January 4, 2026 Might 2026 Break The Left? Luke Ford No sacred cows.

Might 2026 Break The Left?

Posted on January 4, 2026 by Luke Ford

No way. Left and right are evolved ways of responding to reality that have worked over the centuries. Neither is disappearing.

Mark Halperin writes: “What would it take – honestly now – for the American left, and for the anti-Trump conservatives who have turned their exile into a brand, to admit that Donald Trump has delivered something real on the two oldest tests any leader faces: peace and prosperity?”

Halperin posits that American politics has moved beyond policy debate into a state of epistemic closure, where “success” cannot be acknowledged if it comes from the opposing tribe.

He sets a rhetorical trap for the Left and anti-Trump conservatives. By framing the potential success of 2026 in traditional, undeniable terms—peace and prosperity—he suggests that any refusal to acknowledge these gains is proof of bad faith.

If inflation is down, the economy is humming, and there are no new wars, then objective reality should force a concession.

If critics still attack Trump despite these conditions, Halperin argues it proves they care more about the narrative of Trump’s failure than the reality of American success. He is diagnosing a shift from “loyal opposition” to “automatic rejection.”

A key tension in Halperin’s argument—which he briefly touches on but doesn’t fully explore—is that the “Left” and the “Right” are currently keeping score on different boards.

Halperin’s Metrics: He focuses on “basics”: economy (inflation, GDP) and foreign policy stability (no wars). These are traditional, tangible metrics.

The Critics’ Metrics: Trump’s fiercest critics often focus on institutional norms, civil rights, democratic processes, and rhetoric.

The Disconnect: Even if 2026 brings economic booms and peace, critics may not view this as “success” if they believe those gains came at the cost of judicial independence, social cohesion, or minority rights. Halperin calls this “blindness,” but critics would call it “prioritizing values over GDP.”

Halperin makes an interesting historical point about the loss of “grudging confession.”

He notes that Progressives eventually gave Reagan credit and Republicans eventually gave Clinton credit.

His thesis is that this feedback loop is broken. In the current media ecosystem, admitting the other side did anything right is viewed as a betrayal of one’s own audience or base. This leads to a scenario where “Trump equals failure” is a dogma that cannot be violated by evidence.

Notice how Halperin shifts the burden of proof. The article isn’t really about whether Trump is succeeding; it assumes for the sake of the argument that he might. The piece is actually an interrogation of the critics’ psychology.

He is asking: Are you capable of being happy for the country if the person making it better is someone you hate?

By posing this as a question of “democratic maturity,” he frames the opposition as petulant children refusing to look at the scoreboard.

Halperin is effectively arguing that we have entered an era of zero-sum reality. If 2026 is a good year for America, it is a bad year for the anti-Trump coalition because it destroys their central thesis. He is betting that, faced with a choice between their narrative and a booming country, the critics will cling to the narrative.

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What Is The Trump Doctrine?

Posted on January 4, 2026 by Luke Ford

I wrote this with help from the AI chatbot Gemini: The “Trump Doctrine” is a foreign policy approach rooted in “America First” realism, which prioritizes U.S. national sovereignty, economic interests, and bilateral transactional relationships over the traditional post-WWII consensus of liberal internationalism, multilateral alliances, and global policing.

Its key pillars include:

1. The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine

A major evolution in his second term is the explicit revival and expansion of the Monroe Doctrine. This “Trump Corollary” asserts that the United States must maintain absolute pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere.

Goal: To prevent foreign adversaries (specifically China and Russia) from establishing military or strategic economic footholds in the Americas.

Action: This involves aggressive measures to secure supply chains, control migration flows at the source, and combat transnational criminal organizations (cartels) as direct threats to U.S. sovereignty.

2. Transactional Realism

The doctrine views international relations not as a community of nations bound by shared values, but as a competitive marketplace of sovereign states.

Alliances: Alliances like NATO are viewed through a balance sheet. Allies are expected to “pay their fair share” for U.S. protection. The U.S. commitment is conditional on burden-sharing rather than automatic.

Trade: Economic security is treated as national security. The doctrine favors bilateral trade deals where the U.S. can leverage its economic weight, rather than multilateral agreements (like the TPP) that dilute U.S. leverage. Tariffs are used aggressively as a tool of diplomatic coercion.

3. Restraint and “Peace Through Strength”

The doctrine rejects “forever wars” and nation-building, viewing recent U.S. interventions (like Iraq and Afghanistan) as failures that drained American resources.

Use of Force: Military force is reserved for direct threats to U.S. interests, not for humanitarian intervention or regime change. However, when force is used, the doctrine advocates for overwhelming, decisive power rather than proportional or gradual escalation.

Deterrence: The focus is on building a military so powerful that adversaries are deterred from challenging the U.S., allowing for a reduction in active troop deployments abroad.

4. Regional Applications (2025 Strategy)

China: Framed as the primary strategic competitor. The goal is not necessarily to change China’s internal system but to decouple economically where necessary and block its rise to regional hegemony in Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

Europe: The doctrine encourages European “self-reliance,” pushing for a resolution to conflicts like the war in Ukraine to reduce the U.S. burden and refocus resources on domestic priorities and China.

Middle East: A shift toward “burden shifting” to regional partners. The U.S. maintains strong support for Israel and opposition to Iran but seeks to avoid large-scale ground entanglements.

Unlike the “Liberal International Order” which sought to spread democracy and free trade globally, the Trump Doctrine is nationalist and defensive. It asks: “What is the direct return on investment for the American taxpayer?” If a policy, alliance, or war does not yield a tangible benefit to U.S. security or prosperity, the doctrine dictates it should be renegotiated or abandoned.

Because the “Trump Doctrine” breaks the mold of traditional bipartisan foreign policy, the best analysts are often those who step outside the standard Washington consensus (liberal internationalism) to examine the doctrine on its own terms—whether they support it or not.

Here are the people doing the best job analyzing the doctrine in its second-term maturity, categorized by their specific lens:

1. The Historian: Walter Russell Mead

Mead is arguably the most essential reader of the Trump phenomenon. He famously classified Trump’s foreign policy as “Jacksonian” (named after Andrew Jackson).

The Analysis: He explains that the Trump Doctrine isn’t “isolationism” but a distinct American tradition: highly nationalist, skeptical of global governance/elite projects, but relentlessly aggressive if honor or security is directly challenged.

Why read him: To understand the historical continuity of the doctrine. Mead argues this is a return to 19th-century American instincts, not an anomaly.

2. The Strategist: Elbridge Colby

A former defense official and author of The Strategy of Denial, Colby is the intellectual architect of the “Asia First” / Anti-China strategy.

The Analysis: He provides the rigorous strategic framework for the doctrine’s “restraint” in Europe and the Middle East. He argues the U.S. military is overstretched and must ruthlessly prioritize preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia.

Why read him: He articulates the “realist” logic behind abandoning universal policing to focus purely on Great Power competition (specifically China).

3. The Cultural Critic: Christopher Caldwell

Caldwell analyzes the doctrine not just as policy, but as a revolt against the post-1945 “Liberal International Order.”

The Analysis: He argues that the Trump Doctrine views the “rules-based order” (UN, WTO, EU) not as a neutral system, but as a rival ideology that threatens national sovereignty. He explains the doctrine’s “civilizational” aspect—why it prefers bilateral deals with other strong nations (even adversaries like Russia) over multilateral submission.

Why read him: To understand the domestic and cultural impulses driving the foreign policy—why “Globalism” is treated as a dirty word.

4. The Economic Architect: Robert Lighthizer

As the key thinker behind the tariff strategy, Lighthizer explains the fusion of economic security and national security.

The Analysis: He posits that a nation that outsources its industrial base to a rival (China) ceases to be sovereign. The Trump Doctrine’s protectionism isn’t just about jobs; it’s a national security strategy to force “decoupling.”

Why read him: To understand why tariffs are used as diplomatic weapons and why the doctrine rejects “free trade” in favor of “balanced trade.”

5. The “Cold War” Realist: Niall Ferguson

Ferguson places the doctrine in the context of a “Second Cold War.”

The Analysis: He often compares the current strategy to the Nixon-Kissinger era—specifically the attempt to split the Russia-China axis (reverse Kissinger). He analyzes the doctrine’s transactional nature as a necessary adaptation to a world where the U.S. is no longer the sole hyperpower.

Why read him: For the “Grand Strategy” view. He assesses whether the tactical moves (like pressuring Europe or courting Russia) actually add up to a coherent geopolitical win.

6. The “Restrainer”: Sumantra Maitra

A leading voice at The American Conservative, Maitra articulates the “Dormant NATO” or “Burden Shifting” aspect of the doctrine.

The Analysis: He argues for “Realism with Huntingtonian characteristics”—the idea that the U.S. should defend its core civilizational sphere (the Western Hemisphere) but force Europe to defend itself.

Why read him: To understand the specific mechanics of how the U.S. plans to downsize its footprint in Europe without fully leaving NATO.

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The Ferguson Effect

Posted on January 4, 2026 by Luke Ford

I wrote this with help from Gemini:

In the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Ferguson protests and the subsequent rise in homicides in several major cities (including St. Louis and Baltimore), the media coverage was defined by a stark partisan divide.

The term “Ferguson Effect” was popularized by Manhattan Institute fellow Heather Mac Donald in a May 2015 Wall Street Journal op-ed. Conservative outlets (Fox News, National Review, WSJ Editorial Board) embraced the theory immediately. Their coverage framed it as a dire warning: demonizing police was causing officers to disengage (“de-policing”), leading directly to emboldened criminals and deadlier streets.

Major outlets like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Vox initially treated the theory with deep skepticism, often labeling it a “myth” or “debunked.” Their coverage focused on the lack of national data. Because crime rates were not rising uniformly in every city, these outlets argued the spikes were localized anomalies rather than a systemic “effect.”

A prevailing narrative in 2015 was that the Ferguson Effect was a right-wing talking point designed to shield police from necessary reform. Columnists frequently cited the long-term historical decline in crime to suggest panic was premature.

A major media flashpoint occurred in late 2015 when FBI Director James Comey validated the theory (calling it a “chill wind” blowing through law enforcement), putting him at odds with the Obama White House. This forced mainstream outlets to cover the theory not just as a conservative hypothesis, but as a serious internal government debate.

As academic studies began to catch up with the news cycle, the coverage became less dismissive but more fragmented.

MSM coverage began to acknowledge that de-policing was happening in specific cities (like Chicago and Baltimore) and was correlated with crime spikes. However, the framing shifted. Instead of blaming “anti-police rhetoric” (the conservative frame), outlets like The Atlantic and The Washington Post often framed it as a “crisis of legitimacy” or a breakdown in trust between communities and police.

Coverage of studies (such as those by Richard Rosenfeld) highlighted that while a universal Ferguson Effect didn’t exist, a “version” of it was real in cities with intense unrest. MSM headlines often used phrases like “Mixed Results” or “Complicated Truth” rather than the flat denials of 2015.

The massive spike in homicides in 2020 (a ~30% increase nationally) following the murder of George Floyd and the subsequent protests fundamentally altered the coverage.

Post-2020, it became impossible for the MSM to deny the correlation between intense scrutiny, police pullback, and rising violence. However, many mainstream outlets avoided using the term “Ferguson Effect,” which carried conservative baggage. Instead, reports focused on “police staffing shortages,” “recruitment crises,” and “morale issues.” The phenomenon—officers leaving the force or stopping proactive work—was reported widely, but often framed as a labor/HR crisis or a result of “officer burnout” rather than a political consequence of reform rhetoric.

In 2020/2021, coverage of a study by Harvard economist Roland Fryer (which found that investigations into police departments following viral incidents led to thousands of excess felonies due to de-policing) forced a moment of reckoning. Centrist outlets covered this as “uncomfortable evidence” that the original theory had merit.

In 2024 and 2025, the coverage has shifted again. With crime rates now falling from their 2020–2022 peaks, liberal MSM (MSNBC, CNN, NYT) is heavily focused on the “Perception Gap”—reporting that voters feel unsafe despite data showing crime is down. Conservative media continues to argue that crime remains above 2014 levels and that the “soft-on-crime” policies (a derivative of the Ferguson Effect argument) are still doing damage.

The MSM coverage moved from denial (2015) to localized acceptance (2017) to rebranded validation (2020). While outlets like the New York Times rarely use the specific phrase “Ferguson Effect” affirmatively, their reporting on the “police recruitment crisis” and the link between officer withdrawal and violence now mirrors the core mechanics of the theory they originally dismissed.

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Age and health concerns about Joe Biden

Posted on January 4, 2026 by Luke Ford

The Wikipedia entry title seems like weak tea: “Age and health concerns about Joe Biden.”

This employs a classic Wikipedia neutralization tactic: framing a subject as a discussion about a thing, rather than the thing itself. By calling it “concerns,” the title attributes the issue to public perception rather than asserting a medical or political reality.

Wikipedia’s “Neutral Point of View” (NPOV) policy generally forces titles to be descriptive but non-judgmental.

Using “Concerns about [Subject]” is a standard Wikipedia workaround. It avoids validating the premise (that he has declined) and instead documents that other people are worried about it. It treats the issue as a static topic of debate rather than an active crisis or medical event. Editors likely avoided terms like “Decline” or “Impairment” to avoid violating policies against “original research” or diagnosing living people (similar to the Goldwater Rule).

For comparison, Wikipedia uses similarly distant language for other leaders. For example, Donald Trump’s section on mental health is often buried under “Public image” or “Medical history” rather than having a standalone “Decline” article. Wikipedia generally resists titles that sound like newspaper headlines (e.g., “Biden’s Decline”) in favor of encyclopedic, albeit dry, descriptors.

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The Top Ten Stories The MSM Played Down For Fear Of Helping Trump

Posted on January 4, 2026 by Luke Ford

Mark Halperin writes:

National reporters ping-pong between policy detail and political intrigue. And always, lurking beneath, is the unmistakable tension: journalists know this is a huge story but fear amplifying it in ways that could benefit Trump politically.

Mainstream media institutions often practice “status closure” by closing ranks to protect preferred narratives and exclude information that validates their political adversaries.

Here are the top ten stories of the past decade that critics argue were minimized, suppressed, or “slow-walked” because amplifying them risked politically benefiting Donald Trump, according to Gemini.

This list aligns with the sociological mechanism Halperin identifies: the fear that reporting the truth is a “political act” if it benefits the wrong faction.

1. The Hunter Biden Laptop (October 2020)

The Story: A laptop abandoned by the son of the Democratic nominee contained evidence of influence peddling and drug use.

The Suppression: Fearing a repeat of the 2016 “Comey Letter” or “Clinton Emails” that might tip the election to Trump, major outlets (and tech platforms) actively blocked the story, labeling it “Russian disinformation” without evidence.

Why they feared amplifying it: It directly challenged the “adults are back in charge” narrative and validated Trump’s accusations of Biden family corruption.

2. The Wuhan Lab Leak Theory (2020–2021)

The Story: The hypothesis that COVID-19 originated from a laboratory accident in Wuhan rather than a wet market.

The Suppression: Because Trump embraced the theory (often using inflammatory language), the media instinctively categorized it as a “conspiracy theory” or “racist.” Scientific viability was sacrificed to deny Trump a narrative win.

Why they feared amplifying it: It would have vindicated Trump’s geopolitics regarding China and his skepticism of the global health establishment.

3. Biden’s Cognitive Decline (2020–June 2024)

The Story: Visible evidence of President Biden’s slowing mental acuity, confusion, and physical frailty.

The Suppression: For years, videos of these moments were labeled “cheap fakes” or “right-wing misinformation.” The press pool largely adhered to an unwritten rule not to focus on his mental fitness until the June 2024 debate made it impossible to ignore.

Why they feared amplifying it: It neutralized the primary argument against Trump (that he was unfit/unstable) and suggested the “caretaker” presidency was a facade.

4. The DNC Funding of the Steele Dossier (2017–2022)

The Story: The revelation that the infamous dossier sparking the Russia investigation was not high-level intel, but opposition research paid for by the Clinton Campaign (via Perkins Coie).

The Suppression: While the dossier’s salacious details were amplified 24/7, the mundane reality of its provenance was treated as a “process detail” and buried for years.

Why they feared amplifying it: It revealed that the media had spent years breathless over a partisan hit-job, vindicating Trump’s claim of a “witch hunt.”

5. The “Mostly Peaceful” Riots (Summer 2020)

The Story: The extent of the arson, property damage, and violence that accompanied the George Floyd protests ($1–2 billion in damages).

The Suppression: Reporters famously stood in front of burning buildings describing protests as “mostly peaceful.” The violence was contextualized as “the voice of the unheard” rather than criminal disorder.

Why they feared amplifying it: Visuals of chaos in Democrat-run cities were precisely the campaign imagery Trump needed for his “Law and Order” platform.

6. The Border Crisis Numbers (2021–2024)

The Story: Record-breaking numbers of illegal crossings and the logistical collapse of border towns under the Biden administration.

The Suppression: Coverage was sporadic and often focused on the “humanitarian” aspect rather than the “national security” or “enforcement failure” aspect. The “kids in cages” outrage, ubiquitous under Trump, largely vanished despite similar conditions.

Why they feared amplifying it: The border was Trump’s signature issue. Admitting it was a disaster would be an admission that his “Wall” rhetoric had a point.

7. “Transitory” Inflation (2021–2022)

The Story: The onset of structural inflation caused by supply chain breaks and massive government spending.

The Suppression: Media outlets largely adopted the administration’s talking point that inflation was “transitory” or a “high-class problem,” dismissing working-class concerns as anecdotal.

Why they feared amplifying it: Economic misery is the fastest way to kill a presidency. Validating the “Bidenflation” narrative risked handing Congress back to the GOP (and eventually Trump).

8. Crime Spikes in Major Cities (2020–2024)

The Story: Significant rises in carjackings, retail theft, and violent crime in major metropolitan areas.

The Suppression: Stories were often framed around “perceptions of crime” vs. data, or dismissed as “right-wing panic.” Videos of smash-and-grab robberies were treated as isolated incidents rather than a trend.

Why they feared amplifying it: It indicted the “Progressive Prosecutor” movement and validated conservative critiques of blue-state governance.

9. The Minnesota “Feeding Our Future” Scandal (2022–Present)

The Story: As Halperin notes, a massive $250M+ (potentially billions) fraud ring involving immigrant-run nonprofits.

The Suppression: Local and national media were slow to investigate, fearing accusations of Islamophobia or racism given the involvement of the Somali community and Rep. Omar’s district.

Why they feared amplifying it: It is a tailor-made “MAGA narrative”: Diversity initiatives providing cover for massive theft of taxpayer funds.

10. The Afghan Withdrawal Debacle (August 2021)

The Story: The chaotic, deadly, and humiliating exit from Afghanistan, leaving behind allies and equipment.

The Suppression: While it was covered intensely during the event, the media pivot away from it was rapid. There was little sustained investigative follow-up on the decision-making failures compared to scandals of previous eras.

Why they feared amplifying it: It shattered the “Competence” brand of the Biden administration just months into the term, dangerously validating Trump’s isolationist foreign policy instincts.

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The MSM Hates That The Minnesota Somali Fraud Scandal Helps Trump

Posted on January 4, 2026 by Luke Ford

Mark Halperin writes:

Even liberal operatives admit privately that if one were designing a scandal tailor-made for right-wing outrage, the end result would look a lot like this one — not least because of the major role in the scandal played by her fellow members of the Somali-American community, a ripe and frequent target for President Trump himself…
National reporters ping-pong between policy detail and political intrigue. And always, lurking beneath, is the unmistakable tension: journalists know this is a huge story but fear amplifying it in ways that could benefit Trump politically.

This is a brutal, high-velocity dissection of what happens when a “high-trust” bureaucratic culture collides with “industrial-scale” fraud—and it reads like a vindication of the sociological theories I’ve been tracking, particularly regarding status closure and the shifting cultural guardrails I discussed in the context of Jacob Savage’s essays.

Mark Halperin is framing this not just as a financial crime, but as a collapse of the administrative state’s legitimacy.

The most fascinating layer here is how the fraud was allowed to metastasize to a potential $9 billion scale (a massive escalation from the earlier “Feeding Our Future” baseline of $250 million).

This is a textbook case of bureaucrotic status closure:

The In-Group (The Bureaucracy): The Minnesota state agencies and political class (Walz, Omar, the DFL machine) formed a status group defined by “compassion” and “equity.” To maintain their moral status, they had to view scrutiny of immigrant-run nonprofits as “racially motivated” or “Islamophobic.”

The Exclusion: By defining skepticism as a moral failing (racism), they effectively excluded auditors and whistleblowers from the decision-making process. The “ideological rigidity” Halperin mentions is simply the mechanism used to close ranks.

The Result: A loophole “the size of Lake Superior” wasn’t just missed; it was structurally invisible because seeing it would require the bureaucracy to violate its own internal status codes.

This scenario fits the “Lost Generation” narrative perfectly. You have a legacy system (Minnesota’s state government, rooted in Scandinavian-style high-trust assumptions) being dismantled by what Halperin calls “grifters, middlemen and opportunists.”

It illustrates a transition from a society governed by implicit norms (honor, shame, civic duty) to one governed by explicit exploitation. The “grifters” realized that the state’s oversight mechanisms were vestigial—designed for a population that wouldn’t dream of faking a childcare center—and they acted accordingly. The state’s inability to react until “Washington and the press forced the matter” highlights the paralysis of the old guard.

The article highlights a specific, combustible dynamic between the 47th President (Trump) and Ilhan Omar.

Trump’s move to freeze federal funding (via HHS) is a “nuclear option” that bypasses the media narrative. It forces the state government to either collapse the program or admit the fraud.

Halperin notes that for conservatives, Omar isn’t necessarily the thief, but the patron. In political theory, this is the difference between individual guilt and systemic patronage. The accusation is that her political machine relies on these networks, making her “ideologically complicit” even if her hands are clean legally.

Governor Walz is trapped in the “process” language of a mid-century administrator (“process improvements”), while Trump and the modern media cycle are using the language of “war” (“corruption,” “chaos”). It is an asymmetrical conflict.

Halperin—a veteran of the old media establishment—is pointing out the obsolescence of his own former industry. The fact that a “video investigation by YouTuber Nick Shirley” did more to ignite this wildfire than traditional journalism proves the institutional rot of the legacy press. Halperin explicitly states that journalists “fear amplifying it in ways that could benefit Trump.” This is another form of status closure: the media restricts information flow to protect a political outcome, which paradoxically destroys their own credibility and fuels the “Red quadrants” of digital media.

The article depicts a perfect storm:

Economic: A massive transfer of wealth ($9B) from taxpayers to a specific network.

Cultural: A clash between identity politics and accountability.

Institutional: The total failure of a “blue state” model to police its own distribution channels.

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Will Trump Attack The Mexican Cartels?

Posted on January 3, 2026 by Luke Ford

I like the Venezuela attack.

I don’t support it, but I like it. If Obama or Biden had done this, I would have hated it.

This is my aesthetic reaction to politics. I enjoy the spectacle of American power asserting itself but I am not intellectually signing off on the policy.

What’s going on?

One. I root for my team. I am on team MAGA.

Two. Trump is simply more effective at execution. His approach—striking hard, capturing the target (Maduro), and potentially leaving—makes more sense.

Three. When Obama or Biden intervene, critics often see it as serving a “globalist” order or international norms. When Trump intervenes, his supporters often view it as serving direct US interests (e.g., stopping drugs/narco-terrorism, which was the stated justification for Operation Southern Spear). The action is the same (military force), but the perceived intent changes how it feels.

The invasion of Iraq initially felt like a movie. The statue toppling, “Shock and Awe,” the swift conventional victory—it was visceral proof of competence and strength. That is what I am feeling now with the Venezuela news. It feels good to see the “bad guy” (Maduro) get taken down. It scratches an itch for justice and decisive action that feels rare in modern bureaucracy.

Is Trump going to avoid the 2005 trap? If this Venezuela operation is just a “raid”—smash the cartel state, grab Maduro, and leave—it might remain a “win” in my mind. But if the US tries to install a new government or stays to “stabilize” Caracas, that “2005 feeling” (IEDs, chaos, mission creep) could arrive much faster this time.

Reality eventually overrides partisanship. Many Republicans who loved Bush in 2003 were exhausted by him in 2006.

I am protecting myself from future disappointment by admitting, “I like this now, but I know how this movie usually ends.”

I am getting that “2005 Iraq” anxiety about Venezuela, despite loving the 2025 Iran strike, because you can’t “Midnight Hammer” a regime change.

In Iran, the goal was to destroy a thing (centrifuges). You can do that from the air. In Venezuela, the goal (apparently) was to remove a person (Maduro) and a system.

Now that Maduro is in custody, Trump has broken the “Pottery Barn rule”—he owns Venezuela now. You can’t just fly B-2s home and say “job done” when the capital city is leaderless and potentially dissolving into cartel warfare.

I want want the Venezuela operation to feel like the Iran strike—clean, decisive, over. But the mechanics of it look more like Panama 1989 or Iraq 2003.

If Trump installs a transition council and pulls US troops out in 30 days, leaving the locals to figure it out, it fits the “Iran 2025” model. If we see a headline next month about “US peacekeepers securing Caracas neighborhoods,” that is the “Iraq 2005” nightmare restarting.

Trump’s claim that cartels “run” Mexico is hyperbole in Mexico City (the federal government still functions), but it is a factual reality in states like Sinaloa, Guerrero, and Michoacán.

In many municipalities, the police work for the cartel, not the mayor. If the cartel says “stay inside,” the town shuts down. They don’t just sell drugs; they “tax” avocado farmers, lime growers, and local businesses. That is a function of a state. In the last few Mexican election cycles, dozens of candidates were assassinated. The cartels effectively hold a primary: they decide who is allowed to run.

So, while President Sheinbaum sits in the National Palace, the operational control of roughly 30-35% of Mexican territory is effectively in cartel hands.

This is the immediate tactical nightmare for Mexican groups like the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG (Jalisco New Generation). Under Maduro, Venezuela wasn’t just a bystander; the regime was the trafficker. The “Cartel of the Suns” (military officers involved in trafficking) facilitated cocaine flights from Colombia/Venezuela to landing strips in Mexico and Central America.

If Trump has actually decapitated the Maduro regime, that “state-sponsored” protection for drug shipments vanishes overnight. Mexican cartels just lost their safest logistics partner. They will have to scramble to find new routes, likely pushing back into more dangerous or expensive paths through the Caribbean or Pacific.

The biggest impact on the Mexican cartels isn’t logistical; it’s existential. For decades, the “rules of the game” were: The US will arrest you, but it won’t invade you.

By treating the Maduro regime as a criminal enterprise and using military force to dismantle it, Trump has shattered the sovereign immunity defense.

If the US military can extract a head of state in Caracas because of “narco-terrorism,” a cartel boss in Culiacán is no longer safe just because he’s on Mexican soil.

This creates a dangerous paradox for Mexico. Mexican President Sheinbaum is now in an impossible position. Trump has proven he will use force. To prevent US drones or special forces from operating in Mexico, she may be forced to crack down on the cartels harder than she wants to (risking civil war in Mexico).

When cartels are squeezed or supply chains break, they don’t retire; they fight for what’s left. You might see a spike in violence in Mexico as factions fight over the remaining (now scarcer) supply routes, or as they turn to hyper-violence to try to deter the Mexican government from cooperating with Trump.

Trump is “directionally” correct about cartel control—they are a parallel government. The Venezuela invasion forces the Mexican cartels into a corner. They have lost a key partner (Maduro) and gained a terrifying reality: The US is now willing to treat drug trafficking as an act of war, not a crime.

The capture of Maduro significantly raises the probability of US military action against Mexican cartels, but it likely changes the shape of that action.

If you are betting on whether Trump “attacks” the cartels, the odds are now very high (over 75%). If you are betting on whether he “invades” Mexico with troops, the odds remain low (under 15%).

Here is why the Venezuela operation makes a Mexico strike more likely, and what it would actually look like:

You have to look at the groundwork laid in 2025. By designating groups like Sinaloa and CJNG as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) back in early 2025, the administration removed the legal distinction between a cartel boss and an ISIS commander.

During the buildup to the Venezuela operation (“Operation Southern Spear”), the administration argued that drug trafficking constitutes an “armed attack” on the US. That legal theory doesn’t stop at the Rio Grande. If it justified hitting Maduro, it justifies hitting the Chapitos.

Trump is unlikely to roll tanks across the Laredo bridge—that destroys the US economy (via USMCA trade) and creates a refugee crisis. Instead, he will likely use the “Pakistan Model”:

Phase 1: Cyber & Space: We likely see “unexplained” communications blackouts in Culiacán or massive hacks of cartel financial networks.

Phase 2: Over-the-Horizon Strikes: Trump will likely authorize drone strikes or cruise missiles against “fentanyl labs” in isolated rural areas. He will dare President Sheinbaum to defend a drug lab.

Phase 3: The “Soft” Raid: Special Forces raids (like the one that just grabbed Maduro) but on a smaller scale—snatch-and-grab missions for high-value targets, then extraction by helicopter before the Mexican National Guard can react.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum is now in a checkmate position.

Before today: She could say “Sovereignty is absolute, no US troops.”

After today: Trump just proved he will decapitate a government (Venezuela) over this issue.

She likely has two bad choices:

Fight Back: Threaten to expel US agencies and stop trade. Trump counters with a 100% tariff (which he threatened in late 2024/early 2025). The Mexican peso collapses.

Secret Capitulation: She publicly condemns US aggression but privately allows US drones to operate, hoping to avoid a full trade war.

Trump feels vindicated by the Iran nuclear strike (2025) and the Maduro capture (2026). He likely believes the “experts” who warn about blowback are wrong. Expect a strike on Mexican soil within 6 months. He will frame it as “helping Mexico” get rid of a cancer, whether Mexico wants the help or not.

For decades, the American approach to Mexico was essentially containment: “Accept that the corruption exists, try to keep the violence south of the border, and prioritize trade (NAFTA/USMCA).”

Containment has failed. The violence didn’t stay south (fentanyl crisis), and the trade relationship now feels like it’s funding our own enemies.

If you are looking at this through the lens of the “Trump Doctrine” (punitive raids, results-over-process), here is why the “Narco-State” reality in Mexico is the final boss battle, and why it’s so much harder than Venezuela.

Right now I see a double standard.

Terrorists in the Middle East: If ISIS takes over a town in Syria, we bomb it.

Cartels in Mexico: If CJNG takes over a town in Jalisco and pumps poison into California, we respect Mexico’s “sovereignty.”

The cartels have successfully used the Mexican flag as a human shield. They know that as long as they are “criminals” and not “terrorists,” the US military stays out. Trump’s move to label them FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations) rips that shield away. It reclassifies the problem from “Law Enforcement” (FBI/DEA) to “War” (JSOC/Marines).

We could sanction Venezuela or bomb Iran because our economy doesn’t depend on them.

Mexico is our #1 trading partner.

The integration is so deep that if Trump shuts down the border to squeeze the cartels, he also shuts down US auto plants in Michigan and Texas within days.

The cartels know this. They have effectively taken the North American economy hostage. This is why previous presidents (Obama, Biden, even Trump in his first term) hesitated. They weren’t just afraid of violence; they were afraid of crashing the US economy.

In Mexico, the state has largely chosen plata (silver/money) over plomo (lead/bullets).

When the Mexican military tries to fight, the cartels often outgun them or threaten their families.

So, the state often accommodates them to keep the peace.

Perhaps the US should no longer tolerate Mexico’s accommodation strategy.

If Trump decides to break this “Narco-State” dynamic, it won’t be clean like the Iran strike. It will be messy. The cartels might retaliate by attacking soft targets in the US, or Mexico might retaliate by allowing massive migrant caravans to rush the border (weaponized migration).

As long as Americans want to buy $150 billion worth of drugs annually, someone will sell it to them. If you destroy the Sinaloa Cartel tomorrow, a new group (or smaller, fragmented gangs) will likely step in to fill that vacuum within months.

However, from the perspective of the “Trump Doctrine” of punitive strikes, the goal might not actually be to stop the drugs, but to break the power.

In the 1980s, cocaine required thousands of acres of land in the Andes. You could find it and burn it. Today, fentanyl is synthetic. It is made in small labs, basements, or warehouses. If Trump wipes out every lab in Mexico, production can move to Guatemala, Ecuador, or even inside the US and Canada.

The markup on fentanyl is so astronomical (a few thousand dollars of investment yields millions in street value) that traffickers can afford to lose 90% of their product and still make a profit. You cannot bomb your way out of that math.

The objective may not be to achieve a “drug-free America” (which is impossible via airstrikes), but to demote the cartels from “paramilitary armies” to “street gangs.”

Right now, groups like CJNG have:

Armored divisions.

Anti-aircraft capabilities.

Territorial control (sovereignty).

The Military Viability: The US military is very good at destroying infrastructure and hierarchy.

We can destroy their convoys, their hardened compounds, and their leadership structures.

We can force them to go back underground.

If the goal is to stop them from running Mexico like a parallel government, military force is highly viable. You can make it impossible for them to operate openly.

If Trump succeeds in “destroying” the major cartels (Sinaloa, CJNG), the result isn’t usually peace; it’s fragmentation.

Instead of two or three giant “corporate” cartels running things smoothly, you get 50 smaller, hyper-violent gangs fighting for scraps.

This happened in Mexico after the “Kingpin Strategy” in the 2010s. They broke the big Zetas cartel, and the violence actually increased because the smaller splinter groups were more chaotic and less disciplined.

If the border becomes a war zone and the Mexican supply chain is severed, the market efficiency suggests the supply chain will simply shorten.

Production might move to the US.

If you can make fentanyl in a kitchen in Culiacán, you can make it in a kitchen in Detroit or rural Oregon.

By destroying the Mexican “middleman,” we might inadvertently domesticate the production, bringing the labs (and the toxic waste and local violence) onto US soil.

The Verdict:

Viability of stopping drugs? Near zero. The market always wins.

Viability of breaking the Cartels’ military power? High. We can smash their ability to act like a state.

Posted in America, Drugs, Mexico, Venezuela | Comments Off

Cuba Totters

Posted on January 3, 2026 by Luke Ford

The Cuban regime is closer to collapse than at any point since 1959.

The situation has moved beyond stagnation into a “terminal crisis” phase, yet the government retains significant tools for survival.

Several converging factors have created a highly volatile environment where regime change is now considered a plausible scenario rather than a distant hope.

Economic Implosion: The economy is currently in worse shape than during the “Special Period” of the 1990s.

Collapse of Essentials: The state can no longer guarantee the “basic basket” of food. Daily blackouts often last 12–16 hours.

Currency Failure: The Cuban Peso has effectively collapsed, leading to runaway inflation. The “dollarization” of the economy has created a two-tier society, alienating the loyalist working class who are paid in pesos.

Infrastructure Rot: Critical infrastructure (power plants, water systems) is failing due to decades of neglect, and the state lacks the capital to fix it.

The “Biological” Clock: Raúl Castro (aged 93) remains the ultimate arbiter of power behind the scenes. His eventual death creates a massive vacuum. Current President Miguel Díaz-Canel lacks the “revolutionary legitimacy” of the Castro brothers and is widely viewed as an uncharismatic bureaucrat by both the public and the military elite.

Loss of Fear: The July 11, 2021 protests broke the psychological barrier of fear. Since then, smaller, localized protests have become frequent. The social contract—obedience in exchange for basic welfare—is dead.

Despite the fragility, the regime has substantial resilience that make a “clean” democratic transition difficult.

The Migration “Safety Valve”: This is the single biggest factor saving the regime. Over 1 million Cubans (nearly 10% of the population) have fled since 2021. This exodus removes the most angry, energetic, and young potential dissidents, leaving behind an older, more dependent population.

Military Control of the Economy: The military conglomerate GAESA controls an estimated 70–80% of the economy (tourism, remittances, retail). This keeps the generals loyal to the regime because their personal wealth is tied to its survival. They have more to lose from a transition than to gain.

Fragmented Opposition: While discontent is universal, there is no single organized opposition leader or movement inside the island that can channel this anger into a focused political alternative.

I see three scenarios for Cuba in descending order of likelihood:

The regime manages to limp along, using repression and migration to bleed off pressure. Cuba resembles Haiti—a failed state where the government controls the capital and elites, but the rest of the country operates in anarchy and poverty.

Coup: Facing total collapse or following Raúl Castro’s death, a faction of the military (GAESA) removes Díaz-Canel. They might install a “reformist” junta that promises economic opening (like China or Vietnam) while maintaining political control, sacrificing the Communist Party ideology to save their own wealth.

Collapse: A trigger event (e.g., a total grid collapse lasting weeks) sparks spontaneous, nationwide uprisings that overwhelm security forces. This would likely be messy, potentially violent, and could trigger a humanitarian intervention crisis.

The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency introduces a “maximum pressure” variable. If the US tightens sanctions further or strictly enforces existing ones while Venezuela (Cuba’s patron) faces its own instability, the Cuban regime’s financial lifeline could be severed completely, forcing an accelerated collapse or a desperate pivot.

The status quo is unsustainable. Change is inevitable, but it is more likely to come from a fracture within the military elite or a slow disintegration into a failed state than from a swift democratic revolution in the short term.

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Did The 2020 Stolen Election Narrative Influence Trump’s Actions On Venezuela?

Posted on January 3, 2026 by Luke Ford

President Trump has announced that U.S. Special Forces successfully captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, flying them out of the country to face charges in the U.S.

While the official legal justification for this attack is “narco-terrorism” (based on indictments unsealed back in 2020), the psychological and political justification for the MAGA base is deeply rooted in his “2020 Stolen Election” narrative.

The central claim of the “Kraken” lawsuits and the arguments made by Sidney Powell and Rudy Giuliani in late 2020 was that Venezuela was the architect of the theft. They alleged that the Dominion voting systems were originally designed by Smartmatic at the behest of Hugo Chávez specifically to rig elections in Venezuela, and that this same “Venezuelan software” was imported to the U.S. to steal the election from Trump. This framed the Venezuelan government not just as a geopolitical annoyance or a drug state, but as the primary foreign entity responsible for removing Trump from power. In this narrative, the Venezuelan regime committed an act of war against the U.S. presidency itself.

Because of those 2020 claims, today’s attack likely feels to the Trump base like a “settling of scores” rather than just a drug bust.

By capturing Maduro, Trump isn’t just arresting a foreign dictator; he is capturing the man his supporters believe (via the conspiracy theories) helped install Joe Biden.

It provides a “justice” narrative that goes beyond geopolitics: They stole our country, so we took their leader.

There is a direct personnel bridge between these two worlds. Erik Prince (founder of Blackwater) has been a key figure in both the “election integrity” movement and the push for aggressive intervention in Venezuela.

Throughout 2024 and 2025, Prince was heavily involved in the “Ya Casi Venezuela” (Almost There Venezuela) movement, raising funds and lobbying for the privatized removal of the Maduro regime.

Prince has long argued that the U.S. should take the gloves off, and his influence suggests a merging of the “Stop the Steal” sphere with private military interventionism.

Usually, kidnapping a sitting head of state is a massive violation of international norms that would face domestic skepticism. However, because a large portion of the U.S. electorate was convinced by the 2020 narrative that Venezuela is an active, existential enemy that “hacked” American democracy, the political threshold for this kind of extreme military action was significantly lowered.

While the White House press briefing will cite “drugs” and “national security,” the emotional fuel for this attack—and the reason it will likely be cheered rather than questioned by Trump’s core supporters—is the belief that the Venezuelan regime “messed with the wrong President” in 2020.

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Trump’s ‘Illegal’ Raid On Venezuela

Posted on January 3, 2026 by Luke Ford

Why the fixation with the legality of Trump’s attack on Venezuela? You only get war when normal politics don’t work.

This fixation with legal vs illegal wars of “illegal war” is a product of the Marxist-Leninist DNA of the 1947 Nuremberg Trials. Criminalizing war itself—specifically “Crimes Against Peace”—was heavily influenced by Soviet legal theory. The intellectual architect of “Crimes Against Peace” was a Soviet jurist named Aron Trainin. In the 1930s and 40s, he argued that “aggressive war” should be a crime for which individual leaders could be prosecuted. Trainin’s logic was indeed rooted in Leninism. He viewed fascism as the final, most aggressive stage of “imperialist capitalism.” Therefore, to the Soviets, “aggressive war” was inherently a crime of imperialist exploitation.

When the Allies met in London in 1945 to write the Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Soviet delegation (influenced by Trainin) wanted “Crimes Against Peace” to be defined specifically as aggression committed by the Axis powers. They viewed it as a political crime specific to that ideology.

The American chief prosecutor, Justice Robert H. Jackson, refused the Soviet definition. He argued that if they were to make aggressive war a crime, it had to be a crime based on conduct, not ideology. He famously stated that the law must apply to the condemners just as it does to the condemned.

Hilarious.

The Soviets wanted a law that said “Fascist war is illegal.” The Americans insisted on a law that said “Aggressive war is illegal, no matter who does it.”

The American view won out in the final text. The “illegal war” concept was universalized. This is why today, critics can use the Nuremberg precedent to call American actions illegal. If the pure Leninist view had prevailed, “illegal war” might strictly legally apply only to “fascist” regimes, and the US would theoretically be immune by definition.

When people today call the strikes on Venezuela “illegal,” they are usually citing two things, one of which comes directly from that Nuremberg compromise:

International Law (The Nuremberg/UN Legacy): Because of the precedent set at Nuremberg (and codified in the UN Charter), explicitly “aggressive” war—war not in self-defense and not authorized by the UN—is a crime. Critics argue the Venezuela hit was a “war of choice” or regime change, fitting the Nuremberg definition of aggression rather than self-defense.

Domestic Law (The Constitution): This is separate from Nuremberg. The argument here is that the President cannot initiate a new war without Congressional approval (the War Powers Clause). Since Congress did not vote for war with Venezuela, the military action is constitutionally “illegal” regardless of international law.

If the world stuck to the purely “Clausewitzian” view (war is just politics by other means) that existed before 1945, the strike might be called “unwise” or “imperial,” but never “illegal.” That word is the specific legacy of 1945.

To call the 1947 Nuremberg Trials “universally applied law” is historically laughable. It was a courtroom designed by the victors to hang the losers, and they carefully rigged the rules to ensure their own conduct wouldn’t be on the docket.

You don’t have to look far for proof. The “Tu Quoque” defense (“you did it too”) was officially banned by the Tribunal, but in the backrooms, it was the only thing that mattered.

Here are the three smoking guns that prove my point about “Victor’s Justice”:

1. The Submarine Defense (The Nimitz Affidavit)

This is the most blatant example. Admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the German U-boat fleet, was charged with “unrestricted submarine warfare” (sinking merchant ships without warning).

The Defense: Dönitz’s lawyer pulled a brilliant move. He got an affidavit from US Admiral Chester Nimitz, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet.

The Admission: Nimitz bluntly admitted that the US Navy had done the exact same thing to the Japanese in the Pacific from day one of the war.

The Verdict: The Tribunal was cornered. They couldn’t hang Dönitz for a tactic the American hero Nimitz was openly admitting to. Dönitz was convicted on other counts, but he was specifically not sentenced for the submarine warfare charge. If the US did it, it wasn’t a crime.

2. The Katyn Massacre Embarrassment

The Soviets tried to use Nuremberg to whitewash their own crimes. They insisted on indicting the Nazis for the murder of 22,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest.

The Reality: Everyone knew the Soviet NKVD had actually committed the massacre in 1940.

The Outcome: When the evidence started looking shaky (pointing back to Soviet guilt), the Tribunal didn’t investigate the Soviets; they just quietly dropped the charge against the Germans and pretended it never happened. It was too awkward to prosecute a crime that the prosecutor sitting at the table had actually committed.

3. The “Strategic Bombing” Silence

Notice what wasn’t on the charge sheet? Aerial bombing of civilians.

The Germans leveled Warsaw and Coventry.

The Allies leveled Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo.

Because the Allies had engaged in massive city-busting campaigns, “bombing civilians” was quietly left off the list of war crimes. If they had charged Göring for the Blitz, they would have had to charge “Bomber” Harris and Curtis LeMay for Dresden and Tokyo.

When Justice Jackson said, “The law must apply to the condemners,” he wasn’t describing the reality of 1945—he was lying. Or, at best, he was making a promise the US had no intention of keeping at that moment.

But that lie became the trap. By writing that high-minded ideal into the history books to justify hanging Nazis, he created the very weapon that critics are using against the US regarding Venezuela today. He codified a standard that the US ignored in 1945 because they were the victors, but which now haunts them when they want to act unilaterally.

Nuremberg wasn’t justice; it was a precedent. And precedents have a nasty habit of outliving the power that set them.

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