Michael Anton (b. 1969) became a principal interpreter of nationalist conservatism in the United States during the first quarter of the twenty-first century. His influence rests on articulation. He gave the post-2016 American right a vocabulary of civilizational crisis, and he converted scattered anxieties about demographic change, bureaucratic consolidation, elite legitimacy, national sovereignty, and cultural fragmentation into a single regime-level account.
Anton brings together elite traditions that ordinarily stay apart. He combines the West Coast Straussianism of the Claremont Institute, the strategic outlook of the national security bureaucracy, the message discipline of corporate finance and media, the aesthetic instincts of aristocratic conservatism, and the insurgent rhetoric of populist nationalism. He writes as a regime theorist working inside the ruins of a managerial order he once helped administer.
Born in California, Anton attended the University of California, Davis, then enrolled at St. John’s College in Annapolis, whose Great Books curriculum shaped his intellectual style. St. John’s set students before classical texts. They moved through Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Shakespeare, and Tocqueville in a structured seminar. The training left lasting marks on his prose. His writing favors historical analogy, regime analysis, and classical rhetoric over technocratic policy language.
He completed graduate study at Claremont Graduate University, where he absorbed the West Coast Straussian tradition of Harry V. Jaffa (1918-2015), itself descended from Leo Strauss (1899-1973). The split between East Coast and West Coast Straussianism organized his early worldview. The East Coast school, associated with Allan Bloom (1930-1992) and Harvey Mansfield (b. 1932), stressed philosophical skepticism, elite cultivation, and the quarrel between reason and revelation. The Claremont school treated the American Founding as a moral achievement grounded in natural right and republican virtue. Jaffa and his followers argued that the Declaration of Independence states universal truths while sustaining a particular constitutional order rooted in civic character and national cohesion. Charles R. Kesler (b. 1956), editor of the Claremont Review of Books, served as the living head of this circle and as Anton’s closest mentor.
From this formation Anton inherited a governing conviction: a political regime is a moral and civilizational structure. States endure through cultural confidence, elite legitimacy, and shared national narrative as much as through procedure or growth. That premise underwrites every major argument he later made.
Before his emergence as a nationalist writer, Anton spent two decades inside elite institutions. He worked for California governor Pete Wilson (b. 1933), wrote speeches for New York mayor Rudy Giuliani (b. 1944), and joined the administration of George W. Bush (b. 1946), where he served under Condoleezza Rice (b. 1954) at the National Security Council This experience made him a dissident. He watched the American foreign policy apparatus operate at the high tide of post-Cold War liberal internationalism, when many in Washington assumed American power could remake the globe through intervention, democracy promotion, and technocratic management. Anton came to read that project as strategic confusion and institutional hubris.
He argued that the permanent foreign policy class had detached from concrete national interest and become a self-perpetuating system devoted to ideological universalism and its own continuity. Military interventions, humanitarian wars, and global managerial frameworks served abstract aims cut off from American civic solidarity. The class measured success by institutional survival, international prestige, and elite consensus rather than by strategic restraint or national cohesion. This placed Anton within the broader post-Iraq turn among conservative intellectuals skeptical of intervention, though his version stayed distinct because it fused realist foreign policy with regime analysis. He read failure abroad as a sign of moral exhaustion at home.
After government Anton entered a different elite sphere. He wrote speeches for Rupert Murdoch (b. 1931) and held communications posts at Citigroup and BlackRock. The years in finance and media deepened his picture of managerial systems and transnational elite culture. He observed at close range a corporate world increasingly loosed from national identity. Out of this came a central theme of his later writing: modern elites had stopped acting as stewards of national continuity.
Unlike mass populists who prize anti-elitism for its own sake, Anton admired hierarchy, discipline, cultivation, and excellence. Under the pseudonym Nicholas Antongiavanni he wrote The Suit: A Machiavellian Approach to Men’s Style, a treatise on dress, presentation, and self-command modeled on Machiavelli’s prose. He took tailoring and classical dress seriously as expressions of order. For Anton, civilization shows itself in standards. Clothing, rhetoric, architecture, manners, and institutional decorum register self-command and hierarchy rather than ornament, and cultures decline when standards dissolve and elites cease to embody them.
This aristocratic instinct created a tension with the movement he came to defend. Trump’s political style rejected much of the refinement Anton admired. It ran on media aggression, popular resentment, and anti-institutional energy. Anton resolved the contradiction by arguing that the ruling class had already destroyed the legitimacy of traditional elite authority, so populist disruption became a tactical necessity rather than a model of culture. He treated the populist moment as a corrective force needed to break a decaying order.
That logic reached its fullest expression in 2016 with “The Flight 93 Election,” published in the Claremont Review of Books under the pseudonym Publius Decius Mus. The essay became a foundational text of Trump-era nationalism. The pen name carried a coded argument before the first line. Publius recalled the authorship of The Federalist. Decius Mus named the Roman consul who devoted himself in sacrifice during a moment of existential danger. The composite signaled to readers trained in classical thought that extraordinary conditions might license extraordinary action.
The pseudonym shows that Anton absorbed Strauss’s regime analysis and his account of how careful writers communicate. Anton often writes on more than one level at once. Allusions, pseudonyms, and analogies carry argument beneath the surface, and he assumes that political language frequently conceals the structures of power it claims to describe. Words such as norms, equity, stakeholders, and international order function in his reading as instruments of the managerial class rather than as neutral terms.
“The Flight 93 Election” argued that the contest of 2016 marked an existential crisis rather than a routine partisan choice. Anton compared a vote for Trump to the passengers who stormed the cockpit of United Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. He held that conventional conservatism had failed to halt the consolidation of managerial rule, demographic transformation, ideological capture of institutions, and cultural fragmentation, so support for Trump amounted to a desperate act of regime preservation. The essay landed because it named a shift already moving through the American right. Earlier conservatism assumed the durability and neutrality of liberal institutions. Anton argued that institutional neutrality had collapsed, that universities, media, bureaucracies, and corporations increasingly worked as ideologically aligned enforcement bodies, and that elections had become struggles over the survival of competing regime visions. The piece traveled far beyond think tanks, circulating among donors, activists, journalists, and operatives as an early attempt to set Trumpism inside a theory of regime conflict.
Anton reads political orders as vulnerable to internal exhaustion long before formal collapse appears. Late republican Rome, Weimar instability, and bureaucratic sclerosis hover behind much of his writing. He composes less like a campaign aide than like a historian of regime senescence. On his account, decline begins in the mind and the spirit before it shows in administration. Elites lose confidence in their own civilization, stop reproducing coherent standards, and trade substantive national identity for procedural management, and by the time ordinary citizens grasp the depth of the crisis the capture is already advanced. Critics hear apocalypse in this. Anton hears diagnosis.
He joined the first Trump administration as Deputy Assistant to the President for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council, a post that marked the partial entry of nationalist intellectuals into Republican governance. His tenure also exposed the factional strains inside Trumpism, which held populist nationalists, establishment Republicans, interventionists, libertarians, and corporate conservatives at the same table. Anton left during the period when John Bolton (b. 1948) gained influence, a departure that confirmed how loosely the nationalist faction sat within the governing apparatus.
Out of office he deepened his ties to Hillsdale College and the Claremont network and broadened the original essay into a fuller position. After The Flight 93 Election and The Stakes (2020) tried to systematize the worldview latent in the 2016 piece, and The Stakes popularized the phrase Red Caesarism, the contested idea that a corrupted republic might require extraordinary, even extra-constitutional, executive action to save its substance. He also co-edited Leisure With Dignity, a volume honoring Kesler. During these years Anton took his place in the wider post-liberal turn among conservative intellectuals, alongside Patrick Deneen (b. 1964), Yoram Hazony (b. 1964), Adrian Vermeule (b. 1968), Sohrab Ahmari (b. 1985), and Christopher Rufo (b. 1984), all in revolt against the fusionist consensus that had governed Republican thought since the Cold War.
Yet Anton stayed distinct within that company. Deneen approached liberalism philosophically and through community. Vermeule approached it through law and administration. Hazony stressed nationalism and biblical political tradition. Anton kept his focus on regime conflict, elite formation, strategic asymmetry, and institutional decay, and he never gave up his admiration for excellence and cultivation. The unresolved tension in his thought follows from this. He defends populist disruption while holding that civilization needs disciplined elites. His answer is transitional rather than utopian: populism breaks a decadent managerial order so that a more serious elite might re-form. In this he resembles earlier critics of ruling-class degeneration such as James Burnham (1905-1987) and Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). Every society, on his view, requires elites. The question is whether its elites still possess the moral seriousness to sustain the civilization in their care.
Anton’s return to government in Trump’s second term carried these ideas to the center of state power. He became the 33rd Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State on January 20, 2025, serving under Secretary Marco Rubio (b. 1971), and he wrote the 2025 National Security Strategy as its principal author. He also took part at the expert level in the 2025 negotiations between the United States and Iran. His time in the post proved short. Reporting placed him at odds with the personnel operator Sergio Gor and with the administration’s foreign policy process, and he left in September 2025, succeeded by Michael Needham (b. 1981). Anton returned to his perch as the Jack Roth Senior Fellow at the Claremont Institute and a lecturer at Hillsdale College’s Kirby Center.
His critics cast him as a theorist of emergency politics whose rhetoric corrodes trust in democratic institutions and reframes ordinary disagreement as civilizational war. His defenders answer that he saw earlier than most how far the managerial institutions had consolidated ideological power. His historical significance rests less on policy than on conceptual change. He moved conservative argument away from tax rates, deregulation, and procedural constitutionalism toward sovereignty, elite legitimacy, cultural continuity, bureaucratic consolidation, and national identity. He turned nationalism from a diffuse emotional posture into a structured account of regime conflict.
Whether later historians judge him a prophetic diagnostician of institutional exhaustion or an accelerant of democratic breakdown will depend on the path the American order takes. What stands already is that Anton became a principal interpreter of a transition: the collapse of the post-Cold War conservative consensus and the rise of a nationalist right convinced that procedural liberalism can no longer hold the country together.
Alliance Theory
The primary difference between left and right, the authors argue, is not what values people hold but whom they count as allies. Apply that to Anton and you stop reading him for his thought and start reading him for his coalition. His allies are the historic American nation, white Christians, the military, the working-class heartland, the populist base, and Trump. His rivals are the credentialed managerial class, the journalists, the academics, the foundations, the administrative state, the thing Codevilla (1943-2021) taught him to call the ruling class. Lay his beliefs over that map and they fit the map, not a philosophy. The regime talk is the moralization stacked on top of the alliance.
The theory predicts that a coalition this heterogeneous will generate ad hoc and often incompatible principles, and that the inconsistencies are not failures of thought but the normal shape of coalition-serving belief. Anton supplies the inconsistencies on schedule. He venerates the rule of law and constitutional fidelity, and he floats Red Caesar and extra-constitutional action. He is a free-speech absolutist against the managerial censors, and he wants a regime that forms virtue and would restrain much that the censors permit. He reads the founding through Jaffa as a universal creed open to all who embrace the principles, and he drifts toward a blood-and-soil account of peoplehood in his writing on immigration and citizenship. He attacks the administrative state as unaccountable usurpation, and he wants a strong executive to seize and wield that same apparatus. Anton spends enormous effort trying to make these hang together as one philosophy. Alliance Theory says stop looking for the thread. There is none. Each position serves a specific ally or a specific rival, and the contradictions appear because the allies and rivals do not share a logic, only a side.
The propagandistic biases the paper names show up in Anton in clean form. Perpetrator bias is the rationalizing of an ally’s transgression and the magnifying of a rival’s. The Flight 93 move is perpetrator bias raised to an art. Extraordinary action by his coalition is regime preservation, a desperate necessity, the passengers storming the cockpit. The identical concentration of unreviewable power in the managerial state is tyranny. Same act, opposite valence, sorted by who does it. Victim bias is the embellishing of an ally’s grievance, and Anton’s entire posture runs on it. His coalition is the dispossessed nation, the country class crushed by a hostile ruling class, the conservatives persecuted by a regime that has captured every institution. That is competitive victimhood in the paper’s exact sense, the right’s claim to be the truly oppressed pitched against the left’s oppression narratives, each side striving to establish that it suffered more. Attributional bias is the last piece. Anton assigns his allies’ decline to external causes, the elite betrayal, the open border, the managerial capture, and assigns the rivals’ success to illegitimate seizure rather than merit. The losers-of-globalization story is the external attribution the authors describe, told from the right.
The paper’s treatment of morality lands hardest on Anton because it explains his register. Claiming moral conviction, the authors argue, is a propagandistic tactic. It creates common knowledge that your side is moral and the other immoral, which draws third parties and emboldens allies to attack rivals without cost. Anton’s natural-right gravity, his tragic cadence of Rome and decline, his talk of virtue and the permanent things, all of it functions to build that common knowledge at the highest available altitude. Flight 93 is not a philosophical treatise. It is a mobilization document. Its work is to move wavering conservatives into the Trump coalition by recoding a partisan choice as an existential moral emergency. The Straussian depth is the recruiting instrument, the way you dress a coalition fight in timeless moral truth so that joining feels like rescue rather than alignment.
Alliance Theory also explains the company Anton keeps. The authors note that libertarianism fused with Christian fundamentalism not through philosophy but through a strategic alliance struck in the 1970s, an alliance uncommon elsewhere. Anton’s coalition is the same kind of strange-bedfellows assemblage, Silicon Valley money beside Catholic integralists beside Protestant evangelicals beside ethno-nationalists beside classical-liberal refugees beside the online blood-and-soil right. These do not converge by argument. They converge by shared rivals. Anton’s regime theory is the patchwork narrative that tries to make the assemblage cohere, the story a coalition needs once it exists. The postliberal, natural-right, nationalist, and Caesarist strands are not a philosophy arriving at one conclusion. They are a set of allies in want of a teller, and Anton volunteers.
The authors grant that political scientists have long found the masses lack coherent ideology, and then they push further, insisting that elites are just as inconsistent and are merely better attuned, or more loyal, to their society’s contingent alliances. Calling elite opinion more coherent or sophisticated or deep, they say, is misleading. Anton is the elite theorist who stakes everything on the opposite claim, that his side has the real philosophy and the masses merely feel what he can articulate. Alliance Theory reads his coherence as an artifact of loyalty. He is not deeper than his opponents. He is better attuned to his coalition’s needs and more skilled at dressing that attunement as thought. His motivated reading of every managerial move as capture, his refusal to grant the ruling class a shred of good faith, is in the paper’s terms an honest signal of loyalty, the price of being trusted as a true ally. The esoteric method, the hunt for the hidden subversive teaching, becomes a reliable way to produce readings that signal allegiance.
Now the honest limit. If all belief systems are patchwork justifications for alliances, then Anton’s natural right is coalition propaganda and so is the claim that natural right is coalition propaganda. The theory cannot debunk his philosophy while exempting its own picture as the view from nowhere. What it can do, and does, is strip the special authority Anton claims. He presents himself as a man who reads the moral order and reports it. Alliance Theory returns him to the field as one more partisan, well-attuned and well-armed, producing the story his side requires and calling it the truth about the regime.
The Tacit
Anton owns several tacit skills. He reads old books the way a master reads them, catching the turn beneath the surface that the untrained reader walks past. He judges prose and dress and manners with a connoisseur’s speed, and his menswear treatise, written as Nicholas Antongiavanni, is a document of taste that cannot be reduced to a checklist. St. John’s and Claremont were apprenticeships where a young man sat with texts and teachers until the judgment soaked in. Stephen Turner would call it individual skill built by habituation.
The trouble starts the moment Anton asks that skill to deliver more than it can.
Esoteric reading is the first place it breaks. The Straussian claim is not only that careful reading is a craft. It is that the great writers hid a teaching, that the teaching is a real thing sitting in the text, and that the trained reader recovers it, the same teaching the author buried. Recovery is the load the claim must carry. Turner’s argument in The Social Theory of Practices goes straight at this. A tacit content cannot be shipped intact from one mind to another, let alone across two thousand years and a dozen languages, and arrive as the same content. There is no organ that loads Plato’s secret doctrine into the reader’s head. What happens instead is that a man trained in a particular school produces a reading, and his training shapes what he produces. The Straussian who finds the hidden Plato is not retrieving a stored object. He is generating a reading that his apprenticeship taught him to generate. And the agreement among Straussians about what Plato secretly meant, which they treat as confirmation, is the agreement of men schooled to read alike. Convergence among the similarly trained is not evidence of a recovered doctrine. It is evidence of similar training. Turner dissolves the recovery claim into a habituation claim, and the hidden teaching loses its standing as a thing out there waiting to be found. It becomes the school’s output, attributed to the text.
This matters more for Anton than for an ordinary Straussian, because he runs the same move on the present. His politics rests on a collective tacit object he calls the ruling class or the managerial elite. The picture is of a class that shares an unspoken worldview, a post-national framework operating beneath the surface, enforced without ever being stated. This is the precise entity Turner says cannot exist as a shared tacit substrate. There is no shared framework loaded into every bureaucrat and editor and program officer. What there is, on Turner’s account, is a large number of individuals with overlapping trained dispositions, similar incentives, similar feedback from similar institutions, producing similar output. Turner does not deny the similarity. He denies the hidden shared mind behind it. The difference is the whole game. Anton needs the shared mind because a shared mind can be unmasked, opposed, and defeated as a single adversary. Distributed habit cannot be unmasked, because there is nothing concealed to bring to light, only a pattern of separate men behaving alike for reasons that are mostly visible already. The frame leaves Anton his pattern and takes away his enemy. He has reified a statistical resemblance into a willful collective agent with a buried doctrine, and that reification is the same error he commits when he reads a secret teaching out of Plato.
Anton, through Jaffa and Strauss, treats the regime as a moral and civilizational whole held together by shared character, shared confidence, a common tacit sense of the country and its purpose. His decline story depends on this. Elites lose confidence in their civilization, cease reproducing the standards, and trade the substance for procedure, and the rot spreads through the shared thing before anyone can see it. Turner’s skepticism falls hard here, because shared civic character and collective cultural confidence are the collective tacit entities his book exists to deny. What Anton describes as a regime losing its soul is, in Turner’s terms, a large set of individuals whose trained dispositions and incentives have shifted, each in his own causal history, until the aggregate output looks different. The change is real. The shared soul that supposedly carries it is the fiction. Anton’s tragic prose, the late-Rome cadence, the sense of a single organism sickening, all of it imports the one object Turner refuses to grant. The decline might be occurring. The thing Anton says is declining is not a thing.
Turner’s interest in the tacit always came back to authority. A man who claims tacit knowledge claims something no outsider can audit. He sees what others cannot see, and when asked how, he cannot fully say, because the knowledge is tacit. That unauditability is the source of the authority and also its weakness. Anton’s whole public stance is an expertise claim of this kind. He perceives the crisis the ordinary observer misses. He reads the regime. He sees the hidden structures of power under the neutral words. Pressed for his method, he offers the trained eye, the Straussian ear, the long formation, which is to say he offers tacit knowledge as his credential. Turner’s suspicion of the managerial expert who governs by unarticulated judgment lands with full weight on the man who built his name attacking that expert. Anton’s prophet posture is itself an unauditable claim to tacit insight. The seer who tells you the experts cannot be trusted because their authority rests on knowledge they cannot show you is resting his own authority on knowledge he cannot show you.
The Set
Compared to Elon Musk’s room, the light is dimmer in Michael Anton’s room. The books are older, and the men are more likely to quote a dead Greek than to pitch a fund. Anton shares the center with his teachers and his texts in a way Musk never would. Anton spent the opening months of Trump’s second term as Director of Policy Planning at State and wrote the 2025 National Security Strategy, then left. That movement, from the seminar room to the State Department and back, defines the set. These men want to think and to rule, and they believe the two belong together.
The deep root is West Coast Straussianism (pro-Trump compared to other Straussians). Leo Strauss (1899-1973) is the grandfather, and his student Harry V. Jaffa (1918-2015) is the founder of the specific school, the man who read the American founding and Lincoln through the lens of natural right and gave Claremont its creed. Charles R. Kesler (b. 1956) is the living head, editor of the Claremont Review of Books, Anton’s mentor, the man whose festschrift Anton co-edited. Around Kesler sit the Claremont scholars: Thomas G. West on natural rights, John Marini on the administrative state, Glenn Ellmers, Kevin Slack, Ryan Williams who runs the Institute, and Tom Klingenstein who chairs the board and funds the operation. Larry Arnn (b. 1952) runs Hillsdale and keeps the alliance between the two schools tight. The departed shape the set as much as the living: Angelo Codevilla (1943-2021) gave them the ruling-class-versus-country-class frame, and James Burnham (1905-1987) gave them the managerial revolution to fight against.
A wider tent surrounds the Claremont core, and Anton moves through all of it. Yoram Hazony (b. 1964) runs the National Conservatism conferences and the Edmund Burke Foundation, the meeting ground where the intellectual right assembles once a year. The postliberal Catholics form their own wing: Patrick Deneen (b. 1964), who argued liberalism failed by succeeding in Why Liberalism Failed, Adrian Vermeule (b. 1968) with his common-good constitutionalism, Sohrab Ahmari (b. 1985) at Compact, Gladden Pappin who decamped to Hungary, and Rod Dreher (b. 1967), who did the same. R.R. Reno (b. 1959) holds First Things as their journal. The younger and more online right circles the edges: Curtis Yarvin (b. 1973), whose case for a national CEO and against democracy feeds the Red Caesar talk, Auron MacIntyre, and the activist Christopher Rufo (b. 1984), who turns the theory into school-board fights and policy. Julius Krein runs American Affairs as the economics-and-statecraft organ. In government the set has Vice President JD Vance (b. 1984), who speaks their language and cites their books, and Russ Vought (b. 1976) at OMB, who carries the war on the administrative state into the budget.
What they value is the regime question. The phrase is old, from Aristotle, and it means more than government. It means who rules, by what right, toward what end, and what kind of human being the order produces. They value statesmanship over management, the founder over the engineer, the man who can name the good and order a people toward it. They prize the permanent things, the Western canon, the Declaration and the Federalist read as serious philosophy rather than as documents. They love the text and the close reading of it. Strauss taught them that great writers hide their boldest teaching beneath a surface for the careful few, and they read each other and the classics this way, hunting the hidden argument. They value virtue, hierarchy of the soul, and the cultivation of citizens, and they hold these against what they see as a managerial order that flattens men into consumers and clients.
Their hero system runs on the philosopher-statesman who sees the regime clearly and acts to save it at the decisive hour. The model is Lincoln in Jaffa’s telling, the man who refounded the nation on its first principles when it was about to lose them. Anton’s famous essay supplies the image the whole set lives by: the passengers on Flight 93 charge the cockpit because the alternative is certain death, and a man of courage acts even when the odds are bad and the act is ugly. The hero tells hard truths the regime does not want to hear, takes the abuse, and is vindicated by history. For the bolder wing, the hero shades into Caesar, the one man who restores order when the republic has rotted past saving by ordinary means, and Anton has done more than anyone to make Red Caesar a phrase people argue over. Death, in this story, is the death of the regime and the forgetting of the founding. Immortality comes through the nation preserved, the truth restored, the name remembered alongside the founders and the great statesmen. A man wins by writing the essay that moves history or by standing in the room where the regime is saved or lost.
The status games turn on erudition and on access. The first currency is mastery of the texts. A man earns standing by showing he has read Strauss and Aristotle and the Federalist to the bottom, by catching the hidden argument others miss, by writing prose dense with the tradition. The second currency is the essay that lands, and Flight 93 is the gold standard, the piece that escaped the seminar and changed an election. Writing under a Roman pseudonym, as Anton did with Publius Decius Mus, signals that a man plays the old game of the hidden teacher and the careful reader. The third currency is power, the proof that the philosophy reached the prince. To be read by the president, to write the National Security Strategy, to place students in the administration, raises a man’s standing inside the set the way Sacks going to the White House raised his among the founders. The Claremont fellowships work as initiation and gate. Publishing in the Review or the American Mind marks you as in. Being called a fascist or an authoritarian by the liberal press pays, because it proves you frighten the ruling class. The losses come from inside, from the charge that a man has misread Jaffa, sold out the natural-right teaching for raw power worship, or gone soft on the regime.
Their normative claims are dense and contested. Natural right is real and knowable, and the American founding rests on it, with the Declaration as the philosophical core and equality meaning equal natural rights rather than equal outcomes or equal worth in any leveling sense. The regime should form virtue, not stay neutral among ways of life. The administrative state is a usurpation, an unelected fourth branch that rules without consent and must be broken. The ruling class, the credentialed managerial elite that staffs the agencies, the universities, the press, and the foundations, is illegitimate and hostile to the people it governs. The nation is a real thing worth preserving, immigration should serve the people already here, and globalism dissolves the bounded peoplehood that self-government needs. The boldest claim, the one that splits the set, holds that when the constitutional order has decayed past repair, extraordinary executive action, even action that strains or breaks the forms, can be justified to save the substance.
The essentialist claims. They all reject the progressive faith that man is infinitely malleable and that history moves toward ever-greater freedom. Strauss taught them to fight historicism, the idea that all values are products of their time, and to insist on permanent questions and permanent truths about human nature. Man has a nature, fixed and knowable. Nature gives a hierarchy of souls, the wise and the foolish, the few who can rule and the many who consent. The family is natural, the difference of the sexes is real, and a sound politics conforms to these rather than fighting them. Here the set fractures. The Jaffaites hold the founding as universal and creedal, open to anyone who embraces the principles, a people defined by a shared idea. The newer right pushes toward blood and soil, a people defined by ancestry, language, religion, and place, and Anton has drifted in that direction with his writing on immigration and citizenship, against the more universalist reading his teachers held. The postliberal Catholics add their own essence claim, that man is made for a transcendent good and that a regime which refuses to name that good corrupts him. The Yarvin wing strips the nature talk down to a colder thesis about power and order. They share the enemy and the founding texts. They do not share an account of what America is, and that quarrel runs through every conference and every essay.
Anton bridges the natural-right Claremont core, the nationalist turn, the Caesarist provocation, and the corridors of the State Department, which is part of why he matters and part of why each faction watches him for signs of drift. The bonds hold because these men share Strauss and the regime question and the conviction that the country is in a late and dangerous hour. They fight over the founding, over whether the nation is a creed or a people, over whether to save the republic or to refound it. They circle the same texts, rank each other by who reads deepest and writes boldest, and present a common front against the ruling class they mean to dispossess.
How does Anton deal with people in his Alliance with whom he passionately disagrees?
Anton’s pattern is to keep the fight inside the family and argue it on the merits, in print, by name, while saving his contempt for the people outside the tent. The ferocity that makes him famous points at the ruling class and at the NeverTrump right. Within his own alliance he argues rather than excommunicates, and he is willing to share a stage with men whose conclusions he will not sign.
The clearest case of disagreement with an ally is his exchange with Mark Helprin (b. 1947) on Ukraine in the Claremont Review of Books. The two split hard. Helprin backs Western support for Kyiv and accuses Anton of inventing reckless pro-war rhetoric. Anton answers in the same pages, names the dispute as whether Ukraine is worth the risk of antagonizing Russia, quotes his sources back at Helprin, and gives no ground. The fight is real and sharp. It also stays a fight between two men of the same tradition in the same journal, conducted as argument, with each treating the other as a serious opponent rather than a traitor. That is how Anton handles a passionate disagreement with someone he respects. He publishes against him, by name, and keeps him inside the family.
The Yarvin case shows the other half of the pattern. Anton gave Curtis Yarvin nearly two hours on the Claremont podcast to make the case for an American Caesar and a tech-CEO monarch. Anton does not share the monarchism, and he presses where they part, including how long the present regime lasts if no one moves against it. He does not endorse Yarvin’s most extreme ideas. He hosts the man, engages the argument, and lets the disagreement stand in the open without either capitulation or anathema. He treats a heterodox ally as an interlocutor worth two hours, which is a way of keeping him in the coalition.
Two habits make this possible. First, he subordinates the disagreement to the shared diagnosis. With Yarvin he agrees early that the regime is a kind of theocratic oligarchy run by a progressive priesthood, and treats the quarrel over the cure as secondary to the agreement about the disease. The common enemy holds the alliance together, and Anton keeps the enemy in view so the family quarrels stay family quarrels. Second, the Straussian training lets him hold a position without spelling out its full implications. He floats Red Caesar as provocation and as a question, not as a signed manifesto. That reserve lets him sit at the same table with the natural-right Jaffaites who recoil at Caesarism and with the Yarvin wing that cheers it. He can mean more than he says and say less than he means, which gives the coalition room to disagree without splitting.
When the disagreement is with men who hold power over him rather than fellow writers, the pattern changes. He exits. Reporting on his departure from the State Department had him frustrated with Sergio Gor and with the administration’s foreign-policy process. He finished the National Security Strategy, left, and went back to Claremont and Hillsdale. Argument is for the family of writers and thinkers. With the operators and the process, he withdraws to the perch where his weapon, the essay, still works.
Constitutional Dictatorship
Levinson (b. 1941) and Balkin (b. 1956) wrote “Constitutional Dictatorship” in 2010 as constitutional lawyers, while Anton talks about Red Caesar as a Straussian essayist, but they all reach for the same tools: the Roman dictatorship, Cincinnatus and Caesar, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) on the commissarial and the sovereign dictator, Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) Discourses on Livy, Clinton Rossiter (1917-1970) and his 1948 book Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, Lincoln (1809-1865) as the paragon case, and the Federalist on energetic executive power. Put Anton’s phrase next to their article and you find two men handling the same animal from opposite ends. They want to cage it. He is half-calling it forth.
Both reject the clean line between democracy and dictatorship. Both take the word back to Rome, where the dictator held a real constitutional office for a fixed term and a stated purpose. Both treat emergency and the strong executive as permanent features of any republic rather than aberrations. And both organize their thinking around Schmitt’s distinction, which is the hinge of the whole comparison. The commissarial dictator is constituted by the existing order, takes power for a limited time to save the regime, and gives it back. The sovereign dictator uses the crisis to overthrow the order and found a new one. Levinson and Balkin spend their article arguing that the American presidency is a commissarial dictatorship, bestowed by framework statutes rather than seized, latent until a crisis activates it, distributed across agency heads who each hold unreviewable discretion in their patch. Anton’s Red Caesar lives on the same map. The only question is which of Schmitt’s two figures he is describing, and the answer is where the two projects split.
Levinson and Balkin write to warn and to design. Their whole second half is Machiavellian in the strict sense of the Discourses: build the emergency office into the constitution in advance, separate the body that declares the emergency from the man who wields the power, add sunset clauses and supermajorities and escalator clauses, consider a no-confidence vote and an emergency council of former officials. They place themselves on the side of Hamilton and the Florentine. Their fear is the slide Rossiter charted and Weber (1864-1920) predicted, the drift toward Caesarism, the president who governs through manufactured emergency, the Ponzi scheme of one crisis stacked on the last to keep the public scared and the executive unchecked. For them the constitutional dictator who refuses to return power is the nightmare the design exists to prevent.
Anton inverts the valence. He wants the strong executive. He treats the managerial order, not the presidency, as the standing tyranny. For him the Caesar talk is a remedy rather than a disease. Where Levinson and Balkin see the danger and engineer against it, Anton sees the cure and dramatizes the need for it. This is the first real divergence. Same diagnosis of where unaccountable power sits, opposite prescription.
Levinson and Balkin locate the constitutional dictatorship in the administrative state, distributed among Bernanke at the Fed, the head of the CDC, the director of the NSA, the faceless officials who exercise unreviewable discretion under old framework statutes. The administrative state is the distributed dictatorship, and their reforms aim to thread accountability back through it. Anton agrees that the administrative state is the seat of unaccountable power. He draws the opposite conclusion. For him that apparatus is the ruling-class regime that has captured the country, and the Caesar is the man summoned to break it and take it back. So Anton’s Caesar is, in Levinson and Balkin’s own terms, an attempt to re-concentrate the distributed dictatorship in a single person, to pull the scattered unreviewable power of the agencies up into one will. That move runs from the commissarial toward the sovereign. It is the very tendency their design tries to forestall.
The law professors’ Part III describes the president’s power to define reality, to frame a situation as existential crisis, to make resistance look parochial and futile, to act on the framing and confirm it. They call it governing through emergency and treat it as the engine that produces the powers of constitutional dictatorship. Flight 93 is that move in the form of an essay. Charge the cockpit or die. The framing licenses the extraordinary act. Anton is the rhetorician of exactly the emergency construction they diagnose. Where they study the move with a cold eye and warn against its normalization, he performs it with skill. Read their Part III and his 2016 essay together and he reads as their case study.
Then comes Cincinnatus against Caesar, which the article frames as the ambivalence at the heart of the institution. The dictator can return to the plow or he can have himself named perpetuus. Rome ran the whole arc, from the limited six-month office through Sulla to Caesar, who mocked Sulla for giving power back. Levinson and Balkin say the entire point of constitutional design is to secure the Cincinnatus outcome and block the Caesar outcome. Anton names the Caesar outcome and tries to rehabilitate it, or at least to argue that a republic this far gone may require it. By their lights, to name Caesar with approval is to give up on the design and to welcome the slide that Rossiter and Weber feared. That is the disagreement in one image. They want the man who returns power. Anton entertains the man who keeps it, on the ground that the order he would be returning power to is not worth preserving.
The commissarial dictator preserves an order assumed to be legitimate. Anton’s premise is that the order is already illegitimate, already refounded by the managerial class against the people, so there is no legitimate constitutional order left to preserve. That premise collapses the commissarial option from the inside. If the standing regime is itself a usurpation, then the man who breaks it is not overthrowing a legitimate order but restoring the true one, and Anton can claim the commissarial mantle, saving and refounding, while in practice endorsing the sovereign move that founds a new order. The Schmittian categories flip depending on which order you treat as real. For Levinson and Balkin, the constitutional dictator who will not give power back is the tyrant. For Anton, the managerial state that never gives power back to the people is the tyranny already in place, and his Caesar is the commissarial answer to it. Each can call the other’s order the dictatorship, and that is the crux of the whole comparison.
Both camps reject the comfortable view that American tyranny is impossible. Levinson and Balkin take direct aim at the tyrannophobia argument that the country has never come close to a dictator and never will. They say it already has one, distributed and latent. Anton also holds that America is already under a kind of tyranny, but he names the managerial class rather than the presidency as the tyrant. They start from the same refusal of complacency and walk to opposite culprits. Second, Adrian Vermeule sits in both worlds at once, the Schmittian administrative-law theorist whom Levinson and Balkin engage and an ally in Anton’s postliberal orbit, which shows how small the room is and how the same Schmittian vocabulary serves a liberal warning and a postliberal program in the same years.
The Structural Similarities Between Straussianism & Post-Colonialism
The Straussian esoteric reading doctrine is structurally self-sealing. It’s a closed world. If a text says X on its face, the Straussian can hold that the real teaching is not-X, hidden for the careful reader, with the surface piety placed there to protect the author. Once you grant that move, textual evidence stops being able to refute a reading. A plain statement is the exoteric cover. A contradiction is a deliberate signal. A silence is the loudest speech of all. The method can absorb almost any datum and turn it into confirmation, which is the defining trait of a system immune to evidence. This is the core of M.F. Burnyeat’s (1939-2019) attack in (“Sphinx Without a Secret”), where he argued that Strauss kept finding his own views buried in the great books and that the secret teaching was mostly Strauss talking to himself. Shadia Drury pressed the same charge from another direction, that the hidden teaching turns out to be a Nietzschean elitism the school will not state plainly. Quentin Skinner (b. 1940) and the Cambridge contextualists built a whole rival method on the claim that reading for hidden meaning lets the interpreter say whatever he wants. The critics disagree about the content of the supposed secret. They agree the practice resists falsification. On that axis the analogy to a hermetic, self-validating world holds.
The lineage structure deepens the resemblance. West Coast Straussians venerate Jaffa as Jaffa venerated Strauss, and a reading gets its warrant from the school rather than from any public method an outsider could run. Agreement among the initiated then counts as proof, when it is really the convergence of men trained to read alike. Add the gatekeeping, the Claremont fellowships as initiation, the in-group vocabulary, the standing contempt for mainstream political science and academic history of philosophy, and you have the social form of a closed circle: you are inside or you are one of the vulgar who cannot see. The flattering epistemics of the few who can read are real, and they do insulate the group from outside correction, because outside correction can always be dismissed as the complaint of a man who never learned to read.
Now the differences. A sealed world does not spend fifty years at war with itself. The East Coast and West Coast split is a sustained, bitter, public quarrel about the deepest questions, reason against revelation, the standing of the American founding, whether the Declaration states a universal truth or a useful myth. Jaffa fought Mansfield and the Bloom-Pangle line for decades and gave no quarter. Anton sits inside a school that argues ferociously over exactly the things that define it. A community immune to critique would not host that. The closure points outward, against the academy and the vulgar reader, more than inward.
Strauss’s own work on Maimonides (1138-1204), Spinoza (1632-1677), and the medieval Arabic philosophers rested on a falsifiable historical claim, that some writers under persecution did hide their meaning, and that claim has real evidence behind it. The book to read against my own thesis is Persecution and the Art of Writing, where the esoteric idea is argued rather than assumed. The closure enters when the historical thesis becomes a universal license, when every text is read as hiding a teaching whether or not the author had reason to hide. And the closure tightens further on the West Coast political branch, because there the reading serves a coalition and a program. A method that already resists evidence resists it harder when a political identity rides on the result. Anton is a product of that branch, which is the most motivated and the most sealed part of the tradition.
Convenient Beliefs
Start with the master one. Natural right is real and knowable. Everything in Anton rests on this. His authority to read the regime, his claim that the founding states a moral truth and not a preference, his standing to say the country is in decline against a fixed standard, all of it presupposes that there is a knowable natural standard and that he has access to it. The amount riding on the belief is total. The amount of scrutiny he gives the belief itself is near zero. He argues from natural right constantly and almost never argues for the proposition that natural right can be known by a man and applied to a regime, because that is the proposition he cannot afford to lose. If natural right is not knowable in the way he needs, he is not a reader of the moral order reporting its dictates. He is a partisan with strong opinions and a good vocabulary. The belief survives by convenience. The cost of doubting it is his whole vocation, and so he does not doubt it.
The regime as a moral and civilizational whole is the second. Anton treats the regime as a thing with a character and a soul, a unity that can keep its confidence or lose it, sicken, decline, and need saving. This is convenient in a precise way. It supplies the object his prophetic role requires. A man can diagnose the decline of a soul and call for its rescue. He cannot do anything so heroic with a loose aggregate of institutions, habits, statutes, and individuals each changing for its own reasons. If the regime is the aggregate rather than the soul, there is no single patient to diagnose and no single rescue to lead, and the tragic register goes flat. Anton never tests whether the regime is the kind of thing that can have a soul, because the test threatens the role the belief makes possible. He asserts the whole because the whole is what he needs to address.
The ruling class as a coherent, hostile, illegitimate agent is the third. Anton’s politics requires that the managerial elite be a unified actor with a shared mind and a will to dispossess his coalition. The convenience runs two ways. It supplies a single enemy that can be named, opposed, and one day broken. And it explains his side’s defeats without requiring his side to look at itself, because the losses become the work of a coordinated adversary rather than the result of his coalition’s own weaknesses. Examining the belief would mean asking whether the ruling class is one agent or many separate people behaving alike for ordinary reasons, and whether his coalition’s decline owes something to its own failures. Both questions are expensive, so neither gets asked. The enemy stays unified because a unified enemy is convenient.
The recoverable hidden teaching is the fourth, and it is the one that pays him most directly. Anton holds that the great writers concealed a true teaching and that the trained reader recovers it. This belief grants him an authority that cannot be checked, since the meaning lives beneath the surface where only the careful reader can see it. That is exactly the kind of belief Turner expects to find protected, because everything Anton does as an interpreter depends on it and nothing he does ever puts it at risk. He cannot test whether his recovered teaching is in the text or in his training, because the test would expose his readings to ordinary checking and strip the privilege the belief confers. So the doctrine stands, untested, doing its work.
Red Caesar and the existential emergency are the fifth. The belief that the crisis is so severe that extraordinary, even extra-constitutional, action is warranted is convenient because it licenses what Anton already wants, a strong executive that breaks the managerial order, while letting him keep the language of constitutional fidelity and regime preservation. The emergency framing relieves him of the harder task of defending the action on ordinary grounds, where it would have to answer to the rules. He does not examine whether the emergency is as total as he says, because the totality is what does the licensing. A smaller crisis would demand smaller measures and ordinary justification, which is the burden the convenient belief exists to remove.
Underneath these sits the oldest one, the belief that the wise few see what the many cannot. It is convenient because it places Anton among the few and turns every objection from outside into evidence that the objector is one of the many who fail to understand. The belief immunizes his judgments against correction. He cannot inspect it, because inspecting it would mean submitting his insight to the same public checking he denies the many, and that is the exposure the belief is shaped to prevent.
Turner Against Essentialism
Turner is a nominalist (a philosopher who believes that abstract concepts do not exist in reality, instead the world only consists of individuals and concrete things) about the social world, and his anti-essentialism is the working edge of that nominalism. The error he hunts is the slide from a noun to a thing. We have the word, so we assume there is an entity, and then we assume the entity has an essence, a defining inner nature that makes it what it is and sets its boundaries. Stephen Turner denies the entity and the essence both. What exists are particulars, individual people with individual habits formed by their own histories, and the apparent essence is a name laid over the scatter plus a back-projection that treats the name as if it pointed to a substance. His second move is sharper and more useful here. Essence claims do political work. To assert an essence is to naturalize a boundary, to take a contingent and contestable line and present it as a discovery about being. That is what he means by the politics of essence. The man who names the essence gets to police the boundary and call the policing metaphysics.
Anton is essentialist nearly all the way down, and the essences are the structural members of his thought. He posits a human nature that is fixed, knowable, and hierarchical, with the high-agency man as a kind of person you can identify by what he builds and the many as another kind fit to consent rather than rule. He posits the nation as a real thing with an identity, the people as a unity with a character. He posits the regime as a moral and civilizational whole with a soul that can keep its confidence or lose it. He posits the West as a civilization with an essence worth preserving. He posits natural right as a real order in the structure of things. And he posits the ruling class as a coherent kind, a managerial elite with a shared nature and a single will. Turner’s response to each is the same. There is no essence there. There is human variety and trained disposition, not two fixed types of man. There is a large population of people with overlapping habits, not a national soul. There is a set of institutions and statutes and individuals each changing for its own reasons, not a regime with an inner life. There is a tradition of texts and practices, not a Western essence. There is what people believe and enforce, not a natural order standing behind it. There is a distribution of similarly trained officials, not a ruling-class mind. In every case the noun has been mistaken for a thing and the thing endowed with an essence it does not have.
Notice that Anton’s internal quarrel runs between two essentialisms rather than between essence and its absence. The Jaffa line holds that America is an idea, a nation defined by an essential proposition in the Declaration. Anton’s later drift holds that America is a people defined by ancestry, religion, and place. Turner dissolves both with one stroke, because both commit the same error. The creedal nation and the blood-and-soil nation are each an essence claim, one locating the essence in a proposition and the other in a lineage, and neither names a thing that has an essence to locate. The fight Anton takes as the deepest question of his tradition is, on this reading, a fight over which essence to assert about an object that has none.
Anton’s essences each draws a line his coalition needs and then presents the line as nature. The essence of the nation decides who is really American and licenses the immigration position. The essence of the regime decides what the country really is and licenses the diagnosis of decline. The essence of human nature decides who is fit to rule and licenses the hierarchy. The essence of the West decides what must be defended and licenses the enemy. Turner’s point is not that these boundaries are wicked. It is that they are constructed and contestable, and that calling them essences is the move by which a man hides their construction and exempts them from argument. You do not debate an essence. You either see it or you are blind to it, which is the same authority structure Anton wants for every one of his claims.
Turner’s Explaining the Normative picks up exactly where the essentialism leaves off. The anti-essentialism removes Anton’s entities. Explaining the Normative removes the bindingness those entities were supposed to generate. Even if you granted Anton a nation or a regime or a human nature, you would still face the further claim that these ground oughts, that natural right obligates, that the founding binds us, that the regime ought to cultivate virtue, that a Caesar would be justified. Turner’s target in that book is normativism, the view that normative facts are basic and cannot be reduced, that a binding ought is a real extra feature of the world over and above what people believe, want, habituate, and enforce. He argues that the appeal to such facts explains nothing. The only evidence for the norm is the behavior the norm is invoked to explain, so the norm adds a circle, not a cause. A naturalist account does the work without the residue. There are habits, mutual expectations, sanctions, and the empirical facts of practice, and the word binding names how those feel from inside, not an additional thing in the world.
Anton’s natural right is normativism in its strongest form, and Strauss is the reason. Strauss made anti-historicism a creed, the insistence that there are permanent questions and permanent normative truths that philosophy recovers and that stand above any age. Turner’s book is the patient naturalist refusal of that creed. Normativity, he argues, is not the kind of thing that has eternal truths waiting to be found. It is a way of talking that converts dispositions into obligations. So when Anton says the founding’s principles bind the living, Turner asks what the binding adds beyond the fact that some Americans were raised to revere those principles and will sanction those who flout them. When Anton says the regime ought to form virtue, Turner asks what the ought adds beyond Anton’s preference and his coalition’s willingness to enforce it. When Anton says the Caesar would be justified, Turner asks what the justification is, in non-normative terms, other than that Anton and his allies want the outcome and would back the man who delivers it. In each case the deflation cashes the binding ought as want plus enforcement, and the word duty turns out to be the honorific a faction gives its own preferences when it wants others to feel obligated by them.
Every strong normativism smuggles in a we. We ought, we are bound, the norm holds for us. The neo-Kantians and the space-of-reasons philosophers, Brandom (b. 1950) and Habermas (b. 1929) among them, try to ground the ought in the conditions of a shared we, and Turner answers that the we is the same illegitimate collective entity his anti-essentialism already rejected. Natural right binds whom? The American people, the regime, mankind. Those are not unified subjects that can be bound. They are populations of separate men. So the binding has no one to bind except by Anton’s say-so, and the say-so is exactly the authority the normative claim was meant to establish. The argument runs in a circle, and the circle is the point. Anton’s moral cosmos, run through both frames, comes apart into two residues and nothing else. The essences become names for distributions of particulars. The oughts become preferences his coalition will enforce. What presents itself as a science of the regime grounded in permanent truth turns out, on Turner’s accounting, to be a set of contingent boundaries called nature and a set of contingent wants called duty.
Michael Anton and the Penalty Cascade
Darel E. Paul ends From Tolerance to Equality (2018) with a passage on the price of losing a fight over the definition of reality. The loser gets the weight of the dominant culture pressed against him, watches his members peel away and the remainder lose the will to resist, forfeits access to elite institutions and networks and the material benefits they confer, and at last faces the force of law, the power of the state. The passage describes a penalty cascade in five stages, stigma, attrition, demoralization, exclusion, coercion, arriving in order, each stage financing the next.
Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen show the cascade attempted against mass politicians, failing in Britain for want of mass enforcement and holding in France for forty years before decaying. Michael Anton shows something different: the cascade as experienced by an individual member of the professional class, which is the level where Paul’s American version bites hardest. Anton is a double specimen. He wrote the most influential American statement of the cascade from inside the losing side, and his own career, the pseudonyms, the unmasking, the refuge, the two tours of state power, runs the model at the scale of one man.
Begin with the theory, because Anton produced it before he illustrated it. “The Flight 93 Election” appeared in September 2016 on the website of the Claremont Review of Books under the name Publius Decius Mus, a Roman consul who won a battle by riding into the enemy line to die. The essay argued that American conservatism had lost every institutional fight for a generation, that the Left held the commanding heights of education, media, entertainment, philanthropy, and the professions, and that a Hillary Clinton administration meant the arrival of the final stage, the state turned on dissent. The famous line ordered readers to charge the cockpit or die. Strip the polemic and the essay is a penalty-cascade analysis written at what its author judged to be the threshold of stage five. Its practical conclusion follows from the model with a logician’s economy: if the cascade is nearly complete and only the state stage remains open, then seizing the state is the single move left, whatever the risks of the pilot. Paul observes that combatants fight so hard because all of them can see the whole cascade from the first skirmish. The Flight 93 essay is what that sight looks like written down, by a man who believed his side stood at the bottom of the slide looking up.
Now the specimen. Anton spent the years before 2016 inside the institutions his essay described as enemy terrain. After degrees from the University of California, Davis, St. John’s College in Annapolis, and Claremont Graduate University, he worked as a press aide to Governor Pete Wilson, in the press office of Mayor Rudy Giuliani, and for four years on the National Security Council staff of George W. Bush, then went to the private sector, speechwriting for Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, communications at Citigroup, and finally a managing director’s post at BlackRock, the largest asset manager in the world and as central a node of American elite life as exists. From inside that node he published his politics under other names. The habit began as play: his 2006 book on menswear, The Suit, a Machiavelli pastiche, appeared under the name Nicholas Antongiavanni. By 2016 the habit had turned protective. He wrote for the Journal of American Greatness, the short-lived group blog that built the intellectual case for Trump in early 2016, as Decius, and when the blog shut down he carried the name to the Flight 93 essay.
The pseudonym is the detail that anchors Anton’s case to Paul’s American material, because it concedes the cascade’s power at stage four before any penalty was applied. A managing director at BlackRock judged that publishing his political views under his own name might end his career in elite finance, and the judgment was almost certainly correct. Paul documents the same calculation running through the professions, the Evangelical social work students facing accreditation ideology, the Christian academics a 1999 survey found more damaged by their faith than by party or sex at elite research institutions. The cascade does its deepest work here, in the anticipatory self-censorship of professionals who never test the penalty because they can price it in advance. Anonymity is the cheapest stall technology available to the individual, and its prevalence measures the cascade’s reach: the number of pseudonymous writers in a professional class is an index of how much dissent the class contains and how certain the penalty for voicing it has become.
The unmasking came in February 2017, when the Weekly Standard identified Decius as Anton just as he entered the Trump White House as deputy assistant to the president for strategic communications, the post Ben Rhodes had held for Barack Obama. Stage one executed within days, and the executioners were fellow conservatives. Bill Kristol (b. 1952) reached for the heaviest mark in the modern lexicon, tweeting a comparison of Anton to Carl Schmitt, the crown jurist of the Third Reich. The episode shows the cascade running inside a coalition rather than between coalitions. The Never Trump remnant of the conservative intelligentsia spent 2016 and 2017 attempting a miniature cascade against Trump’s intellectual supporters, stigma through the fascism comparison, attrition through purges at the legacy conservative magazines, exclusion from the respectable panels and mastheads. The attempt failed for the same reason Coutts failed against Farage: the penalty arrived after the target had already reached power. A stigma aimed at a man holding a White House pass transfers its force to the target, and the Schmitt comparison became a credential in the circles that now mattered to him.
When Anton left the NSC in April 2018, as John Bolton arrived, the question posed by his career was whether the door back to elite finance stood open. He did not test it. He went instead to the parallel academy, a lectureship at Hillsdale College and a senior fellowship at the Claremont Institute, and there the case connects to the stall strategy that runs through this series. Orthodox Jews, traditionalist Catholics, and Mormons stalled the cascade by maintaining parallel institutions that made exclusion from elite networks survivable. American conservatism built the same infrastructure for its intellectuals across half a century, Claremont founded in 1979 by students of Harry Jaffa, Hillsdale sustaining independence by refusing federal money, the network of fellowships and small magazines that can employ a man the universities and the foundations will not touch. The parallel academy cannot confer elite consecration; no Claremont fellowship opens the doors a Harvard chair opens. What it does is interrupt stage two and stage three. It keeps the excluded employed, published, and in company, which prevents the attrition and demoralization that exclusion is designed to produce. Anton spent six years there, wrote After the Flight 93 Election (2019) and The Stakes (2020), taught, and waited.
During those years he added a second theoretical contribution, the celebration parallax, his name for the rule by which the same factual claim is forbidden or celebrated depending on who asserts it and with what valence. The demographic transformation of the United States is a racist conspiracy theory when a restrictionist describes it and a triumph when a progressive toasts it; he compressed the rule into a formula, that’s not happening and it’s good that it is. Whatever one makes of the examples, the concept is a stage-one analysis of some rigor. Paul’s frame holds that the fight is over who defines reality. The parallax specifies the operating rule of the winner’s position: reality itself is not contested, only the license to state it, which belongs to one side. A regime that can distribute the right to describe facts has won the definition fight in the fullest sense, and Anton’s concept describes the prize from the loser’s side of the table.
The state stage of Anton’s own story ran twice, and the second tour exceeded the first. In December 2024 Trump nominated him director of policy planning at the State Department, the office George Kennan built, and he assumed it on January 20, 2025. In April 2025 Secretary of State Marco Rubio made him technical lead of the American delegation negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program, a dozen mostly career officials under a man who had entered public life through a pseudonymous blog. He held major roles on Russia and Ukraine policy and served as lead author of the administration’s national security strategy, a document whose civilizational emphases readers traced to his hand. His formal term as director ended on September 15, 2025; he stayed on as senior adviser to the secretary through the strategy’s completion and left government at the end of 2025. The man who wrote in 2016 that only seizing the state could interrupt the cascade helped run the state’s foreign policy for a year and drafted the document meant to define its purposes.
The route deserves attention, because it differs from Farage’s and Le Pen’s in a way the frame can absorb. Mass politicians reach the state through elections, and their route around the cascade is plebiscitary, the referendum, the by-election, the presidential ballot. Intellectuals and professionals face the cascade through institutions and credentials, and their route to the state runs through appointment and patronage. A movement that wins the presidency acquires several thousand appointive offices, which function for its intellectual class as an alternative consecration system, conferring at a stroke the standing the universities and the professions withheld. Policy planning at State outranks any chair Anton was never offered. For the professional-class dissident, the cascade’s reversal is a patronage event, and the durability of the reversal depends on holding the appointing power, which is why the intellectual wing of such movements attaches itself to electoral fortunes with an intensity that looks disproportionate until the dependence is seen.
The last analytical question is the one Anton’s case forces on the frame: what happens when the cascade’s targets, having seen every stage, capture the state themselves. The second Trump administration answered with a reciprocal cascade run from the top down, security clearances stripped from critics, executive orders aimed at disfavored law firms, funding and accreditation pressure on universities, the machinery of exclusion pointed back at the institutions that had operated it. Anton’s own portfolio was foreign policy, Iran and Ukraine and the strategy document, and there is no basis for assigning him an operational role in the domestic campaign. His role was earlier and deeper. The Flight 93 essay and The Stakes supplied the licensing argument, that the other side had run the cascade first and would run it to the end, so that reciprocity was not aggression but defense. Paul’s frame predicts this development without naming it. A cascade fully visible to its targets is a curriculum, and the losers study it. Once both coalitions believe the other will press the sequence to stage five at the first opportunity, each seizure of the state begins with preemption, and the fight over who defines reality loses whatever restraints the fiction of neutral institutions once imposed. The frame’s grimmest implication is that transparency makes it worse: the better both sides understand the cascade, the harder they fight, exactly as Paul says, and the less either can afford to leave it unused while holding the state.
Anton’s case adds three items to the frame’s inventory. Pseudonymity enters as the individual’s stall against stage four, and its prevalence in a professional class measures the cascade’s anticipatory power. The parallel academy enters as the institutional stall, preserving the excluded intellectual against attrition and demoralization at the cost of consecration. And the appointment route enters beside the plebiscitary route as the second door to the state, the one sized for intellectuals, opened by patronage, and closed again with each change of administration. Anton walked through it twice, and as of the end of 2025 he stands outside it again, back in the parallel academy with the strategy document as his legacy, waiting on the electoral fortunes that govern whether the door opens a third time.
The Great Delusion
If John J. Mearsheimer (b. 1947) is right that humans are tribal at their core, his anthropology serves as a validation for the political thought of Michael Anton. Anton rose to prominence with his essay “The Flight 93 Election” and his subsequent book The Stakes. He argues against the prevailing liberal consensus. If Mearsheimer is correct, Anton’s warnings about the fragmentation of the American republic are accurate assessments of human behavior under pressure.
Mearsheimer writes in The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities that liberalism treats people as atomistic actors and ignores their social nature. Anton shares this deep skepticism toward the liberal project. He argues that the modern ruling class uses an ideology of abstract rights and forced diversity to dismantle traditional social bonds. If Mearsheimer is correct, this liberal project is a delusion. It works against the deep-seated human need for group belonging. Anton sees the erosion of a shared American identity as a fatal vulnerability. When a state strips away common socialization, it does not create a society of liberated individuals. It creates an unstable arena where tribal allegiances inevitably reassert themselves.
Mearsheimer asserts that intense socialization during a long childhood forms human preferences far more than reason. This perspective aligns with Anton’s defense of a specific cultural heritage. For Anton, a coherent political community requires a deep value infusion rooted in shared history and habits. He believes a nation cannot survive on abstract principles alone. If reason is subordinate to socialization, then the liberal belief in a universal proposition nation is flawed. People do not bind themselves to a state because of logical arguments about human rights. They bind themselves to a community that protects them and mirrors their identity.
The willingness of individuals to make great sacrifices for their fellow group members explains the urgency in Anton’s writing. Anton views politics as a competitive struggle for group survival. If humans are lone wolves, then open borders and global integration might work. But if humans are social beings who prioritize their own tribe, then globalism threatens the survival of the group. Mearsheimer’s anthropology confirms Anton’s foundational premise. It suggests that when a regime ignores the tribal core of man, it invites its own destruction.
‘A Big Misunderstanding’
Michael Anton provides the quintessential political application of David Pinsof’s thesis. His famous 2016 essay, The Flight 93 Election, and his subsequent books, After the Flight 93 Election (2019) and The Stakes (2020), argue against the idea that American politics is a big misunderstanding that can be solved by reasonable discourse, fact-checking, or better education.
Anton views politics through a clear friend-enemy lens. To him, the conflict between the ruling elite and the rest of the country is not a consequence of cognitive biases or a breakdown in communication. It is a zero-sum competition over the coercive apparatus of the state.
Mainstream conservative and liberal intellectuals often treat political dysfunction as a problem of polarization, tribalism, or a lack of civility. They suggest that if both sides simply understood each other better, the country could function. Anton rejects this premise.
In The Flight 93 Election, Anton argues that the progressive elite understands its goals perfectly. The enforcement of its ideology is not a mistake or a misunderstanding of constitutional principles; it is a calculated effort to consolidate power and replace the existing American citizenry and culture. Anton writes that the left aims for the total victory of its program, which means the destruction of its political opposition.
When Pinsof writes that partisans hate each other because they are locked in a high-stakes battle over who gets to put people in prison at gunpoint, he describes Anton’s exact worldview. Anton did not see the 2016 election as a debate over policy details, but as a struggle for survival. Charge the cockpit or die. That logic assumes the enemy knows exactly what he is doing.
Pinsof argues that social scientists and intellectuals manufacture the myth of misunderstanding to make themselves indispensable. If the public is broken, the experts must fix them through interventions and policy.
Anton applies this critique to the administrative state and the “managerial elite.” He argues that the credentialed class uses the language of expertise, meritocracy, and public service to mask its raw group interests. The elite does not push policies like mass immigration, globalist trade deals, or diversity initiatives out of a misunderstanding of economic realities. They push them because these policies enhance their status, weaken their domestic working-class rivals, and secure their hold on institutional power.
The rhetoric of the ruling class—framed around democracy, equity, and human rights—is what Pinsof calls a corporate mission statement. It is designed to signal virtue and justify the domination of outsiders. Anton’s work strips away this language to focus on the actual motives: the preservation of power and the marginalization of the historic American electorate.
Anton also applies Pinsof’s concept of strategic stupidity, though he directs it at his own side. For decades, the conservative establishment operated on the assumption that they just needed better arguments, better think-tank white papers, and better messaging to win over the country. They treated progressivism as a series of bad ideas that could be corrected through debate.
Anton argues this posture was either blind or complicit. The failure of the Republican establishment to stop the progressive advance was not a misunderstanding of the stakes; it was a comfortable arrangement. Staying in the minority while managing the decline allowed conservative insiders to maintain their status, fundraising apparatus, and positions within the Washington hierarchy. Their high-minded commitment to norms and civility was an honest signal of surrender that kept them safe from elite wrath.
Pinsof concludes that intellectuals face an unpleasant reality: the world cannot be saved by advice because people act on incentives and motives, not bad beliefs.
Anton’s writing reflects this tragic, non-therapeutic view of human nature and politics. He does not offer a list of policy tweaks or educational reforms to bridge the partisan divide. In The Stakes, he outlines the stark possibilities facing a deeply divided nation, ranging from soft despotism to secession or regime collapse. He treats these outcomes not as misunderstandings to be avoided through positive thinking, but as the natural result of two hostile groups competing for the same territory and state machinery.
For Anton, as for Pinsof, the political system is not broken. It is operating precisely on the logic of Darwinian competition. The primary error of the pre-Trump political class was the belief that the conflict was just a big misunderstanding.