Politicizing the Bible: The Roots of Historical Criticism and the Secularization of Scripture 1300-1700

I first read this book two years ago and I still can’t get it out of my head.

Here are some highlights from this 2013 book by two Roman Catholics:

* Our argument, to put it all too simply, is that the development of the historical-critical method in biblical studies is only fully intelligible as part of the more comprehensive project of secularization that occurred in the West over the last seven hundred years, and that the politicizing of the Bible was, in one way or another, essential to this project. By politicization, we mean the intentional exegetical reinterpretation of Scripture so as to make it serve a merely political, this-worldly (hence secular) goal . Since this effort was largely undertaken by those who embraced a new secular worldview, the effect was to subordinate the method of interpreting Scripture to secular political aims. This subordination was essential in the early development of the modern historical-critical method.

* Jon Levenson: “historical criticism is the form of biblical studies that corresponds to the classical liberal political ideal.”

* For Troeltsch, the necessary effect of applying the historical method to Scripture was and is “the disintegration of the Christian world of ideas. . . .” “Once applied to the scientific study of the Bible and church history,” declared Troeltsch, “the historical method acts as a leaven, transforming everything and ultimately exploding the very form of earlier theological methods.” 39 The reason for this disintegration (or explosion), according to Troeltsch, is the irreconcilable difference that exists between the earlier dogmatic method, which presupposes certain historical facts, like the Resurrection, that stand outside a purely secular understanding of history, and the modern historical method, which assumes “secular history reconstructed by critical historiography.” 40 Secular history assumes that miracles cannot happen or at least such miracles cannot be verified by the historical method. More accurately, secular history assumes that all alleged supernatural beings or events can be explained in natural terms.
Since according to Troeltsch the historical method is essentially opposed to the dogmatic, then application of the historical method to Scripture can only result in treating it from the secular point of view—as one would any other artifact in the history of religions. The result would seem to be a complete relativizing of Christianity that, Troeltsch claimed, would indeed be “the consequence of the historical method only within an atheistic or a religiously skeptical framework.” Troeltsch, a liberal Protestant, asserted that he was seeking “to overcome this relativism through the conception of history as a disclosure of the divine reason,” wherein revelation is replaced by a “philosophy of history.”

* “It is difficult to overestimate the significance the nineteenth century has for biblical interpretation. It made historical criticism the approved method of interpretation. The result was a revolution of viewpoint in evaluating the Bible. The Scriptures were, so to speak, secularized. The Biblical books became historical documents to be studied and questioned like any other ancient sources. The Bible was no longer the criterion for the writing of history; rather history had become the criterion for understanding the Bible.”

* The systematic exclusion of the supernatural and the consequent attempt to give natural explanations for events like miracles, theophanies, and other alleged irruptions of the divine or angelic effectively secularizes Scripture, making it one among many other manifestations of religious belief without verifiable substance. It relativizes and privatizes belief, or simply eliminates it as unscientific. In doing so, it removes Christianity as a political force, making of it at best a bearer of nondogmatic moral teachings that undergird the political order. There is no doubt that this transformation of Christianity accords nicely with the modern secular political aims. The question we pose here is: Did this happen by accident or design?

* According to Levenson, the historical-critical approach has an intrinsic aim, not found in Scripture itself, of producing the beliefs that accord with modern secular political aims , where religion is either reduced to mere private belief unsupported or rejected by reason and science, or made to serve as a moral prop for a particular kind of political order. The defining secular political aim is to keep religion from disturbing or significantly determining public life—an understandable aim, given that the modern historical-critical method was largely forged during and just after the great “wars of religion” that so disturbed political order in the late 1500s and a large portion of the 1600s. 45 But to say that it is an understandable aim only highlights the fact that it was an alien one, forced upon the text, rather than derived from it.

* Averroes (or Ibn-Rushd, c. 1126–1198) was a Muslim philosopher [who] argued in his On the Harmony Between Religion and Philosophy that there is indeed one truth, but it is known according to the capacity of the knowers: at the bottom are those open only to rhetorical persuasion, in whom appeal is made to the imagination and the passions; above these are those capable of dialectic, who are satisfied with the probable arguments of theology; and finally, at the top and fewest in number, are the philosophical men who demand rigorous rational demonstration. Needless to say, the hierarchical ranking entails a superiority of the truths of natural reason to those of revelation, but it also includes the notion of control of the masses by the philosophers using the myths of religion.

* What should be done when the philosophical arguments of Aristotle contradicted the truths of Christian faith? Aristotle could be rejected (the radical Augustinian approach); Aristotle could be corrected and worked into a synthesis (St. Thomas); or the truths of his philosophy could stand, in contradiction, alongside the truths of faith, creating a kind of double, incompatible set of truths, the truth according to reason and the truth according to revelation…

* “The specifically political feature of Marsilius’s Averroism consists in his completely secular approach to all aspects of the state, including those connected with religion, theology, and the church. The Averroist method meant that problems could be investigated by rational procedures alone in complete independence of faith and of the theological tradition founded upon faith.”

* Spiritual authority resides in the Bible, not in the ecclesial hierarchy; yet Marsilius places the authoritative interpretation of the Bible ultimately in the hands of the civil legislator, the legislator humanus. He argues that the power to interpret doubtful passages of Scripture resides not in the pope or any other bishop, but in a general council, one whose members are ultimately determined by human legislators.

* The shift of authority is not from the pope and council to the text itself, but from the pope and council to the expert in interpreting the text.
Herein lie the first awakenings of the modern biblical exegete. In regard to the order of authority, we are far closer in these passages to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century understanding of the role of the professional scriptural scholar than we are to the sixteenth-century attempt to root authority in the biblical text as against the papacy. The “expert” stands in authoritative judgment not just above Church councils and the papacy, but also above the inexpert who are the vast majority of the faithful. He even stands above the text itself, insofar as it is his expertise that unlocks its definitive meaning.

* In rejecting universals, nominalism rejected Aristotelian forms, and this rejection, we recall, was theological at root. The forms, even understood as ideas in the Divine Mind, seemed to Ockham to limit God’s will. But the elimination of forms left reality as a collection of essentially unrelated particulars, each of which, presumably, could then be an object of empirical scrutiny. 128 Yet empirical examination of sheer particularity as such is notably difficult. The human mind understands more by similarity than difference. Rather than being left with an intractable mass of particulars, natural philosophers such as Galileo, Descartes, and Newton would substitute mathematical forms as the new universals, the ideal forms that define the shape and activity of passive or inert matter. For most theologians in the seventeenth century, these mathematical forms were taken to be impressed by God according to His will; they were the “forms” of His commands, or laws, of nature. Since for these theologians the laws had their origin in God’s will, the laws could be otherwise, and so, presumably, would the mathematical forms they took. 129 But again, the theological belief in the ultimate contingency of the laws was short-lived. Within a century, the inner necessity of mathematics was identified with the laws of nature, and nature came to be governed by its own laws, the result being that the “necessitarianism” of mathematics drove out the possibility of divine action (and soon enough, the Divine).

* Ockham’s denial of universals allowed for, but did not of itself cause, the replacement of Aristotelian forms with mathematical forms. The most accurate characterization might be that Ockham’s nominalism left a vacuum that would be filled by another kind of universal. If the modern account of the laws of nature did indeed have its origin in Ockham’s desire to safeguard God’s omnipotent will, 130 these laws would soon enough break away from the will of God (in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), and come to be considered self-subsisting causal powers that either limited or excluded divine action. One can hardly downplay the importance of this development for the judgment of nineteenth-century German scriptural scholars that the miraculous had to be excised from Scripture or be reduced to the mythological.

* Indeed, Wycliffe argues that, however worthy the idea of a Holy Roman Empire is in theory, the universality is impracticable because the vast geographical distances and obstacles (such as mountains and seas) and diversity of languages and customs make such rule impossible; therefore, “the terrestrial Empire ought to be dissolved”.

* Wycliffe’s participation in English messianic nationalism lent tremendous weight to the establishment of a national Church, one (again) in which the king ruled, in the style of David and Solomon, the priesthood. Since the focus is on the nation, the English nation, Wycliffe’s exegesis in support of a national Church could not help but involve a politicization of Scripture. If England is the new Israel, salvation history as found in Scripture must be reinterpreted with English history as its culmination.

* For Wycliffe, Scripture alone could only mean Christ alone, for He and He alone is the “Book of Life,” the “Scripture that cannot be destroyed.” The difficulty with this position is that the high-flying metaphysical realism that makes it intelligible cannot easily pass into common coin (and, indeed, becomes suspect anyway with the condemnation at Constance). The “decay” of the position into a simple notion of sola scriptura, in which the individual reader of the text claims immediate access to its truth, was inevitable, and indeed occurred in Lollardry. In fact, it was inherent in Wycliffe’s original argument. Where else was Christ to be known but through the Scripture? And if the Church and the hierarchy were not only corrupt, but likely among those damned by predestination, then all authority of interpretation was thrown back upon the individual believer. Since multiple interpretations will then naturally arise, the confusion will call for an authoritative clarification. Wycliffe would have this done by properly trained theologians, but since they are in service to the state, the remedy for clarification falls to the secular power. The practical effect will be for the state to settle theological disputes arising from multiple interpretations according to exigencies of state.

* Machiavelli is legendary as a teacher of evil, a man who counseled princes to cast away all notions of right and wrong and do whatever furthers their political causes, no matter how brutal or duplicitous.

* Machiavelli was deeply concerned with the interpretation of the Bible insofar as it served his purposes. It is central to his project, as a self-conscious founder of “new modes and orders,” that he must treat Holy Scripture in a most unholy way. The reason for this treatment is profoundly political, or to say it another way, fundamentally secular. In The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, Machiavelli asserts that, in contrast to the ancient, pagan vigorous and manly love of freedom, Christianity makes citizens effeminate and hence incapable of the rigors of true political freedom.

* Christianity is just one more religion, and as such can be treated with the same detached curiosity as the ancient pagan religions were treated by ancient sages. For Machiavelli—partly from his own character but also from witnessing the morally decrepit state of the lives of churchmen—this detached curiosity assumes that religion is a false but politically necessary and powerful tool for irreligious rulers to control their subjects. This is as true for popes as it is for great religious leaders (such as Moses) who appear in Holy Scripture.

* In order to understand Machiavelli’s intent, we must do that which is forbidden and, following Machiavelli’s lead, “reason about Moses.” We must treat Moses’ actions as we would those of Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and any other merely human, merely historical example. To do so, we must read the Bible alongside other ancient historical accounts, in the same kind of historical-critical treatment as one would any other historical work. This implies that one is considering the Bible’s author as one among equals with Livy, Polybius, Plutarch, Xenophon, Herodotus, Thucydides, Tacitus, and other eminent ancient pagan historians.
It is difficult to overemphasize the momentous effect of this great shift in the consideration of the Bible. The recovery of ancient texts in the Renaissance—in the deepest sense of recovery: a reading of pagan authors on their own terms, a consideration of what pagan sages said independently of Christianity and even in antagonism to it—contributed far more as a catalyst to modern secularization than many historians would lead us to believe. Our concern with Machiavelli in particular is the way he uses pagan authors as guides to reading the Bible as one would any other historical work, a mode of approach that contributes to the later historical-critical assumption that the Bible must be treated as one text among others. The assumption in both instances is that faith in the Bible as revealed actually obscures its real meaning, so that its real meaning can only be recovered, or better uncovered, by laying aside faith and deferring to history as known by reason. Machiavelli provides a template, an exercise in exegesis, which works to alert Christianized minds to long-buried pagan truths.

* Interestingly, Cyrus the Great is the only prince in the list found in both sacred and secular sources, both in the Old Testament (primarily in the prophets Isaiah and Ezra) and also, most notably, in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. That gives the reader a chance to compare the two accounts.

* Was Moses really offended by idolatry at Mt. Sinai on behalf of God, or did he merely order the slaughter of those Israelites who opposed his rule? Was Moses really guarding the priesthood in opposing the rebellion of Korah (Numbers 16), or eliminating his political opposition? Machiavelli later informs the reader, “whoever reads the Bible judiciously will see that since he [Moses] wished his laws and his orders to go forward, Moses was forced to kill infinite men who, moved by nothing other than envy, were opposed to his plans.”

* Religion provides political order, but political order is always particular, founded on particular soil with a particular people and with particular religious beliefs and rituals. What is essential, Machiavelli notes, is not the truth or falsity of each religion, but the power of its particular historical formation on a people, and the prudent prince should do everything he can to maintain it.

* Given the moral caliber of popes and cardinals, their use of Scripture to justify their indulgences, indiscretions, immorality, and naked political ambitions was an egregious, even epic, example of politicization—one that was clear to all of Europe. This hypocrisy not only stained the Roman Curia and brought about the splintering of Christianity in the Reformation (which had its own politicizing effects upon Scripture), but even more, served for centuries to come as an exemplar illustrating the alleged fundamental duplicity of all priests and all “organized” religion. In regard to modern scriptural scholarship, the effects will be multiple: the rejection, downplaying, or downgrading of the Old Testament priesthood as a corruption of the true religion (the true religion either embedded in a submerged layer of the Old Testament, or contained only in the New Testament); the exegetical excision of all nonmoral aspects of the Old and New Testament as harmful accretions, in an effort to purify Christianity of its harmful historical accidents; and finally, the treatment of the Bible itself, by those who have given up their faith entirely, as an earlier illustration of the corruption found in the Renaissance Roman Curia.

* His discovery of the “key” to the underlying motives of biblical figures created a new mode of exegesis, and Machiavelli therefore can rightly be considered as one of the earliest, and certainly the most influential, sources of the hermeneutics of suspicion. Even aside from Machiavelli, this suspicion defines itself against tradition. Since the orthodox treatment of the text assumes a unity of appearance and reality, orthodoxy itself becomes suspect, and the hermeneutics of suspicion thereby defines its exegetical approach against the traditio of interpretation.

* it is ultimately misleading to designate the historical-critical method as historical and critical, since history is understood according to the critical framework of a quite particular philosophy. Machiavelli’s treatment of Scripture as a history according to the mode of Livy is the founding paradigm.

* an especially notable trait of modern biblical exegesis is its adherence to some quite practical, this-worldly political or moral system that defines the exegetical framework by which the enlightened hermeneut parses the text. Using this framework, he finds (at the end of his labors) that some key figure in the Bible (be it Moses, Jesus Himself, or St. Paul) is really a Stoic, a common sense Englishman, a Deist, a Hegelian, an existentialist, or a Marxist revolutionary. All the passages that seemingly contradict such a surprising interpretation can be put down to the cleverness or benevolent condescension of the key figure in hiding his true identity, or the stupidity of the masses as manifested in the key figure’s disciples (who being unable to grasp the truth, embrace and then embellish a religion built upon a mythologized account of the key figure, complete with miracles).

* What makes Luther’s challenge historically significant is the combined force of his particular theological reformulation and the peculiar political context of his time. As some historians have remarked, if not for that political context, Luther’s challenge would likely have remained a merely local affair, quickly contained and diffused by the joint efforts of the emperor and the pope, and with the help of the German electors.
As R. W. Scribner and C. Scott Dixon rightly note, it is clear that “From the very beginning, the question of religious reform was so inextricably linked to political issues that it could never give rise to an unpolitical Reformation.” Nor to an unpolitical exegesis of Scripture.

* This substitution of the individual soul for the Church—which does indeed follow from his doctrine of justification by faith alone—eliminated in one stroke the necessity of the Church as the essentially distinct counterpart to the state, and by consequence, allowed the state to assume the structure of ecclesiastical authority over the individual believer-citizens.

* In Luther’s alternative ecclesiology, in which there is no real distinction between priest and lay, 187 the Church as a necessary, permanent, and divinely intended body of Christ that visibly mediates salvation has been made secondary and derivative to what becomes the primary relationship of salvation, the promises of God known through the biblical text to the individual soul.
Without this move, the characteristic privatization of religion in modernity, and hence its increasing removal from the public realm, would not have been possible, and even more, the religious affirmation of modern individualism, which gave it such strength as it arose in the seventeenth century, would have been far less powerful. But the most important effect was the removal of the Church as a visible entity, which allowed the state to fill the vacuum.

* Luther: “Everybody is not to be toyed with. Therefore God would have authorities so that there might be order in the world.”

This was a startling admission by Luther, especially in light of his notion of the priesthood of all believers and his earlier hopes that translating the Bible into the vernacular would finish the work he had begun. Luther was not the only one worried about Mr. Everybody. A magistrate’s report given during the Hanseatic Diets of 1525 complained that “everybody, and above all the uneducated, even women, dare to preach the Gospel and the Word of God . . . and using Christian freedom as a pretext, they live according to their own will and fancy, disregarding the ordinances and regulations. . . .” At the heart of the problem was exegesis: the “everybodies” were interpreting the words of the Gospel wrongly, twisting them “from what they really meant in order to please the common people . . . and this would lead to carnal freedom, which would be followed by revolts against the magistrates and bring about the ruin of towns.” 234
Exegesis soon became a widely recognized political and a theological problem. This is made quite clear in the debate between Luther and Karlstadt in regard to images. The direct implication of Luther’s position is that proper interpretation of the commandment against idolatry, and more important, its enforcement, must necessarily become a civil matter for “we are under our princes, lords, and emperors,” and “we must outwardly obey their laws instead of the laws of Moses.” 235 It is not surprising that exegetical divergences from Luther would soon be politically suppressed, and the proper interpretation politically impressed.

* We cannot overestimate the effect Luther’s public judgment of the canon had upon future scriptural scholarship. Ranking the books of the Bible according to a “true kernel,” thereby creating the “true touchstone for testing every book,” will take many forms over the next centuries, often in imitation of Luther’s emphasis on St. Paul, but sometimes in direct opposition, where St. Paul is the great distorter rather than illuminator of the “true canon.” Because it will become increasingly obvious—as it did for Luther’s own critics, both Protestant and Catholic—that individual books do not provide unanimous affirmation of the chosen kernel, exegetes will increasingly turn to sorting through individual texts, layering them according to authentic and spurious, early and late, pure and tainted passages, a tendency that will reaffirm the above-mentioned attempt to recover the original Gospel proclamation from the Scriptural text witnessing the decline.

* Luther’s goal was not to create the modern secular state, but to remove religious authority from the governing powers. While faith is to be grounded sola scriptura , the secular power does not use the Bible to govern. 265 The secular power governs by reason and the natural law, which do not pertain to the realm of the spirit, but do pertain to the realm of the flesh. Yet, as Cargill points out, this demotion of reason to merely secular concerns, and the elevation of faith completely above reason with no analogical connection between the two, bring about a kind of Averroism, however unintended. Faith is irrational rather than supernatural, and reason is entirely independent and thoroughly natural.

* Luther’s division of the sacred from the purely secular also prepared the way for acceptance of the modern assumption that the state is entirely a-religious and concerned only with the well-being of the body, and that religion is purely an inner, spiritual, and private concern (which we will see played out in John Locke). Luther thereby contributed to the West’s reception of a purely secular, materialistic notion of politics adumbrated by Marsilius and Machiavelli, and later enunciated by Hobbes and Locke, where government is defined solely by external coercion, bodily preservation, and physical comfort.

* Luther’s theological efforts seemed to ignite political rebellion among the lower orders. Luther well understood how politically combustible his theological position was. As he himself said, “Had I desired to foment trouble, I could have brought great bloodshed upon Germany. Yea, I could have started such a little game at Worms that even the emperor would not have been safe.”

* As moral conditions declined, rather than improved, with time, “Luther preached more and more to emphasize the law.”

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Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt: the Politics of Order and Myth

Here are some highlights from this 2013 book:

* In the years since World War II, the prevailing paradigm of politics has largely centred on the redistribution of resources. Hobbes and Schmitt, by contrast, help us appreciate two other conceptions of politics. Firstly, these thinkers averred that it is the problem of order not redistribution – which is the fundamental concern for any society. Secondly, both were acutely aware of the role played by myth: that is, how shared ideas – sometimes created for this very purpose – serve to promote order, social cohesion, and law-abiding behaviour.

* they actually provide a perspective that is quite different from that of the lion’s share of contemporary political thought.

* Future historians will perhaps consider the period between 1945 and, say, the 1990s as a historical parenthesis during which the problem of distributive justice over-shadowed other concerns in political thought. An influential – maybe even the – definition of politics in that epoch stated that politics was ‘the authoritative allocation of values for a society’ (Easton 1965, p. 50), that is, that it was essentially concerned with the distribution of goods.

* the most influential thinker of Anglo-Saxon academic political theory during that period, John Rawls, set
the agenda for the revival of normative inquiry precisely by addressing the question of who has and gets what as the essential problem of politics.

* But for Hobbes and Schmitt, the over-arching, perhaps overwhelming concern is the problem of war versus order. Politics is, then, primarily about controlling violence and maintaining order in the face of forces that undermine social cohesion and political authority.

* Max Weber’s famous definition of the state is precisely about this: the monopoly on violence is the essential property of the state.

* It could be argued that the perspective of order and violence is still under-represented not only in the social sciences – the sole exception being international relations – but also in contemporary political
philosophy. Moreover, it could be argued that recent developments, such as the rise of terrorism, violent political protests against ‘globalisation’, and the recurrent breakdown of order and social cohesion in many economically disadvantaged parts of the world, especially Africa, should inspire us to reorientate our inquiries toward the problem of order.

* For Hobbes, the fundamental problem is, famously, that ‘Nature [has made] men apt to invade, and destroy one another’, a problem that can only be solved by a sovereign wielding absolute power over them. And Schmitt, of course, says that a political community is not even political if it does not prohibit private revenge and retaliation, that is, maintain its monopoly on the political, at least in times of war.

* Hobbes’s implosive conception of consent, ‘every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth’.

* If order is the fundamental concern for any political community, then it cannot keep violence and civil unrest at bay only by means of the police, the judiciary, and the military. The fabric of society is more fragile and at the same time more robust than that. According to a very old tradition in political thought, political communities need not only people policing them, but also a common ethos for which to strive. In short, they need what could be called a myth…a set of ideas that is created for political purposes, that gives meaning to
the world and provides people and communities with common beliefs and values.

* So ideas can in some cases be more powerful than firearms. Stalin once contemptuously asked how many divisions the pope had, implying that military force was what really counted; today, there is a new pope who still
possesses no divisions of men and women under arms, yet he is, arguably, more powerful than the heirs of Stalin.

* Oakeshott’s vision is a dandyesque and authoritarian society whose members regard one another with detached yet courteous interest, whereas Schmitt’s involves the total state maintaining unity by telling and enacting the tale of other people as enemies.

* The task of the intellectual historian, after all, is not to be a kind of schoolmaster and to hand out good or bad marks for right or wrong interpretations of classical texts – rather, he or she must ask what choices underlay certain interpretations (even those demonstrably false), and what purposes they might have served.

* Schmitt did not stop to argue about – or even just to refute or to accept – Hobbes’s central claim about the state as the outcome of a collective authorization…

* Two things strike the careful reader of On human conduct: on the one hand, the emphasis Oakeshott placed – in almost Millian, Tocquevillian or Burckhardtian manner – on energy, initiative, adventure, risk, confidence and
engagement. More energy seemed a value in itself, and confident enactment of an adventure – even if it resulted in failure – infinitely preferable than any secure achievement of ‘suburban pleasures’. Now, time and again this particular perspective was in turn strengthened and more fully expressed with religious allusions. One was the image of civil association as a civitas peregrina that Oakeshott memorably described as “an association, not of pilgrims traveling to a common destination, but of adventurers each responding as best he can to the ordeal of consciousness in a world composed of others of his kind, each the inheritor of the imaginative achievements
(moral and intellectual) of those who have gone before and some joined in a variety of prudential practices, but here partners in a practice of civility the rules of which are not devices for satisfying substantive wants and whose obligations create no symbiotic relationship.”

* On the one hand, Hobbes shares a strong war/crime distinction with Schmitt. On the other hand, Hobbes never suggests that lethal enmity gives a ‘meaningful’ tension to human life. Hobbes also describes the way feverish human minds may imagine enemies where none exist.

* In both Political Theology and Roman Catholicism, Schmitt suggests that a dangerous, unqualified belief in humanity’s natural goodness motivates a peculiarly modern agenda bent on tearing down all forms of authority.
According to this view, Schmitt writes, once individuals live in complete, unencumbered freedom, all problems will become technical or economic rather than political or moral. This belief finds its definitive home in Soviet Russia, which Schmitt views as a frightening amalgam of irrational Eastern Christianity, radical anarchism, and the basest form of socialist materialism. The Russian Revolution signifies, for Schmitt, nothing less than a rebellion against the theistic notion that good must be granted, encouraged, or at least partially imposed upon man from outside, that is, transcendentally by God.

* In Political Theology, Schmitt sympathized with the responses to anarchism and socialism launched by Catholic counterrevolutionaries, such as Maistre, Bonald, and especially Juan Donoso Cortés, who promulgated the
belief that man is evil – pure and simple – and that any authority, as such, is good.

* Two changes in circumstance seem to have profoundly affected his ideas between the publication of Roman Catholicism and the composition of The concept of the political. Personally, Schmitt had broken bitterly with the Catholic Church after an embarrassing divorce and remarriage. More generally, the drastic economic, social, and political effects of the surrender terms dictated to Germany by the Allies at Versailles in 1919 had become more painfully apparent. These two situations almost simultaneously removed the explicitly Catholic, moral foundation of Schmitt’s intellectual efforts and transformed Western liberalism into an enemy of the same magnitude as Eastern anarchosocialism. Interestingly, Schmitt did not yet adopt a more hostile attitude
toward Jews in this era. Indeed, The concept of the political is dedicated to a Jewish friend from Schmitt’s youth who died serving Germany in the Great War; some of the most respectful passages of the work are reserved for Leftists of Jewish descent, Marx and Lukács; and, in an important lecture appended to the work, Spinoza – no less a bête noire for many anti-Semites than Marx or Freud – is placed right alongside Schmitt’s intellectual idol, Hobbes, as a chief representative of ‘the heroic age of occidental rationalism’.

* Two points support those who insist that the instances of anti-Semitism expressed by Schmitt at this time were merely rhetorical efforts to better ingratiate himself with the Third Reich: firstly, he never expressed such
sentiments in his pre-Nazi career; and, secondly, Schmitt’s anti-Semitism seemed to emerge only when Schmitt came under suspicion as a late-arriving and inauthentic Nazi and then intensified once he was openly denounced by the SS in their publication Das schwarze Korps. Conversely, the main objections to the ‘opportunism’ thesis can be summed up as follows: Schmitt persisted in the deplorable denunciation of Jews and Judaism in his postwar
work; and his Nazi-era anti-Semitism was too fervent and too deeply entangled with the substance of his arguments to be considered merely cosmetic.

* Schmitt’s 1938 book The Leviathan in the state theory of Thomas Hobbes, an otherwise astounding interpretation of Hobbes’s use of symbolism, is a case in point. When explaining the collapse of the Hobbesian sovereign state,
what he considered to be the pinnacle of political theory and practice, Schmitt assigns to the ‘Jewish philosopher’, Spinoza, the central role in an esoteric passion play (LS, p. 55). Schmitt posits Hobbes’s absolutist state as a ‘mortal god’ that was betrayed by Spinoza on behalf of ‘his own Jewish people’ with dramatically detrimental consequences for Christians (LS, p. 60). The God-become-Man Leviathan state, who came to bring peace and security to humanity, was undermined by the ‘liberal Jew’, Spinoza; the latter used the
subjective freedom of conscience permitted by Hobbes to turn particularist societal forces against the unity of the state so as to benefit the interests of assimilating Jews (LS, p. 57). As Miguel Vatter brilliantly points out (2004, pp. 190–92), according to this narrative, Spinoza and the Jews effectively crucify divinity incarnate, the Leviathan state, on the cross of private conscience, unleashing chaos and disorder on the Christian world in the form of the Enlightenment, the age of revolutions, world wars, and even, at the deepest levels of the text, the mechanically oppressive and abusive Nazi state itself.

* Schmitt’s criticism of Weimar liberalism as a suicide pact closely tracked Hobbes’s argument that ‘those princes who permit factions, do as much as if they received an enemy within their walls: which is contrary to the subjects safety, and therefore also against the law of nature’ (Hobbes 1841, ch. xiii, §13, p. 176). Weimar Germany, forced to wear an off-the-shelf English suit (limited government) was an incoherent polity because ‘a multitude of men, enemies and subjects, living promiscuously together, cannot properly be termed a kingdom’ (Hobbes 1841, ch. xvii, §5, p. 256). This domestic incoherence, stoked by seditious domestic factions in league with foreign powers, redounded to the benefit of Germany’s mortal foes because of, to use Hobbes’s words, ‘Quarrels, Factions, and at last Warre’ (Hobbes 2005, ch. xviii, §15, p. 144). As a first step to solving this problem, the Tudor monarchy acted decisionistically…

* Arguing that constitutional limits on sovereign power could be crippling, especially in wartime, Hobbes compared constitutional government to playing tennis while being pushed around in a wheelbarrow by counselors who cannot agree among themselves.

* Liberalism can also cripple the state in confrontation with deadly enemies by a dogmatic adherence to freedom of trade. Hobbes and Schmitt agreed upon this basic idea as well. Private merchants can endanger national security by selling all manner of harmful technology to our enemies…

* Finally, liberalism can weaken the state and expose it to its enemies by cleaving dogmatically to the principle of publicity. Secrecy is essential for dealing with the enemy. This was one reason why Hobbes’s preferred monarchy to other forms of government: he associated ‘serious consultation’ with ‘Deliberations that ought to be kept secret’…

* It is difficult to imagine Hobbes being brought to nausea and despair by a peace treaty of any kind. He viewed the powerful psychological impact of group humiliation on the behavior of individuals as part of the human
comedy, not as a basis for his own political theory. Indeed, he was convinced that human beings would be better off if they could give less importance to enhancing their reputations and more importance to preserving their lives. This is why, in the end, Schmitt alleges that Hobbes had no serious concept of the enemy. Hobbes may have agreed that war was inevitable; but he never suggested that war made life meaningful and thrilling and serious. He did not imagine that facing an enemy would help degraded men escape a depoliticized social world. The
[awe-inspiring] state of Schmitt’s dreams, contrariwise, is not a peacekeeping state. Hobbes was morally attracted to the normal situation; Schmitt found normality boring.

* In his review of Mein Kampf, George Orwell said that capitalism and socialism offered people a good time, whereas Hitler offered people struggle, danger and death. Schmitt’s deadly conflict, shooting adrenaline through combatants’ veins, lifts them above the frivolity of consumerism. Schmitt even suggests that the value of life stems not from reasoning but rather emerges in a state of war where men inspirited by myths do battle.

* Hobbes calls himself ‘an enemy to Atheists’ (Hobbes 1841, ch. xiv, §19, p. 198, n. 2) not only because such an avowal is prudent exotericism, but also because he means it. True, Christianity’s principal contribution to political development has been religious civil war, a particularly virulent kind of bloodletting unknown to blood-drenched antiquity (Hobbes 1990, p. 63f). But religious sentiments and beliefs cannot be eliminated from human consciousness. It is therefore crucial to wrap secular authority in ‘the cloak of godliness’ (Hobbes 1990, p. 26), using mankind’s ‘Fear of things invisible’ (Hobbes 2005, ch. xi, §26, p. 86 and especially their ‘feare of damnation’ (Hobbes 1841, ch. vi, §11, p. 78) and ‘apprehension of everlasting torments’ (Hobbes 1841, ch. xxi, §5, p. 156) to discipline unruly subjects into obedience. If the sovereign does not lay hold of superstition and use it to master the reason of his subjects, then his rivals will. That is the thinking behind Hobbes’s important principle: ‘the authority of interpreting God’s Word, … belongs not to any foreign person
whatsoever’ (Hobbes 1841, xvii, §27, p. 293). He acts upon this principle himself, giving his own sovereignty-friendly interpretations of Holy Scripture – the hermeneutical equivalent of seizing the outworks from which ‘the enemy’ might otherwise impugn the civil power.

* In Behemoth, Hobbes wrote that Christian ecclesiastics gain sway over the minds of young men by making them feel guilty for their perfectly natural sexual desires.

* the Hobbesian ‘enemy’ is not simply chosen by the sovereign without any reference to a norm. Instead, the enemy, for Hobbes, is precisely the individual who violates the fifth law of nature, namely, compleasance.

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The Last Intellectuals: American Culture In The Age Of Academe

Russell Jacoby writes in 2000:

* A specter haunts American universities or, at least, its faculties: boredom. A generation of professors entered the universities in the middle and wake of the sixties, when campuses crackled with energy; today these teachers are visibly bored, if not demoralized. One report found college and university faculties “deeply troubled” with almost 40 percent ready and willing to leave the academy.’

* Intellectuals have not disappeared, but something has altered in their composition. They have become more professional and insular; at the same time they have lost command of the vernacular, which thinkers from Galileo to Freud had mastered. Where the Lewis Mumfords or Walter Lippmanns wrote for a public, their successors “theorize” about it at academic conferences.

* It was easy to list the conservative tracts decrying educational misdeeds (Illiberal Education, Tenured Radicals, The Closing of the American Mind), but where were the rejoinders? The liberal professors growled and scowled, but had trouble answering in limpid English; instead they collected conference papers. When their books finally appeared, they lacked bite. In the liberal view, education proceeded swimmingly; it had become more diverse, multicultural, and exciting, a fact only crabby conservatives failed to fathom. A strange inversion had taken place; liberals and leftists, once critics of the establishment, had become its defenders.

* “There’s plenty of intellectual activity going on in America now,” grumbled Walter Kendrick in one of the first reviews, which appeared in the Voice Literary Supplement. For instance, “The very existence of the Voice Literary Supplement (a public intellectual journal) proves that the situation isn’t quite so bleak as Jacoby maintains.” This turned out to be a stock response. Reviewers championed themselves, their journals, and their friends as refuting my argument. “The reason Jacoby can’t find young radical intellectuals is that he looks for them in the wrong places,” claimed Lynn Garafola, a historian of dance. What are the right places? Periodicals like Cineaste, Performing Arts journal, and The Drama Review; she finds many public intellectuals, some very close to home, actually one in her home (her husband, Eric Foner, author of “widely read volumes”), as well as people down the block such as “October editor Rosalind Krauss, an art critic so well known that a New Yorker profile (on someone else) opened with a descrip tion of her living room.” The last is particularly touching. A description of one’s living room in a New Yorker profile (of someone else) ratifies status as a public intellectual. How could I miss that?

* Beyond slighting their friends and acquaintances, my critics charged me with the primal crime for all progressives: nostalgia. For many of my reviewers history only advances, as if twentieth-century death camps improved upon nineteenth-century prisons. To suggest otherwise brands one a hopeless romantic. These reviewers operate with ossified categories: Either toot your horn for the contemporary intellectuals or cry in your soup for the past.

* This book is about a vacancy in culture, the absence of younger voices, perhaps the absence of a generation. The fewextremely few-significant American intellectuals under the age of thirty-five, even forty-five, have seldom elicited comment. They are easy to miss, especially because their absence is longstanding. An intellectual generation has not suddenly vanished; it simply never appeared. And it is already too late-the generation is too old-to show up.

* A public that once snapped up pamphlets by Thomas Paine or stood for hours listening to Abraham Lincoln debate Stephen Douglas hardly exists; its span of attention shrinks as its fondness for television increases. A reading public may be no more. If younger intellectuals are absent, a missing audience may explain why.

Russell Jacoby wrote in the original 1987 edition:

* …the habitat, manners, and idiom of intellectuals have been transformed within the past fifty years. Younger intellectuals no longer need or want a larger public; they are almost exclusively professors. Campuses are their homes; colleagues their audience; monographs and specialized journals their media. Unlike past intellectuals they situate themselves within fields and disciplines-for good reason. Their jobs, advancement, and salaries depend on the evaluation of specialists, and this dependence affects the issues broached and the language employed.

* Today nonacademic intellectuals are an endangered species; industrial development and urban blight have devastated their environment. They continue to loom large in the cultural world because they mastered a public idiom. The new academics far outnumber the independent intellectuals, but since they do not employ the vernacular, outsiders rarely know of them.
Academics write for professional journals that, unlike the little magazines, create insular societies. The point is not the respective circulation-professional periodicals automatically sent to members may list circulation far higher than small literary reviews-but the different relationship to the lay public. The professors share an idiom and a discipline. Gathering in annual conferences to compare notes, they constitute their own universe. A “famous” sociologist or art historian means famous to other sociologists or art historians, not to anyone else. As intellectuals became academics, they had no need to write in a public prose; they did not, and finally they could not.

* intellectuals. In 1970 the ten leading intellectuals were: Daniel Bell, Noam Chomsky, John Kenneth Galbraith, Irving Howe, Dwight Macdonald, Mary McCarthy, Norman Mailer, Robert Silvers, Susan Sontag, and “tying” at tenth place, Lionel Trilling and Edmund Wilson.’ None could be considered young, with the possible exception of Susan Sontag (thirty-seven in 1970). The absence of the young even on the extended list of the “top” seventy intellectuals troubled Kadushin… “The elite American intellectuals as we saw them in 1970,” Kadushin noted, “were basically the same ones who came to power in the late 1940s and early 1950s.”

* When universities occupied a quadrant of cultural life, their ills (and virtues) meant one thing. When they staked out the whole turf, their rules became the rules.

* Academic writing developed into unreadable communiques sweetened by thanks to colleagues and superiors.

* Daniel Bell recalls that when he was about to be granted tenure at Columbia University, an awkward question came up. They asked ” ‘Do you have a Ph.D.?’ I said `No.’ They asked, `Why?’ I said, `I never submitted a thesis.’ ” This was happily resolved by awarding him a Ph.D. for past work, his book The End of Ideology.

Such informality reflects a past era; it is next to impossible to obtain university posts without a Ph.D., as did Irving Howe or Alfred Kazin, or to be awarded degrees on the basis of past work, as were Daniel Bell or Nathan Glazer. A younger intellectual could no more show up for a dissertation “defense” with a collection of essays written for several magazines, which constituted The End of Ideology, than he or she could show up without taking the requisite number of credits and seminars-and without paying the proper fees.

* To live from selling book reviews and articles ceased to be difficult; it became impossible. The number of serious magazines and newspapers steadily declined (and the pay scale of those remaining hardly increased), leaving few avenues; the signs all pointed toward the colleges. If the western frontier closed in the 1890s, the cultural frontier closed in the 1950s. After this decade intellectuals joined established institutions or retrained.

* The cadence of his prose and his measured liberalism distinguished Trilling, but not the brilliance, originality, or force of his thought. His reach, in fact, was limited, no further than AngloAmerican literature; his social theory, thin; his philosophy, weak. His essays which often originated as lectures to admiring audiences, suffer on the cold page. What Trilling wrote of V. L. Parrington, in the opening essay of The Liberal Imagination, could almost be said of himself. He was not “a great mind … or an impressive one … what is left is simple intelligence, notable for its generosity and enthusiasm.”24 Even a sympathetic study of Trilling suggests his essays suffered from vagueness or “weightlessness.”

* Thinking and dreaming require unregulated time; intellectuals perpetually lingering over coffee and drink threaten solid citizens by the effort-or the appearance-of escaping the bondage of money and drudgery. Guardians of order have denigrated, almost for centuries, critics and rebels as mere “coffee house intellectuals.”‘ In the catalog of bourgeois sins bohemian intellectuals earn a double entry, thinking too much and doing too little. Crown aristocrats have been no less disdainful. When the count who lurched Austria into World War I was warned that war might ignite a Russian revolution, he retorted, “Who is supposed to make that revolution? Herr Trotsky in the Cafe Central?”‘ (For several years Trotsky lived in Vienna, frequenting its cafes.)

* Yet a thick-skinned approach that dismisses the quotidian as irrelevant is hardly superior. The rhythm of the lives of intellectuals permeates their writings. This is not surprising. If telephoning supplants letters and cafes yield to conferences, thinking itself-its density and parameters-may echo the shifts. The decline of bohemia may entail not simply the decline of urban intellectuals and their audience, but of urban intelligence as well. To vary an old proposition, cafe society gives rise to the aphorism and essay; the college campus yields the monograph and lecture-and the grant application.

* Founded in 1872, the Bohemian Club was associated with numerous West Coast writers and poets, including Ambrose Bierce, Jack London, and Mark Twain. Within a few years, however, it ran up against the common fate of bohemians: lack of money. Many could not afford to chip in for the rent; others took action. “It was soon apparent,” recalled one well-heeled member, “that the possession of talent, without money, would not support the club.” The logic was simple: “It was decided that we should invite an element to join the club which the majority of the members held in contempt, namely men who had money as well as brains, but who were not, strictly speaking, Bohemians.” With this decision “the problem of our permanent success was solved.”

* …gentrification undercuts urban bohemias; the dependence of writers and artists’ communities on cheap housing cannot be overemphasized.

* Intellectuals of the 1950s, when they reflected on the “death of bohemia,” regularly indicted the refurbished housing and onerous rents. “The past always lingers on,” wrote William Phillips in 1952, but the cold-water flat is gone, taking with it the wandering, jobless writers and artists.72 Higher rents obviously do not spell the end of artistic life; but they do require more income, more commissions, more connections. For the young or unestablished the rents simply are not possible.

* Ten years earlier, at the war’s end, Partisan Review had already raised an alarm: professionals and academics were replacing unaffiliated intellectuals. A new “American academic type,” a by-product of the “Managerial Revolution,” was “everywhere ascendant,” announced Newton Arvin in 1945. This new breed discarded “wide-ranging, curious, adventurous, and humane study” for “results” and office management. With fields and subfields, committees and organizations, the new academics were preparing to put “our literary heritage on a firm fiduciary basis.”6 Another critic concurred; college teachers who lived conventional lives and thought conventional thoughts were phasing out free-lance, bohemian, and avant-garde intellectuals. “The academic hierarchy … enforces caution on the imaginative or adventurous thinkers”; even in their personal lives, professors could not afford to be “conspicuously out of line.”‘

* For intellectuals coming of age in the sixties and after, life outside universities was not even a memory. However, intellectuals like Philip Rahv, Alfred Kazin, and Irving Howe became professors only after years as free-lance writers and editors.
Others, such as Lewis Mumford, Edmund Wilson, Gore Vidal, or Dwight Macdonald, never made the transition. All, however, were aware of the migration and its consequences. In the early part of the century, recalled Malcolm Cowley, teaching and writing had been “separate worlds”; but today, no longer “independent craftsmen,” writers assume roles as professors or as well-paid employees in government or magazine bureaus.
The evidence of change seemed everywhere; universities and national magazines eagerly hired intellectuals; either Luce publications or The New Yorker sent checks to Dwight Macdonald, Alfred Kazin, Edmund Wilson, John Kenneth Galbraith, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Bell, and many others. Major publishing houses launched “little” magazines for young and avant-garde writers. Pocket Books founded discovery; Avon offered New Voices, Doubleday put out New Writers, and New American Library, the paperback publisher of Mickey Spillane, established the most successful series, New World Writing. One issue ran “Jazz of the Beat Generation” by a “Jean-Louis,” an excerpt from Kerouac’s unpublished On the Road.”
To Isaac Rosenfeld (1918-56), a Chicago essayist, these developments signified that an intellectual life of poverty and protest belonged to the past. “The writer very seldom stands over against the world as he used to, and when he does, the danger is that he may be attitudinizing.” Even the bohemia that sheltered poor writers and artists showed signs of renovation. “The garret still exists, but the rent has gone up.”

* IN PLOTTING cultural life often the less original thinkers register most faithfully the zeitgeist. In his evolution and politics, Norman Podhoretz exemplifies the trajectory of New York Jewish intellectuals. Like the others, he was first of all a publicist-a journalist, a book reviewer, and an essayist who wrote well and easily.

* If Jewish intellectuals gravitated toward radicalism in large numbers, they also hastily beat a retreat. By the 1950s not simply Glazer, Hook, Feuer, and Lipset but Irving Kristol, Lionel Trilling, Daniel Bell, Leslie Fieldler, and scores of others traded in their red pasts for blue chip careers. In contrast non-Jewish (and usually non-New York) intellectuals seemed more willing or able to retain radicalism throughout their careers.

* The long view suggests not how many, but, compared to the non-Jews, how few Jewish intellectuals remained radicals and dissenters. This could almost be seen in pairs of kindred Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals: Lionel Trilling (1905-75) and Dwight Macdonald (1906-82); Daniel Bell (1919- and C. Wright Mills (1916-62); Norman Podhoretz (1930- and Michael Harrington (1928). Other non-Jews could be added: Edmund Wilson, Gore Vidal, Paul Sweezy, John Kenneth Galbraith, Christopher Lasch. But the list of Jewish public intellectuals who remained devoted to a radical vision seems shorter.

* Estrangement from a Christian civilization, runs the usual argument, edged Jews into reformism or revolution. Yet this argument can be reversed, or at least recast: personal alienation does not engender a hardy radicalism. The angst that expresses the pain of separation also craves union-or its substitute, recognition and acceptance. The social critique founded solely on alienation also founders on it.

* Moreover, for Jewish intellectuals to complete college or secure academic posts was especially sweet; compared to the Christians, it often marked firsts for their families.56
No dense Freudian theory is necessary to explain that economic deprivation and cultural estrangement often led to an identification, and overidentification, with the dominant cul- ture.57 Jewish intellectuals from Yiddish-speaking families Trilling, Fiedler, Howe, Kazin-often fell in love with American and English literature. The phenomenon is familiar, but its relevance for American intellectuals has not been noticed. The “foreigner”-the Jewish intellectual-embraced his new cultural home, sometimes dispatching critical acumen for recognition and approval. The native son, lacking a similar estrangement, kept a distance, often turning to foreign sources. While Trilling drenched himself in American and English literature, Wilson studied Russian. Sidney Hook stuck to John Dewey, while C. Wright Mills wandered into the thicket of German neoMarxism.
Is it possible that solid American backgrounds allowed-obviously did not compel-a distancing that sustained radicalism for the long haul? That the anxiety of illegitimacy, or persecution, did not haunt the all-American intellectuals? That their sometimes more monied or aristocratic background gave them better footing? Did more principles and less angst infuse the radicalism of non-Jewish intellectuals? Did the radicalism steeped in anxiety slide into conservatism, while the Texan, Puritan, or Scottish identities of Mills or Wilson or Vidal or Galbraith gave rise to a bony radicalism more resistant to economic and social blandishments?
Trilling and Mills exemplify the contrasts between Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals. Trilling typifies the successful and moderate Jewish professor with a radical past; Mills, the American rebel suspicious of compromise and adjustment. Trilling’s Yiddish-speaking parents (his father was a tailor and an unsuccessful furrier) encouraged his studies; it was assumed that he would attend college, and like other Jewish intellectuals, he commenced a lifelong commitment to English literature. His talent and devotion paid off: Trilling, who entered Columbia University as an undergraduate, was the first Jew tenured in its English department.
Everything about Trilling, from his name to his demeanor, implied a successful adjustment to Anglo-American culture. As his wife later wrote, “in appearance and name” Trilling made a “good gamble” for an English department looking for its first Jew. “Had his name been that of his maternal grandfather, Israel Cohen, it is highly questionable whether the offer would have been made.”” As a polished and judicious commentator on humanism and literature, Trilling earned an endowed chair, showers of awards, honorary titles, national recognition. For intellectuals caught between a leftist, often ethnic, past and cold-war prosperity, Trilling struck the right tone; he contributed to “reconciling a depoliticized intelligentsia to itself and the social status quo.”

* For an immigrant family, a university career-status, salary, and security-signified unalloyed advance. Herein lies a critical difference between an American and an immigrant experience. Mills recalled a family past-his grandparents-of independent ranchers. Whether this was fact or fiction hardly matters, for it shaped a vision of self and world: life as an employee in an office-university, government, or publishing-did not measure up no matter the title, money, or respect. The same could be said of other venerable intellectual radicals, such as Wilson or Vidal or Galbraith; they looked back to families of independent farmers, statesmen, or rebels that seemed to provide a secure base for a radical life.

* Jews became intellectuals for the same reasons they became shopkeepers: they were not automatically excluded, and they commanded the prerequisities, wits and gumption.

* By quality alone, it is simply not possible to sharply distinguish the oeuvre of New York intellectuals from that of non-New Yorkers. Essay by essay, book by book, the collective work of New York intellectuals is neither so brilliant nor so scintillating that all else pales. It is almost more feasible to reverse the common opinion: the significant books of the fifties were authored by non-New Yorkers. The books by C. Wright Mills or Jane Jacobs or Rachel Carson possessed an energy and originality that the New Yorkers’ books rarely matched.SB
If this is true, then New York intellectuals receive the lion’s share of attention less by reason of genius than by sociological luck: their New York location and their personal and physical proximity to the publishing industry. In addition, their tireless monitoring of themselves lays the groundwork for further studies (and myths). For those padding cultural histories with reports on what writer X said to editor Y at Z’s party, the New York scene is a motherlode. It would be more difficult to fluff up a study of Norman 0. Brown or Kenneth Burke, around whom there were no circles and little gossip.
Cultural attention and intrinsic merit rarely tally, but even within the rarified universe of Freud studies, New Yorkers tend to edge out non-New Yorkers; for instance, the writings of Lionel Trilling and Norman 0. Brown on Freud belong to approximately the same period. For concentrated intellectual probing Brown’s Life Against Death may have no match in American studies of psychoanalysis; compared to this book Trilling’s Freud writings are casual and familiar.

* A cool appraisal of New York intellectuals reverses Bell’s judgment: they are best-most convincing, articulate, observant-when they are discussing their own lives, but the compelling theoretical works by New York intellectuals are in very short supply. Bell got it exactly wrong: precisely because of their immigrant past and fragile situation, New York intellectuals specialize in the self; theirs is the home of psychoanalysis, the personal essay, the memoir, the letter to the editor. In style and subject matter their writings are generally highly subjective. Of course, this is not a failing. An intensely personal voice permeates their most brilliant writings, for instance Kazin’s work including, obviously, his autobiography.

* In Don DeLillo’s White Noise, Murray calls in his colleague, Jack, for advice. Murray bursts with praise and admiration. Jack invented Hitler Studies, which has become a small industry in the academic world. Everyone honors, defers, and toadies to Jack; he is invited to numerous conferences. “You’ve evolved an entire system around this figure [Hitler], a structure with countless substructures…. I marvel at the effort. It was masterful, shrewd and stunningly preemptive. It’s what I want to do with Elvis [Presley].”
A reviewer of a recent satiric academic novel summed up the situation:
“Once upon a time, if you wanted to get people to laugh at professors, you would portray them as goggle-eyed intellectuals so disoriented from the practical world that they wore unmatched shoes and spoke in Sid Caesarian German about incomprehensible nonsense. Today … the figure of the absent-minded professor has been replaced by a pack of smoothies…. Instead of retiring from the world of events, the new comic professor has the world too much with him. He craves big money, drives sporty cars, covets endowed chairs, and hops from conference to conference in pursuit of love, luxury and fame.”

* As they obtained university slots, New Left intellectuals acquired the benefits: regular salaries, long vacations, and the freedom to write, and sometimes teach, what they wanted. Of course, it was not this simple. Vast insecurities beset the academic enterprise. One’s future depended on a complex set of judgments made by colleagues and administrators. Academic freedom itself was fragile, its principles often ignored. Nor were these violations confined to meddling trustees and outside investigators. The threat emerged, perhaps increasingly, from within; academic careers undermined academic freedom. This may be a paradox, but it recalls an inner contradiction of academic freedom-the institution neutralizes the freedom it guarantees. For many professors in many universities academic freedom meant nothing more than the freedom to be academic.

* What is often obscure in the history of academic freedom is its almost inverse relationship to professionalization. Not classroom teaching but public statements or political affiliations have provoked hostility to professors. When threatened they have withdrawn, naturally, into their speciality. Professionalization has served as a refuge; it has also entailed a privatization that eviscerates academic freedom.

* Conservative periodicals, such as Commentary or American Scholar or Modem Age, print articles almost monthly lamenting that left academics have seized the universities. “Those of us who received graduate degrees in the humanities from American universities in the 1960s,” begins a typical piece, “know that a major change took place in the academy about that time.” This change is what the author calls “an invasion and conquest” by left professors espousing “dialectical methodologies.

* This conservative nightmare lifts with any daytime inspection of universities. What happened to the swarms of academic leftists? The answer is surprising: Nothing surprising. The ordinary realities of bureaucratization and employment took over. The New Left that stayed on the campus proved industrious and well behaved. Often without missing a beat, they moved from being undergraduates and graduate students to junior faculty positions and tenured appointments.
The ordinary realities comprise the usual pressures and threats; the final danger in a liberal society is unemployment: denial of tenure or unrenewed contract. In a tight market this might spell the end of an academic career. The years of academic plenty were long enough to attract droves of would-be professors; they were brief enough to ensure that all saw the “No Vacancy” sign. Professionalization proceeded under the threat of unemployment. The lessons of the near and far past, from McCarthyism to the first stone thrown at the first outsider, were clear to anyone: blend in; use the time allotted to establish scholarly credentials; hide in the mainstream.
Nor does it take much to intimidate professors; news travels fast and well. All know cases of teachers forced out, not because they were imperfect professionals but because they were something more: public intellectuals and radicals. Inevitably the cases reported in the news are those that take place in the elite and Ivy League schools; and simply by virtue of the publicity they are often “happily” resolved.

* Sociologists and more sober conservatives concede that leftwing professors are less left-wing than they are professors.

* Radicals in the University, a study published by the Hoover Institution, the conservative think tank, allows that since radicals captured the Modern Language Association (MLA) in 1968, nothing has changed. “In retrospect, the spectacular 1968 successes of the radicals have proven to be ephemeral. MLA is little different from what it was before 1968.” A conservative who wandered into the American Philosophical Association convention was pleasantly surprised: radicals had made hardly any impression.

* By establishing a credible body of radical, feminist, Marxist, or neo-Marxist scholarship, they assailed the venerable, sometimes almost official, interpretations dominant in their fields. The extent of this literature, the outpouring of left academics, is extraordinary, without precedent in American letters. In several areas the accomplishments of New Left intellectuals are irrevocable.
Yet it is also extraordinary for another reason; it is largely technical, unreadable and-except by specialists-unread. While New Left intellectuals obtain secure positions in central institutions, the deepest irony marks their achievement. Their scholarship looks more and more like the work it sought to subvert. A great surprise of the last twenty-five years is both the appearance of New Left professors and their virtual disappearance. In the end it was not the New Left intellectuals who invaded the universities but the reverse: the academic idiom, concepts, and concerns occupied, and finally preoccupied, young left intellectuals.

* Max Weber, very much a successful professor, once suggested that all prospective academics should answer the following question: “Do you in all conscience believe that you can stand seeing mediocrity after mediocrity, year after year, climb beyond you, without becoming embittered and without coming to grief?” He added, “I have found that only a few men could endure this situation.”

* One survey of American professors dryly states that initially “it is much more the prestige of one’s terminal degree and one’s graduate sponsor than one’s scholarly productivity which will lead to a good academic appointment.” Later professional achievement, however, does not correct but reinforces this imbalance; early success ensures future success. “Once having secured the right initial appointment, which is more a function of prestige than demonstrated competence … subsequent appointments are determined by the prestige of that first appointment.” University success, Martin Finkelstein concludes, summarizing studies of academic careers, depends more on “the prestige and visibility afforded by institutional affiliation” or “the prominence and power of contacts” or “the prestige of one’s doctoral institution” than on “either the quality or the number of one’s scholarly publications.”

* professionalization leads to privatization or depoliticization, a withdrawal of intellectual energy from a larger domain to a narrower discipline.

* Who are the important political scientists? Ricci asks. There seem to be none. He suggests that “the declining number of great thinkers and the growing prominence of universities” are related. Moreover, the eclipse of general intellectuals means that American citizens now rely on the professionals for information. Yet the work of these specialists reflects their own university situations, not the needs of the public.

* That it is difficult for an educated adult American to name a single political scientist or sociologist or philosopher is not wholly his or her fault; the professionals have abandoned the public arena. The influx of left scholars has not changed the picture; reluctantly or enthusiastically they gain respectability at the cost of identity. The slogan that was borrowed from the German left to justify a professional career-“the long march through the institutions”-has had an unexpected outcome: at least so far, the institutions are winning.

* Exposes and denunciations of academic sophistry and careerism can often be found in conservative journals, such as The New Criterion, Commentary, American Scholar, but rarely in left and liberal ones. Conservatives honor men of letters, regularly attacking professors and academic hustlers. Why?
In principle, conservatives have been less tempted by institutional or government solutions to social ills. At least since Edmund Burke, they have objected to experts, lawyers, or professors meddling in government or society; this is the crux of the conservative critique of the Enlightenment. They have prized the man of letters devoted to letters, not politics.

* This commitment to the aristocratic man of letters fires a critique of the university that has no left counterpart. The titles alone of books by conservatives index their concerns: The Degradation of the Academic Dogma by Robert Nisbet, The Fall of the American University by Adam Ulam, Decadence and Renewal in the Higher Learning by Russell Kirk, The Decline of the Intellectual by Thomas S. Molnar. These works all indict the endemic careerism and corruption of bloated universities. The authors’ loyalty to the obsolete man of letters enables them to condemn academics swarming for grants and advancements. Russell Kirk, a central figure of post-World War II conservatism, resigned from his university post in the early fifties, already protesting automatic growth and academic bureaucratization.
The intensity of the conservative attack on the university al most transcends political labels. Nisbet, in The Degradation of the Academic Dogma, occasionally sounds like a wide-eyed radical unmasking colleagues as capitalist tools. He deplores the conquest of the university by capitalism: “The first million dollars given to a university” was a million too much. “The first man who, having enclosed a piece of the university, bethought himself of saying, `This is my institute’ and found members of the faculty simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of the university’s higher capitalism.” 14
Entrepreneurs and hucksters have replaced disinterested scholars and researchers. An “academic bourgeoisie” complete with shoddy goods and conspicuous research has sprung up. “Scratch a faculty member today,” Nisbet reports, “and you almost always find a businessman.” “The entrepreneurial spirit” spreads throughout the university, corrupting everything and everyone.

* Unlike left academics, more easily seduced by professional journals, jargon, and life, the conservatives are committed to lucid prose; for this reason they are readable and are read. While several periodicals of the left devoted to the general reader have appeared in recent years, for instance Salmagundi or Grand Street, the proliferating radical journals are geared to sympathizers in various disciplines; the uninitiated could hardly plow through Enclitic or Social Text. The conservative journals, however, adopt a public idiom; an outsider can pick up and read The New Criterion.
Moreover, the conservative journals seem willing not only to challenge new academic wisdom but to highlight its function, shoring up insecure professors. A typical essay in Commentary questions the mania for theory by literature departments. “The terms that now cause pulses to race-deconstruction, disseminations, epistemes, the mirror stage, and the like-are so undescriptive of literary detail that they tend not so much to explain literature as to replace it.” Geoffrey H. Hartman, a Yale literary critic whom Frederick Crews quotes, states that he and his colleagues resist the attitude that “condemns the writer of criticism or commentary to nonliterary status and a service function.” The literary critics respond by the cult of high Theory, including the cult of the high Theorists-themselves. 16 Another Commentary piece judges, “this eagerness for a whole new set of terms that can be maneuvered around and behind and beyond literature has the look of a program of system-wide retooling in an industry that has discovered it is antiquated. 1117
The conservative critique comes alive, sniffing academic wheeling and dealing and its debased prose, where the left often slumbers. However, the vigorous right-wing attack soon flags. Conservatives’ opposition to professionals founders on their suspicion of all intellectuals, at least of all those who do not know their place.’s They inch toward anti-intellectualism, praising the experts they sometimes challenge. Their man of letters stays out of trouble by staying in a specialty.
From the Dreyfus affair to the Vietnam War, conservatives howled that intellectuals meddled in matters outside their training.

* Ironically, the conservative critique of professions turns into its opposite, a defense of special interests and fields. They object to the poets or plumbers speaking about foreign policy, instead of poems and sinks, as if the divisions of labor were cast in heaven. Herein lies a critical difference with the sometimes overlapping anarchist critique of professions.

* Hilton Kramer’s The New Criterion and Joseph Epstein’s American Scholar persistently accuse the left of injecting politics into culture. “The intrusion of politics into culture,” states Epstein, is “one of the major motifs” of the last twenty-five years.21 Not only do they imagine that at some point culture was uncontaminated by politics; but for them politics can only mean left-wing politics. Their own politics is not politics. Yet rarely have general periodicals devoted to the arts and schol arship been as emphatically political as The New Criterion and American Scholar. Alfred Kazin remarks that American Scholar, the journal of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, was never associated with any particular politics-until a neoconservative began saving it from politics.” The same might be said of Commentary. It may have once been liberal and tolerant of radicals, but it was never so relentlessly political until it became conservative.

* Certain topics are taboo; it is difficult to discuss the possibility that “some group differences in performance on IQ tests might have a genetic component”…

* From vague allusions we are to conclude that Marxists “dominate” departments and fields, but nothing is said of the conservatives who control most departments of economics or philosophy or political science or psychology. Radicals, we are told, try to hire radicals-as if conservatives for years, decades, or centuries have not staffed universities with conservatives. We are to presume that conservative ideas have difficulty getting a hearing-as if the entire structure of government, from the American president to most college presidents, does not emphatically lean to the right.

* The conservatives’ critique of big universities and big bucks is also more than a bit compromised by their embrace of big universities and big bucks. Few have resigned like Russell Kirk. They attack the noxious impact of the dollar from cool corporate offices. If left-wing academics appear sweaty, clamoring for positions and appointments, perhaps it is because they have traditionally been blacklisted, locked out in the street. It looks rather un seemly-from the top floors where the conservatives lament the decline of scholarship. No academic left can tap funds of the magnitude available to conservative intellectuals. No slick and expensive left journal has ever appeared like The New Criterion, handsomely funded by a conservative foundation, an arm of the Olin Corporation, which originally provided Park Avenue office space for Kramer’s periodical.35 Nor does the left include individuals like Richard Mellon Scaife, a great-grandson of the founder of the Mellon bank fortune, with millions available to fund conservative projects and journals.36
American corporations increasingly spread their political views by supporting or paying conservative intellectuals.

* The transformation of the traditional intellectual habitat is not instantaneous; it parallels the decay of the cities, the growth of the suburbs, and the expansion of the universities. There is no need to announce the collapse of civilization when fast food outlets nudge out greasy spoons, vending machines replace newspaper stands, or green campuses supplant vandalized city parks; but there is little reason to ignore its impact on the rhythm of cultural life. It matters whether people grow up on city streets or in suburban malls; whether intellectuals obsess about a single editor who judges their work or three “referees,” ten colleagues, several committees, and various deans.
Universities encourage a definite intellectual form. They do not shoot, they simply do not hire those who are unable or unwilling to fit in. Even Henry Luce of the Time magazine empire, often denounced as a master propagandist, employed and even liked mavericks and dissenters. Universities, on the other hand, hire by committees: one needs degrees, references, the proper deference, a pleasant demeanor. To win over a committee that recommends to a department which counsels a chairman who advises a dean who suggests to a college president takes a talent very different from gaining the assent of a single individual. It is almost ludicrous to imagine “Professor Edmund Wilson” or “Professor H. L. Mencken.”
It is even possible to chart a cultural shift in the unlikely quarter of book acknowledgments and dedications. Early Elizabethan books were usually graced by flowery prefaces dedicated to a patron who supported the writer and who, it was hoped, would be instructed and edified by the work.

* There is no doubt that the demise of public intellectuals reflects the recomposition of the public itself; it coincides with the wild success of television, the expansion of the suburbs, the corrosion of the cities, the fattening of the universities. The eclipse of the big general magazines, such as Look and Life, itself registers a parcellation of a once more homogeneous public; they have been replaced by “special interest” magazines-tennis, computer, travel, sports. In view of these developments, the disappearance of general intellectuals into professions seems completely understandable, inevitable, and perhaps desirable.

Posted in Academia | Comments Off on The Last Intellectuals: American Culture In The Age Of Academe

Soundtracks: The Surprising Solution to Overthinking

Jon Acuff writes in this 2021 book:

* Roy F. Baumeister, Rozin’s collaborator, explained why in his book The Power of Bad: How the Negativity Effect Rules Us and How We Can Rule It : “There is no opposite of trauma, because no single good event has such a lasting impact. You can consciously recall happy moments from your past, but the ones that suddenly pop into your head uninvited—the involuntary memories, as psychologists call them—tend to be unhappy.” 4
Your brain builds on overthinking’s habit of negativity by doing three additional things:
1 Lying about your memories
2 Confusing fake trauma with real trauma
3 Believing what it already believes

* There are three actions to change your thoughts from a super problem into a superpower:
1 Retire your broken soundtracks.
2 Replace them with new ones.
3 Repeat them until they’re as automatic as the old ones.

* The Three Questions You Should Ask Your Soundtracks

Question 1: Is it true?
Question 2: Is it helpful?
Question 3: Is it kind?

Would You Say This to a Friend?

* 50 Turn-Down Techniques You Can Use Today When Your Broken Soundtracks Get Loud
1 Go for a short drive down one of your favorite roads with the windows down and the music up. (I just wrote a Bruce Springsteen song.)
2 Drink a cup of coffee. Caffeine is the nectar of the gods.
3 Clean a drawer—or a whole closet if you’ve got the time.
4 Google “Steven Seagal” and “Russia” and see what he’s been up to lately. You will not be disappointed.
5 Put something back where it belongs. The shoes in my house always seem to be on adventures far from their home in the garage.
6 Take your dog for a walk or even to the dog park. I’ve been told it’s creepy to go to the dog park to pet all the dogs if you don’t own one. Noted.
7 Watch fifteen minutes of a British baking show where the judges encourage contestants instead of shaming them on a deeply personal level for their icing choices.
8 Knit a few rows on your turn-down scarf.
9 Take a nap. Remember those things you raged against in childhood? Now we love them.
10 Write a thank-you note to someone using actual paper and actual stamps and your actual hand.
11 Text something encouraging to a friend if that last one felt altogether too exhausting.
12 Add a few pieces to a puzzle.
13 Read a bit of fiction. Don’t force yourself through the classics if you despise them. Grab a beach book, where every single chapter has a climax and the main character’s name is something dramatic like Jackson Steelsmith or Savannah Orion.
14 Use a meditation app like Headspace or Calm for ten minutes.
kidding. Why would you do that to yourself? Buy a pair of Crocs for them and then call it a day. Nobody has time for laces.
16 Go to the gym. If you’re not motivated, sign up for a class that costs you money so you’ve got some skin in the game.
17 If you don’t have access to the gym, do ten jumping jacks, ten push-ups, or ten sit-ups.
18 If those are your three least-favorite things to do, go for a short walk.
19 Swing on a playground for ten minutes. Somewhere along the way to adulthood most of us lost touch with that simple joy.
20 Pretend to be your favorite professor and hold class outside for yourself today. Find a bench at work or a chair in your backyard and get some fresh air.
21 Watch ten minutes of your favorite comedian.
22 Take a bath or shower. Try real shampoo, not just a spritz of dry shampoo, a deception I caught my wife using after fifteen years of marriage. Just when you think you know someone.
23 Take a few deep breaths. The nice thing about this one is you were probably already planning to breathe today, so you might as well make a few of them deep.
24 Listen to your favorite music, even if it’s the wrong season. You want to bust out the Charlie Brown Christmas soundtrack in July? Go for it.
25 Call your mom.
26 Or, equally helpful, depending on your relationship with your mom, give yourself a week off from talking to your mom.
27 Dress up. I know the American dream is to work from home in your pajamas, but tired sweatpants are the uniform of broken soundtracks. Flannel feels like failure after a few hours. A robe is clothes melatonin. That’s one of the things we all learned working from home during the coronavirus pandemic. Put on a belt and you’ll already feel like you have a little bit of momentum.
28 Catch up on the latest episode of a podcast you love.
29 Look through your camera roll at the photos of your last vacation. David Thomas said that once you’ve got a few physical turn-down techniques, it’s great to add some digital ones too.
30 Plan your next vacation. Pick a place, pick a time of year, and pick one activity you’ll do when you go there.
31 Watch one of your favorite movies from the 1980s or 1990s. Start with Aspen Extreme , which the Seattle Times rightfully called “ Top Gun on the Ski Slopes.”
32 Light a candle or diffuse essential oils if you’re at home and won’t have to talk to HR about all the fires.
33 Start a new hobby. Learn to play guitar (start with “Wonderwall” by Oasis, obviously). Try watercolor painting. Sign up for a pottery class.
34 Balance your personal budget. This one would give me a panic attack, but for a lot of people, dealing with numbers is a great way to quiet down all the emotions broken soundtracks add to situations.
35 Build a “bliss box” with a few of your favorite items that always put you in a good mood.

Which Soundtracks Should You Borrow?
All of them.

Posted in Psychology | Comments Off on Soundtracks: The Surprising Solution to Overthinking

Who will lead? (9-7-22)

00:30 God save the King
02:00 Dooovid joins
09:45 The WASP Question
16:00 WP: New York set to force ultra-Orthodox schools to teach secular subjects
22:00 Soundtracks: The Surprising Solution to Overthinking
36:30 Elliott Blatt joins
46:00 Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America
54:30 Yeshiva University doesn’t have to recognize LGBTQ student group for now, Sotomayor rules
56:00 Meet Joe Biden’s Monkeypox Czar — A Gay Doctor In Drag Who Wants To ‘Dismantle Stigma

Posted in America | Comments Off on Who will lead? (9-7-22)