The Cuban regime is closer to collapse than at any point since 1959.
The situation has moved beyond stagnation into a “terminal crisis” phase, yet the government retains significant tools for survival.
Several converging factors have created a highly volatile environment where regime change is now considered a plausible scenario rather than a distant hope.
Economic Implosion: The economy is currently in worse shape than during the “Special Period” of the 1990s.
Collapse of Essentials: The state can no longer guarantee the “basic basket” of food. Daily blackouts often last 12–16 hours.
Currency Failure: The Cuban Peso has effectively collapsed, leading to runaway inflation. The “dollarization” of the economy has created a two-tier society, alienating the loyalist working class who are paid in pesos.
Infrastructure Rot: Critical infrastructure (power plants, water systems) is failing due to decades of neglect, and the state lacks the capital to fix it.
The “Biological” Clock: Raúl Castro (aged 93) remains the ultimate arbiter of power behind the scenes. His eventual death creates a massive vacuum. Current President Miguel Díaz-Canel lacks the “revolutionary legitimacy” of the Castro brothers and is widely viewed as an uncharismatic bureaucrat by both the public and the military elite.
Loss of Fear: The July 11, 2021 protests broke the psychological barrier of fear. Since then, smaller, localized protests have become frequent. The social contract—obedience in exchange for basic welfare—is dead.
Despite the fragility, the regime has substantial resilience that make a “clean” democratic transition difficult.
The Migration “Safety Valve”: This is the single biggest factor saving the regime. Over 1 million Cubans (nearly 10% of the population) have fled since 2021. This exodus removes the most angry, energetic, and young potential dissidents, leaving behind an older, more dependent population.
Military Control of the Economy: The military conglomerate GAESA controls an estimated 70–80% of the economy (tourism, remittances, retail). This keeps the generals loyal to the regime because their personal wealth is tied to its survival. They have more to lose from a transition than to gain.
Fragmented Opposition: While discontent is universal, there is no single organized opposition leader or movement inside the island that can channel this anger into a focused political alternative.
I see three scenarios for Cuba in descending order of likelihood:
The regime manages to limp along, using repression and migration to bleed off pressure. Cuba resembles Haiti—a failed state where the government controls the capital and elites, but the rest of the country operates in anarchy and poverty.
Coup: Facing total collapse or following Raúl Castro’s death, a faction of the military (GAESA) removes Díaz-Canel. They might install a “reformist” junta that promises economic opening (like China or Vietnam) while maintaining political control, sacrificing the Communist Party ideology to save their own wealth.
Collapse: A trigger event (e.g., a total grid collapse lasting weeks) sparks spontaneous, nationwide uprisings that overwhelm security forces. This would likely be messy, potentially violent, and could trigger a humanitarian intervention crisis.
The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency introduces a “maximum pressure” variable. If the US tightens sanctions further or strictly enforces existing ones while Venezuela (Cuba’s patron) faces its own instability, the Cuban regime’s financial lifeline could be severed completely, forcing an accelerated collapse or a desperate pivot.
The status quo is unsustainable. Change is inevitable, but it is more likely to come from a fracture within the military elite or a slow disintegration into a failed state than from a swift democratic revolution in the short term.
