Who Has Discussed Realist Anthropology in Polite Society?

Several respectable bodies of thought reach John J. Mearsheimer’s premises without his realist framing, and they have done so for two centuries.

The oldest line runs through the counter-Enlightenment. Edmund Burke (1729-1797) holds that reason is thin and inheritance is deep, that a man draws more from the partnership of generations than he can work out on his own, and that the abstract rights-bearing individual of the French theorists names no creature who ever lived. Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) puts it in his line about having seen Frenchmen and Italians and Russians but never, in his life, Man. David Hume (1711-1776) supplies the engine for the claim about reason a generation earlier when he makes reason the slave of the passions. These three carry the structure: weak reason, prior attachment, the fiction of the unencumbered self.

The sociological founding gives it a science. Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) treats the social as a thing in its own right, prior to the individual and productive of him, so that even the modern cult of the individual is a collective creation. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) names the value infusion Mearsheimer describes. His habitus is the set of dispositions laid down early, below awareness, that shapes how a man perceives and judges before he reasons at all.

The communitarian philosophers built the respectable critique of liberal anthropology in the 1980s and they sit at the center of polite society. Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-2025) in After Virtue and Dependent Rational Animals argues that a man is constituted by traditions and narratives he did not choose. Michael Sandel (b. 1953) in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice takes apart the Rawlsian self that arrives prior to its ends. Charles Taylor (b. 1931) in his essay “Atomism” and in Sources of the Self argues that the very capacities liberalism prizes can only form inside a society. Robert Bellah (1927-2013) and his coauthors in Habits of the Heart show American individualism eating the bonds Americans depend on.

A conservative line attacks reason directly. Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) in Rationalism in Politics sets technical reason against the practical knowledge carried in traditions and never fully stated. Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) in The Constitution of Liberty and The Fatal Conceit makes tradition the bearer of knowledge no single mind commands, and treats the constructivist faith in reason as a conceit. Roger Scruton (1944-2020) defends prior attachment to home and people as the ground of the self.

The evolutionary and psychological strand reaches the same premise about reason from the lab. Jonathan Haidt (b. 1963) in The Righteous Mind makes intuition the elephant and reason the rider who rationalizes after the fact, and calls man ninety percent chimp, ten percent bee. Daniel Kahneman (1934-2024) gives the slow deliberate system second place behind fast intuition. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber in The Enigma of Reason argue that reason evolved for winning arguments inside a group, not for finding truth alone. Robin Hanson and Kevin Simler in The Elephant in the Brain treat conscious reasoning as a press secretary for motives it does not see.

The cultural anthropologists supply the transmission. Joseph Henrich in The Secret of Our Success and The WEIRDest People in the World argues that man is a cultural animal who survives by copying, and that the atomistic individual of liberal theory is a recent and peculiar product of one strange corner of the world rather than the human default.

The tribal core has its respectable carriers too, though they pay a higher price for it. Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) in Who Are We? and The Clash of Civilizations puts group identity ahead of creed. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) grounds the political in the friend and enemy grouping. E.O. Wilson (1929-2021) defends group selection and the eusocial pull.

The live synthesis is Patrick Deneen in Why Liberalism Failed, published the same year as Mearsheimer, which argues that liberalism rests on a false picture of the autonomous self and undoes itself by acting on it. Christopher Lasch (1932-1994) reaches a near neighbor from the left in The Culture of Narcissism and The True and Only Heaven. John Gray (b. 1948) in Straw Dogs turns the apparatus against liberal humanism and its faith in progress.

For epistemic dependence, the sources are John Hardwig, whose 1985 paper named the problem, C.A.J. Coady in Testimony, and Steven Shapin in A Social History of Truth, who shows trust standing under even the hardest knowledge.

These premises move freely in polite society when they wear evolutionary psychology, communitarian philosophy, cultural anthropology, or the conservative inheritance. The same premises, stated plainly and drawn toward their political conclusions, get a man expelled from those rooms. The respectable carriers keep their standing by holding the anthropology and declining the politics Mearsheimer is willing to name. That gap, between who may say these things and who may act on them, is the part almost no one writes about.

A correction. Tribalism as fact does not yield favor your tribe. Haidt holds the same anthropology and draws the reverse lesson: your moral mind lies to you, so distrust it, build institutions that check it, practice humility toward the people you find disgusting. Mearsheimer holds it and draws the nationalist lesson: the bonds are real and durable, so stop pretending the species dissolves into a liberal universal, and let nations be nations. One description, two roads. The fact says nothing about which to take. So polite society does not police the premise. It polices the road. You may carry the dark anthropology into the room on one condition, that you pay it off with the meliorist conclusion, the humility, the warning against your own instincts. Hold the fact and recommend restraint, keep your chair. Hold the fact and recommend partiality, lose it. The toll is the direction you point the same truth.
Then the question of why partiality is the firing offense and restraint the dues. In-group preference does not read the same on every group. Among out-groups and minorities it reads as peoplehood, solidarity, self-determination, and the institutions bless it. Among majority or founding or dominant groups it reads as chauvinism, and the institutions were built after 1945 to suppress it. So the same sentence, my people should look after their own, is civic virtue from one mouth and menace from another. The anthropology is neutral as to coalition. The license is not. That asymmetry is the live wire in the subject, and touching it is the thing that gets a man put out.
Society already acts on the premises. It runs ethnic patronage, diaspora lobbies, group remedies, speech rules that protect some groups from others, immigration politics keyed to who counts as us. It acts on the tribal anthropology every day, for some coalitions, against others, and never under the banner of the anthropology. So the gap does not sit between belief and action. The action is everywhere. The gap sits between the action and its avowal. Naming the thing is the crime. Doing it is administration. Mearsheimer’s sin is not that he wants tribes to matter. They already govern. His sin is that he says so in the open and points at the asymmetry that lets the saying be punished selectively.
This explains the silence. The cost of describing the gate is paid at the gate. The men positioned to see it, the respectable carriers, hold their standing on the condition of not saying it, so their incentive runs against the only sentence that would describe it. The men who do say it, the dissident right and the realists, arrive pre-discredited, so their description does not register as scholarship. It registers as recruiting. The topic is self-sealing. The toll falls on whoever names the toll. That is why the literature thins to nothing right at the point where it would get interesting.
Here is the strongest argument for leaving it alone, and a serious man has to answer it. The gap might be load-bearing. A polity of tribal animals may cohere only by forbidding the open avowal of tribalism. The taboo does the work that Plato gave the noble lie and that the fourth chapter of Turner’s book Making Democratic Theory Democratic gives to myth: it suppresses the war of all coalitions by denying that the coalitions are at war. Schmitt sits behind the curtain with the friend and the enemy, and the curtain is the thing keeping the room from becoming a battlefield. On this reading the silence is not failure of nerve. It is distributed prudence. To name the gate is not to liberate anyone. It is to hand every tribe the permission slip at once and detonate the truce. The writer who tears the veil thinks he is telling the truth. He may be firing the starting gun.
The counter is that the guardrail has a shelf life, and the bill comes due in the way Turner’s populists arrive. A rule administered to one coalition and not another stays stable only while the disfavored coalition fails to notice, or lacks the numbers and the voice to object. Cheap speech lowers the cost of noticing. Once the asymmetry is visible to the people on the wrong side of it, the denial stops calming them and starts enraging them, and the populism is the predicted result, not a malfunction. So the gate is a guardrail with an expiration, and the eruptions of the last decade are what expiration looks like.
I will not pretend to resolve it, because the resolution is the contested thing. The descriptive claim holds: the premises move freely in academic dress and get a man expelled in plain clothes, and the line tracks coalition rather than truth. What that gap is, a hypocrisy to expose or a fiction holding the floor up, divides exactly along the politics the anthropology was supposed to be neutral about. And the writer who wants to describe the gate honestly has the standpoint problem from before. He cannot get outside the room to report on the door, because there is no outside. He writes from a coalition too, and the act of naming the asymmetry is a move in the game he claims to be describing.

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Making Democratic Theory Democratic (2023)

Grant John J. Mearsheimer his anthropology, and most of this book survives. Authors Stephen Turner and George Mazur have already done much of the demolition Mearsheimer wants done.
They deflate. Democracy is a majoritarian procedure for making law and choosing leaders, no more. The will of the people is a fiction, and they cite Max Weber (1864-1920) saying so. Values vary from man to man, and no reasoner stands outside the variation to rank them. The Rawlsian veil and the Straussian philosopher are virtual beings, not citizens. John Rawls (1921-2002) and Leo Strauss (1899-1973) each build a reasoner who escapes his socialization to reach a standard above the fray. Turner says no such reasoner exists. The rule of law, stripped of its decorative associations, is a coercive order obeyed and effective, turnable to many ends.
All of this sits well with Mearsheimer. Both men reject the rationalist, universalist picture of the liberal self. Both treat the unencumbered chooser as a story. Turner’s Ideologiekritik of liberal shibboleths and Mearsheimer’s demolition of liberal universalism cut in the same direction. So the book is not a target. It is, for long stretches, an ally.
Now the damage.
Turner clears away the virtual citizen and keeps a thinner one, the conversationalist. He sets the conversation against the abstraction. Citizens, he writes, persuade each other on factual, prudential, pragmatic, and empathic grounds, and might reach a novel compromise. This is his wish, the thing he defends once the absolutist models fall. Grant Mearsheimer and the conversationalist joins Rawls and Strauss as a fiction. Mearsheimer ranks reason the weakest of the three sources of preference, behind socialization and innate sentiment, and he says the value infusion lands early, before a man can think for himself. A conversation that moves men by reasons is the open reasonable feedback Mearsheimer denies. Men do not get talked out of their group attachments by prudential and empathic appeals. They defend the coalition and find reasons after. Turner thinned the liberal reasoner without killing him.
Watch where Turner puts value. It varies, he says, from person to person. Different men value different things and ground their preferences in different experience. The unit of valuation is the individual. This is the fact-value picture he takes from Kelsen (1881-1973): values are personal, hot cognition, relative to the cognizer. Mearsheimer moves the unit. Value is not first personal and idiosyncratic. The family and the society impose the value infusion, and men hold strong attachment to the group and sacrifice for it. So the variation Turner sees among individuals is, on Mearsheimer’s account, variation among the tribes that made those individuals. Turner’s value-relativism stays individualist at its root, the same root liberalism stands on. He keeps the atomistic seat of value while denying the atomistic reasoner. Mearsheimer relocates value to the coalition and reads individual preference as the tribe speaking through the man.
The fourth chapter, on anti-populism, runs closest to Mearsheimer and then stops one step short. Turner calls the people, the state, and expertise an unstable triad, and says it is mythogenic. Stabilizing it requires fictions. Expertise is the neutral third leg, and its neutrality is a legitimacy claim, a myth that lets administrators rule while the people keep a place without power. Anti-populism is the counter-myth that reconciles practices drawn from absolutism with the rhetoric of democracy. This is close to Mearsheimer already. The expert faction claims the narrative engine of the state under cover of neutrality. But Turner reaches for myth where Mearsheimer reaches for tribe, and the difference holds. A myth is a story a society tells to stabilize an arrangement. A tribe is a coalition fighting rivals for control. Turner’s myths float a little free of the warring groups that author them. He treats them as answers to a structural problem, the triad that cannot be balanced. Mearsheimer grounds each myth in a coalition’s bid to win and to coerce the belief of others. Read his way, anti-populism is not a fiction the system needs. It is the weapon one faction, the credentialed, carries against another, the people, and the talk of neutrality is the disguise tribal power wears in a regime that must still call itself democratic.
The deepest tension lies in the standpoint. Turner’s enterprise is meta. He offers a framework that enables understanding, not a side in the fight. He excludes ideology from the basic framework. He half-admits the strain when he writes that meta arguments have the effect of taking sides. Grant Mearsheimer and the strain becomes the problem. There is no meta position. The man doing Ideologiekritik is socialized, tribal, reason-weak, the same as the men he studies. His deflationary positivism is not a view from above. It is a position in the contest, and it serves a coalition: the realists and positivists against the Rawlsian left and the Straussian right, the anti-normativists against the normativists. Turner the value-relativist becomes, on his own premises read through Mearsheimer, a participant who mistook his faction’s frame for neutrality. The critic of myths makes a myth, the myth of the standpoint that sees myths plain. Mearsheimer denies any man the buffered position the method needs.
So the book and the frame agree on the corpse and part over what killed it and what lives. Both bury the rational universal liberal self. Turner buries it and keeps three things: the reasoning conversationalist, the individual as the seat of value, and the meta-critic who stands clear of ideology. Mearsheimer’s premises take all three. What remains, granted those premises, is closer to Turner’s own anti-populism chapter than to his conversational ideal. A permanent contest among tribes for the engine that makes belief, with procedures, expertise, and the rule of law as its truce lines and its weapons, and no conversation wide enough, no critic neutral enough, to rise above the fight.

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Stephen P. Turner’s Anthropology & Epistemics

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

If Mearsheimer’s premises are right, the impact on Stephen Park Turner (b. 1951) is nuanced. His framework would receive both a powerful validation and a major structural challenge.
As a Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of South Florida, Turner has spent his career examining the philosophy of the social sciences, the nature of expertise, and the sociology of knowledge. The realist framework intersects with his life work in two ways.
One. The validation of his critique of shared culture. In The Social Theory of Practices, Turner argues against collective, supra-individual concepts like a uniform “culture” that group members simply download and share. Instead, he focuses on the actual, messy mechanics of transmission. He posits that what looks like a cohesive collective culture is a rough uniformity built through individual interactions, varied personal experiences, and feedback loops. If Mearsheimer is right about the total power of childhood value infusions, Turner’s emphasis on the transmission mechanism is completely validated. Culture is not an abstract cloud floating above individuals; it is a concrete, persistent series of behavioral habits and moral codes driven into the young to create group cohesion. However, the realist premise pushes Turner’s model further than his individualist focus on varied interactions implies because it suggests that these feedback mechanisms are not accidental or open-ended, but are heavily wired by an evolutionary necessity for tight in-group solidarity.
Two. Validates Turner’s analysis of epistemic inequality. In The Politics of Expertise and Liberal Democracy 3.0, Turner tracks the rising authority of technical and scientific experts in modern society. He points out that this reliance on experts introduces a profound “epistemic inequality” into liberal democracy, creating a fundamental tension between technocratic guidance and public governance. If the realist premise holds, Turner’s skepticism toward the neutral authority of experts is fully vindicated. Experts are not value-free information processors standing above the tribal fray. They are highly socialized members of a specific elite sub-tribe, trained in academic fortresses. The data and objective policy recommendations they issue are not neutral truths, but the protective ideology of their own institutional caste. Turner’s warning that expertise introduces a new axis of inequality matches the realist conclusion: “expert knowledge” functions as a highly effective weapon used by a managerial tribe to assert dominance over competing social groups.
While Turner is a sharp critic of how expertise distorts democratic processes, his work seeks to understand how civil society and liberal structures might adapt to or survive these epistemic tensions. If Mearsheimer is right, the very concept of a stable liberal democracy operating via open, reasonable feedback loops is an illusion. The tension Turner identifies cannot be managed or resolved through a better structural design of civil society. The rise of competing experts and the suppression of alternative views through “epistemic coercion” are not institutional malfunctions that can be corrected; they are the permanent, zero-sum dynamics of tribal factions fighting to control the narrative engine of the state.
Mearsheimer and Turner agree that epistemic coercion and epistemic dependence sit together because a man knows almost nothing on his own. He takes most of what he holds true on trust, from teachers, books, experts, and the people around him. John Hardwig gave this the name epistemic dependence in 1985, and it follows from the division of cognitive labor. No one checks the chemistry, the law, the history, and the medicine for himself. He relies on others who claim to know.
Once you grant that, coercion stops looking like a fault in the system and starts looking like a feature of the ground. Whoever controls the sources a man leans on holds power over what that man believes. The dependence is the opening. You cannot close the opening without removing the dependence, and you cannot remove the dependence, because no one thinks alone any more than he survives alone. That is the bridge to Mearsheimer. The social necessity he describes at the level of survival shows up again at the level of belief. We are embedded thinkers for the same reason we are embedded actors. By necessity.
Turner does not agree that these tensions are permanent, zero-sum, past repair by any design of civil society. Turner writes that structures can alter and mitigate. Mitigate is the word to watch. A man who held the contest zero-sum would not reach for it. Turner tells you the room for institutional work is real. Courts, universities, a free press, rival centers of expertise, these change how dependence spreads and how coercion travels. They do something.
Turner’s books, The Politics of Expertise and Liberal Democracy 3.0 among them, doubt that anyone can engineer the conditions of legitimate knowledge from above. The people who would design the mitigating structures depend on experts too. They face the same problem they mean to fix. And the effects of any reform run loose. You cannot model them in advance and collect the result you planned. So structures help, and the help comes without a guarantee and without a forecast.
There is slack between the anthropologies of Mearsheimer and Turner. The slack is small, and no one can promise where it leads, and inside that slack runs Turner’s project. He does not defend the liberal dream of open reasonable feedback. He denies that its failure leaves only tribal warfare with nothing left over. The slack is the partial, unreliable purchase that structures keep on a problem they can never solve.
The case for convenient belief by Turner here is strong. Take away the slack, seal the contest, call it zero-sum, and his books and articles lose their subject. A scholar of how liberal structures survive needs the structures to survive a little. The mitigation thesis keeps the enterprise running. He has spent his career on whether expertise and democracy can be reconciled, and a man cannot spend a career on a question he holds already closed. So the belief pays him. It pays his standing, his shelf, his reason to keep writing. The first beneficiary of the belief is Turner.
But convenience names the pull on a man who holds a belief. It says nothing about whether the belief tracks the world. A view can serve the one who holds it and still be true.
Now the part that complicates the easy verdict. Watch how little he kept. He concedes almost the entire hard claim by Mearsheimer. Rooted in necessity, yes. He keeps only “partially and unpredictably,” the smallest remainder a man could keep and still have work to do. A purely convenient belief runs the other way. It inflates. The comfortable version says structures work, reform succeeds, the dream sits within reach. That flatters the liberal and flatters the scholar’s craft. Turner refuses it. He also refuses the tribal answer that would please the realist. His hedge pleases no coalition.
Turner concedes the maximum, retains the minimum, and you have what an honest mind looks like under pressure. You also have what convenience looks like once an honest mind puts it on a short leash. The frame cannot pry those two apart from the outside. What you can say with confidence: if this is convenience, it runs lean. He bought himself the least belief that keeps the lights on, and he paid full price in concessions for it.

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What Might A Democratic Party Platform Look Like If It Aligned With Reality?

If John Mearsheimer’s premises are right, meaning humans are deeply tribal, national identity reigns supreme, and abstract moral crusades mask the raw struggle for security in an anarchic world, the Democratic Party would face a total structural realignment.

To remain viable, the party would have to abandon the modern post-Cold War consensus of liberal internationalism, borderless cosmopolitanism, and technocratic global governance. Instead, a realist Democratic platform would fuse left-wing economic solidarity with an intense focus on preserving domestic group stability, using state power to protect the working-class tribe from the disruptive forces of global capital and international conflict.A platform built on these realist imperatives would lead on four primary pillars.

1. Class Solidarity as Tribal Cohesion

Modern Democratic platforms often treat economic policy through a universalist lens of human rights or individual opportunity. Under a realist framework, economic disparity is recognized as a direct threat to the internal solidarity of the national tribe.

High, progressive taxation on mobile capital, the revitalization of powerful labor unions through federal protection, and massive state-directed redistribution programs like universal healthcare and guaranteed public employment.

If a nation-state is to survive in a competitive global system, it cannot allow its internal population to fracture along wealth lines. Class stratification undermines the shared sense of oneness necessary for a tribe to sacrifice for the collective good. The working class must be economically locked into the state’s survival, ensuring they view the national government as their primary protector.

When capital is highly mobile and concentrated in a small, transnational managerial caste, that elite develops interests separate from the national group. They no longer rely on the local working class for their status, and they no longer view the survival of the state as tied to their personal well-being.

This detachment creates a dangerous internal fault line. If the ordinary citizens who populate the military, manufacture the goods, and maintain the infrastructure see that the state functions primarily to protect the assets of a detached elite, their willingness to sacrifice for the collective good evaporates. In a great power conflict, a state with an alienated working class faces internal rot and potential collapse.

Under this model, high progressive taxation is not a tool for achieving cosmic fairness; it is an act of state preservation. It is designed to pin capital to the territory of the nation.

By imposing severe financial penalties on capital flight and offshoring, the state forces corporate entities to reinvest their surpluses domestically. The wealth generated within the borders is systematically captured and transformed into tangible state capacity.

Standard economics views labor unions either as market distortions that reduce corporate profits or as instruments for individual worker empowerment. A realist platform completely reframes organized labor as a vital mechanism for internal stability.

Federal laws that mandate unionization and protect collective bargaining perform a critical sociological function: they institutionalize class conflict within a controlled, state-sanctioned architecture. By giving the working class an institutionalized lever to secure a premium on their labor, the state prevents the development of radical, anti-systemic domestic movements. Unions become a stabilizing force, binding the material destiny of industrial workers to the regulatory power of the state.

The establishment of massive, state-directed redistribution networks—such as universal healthcare and a federal job guarantee—serves as the ultimate engine of civic socialization.

By removing healthcare from the private market and placing it entirely under state administration, the citizen’s physical survival is rendered explicitly dependent on the survival of the government. Private anxieties are replaced by a baseline reliance on the public apparatus.

A federal job guarantee ensures that during global economic downturns or supply chain reorientations, the human capital of the nation is not left to decay in unemployment. The state absorbs the excess labor pool, directing it toward the construction of roads, ports, energy facilities, and defense infrastructure.

The ultimate objective of this platform is to build an unyielding psychological and material link between the ordinary citizen and the sovereign state.

If human beings are naturally tribal and look to their group for defense against a hostile world, the national government must be the undisputed provider of that defense. When a worker receives his healthcare, his employment, and his community’s economic stability directly from the state, his loyalty to that state becomes absolute.

Class stratification is erased not to achieve a utopian, borderless equality, but to forge a highly disciplined, cohesive social unit. By locking the working class economically into the state’s survival, the nation ensures that when it must compete against rival great powers, its internal population operates as a singular, unbreakable column.

If Mearsheimer’s premises are right, a Democratic Party looking to secure its long-term survival would radically alter its approach to hot-button social issues like Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) and transgender rights.

Currently, the progressive wing of the party approaches these issues through a combination of post-modern intersectionality and liberal universalism. They treat minority identities as global, unencumbered categories of individual rights that must be liberated from local historical power structures.

Under a realist framework, this approach is exposed as an internal security disaster. If human beings are fundamentally tribal and require a unified national identity to maintain the internal cohesion necessary to survive great power competition, then fragmenting the population into competing sub-tribes is a form of state suicide.

To maintain political dominance and protect the state, a realist Democratic platform would strip these social issues of their intersectional rhetoric, re-framing them through the strict logic of national integration, majoritarian solidarity, and civic socialization.

Modern DEI programs are built on the assumption that a institution must mirror and elevate distinct group identities, often cultivating a race-conscious, sub-tribal awareness.

Democrats would dismantle the current iteration of DEI, replacing it with a state-directed program of Civic Integration and Shared Class Identity.

If you teach a multi-ethnic population to view themselves primarily through the lens of separate racial and cultural sub-tribes, you dissolve the shared “oneness” required for a nation-state to endure. The party would stop using DEI as a tool to celebrate permanent fragmentation. Instead, they would use public institutions and corporate frameworks to enforce a singular, working-class national identity. Diversity would no longer be celebrated as an end in itself; it would be treated as a demographic reality that the state must actively manage and assimilate into a cohesive, patriotic whole to prevent domestic balkanization.

The dominant progressive position on transgender issues rests on radical individualism—the belief that the individual mind is a self-authoring entity that can completely redefine its identity, biology, and social role independent of collective norms.

The party would pivot away from defending fluid, open-ended gender definitions, instead anchoring its policies in state-sanctioned stability, age-restricted medical protocols, and the preservation of majoritarian social norms.

Early, non-negotiable childhood socialization is what keeps a human society stable. When an institution introduces concepts that suggest the baseline biological coordinates of a community are infinitely plastic and self-directed, it induces deep cultural anxiety and weakens the group’s foundational socialization engine (the family). To protect its standing with the broader working-class tribe, the Democratic platform would adopt a position of institutional stabilization. They would restrict gender-affirming care for minors, protect traditional privacy spaces based on biological realities, and frame the issue around civic tolerance for adults rather than a state-sponsored rewriting of social biology.

Under this realist realignment, the way Democrats talk about social issues would shift entirely. They would no longer speak the language of individual expression or global human rights.

The party would argue that internal social peace is a national security requirement. Constant, low-intensity cultural warfare over pronouns, corporate quotas, and historical revisionism drains the state’s energy and prevents the formation of a unified front against external adversaries like China.

By dumping the unpopular, hyper-individualistic vanguard elements of the cultural left, a realist Democratic Party would remove the primary cultural weapon the Republican Party uses to win over the working class. They would settle the culture war through an enforcement of majoritarian stability, clearing the terrain to focus entirely on their primary structural goal: locking the working class into a powerful, insulated, and hyper-cohesive domestic economic fortress.

2. Progressive Environmental Realism

The conventional platform frames climate change as a global moral imperative requiring international treaties, shared carbon markets, and multilateral cooperation. A realist Democratic platform would strip away this cosmopolitan rhetoric.

An aggressive, state-directed industrial mobilization to achieve complete clean energy autarky, deploying heavy federal capital into domestic wind, solar, and next-generation nuclear infrastructure, combined with carbon tariffs on foreign competitors.

The party would stop pretending that global climate agreements can override the self-interest of rival great powers like China or Russia. Instead, the green transition would be weaponized as a tool for national security. By freeing the state from reliance on global oil and gas supply chains, the platform ensures the national tribe cannot be strangled by foreign adversaries during geopolitical crises.

3. Foreign Policy Restraint and Domestic Reconstruction

For decades, the foreign policy establishment within the Democratic Party championed “liberal hegemony”—using American military power to spread democracy, enforce international law, and build transnational institutions. Mearsheimer’s core thesis labels this a catastrophic failure that triggers bloody nationalist backlashes abroad.

A grand strategy of restraint and offshore balancing. The party would advocate for the winding down of open-ended foreign entanglements, the rejection of humanitarian interventions, and a sharp reduction in global military footprint, redirecting hundreds of billions of dollars into domestic infrastructure, public education, and state capacity.

Nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on earth; foreign populations will always violently resist American attempts at social engineering. The state must husband its power, preserve its blood and treasure, and focus strictly on maintaining a balance of power in critical regions, letting local actors bear the costs of regional stability.

4. Controlled Borders for Labor and Social Stability

The modern progressive faction often views strict border enforcement with skepticism, advocating for relaxed asylum laws and open paths for global migration. A realist platform recognizes that an influx of unassimilated populations destabilizes the internal culture.

A highly regulated, enforcement-heavy immigration system that ties entry strictly to domestic labor shortages, paired with massive federal funding for public integration programs, English language education, and civic socialization.

If intense childhood and civic socialization is what creates a functional human community, a state cannot maintain order if it introduces millions of individuals from entirely different socialization engines without a strict mechanism for assimilation. Border control is not treated as a racial or moral issue, but as a basic requirement for protecting the domestic labor market and maintaining the cultural cohesion of the existing national group.

5. Sovereign Labor Subsidies and the Anti-Globalist Welfare State

The platform would abandon the classic neoliberal approach to welfare, which relies on globalized growth to lift all boats and retraining programs to fix structural unemployment.

Enact a federal job guarantee in public infrastructure, direct wage subsidies for unionized domestic workers, and the implementation of aggressive wealth taxes to permanently fund a fortress of universal public services (childcare, healthcare, and state pensions).

If internal friction weakens a group’s survival capacity, extreme wealth inequality is a national security crisis. The platform treats the working class not as atomistic consumers looking for the cheapest imported goods, but as the primary human core of the nation. By insulating this group from global labor market shocks, the state builds unyielding domestic loyalty and structural stability.

6. Demolishing Corporate Monopolies as Hostile Internal Factions

The platform would move past standard regulatory anti-trust enforcement and treat multi-national tech, finance, and agricultural conglomerates as powerful, un-socialized internal factions whose interests run counter to the national tribe.

The systematic breaking up or nationalization of mega-corporations that control vital infrastructure, such as digital banking networks, pharmaceutical manufacturing, and communication utilities. Corporate charters would be tied directly to a mandate for national public utility.

In a zero-sum political environment, an elite corporate caste with no national loyalty is an existential threat. These entities use their vast wealth to captured regulatory bodies and shape public narratives for their own benefit. The state must crush these independent power centers to ensure that the material resources of the country remain under the direct control of the democratic collective.

7. The Defense of Public Space and Radical Civic Socialization

The platform would recognize that left-wing political longevity requires capturing the primary socialization engines of the state. It would abandon the idea that civic values emerge organically from a neutral public square.

Massive federal investment into physical public goods—parks, libraries, municipal recreation centers, and state-funded civic clubs—paired with a mandatory curriculum in public schools that explicitly instills a moral code of civic obligation, collective labor history, and national solidarity.

If human minds are captured by early value infusions, leaving the social landscape to be atomized by private real estate developers, commercial algorithms, and insular private schools is political suicide. The party would actively use public infrastructure to forge a unified social identity, injecting the young with a shared moral framework centered on collective mutual aid and loyalty to the democratic state.

8. Ecological Territorialism and Resource Denationalization

The party would reframe the environmental movement away from international carbon markets and transnational climate treaties, which are consistently subverted by great power self-interest.

The aggressive invocation of national security powers to seize, protect, and restore public lands, water networks, and agricultural resources from private or foreign exploitation, combined with severe ecological tariffs on imported goods produced via environmental degradation.

A tribe cannot survive without a secure, fertile, and self-contained material habitat. Environmental degradation is treated as a physical invasion of the national territory. By securing and state-managing the physical landscape, the platform ensures that the primary biological prerequisites for the group’s long-term survival—clean water, arable land, and dense domestic energy—remain entirely sovereign and insulated from global market volatility.

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What Might A Republican Platform Look Like If It Aligned With Reality?

If John J. Mearsheimer’s premises are correct that human behavior is governed by innate tribal sentiments and childhood value infusions, that abstract reason is a weak secondary tool, and that the international arena is an unyielding great power competition, the Republican Party would maximize its interests by abandoning conventional libertarianism and neoconservative globalism.

Instead, the platform would focus entirely on protecting the native tribe’s primary socialization engine and securing the material power of the state within a dangerous, anarchic world.

A platform engineered around these realist imperatives would lead on these pillars:

1. Absolute Sovereign Border Protection and Cultural Assimilation

Under the realist lens, a state cannot survive if its internal cohesion fractures. A borderless nation or a completely fragmented multicultural society is an existential failure.

An immediate, severe restriction on immigration, coupled with an aggressive, state-backed mandate for cultural assimilation.

The platform would treat immigration not as an economic calculation of cheap labor (rejecting the corporate libertarian view), but as a demographic challenge to group solidarity. To ensure state survival, incoming individuals must be thoroughly digested by the native tribe’s socialization engine, adopting its language, legal traditions, and historical memory.

2. Economic Mercantilism and Industrial Sovereignty

Neoliberal globalism and free-trade agreements like NAFTA assume that global efficiency maximizes human welfare. Mearsheimer’s premises reveal this as a catastrophic vulnerability: interdependence creates weakness.

High strategic tariffs, aggressive industrial policies to repatriate manufacturing, and total supply-chain independence in steel, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and energy.

If Mearsheimer’s premises are right, a sophisticated Republican economic platform must entirely reject the mid-century consensus that separated “free markets” from “national security.” In an anarchic world where state survival depends on relative power, economic policy is simply a weapon of statecraft.

A fully realized Republican Trade and Industrial Policy platform built on these realist imperatives moves beyond generic protectionism. It structures the state to achieve absolute material self-reliance, strategic insulation, and dominance over great power rivals.

The goal of trade policy is no longer consumer welfare or absolute global efficiency; it is the minimization of strategic vulnerability. Interdependence is weakness.

Implement a permanent, non-negotiable baseline tariff on all foreign manufactured goods, with an aggressive, multi-tiered tariff regime specifically targeting non-market adversaries. This systematically alters the cost-benefit analysis for domestic firms, forcing the repatriation of capital.

Move away from multilateral frameworks like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Most-Favored-Nation principle. Trade agreements must be bilateral, strictly conditional, and based on absolute reciprocity. If a foreign nation imposes a tariff or non-tariff barrier on an American product, the US automatically mirrors that exact barrier.

Revoke Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR). Strip strategic adversaries of normal trade status. The state uses targeted enforcement mechanisms under Section 301 and Section 232 to systematically sever economic dependencies in dual-use technologies and advanced manufacturing.

The state cannot rely on the open market to provision the baseline requirements of survival. The party abandons laissez-faire abstraction to mandate domestic production capabilities in four existential pillars:

Force the rebuilding of domestic productive capacity in steel, aluminum, copper, heavy trucks, and shipbuilding through state-guaranteed purchase agreements and long-term capital subsidies.

Mandate that all essential medicines, active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and medical equipment used in American hospitals or stockpiles be manufactured within the physical borders of the United States.

Critical minerals. Establish a state-directed, border-adjusted price mechanism for critical minerals and rare earth elements. The state insulates domestic mining and processing from foreign predatory pricing, creating a secure, alternative supply network independent of adversary control.

Extend aggressive domestic fabrication mandates down the entire supply chain—not just for high-end logic chips, but for the legacy and foundational chips that power defense infrastructure, telecommunications, and the automotive sector.

Capital mobility must be subordinated to the national interest. Wall Street cannot be permitted to fund the rise of foreign adversaries or hollow out domestic stability for short-term arbitrage.

Ban American venture capital, private equity, and institutional funds from investing in technology, manufacturing, or infrastructure assets located within strategic adversary nations.

Make the 18% corporate tax rate and full capital expensing contingent on domestic manufacturing footprint. Corporations that outsource production face punitive tax penalties and are barred from receiving federal contracts, research grants, or participating in public-private partnerships.

Use state power to acquire “golden shares” or direct equity positions in critical, fragile domestic industries (such as specialized aerospace or advanced machine tools) to shield them from foreign acquisition, hostile takeovers, or bankruptcy during market downturns.

A manufacturing renaissance requires cheap, dense, and dispatchable power. The platform treats energy not as a regulatory portfolio, but as the foundational input for all industrial competitiveness.

Eliminate federal tax credits and mandates for intermittent green energy sources that destabilize the grid and inflate industrial power costs.

Fast-track permitting timelines, opening public lands for resource extraction, and executing state-backed guarantees for the construction of a new generation of small modular civilian nuclear reactors and natural gas infrastructure directly attached to industrial manufacturing hubs.

A factory is useless without a disciplined, highly skilled workforce. The platform treats the working class as the vital human core of the national tribe, protecting it from both wage suppression and ideological alienation. Opportunities for honor and status must be expanded to include more persons who do not go to college.

Abolish foreign guest-worker programs and low-skill visas that multi-national corporations use to bypass American workers and suppress wages in the construction and manufacturing sectors.

Divert federal student loan guarantees and research funding away from abstract humanities programs at elite universities and directing those resources into localized vocational training, technical institutes, and advanced engineering programs explicitly aligned with regional industrial needs.

In a zero-sum, competitive world, the “wealth of nations” is secondary to the “security of nations.” The platform would reject the myth of a borderless global market. It would treat economic policy as an instrument of statecraft designed to maintain the material dominance of the state over rivals like China, while ensuring the domestic working class remains loyal and economically integrated into the national tribe.

3. Retrenchment and Realist Foreign Policy

The neoconservative crusade to export democracy and enforce a “rules-based international order” through military intervention is viewed under this framework as a dangerous liberal delusion. It triggers intense nationalist resistance abroad and wastes the state’s blood and treasure.

A foreign policy of offshore balancing and strategic retrenchment. The military would pull back from open-ended nation-building deployments in the Middle East or eastern Europe. Resources would be concentrated entirely on maintaining a lethal nuclear deterrent and a dominant naval and technological presence in critical geographic zones (like the Indo-Pacific) to check rival great powers.

Alliances are temporary arrangements based on raw self-interest, not permanent moral commitments to shared values. The state must husband its power and let regional rivals balance against each other, intervening only when an existential threat directly challenges the global balance of power.

4. Recapturing the Domestic Socialization Engines

The most critical domestic battle under a realist framework is the fight over value infusion. The party would recognize that whoever controls the schools, the universities, and the legal defaults controls the future of the tribe.

The systematic defunding of DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) bureaucracies in public institutions, universal school choice to bypass captured public school systems, and the protection of traditional family structures and religious freedom through federal and state law.

If a child’s moral imagination is captured during a long childhood before critical thinking develops, the left-wing managerial tribe’s current monopoly over elite education is an existential threat to conservative survival. The platform would stop appealing to a neutral “marketplace of ideas” and use raw state power to dismantle the opposing faction’s fortresses, ensuring that the next generation is injected with a moral code centered on national loyalty, civic duty, and historical continuity.

5. Explicit Pro-Natalism and Demographic Security

The platform would abandon the standard view of family policy as either a purely private religious issue or an abstract tax credit consideration. It would treat demographic decline as an immediate threat to the long-term survival of the national tribe.

Aggressive, state-backed financial and social incentives for married native citizens to have larger families, combined with the restriction of foreign worker programs that suppress domestic wages.

A state cannot project power or maintain internal solidarity without a stable, replacement-level population that shares a unified historical identity. Relying on mass immigration to fill labor shortages is a catastrophic structural failure that introduces incompatible socialization models into the state. Demographic security is the foundation of national power.

6. The Subversion of Left-Wing Institutional Fortresses

The platform would recognize that the long march through the institutions executed by the progressive managerial tribe cannot be countered by pleading for “viewpoint diversity.” It would treat captured universities, foundations, and public broadcasters as hostile territory that must be dismantled.

Using the power of the purse and federal tax codes to target elite university endowments, stripping tax-exempt status from ideological non-profit foundations, and establishing new, state-directed parallel institutions that explicitly train a counter-elite in traditional national values.

If childhood and early-adulthood value infusions dictate lifelong political loyalty, leaving the elite credentialing apparatus in the hands of an opposing faction is a form of political suicide. The party would stop pretending the university is a neutral seminar room and treat it as a captured fortress that must be subverted through raw state power.

7. Technological Autarky and Sovereign Data Control

The platform would reject the Silicon Valley myth of a borderless digital commons managed by multi-national corporations. It would treat technology and information infrastructure as the primary modern terrain of great power conflict.

The mandatory domestic ownership and localization of all critical data infrastructure, severe federal restrictions on foreign tech platforms, and state-directed investments into sovereign artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and satellite networks.

Interdependence in digital infrastructure creates extreme strategic vulnerability. Allowing foreign adversaries or detached globalist corporations to control the algorithms that shape the domestic population’s information intake is a failure of statecraft. The state must control its digital borders as strictly as its physical ones to prevent hostile psychological manipulation and espionage.

8. Legal Realism and Judicial Power Project

The platform would discard the conservative romance with abstract legal neutralism, originalist passivity, and the myth of the referee judge who simply calls balls and strikes.

The deliberate appointment of judges who view the law through the lens of legal realism—recognizing that law is an instrument of authority used to maintain social order, protect core national structures, and defend the primary group against internal subversion.

In a zero-sum struggle for political survival, appealing to neutral procedural rules while the opposing faction uses the legal apparatus to enforce its own moral code is an explicit strategy for defeat. Judicial power would be used actively to secure the administrative and legal conditions necessary for the national tribe to survive and project its authority across generations.

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John Stuart Mill and the Enlightenment

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

The atomistic liberal of The Great Delusion picks his values off a menu by reason. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) held the reverse. The force behind On Liberty comes from his fear of custom, not from any faith that men reason their way to their beliefs. He calls it the despotism of custom. He points to China as the case of a people who perfected their customs and then stood still for centuries. Mill concedes John Mearsheimer’s (b. 1947) premise before Mearsheimer states it. Most men inherit their beliefs and then defend what they inherited.
Mill does not describe man as a lone reasoner. He laments that man is a herd creature and then asks what a society might do to protect the few who are not. The individualism in On Liberty works as a prescription built on top of the social man, not as a portrait of him. Mearsheimer reads liberal individualism as a claim about what men are. In Mill it operates as a claim about what a small number of men can become, and why the rest have a stake in shielding them.
Grant the socialization story and Mill’s politics still stands, because his politics answers that story. He wants room for the dissenter, the eccentric, the man who runs an experiment in living, against the pressure Mearsheimer describes. He does not justify that room by pretending everyone reasons. He justifies it by the gain that comes to a society when it leaves a channel open for the rare man who pushes against the inheritance and turns out to be right.
Mill needs reason to override socialization at least sometimes, in at least a few men, under good conditions. Mearsheimer ranks reason last among the three sources of our preferences and puts socialization and inborn sentiment above it. Push that ranking hard and Mill’s hope narrows to a thin band: the exceptional mind in whom criticism outruns the value infusion. Mill half believed this himself. He worried about mediocrity and the weight of mass opinion, and he wanted a learned class to hold the higher ground. Mearsheimer’s anthropology pushes Mill toward his own colder side, the side that doubts the many and rests its hopes on the few. The democratic Mill recedes. The aristocratic Mill comes forward.
Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) read Mill’s deepest commitment as self-creation rather than happiness, the man who makes his own life as a work and chooses his own path. Set that Mill against Mearsheimer and the conflict sharpens. If the self arrives all but finished, fabricated by family and society before the boy can weigh anything, then self-creation describes a late and partial edit, not an authorship. Mearsheimer does not deny that a man can revise himself. He denies that the revising self came from nowhere. Berlin’s Mill wants an author. Mearsheimer offers an editor working on a manuscript other hands already wrote.
Mill’s view of where moral feeling comes from takes a separate hit. Mill stood with the associationists against the intuitionist school of William Whewell (1794-1866). He held that our moral sentiments, however fixed they feel, come from education and association rather than from innate structure. His reform program depends on that plasticity. Remake the schooling and the institutions and you can remake the character, and so the society. Mearsheimer lists inborn sentiment as a force that shapes how a man thinks before he thinks. If that is right, character resists the reformer’s hand more than Mill allowed, and tribal feeling sits deeper than association can reach.
The sharpest defeat falls on Mill’s cosmopolitanism. In Utilitarianism he roots the sanction of morality in the social feelings of mankind, the wish to live in unity with one’s fellows, and he thought civilization widens that feeling. There lies the hope: the circle of sympathy grows until it reaches the species. Mearsheimer agrees that man is social and bonded and ready to sacrifice for his group. He denies the expansion. The bond holds at the level of the tribe and the nation and goes no further with any force. The quarrel is not whether man is social. Both men say he is. The quarrel is the ceiling. Mill bets the sympathy climbs to humanity. Mearsheimer bets it stops at the nation, and that when nationalism and liberalism collide, the nation wins. If Mearsheimer is right, the communitarian half of Mill survives and the cosmopolitan half fails.
Mearsheimer says liberal universalism breeds crusades, the urge to carry rights to every people for their own good. Mill is the case in point, not the exception. He worked for the East India Company for most of his career. On Liberty exempts the barbarians and the societies it calls backward from the liberty principle and grants that despotism suits them so long as it improves them. The missionary liberalism Mearsheimer describes runs straight through Mill’s imperial writing. A defender can answer that Mill’s universalism comes hedged. Mill does not think you can hand free institutions to any people at any stage. He ties good government to national character and to a people’s readiness, which reads closer to Mearsheimer’s realism than to the abstract creed Mearsheimer attacks. So Mill ends up more universalist and more particularist than the figure in the book, the imperialist by his paternalism and the realist by his developmentalism.
What comes through intact is the core argument of On Liberty about speech and harm. Those arguments never rested on atomism. Mill defends open debate because collision with error keeps truth alive and because the silenced opinion may hold the part of the truth the reigning view lacks. He defends the harm principle as a line drawn around the social pressure he saw everywhere. Grant Mearsheimer’s man, the social creature shaped by inherited value, and these arguments earn their keep, because they answer the very conformity Mearsheimer treats as our default. Mill becomes less a prophet of the sovereign individual and more a designer of guardrails against the herd.
Mearsheimer ranks reason last and then writes four hundred pages of reasoned argument meant to change how readers think, and he ranks the three sources for us as though we can weigh his ranking. The genre fights the thesis. Mill at least carries a theory for why argument earns its keep among the small class that reads and writes and decides what counts as knowledge. Mearsheimer leaves reason a junior place and then asks it to do the heavy lifting of his book. The tension does not sink his anthropology. It marks the seam where his account and Mill’s might still do business, in the narrow niche where reason does more work than it does in the run of men.

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The Nathan Cofnas Debates

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Grant Mearsheimer his three claims. Men are tribal before they are anything else. Reason ranks below socialization and inborn sentiment in setting what a man wants. Colorblind meritocracy is a local creed, not a law of nature. Run the Cofnas affair through that frame and the familiar story comes apart. The free-speech reading and the inclusion reading both assume a contest over evidence and rights. The realist reading sees a tribe defending the engine that reproduces its young.
Start with what Cofnas wants, because his own program carries the flaw he finds in his enemies. He argues that wokeness follows from the equality thesis, the premise that every group holds the same spread of cognitive traits. Accept that premise and any gap left over reads as proof of hidden racism. He wants the elite to trade the equality thesis for hereditarianism, genes playing a non-trivial part in average group differences, and he expects a colorblind meritocracy of individuals to settle out the far side. The fight then narrows to which premise the elite carries.
Mearsheimer’s man wrecks the payoff. A meritocracy of sorted individuals asks men to hold still while status flows to whoever scores highest, and to take their rank without forming a faction. No people does this. Tell a group it sits low on a prized trait and it does not scatter into lone strivers. It organizes. It mobilizes along the line Mearsheimer says runs deepest. Under his premises, hereditarian facts, once public and believed, arm tribal competition rather than dissolve it. Cofnas imagines the truth about genes yields peace and merit. The realist predicts it yields sharper coalitions and a harder scramble for power and resources. So Cofnas underrates tribe in his cure as the liberals underrate it in theirs. Two rationalist projects, one blind spot.
Look at the pair side by side and they rhyme. The woke elite holds that reason and reformed schooling erase the difference and widen sympathy toward all mankind. Cofnas holds that reason and accepted data sort men by talent and leave a creed of individual merit. Both trust the right facts to govern the man. Mearsheimer ranks reason last of the three and puts the value infusion above it. Both projects misread the creature in the same direction.
The crusade reading falls on Cofnas next. His hereditarian revolution is a missionary campaign. Convert the elite at the top universities, reform the society from above, carry the unwelcome truth into the fortress for the good of all. That is the universalist structure Mearsheimer attacks in liberalism, the urge to remake men by fixing the doctrine. Cofnas stands inside the pattern, not outside it. He is another missionary with a rival gospel, and the gospel travels by argument because he believes argument moves the men who run things.
That belief is the heart of the misread. He pins his hope on a vanguard of intelligent, rational leaders who change their preferences when shown the chart. Mearsheimer’s account of childhood value infusion says the elite mind is the most socialized mind in the country, formed inside the institution that selected it, trained it, and handed it its moral coordinates. Reason there is a lawyer for inherited preference, not a scientist chasing the taboo fact. Asking that elite to adopt race realism by philosophical argument asks the immune system to welcome the thing it formed to destroy.
The institution behaves the way the frame predicts. The university reproduces a value infusion and passes it to the next ruling class. The marketplace of ideas is a story the engine tells about itself. Its work is transmission, generation to generation, of a moral code, and the equality thesis sits at the center of that code as the sacred premise. Cofnas attacks the premise at the root. Function drives what follows. They did not disprove him. They removed him, the way a body clears what threatens its cohesion, and the removal needed no finding of fact.
Cofnas held no tenure. He was a Leverhulme early-career fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy and a College Research Associate at Emmanuel, a peripheral and unprotected affiliate. The college cut the affiliation. The faculty held the line. Realism expects the tribe to cull the exposed member first, at the lowest cost, and to send its signal through the cheapest available actor. A marginal post-doc is the easy target. The pattern then repeated at Ghent, where his own department moved against the appointment. One campus might be an accident. Two is a fault line.
So the protestors read the institution right and read themselves wrong. They see that the fortress lives by enforcing its code, that an affiliated insider who breaks the code threatens the cohesion of the whole, and that the safe move is expulsion. They are correct about all of it. Then they tell themselves the expulsion serves a borderless human liberation. Under Mearsheimer it serves their tribe and no one beyond it. Realists in the deed, universalists in the self-description: that is his portrait of the liberal, drawn from life.
The affair resolves into a hard diagnosis. No neutral seminar room. No resting point in colorblind merit, because the merit creed is one tribe’s myth and the egalitarian creed is another’s, and neither describes the man as he is. The university is an arena of great power competition, and the prize is the engine that infuses the next elite. Academic freedom and the Equality Act 2010 set the rules of the contest. They do not name the prize. The only live question is which tribe runs the engine, and on what terms it shapes the moral coordinates of the men who will govern.
Cofnas bets the truth about genes will free the West, and he addresses his guide to the most heavily socialized people in the country, on the faith that argument reaches them. The genre fights the thesis, the way the genre fights Mearsheimer’s own four hundred reasoned pages. If reason ranks last, the hereditarian revolution is a sermon preached to men whose tribe has already told them what to believe. The only readers it converts are the few in whom criticism outruns the infusion. That band is real, and it is too thin to turn an elite. It is also the one niche where Cofnas, and Mearsheimer, and the argument itself still do their work.

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The Amy Wax Debates

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Grant Mearsheimer his premises. Men are tribal first. Reason sits below socialization and inborn sentiment in setting what a man wants. Universalist, individualist talk is a shield, not a description. Run the Amy Wax affair through that frame and the academic-freedom story and the inclusion story both thin. Instead, we see a fight between two coalitions for the engine that forms the next elite.
Wax argues that all cultures are not equal and defends mid-century bourgeois culture, the Anglo-Protestant legal inheritance, and assimilation. Her enemies hear White supremacy. Her friends hear a brave defense of the West. The frame hears Wax defending a value infusion. She tells the society that its order rests on a code drilled into children, and that the code holds the state together. On Mearsheimer’s account she has this right. The childhood infusion does most of the work, more than reason, and a people that loses its infusion loses its cohesion.
Then she breaks her own insight. She treats the Anglo-Protestant matrix as an open system that any individual can enter by learning the script. That is the conservative-liberal hope folded inside her realism, assimilation as a merit on-ramp for the atomized newcomer. She names a real friction, the strain when millions arrive carrying other infusions, and then she prescribes a cure that assumes the tribe is a club a man joins by reading its handbook. Mearsheimer’s man does not join a tribe that way. The script he lives by went into him in childhood, before he could weigh it, and an adult does not swap one infusion for another the way he changes an opinion.
Wax’s case rests on culture, not blood. She says the bourgeois script can be taught and absorbed, which puts socialization above inborn sentiment, the order Mearsheimer sets. The hereditarian leans the other way, on genes.
Now the institution. Penn argued professional norms and equal learning opportunity. The Heterodox Academy and the free-speech camp answered with the Chicago Principles and the marketplace of ideas. The frame treats the marketplace as a story the engine tells. The elite university transmits a moral code to the class that will run things, generation after generation, and a managerial faction now holds the engine and runs a code built around diversity, equity, and inclusion. The sacred premise of that code is the equality of groups and the openness of the multicultural settlement. Wax attacks the sacred premise by name and in public.
The sanction follows from that function. Her offense, in the frame, is the breach of the sacred said out loud. A tribe punishes the spoken heresy harder than the private doubt, because the spoken heresy threatens the cohesion the code exists to hold.
Penn left her tenure standing. One year of suspension at half pay, the loss of her named chair and her summer pay in perpetuity, a public reprimand, and a standing order that she state at every appearance that she speaks for herself and not for the law school. The faction measured the cost. A tenured chair is an expensive target. Dismissal makes a martyr and hands the courts a clean claim. So the tribe drew the boundary, shamed the heretic, and contained her, all short of the rupture that firing brings. The disclaimer is the sharpest stroke and the most telling. It cuts her voice away from the tribe’s name. You may speak, it says, but never again in our name. Against a peripheral affiliate the tribe can expel outright. Against a tenured insider it calibrates. The cost of the target sets the maneuver.
Her legal strategy then walks into the frame. She files under Titles VI and VII and her tenure contract, appealing to colorblind, neutral principle. The court reframed the suit as breach of contract and set the speech claim aside. The district judge dismissed the case in August 2025. She stands now on appeal before the Third Circuit, with a separate contract suit filed in Pennsylvania state court in November 2025 waiting behind it. The realist reading says the neutral-rights vocabulary she reaches for belongs to the order the faction has already displaced, and that law serves the arrangement in power, so she pleads the old rules into a room that keeps new defaults.
If law were only an instrument of the dominant tribe, Wax would hold no case. She holds one. A contract claim has teeth a captured institution cannot wish away. Procedure binds even a faction that runs the engine. Belief and contract suits sometimes lose in the first round and win on appeal, as Forstater did in Britain. Pure realism overshoots here. The old liberal rules are not a fiction all the way down. They run weaker than Wax hopes and stronger than the frame allows, and the appeal is the place to watch which reading the law bears out.
Then the symmetry. Both sides reject the neutral university, and both dress their tribe in a universal creed. The new faction wields inclusion and harm reduction to purge dissent and enforce its code, and it tells itself it serves a borderless human equality. The traditionalist camp wields academic freedom and merit to hold ground for the old alignment, and it tells itself it serves universal reason and the open society. Each pairs a true tribal instinct with a false universal story.
The affair resolves where the Cofnas affair resolves. No neutral seminar room. No value-free university, because the university is always a site of socialization and never anything else. The only live question is which faction holds the engine and which code it pours into the students who pass through. Wax names the engine and defends one code for it. Her enemies hold the engine and defend another. The contest is great power competition over the right to form the next elite, and the rest, the principles and the statutes and the reprimands, is the vocabulary the two sides speak while they fight for the prize.
Wax defends the bourgeois infusion as the ground of a stable order, and then she asks colorblind law and open debate to rescue her, as though reasoned principle stood above the fight. The frame says reasoned principle ranks junior to the value infusion and serves whoever holds the engine. If she has it right that childhood socialization rules the man, then her appeal to neutral reason is the weakest card in her hand, and her strongest holding is the one her enemies hold too, a tribe that will fight for the engine. She asks the room to honor a creed the room no longer teaches its young.

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Benjamin Schreier: Literary Critic of Jewish Identity and Ethnic Studies

Benjamin Schreier (b. 1972) holds the Mitrani Family Professorship of Jewish Studies and a professorship in English and Jewish Studies at Penn State University, where he has directed the Jewish Studies Program and the graduate program in English. Since 2011 he edits Studies in American Jewish Literature, a journal published by Penn State University Press and one of the field’s central venues. His scholarship occupies the meeting point of literary theory, intellectual history, ethnic studies, and the sociology of academic knowledge, and across three monographs he presses a single sustained argument: that the categories scholars use to organize literature, above all the category of Jewish identity, are products of critical and institutional labor rather than reflections of a prior cultural essence.

Schreier earned his B.A. in English at Swarthmore College in 1994, graduating with High Honors, and completed his Ph.D. in English and American literature at Brandeis University in 2003. His training joined close textual reading to the theoretical currents that remade the humanities in the late twentieth century, among them post-structuralism, cultural studies, and the critical theory of identity and representation. That double inheritance marks all his work. He reads particular texts with care, and he reads the disciplines that read those texts with equal care.

His first book, The Power of Negative Thinking: Cynicism and the History of Modern American Literature (University of Virginia Press, 2009), takes cynicism as a category of literary and intellectual history. Schreier traces how skeptical and oppositional habits of thought shaped modern American writing, and the book already shows the concern that organizes his later career: the tension among identity, critique, and the cultural authority that lets some readings count and others fall away.

The book that established his reputation, The Impossible Jew: Identity and the Reconstruction of Jewish American Literary History (NYU Press, 2015), turns that concern on his own field. Schreier rejects the premise that Jewish American literature expresses a coherent Jewish communal self waiting in the texts to be found. He argues instead that “Jewish American literature” is a critical and institutional construction, assembled by scholars, critics, editors, and teachers who decide which writers belong and what their belonging means. Through readings of figures across the canon, among them Abraham Cahan (1860-1951), the New York Intellectuals, and Philip Roth (1933-2018), he asks what identity-based literary study does when it puts identity to work, and he treats the answer as a question about the discipline rather than about the writers. The book reached debates well beyond Jewish studies, touching canon formation, ethnicity, and the politics of identity in the academy, and reviewers noted the paradox at its center, that a sustained critique of the field also enriches it.

The Rise and Fall of Jewish American Literature: Ethnic Studies and the Challenge of Identity (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020) extends the argument into a cultural and intellectual history of Jewish American literary study as such. Schreier traces how the field formed across the twentieth century and which institutional and political conditions gave it shape. He holds that labels like “Jewish American literature” are not neutral descriptions but artifacts of particular historical circumstances, and he asks whether identity-based frameworks still serve the reading of literature in a more mixed and connected cultural world. Read together, The Impossible Jew and The Rise and Fall of Jewish American Literature form one argument against essentialist accounts of ethnicity and identity in literary scholarship, and they place Schreier among a cohort of critics who want to rebuild the foundations of minority and ethnic literary study rather than add to its accumulated readings.

His other publications widen the frame. He edited Studies in Irreversibility: Texts and Contexts (2007), and with Jonathan Eburne he edited The Year’s Work in Nerds, Wonks, and Neocons (2017), a project that carries his interests into the politics and self-conception of contemporary American intellectual life. As editor of Studies in American Jewish Literature he has pushed the journal toward ethnic studies, secularism studies, political theory, postcolonial scholarship, and the critical study of identity, positioning it as a site for interdisciplinary work that situates Jewish culture inside larger social and theoretical arguments.

At Penn State he teaches across American literature, Jewish American literature, ethnic literature, American comedy, modernism, post-Holocaust literature, Jewish American film, contemporary political fiction, and the intellectual history of the New York Intellectuals, at both undergraduate and graduate levels. His teaching turns on close reading, theoretical self-awareness, and reflection on the categories through which readers assign value to texts.

A constant runs through the scholarship, the editing, and the teaching: the relation between literary criticism and institutional power. Schreier holds that a critic must read the assumptions and structures that govern his own methods alongside the texts those methods address, and this reflexive demand separates his work from more conventional literary history. His current research carries the program into new material. He is at work on a study of Palestinian American literature within the development of Arab American studies, and on a second project concerning Zionism and the institutional and cultural politics of the Jewish Studies field, both of which keep his long-standing question in view: how cultural categories form, gain authority, and govern reading inside the academy and beyond it.

The Impossible Jew: Identity and the Reconstruction of Jewish American Literary History

Schreier mounts a fierce polemic against the standard methods of Jewish American literary history. He argues that scholars in the field isolate themselves in a self-imposed ghetto. This isolation happens because they take Jewish identity for granted. They treat Jewish literature as a simple mirror of a biological or sociological population. Schreier calls this approach a form of historicist nationalism. It presumes that a critic can always recognize a stable Jewish subject behind the text.

Instead of this comfortable historicism, Schreier proposes what he calls a critical semitism. This perspective treats Jewishness not as a fixed biological fact but as an active cultural medium and an object of desire. Literature does not merely reflect a pre-existing identity. It tests, disrupts, and resists ready-made categories. Schreier looks at the ways texts build the vocabularies that allow people to think about identity. He investigates the limits of classification where identity grows uncertain and spectral.

The book moves chronologically through major touchstones of the canon to demonstrate this theory. Schreier reads Abraham Cahan’s early work not as a simple story of assimilation but as an illustration of how migration destabilizes the very terms of recognition. He challenges the standard history of the New York Intellectuals. Right-wing critics often claim these writers naturally evolved into neoconservatives due to their Jewish heritage. Schreier counters that this narrative relies on a false, biological concept of responsibility to a state polity. Turning to Philip Roth’s The Counterlife, he shows how the text stages the anxious search for an external referent and reveals that the discourse of the Jew requires a constant critical supplement. Finally, he positions Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close as a text where identity depends on the reader’s desire to locate it.

A critique of Schreier’s project highlights both its theoretical strength and its material limitations. He succeeds in shaking the field out of its complacency. He forces critics to question the racialist assumptions that often lurk beneath talk of culture and heritage. By connecting Jewish studies to broader critical theory and ethnic studies, he breaks down institutional walls. His focus on active desire rather than passive reflection restores a sense of political and aesthetic stakes to reading.

Yet this postidentitarian move carries a significant cost. By turning Jewishness into an unstable specter or a product of interpretive will, Schreier risks vaporizing the material realities of history. Writers like Cahan and Roth reacted to concrete social conditions, institutional discrimination, and specific communal struggles. Reducing their historical environment to an effect of textual desire minimizes the real pressures that shaped their work. If identity becomes purely spectral, the category loses its utility as a tool to analyze historical experiences, leaving the critic with an elegant theory that struggles to speak to the lived realities of the authors he examines.

If John Mearsheimer’s anthropology is correct as per the below section, it undermines the entire foundation of Schreier’s The Impossible Jew.

Mearsheimer’s assertion that humans are fundamentally tribal, socially embedded, and shaped by an early “value infusion” opposes Schreier’s desire to dismantle stable ethnic categories.

Schreier advocates for a “postidentitarian” and “subjectless” approach to Jewish studies, drawing on critics who try to decouple ethnic fields from a concrete, identifiable human population. He argues that a text’s Jewishness should be viewed as a spectral product of interpretive desire rather than a reflection of real Jews. If Mearsheimer is right, Schreier’s theory is a textbook example of hyper-individualistic liberal delusion. In Mearsheimer’s view, humans do not operate as lone wolves or choose their identities from a menu of textual desires; they are born into social groups that shape their identities long before they can think for themselves. Schreier’s attempt to vaporize the biological and sociological reality of “the population” ignores the evolutionary and social fact that group survival depends on cooperation and shared, inherited tribal realities.

Schreier critiques the historicist mainstream of Jewish studies for its “anthropological expectation” that a body of literature represents a legible population. He calls this a complacent, nationalistic dead end. If Mearsheimer is right, this historicist “ghetto” is the only valid way to read literature. Literature should be evaluated through the lens of population, socialization, and shared tribal experience because authors are products of intense early childhood socialization within their specific group. You cannot separate a text from the collective survival engine of the society that produced the writer.

In Chapter 3, Schreier attacks right-wing critics like Ruth Wisse who argue that the Jewish New York Intellectuals had a cultural responsibility to a Jewish polity. Schreier prefers Lionel Trilling’s model of “self-conscious detachment from any position” and the preservation of individual imaginative freedom over collective affiliation. Mearsheimer’s framework suggests that Trilling’s detached, universalist individualism is a psychological impossibility. If humans are tribal at their core and reason is subordinate to socialization, then the New York Intellectuals could never strip away their early “value infusion.” Wisse’s argument that their identity naturally bound them to the fate of their group comports with Mearsheimer’s belief that individuals develop powerful, involuntary attachments to their group and are wired to cooperate for collective survival.

If Mearsheimer is right, Schreier’s book is an artifact of the post-Cold War liberal universalism it purports to critique. By trying to turn a concrete, historical group identity into an abstract aesthetic playground of “negation” and “unknowability,” Schreier is downplaying the social nature of human beings to the point of ignoring it. Mearsheimer would argue that no matter how much a literary critic twists textuality to make identity “impossible,” the tribal reality of human socialization will always dictate the boundaries of the group.

The Great Delusion

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

The liberal error, for Mearsheimer, lies in treating the person as a free-standing chooser of his own moral code, when the code arrives mostly from birth and upbringing. If this anthropology holds, what happens to Schreier?
Schreier’s argument moves in the opposite direction. He treats Jewish identity as made rather than given, and he treats the communal self that the field claims to read as the field’s own product. The category gets assembled by critics and editors and teachers, and a man might dismantle it by showing the seams. That is a claim about contingency. The thing the field calls a Jewish communal essence has no fixed reality. It can be built, and what can be built can be taken apart, or built otherwise, or set aside.
Run the two men against each other. Mearsheimer does not say group identity is fixed in its content. He says attachment to the group is near-universal, deep, and prior to reason, planted by socialization before the man can weigh it. Schreier’s construction thesis and Mearsheimer’s social anthropology might seem to meet here, because both deny a timeless essence and both grant that identity gets formed rather than inherited from nature. The agreement breaks on what the formation produces. For Schreier the construction is light, a critical and institutional artifact a scholar might expose and loosen. For Mearsheimer the construction is heavy, a value infusion welded to the man in childhood, carried below the reach of argument, defended sometimes to the death. Schreier shows that the academic category was assembled. Mearsheimer answers that the assembly of a category and the durability of a bond are separate questions, and that the bond survives the demolition of the category.
Mearsheimer’s account turns on the weakness of reason against socialization, and Schreier’s project is a project of reason. It asks a man to see through his inherited sense of who he is, to recognize the communal self as a construction and hold it at the distance critique requires. Mearsheimer ranks that capacity last among the forces that move us. He might read the anti-essentialist program as a late and local product of one particular socialization, the training of the theory-formed humanities of the 1990s, a group with its own intense value infusion and its own sacred refusal of essence. The man who learned to distrust group belonging learned it from a group. His cosmopolitan suspicion of the tribe is the marker of his tribe. On Mearsheimer’s terms the academic who announces that identity is constructed performs the membership badge of the cosmopolitan intellectual class, and he mistakes a socialized preference for the verdict of free reason.
Samuel Moyn (b. 1970), whom Mearsheimer quotes on the rise of human rights, sits near this point. The elevation of the rights-bearing individual over the inherited group is, for Mearsheimer, the signature liberal move, and Schreier’s loosening of communal Jewish identity belongs to the same family. It frees the person from the weight of the collective self. Mearsheimer says the weight does not lift, that the liberal who proclaims the autonomous chooser describes a creature who never existed, and that the social animal goes on cooperating with his fellow members and sacrificing for them after the theorist has declared the bond a fiction.
What survives for Schreier, if Mearsheimer is right, is narrower than the full anti-essentialist claim but firmer for the narrowing. Schreier might be correct about the academic category and wrong about the attachment beneath it. Jewish American literature as a field, a canon, a journal, a set of chairs, got built by men making choices, and Schreier maps the building with care. The error, on this reading, comes when the construction thesis migrates from the category to the bond, when the demonstration that scholars assembled a label becomes a suggestion that the communal self is similarly optional. Mearsheimer holds that the self is not optional. The group precedes the man, shapes him before he can refuse, and holds him after he thinks he has reasoned his way out. The category is paper. The tribe is not.
There is a cost to Schreier in this collision, and a cost to Mearsheimer. The cost to Schreier is that his rationalism might overreach, treating critique as a solvent strong enough to dissolve what childhood welded, and underrating the durability of the attachment his own readers carry into the seminar room. The cost to Mearsheimer is that he can prove too much, since an anthropology that makes reason nearly powerless against socialization struggles to explain Schreier at all, the man who did, in fact, turn his critical faculties against the value infusion of his own people and his own field. If socialization wins as completely as Mearsheimer says, the heretic should not exist. He does exist. Either reason can do more than Mearsheimer grants, or Schreier’s heresy is the socialized loyalty of a rival group, and the tribe he serves is the one that taught him to doubt the tribe.

The Set

Picture the world Benjamin Schreier moves through. It has rooms, and the rooms have addresses. The Modern Language Association convention in winter, a vast hotel given over to job interviews and panels and the slow theater of who greets whom in the lobby. The annual meeting of the Association for Jewish Studies, where the Jewish studies people gather and the literature scholars form a wing of a larger hall that runs from Talmud to Holocaust history to Israeli politics. The seminar room at Penn State where the graduate students learn the trade. The pages of the journals, which are rooms too, with doors and gatekeepers. PMLA at the top of the literary hierarchy. American Literary History. American Literature. And the room Schreier himself keeps the keys to, Studies in American Jewish Literature, which he has edited since 2011, the field’s house organ, the place where a young scholar’s first essay on Roth or Ozick either appears or does not.

The people in these rooms share a formation. They came up through doctoral programs in English in the 1990s and after, when theory had won and the older philology had lost, and they carry the marks of that victory. They read Foucault in coursework. They learned to say that categories are produced rather than found, that the canon encodes power, that the critic’s job is to expose the operations a text conceals. Schreier’s own line runs Swarthmore to Brandeis to the chair at Penn State, and the line is typical of the set, the small liberal arts college and then the research university and then the tenure track at a flagship. The names around him in the field of Jewish American literary study form a recognizable company. Hana Wirth-Nesher, who wrote on language and the Jewish American text. Werner Sollors (b. 1943) at Harvard, whose work on ethnicity and consent and descent set terms the whole field still argues with. Michael P. Kramer, who debated with Wirth-Nesher over whether Jewish American literature even names a coherent object, a debate Schreier inherited and pushed further than either. Benjamin’s elders and contemporaries also include figures like Ruth Wisse (b. 1936), who holds the opposite pole from Schreier, the scholar for whom Jewish literature expresses a real and continuous national culture, and whose politics run to the defense of the Jewish people as a people. Set Schreier against Wisse and the field’s whole argument stands out in relief. She believes in the thing. He shows it was built.

What do they value? They value the unmasking. The highest praise in this set is that a piece of work is smart, and smart means it caught something the naive reader missed, found the seam, showed the construction, refused the obvious. A scholar earns standing by demonstrating that what looked natural was made, what looked innocent served power, what looked like a stable identity was a process held together by institutions. The set prizes theoretical sophistication, which means fluency in the vocabulary of construction and discourse and the critique of essence, and it holds in quiet contempt the work that takes its object at face value. To call a colleague’s book undertheorized is to wound him. To call it rigorous and self-aware is to bless him. Schreier sits near the center of what the set values, because his whole career performs the unmasking on the field’s own foundations, which is the unmasking the set admires most, the one that turns the tools on the home discipline.

Their hero system runs on the figure of the critic who sees through. The man who matters is the man who exposed an illusion others lived inside. The set tells its own history this way, as a sequence of demystifications, each generation pulling down what the last took for granted. The philologists believed in the text. Then theory showed the text was a site of power. The early ethnic critics believed in authentic ethnic experience. Then the next wave showed that authenticity was a construction. Schreier stands at the far end of this sequence, the man who turned the demystifying habit on the category of Jewish American literature and asked whether the field’s object had ever existed. To belong to this hero system is to want to be the one who saw furthest through, and the reward is a name that the next generation of scholars must cite, a place in the chain of those who advanced the critique. The body fails, but the citation persists, and the footnote is the set’s form of life after death.

The status games are mostly silent. Where you publish ranks you. A book with a university press, and the presses themselves are ranked, Harvard and Chicago and Princeton above the rest, NYU and Penn solidly respectable, and Schreier has published with Virginia, NYU, and Penn, a strong record that places him among the serious without placing him at the absolute summit. Who blurbs your book ranks you. Who writes the review and where ranks you. The invitation to the keynote rather than the parallel panel ranks you. The endowed chair ranks you, and Schreier holds the Mitrani Family Professorship, which marks him as a man the institution has chosen to honor. The directorship of a program ranks you, and he has run the Jewish Studies Program and the graduate program in English. The editorship of a journal ranks you highest of all in one specific way, because it makes you a gatekeeper, a man others must please, and Schreier’s long tenure at Studies in American Jewish Literature gives him that power over the field he critiques. The set plays these games while pretending not to, because open ambition reads as vulgar, and the proper pose is the disinterested pursuit of knowledge with the status accruing as a byproduct one never sought.

Their normative claims cluster around method. The set holds that a scholar ought to be reflexive, ought to examine the assumptions built into his own categories, ought to refuse the comfort of treating a constructed thing as natural. The cardinal sin is naivety, the unexamined belief, the scholar who writes about Jewish identity as though everyone knows what it is. The cardinal virtue is the critical self-awareness that turns the analytic eye on the analyst’s own tools. Schreier’s demand that the field face the made character of its object is a pure expression of the set’s normative order. He is not introducing a foreign standard. He is enforcing the set’s own ought with more nerve than most, applying to the field’s foundation the reflexivity the set preaches but often spends on safer targets.

Their essentialist claims are harder to find, because the set defines itself against essence, and a man trained in this room learns to flinch at any sentence that says a group is something. They will not say Jews are. They will not say literature expresses an authentic national soul. The flinch is so trained that it functions as the set’s deepest essentialism, the one thing they treat as given rather than constructed, the conviction that essences are always false and construction always the truth beneath them. They are essentialist about anti-essentialism. They hold, as a matter past argument, that the sophisticated position is the one that dissolves the stable category, and they do not turn the dissolving habit on that conviction. Schreier shares this. His work assumes, rather than argues, that showing a category was built settles something, that the constructed thing is thereby less real, less binding, less worthy of a scholar’s belief. The assumption is the set’s bedrock, and it sits under his project unexamined.

The moral grammar follows. To be good in this world is to be smart and self-aware and on the right side, and the right side means the side that questions power, exposes construction, and refuses the consolations of identity. To be bad is to be naive, complicit, undertheorized, or worse, to be a defender of the essence, a Ruth Wisse who believes in the people and says so, which the set reads not as a rival intellectual position but as a moral failure, a refusal of the critical maturity the set requires. The grammar lets the set treat a disagreement about method as a disagreement about virtue. The scholar who believes Jewish American literature names a real thing is not merely wrong in this grammar. He is unserious, sentimental, behind the times, a man who has not done the hard work of facing how categories are made. Schreier’s standing in the set comes from speaking this grammar with unusual fluency and aiming it at the largest available target, the foundation of the field, which earns him the set’s highest regard, the regard reserved for the man who turned its own sharpest tool on its own ground and did not flinch.

There is a tension the set carries and rarely names. Schreier and his colleagues make their living from the very category they dissolve. The chair is a chair in Jewish studies. The journal is a journal of American Jewish literature. The graduate students come to study a thing the field’s leading critic says was constructed and may not cohere. The set needs the category to fund the critique of the category, and the men who show that Jewish American literature was built draw their salaries from departments and programs and endowments that exist because someone believes the thing is real. The donors who fund a chair in Jewish studies tend to believe in the Jewish people the way Wisse believes in them, not the way Schreier does. The set lives on this gap and mostly does not look at it, and the not-looking is part of the moral grammar, because to look too hard would be to ask whether the whole enterprise rests on a belief the enterprise officially denies.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002)

Pierre Bourdieu gives us a way to read a scholar’s career as a series of moves in a game, and the game has rules the players rarely state. A field, in his account, is a structured space of positions, and the men who occupy those positions struggle over a scarce resource. In the academy the resource is symbolic capital, the right to be recognized as a legitimate authority, and the deepest stake of all is the power to define what the field studies and how. Bourdieu calls that power the principle of legitimate vision and division, the nomos of the field, the buried agreement about what counts as a real object and a serious question. Most players accept the nomos without thinking. They inherit it as doxa, the unspoken sense of the game that feels like common sense rather than like a position. Schreier built a career by refusing the doxa of his field out loud.
The field here is Jewish American literary study, a subfield of Jewish studies and of American literature, with its own journal, its own canon, its own chairs and prizes and graduate seminars. Its founding agreement holds that Jewish American literature exists, that it forms a coherent body of writing expressing a Jewish communal self, and that the scholar’s task runs to reading that self in the texts. Schreier attacks the agreement at the root. He argues that the category is made rather than found, assembled by critics and editors and teachers who decide which writers belong, and that the communal essence the field claims to study is the field’s own product. The argument is heresy because it names the doxa as doxa, drags the buried agreement into the light, and denies that the field’s central object has the reality the field assigns it.
Bourdieu teaches that heresy is a position in the field, and a productive one. The space of positions always holds an orthodox center and a heterodox margin, and the law that governs intellectual life rewards the man who takes the open rival seat over the man who crowds into the consecrated middle. The orthodox accumulate capital by doing the field’s normal work well. The heretic accumulates a different capital by contesting the terms on which the work proceeds. Schreier occupies the heterodox slot with discipline. Across The Impossible Jew: Identity and the Reconstruction of Jewish American Literary History (2015) and The Rise and Fall of Jewish American Literature: Ethnic Studies and the Challenge of Identity (2020) he sustains a single heretical claim, and the claim gives him a position no orthodox reading of Roth or Cahan could supply. He is the man who says the object does not exist. That sentence is a brand, and in a crowded attention space a brand is worth a great deal.
Here the paradox opens. The heretic cannot leave the field. To overturn the nomos he must mobilize the players who live by it, publish in the venues they read, win the recognition they confer. His heresy depends on the orthodoxy it attacks for its sense and its charge. A man who denied that Jewish American literature exists from outside the field would be a crank. A man who denies it from the Mitrani Family Professorship of Jewish Studies, while editing Studies in American Jewish Literature, is an event. The NYU Press description of The Impossible Jew puts the logic in four words. He destroys to create. Bourdieu would read that formula as the signature of the heresiarch, who clears ground for a new vision of the field and installs himself as the authority over the cleared ground.
Consecration tells the rest of the story. The endowed chair, the journal editorship he has held since 2011, the directorships of the Jewish Studies Program and the graduate program in English, these are the field’s instruments for marking who holds legitimate authority, and the field has handed them to the man who questions its foundations. A field with enough autonomy can absorb its critics and convert their attacks into its own renewal, because the critique demonstrates that the field takes hard questions seriously, and the demonstration raises the value of the game. The heretic gets capital. The field gets proof of its vitality. The arrangement serves both.
Bourdieu uses the word habitus for the durable habits of perception a man acquires from his training and his trajectory, the feel for the game that shapes the moves he finds natural. Schreier’s formation joined close reading at Swarthmore and Brandeis to the theory that remade the humanities in the 1990s, post-structuralism and the critical study of identity, a training that teaches a man to distrust essences and to read categories as constructions. The anti-essentialist move comes to him as second nature, the way a different formation might make communal pride come as second nature. His weapon and his disposition match, and the match is no accident. The field rewarded the disposition with admission, and the disposition produced the weapon the field then rewarded again.
Schreier might be right that Jewish American literature is a construction. The claim can hold as scholarship and function as a position at the same time, and Bourdieu’s point is that the two run together. The denial of the object is also a bid for the authority to define the object, since the man who shows that the category was built claims the standing to say how it should be rebuilt, or whether it should stand at all. His recent turn toward Palestinian American literature and toward Zionism and the politics of the Jewish studies field reads, in this light, as the same move carried to fresh ground, the heretic extending the reach of his vision into the most contested material the field can offer.

The Sociology of Philosophies

Randall Collins (b. 1941) explains intellectual life as a sociology rather than a parade of free minds. Ideas come from people, people come in networks, and the networks run through master and pupil, rival and ally, across generations. Creativity is not the spark of a lone genius. It is the property of chains. A man does the work, but the chain hands him the tools, the problems, the rivals, and the charge of emotional energy that lets him think a new thought and believe it worth defending. Collins built the argument from a survey of the philosophical record across the world, and he distilled it into a law. He calls it the law of small numbers. The attention space of any field holds room for only three to six active positions at one time, no more, because the audience cannot track more than a handful of live arguments, and the rewards of recognition concentrate on the men who hold the open slots. The law governs who gets remembered and who vanishes, and it governs the moves a rising scholar makes if he wants a seat. Schreier reads as a man who found an open slot and took it.
The field of Jewish American literary study has an orthodox center. The center holds that Jewish American literature exists, that it expresses a Jewish communal self, and that the scholar reads the self in the texts. Collins predicts what happens around a strong center. The attention space fills, the consecrated positions crowd, and a man who joins the throng doing the normal work well competes against many others doing the same work, with thin rewards for each. The open slot lies elsewhere, in the position that negates the center. Schreier took the negating seat. He argues that the communal self is the field’s own construction, that critics and editors and teachers built the category, and that the object the field claims to study has no reality apart from the building. The position is contrarian, and Collins teaches that contrarian is where the energy is, because the rival seat sits empty while the orthodox seats are full.
The charge of the anti-essentialist position comes from the orthodoxy it denies. Collins makes this structural rather than psychological. A position carries intellectual energy in proportion to the strength of what it opposes, and an argument against a weak target generates little heat. Schreier opposes the founding agreement of his field, the deepest and most settled of its claims, and the opposition draws its force from the depth of what it attacks. A man who said Jewish American literature was a construction in a field that already believed so would say nothing. A man who says it where the belief in a communal essence runs strongest stakes out a real position, and the field’s attention turns toward him because the conflict is live. The orthodoxy supplies the energy. The heretic spends it. Without the strong center there is no charged margin, and Schreier’s position depends on the vigor of the view it rejects.
The network behind the man fits the frame. Collins holds that creative positions cluster where chains of intellectual contact concentrate, and that a scholar’s training network places him in the structure before he writes a word. Schreier formed at Swarthmore and then at Brandeis through the 1990s, inside the theory currents that remade the American humanities in those years, post-structuralism and the critical study of identity and the suspicion of essence. That network ran hot. It carried high emotional energy and a dense traffic of arguments about construction, representation, and the made character of categories once thought natural. A man trained in that network inherits the tools to dismantle an essence and the confidence that dismantling is the serious work. The anti-essentialist move toward Jewish American literature reads as the application of a network’s standard equipment to a field that had not yet felt its full force. Collins would say the position was waiting in the structure, and the structure produced a man fit to occupy it.
Emotional energy carries the argument from network to career. Collins uses the term for the charge a man draws from successful intellectual rituals, the focused encounters of seminar and conference and argument that leave a participant lifted and certain and ready to push his line. The contrarian who lands a position that the field must answer wins that charge, because the field’s response, even hostile response, confirms that his argument counts. Schreier’s heresy drew the field’s attention, and the attention fed the energy that let him sustain a single position across two books and a long editorship. The orthodox scholar grinding out competent readings in a crowded slot draws less of this charge, because his work provokes no answer and commands no center of attention. The contrarian provokes, and the provocation returns to him as the energy to provoke again.
The law of small numbers also sets a limit, and the limit shapes a career as much as the opening does. The attention space holds only so many seats, and the seat Schreier holds is the anti-essentialist seat in his subfield. Collins observes that men in adjacent positions compete for the same slot, and that the field will not seat two heretics making the identical move. Schreier’s move toward fresh ground, the recent turn to Palestinian American literature and to Zionism and the politics of the Jewish studies field, reads on this frame as the search for new attention space when the original slot has been worked. A position pays its highest returns when it is new. Once the field has absorbed the heresy, the heretic must extend the argument into contested material that the field has not yet metabolized, or watch the returns fall as the slot becomes familiar. The migration to harder ground is the contrarian protecting his charge.

‘A Big Misunderstanding’

David Pinsof writes that intellectuals tell a flattering story about why the world goes wrong, and that the story pays them. The story says the trouble comes from misunderstanding. Polarization, bigotry, war, unhappiness, all of it traces to people getting the facts wrong, and the cure is better understanding, which lifts the men whose trade is understanding to the rank of the most important men alive. Pinsof throws the story out. He holds that people understand what they have an incentive to understand, that stupidity tends to be strategic, and that the engine under human conduct is not bad belief but motive, the drive to climb hierarchies, run down rivals, and dominate others behind a moral screen. Pinsof splits the stated motive from the real one, the mission statement from the deed, and reads the gap between them as the place the truth hides. Turn that move on Schreier.
Schreier’s stated motive is candor. He presents his work as the field cleaning its own house, the critic who refuses the comfortable belief that Jewish American literature names a real communal essence, the scholar willing to show that the category was built and to ask his colleagues to face what they have been doing. The NYU Press line catches the self-image. He destroys to create. Read through Pinsof, the self-image is the mission statement, and the mission statement asks to be checked against the deed.
Pinsof would start with the form of the claim. Schreier tells a field that it has misunderstood its own object. The essentialists think they study a Jewish self in the texts, and Schreier says they have it wrong, that the self is their construction and they failed to see the seams. This is the misunderstanding story in academic dress. The field erred, the critic understands, and the man who understands moves to the front of the room. Pinsof’s essay warns against the story because of what it does for the teller. A scholar who exposes a misunderstanding casts himself as the one who sees clearly while his colleagues sit in fog, and the casting is a status bid before it is anything else.
Pinsof holds that people are not confused about their interests. The field’s essentialists are not victims of a brain-fart. They have reasons to hold the category together, and the reasons are not secret. The category supports jobs, journals, endowed chairs, donor relationships, communal legitimacy, the apparatus that lets a man earn a living reading Jewish books as Jewish books. They believe in the communal self because believing in it pays, and they would keep believing it under any volume of critique, because the belief tracks their incentives rather than their information. Schreier’s demonstration that the category was constructed treats their conviction as an error to be corrected. Pinsof would say it is not an error. It is a position held by men who understand their incentives all too well, and the critique that calls it a misunderstanding misreads interest as confusion, which is the standard intellectual mistake.
Then Pinsof turns the same blade on Schreier. If the essentialists hold their belief because it pays, the anti-essentialist holds his because it pays him. The contrarian slot carries status the orthodox slot cannot, the charge of the man who saw through what everyone else swallowed. Schreier’s deed, on this read, is not the disinterested pursuit of a true account of his field. It is a successful campaign to climb the hierarchy of his field by running down the men who built it, conducted under the moral cover of rigor and self-critique. The cover is the part Pinsof watches closest. A man who said plainly, I attacked my field’s founding idea because the attack was the open path to a chair and a name, would forfeit the moral standing the attack requires. So the motive comes dressed as candor, as service to the discipline, as breaking down the walls of the academic ghetto, and the dress is the tell. Pinsof’s Starbucks line applies without strain. The mission statement speaks of nurturing the human spirit. The firm sells coffee for profit. The monograph speaks of freeing the field for honest self-examination. The career accumulates capital.
Coalition work fills out the picture, and the recent turn supplies the material. Schreier moves toward Palestinian American literature and toward a critique of Zionism and the politics of the Jewish studies field. Pinsof reads these as alliance signals before he reads them as arguments. In the contemporary humanities, the anti-Zionist and anti-essentialist positions confer elite standing, and they mark a man as a member of the cosmopolitan academic coalition rather than the communal Jewish one. Pinsof’s account of bigotry and partisan hatred runs on zero-sum competition over status and over the coercive apparatus of the state, and his account of antiracism notes that the position confers elite rank while letting its holders resent their nearest rivals in the hierarchy. Apply the shape. The Jewish scholar who loosens Jewish communal identity and questions Zionism takes a position that lifts him among one coalition by separating him from another, the communal establishment that sits closest to him in the social order and competes with him most directly for the right to speak for the tradition. The derogated rival is not far away. He is the nearest neighbor.
Pinsof’s law of self-deception keeps the read from collapsing into a charge of fraud, and the distinction matters for fairness. He does not say the intellectual lies. He says the intellectual believes his own mission statement, because the belief is a weapon, and a man who sincerely thinks himself a truth-teller signals candor better than a man performing the part. Schreier need not know any of this. The frame predicts that he would experience his work as honest inquiry and feel the status payoff as the natural reward of being right, and that the sincerity is part of the equipment rather than evidence against the read. The denial is a feature. Pinsof builds it into the model.
The hole at the end of Pinsof’s essay closes the application. He says the world does not want to be saved, that you can study the hole you are stuck in to the last molecule and remain stuck, because the trouble is not ignorance and so knowledge cannot cure it. Schreier studies how his field built its category. He maps the construction with care across two books and a long editorship. And the field goes on building the category, hands him a chair for the mapping, and changes nothing, because no one in it wanted the category dissolved. The essentialists keep their jobs. The journal keeps publishing. The critic keeps his standing as the man who sees through it all. Everyone’s incentives are met, and the critique that promised to expose a misunderstanding turns out to have exposed no misunderstanding at all, only a set of men doing what their interests told them to do, the critic included. On Pinsof’s terms the field has no problem. What looks like its problem, its naive belief in a communal essence, is the solution to a different problem, how to keep the apparatus funded and staffed and legitimate. Nothing is broken. That is the trouble.

Turner on Essentialism

Stephen P. Turner (b. 1951) spent a career hunting essences in social thought and pulling them out by the root. His target is the move that posits a shared collective thing, a substance held in common across many minds, and then treats that thing as the cause of what people do. Society, culture, the normative order, collective representations, shared frameworks, shared tacit knowledge, all of these name a supposed common possession, and Turner denies that the common possession exists. What exists is individuals. Each man acquires his habits through his own causal history, his own training, his own exposure, and there is no guarantee that what sits in one head matches what sits in another. The sameness gets assumed, not shown. When a scholar says a group shares a practice or a culture or an identity, he has helped himself to an essence, a hidden substance that does the explaining while escaping the demand to specify how it works or where it lives. Turner calls these explanatory fictions. They name the thing to be explained and dress the name as the explanation. Apply this to Benjamin Schreier, and the frame cuts toward him and against him at once.
The toward part comes first, because Schreier and Turner start as allies. Schreier denies that Jewish American literature expresses a Jewish communal self, a coherent essence sitting in the texts waiting to be read out. Turner makes the same denial about every collective essence, and he would welcome Schreier’s refusal of the communal self as a clean case of the general move he recommends. The field assumed a shared Jewishness, a substance common to Cahan and Roth and the rest, and built its readings on the assumption. Schreier shows the assumption was an assumption. So far the two men walk together. The Jewish essence is a fiction, and naming it as a fiction is the right first step.
The against part starts where Schreier stops walking. Turner’s argument does not halt at the natural essence. It turns on the substitutes, because the deepest finding of his work is that anti-essentialism keeps smuggling the essence back in under a new name. A man rejects the essence of the group and then explains the group’s products by appeal to culture, or discourse, or construction, or the field, and each of these is a fresh collective substance doing the old collective work. Schreier says Jewish American literature was constructed through the practices of critics, editors, publishers, and teachers. Turner would stop on the word practices and on the word field and ask what they name. A practice, in Schreier’s usage, is something shared across the men who carry it, a common way of building the category. That is the shared practice Turner spent The Social Theory of Practices (1994) showing cannot be a collective object. There is no thing the critics share. There are particular editors with particular habits, each acquired through a particular history, and the word practice papers a single substance over a distribution of separate dispositions that might or might not line up. Schreier traded the essence of Jewishness for the essence of the construction.
The trade runs through his key terms. Construction sounds like a process, a doing, a chain of causes a scholar might lay out step by step. In Turner’s reading it functions instead as a black box, an essence that explains without specifying. To say the category was constructed is to redescribe the category’s existence in the passive voice and present the redescription as a finding. The construction does no causal work that the word names. Who built what, in which year, through which act, with which effect on which reader, these are the questions a real account answers, and the collective noun lets a man skip them while sounding causal. The field is the worst offender. The field constructs, the field assumes, the field studies, the discipline maintains. Turner would say there is no field that constructs anything. There are men, and the field is the name we give to a rough overlap among their separate habits, an overlap we assume rather than measure. When Schreier makes the field the agent of construction, he installs a collective actor with intentions and effects, and the collective actor is an essence as surely as the communal Jewish self was an essence. He dissolved one and conjured another to do the dissolving.
Identity carries the same trouble, and the trouble runs to the center of his project. Schreier writes about identity and identification as his major theme, the made character of the self the field claims to find. Turner would press the question all the way down. If the Jewish self is not a shared substance, then neither is identity as such, and the word identity names no common thing that gets constructed or deconstructed. What a fuller account holds is particular men with particular self-understandings, formed by particular histories, no two alike, with the sameness across them assumed for convenience and never established. Schreier’s critique stops at the right place to indict the essentialists and the wrong place to spare himself, because the apparatus he uses to expose the Jewish essence, identity and construction and the field and institutional power, runs on essences of its own. He sees the substance in his opponents’ object and not the substance in his own tools.
The honest version of the project, on Turner’s terms, would read as biography and causal history rather than as the operation of forces. It would name a particular editor, trace where he learned his habits of selection, show whom he taught and what those students carried forward and how their habits diverged from his, and never assume that the men add up to a thing called the field with a will to construct. Schreier comes close in places. He names Cahan, names Roth, names the New York Intellectuals, names critics. The explanatory weight falls elsewhere. It falls on institutional power, on the discipline, on identity-based literary study, on the practices of the field, the collective nouns that carry the argument while the named individuals serve as illustration. Turner’s complaint is exact. The men are present as examples and absent as causes, and the causes are essences.
There is a reflexive sting, and Turner’s frame delivers it without the help of any other. Schreier built his standing as the scholar who refuses convenient essences and faces the constructed character of his field’s object. Turner shows that the refusal is partial, that the anti-essentialist retains a working set of essences he never turns the critique upon, and that the retention is what lets the critique proceed at all. A thoroughgoing application of Schreier’s own principle would corrode the ground he stands on, because construction and field and identity and practice would go the way of communal Jewishness, and the scholar would be left with particular men doing particular things for particular reasons, which is harder to write and impossible to brand. The half-measure is not a failure of nerve. It is the condition of having an argument to make. Pull the last essence and there is no thesis, only a long list of individuals.
The frame has its cost, and naming it keeps the application honest. Turner’s demand can dissolve every collective term, and a man cannot write history or sociology or literary study while refusing all collective shorthand. At some point a scholar says the field or the tradition or the practice, because the alternative is a catalog no reader can finish, and Turner grants the point. His test is not whether a writer uses a collective noun but whether the noun does causal work the writer can cash out, or hides the absence of such work behind a word that sounds like a cause. Schreier might survive the test in places, where his collective talk shortens a story he could tell in full if pressed. He fails it where the collective noun is the story, where construction and the field carry an explanatory load that no account of particular men ever arrives to support. The essence he exposed in his opponents is the essence he kept for himself, and Turner’s frame, applied to the end, leaves the anti-essentialist holding the substance he was sure he had abandoned.

Explaining the Normative

Stephen P. Turner aimed a second campaign at a target close to the first. Where his work on essences attacks the shared substance, his work on the normative attacks the shared ought. Normativism, as he names it in Explaining the Normative (2010), holds that a special domain of facts sits above the causal world, facts about what is correct, valid, required, binding, and that this domain explains how men agree, follow rules, mean the same things, and submit to standards. The normativist says people are bound by norms, answerable to reasons, governed by a shared sense of what counts as right. Turner denies the domain. What exists is habit, training, disposition, sanction, the ordinary causal traffic of men learning to do things and correcting each other. The normative is a layer the theorist adds on top, a posit invoked to fill a gap, and the gap it fills is the theorist’s sense that without an ought the agreement would be impossible. Turner calls the move a transcendental argument and treats it as a bluff. The bindingness is asserted, never cashed. It does no causal work the habits do not already do, and it launders contingency into necessity, converting what men happen to do into what they are required to do. Apply this to Schreier, and the question shifts from what he claims about his field to what he claims his field owes.
Schreier does more than describe. He charges. The essentialists have not merely built a category, they have failed to see that they built it, and the failure reads in his work as a fault, a deficiency, a lapse the field ought to repair. His signature demand is reflexive criticism. The scholar must examine the assumptions of his own method, must face the constructed character of his object, must refuse the convenient belief in a communal essence. Each must carries an ought. Turner’s frame asks where the ought comes from and what gives it force.
Start with the word wrong, because Schreier needs it. His critique holds that the essentialists got something wrong, that their readings mistake a construction for an essence, that they err. Wrong, mistake, error, these are normative terms, and they claim a standard against which the essentialist reading falls short. Turner presses the claim hard. Wrong relative to what, and what makes that standard binding on a man rather than one more trained habit competing with his? The essentialist learned his habits in his formation, acquired the disposition to read a Jewish self in the texts, and reproduces the disposition in his students. Schreier learned different habits in a different formation, the theory-formed humanities of the 1990s, and acquired the disposition to distrust essences and prize reflexivity. Two trained dispositions, two ways of reading, each reproducing itself through its own students and sanctions. To call one wrong and the other correct is to posit a normative fact that ranks them, and Turner says no such fact arrives. There is the standard Schreier prefers and the rhetoric that converts the preference into a verdict the essentialists stand convicted under.
The conversion is the part Turner watches. Normativism works by turning a habit into an obligation. Schreier values reflexivity, and his community rewards reflexivity, and out of the valuing and the rewarding comes a standard. Then the standard changes grammar. It stops being something Schreier favors and becomes something the field is bound to honor, a mark of serious scholarship the naive essentialist has failed to meet. Turner would identify the change of grammar as the trick. The reflexive demand presents itself as a requirement of good criticism as such, binding on anyone who would do the work properly, when it is the trained preference of a particular intellectual culture given the voice of necessity. Reflexivity is not superior by some normative fact. A community produces the disposition, rewards its display, and elevates it to a duty the outsiders are answerable to. The duty is the preference wearing a uniform.
The transcendental shape sits under the argument. Schreier’s case runs on a buried requirement. Good scholarship requires that the critic face his constructions, and without that facing the field falls into the error of essentialism. The requires does the work, and Turner asks for the receipt. Essentialist literary study runs fine on its own terms. Men do it, publish it, get hired for it, train others in it, and the practice reproduces itself across generations without collapse. In what sense, then, is it required to be otherwise? Only relative to the standard Schreier brings from his own formation. The necessity is an illusion produced by mistaking the failure to meet his standard for a failure to meet a standard the practice is bound by. The essentialists are not failing at the thing they do. They are doing a different thing, and Schreier’s requires names his wish that they would stop, dressed as a law they are breaking.
Turner’s long work on expertise sharpens the point, because Schreier is an expert claiming normative authority over a field. His books and his editorship and his chair give him standing, and from that standing he tells the field what it ought to recognize about its own object. Turner asks how such a claim gets cashed. The expert who says you ought to defer to my account of what is correct makes a bid for authority, and the normative clothing hides the bid. Schreier’s demand that the field face its constructions reads on this frame as a move to install his vantage as the one from which the field’s practice gets judged. The authority is real as power and unearned as a normative fact. He cannot show that the field is bound to accept his standard. He can show that he holds the position from which the standard issues, which is a different thing, and the normative talk runs the two together so that the power passes for correctness.
The reflexive turn arrives where it always arrives with Turner, and the normative version cuts a clean line. Schreier demands that the critic examine the assumptions of his method. He examines the essentialist’s assumption of a communal self. He does not examine his own assumption that reflexivity binds, that anti-essentialism is correct, that the field owes its categories a reckoning. Those oughts ride along unexamined, and they are the normativism, the residue of binding standards he never turns the reflexive question upon. A man who pressed Schreier’s own demand to the end would ask Schreier to face the constructed character of his sense that scholars ought to face the constructed character of their objects. The demand for reflexivity is a trained habit elevated to a duty, and the reflexive critic, so thorough about his colleagues’ assumptions, leaves his own deepest assumption, that there is a right way to do this and the others are failing it, standing untouched in the doorway.
A limit. Turner’s deflation of the normative threatens every evaluation, including the evaluations a critic cannot do without. A literary scholar has to say some readings are better than others, some careless and some careful, and if there are no normative facts then Schreier’s charge of error against the essentialists loses its ground, and so does any charge anyone might bring against Schreier, and so does Turner’s own complaint against normativism, which sounds like a claim about how theory ought to proceed. Turner has his replies. He is no flat relativist, and he holds that men can prefer and argue for their preferences without pretending the preferences are normative facts discovered in a higher domain. The reply tells where Schreier might survive and where he sinks. He survives where he frames his anti-essentialism as the more useful approach, the one he favors and recommends and will argue for, a habit he prefers and asks others to try. He sinks where he frames it as what the field is bound to see, what serious scholarship requires, what the essentialists stand in error against. The first is a preference a man can defend. The second is an IOU he writes against a domain Turner says is empty, and the note never clears.

Hero System

Two terrors sit under a life. The first is the body, the animal fact, the meat that fails and goes into the ground. The second cuts deeper in certain men. It is the suspicion that nothing about a life reaches past the flesh, that the name goes when the body goes, that the work was a way to fill the hours. Ernest Becker (1924-1974) built his picture of man on these two terrors and called the human answer a hero system. A hero system tells a man how to count. It hands him a path to significance inside a scheme that outlasts his body, and the scheme can be the nation, the faith, the bloodline, the cause, the book that stays on the shelf after the man who wrote it is gone. The hero system is a denial of death wearing the clothes of a purpose.
Schreier built his hero on a refusal. Where other men reach for an essence to belong to, a communal self that holds them and survives them, he made his name showing that the essence was never there. The field of Jewish American literary study believed it studied a Jewish communal soul living in the texts. Schreier showed the soul was built, assembled by editors and critics and teachers who decided who belonged. His heroism is the heroism of the man who will not be fooled. That posture has a long pedigree and a particular cost, and Becker gives us the tools to read both.
Every hero system rests on a story about something missing. The story names a lack, and the heroism repairs it or stares it down. Schreier’s story is the story of the absent essence. The field thought it possessed a thing, and the thing was gone, was never present, was only ever a construction men mistook for a substance. Take away the comforting essence, his work says, and the field will grow up. What remains when the illusion goes is the honest scholar, clear-eyed, facing the made character of his world without the crutch the others lean on. This is a subtraction story. It promises that you reach maturity by stripping away the consolations, and that the man left standing in the cleared field is the adult in the room.
Becker spent his life on the flaw in that promise. The cleared field is never empty. Strip one hero system and another moves into the space, and the man who subtracts the old consolation rarely notices that he has installed a new one. The demystifier has his own immortality project. It is demystification. He earns his significance by being the one who saw through what the others swallowed, and that role outlasts the body as surely as any creed. The believer wins his place in the scheme by belonging. The unbeliever wins his place by refusing to belong, and the refusal becomes a faith with its own saints and its own contempt for the unconverted. Schreier’s hero is the man who would not be consoled, and Becker’s question is whether that refusal is a consolation.
Hold the word at the center of the man. Call it honesty. Schreier’s honesty means facing the construction, refusing the essence, naming the seams in what looks seamless. He treats this as a near-universal good, the thing serious scholarship owes. The trouble is that honesty means a different thing in every hero system, and the differences run deep, and a man rarely sees that his honesty is the local honesty of his tribe rather than honesty as such.
Take a hospice chaplain at the bedside of a dying woman. Honesty for him does not mean stripping her of comfort. It means staying in the room when the prognosis is bad and not pretending it is good, holding her hand while telling her the truth she can bear, and the truth she can bear includes the promise that she is held by something larger than the disease. His honesty is presence under God, whose name he capitalizes and whose mercy he believes runs through the moment. To strip the dying woman of consolation would be to him a cruelty, not a candor. His hero system rewards the man who carries others toward the end without lying and without abandoning them to the void. Honesty here is fidelity.
Take a deep-sea welder, two hundred feet down, sealing a pipeline joint in the dark. Honesty for him means the weld that holds. He cannot fake it. The pressure tests the joint, and the joint passes or men die. His honesty is the refusal of the cosmetic, the surface that looks finished and fails under load. He earns his standing among the other divers by work that survives the test no rhetoric can talk past. His hero system has no place for the elegant argument. It has place for the thing that holds when the water presses in. Honesty here is the weld.
Take a woman who left a secular life and became observant, a baal teshuva keeping a kosher home she did not grow up in, learning the laws as an adult. Honesty for her means submission to a word she takes as given rather than made. She found her freedom in accepting that the obligations are not hers to construct, that the self is answerable to a law older than the self, and that the deepest honesty is the admission that she did not invent the good and cannot. Her hero system rewards the woman who bends her will to the revealed order and finds herself enlarged by the bending. Schreier’s honesty would call her essence a construction. Her honesty calls his construction a refusal to kneel. Each reads the other’s candor as evasion.
Take a quant at a trading desk who builds the model that prices the firm’s risk. Honesty for him means the number that does not flatter, the figure that tells the partners their favorite position will blow up. He earns his place by the unblinking estimate, the model that resists the wish. His honesty is the cold figure against the warm story everyone wants to believe. He and Schreier share a temper here, the suspicion of the comforting account, and they would still part on the question of where the comfort hides, because the quant trusts his number as a fact about the world and Schreier would ask who built the number and whose interests it serves.
Take a matador. The Spanish bullring has a word for it, the truth of the faena, the honest pass worked close to the horns rather than the safe pass faked at a distance. His honesty is the willingness to stand where the animal can reach him. He earns immortality, the only kind his hero system offers, by facing death in the afternoon and not flinching, and the crowd reads his courage in the inches between his body and the horn. Honesty for him is proximity to the thing that kills. Schreier faces no horn. His danger is the bad review, the unanswered argument, the slot that fills before he reaches it. The matador might find the scholar’s honesty bloodless, a courage with nothing at stake but reputation, and the scholar might find the matador’s honesty a vanity dressed as nerve. Both call their own version the real one.
Set Schreier’s honesty beside these and its shape comes clear. His honesty is demystification, the act of showing that what looked given was made. Inside his hero system this is the supreme virtue, the thing that separates the adult from the child, the critic from the dupe. He earns his significance by performing it across two books and a long editorship, and the performance grants him a name that will sit in the field’s footnotes after the body fails. The chaplain earns his place by fidelity, the welder by the weld, the baal teshuva by submission, the quant by the figure, the matador by the horns. Schreier earns his by seeing through. Each man calls his own coin honesty, and each spends it for the same wage, a stake in something that survives him.
How much of this does the man see? Schreier’s method is the demand for self-examination. He tells the field to face its assumptions, to turn the critical eye on its own categories, to refuse the convenient belief. He runs the demand on his colleagues with discipline. He does not appear to run it on his own hero. The reflexive critic, so sharp about the essentialist’s comfort, leaves his own comfort standing in the doorway, the comfort of being the man who exposes comfort. He sees that the communal self is an immortality project for the men who hold it. He does not seem to see that demystification is an immortality project for the man who performs it. The self-awareness is high in form and stops at the one place it might cost him. This is the common shape of the debunker. He audits every faith but the faith that he is above faith.
The shape of the hero, first. Schreier is the cosmic skeptic, the man who wins his place in the scheme by refusing every scheme but skepticism. He stands where the prophet once stood, calling the people off their idols, and the prophet’s old danger follows him, the danger of mistaking the smashing of idols for the absence of worship. He worships clarity. He serves it the way the chaplain serves God and the matador serves the bull, and his service buys him the same thing theirs buys them, a defense against the suspicion that the name dies with the body.
The unnamed rival, second. He defines himself against a man he rarely names, the consoled man, the scholar who reads the Jewish self in the texts and sleeps well, the believer in the essence. The rival is the figure who belongs without apology, who takes the communal soul as given and is warmed by it. Schreier’s hero needs that man to exist, because a demystifier with no one left to demystify has no role to play. He is bound to the essentialist the way the unbeliever is bound to the church he left, and the binding shows in how steadily he returns to the same target across a career.
The cost the ledger cannot price, last. The man who dissolves the communal self in others cannot keep it for himself. He showed the field that its belonging was built, and the showing left him outside the building he took apart. The chaplain has his God, the welder his crew, the baal teshuva her law and her table, the matador his crowd. Schreier has the clarity, and clarity is a cold thing to be held by at the end. He traded the warmth of the given self for the standing of the man who proved it was made, and the trade reads as a victory in every column the field can count. The column the field cannot count holds the thing he gave away, the home he might have lived in had he been willing to believe it was real.

The Voice

Read Benjamin Schreier in his own pages and a voice comes up off the paper at once, unmistakable and worked. Start with the sentence, because the sentence is where he lives. He writes long, and he writes loaded. A characteristic sentence opens on a claim, then qualifies it, then qualifies the qualification, then turns on a colon or a dash and delivers the point it has been circling. He packs subordinate clauses inside subordinate clauses, and he trusts the reader to hold the whole structure in mind until the close. The prose moves the way a man thinks aloud when he distrusts every simple version of what he means. He will not say a thing plainly if a plain saying would let a false ease slip in.
The diction runs to the theoretical, and he wears it without apology. Hegemonic, historicist, epistemological, interpellated, ethnological, autocritique, representativity. These are the working tools of the theory-formed humanities, and Schreier reaches for them as a carpenter reaches for the plane, not to show the tool but to take the surface off. The vocabulary marks his tribe and does his labor at the same time. A reader outside the seminar feels the door close a little. A reader inside hears a man fluent in the house language, using it to say something the house does not want said.
Against that density he sets a second register, and the contrast is the signature. He coins blunt, almost rude tags for the things he attacks. He calls the field’s self-image the JCC conception of Jewish studies, and the joke lands because the Jewish Community Center is the warm suburban building where Jewishness means bagels and a gym membership, and he means the field has confused that comfort for thought. He calls the 1950s arrival of Bellow (1915-2005) and Malamud (1914-1986) and Roth and Grace Paley (1922-2007) the breakthrough, in scare quotes, and then names it the primal scene of the field, borrowing Freud to suggest the discipline keeps reenacting a founding it cannot look at. He writes that a Jew is a Jew is a Jew when it comes to keyword searches, turning Gertrude Stein (1874-1946) into a jab at the field’s unexamined faith that it knows a Jew when it sees one. The high theory and the low jab work the same seam. He uses the fancy word to dismantle and the rude word to deflate, and a paragraph will swing from one to the other inside a single breath.
He likes the diagnostic metaphor, and the diagnosis is always of sickness. The field’s habits contaminate its discourse. Its clubbiness metastasizes. Its insiderism is insidious. He reaches for the language of disease and of bad faith because he reads the field as a body protecting a comfort it should have outgrown, and the medical figure lets him sound less like a colleague with a disagreement and more like a man naming a pathology others have agreed not to see. The reviewers caught the temperature. They call him relentlessly intelligent, frequently polemical, bracing, a passionate wake-up call, and one of them, less charmed, notes the easy dismissals, the quick swipe at a rival critic in passing rather than the patient engagement.
The Yiddish and Hebrew matter, because of how he handles them. He drops sholom bayis, peace in the home, and sinas chinam, baseless hatred, into the argument in italics, and he uses them against the people who use them. The field, he says, treats hard criticism as a breach of the peace, as a kind of baseless hatred among Jews, and so it leaves its arguments at the door and calls the leaving virtue. He takes the community’s own pieties, the words a rabbi might use to keep peace at a fractious table, and shows them working as a gag. A man raised near those words knows their weight. He spends the weight to make his point, which is a move available only to an insider, and he is an insider attacking the privileges of being one.
His rhetoric runs on direct address and the staged question. He stops to ask why anyone should care how old the field is, answers fair question, and proceeds. He poses the objection a hostile reader would raise and takes it on the chin in the open. This is the manner of a man who wants the fight in public. He says so. He opens the essay on the field by praising expressed antagonism and calling the willingness to have it out a lost art, and he closes it by saying that not taking the field for granted means having fights, and asking how else scholarly work could carry any dignity. The pugnacity is the point and the brand. Where his colleagues prize sholom bayis, he prizes the argument conducted loudly enough that the room must turn and watch.
There is a tonal split between the books and the op-ed, and the split tells you something. In the monographs and the field essays the sentences thicken and the theory runs deepest, because the audience is the guild and the guild rewards the difficult surface. In the Chronicle, writing against the recommendation letter for a general academic reader, the prose shortens and hardens, and he calls the genre dishonest and useless for everyone in a subtitle a child could parse. The man can write plain when he wants the blow to land on a wide audience, and he writes dense when he wants standing inside the field. The choice is strategic, not a limit. He knows two registers and picks the one the room rewards.
Irony coats most of it. He rarely states contempt outright. He lets the adjective carry it, the much-ballyhooed breakthrough, the self-congratulatory emancipation, the field patting itself on the back, the scholar primping for his fellow insiders. He builds a sentence so that the sarcasm sits in a single chosen word and the rest stays level, which lets him deny heat while delivering it. The aside in parentheses does similar work, a quick concession or a muttered perish the thought that signals he sees the obvious objection and finds it beneath a full answer. The manner is donnish, quick, a little superior, the voice of a man who has thought about this longer than you have and wants you to feel the gap without his having to assert it.
What you do not find is warmth toward the object. He writes about Jewish American literature with great energy and almost no affection for the comfortable version of it. The feeling in the prose attaches to the act of seeing through, not to the books or the writers or the people. When he quotes Leslie Fiedler (1917-2003) admitting that his criticism was never disinterested, that he wrote as a Jew about the movement that carried Jews to the center, Schreier is not warmed by the confession. He uses it as evidence, the field caught in the act of mistaking autobiography for scholarship. Even his praise tends to be praise for candor about interest, for a man owning the bias Schreier wants to expose. He capitalizes on honesty wherever he finds it and reserves his own for the demolition.
The whole performance has a cost built into its surface, and a careful reader feels it. The density that proves seriousness to the guild also walls the work off from the community it concerns, the Jews who fund the chairs and fill the JCCs and would not finish a paragraph of the prose written about them. The pugnacity that he frames as the recovery of a lost honesty also reads, at moments, as a man enjoying the fight for its own sake. And the irony that protects him from sounding merely angry also keeps a certain coldness at the center, the sense that the writer is never quite in the room with the thing he describes, always a half step above it, narrating the autopsy. He writes, near the end of that field essay, that Jewishness should center a community of critique rather than a community of interest. The line is the man entire. He would trade the warm room full of people who belong for a colder room full of people who argue, and he writes in the prose of the second room, to the second room, against the first.

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Roger Pilon: Natural Rights, Judicial Engagement, and Constitutional Liberty

Roger Pilon (b. 1942) is an American political philosopher, constitutional theorist, and legal scholar whose work across more than four decades has shaped modern libertarian constitutionalism, and whose name now stands among the foremost American advocates of natural-rights theory, limited government, economic liberty, and constitutional originalism. Through his long association with the Cato Institute, where he founded the Center for Constitutional Studies in 1989 and served thereafter as vice president for legal affairs, Pilon became an architect of the libertarian legal movement, and his writings on natural rights, judicial review, property, federalism, and constitutional interpretation have reached scholars, judges, litigators, and policymakers who otherwise share little common ground.

His path to intellectual life departed from the conventional academic route in ways that mark the rest of his career. Born in Vermont and raised near the village of Galway in rural upstate New York, Pilon enrolled at Syracuse University as an engineering major, switched to music, and, finding neither discipline satisfying, left formal education for roughly seven years, a stretch he later described as an intellectual odyssey of various jobs, wide reading, and slow movement toward philosophy, political theory, economics, and law. He returned to higher education in 1968 with a clearer sense of purpose and took a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Columbia University in 1971.

Pilon continued at the University of Chicago, where he earned a master’s degree and a doctorate in philosophy. His dissertation, A Theory of Rights: Toward Limited Government (1979), examined the philosophical foundations of individual rights and the moral limits of political authority, and it carried the marks of three influences who supervised or surrounded the project: the philosophers Alan Gewirth (1912-2004) and Alan Donagan (1925-1991), who directed the work, and the economist Milton Friedman (1912-2006), whose presence at Chicago colored the broader intellectual setting. During these years Pilon also met the law-and-economics scholarship then forming at Chicago, a body of thought that would inform his later constitutional writing.

The defense of natural rights has supplied the central theme of his career. Drawing on John Locke (1632-1704), the American Founders, and the wider classical liberal inheritance, Pilon argues that individuals hold rights because of their nature as rational and purposive agents, that such rights do not originate in government, and that governments instead come into existence to secure rights already in place. On this account the legitimacy of any political institution turns on how well it protects life, liberty, and property while respecting the equal rights of others.

This starting point leads him to a sharp distinction between liberty rights and welfare rights. Liberty rights guard the individual against coercion and interference. Welfare rights, by contrast, require government to compel some men to furnish resources or services to others. Pilon argues that governments may choose to establish social programs, yet such programs ought not be mistaken for fundamental rights, a position that places him within the classical liberal tradition and that has shaped his criticism of expansive government programs and regulatory systems.

Property occupies a place near the center of his thought. He treats property not as an economic institution alone but as a condition of personal independence, holding that secure control over one’s labor and possessions guards the other liberties, which grow vulnerable without it. Much of his scholarship therefore criticizes the judicial doctrines and regulatory practices that weaken constitutional protection of private property, and he has pressed a long argument against eminent-domain abuse, against heavy regulation, and against doctrines that let governments load substantial burdens on owners without compensation.

His constitutional theory joins originalism to a broader commitment to the principles of the American Revolution as stated in the Declaration of Independence. Pilon argues that the Declaration of Independence supplies the moral ground of the American constitutional order and that the Constitution then builds the institutions meant to secure those principles, and for that reason he rejects procedural or majoritarian readings of constitutional government, holding that democratic majorities carry legitimate authority only within the boundaries set by individual rights.

A defining feature of his legal philosophy has been a long quarrel with judicial restraint. Across the late twentieth century many conservative legal thinkers, Robert Bork (1927-2012) foremost among them, argued that judges should defer to legislatures except where a constitutional violation appears explicit and unmistakable. Pilon refused that view. He held that courts carry an affirmative duty to protect liberty against governmental encroachment and should not presume the constitutionality of legislative acts, and decades before the term gained currency he argued for what later acquired the name judicial engagement, an approach under which courts enforce constitutional limits on government power and give substantive protection to individual rights.

His scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment shows the same commitment. Pilon argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect substantive individual rights against the states, and he regards the Supreme Court’s decision in The Slaughter-House Cases as among the gravest constitutional errors in American history because it drained that clause of force. Restoring the clause to its original meaning, he contends, might strengthen constitutional protection for economic liberty, property, and other freedoms.

Though known mostly as a scholar, Pilon also gathered considerable government experience. Under the administration of Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) he held a series of senior policy posts at the Office of Personnel Management, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice. At the Justice Department he served as the first director of the Asylum Policy and Review Unit, where he worked on refugee and asylum questions during a period of large international migration and Cold War strain, and the experience deepened a skepticism toward bureaucratic expansion and confirmed his sense that administrative agencies often wield powers hard to square with constitutional principle.

One episode from these years carried a personal cost. A lengthy inquiry by the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility considered an alleged disclosure of classified information, and Pilon maintained his innocence throughout. After his clearance he brought suit under the Privacy Act, arguing that confidential information about the investigation had leaked. The litigation ended in his favor with a substantial settlement, an outcome that hardened his standing as a critic of governmental abuse and administrative misconduct.

Before his government service Pilon taught philosophy at California State University, Sonoma, and philosophy of law at Emory University School of Law, and he held a fellowship at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellowship at the Institute for Humane Studies. These posts tied him to a widening network of scholars devoted to free markets, constitutional government, and classical liberal ideas.

In 1989 Pilon joined the Cato Institute and founded what became an influential center for constitutional study. Under his direction the Center for Constitutional Studies advanced scholarship on limited government, federalism, economic liberty, and judicial review, and it grew into a venue for debate over constitutional interpretation and legal reform. Pilon organized conferences, sponsored research, testified before Congress, and built relationships among academics, judges, litigators, and policy experts drawn to the project of restoring constitutional limits on government power.

Among his lasting institutional achievements stands the Cato Supreme Court Review, which he created in 2001. Conceived as an annual study of the Court from a classical liberal vantage, the publication became a respected forum for legal analysis and constitutional argument. Pilon served as its founding publisher and later as publisher emeritus, and through the Review and the wider work of Cato’s constitutional program he carried libertarian legal arguments into the mainstream discussion of constitutional law.

He has written across a wide range of subjects, from free speech, federalism, and economic liberty to drug prohibition, judicial review, constitutional history, and international human rights, and he has edited volumes that include Flag-Burning, Discrimination, and the Right to Do Wrong, The Politics and Law of Term Limits, and The Rule of Law in the Wake of Clinton. His writing returns again and again to the danger of concentrated political power and to the place of constitutional constraint in the preservation of individual freedom.

Unlike many conservative constitutional theorists, Pilon grounds rights in reason rather than theology. He acknowledges the historical weight of Christianity on Western political development, yet he argues that natural rights admit of justification through philosophical reasoning open to all men whatever their religious belief, a rationalist orientation that reflects both his philosophical training and his continuing engagement with Enlightenment political thought.

His influence runs past libertarian circles. Scholars who work on judicial engagement, constitutional originalism, economic liberty, and limits on administrative power often take up arguments that Pilon helped form decades earlier, and while critics challenge his reliance on natural-rights reasoning and his skepticism toward the modern regulatory state, even opponents grant his standing as a consistent defender of classical liberal constitutionalism.

Pilon remains a senior fellow at Cato and continues to write and speak on constitutional questions, property, the Declaration of Independence, and the proper scope of government. His later writing circles back to the themes that have held him throughout: the moral foundations of liberty, the hazards of unconstrained political power, and the constitutional architecture built to protect individual rights.

He is married to Juliana Geran Pilon, a Romanian-born philosopher, author, and scholar of democracy and international affairs, and their shared formation in philosophy reflects a long intellectual partnership rooted in a common interest in political thought and the defense of free societies.

The significance of Roger Pilon rests not in his scholarship alone but in his work as a bridge among academic philosophy, constitutional law, and public policy. At a time when many legal scholars settled into either abstract theory or practical litigation, Pilon tied foundational questions about rights and human freedom to concrete constitutional disputes, and through that effort he became an architect of contemporary libertarian legal thought and a leading advocate of limited constitutional government in modern America.

The Sociology of Philosophies

Randall Collins (b. 1941) wrote The Sociology of Philosophies to press a hard claim about how ideas rise. Thinkers do not win on the strength of their arguments alone. They win on position in a network. The eminent cluster with the eminent, master to pupil and rival against rival, and the names that survive tend to sit at the dense crossings of these chains. Collins read two and a half millennia of philosophy this way and found one shape across cultures and centuries: a small set of linked figures holds the attention of each generation, the link comes first and the fame second, and the texts that endure carry the emotional charge of the gatherings that produced them. Set Pilon against this frame and the life hands the frame its data.

Begin with the chain that formed him. Collins holds that creative thinkers descend from creative thinkers, that cultural capital and emotional energy pass down master-pupil lines the way an inheritance passes down a family. Pilon took his doctorate at Chicago under Gewirth and Donagan, two philosophers already at work on the foundations of rights and moral agency, and he did so within reach of Friedman and the law-and-economics scholarship then gathering force at the same place. On Collins’s reading this matters more than any single book Pilon later wrote. He arrived at his own work charged by contact with men who held the attention of their fields, and he carried their problems forward as his own. Gewirth argued rights from the structure of rational agency. Pilon’s dissertation, A Theory of Rights: Toward Limited Government, took up that thread and ran it toward constitutional limits. The continuity reads less as borrowing than as descent.

Collins adds a second law, the one he calls the law of small numbers. The attention space of any field holds room for only a handful of active positions at a time, somewhere between three and six. Below three there is too little conflict to hold an audience. Above six the field splinters and no position commands notice. Rivals therefore define one another, and a thinker secures his slot by standing against the men who hold the neighboring slots. Place Pilon here and his quarrel with judicial restraint comes into focus. Across the late twentieth century the conservative legal field organized itself around restraint, and Bork held that position with authority. Pilon took the opposing slot and argued for what later acquired the name judicial engagement: courts that enforce constitutional limits rather than defer to legislatures. The two positions sharpen against each other. Engagement needs restraint to push against, and the energy of the argument comes from the opposition as much as from the substance. Collins would read the pairing as structural before it is philosophical.

The third element is the base. Collins insists that no intellectual position survives without an organizational base and a patron to fund it. Monasteries carried medieval philosophy. Universities and academies carried what came after. Shift the base and the field shifts with it. Most thinkers inherit a base, a chair in a department built by men who came before. Pilon built his own. He had taught at Sonoma and at Emory and had held fellowships at Hoover and the Institute for Humane Studies, the ordinary stations of an academic career, and then in 1989 he left that path and founded the Center for Constitutional Studies at Cato. The move reads, in Collins’s terms, as the creation of a base outside the university, funded by the patronage that sustains the libertarian network, and stocked deliberately with the carriers a position needs to spread: not other philosophers alone but judges, litigators, and policy experts who could move the argument from the page into the courts. A philosopher who recruits litigators has understood something Collins makes explicit. Ideas travel through their carriers.

The base needs its rituals, and here too the life cooperates. Collins draws his account of emotional energy from the study of interaction rituals, the focused gatherings that generate solidarity and recharge the confidence of the men inside them. Pilon ran conferences, testified before Congress, and built relationships across the field, and in 2001 he founded the Cato Supreme Court Review, an annual study of the Court from the libertarian vantage. An annual review is a ritual in Collins’s sense. It assembles the network on a fixed cycle, focuses its attention on a shared object, and sends its members back to their work charged with the sense that they belong to a project larger than any one of them. The Review did for Pilon’s circle what the seminar and the academy did for the chains Collins traced across history. It manufactured the solidarity that keeps a position alive between generations.

The judicial engagement idea rose, Collins’s account suggests, less because the argument compelled assent than because Pilon occupied a slot, built a base, ran the rituals, and recruited the carriers who could push the position into the institutions that decide cases. The merits of the natural-rights argument sit outside the frame. Collins brackets the question of whether a thinker is correct and asks instead how his position captured and held a share of the attention space. By that measure Pilon succeeded through the same route Collins found everywhere: descent from an eminent chain, a defining rivalry, a self-built base, a patron, and a ritual that renewed the arrangement on schedule.

Pilon presents himself as a man who reasons rights from human nature and follows the argument where it leads, and the natural-rights tradition trains its defenders to tell the story that way, as conviction against power. Collins relocates the story in the network. The conviction is real and the frame does not deny it. The frame holds that conviction alone never built an attention space, and that the rise of judicial engagement runs through Chicago, through Cato, through the Review, and through the litigators who carried it, more than through the force of any single proof.

What the frame leaves out is the content of the rights themselves and the question of whether the Privileges or Immunities argument or the reading of The Slaughter-House Cases states something true about the constitutional order. Collins does not arbitrate that. He maps the network that carried the claim into the room where it could be heard. Pilon’s life supplies what the theory asks for, and the theory returns a Pilon who looks less like a philosopher alone with a principle and more like a node that found its slot, built its base, and held its share of the attention space for forty years.

The Great Delusion

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Pilon grounds rights in man’s nature as a rational and purposive agent. Rights precede government. They reach all men through reason, whatever the creed or culture a man happens to inherit, and Pilon takes care to ground them in reason rather than theology so that the claim might hold for everyone and not for believers alone. The rights-bearing individual stands first, the group and the government after, and property guards the independence that lets the individual stand at all. The architecture rests on three loads: the individual is prior, reason is the faculty that finds his rights, and the rights so found hold for every man.

Mearsheimer pulls each load.

He pulls the faculty first. Pilon rests the structure on reason, and Mearsheimer ranks reason the weakest of the three sources and the last to arrive. The faculty Pilon makes foundational shows up after a man’s society has already stocked him with a code, which means the rights Pilon says any man can reason toward are, on Mearsheimer’s account, reached by almost no man through reason, because reason is not the place moral codes come from. Pilon’s foundation turns out to be the part of the human equipment that does the least work.

He pulls the unit next. Pilon’s individual holds rights before any government and, in the logic of the argument, before any group. Mearsheimer’s individual is born into a society that forms him before he can assert a self, and develops attachments to that society strong enough to die for. The atomistic rights-bearer, the self who owns himself prior to the social world, is the figure Mearsheimer says liberalism invents and then mistakes for something it found in nature. Liberty rights that guard the self against coercion and property that secures the self’s independence both presuppose a self standing apart from the group. Mearsheimer denies there is one.

He pulls the reach last, and this pull does the most damage to the thing Pilon cares about. Pilon left theology for reason to win the universal, rights for all men whatever they believe. Mearsheimer answers that moral codes come from socialization and inborn sentiment, both of them local, both varying from group to group, so the universal Pilon reaches for through reason collapses back into the particular code of one society. The flight from creed lands in another creed wearing different clothes.

What then for Pilon, if Mearsheimer is right?

His universalism reads as parochialism in disguise. The natural rights he calls human nature become the moral inheritance of a particular people, Lockean, Enlightenment, American, dressed up as the structure of all human nature and offered to the species. Mearsheimer ties this move to foreign policy, to the liberal state that goes abroad to spread rights it takes for universal. Pilon keeps his work at home, on the Constitution and the courts, yet the intellectual move underneath is the one Mearsheimer names: take the code of your own society, run it through reason, and present the output as a discovery about man as such.

Something of Pilon survives the demolition, though not the part he would defend hardest. Mearsheimer grants that liberalism works inside a nation-state, nested within a bounded group held together by the stronger force of nationalism. Pilon’s constitutional project can survive on those terms, re-described as the defense of one nation’s inherited settlement rather than the application of universal reason. The American order is a particular people’s achievement, and a man who guards it guards his tribe’s arrangement. That is the last name Pilon claims for what he does. Mearsheimer hands it to him anyway.

The stress test owes Pilon a fair limit, and here it is. Mearsheimer’s anthropology describes how men come to believe what they believe. Pilon’s claim is normative, that rights exist however a man arrives at the sight of them. A story about how a belief forms does not settle whether the belief is true. Mathematics also arrives after the value infusion, and its lateness says nothing about whether its theorems hold. Pilon can answer, then, that Mearsheimer has explained why few men reason their way to natural rights without showing that natural rights are not there to be reasoned toward. To explain the rarity of a belief is not to refute it.

The standoff costs Pilon more than it costs Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer dissolves the social plausibility of the universal claim and leaves Pilon a foundation that almost no man reaches through the faculty Pilon says delivers it, defended by a tradition that looks, from the outside, like one tribe’s code raised to the dignity of human nature. Pilon keeps the bare possibility that the rights are real and waiting. Whether a moral foundation that nearly no one reaches by reason can still serve as the foundation it claims to be is the question Mearsheimer forces and Pilon cannot walk around. The rationalist grounding that was supposed to open natural rights to every man becomes, if Mearsheimer is right, the narrowest beam in the house.

The Man Who Owes Nothing

He leaves Syracuse with nothing settled. Engineering first, then music, then neither, and then the long stretch of close to seven years, jobs and reading and no degree to hand a parent or a dean. A man can read his way out of one life and into another across years like those, and Pilon does. He comes back to school in 1968 already formed, already his own work, and earns the Columbia degree in 1971 and the Chicago doctorate after. The pattern holds for the rest of the life. He builds what he stands on. He founds his own center in 1989 rather than take a chair some other man built. He grounds rights in reason so that no priest need vouch for them. He owes the standing to no one, and that, more than any single argument, is the shape of the man.

Ernest Becker (1924-1974) wrote The Denial of Death to explain what such standing is for. A man knows two things an animal does not. He knows he will die, and he knows, in the meantime, that he is an animal, a thing that eats and sweats and rots, a creature of no obvious account against the size of the universe. These two facts, mortality and creatureliness, press on him every waking hour, and he cannot live under the full weight of them. So every culture hands him a hero system, a set of roles and prizes by which he can feel that his life counts for something that will not die with his body. The hero system is the answer to the terror. It tells a man how to earn significance, how to be of lasting worth, how to purchase a piece of the eternal with the coin of a single life. Becker calls the deepest version of this project causa sui, the wish to be the cause of oneself, to be one’s own father, to owe one’s existence to no one and so to slip the leash of dependence and, behind dependence, of death.

Read Pilon through that lens and the wandering years stop looking like indecision. They look like the first move in a causa sui project carried out with rare consistency. The subtraction comes first. Pilon subtracts the inherited path, the degree taken on schedule. He subtracts theology from the ground of rights, grounding them in reason so the structure stands without God’s signature. He subtracts the borrowed institution and raises his own. What remains after the subtractions is a self that claims to rest on itself, a man who reasons his rights out of his own nature and bolts them to a Constitution built to outlast him. The eternal thing Pilon attaches himself to is not heaven and not the tribe. The eternal thing is rights, which on his account precede every government and survive it, and which therefore do not die.

Now the sacred words. Pilon keeps three close: liberty, property, rights. They serve one master word under them, and the master word is independence. Liberty is the absence of another man’s hand on you. Property is the wall that keeps the hand off. Rights are the title to the wall. Strip the technical layers and the thing being protected is a self that stands alone, owes nothing, asks nothing, and answers to no one but its own reason. For Pilon independence is the proof of dignity and the highest of the goods. A man who depends is a man diminished. A man who needs is a man exposed. The free man is the man who has arranged his life so that he need not need.

Hold that word up, independence, and carry it into other hero systems, because a sacred word means nothing until you know which terror it answers and which heaven it buys.

Carry it to a dying man in a hospice bed, three days from the end, who spent forty years building a life that required no one. He says it plainly to the chaplain who comes in the afternoon. “I never wanted to be a burden. I arranged everything so I would never have to ask.” His hands move on the blanket. “And now I need someone to lift the cup. I need someone to turn me. I wish I had practiced needing people. I wish I had not waited until I had no choice.” For this man independence is not the prize. Independence is the thing he must lay down to die well, the long habit that left him alone at the one hour belonging is the only comfort.

Carry it to a Maori elder on the bank of a river his people have named as an ancestor and a person in law. Ask him whether the river is his property, whether he holds independent title. He laughs, not unkindly. “You ask the wrong question. The river does not belong to me. I belong to the river, and so did my grandfather, and so will my granddaughter when I am bones.” For him the self that owns and stands alone is a category mistake, a knot that thinks it is the whole rope. Significance comes through the line that runs from the dead to the unborn, and a man’s worth is his place in that line, not his title to a parcel he can sell.

Carry it to a Trappist in a cloister who rose at three for vigils and will rise at three tomorrow. He took a vow of obedience and counts it the day he was set free. “I have no will of my own inside these walls,” he says, and his face when he says it holds no grief. “That is the freedom. The man outside spends his strength deciding. I gave the deciding to God and to the abbot, and what is left over I give to prayer.” For him independence wears the old name of pride, the first sin, the one that wanted to be its own cause and fell. The hero system here runs the other way from Pilon’s. A man earns the eternal by emptying the self, not by fortifying it.

Carry it to a sergeant who came back from a long deployment and buried two men from his squad. Say the word independence to him and watch his jaw set. “Out there the guy who wanted to do it his own way, who wanted to be the independent operator, that guy got people killed. You live because the man next to you carries your gear when you fall out. You owe him your life and he owes you his, and that debt is the only thing that holds when the rounds come in.” For him the free man who owes nothing is the dangerous man. Worth comes through the debt, through the unit, through the obligation Pilon’s free agent files under coercion.

Five men, one word. To Pilon it is the highest virtue. To the dying man it is the habit he regrets. To the elder it is a confusion. To the monk it is a sin. To the sergeant it is a hazard. The word does not float free with a fixed meaning a man can reason toward. The word lives inside a hero system and dies outside it, and each of these men reaches for the eternal by a route that makes Pilon’s route look not universal but particular, the chosen path of one tradition that prizes the standing-alone self above the held self, the bought wall above the inherited line.

How much of this does Pilon see. At the level of argument, a great deal. He knows he holds a position. He names his framework, defends it against rivals, grants that other men reason their way to other conclusions. He fought judicial restraint for decades and knew Bork held the opposite slot in good faith. His self-awareness as a thinker runs high. His self-awareness as a creature runs low, because the hero system is built to keep it low. A man cannot see his own death-denial as a death-denial and still draw comfort from it. Pilon experiences his love of independence as the recognition of a truth about human dignity. Becker says that is how it must feel from the inside. The vital lie does not announce itself. It presents itself as the plain sight of what is real.

Three coordinates close the reading.

The shape of the hero. Pilon is the self-caused man, the boy who walked away from the credential and spent seven years making himself, the scholar who grounded his rights in his own reason and his own institution, the figure who arranged a life and a philosophy so that he might owe his standing to no one and might fasten that standing to a thing, natural rights, that does not die. The denial of death takes, in him, the form of independence raised to a metaphysics.

The unnamed rival. Pilon names the state. The leviathan, the regulator, the eminent-domain officer, the agency that takes property without paying for it, these are the named enemies of the work. The rival he never names stands behind the state and wears it like a uniform. The rival is dependence, and behind dependence, death. The government that can coerce you, take your wall, end your independence is mortality in administrative dress, the one adversary a man cannot litigate against, displaced onto the one adversary he can. Pilon spent a career suing the stand-in.

The cost the ledger cannot price. Pilon built an accounting, liberty rights on one side, welfare rights on the other, the compelled transfer weighed against the protected sphere. The ledger is clean and the entries balance. What the ledger cannot price is the worth of being held. It has no column for the infant who owes everything and earns nothing and is loved past all desert, and no column for the old man who needs the cup lifted to his mouth, and these two, the cradle and the deathbed, are the pure cases of the human creature, the start and the finish Becker named. A life built to need no one arrives, at the end, needed by no one. That is the entry the man who owes nothing can never enter, because to enter it he would have to admit the debt, and the hero system stands on the refusal of the debt. He dies solvent and alone, the books square, the cup just out of reach.

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