compared to all those dupes out there â as though their âfans are more intelligent than the idiotic others who donât âget it.ââ
Golfer Lee Trevino said, âWhen I was a rookie, I told jokes, and no one laughed. After I began winning tournaments, I told the same jokes, and all of a sudden, people thought they were funny.â
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The Women of the Far Right: Social Media Influencers and Online Radicalization
Here are some highlights from this 2023 book by sociologist Eviane Leidig:
* In May 2019, then twenty-three-year-old Canadian Lauren Southern posted on her website, laurensouthern.net, a farewell message titled âA New Chapter.â In it, Lauren 1 stated that over the course of four years, she had made deep friendships and embarked on adventures around the world, listening to stories of hope and loss.
Unless you knew about Lauren Southernâs political activism, her farewell message revealed nothing about her political beliefs. Yet her departure from public life, despite having signaled a move away in the six months earlier, was a major loss of one of the alt – rightâs main celebrities.
The rise and fall of Lauren Southern reflect the ephemeral nature of the alt – right movement. After all, the alt – right had no clear leader, structure, or even ideology. It existed almost entirely online, and its adherents were vulnerable to censorship, suspension, and shadow banning.* The American and Canadian women who feature at the core of this book are Lauren Southern, Brittany Sellner (n Ă© e Pettibone), Lana Lokteff, Rebecca Hargraves, Robyn Riley, Ayla Stewart, Lacey Lynn, and Lauren Chen… With the exception of Lauren Chen, who crosses the far right and conservative spectrum, these influencers are not involved with these conservative organizations and prefer to engage in political activism that is more explicitly ideologically extreme.
* These young, attractive women are taking to mainstream social media sites to recruit followers and build audiences for their cause. I call these women âinfluencersâ because they serve as leading online personalities shaping and popularizing ideas within the far – right community. Compared to the dark web and fringe forums such as 4chan and 8kun (previously 8chan), which inspired the terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019 and in Buffalo, New York, in 2022, forums where (mostly male) users hide behind anonymous avatars, these women prefer to spread their message on mainstream platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter. Importantly, being an influencer isnât just discourse oriented. It is encompassed within a broader influencer culture . The media scholar Crystal Abidin defines influencers as âeveryday, ordinary Internet users who accumulate a relatively large following on blogs and social media through the textual and visual narration of their personal lives and lifestyles, engage with their following in âdigitalâ and âphysicalâ spaces, and monetize their following following by integrating âadvertorialsâ into their blog or social media posts and making appearances at events.â 3 The far – right women featured in this book are self – styled vloggers (video bloggers), activists, entrepreneurs, and authors. They discuss issues such as dating and relationships alongside free speech, the âinvasionâ of migrants in Europe, and culture wars on university campuses. They travel the world to film documentaries and go on speaking tours. In this book, I show that it was the female leaders of the alt – right who helped mainstream the ideas of what was previously a fringe phenomenon by tapping into the practices of influencer culture to reach wide audiences.
* what makes these women so appealing is how they present as relatable to viewers. They may be energetic, charming, and self – confident, but they are also remarkably down – to – earth and empathetic. These women discuss the troubles of finding love, desiring financial security, and making friends amid loneliness. They post photos of themselves traveling on vacations and at coffee breaks in caf Ă© s. They showcase their lives and lifestyles.
I contend that perceptions of authenticity and accessibility serve as the most powerful tools of the modern far right.* Media scholars note…that âthe internet does not cause radicalization, but it helps spread extremist ideas, enables people interested in these ideas to form communities, and mainstreams conspiracy theories and distrust in institutions.â
* Parasocial relationships are one – sided relationships in which fans feel as if they intimately know and are close to a celebrity after prolonged exposure. But whereas parasocial interactions usually consist of fans developing illusions of intimacy with the celebrity, here in the case of far – right women influencers the fandom culture transforms into a community where influencers respond to fans, while fans, in turn, participate in helping to shape influencer content via comments and likes. [Scholars say] âAuthenticity has become less of a static quality and more of a performative ecology and parasocial strategy with its own bona fide genre and self – presentation elements.â
* I was facing the same life obstacles at the same time as they were: all of us were young adult women seeking to find our voice and identity, to assert ourselves, to feel empowered and valued (paradoxically feminist goals for them). Although we had different pursuits, their stories of self – fulfillment and accomplishment were a common bond between us. Even as someone who can spot the signs of radicalization, I found it easy to become absorbed in these womenâs world. And here lies the crux of the problem: these influencers are integral to normalizing the far right in the twenty – first century through their visible social media performances.
* âbeing part ofâ versus being âinterested inâ the alt – right is a slippery slope.
* Scholars define populism as fitting into two camps. The first camp advocates what the political scientist Cas Mudde calls a âthin ideologyâ of âthe pure peopleâ versus âthe corrupt eliteâ and of politics representing the general will of the people. It is a thin ideology because it depends on a âthickerâ ideology, such as nationalism, to function. 14 According to this definition, populism can manifest on both the political left and the political right.
* The journalist Seyward Darby describes Ayla Stewart as âa seekerâ: âThroughout her life, Ayla had been in zealous pursuit of meaning; [the far right] was just her latest aspiration.â Lana Lokteff, in contrast, is an opportunist seduced by power and influence. âShe is a stage manager as much as she is a performer. She dictates what her audiences see, and she doesnât want anyone to peek behind the curtain,â 35 Darby noted when she tried to get access to Lanaâs private life. Lana prefers to control the narrative, to play the game, rather than provide an unfiltered picture.
* The media scholar Theresa Senft coined the term microcelebrity in 2008 when she was researching âcamgirls,â young women who broadcast their lives to the public on the internet… They fulfill four criteria to achieve this status: they âusually engage with positive self – branding strategies (as opposed to playing with notions of shame and scandal); manage a public visibility that is sustained and stable (as opposed to being briefly viral or transient); groom followers to consume their content aspirationally (as opposed to accumulating hate – watchers or audiences who tune in only with the desire to watch them fail or gawk at them); and can parlay their high internet visibility into an income that is lucrative enough for a full – time career.â
* the process for far – right women is gradual, sometimes taking years; the retelling of their âjourneyâ can be convoluted, contradictory, and they can sometimes go so far as to âreshape stories, even memories, of their pastâ to fit their present activism. 29 âWhenever she told the story of her life,â writes the journalist Seyward Darby about Ayla Stewart, âAyla described a gradual awakening â a realization that the media and Americaâs raging liberal culture had taught her to hate herself, her femininity, and her race.â 30 It is most likely that Ayla was framing her radicalization journey according to her current political beliefs as a way of situating and understanding her past self.
* Each embarked on a journey of self – improvement with a mindset of accepting personal responsibility. Along the way, they found confidence in voicing unpopular political opinions through watching the male YouTubers. They âhave inspired me to say what Iâm thinking and not be afraid of the repercussions,â Rebecca claimed in her first YouTube video in February 2016. âThese things are the truth ⊠to save Western society, which I see crumbling,â she added. 34 Their stories are ones of resilience as much as of a reawakening. And yet in sharing their journeys, they use far – right ideology to explain the reasons for their past unhappiness.
* Robyn, who now has tens of thousands of subscribers to her YouTube channel, related in a video titled âI Lost All My Friends in the Culture Warâ in September 2018 her painful experience of losing former university friendships. Misty – eyed, her voice shaking, she described feeling betrayed by the very people she once considered her second family: âMy old friends who are still liberal canât see what Iâm doing on social media outside of the confines of their own perspective, which puts me in a category of someone who is propagating hate speech, someone who has been radicalized, someone who believes in conspiracy theories, theories, someone who probably has no credibility, someone who is being misled by unreliable sources, someone who has been manipulated by men in my life, someone who has probably internalized misogyny â I would imagine is something running through their heads.â With her head held high, Robyn renounced her old friends. âWhen strangers are more supportive of what Iâm doing on here than old friends, then maybe itâs time to let go.â 36 No doubt it is easier to let go when you can frame your cause as worthy to tens of thousands of supportive strangers… By sharing her experience, Robyn hoped that others would find the strength to gain what she called âself – respect.â This âsense of moral worthiness,â as Kathleen Blee describes women radicalized in the far right, 37 gives purpose to these influencers.
* With âglow up,â an emphasis is placed on routines and lifestyle changes revolving around health. The process also centers on building self – confidence and discovering oneâs preferences, values, and passions. The ultimate aim of a glow up is a rebranding of oneself â a perfect analogy for red pilling.
* A recurring theme across Robyn, Rebecca, and Laceyâs red pill stories is how these influencers create validation for their life choices. Framing the process as finding their âauthenticâ and âhonestâ selves distracts from the hateful ideology of the far right. Gaining a sense of âself – respectâ and building confidence in oneâs opinions are attractive to vulnerable young people, but for these influencers these gains come at the expense of dehumanization and âothering.â Their far – right propaganda is highly effective at turning personal grievances into a âworthyâ cause. Women influencers are at the helm of manipulating susceptible viewers into believing that joining the far right will bring them happiness, which in turn will lead to the betterment of society overall.
* far – right women influencers have a high male viewership [because] they function as honeytraps for the male gaze.
* being part of a social movement creates powerful bonds of community, which is considered like a family.
* By far, the women themselves are the most crucial form of entrepreneurism as influencers. They capitalize on their looks and youth to construct themselves as the most visible women on the far – right frontlines. Building audiences on platforms such as YouTube and Instagram, which are visually oriented, is possible due to what the media scholar Alice Marwick describes as âInstafameâ: âan online attention economy in which page views and clicks are synonymous with success and thus online status.â 49 The concept of the âattention economyâ is key here. As the sociologist Zeynep Tufekci notes, â Attention is a key resource for social movementsâ because the latter depend on it to frame their goals, convince the public of their causes, recruit, neutralize the opposition, create solidarity, and mobilize supporters. 50 If we think about the far right as a social movement, then these women influencers play an integral role in furthering its aims within the online attention economy.
Far – right women influencers solicit attention by curating a microcelebrity profile that strategically reveals personal information while also coming across as a source of inspiration for their followers. They maintain a delicate balance of accessibility, authenticity, and aspiration. âMicrocelebrity is linked to the increasingly pervasive notion of âself – branding,â a self – presentation strategy that requires viewing oneself as a consumer product and selling this image to others,â writes Marwick. 51 Building upon Rebecca Lewisâs research on reactionary – right YouTubers, these women influencers are âsellingâ the far right through their own âpolitical self – branding,â in which âthey live their politics as an aspirational brand.â 52 Whether that brand is achieved by selling merchandise featuring their catchphrases or simply by posting selfies of behind – the – scenes action, these seemingly banal activities serve a very important purpose: far – right propaganda.
These influencers thus practice a type of ârelational labor,â which, the media scholar Nancy Baym writes, entails ongoing audience engagement over time to build social relationships. However, unlike sole emotional labor, relational labor usually involves connections tied to earning money.* Dutch influencer Eva Vlaardingerbroek, a former politician who worked as a trainee for the far – right Forum for Democracy (FvD) party in the European Parliament in Brussels. She holds a masterâs degree in philosophy of law and pursued a PhD in the Netherlands before dropping out to focus on politics full – time. Eva became a rising star among the Dutch far right for delivering a speech critical of feminism in 2019, but the next year she ended her membership in FvD following internal party divisions â not least complicated by her romantic relationship with its leader, Thierry Baudet, a few years earlier. At the time she exited FvD, she was dating Julien Rochedy, a French politician of the far – right National Rally party and later moved to Sweden to become the host of a YouTube program called Letâs Talk About It , run by the Sweden Democrats, a party with roots in neo – Nazism. 72 She returned to the Netherlands at the end of 2021 to take up a position at a law firm to fight government mandates such as mask wearing and vaccination against COVID – 19.
U.S. audiences may be familiar with Eva because she began regularly appearing as a guest commentator on Tucker Carlsonâs show on Fox News , discussing the âskyrocketing crime epidemicâ in Sweden, which she linked to mass immigration and demographic change.* The media scholar Bharath Ganesh describes the âungovernabilityâ of online spaces where the far right is present. He characterizes this presence as âa swarmâ with three central components: âits decentralized structure, its ability to quickly navigate and migrate across websites, and its use of coded language to flout law and regulation.â
* Lauren [Southern in 2022] further divulged the drama and conflict within the far – right political scene, including blackmail, threats, betrayal, and rumors. âWe have a lot of cultlike dynamics of our own, where people can get excommunicated, where we donât really look into things that deeply if the saints of our movement say it,â she critiqued. According to her description, the far – right milieu is engrossed in the spectacle of celebrity and fandom. She was now largely pessimistic about the world in which she rose to fame: âThe fact [is] that so much of this 2016 alternative – right, dissident – right movement was so coded in selfishness, narcissism, cult of personality, and none of it was about helping people. It was about how well latching onto this personâs struggle [will] potentially boost my career.â
For viewers who didnât know what people she was referring to, she stated explicitly, âIâm talking about the people at the top.â The leading figures Lauren criticized in the video are Ezra Levant, Milo Yiannopoulos, Tommy Robinson, Faith Goldy, and Paul Joseph Watson. She exposed these individualsâ atrocious behavior either toward her personally or toward others who were victimized. âA lot of money, influence, power, and faith people are putting in people is getting squandered away. Squandered away due to ego.⊠Itâs really important to highlight just how messed up the culture was in this political movement,â Lauren explained.* âIt can be a profitable decision to go far to the right, where the audience is very accepting and gets excited about new personalities that come on the scene, especially young women,â observes the journalist Jared Holt. âBut because this audience is so toxic and hateful, going to that audience is sort of like your last stop on a media career.â
* âIt was hard to imagine Lana [Lokteff], whoâd sought a spotlight for so much of her life, gladly disappearing into her home should a white ethno – state ever exist. I wondered if the pursuit of white nationalism â the struggle, as believers would call it â was the endgame for people like Lana.â 18 As the most prominent women in the movement, these far – right influencers are attracted to the fame and status they receive as figureheads. Do they truly advocate for what theyâre saying, or do they just understand that using certain catchphrases will garner more attention and views? There is an underlying tension between authenticity and propaganda in these influencersâ self – presentation online.
* âIn the end, the needs and ambitions of women activists never fit into right-wing extremist parties and organizations dominated by men.â
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My Favorite Songs
That’s the beginning number of my Youtube music playlist.
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My Favorite Movies
* A Man For All Seasons (1966)
* Chariots of Fire (1981)
* Cinema Paradiso (1988)
* A Perfect World (1993)
* Legends of the Fall (1994)
* Big Fish (2003)
* Love Story (1970)
According to Grok, this means:
Appreciation for Depth and Meaning: Movies like A Man for All Seasons and Chariots of Fire are rich with moral complexity, personal conviction, and triumphs of the human spirit. You might value stories that explore integrity, faith, or standing up for whatâs right, even against tough odds.
Love for Emotional Resonance: Films such as Cinema Paradiso, Big Fish, and Love Story lean heavily on nostalgia, love, and the bittersweet beauty of life. This could mean youâre drawn to heartfelt narratives that tug at the emotions and leave a lasting impressionâstories that feel personal and reflective.
Taste for Character-Driven Drama: A Perfect World and Legends of the Fall feature flawed, complex characters navigating messy, often tragic circumstances. You might enjoy watching people wrestle with their choices and fates, hinting at an interest in psychology or the human condition.
Nostalgia and Timelessness: Many of these movies span different eras and have a classic, almost timeless quality. You might have a soft spot for storytelling that feels enduring, perhaps reflecting a personality that appreciates history, tradition, or the way the past shapes the present.
Romantic and Idealistic Streak: Whether itâs the sweeping romance of Love Story or the epic passion in Legends of the Fall, thereâs a thread of idealism here. You might be someone who finds beauty in big emotions and grand gestures, even when they come with a dose of heartache.
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Decoding Journalism, Decoding Winners From Losers (1-17-24)
01:00 New Yorker: How Ten Middle East Conflicts Are Converging Into One Big War, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-ten-middle-east-conflicts-are-converging-into-one-big-war
10:00 Democrats Are Preparing For Donald Trump To Be President Again, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S-KxZ8gbp2Y
17:00 Amy Wax talks with Richard Hanania, https://www.richardhanania.com/p/amy-wax-versus-the-midwit-gynocrats
19:00 Extremely Online: The Untold Story of Fame, Influence, and Power on the Internet, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=154056
22:00 All the News Thatâs Fit to Click: How Metrics Are Transforming the Work of Journalists, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=154027
1:21:00 Assume Nothing: Encounters with Assassins, Spies, Presidents, and Would-Be Masters of the Universe, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=153998
1:33:00 What Distinguishes Winners From Losers?, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=153969
1:40:00 How do you fight anti-semitism?
1:50:00 A Republican Pollster on Trumpâs Undimmed Appeal, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UscAXKmj__k
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Extremely Online: The Untold Story of Fame, Influence, and Power on the Internet
The world is a big oozing mess, but to create meaning and order in our lives, we develop and sanctify boundaries between the clean and the dirty, the heroic and the cowardly.
Here are some excerpts from this 2023 book by Washington Post journalist Taylor Lorenz:
* In April 2007, he confronted the masterminds behind Socialite Rank. It wasnât a group of top – tier socialites teaming up behind the scenes; in fact, it wasnât anyone most people knew at all. The all – powerful website was run by a completely random pair of Russian Ă©migrĂ©s named Valentine Uhovski and Olga Rei. The duo was not remotely born into high society and they had essentially created the blog as a social experiment.
New York Magazine ran a cover story on the shocking reveal. Elite society was astonished. They realized they had been brought to their knees, to tears, to a frenzy â by two people they wouldnât have given the time of day. The outsiders had upended the ultimate insiders, and it had cost less than a trip to the hair salon.* Most legacy publications didnât see blogs as a threat at first. Bloggers looked like curious eccentrics, a band of second – rate scribblers with too much time on their hands. The old guard scoffed that bloggersâ writing wasnât up to the standards of the New York Times or Vanity Fair. They doubted that bloggers could ever break consequential stories without the access and talent monopolized by legacy media.
Readers, on the other hand, enjoyed the lack of polish. The media environment of the 1990s was centralized and corporate after waves of mergers left only a handful of conglomerates whose content was middle – of – the – road, burnished, and safe. In 2002, Wired declared âThe Blogging Revolution,â a paradigm shift in how people distributed and received information: âReaders increasingly doubt the authority of the Washington Post or National Review, despite their grand – sounding titles and large staffs. They know that behind the curtain are fallible writers and editors who are no more inherently trustworthy than a lone blogger who has earned a readerâs respect.â Blogs offered readers everything that legacy media couldnât, revealing what writers really thought. Whatâs more, blogs also enabled real – time interaction between writers and readers through comments sections attached to posts. Unlike message boards, blog posts primed the discussion with original, substantial content that was ripe for debate.* By 2009, fashion bloggers like Bryan Boy and Garance Dore made their foray into high – brow fashion circles. Bloggers were suddenly sitting in coveted front – row seats during New York Fashion Week, then at Dolce & Gabbanaâs show at Milan Fashion Week, in a shocking upset that fashion insiders dubbed âblogger gate.â âBloggers have ascended from the nosebleed seats to the front row with such alacrity that a long – held social code among editors, one that prizes position and experience above outward displays of ambition or enjoyment, has practically been obliterated,â wrote Eric Wilson of the New York Times.
I want to share with you an Andrew Gelman (Columbia University Statistics professor) blog post from November 2011:
Journalist Jonathan Rauch writes:
This is the blogosphere. I’m not getting paid to be here. I’m here to get incredibly famous (in my case, even more incredibly famous) so that I can get paid somewhere else. . . .
The average quality of newspapers and (published) novels is far, far better than the average quality of blog posts (and–ugh!–comments). This is because people pay for newspapers and novels. What distinguishes newspapers and novels is how much does not get published in them, because people won’t pay for it. Payment is a filter, and a pretty good one. Imperfect, of course. But pointing out the defects of the old model is merely changing the subject if the new model is worse…
Yes, the new model is bringing a lot of new content into being. But most of it is bad. And it’s displacing a lot of better content, by destroying the business model for quality. Even in the information economy, there’s no free lunch…
Yes, there’s good stuff out there. But when you find a medium in which 99 percent, or whatever, of what’s produced is bad, there is a problem with the medium…
I believe there are inherent problems with the blogosphere as a medium. Lack of a payment model militates against professionalism and rewards noisiness…
In terms of the environment and the incentives it creates, the blogosphere, I submit, is the single worst medium for sustained, and therefore grown-up, reading and writing and argumentation ever invented.
I wonder if his problem is that he’s aiming for too big an audience. We have something like 5000 subscribers here. Maybe if Rauch were willing to settle for an audience of 5000 rather than millions, he could be mild, moderate, think things through, and get it right. To be all these things and have a huge audience? I think that takes a huge amount of luck. It happened with John Updike, and Francis Fukayama, and Tyler Cowen, and . . . not so many others. But if you’re willing to accept a niche audience, you can be as serious as you want…
Rauch writes that journalists like himself are “the kind of people who punched their tickets on newspaper police beats where they learned quaint notions of fairness and accuracy and keeping one’s opinions out of it and all that.” Given that Rauch is currently posting nothing but opinions and has stated that he will do no reporting on his blog, and given that I haven’t seen any police reporting from him lately, I think it’s safe to say that he doesn’t actually view fairness, accuracy, and the traditions of the police beat as valuable in themselves but rather as some sort of hazing that you had to do in the old days before you could get to the fun stage of opinionating. So I can feel his frustration that bloggers today feel free to express their opinions in public–just like Rauch, but they never had to do all that police-beat stuff first. Rauch had to eat his spinach but these dudes get to skip right to the dessert. Talk about violating “quaint notions of fairness”!
Life is like that. Just when you finally become an expert on something, your expertise becomes obsolete. You spend a couple decades getting good grades and becoming really good at taking tests, then suddenly you never need to take a test again. You master the skills of diaper-changing, then all of a sudden your kids are walking around wearing real underwear and you have no place to apply your talents. You’re Derek Jeter and you get to be really really good at hitting, throwing, and catching, and then before you know it, it’s time to retire. And so on.
Rauch is in a difficult position, I think, in that his particular journalistic niche includes a lot that people are happy do for free. His most recent book, “Gay Marriage: Why It Is Good for Gays, Good for Straights, and Good for America,” is the sort of thing you might very well see on a blog.
Academic publishing
Rauch writes that blogging, and the internet in general, is “displacing a lot of better content, by destroying the business model for quality.” What really struck me about this remark was how different things are in academic publishing. Nobody pays us to write journal articles: we do it for free and we always have. We get paid to teach and to do research. Publications can indirectly make us money–if I publish an important article, it can help me get a research grant–but no part of this system requires the readers of my work to pay for it. If every journal were to become free and online overnight, everything could proceed just as before. The argument that paid writing is better than free writing just doesn’t apply in my world.
Journalists view their profession as a holy calling (they have their own hero system). As noted in the 2021 book, All the News Thatâs Fit to Click: How Metrics Are Transforming the Work of Journalists:
* …journalism is an anomalous case of cultural production in that its practitioners operate according to a set of normative, rather than artistic, commitments. As media scholar Mike Ananny puts it, âUnlike artistic fields of cultural production, the pressâideally and principallyâpursues its autonomy in order to advance public interests.â
* A range of established journalistic norms and practices, such as refusing gifts, denying sources quote approval, and establishing a âwallâ between the editorial and business sides of news organizations, stem from efforts to maintain autonomy.
* As sociologist Herbert Gans wrote in an oft-quoted passage from his classic newsroom ethnography Deciding Whatâs News, journalists âhad little knowledge about the actual audience and rejected feedback from it. Although they had a vague image of the audience, they paid little attention to it; instead, they filmed and wrote for their superiors and for themselves, assuming . . . that what interested them would interest the audience.â
What makes a piece of writing “journalism” and hence protected by the First Amendment is somewhat subjective. Journalists, like other professionals, guard their status zealously. They are in an awkward position because their job is essentially making judgments that are not subject to objective criteria. They are often quick to dismiss many bloggers, for example, for the cardinal sin of not doing journalism.
In his work-in-progress, Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression, philosopher Rony Guldmann writes:
* Questioning whether the post-war professionalization of education, business, and journalism was genuinely necessary, Gelernter observes that universities had an obvious interest in âconvert[ing] as much of the landscape as possible into fenced-off, neatly tended, carefully patrolled academic preserves,â so that the âsmooth, manicured green lawn of scienceâ might replace the âwild sweet meadow-grass of common sense.â Justified or not, this trend toward professionalization doesnât strike liberals as essentially political… Professionalization is just another expression of liberalismâs ordering impulses and monkish virtues, the artificial devaluation of knowledge borne of encounters with anti-structureâthe âwild sweet meadow-grass of common senseââand an exaggerated respect for knowledge that, shielded from that anti-structure, can be âscored by those with authority.â To maintain their dominion, liberals must discredit knowledge that originates in âembodied feelingâ and ânonexplicit engagement with the worldâ as mindless habit and reflex, lax and disorganized folkways to be uprooted.
* As a dissident culture, conservatism is by definition in a position of weakness. The elites of the dissident culture âcannot begin to match, in numbers or influence, those who occupy the commanding heights of the dominant culture, such as professors, journalists, television and movie producers, and various cultural entrepreneurs.â Even religion has fallen under the dominant cultureâs sway. One might have expected it to be at the forefront of the resistance. But âpriding themselves on being cosmopolitan and sophisticated, undogmatic and uncensorious,â the mainline churches have offered âlittle or no resistanceâ to the âprevailing culture.â
* The Ford Foundation, the New York Times, and Hollywood are just the latest iterations of the âunnaturalâ life of court society, of the unhealthy self-consciousness and other-directedness that stands in sharp contrast to those who pour their hearts out singing the Star-Spangled Banner, surrendering to the excitement of their hearts âunhindered by âcold reason.ââ
* The now overthrown WASP establishment âsaw itself as the nationâs high end, the top of a vertical spectrum.â But the new ruling class of âPORGIsââpost-religious, globalist intellectualsâsee themselves âas separated by a cultural Grand Canyon from the nation at large, with Harvard and the New York Times and the Boston Symphony and science and technology and iPhones and organic truffled latte on their sideâand guns, churches and NASCAR on the other.â
Laura Ingraham notes: “If youâre an elitist whoâs spent his entire career working for the Ford Foundation, the New York Times, or a Hollywood studio, concepts like valor, bravery, and sacrifice are probably alien to you. You donât take them seriously, you donât know anyone who does, and you naturally think that anyone who does profess to live by them must be mentally defective, even evil.”
Does anyone fret anymore that blogs are killing the MSM?
Taylor Lorenz writes in his her new book:
* As blogs boomed, traditional media felt the hurt, especially local and regional newspapers. Subscription rates everywhere plummeted now that the internet gave readers access to a wealth of free information, including articles from the very newspapers they no longer purchased in physical form. The industryâs century – old business model crumbled, forcing newsrooms around the country to hemorrhage staff and shut down. As they did, gatekeepers went from dismissive to hostile. In testimony before Congress, David Simon, a former reporter for the Baltimore Sun and creator of The Wire , warned that the blogosphere was causing a media death spiral: âReaders acquire news from the aggregators and abandon its point of origin â namely the newspapers themselves. In short, the parasite is slowly killing the host.â
By the end of the 2000s, it looked more like the parasite and host had merged. As top blogs expanded their headcount by hiring professional reporters, designers, and support staff, they came to resemble traditional media companies, complete with newsrooms and sales departments. Many legacy publishers realized that their best strategy was simply to invite bloggers in. Major publications, from the New York Times and the Atlantic to Glamour and Elle, hired the top crop of bloggers to fill out their ranks of writers and reporters. These same organizations also started major blogs of their own, or bought successful sites outright. By 2009, nearly half of the fifty most – trafficked blogs were owned by corporate media behemoths like CNN, ABC, and AOL. Yet while star bloggers in tech and politics received top billing, another class of bloggers was quietly ushering in a larger shift.
In the end, the defining figure of the blog era wasnât the nerd or the wonk. It was the mommy blogger.* JULIA ALLISON WAS A JUNIOR at Georgetown University in 2002 when she started a dating column in the school paper called âSex on the Hilltop.â Sex and the City was one of the hottest shows on television. As her column became a campus sensation, Allison felt like Georgetownâs own Carrie Bradshaw. The universityâs location in Washington, D.C., brought national coverage to her column. (When she wrote about dating an anonymous young congressman, the Washington Post was swift to reveal his identity.) Her peers enjoyed her candid style, but within months, her headlines began to enrage Georgetown alumni and some students. âI didnât write about sex very much,â Allison told me, âbut all the conservatives at Georgetown were so upset. I became this lightning rod.â Still, Allison soon landed bylines at national outlets like Cosmopolitan and Seventeen. Film producer Aaron Spelling even optioned her life rights when she was twenty – one.
* [Julia] Allison got an idea when she saw Tom Wolfe on a book tour that year. Everywhere he went, he appeared in his iconic white suit. âHeâs a brand,â she realized. âIâve got to be known and become a name.â Wolfe built his brand in another era, but he wasnât the only archetype for Allison to follow.
* Nearly every article documenting Allisonâs rise contained a disturbing level of misogynistic language and tropes. Tech journalists, who were overwhelmingly men, implied that Allison was promiscuous. They used highly gendered language to slut – shame her and question her credibility as an expert on media and technology. She was accused of trying to sleep with the powerful men in tech whom she interviewed or partnered with. Fast Company ran a piece titled âSometimes Breasts Arenât Enough, Julia Allison.â Wired and the rest of the tech press was similarly hostile.
* By 2012, she decided that she couldnât handle any more online assaults. âIt had been about ten years of my life, and I was exhausted,â she said. âI felt beaten down, I felt completely disillusioned, and I wanted a different reality. More than anything, I wanted to be off the internet. I was like, âI donât know how Iâll make money, but I canât make it this way anymore.â And I never looked back.â
She set out to erase herself from the internet. She spent hours deleting over 14,000 tweets, one by one. She removed Tumblr posts, made other accounts private, and restricted access to her viral YouTube and Vimeo videos.
Every so often she dipped her toe back in, and each time she regretted it.* Allison lives a quieter life now. She resides in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with her fiancĂ© and was recently accepted into a masterâs program at Harvardâs Kennedy School in leadership and public policy.
* In 2013, creators were happy to wander into malls with no security and get mobbed by fans. But that was a naĂŻve dream years later. The turning point came in June 2016, when the YouTuber and music artist Christina Grimmie was murdered by a fan in Orlando. Grimmie had posted on social media asking people to attend a concert she was giving and, after her performance, she stuck around to meet her followers. As she opened her arms to give a twenty – seven – year – old fan a hug, he fatally shot her once in the head and twice in the chest. Police later revealed that the fan had stalked her for years online and fantasized about the two of them being together. When he realized he couldnât have her, he chose to murder her.
* Before YouTubeâs algorithm change, users would hop frequently between short, catchy videos. Afterwards, creators noticed that the more they let fans into their daily lives, the deeper the engagement theyâd generate on their videos. The algorithm was encouraging a return to the Lonelygirl15 era.
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