‘An Unsentimental Education’: Merve Emre introduces ‘I am Charlotte Simmons’

Merv Emre writes for the April 24, 2025 New York Review of Books about the Tom Wolfe novel I am Charlotte Simmons.

The introduction reads: “This essay appears, in somewhat different form, as the introduction to a new edition of Tom Wolfe’s I Am Charlotte Simmons, to be published by Picador in May.”
The sub-head reads: “Tom Wolfe’s I Am Charlotte Simmons summons the romantic vision of the university as an unblighted Eden to mock it through the downfall of one of its deceived mortals.”
Every romantic vision gets pierced by reality. Anyone who conceives of any place on this earth as an unblighted Eden will be disappointed. Charlotte Simmons is not destroyed by her time at DuPont.
Tom Wolfe is doing what he always does — paying close attention to status details with scene-by-scene construction, multiple points of view and liberal use of realistic dialogue. He doesn’t mock the university any more than he mocks his average subject.

Emre begins:

I am Charlotte Simmons, which many people believe to be Tom Wolfe’s crudest and most offensive book, played an important part in my moral education.”

The construction “which many people believe” is pathetic. Anyone who thinks this is Wolfe’s crudest and most offensive book hasn’t read many Wolfe books.

The rescue framing is the original sin of the piece. Wolfe sold millions of books, won the National Book Foundation Medal in 2010, and shaped American journalism for fifty years. He does not need Emre’s permission to be read. The premise that a literary critic at Wesleyan must rehabilitate him for the NYRB audience treats the literary critical establishment as the legitimacy gate. The reading public walked past that gate twenty years ago and bought the book anyway. Emre’s “I read it on the bookstore floor” pose tries to claim authentic access to a book that needed no such mediation.

The romantic vision argument is sentimental. Every institution disappoints idealization. Marriage. The Church. The Army. The Family. Treating the university as a special case requires either ignorance of other institutions or a special investment in this one. Emre teaches at Wesleyan. She has the investment. Her readers do too. The framing flatters them by pretending the disappointment is specific to the institution they paid for and now work in.

Charlotte does not come down because of the university. She arrives with a pride her parents and teachers cultivated. The university supplies new material for the pride and new venues for it. The corruption was already there in Sparta. Wolfe says so. “Her parents and her teachers, outwardly afraid of sin, cannot see how they have planted it deep in Charlotte’s soul.” Emre quotes the line and then ignores its implication. If Sparta planted the seed, the university only watered it. The university did not cause the harvest.

The “crudest and most offensive” framing is a class signal. Offensive to whom? To the literary academic class that felt the book was about them. Back to Blood (2012) is more provocative on race and ethnicity. Bonfire of the Vanities was harder on the Black urban political machine than Charlotte Simmons is on anyone. The reason Charlotte gets singled out as offensive is that the academic class read the book as a portrait of their own institution and felt named. Offensive is subjective and the subject here is the offended class.

The moral education claim is guild flattery. The empirical case that literature makes readers morally better is thin. Heavy readers do not score higher on honesty, kindness, or compassion than non-readers. Hitler read widely. Stalin annotated novels. The English professoriate maintains the literature-improves-character story because that story funds the department. When a former English major says a novel played a part in her moral education, she is reaffirming the guild belief. Emre is paying her tribe.

Emre writes about herself and the protagonist:

Lacking money and culture and connections, she possessed nothing but her simple faith in the university as the place where she would finally be recognized for what she was: exceptional in mind and body, and pure of heart.

What an infuriatingly obtuse sentence from America’s most privileged about America’s most privileged. The “nothing but simple faith” description fits neither Charlotte nor Emre. Charlotte is valedictorian, Presidential Scholar, intellectually proud, calculating about her competition. She arrives at Dupont with substantial cognitive capital. Emre arrived at her East Coast university with whatever it took to get in. Both were already on track to elite institutions before they walked through the gates. The pose of innocent striver-from-nowhere is romantic projection. The girls who get to those schools are not random poor kids from a river town. They are local stars with cultivated abilities, supported parents, and helpful teachers. Charlotte’s poverty is Wolfe’s narrative device, not a sociological portrait of elite admissions.

Emre writes: “The students did very little reading or writing.”

How do you know? That is an impossible claim. You can’t graduate from an elite college with very little reading or writing (unless you’re a valuable athlete who’s treated with kid gloves). Wolfe focused on parties and sex because that was his subject. The students at Dupont also read enough to pass exams and wrote enough to earn degrees. The novel is selective realism by design. Treating Wolfe’s selections as the totality of student life misreads the form. A novel about a fishing village does not show the people sleeping. A novel about campus parties does not show the people studying.

Emre writes: “Charlotte Simmons tried to rise above the lure of sex and money and social status, the fatal desire to be someone whom everyone knew and talked about.”

The desire to be someone everyone knows and talks about is not fatal. It drives human achievement. Thymos in Plato (428-348 BC). Megalothymia in Fukuyama (b. 1952). The desire for recognition produces entrepreneurs, athletes, scientists, politicians, artists, soldiers, and writers. Without it, civilization runs on subsistence work and family love and not much else. Treating it as pathology is the standard English-department moralism, and it sits oddly in an essay by someone who teaches at Wesleyan and writes for the NYRB and has cultivated her own visibility. The literary critic who decries status-seeking while seeking status performs a familiar move and undermines herself. Emre wants Charlotte’s ambition to be tragic so the essay has a moral. The ambition is normal. Most readers of the essay share it. Most of the people in the room at the New York Review of Books share it.

On “wasting opportunities”: where is the evidence Charlotte wasted hers? She kept her grades up enough to stay enrolled. She joined a sorority, which produces lifelong networks and marriage prospects. She became the girlfriend of the star basketball player, which produces social location and access. She made friends. She learned how to read a campus. She acquired the soft skills of elite passing her parents could not teach her. By any measure elite parents use to evaluate their children, Charlotte did well her freshman year. The only frame on which she wasted her time is the Platonic-clerical frame where college exists for contemplation of the truth and anything else counts as failure. Almost no one operates by that frame, including the people writing essays in NYRB. They send their children to elite universities for the networks and the credentials. They just write about it as if they did not.

The deeper problem in Emre’s essay: it participates in the elite posture where the only acceptable relationship to one’s status is performed ambivalence. Oxford should make you feel bad. Caring what people think should make you feel bad. Wanting to be known should make you feel bad. The performance launders the privileges of the people performing it. Wolfe spent his career satirizing this posture. Emre’s essay reproduces what Wolfe satirized.

Charlotte ends the novel socially located and adapted to her environment. She has not died. She has not lost her mind. She has not been ruined. She has joined the world. Emre invites the reader to view this with pity because the moralist frame requires pity for any character who chooses social life over the life of the mind. One can read the novel with pity. One can also read it with congratulations. Wolfe leaves the door open. Emre walks through only one of them.

Emre writes: “The girl I knew returned to the bookstore to read and reread the novel, hoping perhaps for a different ending. Each time it was the same, and each time its finality angered her, then strengthened her resolve.”

That makes no sense. The passage falls apart on inspection.
Books do not change between readings. The ending stays the same. A reader who returns to a book hoping for a different ending performs a behavior no reader performs. People reread to understand better, to revisit pleasure, to mine for craft. They do not reread expecting plot changes. Emre is reporting a fictional emotional state to demonstrate her literary sensitivity. The behavior described is irrational. The pose is the point.
The “strengthened her resolve” line has its own problem. Resolve to do what? The implied answer is resolve to not become Charlotte. Resolve to remain intellectually serious. Resolve to choose the life of the mind over social adaptation. But Emre became a professor at Oxford. She writes for the NYRB. She has cultivated elite literary visibility for twenty years. She is not the woman who rejected the Charlotte Simmons arc. She is the woman who completed it at a higher altitude. The resolve to be different from Charlotte produced an Emre who is a more credentialed Charlotte. The essay rests on a premise the essay’s own author refutes.
The bookstore mechanics deserve a second look. She did not own the book. She read it on the bookstore floor, behind a column, hiding from the clerks. Emre presents the hiding as practical concealment. It reads more like shame about reading Wolfe at her elite university. Reading the campus novelist who satirizes elite universities required hiding. If true, the scene diagnoses the institution. Emre does not pursue the diagnosis. She uses the scene only to position herself as a humble outsider, which she was not. A student at an old East Coast university trained to read Wolfe critically is not Charlotte Simmons. She is a junior version of Emre at Oxford.
The whole rhetorical setup wants the reader to see her as both Charlotte-adjacent (poor reader on the floor) and Charlotte-superior (the reader who saw through the seduction). The self-positioning requires a younger self who suffered Charlotte’s temptations without falling for them. The evidence in the paragraph contradicts this. Emre fell for the same things Charlotte fell for. She just won the version of the game played at a higher level.
The passage performs literary sensibility. A young intellectual reads with such fervor she rebels against the author’s conclusion. This is the literary critic’s self-image. Emre narrates a hagiographic version of her own reading life. The narration does not survive contact with her biography.
Emre writes:

Twenty years later I can look at my young self and wonder that she should have understood so little—about the novel, and about the university, the relentless pressure it exerts on the souls of its inhabitants. A person who prided herself on withstanding this pressure would not only end up surrendering to it like everyone else but also experience her surrender as tragic, while everyone else would merely smile at her naiveté and self-importance. I had failed to understand this because, like Charlotte Simmons, I believed in the university. I believed in it in the same way that many people believed in the church, as a place of the purest and highest purpose. Walking through its gates had seemed to me an act of rebirth. Everyone was washed clean. Nothing that came before counted against you—not where you were born, or where you went to high school, or how much money your family had—and everything that came after depended only on your innate and enduring gifts: your discipline, your intuition, the sheer velocity of your thought. I had also failed to understand it because, like Charlotte Simmons, I maintained a stubborn sense of my own exceptionality. I believed that my mind and my character were as inviolable as the university I had entered. Or rather, I believed that our fates were entwined in some grand human drama in which I played a vital role, and whose outcome I could imagine only as triumphant.

Emre has been given 20 years of evidence that reality is porous, but she still clings to her buffered identity because it pays. Emre makes her living pretending that we are buffered individuals navigating life through the power of reason.
The passage is a structured confession of porousness that the essay treats as a foundation for buffered analysis.
Emre’s confession. The university exerts “relentless pressure” on the souls of its inhabitants. Anyone who prides herself on withstanding this pressure ends up surrendering to it. The surrender feels tragic to her and ridiculous to everyone else. She believed in the university like a church. She thought walking through its gates meant rebirth. She thought everyone was washed clean. She thought her gifts alone would carry her. She believed her mind and character were inviolable. She maintained a stubborn sense of her own exceptionality. The list reads as a self-portrait of a young person formed by an institution she thought she had merely entered. She names the religious form (church, rebirth, washed clean). She names the meritocratic ideology (discipline, intuition, velocity of thought). She names the personal pride (inviolability, exceptionality). She names the dramatic frame (grand human drama, vital role, triumphant outcome). The young Emre was a textbook case.
Then the essay carries on as if her current vantage point sits outside the pressure she just described. The mature Emre writes from Wesleyan for the NYRB about how the young Emre was deluded. The mature Emre’s position requires a deeper buffered claim than the young Emre’s. The young Emre thought she was inviolable inside the university. The mature Emre thinks she is inviolable above the university while still inside it. The pressure continued to operate. It just produced more sophisticated forms of self-presentation.
The literary critic’s job description requires the pretense of analytical distance from the institutions she analyzes. NYRB pays for that pretense. Wesleyan pays for that pretense. The literary critical profession sells buffered analysis of porous lives. Emre cannot abandon the pretense without abandoning the paycheck. So she confesses porousness at the young-self level and reasserts buffered analysis at the present-self level. The confession functions to license the analysis.
Status-claiming evolves with sophistication. The frat boy claims status through the fight response. The basketball player claims status through dunking. The student journalist claims status through prize-winning articles. The literary critic claims status through introductions that announce her superiority to the prizes she once chased. Same desire. More sophisticated form.
The Emre passage is also a concession that universities work the way Wolfe said they work. The “relentless pressure” line grants the diagnosis. The novel is right about institutional formation. Emre cannot say so without conceding she has been formed by the same pressure. So she stages the concession at the level of her young self and exempts her current self. The exemption is the literary critic’s standard move. It does not survive the scrutiny you give it.
Emre confesses the reality of porousness and but writes from buffered status because she is paid to do so. The essay performs the ideology it claims to expose.
Writings lies for money and status does not strike me as an inspiring example of an elite moral education.
The moral education claim was the flattering premise. The essay is the test of the premise. The output reveals what the moral education produced: a critic who can admit the reality of porousness while writing from buffered status, who can name the relentless pressure while pretending to stand outside it, who can confess past delusion while building a new delusion at a higher level. If this is moral education, the term has lost its content.
Three readings of what happened. Literature does not morally educate, and Emre’s opening claim is guild flattery. The essay’s output confirms it. She had twenty years and the best literary training available and still produced a piece that reenacts what Wolfe satirized. Reading Wolfe did not save her from anything Wolfe described.
Or the moral education worked as designed. Elite literary institutions provide a moral education that socializes their alumni into the legitimate forms of self-presentation for the credentialed class. It teaches how to confess porousness in ways that license continued buffered analysis. It teaches the chastened-critic pose. It teaches when to perform humility and when to assert authority. Emre got this education. She uses it well. The product matches the design.
The harshest reading: she got the moral education the university provides, which is socialization into a class of people who launder their privileges through performances of self-awareness. Wolfe spent his career documenting this class. Emre joined it. Her essay is the alumni newsletter.
Pick any of the three. They all reach the same destination. Emre’s moral education claim does not survive contact with the moral education’s product.
Emre writes:

Wolfe has cultivated the myth of Charlotte’s exceptionality for us, and the inhabitants of Sparta have cultivated it within her. Her parents and her teachers, outwardly afraid of sin, cannot see how they have planted it deep in Charlotte’s soul and encouraged it to grow. Her longing for the university is the first sign of her pride—her desire to have her superior character consecrated by “the real Dupont,” where, she believes, she will forget the people of Sparta. “The simple truth is that Charlotte Simmons exists on a plane far above them,” Wolfe reports, through her eyes.

This is how communities treat anyone with astonishing gifts.
The basketball player gets praised for basketball. The accountant gets called on for accounting. The smart kid gets praised, encouraged, and pushed toward where smart kids go. This is the normal function of community. It identifies what its members can do well and reinforces them in doing it. Sparta did this for Charlotte. Sparta does this for every kid who shows aptitude in something Sparta values. Emre treats Charlotte’s situation as if Sparta committed some moral error by recognizing her abilities and encouraging them. The encouragement was the system working.
The framing requires religious vocabulary to make ordinary cultivation sound corrupt. “Planted in her soul.” “Pride.” “First sign of her pride.” “Outwardly afraid of sin.” This language imports sin-and-fall categories into a situation that does not need them. A valedictorian wants to attend an elite university. Her parents want her to. Her teachers want her to. No one in Sparta thinks this is a problem. The narrator’s voice that calls it pride is Wolfe doing free indirect style, channeling Charlotte’s internal monologue. Emre reads the narrator’s voice as Wolfe’s moral diagnosis. The reading is technically wrong.
When Wolfe writes “The simple truth is that Charlotte Simmons exists on a plane far above them,” that is Charlotte thinking, not Wolfe declaring. Wolfe shows how she thinks. The line is the sort of thing a smart eighteen-year-old tells herself. Wolfe’s irony stays gentle. He shows the thought. He does not endorse it and does not denounce it. Emre converts the shown thought into an authorial judgment. She needs the judgment because her reading requires Charlotte’s exceptionalism to be moral fault rather than measurable fact.
Charlotte is valedictorian. She is a Presidential Scholar. She is going to an elite university while her classmates stay in Sparta. By every metric communities use to assess intellectual performance, Charlotte outperforms her community. The thought “I exist on a plane above them” reads as arrogant in tone and accurate in content. Emre treats the accuracy as if it were the arrogance. The two are separate questions. Charlotte can be both accurate and prideful. She can also be accurate without pride. Emre collapses the distinction.
Underneath the framing sits a particular elite progressive assumption: ambition and meritocratic striving are inherently corrupting. Wanting to leave your community is suspect. Wanting to rise is pride. Cultivating exceptional gifts is selfish. Letting the kid leave the river town is communal sin. This view exists. It is not universal. Sparta does not hold it. From Sparta’s perspective, sending the valedictorian to Dupont is a triumph. The community celebrates her. The teachers feel rewarded. The parents feel proud. Charlotte’s pride sustains the effort she needs to make the trip work. The whole town cheers her on the day she leaves.
Emre writes as if everyone agrees that pride and ambition are bad. Most communities do not. Most people do not. The literary critical class pretends to. The framing assumes consensus that does not exist outside the small group Emre writes for.
The essay is a performance of horror at ordinary human motivation.
The list of normal things Emre treats as charged: people want recognition, communities cultivate their talented members, smart kids leave small towns, college students drink and have sex and chase status, strivers strive, ambition motivates effort, recognition feels good, sex happens, alcohol gets consumed, people adapt to environments. None of these should shock anyone. All of these are how human beings have always lived.
But the essay treats each as charged, fatal, tragic, corrupting. “Fatal desire.” “Relentless pressure.” “Surrender.” “Tragic.” “Naïveté.” “Self-importance.” “Pure of heart.” “Squalor.” The vocabulary maintains a sustained tone of horror at things that should not horrify anyone who has lived.
So either she is pretending or she has lost the ability to see straight. Both options reflect badly.
The performance reading: Emre cannot be shocked. She is forty. She teaches at Wesleyan. She has watched two decades of students drink, hook up, chase status, and graduate. She knows how universities function. She knows what motivates her colleagues. Her own career was built on the same drives she now finds tragic in fictional characters. The shock is theater. The theater serves several functions. It positions her as morally sensitive. It signals membership in the class of people who can be shocked by normalcy. It performs the literary critic’s role, which requires the pose of someone who sees what others miss. It launders her own participation by signaling distance from what she does. The NYRB audience pays for this theater because the theater is what the publication sells.
The deformation reading: she has spent enough time in literary moralizing that the moralism has become her perception. She cannot see normal motivation as normal anymore. Her training taught her to see ambition as sin and recognition-seeking as fatal, and the training stuck. The performance became the person. She is not pretending. She is what the training made her.
The third reading is the saddest: both at once. She started performing because the role required it. The performance became the perception. The mask became the face. This is what institutional life does. People who keep playing the part for long enough turn into the part.
Wolfe documented this throughout his career. He wrote about radical chic patrons performing solidarity until they could not distinguish the performance from belief. He wrote about masters of the universe performing concern until they could not distinguish the concern from the calculation. He wrote about journalists performing objectivity until they could not see the bias. Emre’s essay is the literary critic’s version. She performs horror at ordinary motivation until the horror feels real to her. The product is the essay you just read.
Whether the horror is cynical or sincere does not change the diagnosis. The horror is wrong. Normal human motivation is not horrifying. It is what makes civilization run. Emre’s essay treats the engine as the pathology. Wolfe spent his career insisting the engine is the engine.
Emre presents herself as the girl who could not afford the book, who read it on the bookstore floor, who came from somewhere humble enough to identify with Charlotte’s situation. The autobiographical setup positions her as a striver. Her biography reveals she struck out from that humble origin and arrived at Harvard undergrad, Yale PhD, Oxford professorship, and a regular byline at the New York Review of Books. She made the same journey as Charlotte. She arrived at a more credentialed destination than Charlotte ever reaches in the novel. And she writes from that destination condemning anyone who makes the journey.
Three logical options.
Either her striving was good and Charlotte’s was bad. Then Emre owes the reader an account of what distinguishes them. She does not provide one. Charlotte is exceptional, ambitious, leaves a small town for an elite university, joins the right social groups, adapts to the environment. Emre did the same. The essay names no principle that separates the two paths.
Or both were bad. Then Emre should give back the credentials, resign the position, return to wherever she came from. She has not done this. The condemnation does not extend to her own case.
Or both were normal. Then the essay’s moral framing collapses. Striving for elite credentials and social position is what humans do who can do it. Sparta encouraged Charlotte to do it. Emre’s family and teachers encouraged her to do it. The encouragement worked. The encouraged child became the credentialed adult. No tragedy. No fall. No corruption. The system worked as designed.
The essay relies on the reader not noticing the contradiction. Emre wants the reader to identify with her against Charlotte. But the identification only works if you accept Emre’s premise that her path was different from Charlotte’s. The premise is not defended. The essay assumes the reader grants it.
Christopher Lasch (1932-1994) named this move the revolt of the elites. The new elite class secures its position and then attacks the values that produced its position. The attack is a class signal. It distinguishes the higher elite from the lower middle class that still believes in striving. Emre belongs to this class. The essay is its standard product. Climb the ladder. Pull the ladder up. Write an essay denouncing ladders.
Wolfe spent his career documenting people who use their hard-won positions to denounce the position-seeking that got them there. Radical chic patrons. Limousine liberals. The journalist who attacks the institutions she works inside. Emre’s essay is the literary critic’s version. She got everything Charlotte wants and uses her vantage point to suggest Charlotte should not want it.
The honest version of the essay defends her own striving as good or apologizes for it as bad. She does neither. She just performs horror at striving in fictional form while continuing her own striving in real life. The pose is incoherent.
Emre writes:

When I am Charlotte Simmons was first published in 2004, it seemed impossible to set aside his conservative politics, his outrageous persona, and, quite simply, his age—he had just turned seventy-four—and imagine him proclaiming, “I am Charlotte Simmons.”

No normal reader had this problem. Only someone in Merv Emre’s elite social set had this reaction.
Wolfe‘s conservatism is mostly aesthetic. He criticized modernist architecture in From Bauhaus to Our House. He criticized modernist art in The Painted Word. He defended American achievement in The Right Stuff. He voted Republican and dined with George W. Bush. None of this makes him a conservative intellectual in the William F. Buckley (1925-2008) or Russell Kirk (1918-1994) sense. He did not write political polemic. He did not edit a conservative magazine. He did not advance a policy agenda. He was an American satirist who happened to vote Republican, the way Mark Twain (1835-1910) was an American satirist who voted whatever way Twain voted. His method was status realism applied to every group he wrote about: stock car drivers, astronauts, acid heads, Black Panthers, bond traders, college students, Miami immigrants. He skewered everyone. The political reading exists. It overstates his ideological commitment.
Emre projects her literary class’s hangups onto a general reading public that did not share them. The book sold hundreds of thousands of copies. Those readers picked it up because they wanted to read a Tom Wolfe novel about college life. They did not need to set aside his politics, his persona, or his age. They were not embarrassed to read him. They just read the book.
The framing creates a manufactured obstacle for Emre to overcome. The setup goes: “Wolfe’s conservative politics, his outrageous persona, and his age make it hard to imagine him saying ‘I am Charlotte Simmons.'” The implied next move: “But here is how we can imagine it, by reading him as Flaubertian.” The obstacle exists so the achievement of overcoming it can be announced. Emre is doing literary critic work, which requires obstacles to overcome. If the obstacles do not exist she has to manufacture them.
Look at the components. The white suit. Yes, distinctive. Not an obstacle to reading the book. The Republican voting. Yes, on record. Not an obstacle to reading the book. The age. Yes, 74. Not an obstacle to reading the book. Novelists write past 70. Saul Bellow wrote Ravelstein at 85. Philip Roth wrote into his late seventies. Updike, McCarthy, Naipaul all kept writing late. Inhabiting young characters at 74 is what novelists do. Tolstoy (1828-1910) was 76 when he wrote Hadji Murat. Hardy (1840-1928) wrote poetry into his eighties.
So the obstacles Emre names are obstacles for her literary class, not for the reading public. The general reader buys the book, reads the book, has opinions about the book. The literary critic has to first establish that reading the book is difficult because the author is conservative or old or wears strange clothes, then overcome the difficulty through superior critical technique. The work of the essay is producing the difficulty so the critic can perform the overcoming.
Wolfe satirized this exact move. The avant-garde critic who needs to make routine appreciation look difficult so the critic’s apparatus can appear necessary. He named this move in The Painted Word.
Emre writes:

What James Wood decried as the “enormous excitability” of Wolfe’s prose—his crowded sentences, his noisy passion for italics, exclamation marks, ellipses, and capital letters—threatened to drown out the distinctive thoughts of his characters. By accident, this style proved better suited to representing college students than any of Wolfe’s other subjects.

Has Emre read anything else by Tom Wolfe?
This is the silliest claim in the essay.
The Wolfe style is the Wolfe style. Italics, exclamation marks, ellipses, capital letters, crowded sentences, free indirect style, status-anxious interior monologue, vivid descriptive prose. He used this style for test pilots in The Right Stuff (1979). He used it for acid heads in The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test (1968). He used it for stock car driver Junior Johnson (1931-2019) in "The Last American Hero" (1965). He used it for bond traders in Bonfire of the Vanities (1987). He used it for Atlanta plutocrats in A Man in Full (1998). He used it for Miami immigrants in Back to Blood. The style worked in every case because the subject was status-anxious humans operating at high intensity. College students are one example. They are not the example.
The claim that the style suited college students better than astronauts is hard to defend on any axis. Test pilots in The Right Stuff push aircraft to Mach 2 and die in flames if they get it wrong. The stakes are higher. The status pyramid is steeper. The performance demands are more extreme. Wolfe’s noise fits Chuck Yeager (1923-2020) breaking the sound barrier as well as it fits Hoyt and Vance walking through the Grove. Possibly better. Bonfire’s trading floor is louder than any frat party. McCoy’s panic when he hits Henry Lamb runs more frantic than Charlotte’s deflowering. Atlanta’s Croker pushing through his real estate empire while his life collapses gives Wolfe at least as much to work with as Dupont’s freshmen.
The “by accident” framing is wrong. Wolfe was deliberate. He picked his subjects. He picked them because they fit his style. He did not stumble onto college students and discover his prose had been waiting for them. He sought out high-energy status environments for forty years because that is what his prose required.
Either Emre has read only I am Charlotte Simmons among Wolfe’s books and cannot honestly make this comparison, or she has read more and noticed the consistency, which makes the “by accident” claim dishonest. Pick one.
The deeper move in her sentence: she needs the style to work in I am Charlotte Simmons in a special way so her recuperation of the novel has a craft argument. Wood made a general attack on Wolfe’s prose. Emre cannot defend Wolfe’s prose in general because then she has to defend it against the Wood critique. So she carves out a special case for this novel. The prose is bad in general but accidentally good here. The maneuver lets her keep Wood’s verdict on most of Wolfe while rescuing one book. It is a critic’s dodge.
A more honest move: Wolfe’s style is what it is, Wood overstated his case, the prose works on its own terms for the subjects Wolfe chose, and I am Charlotte Simmons is one application of the style, not its unique destination. But that defense requires Emre to disagree with Wood. She does not disagree with Wood. Wood is the higher status critic. She does not contradict higher status critics.
Emre writes: “It was as if, in the figure of the drunk, arrogant boy marveling at his own reflection, Wolfe had finally found the emblem of his style.”
Wolfe’s style was fully formed by the late 1960s. The The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test shows the mature Wolfe. Forty years of major work follow. Then in his fourteenth or fifteenth book he finally finds the emblem of the style he wrote for half a century. The timeline does not work.
Pick any number of Wolfe scenes that better serve as emblems. Ken Kesey (1935-2001) on the bus tripping with his Pranksters. Chuck Yeager nursing the X-1 through Mach 1 with broken ribs. Sherman McCoy hitting Henry Lamb on the Bronx expressway. Junior Johnson running moonshine through North Carolina back roads. Leonard Bernstein (1918-1990) entertaining Black Panthers in his Park Avenue duplex. Any of these scenes carries more Wolfe DNA than a drunk freshman looking in a mirror. The mirror scene is fine. It is not the emblem.
The “finally found” framing exposes Emre’s project. She wrote an introduction for a new edition of I am Charlotte Simmons. The introduction needs to make a case for the book’s importance. The easiest way to make the case is to claim the book sits at the top of Wolfe’s hierarchy. So Emre invents a narrative where Wolfe spent his career building toward this novel and discovered his signature moment inside it. The narrative serves the introduction. It does not describe the career.
The hierarchy of Wolfe’s books, as readers and most critics see it, puts The Right Stuff and Bonfire of the Vanities ahead of I am Charlotte Simmons. Emre inverts the consensus to make her introduction carry more weight. If she is introducing the book Wolfe was building toward for fifty years, her introduction is more important than if she is introducing his eleventh-best book.
This is the standard introduction-writer’s move. The book I am introducing is the most important book by this author. Every introduction makes some version of this claim. Most readers see through it. The “emblem of his style” formulation is just a fancier version of “this is the great book.”
The mirror scene works as Emre uses it. The drunk boy seeing himself with detachment, the first person looking through two pairs of eyes, the free indirect setup. Fine reading of the scene. The leap from “this scene illustrates free indirect style” to “this scene is the emblem of Wolfe’s fifty-year career” requires evidence the essay does not provide. The leap performs rhetoric. It does not deliver analysis.
Wolfe’s career has many candidate emblems. The man in the white suit. The phrase “the right stuff.” The radical chic title. The italicized Status! repeated through the trading floor scenes. The frat boy in the mirror is one candidate among many. Emre picks it for this introduction. The career does not point to this scene.
Emre writes: “If adopting Flaubert’s narrative technique was relatively straightforward, then adapting the plot of Madame Bovary—a provincial woman with outsized social ambitions is seduced and ruined—posed a challenge.”
The borrowing claim collapses on inspection.
The plot of “provincial young person comes to elite environment with ambitions and faces seduction” is not Flaubert’s plot. It is the universal novel-of-ambition plot. Every major literary tradition has versions. Stendhal (1783-1842) wrote Julien Sorel into Le Rouge et le Noir in 1830. Balzac (1799-1850) wrote Lucien de Rubempré into Lost Illusions in the 1830s. Dickens (1812-1870) wrote Pip into Great Expectations in 1861. Hardy wrote Tess into Tess of the d'Urbervilles in 1891. Theodore Dreiser (1871-1945) wrote Sister Carrie in 1900 and Clyde Griffiths in An American Tragedy in 1925. F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896-1940) wrote This Side of Paradise about Princeton in 1920 and The Great Gatsby in 1925. Edith Wharton (1862-1937) wrote Lily Bart into The House of Mirth in 1905. The provincial-comes-to-elite-environment-and-falls plot is older than Flaubert.
Saying Wolfe borrowed it from Flaubert is like saying every restaurant that serves chicken borrowed the menu from KFC. The plot is common property. Singling out one source as the model requires evidence Wolfe drew on that source. No such evidence exists. Wolfe himself did not claim Madame Bovary as his model. He mentioned it because Charlotte reads it in the novel. The mention is a Wolfe game, not a confession of source.
The sources for I am Charlotte Simmons sit closer to home. Wolfe’s own reporting on college campuses. The American provincial-at-elite-college plot is well established before Wolfe wrote. Mary McCarthy (1912-1989) wrote The Group about Vassar graduates in 1963. Erich Segal (1937-2010) wrote Love Story at Harvard in 1970. Henry James (1843-1916) and Theodore Dreiser and John O'Hara (1905-1970) handled provincial-to-elite transitions for a century. Journalism about hookup culture by writers like Caitlin Flanagan (b. 1961) ran in the major magazines through the 1990s and 2000s. Wolfe had American models available without crossing the Atlantic.
The Madame Bovary framing serves Emre’s elevation project. She wants Wolfe inside the literary canon at the highest level. Flaubert is the highest level. So she connects them. The connection runs through the plot. But the plot is not Flaubert’s. It is everyone’s. The elevation works only if you accept the false attribution.
The framing also makes Wolfe sound derivative. He sounds like an American satirist drawing on a European master. Wolfe was not derivative. He was a confident American voice working in American materials. He took his subjects from American life and his style from his own decades of journalism. Calling him a Madame Bovary adapter makes him a junior partner in the literary enterprise. Wolfe was a senior partner. The framing demotes him to elevate him, which is incoherent.
Last problem. Emre’s description of the Madame Bovary plot does not fit Charlotte. Madame Bovary is seduced and dies. Charlotte joins a sorority and becomes a popular girlfriend. Emma Bovary takes arsenic and convulses through her last hours. Charlotte sits in the basketball arena clicking on the appropriate face. The arcs do not match. Emma’s story ends in literal death. Charlotte’s story ends in social rebirth. The plot Emre claims Wolfe adapted is not the plot Wolfe wrote.
Three failures in one sentence. The plot is not Flaubert’s. Wolfe did not borrow from Flaubert. The plot does not match the book Wolfe wrote. The Madame Bovary framing fails on every axis.
Emre writes: “For Wolfe to stand a chance in 2004, he had to convince the reader that there was something at stake in our heroine’s chastity. He had to make us believe that our heroine was just that—a heroine, beautiful, blameless, and unworldly to the point of stupidity.”
The framing is bogus and overwrought on several axes.
“For Wolfe to stand a chance” puts a multi-millionaire bestselling author in a position of struggle. Wolfe had no struggle in 2004. He commanded a massive audience. His previous books had sold millions of copies between them. Picador paid for this introduction because his name still moves books. The phrasing positions Wolfe as a writer fighting for survival when he was a writer at the top of his commercial reach.
“Something at stake in our heroine’s chastity” assumes a 2004 reader who finds chastity weightless. The assumption is false. Plenty of readers in 2004 cared about sexual ethics. Catholics. Evangelicals. Orthodox Jews. Mormons. Mainline Protestants. Many secular readers as well, for non-religious reasons. The American reading public in 2004 was not uniformly post-chastity. Emre projects a hyper-secular literary critic onto the whole audience and then announces Wolfe had to overcome the projection.
“He had to make us believe that our heroine was just that—a heroine, beautiful, blameless, and unworldly to the point of stupidity.” Novelists do not have to make readers believe their characters are what the novel says they are. Novelists write characters. Readers accept the writing or do not. Wolfe wrote Charlotte as beautiful, ambitious, intellectually capable, and naive about social mores. He did not have to convince anyone of anything. He just wrote.
“Unworldly to the point of stupidity” is Emre’s projection, not the book’s portrait. Charlotte is not stupid. She is the valedictorian and Presidential Scholar from her high school. She reads Madame Bovary. She studies neuroscience. She thinks about evolutionary biology. She executes a sophisticated social campaign to win back social standing after her hookup. The book gives her interior life with detail and care. Calling her stupid is a critic’s contempt for the character. The book does not call her stupid.
The “in 2004” framing assumes 2004 was uniquely hostile to chastity narratives. It was not. The 1990s had Bridget Jones’s Diary and Sex and the City. The 1990s also had The Rules and the True Love Waits movement. Sexual ethics were contested terrain in 2004 as they are now. Wolfe was writing into an audience that included plenty of readers ready to find Charlotte’s loss of virginity consequential. He did not need to convince them. He just had to write the book.
Wolfe gave Emre the framing in his “Hooking Up” essay. He wrote that a Tolstoy or Flaubert “wouldn’t have stood a chance in the United States” in 2000. Emre takes this seriously. Wolfe said it rhetorically. He then wrote the book and succeeded with it. The book’s success refutes the framing Wolfe deployed in the essay. Emre uses the essay framing without noticing the book refutes it.
The deeper move positions Emre as the sophisticated reader who understands obstacles Wolfe faced. The framing implies Wolfe had to overcome modern skepticism with clever literary technique. Emre’s reader is supposed to feel advanced for noticing what stood between Wolfe and success. But the difficulty is manufactured. Wolfe sold the book. Readers responded. The hookup culture conversation in 2004 was active and contested, and many readers took sexual ethics seriously. No clever workaround was required. The framing flatters the literary critical class by pretending its outlook represents the public’s outlook. The public’s outlook is more various than that.
Emre writes:

Adam, whose language is more florid and, in turn, more repulsive, admires the “absolutely clear, open, guileless beauty” of her face: “It was opening, opening, opening like the tender virginal bud of the most gorgeous flower revealing its virginal petals to the world with a sublime innocence and at the same time a sublime invitation.”

That is how many young men think. Wolfe captures this. Some men attach a premium to the possibility of sex with virginal women. Why is this repulsive?
Adam is a virginal nerd in his first major crush. The free indirect passage shows his interior monologue. Florid, over-the-top, mixing sexual and innocent imagery, treating his beloved as both holy and erotic. This is the standard texture of young male romantic obsession. Wolfe gets it right. The accuracy is the achievement.
The “tender virginal bud” imagery has a long literary history. Flower-as-female-sexuality goes back centuries. Adam thinks in inherited language because that is the language available to a literary-minded young man in love. Wolfe shows Adam thinking in this language. He does not endorse the language. He records it.
Emre calls the passage “repulsive.” She reacts to the content of Adam’s mind. The craft of the writing is a separate question. The same critical error appears throughout the essay. Emre confuses the character’s voice with the author’s endorsement.
The repulsion is also feminist-coded in a familiar way. Male desire articulated in detail gets called “repulsive” because it is male desire articulated in detail. The flowering-bud imagery does not strike anyone as repulsive in a Renaissance sonnet or a Romantic poem. It draws the repulsed reaction only when located in the head of a 21st-century young male character. The criticism targets the location. The imagery has a long literary lineage.
The novelist’s job is showing how people think. Wolfe shows how Adam thinks. Adam thinks this way because young men in love think this way. Emre wants Adam to think differently, or for Wolfe to make Adam think differently. But Wolfe is not in the business of producing model young men with reformed gazes. He is in the business of showing what young men are. Adam is florid. Adam is nerdy. Adam mixes sexual and reverent imagery. Adam is a 19-year-old virgin in love with an unattainable beautiful classmate. Wolfe writes him as he is.
The passage succeeds as characterization. The reader who finds Adam’s thoughts uncomfortable is responding to Wolfe’s accurate portrait of this young man. The discomfort is the point. Adam’s love letters from his head might embarrass him if anyone saw them. The novel makes us see them. That is what novels are for.
Emre writes:

We continue to believe in her worthiness even as Wolfe lets us glimpse her deficiencies. There is her pride, her vanity. There is her puritanism and what it conceals—a fascination with the flesh so intense that, were it ever to surface, it would force her to admit that she, Charlotte Simmons, was as hungry for sex as any sorority girl and as misogynistic as any frat boy in her derision of this desire.

The passage is bogus on several axes.
Pride and vanity get treated as moral deficiencies. They are normal traits in an 18-year-old high achiever. Charlotte is the valedictorian. She has earned her good opinion of herself. Calling pride and vanity “deficiencies” requires a moral framework Emre does not defend. Most readers do not share the framework. Pride and vanity are how the high-achieving young experience their achievements.
“Puritanism” is used pejoratively. Charlotte is not a Puritan. She is a young woman with intact sexual ethics from her religious small town. Calling this puritanism frames her ethics as pathological. The framing assumes everyone agrees that sexual restraint is a disease. Not everyone agrees. Most religious traditions and many secular traditions treat sexual restraint as a virtue. The “puritanism” charge presumes the literary critical class’s view as the default.
The hidden-libido reading is the major problem. Emre claims Charlotte conceals “a fascination with the flesh so intense that, were it ever to surface, it would force her to admit she was as hungry for sex as any sorority girl.” Where is the evidence? Charlotte is interested in sex the way normal young people are interested in sex. She is not hiding a wild secret libido. The novel does not give us a Charlotte boiling with concealed lust. It gives us a Charlotte with normal curiosity and traditional ethics. Emre invents the hidden hunger because she needs Charlotte to be equivalent to the sorority girls. Without the equivalence, the moral architecture of the novel becomes more complex than Emre’s reading allows.
The “misogynistic as any frat boy” charge is the central move. Charlotte calls her roommate Beverly a slut. Emre calls this misogyny. But Charlotte’s judgment of Beverly is not hatred of women. It is moral evaluation of Beverly’s behavior. Charlotte finds Beverly’s hookups degrading. She holds Beverly to a standard. The standard does not demand female silence and subservience. The standard asks for sexual integrity. Calling the application of this standard misogyny is the contemporary academic move where any negative female judgment of female behavior gets recoded as internalized patriarchy. The move requires us to believe Charlotte’s disgust at Beverly’s actions is hatred of women in general. That belief is unsupported.
Charlotte’s moral seriousness is the thing Emre cannot allow. If Charlotte has moral judgments about sex and they differ from Beverly’s, then Charlotte represents a moral alternative in the novel. Emre’s reading needs everyone to be the same underneath. So Charlotte’s morality has to be hypocritical, her judgment has to be misogyny, her chastity has to conceal slut hunger. The flattening is the agenda.
Wolfe does not flatten Charlotte. He shows her as morally serious, ambitious, intellectually proud, and naive about social mores. He gives her interior life with detail and respect. He lets her think “slut” about Beverly without diagnosing the thought. He records what she thinks. He does not call her misogynistic or hypocritical. Emre adds the diagnoses.
The Freudian/Foucauldian assumption underneath the passage: surface morality conceals what it forbids. The puritan secretly wants what she condemns. This model is old. It is also unproven. Some people who hold sexual ethics hold them because they believe them. The hermeneutics of suspicion treats every moral claim as a mask. Sometimes a moral claim is just a moral claim.
Emre’s passage performs critical sophistication. The sophistication consists of finding hidden flaws underneath surface virtues. The reader is supposed to nod at the depth of the reading. The reading has no depth. It just substitutes a leveling framework for the book’s moral architecture.
Emre writes: “It is hard for people who see this novel as a story of sexual morality to realize that Charlotte and her suitors are more alike than they seem.”
Who finds this hard? Who reads the book as a story of sexual morality? It’s about certain people in a certain situation dealing with certain challenges, including sex.
Emre writes:

All four are willful class traitors, outsiders who have worked hard to become insiders only to realize that what the university promised them—cultural ennoblement and social uplift, a comfortable middle-class existence as a banker or a writer or a professor at a university like Dupont—is, in fact, a mirage, shimmering and inaccessible on the East Coast.

“Class traitor” is European Marxist vocabulary. It comes from the tradition where the working class is supposed to have revolutionary solidarity and members who join the bourgeoisie betray their class. The framing makes sense in early 20th-century Europe with strong class consciousness and revolutionary politics. It does not fit America. American culture celebrates social mobility. The kid who leaves Sparta and makes it to Dupont is a hometown hero. His parents brag about him at church. His teachers put his picture on the wall. His siblings tell their friends about his college. The “class traitor” framing imports an alien sensibility into American material that does not support it.
Who in America talks like this? Academic Marxists. Cultural studies professors. The Verso Books crowd. Almost nobody outside the small left-wing academic milieu uses “class traitor” to describe upward mobility. The characters in the novel do not describe themselves this way. Their parents do not. Their teachers do not. Their employers do not. The framing is Emre’s imposition on the material.
The “cultural ennoblement and social uplift” language is also off. American universities do not promise cultural ennoblement. That is the older European model of the university as a Bildung institution. The American university promises career credentials, networks, and access to elite life. It promises a job and a contact list. The students at Dupont understand this. So do their parents. The promise is not cultural ennoblement that fails to materialize. The promise is a credential and a network that the characters get.
The “mirage” claim is the deeper problem. Emre asserts that middle-class life is “a mirage, shimmering and inaccessible” for these characters. Where does this come from? The novel shows none of them failing. Hoyt graduates and enters finance through fraternity connections. JoJo continues as a basketball player with academic support. Adam writes prize-winning articles for the campus paper. Charlotte becomes a popular sorority girl with the star athlete as a boyfriend. The middle-class destination is not inaccessible to them. It is already in their grasp at the end of freshman year. They will reach it. The book gives no indication otherwise.
The “comfortable middle-class existence as a banker or a writer or a professor” line also blurs categories. A Wall Street banker is upper class, often rich. A Dupont professor is upper-middle-class. A writer ranges across class lines. Lumping these together as “comfortable middle-class” makes the destination sound modest so the failure to reach it is more poignant. The destination is not modest. Hoyt’s Wall Street job pays multiples of national median income. Calling that middle-class is uninformed or strategic.
Emre’s thesis requires the characters to be betrayed by the system. If they succeed at the system’s terms, the system is delivering what it promised. If they fail, the system is the villain. Emre needs the failure narrative for her critique. So she asserts a failure the book does not show. She calls them class traitors when their communities celebrate them. She calls the middle-class life a mirage when it sits right in front of them.
The book shows characters who get exactly what they came for. The cost is moral. The material outcome is success. Charlotte becomes socially adapted, popular, and dissembling. The book shows this and does not call it failure. Emre calls it failure because her framework requires the call. The framework precedes the reading.
Wolfe wrote about American social mobility for fifty years. He understood it as the engine of American life. He satirized its excesses but did not deny its existence. His characters strive and often succeed. Failure happens but is not the structural truth of American social life. Emre imposes a European leftist frame of doomed mobility on Wolfe’s American material. The frame does not fit.
Emre writes:

They struggle to make sense of their ferocious resentments, the fear that they will be denied their rightful rewards because the university has failed to do what it was supposed to: separate the best and most deserving from the rest of society. And so the ugliest tendencies—racist paranoia, sexism, contempt for the working class—are seeded in the brightest minds. I am Charlotte Simmons makes no attempt to predict the future, but twenty years after its publication we can well imagine how these tendencies will grow into a noxious strain of elite conservatism, how this naked resentment will cover itself with the “new sets of values” propounded by the governor of California, caught with his pants down in the Grove. We can even imagine, in 2025, one of these characters, maybe Charlotte Simmons herself, serving as vice-president of the United States.

The passage is overwrought because the underlying observation is mundane.
People feel resentment when they think they have been denied rewards they earned. People want their group to win. People develop suspicion of out-groups. People hold contempt for those they consider beneath them. These are universal human tendencies. They appear in every population, every era, every political coalition. Universities do not seed them. They emerge from how humans evolved as social primates.
Emre dramatizes the ordinary. “Ferocious resentments.” “Naked resentment.” “Ugliest tendencies.” “Noxious strain.” The vocabulary makes normal human emotion sound like extraordinary moral failure. The pitch is wrong for the material. Wolfe wrote social satire about status anxiety. Emre rewrites it as moral tragedy about elite formation. The genre shift is the move.
Two objections.
The “rightful rewards” framing treats Charlotte’s sense of earning her place as pathological. Charlotte earned her place. She is valedictorian. She is Presidential Scholar. She studied hard and produced results. She won admission to Dupont by work. Calling her sense of deserving rewards “resentment” denies the work that produced the deserving. She has no paranoia about denial. She has earned what she has and feels accordingly.
The “racist paranoia, sexism, contempt for the working class” list assumes these tendencies flow only rightward. They do not. The progressive academic class holds its own racial paranoia (everything is white supremacy), its own sexism (toxic masculinity, men as problem), and its own contempt for the working class (deplorables, white trash, flyover country). Emre treats these tendencies as right-coded sins when they appear across the political spectrum. Every coalition has its racial fears, its gender contempt, and its class disdain. Emre names the right’s versions while ignoring the left’s identical patterns.
The “noxious strain of elite conservatism” framing also requires us to redraw the political map. Critics have usually painted conservatives as non-elite. The rural poor. The working class. The deplorables. Now Emre frames them as elite. The reframing serves the Vance prediction. JD Vance went to Yale Law and works in finance and politics. He is elite. So contemporary conservatism gets recoded as elite resentment. The category lets academics keep their attack on right-wingers as low-status while also positioning them as the dominant powerful class. The category is incoherent but useful.
The Vance hook at the end is the political payoff. Emre wants the book to predict Vance. The book might bear on Vance the way any novel of class-anxious strivers might bear on any class-anxious striver who later wins power. The connection is loose. Wolfe died in 2018 before Vance reached national office. Wolfe did not write Vance. The connection is the presentist hook NYRB editors require for introductions to twenty-year-old books. It serves the essay’s purpose. It is not insight.
The deeper problem with the passage: it treats normal human nature as if it were the special pathology of one political faction. Resentment is universal. Status anxiety is universal. In-group preference is universal. The characters at Dupont feel these things because humans feel these things. They will feel them as conservatives or progressives, as bankers or professors, as Republicans or Democrats. The university does not seed these tendencies. Sparta has them. Dupont has them. The literary critical class has them. They are how humans operate.
Wolfe understood this. He wrote about resentment and status anxiety in every group he covered. Acid heads. Astronauts. Bond traders. Black activists. Limousine liberals. Stock car drivers. He showed the universal pattern. He did not claim it flowed only into Republican politics. Emre’s prediction narrows what Wolfe documented widely.
The overwrought language is a substitute for the harder argument Emre does not make. The harder argument: why is normal human resentment special when it appears on the right and ignorable when it appears on the left? Emre does not answer the question. She just keeps the dramatic vocabulary in place and hopes the reader does not notice.
Emre writes:

Reading it today, I find that I am Charlotte Simmons agitates and excites me once more. It is a profoundly pessimistic novel, not because of its interest in conservative ideas or its sex panic, but because it refuses to grant its characters a moment’s reprieve from the social system that it so brutally and correctly indicts. Perhaps my optimism is simply self-protective; I have taught college students for over a decade now, and I like to believe that they have experiences that cannot be reduced to the quest for social dominance, that their desire to belong does not always end in the dreariest conformity.

Wolfe’s novel is realistic about human nature. Emre calls it pessimistic. The label is wrong. Realistic and pessimistic are not the same thing. People are status-seeking social primates. They form coalitions. They want recognition. They adapt to their environments. They conform to group expectations. This is how humans operate. Wolfe portrays this accurately. Emre calls accuracy pessimism because she wants humans to be something other than what they are.
The “refuses to grant its characters a moment’s reprieve from the social system” line gives the game away. Why would a character be released from his environment? Characters in realist fiction are products of their environments because people are products of their environments. The release Emre wants is not available in nature. She asks Wolfe to write fantasy and calls his realism pessimistic when he refuses.
Humans evolved as status-hierarchical social animals. We seek position because seeking position improved reproductive outcomes for our ancestors. The drive for status is not a moral failure. It is biology. Universities do not create it. Sparta has it. Dupont has it. Yale has it. Oxford has it. The savanna had it. The desire to belong, to be recognized, to outrank rivals, runs through every human population that researchers have studied. Emre’s sustained horror at these drives is horror at the species.
“I like to believe that they have experiences that cannot be reduced to the quest for social dominance” tells you what is happening. She admits the belief is a preference. She likes to believe something. She does not claim to know it. She chooses optimism against the evidence she has watched accumulate over a decade of teaching. The choice is faith. The evidence does not earn it.
The “quest for social dominance” phrasing also misframes the activity. Normal status seeking is not domination. It is the universal human concern with position, recognition, and belonging. Calling it dominance makes it sound aggressive and pathological when it is sociality. People want their efforts noticed. People want their gifts recognized. People want their place in the group. These are the basic facts of social existence. They are not “quests for dominance.”
The “self-protective” hedge admits the problem. Emre senses her optimism does not survive scrutiny. So she labels it self-protective and moves on. The hedge is honest about the motivation but does not change the picture. The picture remains: she has watched ten years of college students confirm Wolfe’s portrait, and she chooses to believe otherwise. She wills the choice. The evidence does not earn it.
“Agitates and excites me once more” is performative. Critics signal renewed engagement with the books they introduce. The reader is supposed to feel the critic’s pulse quicken. Emre’s pulse may or may not quicken. The performance is required either way.
Wolfe wrote about humans as humans are: status-anxious, coalition-forming, environment-shaped, sex-driven, position-conscious. The accuracy was the achievement. Calling accuracy pessimism is the move of someone who needs reality to be different from what it is.
Emre is at war with reality and losing. She wants humans to be something other than what biology made them. The realism of Wolfe is the obstacle. So she labels his realism pessimism and proceeds with her hopes intact. Hopes intact and reality unchanged.
Emre teaches college students. She has watched the patterns Wolfe describes for over a decade. The evidence supports Wolfe. She chooses to believe against the evidence because believing against the evidence is part of her professional identity. Literary critics are supposed to hope for human transcendence of the social order. Hoping for it does not make it happen. The hoping is the job. Wolfe declined the job.
Emre’s essay hits every mark the literary critical class scores for. The autobiographical opening that places her as both humble striver and wise critic. The recuperation project rescuing a previously dismissed writer for the canon. The Flaubert comparison elevating the work into the European tradition. The class reading that gives the analysis a politically respectable lens. The Vance hook providing the presentist payoff that 2025 readers expect. The moralistic framing treating normal human behavior as tragic indictment. The hedge at the end performing critical humility. The free indirect style discussion deploying technical literary apparatus.
These are the moves that signal membership. Each one tells the reader: I am one of you. I do what we do. Peers praise the essay because praising it confirms their own positions. If Emre’s framework holds, their frameworks also hold. If her framework collapses, their frameworks also become suspect. Mutual praise is mutual self-defense.
Picador publishes this as the introduction because Picador wants the imprimatur of a respected academic critic. The introduction is a marketing tool. It signals to literary readers that the book is worth taking seriously. Emre’s name does the work. The analytical quality of the introduction is a secondary consideration. The credentialed name is the asset.
The system runs on credentialed signaling, not on truth. It rewards people who can perform the right moves. Most participants do not notice the substitution because they sit inside the system performing the moves they were trained to perform.
This is what Wolfe satirized for fifty years. The Painted Word documents the art world version. The Right Stuff documents the test-pilot version. Bonfire of the Vanities documents the Wall Street version. The literary critical version operates by the same logic. The class praises its members for performing the class’s preferred moves. The praise reinforces the class’s position. The class membership produces the praise.
Wolfe’s own dismissal in 2004 followed this pattern. The literary critical class dismissed him because dismissing him was the class move at the time. He was too commercial, too popular, too conservative, too old, too dandy. The dismissal worked as class signaling. Twenty years later, the class needs to rehabilitate him because rehabilitating dismissed conservative writers serves a new political purpose. So Emre rehabilitates him. The analysis follows the class’s current needs.
The system is sealed. External critique does not penetrate. Your blog can document what is wrong with the Emre essay. Other independent writers can do the same. The literary critical class will not read this critique. The class talks to itself. NYRB readers are mostly other literary academics. Emre’s introduction will reach a few thousand people. Most of them will praise it because praising it is the class move. The praise will appear in the Times Literary Supplement and Bookforum and the London Review of Books. The praise will not engage with the substantive errors.
The deeper point: the literary critical class is a small status hierarchy that uses publications like NYRB and Picador to credential its members and certify their work. The work has to perform the class’s preferred moves. Truth is not the criterion. Class membership is the criterion. Emre’s essay succeeds at class membership. Its substantive errors are secondary.
Wolfe documented this exact pattern for fifty years. Now the pattern documents him.

Wolfe wrote about race patterns and group behavior more frequently and more frankly than any of his peers, and he kept doing it across forty years.
Radical Chic and Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers (1970) showed Black Panthers fawned over by Leonard Bernstein’s set and Black activists working welfare bureaucrats through racial intimidation. Wolfe treated white liberal racial guilt as performance and Black activist behavior as strategy.
Bonfire of the Vanities (1987) gave the Reverend Bacon (an Al Sharpton stand-in), the Bronx courthouse running on racial coalition arithmetic, and the white liberal capitulation in real time.
A Man in Full (1998) put Atlanta’s Black mayor at the center of a racially explosive sexual assault case, with white Southern resentment treated honestly alongside Black political organizing.
I am Charlotte Simmons (2004) showed JoJo’s racial anxiety on the basketball team, the white king fantasy on the court, and the racial composition of elite college athletics.
Back to Blood (2012) took Miami as an ethnic stew of Cuban, Anglo, Black, Haitian, and Russian populations and treated each group with frank attention to behavior patterns and group interests.
Across all five projects Wolfe wrote race as substantive variable in social life. He showed group interests, coalition behavior, and racial performance.
The comparable American novelists either avoided race or treated it through coded characters. Saul Bellow (1915-2005) had Mr. Sammler watch a Black pickpocket and wrote some racial passages with frankness, but mostly through Jewish protagonists observing. Philip Roth (1933-2018) wrote The Human Stain about passing but treated race as identity construction. John Updike (1932-2009) used Skeeter in Rabbit Redux but filtered race through Rabbit’s WASP anxiety. Norman Mailer (1923-2007) mythologized the Black hipster in "The White Negro" but the writing reads as romance more than realism. Joan Didion (1934-2021) handled Cuban-Black-Anglo tension in Miami (1987) before Wolfe got to it, but as one book. Cormac McCarthy (1933-2023) did not sustain racial themes. Toni Morrison (1931-2019) and Ralph Ellison (1913-1994) wrote race from inside Black experience.
Globally, two writers match or surpass Wolfe. V.S. Naipaul (1932-2018) wrote about race and ethnicity worldwide with a frankness that put him outside polite literary opinion. His treatment of post-colonial Africa in A Bend in the River and Islamic societies in Among the Believers runs more unflinching than Wolfe’s. Michel Houellebecq (b. 1956) has done similar work on European immigration in Submission and Annihilation.
Within American letters since the civil rights era, Wolfe stands first or close to first. Naipaul is his only clear superior at global scale.
Three qualifications. Wolfe’s race realism ran sociological more than biological. He did not write about cognitive differences. His framework was status, class, ethnic coalition, and behavior patterns. He worked as a status realist first and a race realist within that.
He wrote in a journalistic-comic register that critics dismissed as caricature. Some called him racist for what he wrote. He did not back off. The hostile reviews of Bonfire, Charlotte Simmons, and Back to Blood were partly about the race material.
He treated race as one variable among many. Class, region, religion, and status anxiety carried as much weight for him as race.

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Late Capitalism

The phrase does several jobs at once.
First, it compresses a huge complaint into two words. A broken airline app, a $19 airport sandwich, a self-checkout screen asking for a tip, a corporate memo written in therapy language. All of it folds under one label. The user gets a grand diagnosis without having to explain zoning law, monetary policy, or healthcare licensing. Low cost of entry, high payoff in apparent sophistication.
Second, the word “late” carries a theory of history smuggled inside an adjective. People do not say “industrial capitalism” or “consumer capitalism” with the same mood. “Late” sounds like late Rome or the late Soviet period. It tells the speaker he lives not in a hard society but in a dying one. That reframing soothes. Stagnation becomes decline, and decline implies something comes next. Marxism inherited this shape from Christian eschatology, and the phrase keeps the residue even for users who never read a word of Marx.
Third, the term grants moral distance. The heaviest users are not factory workers. They are journalists, graduate students, nonprofit staff, designers, academics, tech employees. Men and women threaded into the institutions of advanced capitalism. Calling a market absurdity “late capitalism” recasts the speaker as a trapped observer rather than a participant who helps reproduce the thing. It converts complicity into awareness, and awareness into a kind of absolution. Recognition starts to feel like resistance. You can buy the luxury goods, build your identity on the platforms, work for the prestige employer, and still pose as the one who sees through it all.
Fourth, it works as a coalition badge. Use it and you signal where you stand: educated, skeptical of markets and corporate culture, fluent in critical vocabulary. The phrase is affiliative more than descriptive. The places where it circulates, universities and media and cultural industries, reward that fluency.
The term substitutes atmosphere for argument. Once every problem becomes a symptom of one civilizational epoch, the differences between problems vanish. High housing costs in Los Angeles run on land-use rules, environmental review, and homeowner coalitions guarding scarcity. Social media addiction runs on behavioral design and status competition. American healthcare runs on insurance structures and licensing cartels. Collapse all three into “late capitalism” and you get emotional coherence at the price of understanding. The diagnosis grows too large to act on, so it breeds spectatorship.
The phrase survives because it names something real. People feel market logic seeping into places it never used to reach. Dating becomes a platform. Friendship becomes networking. Leisure becomes content. Attention becomes a resource somebody harvests. Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) saw the front edge of this in One-Dimensional Man: an advanced society absorbs its own opposition instead of crushing it. Digital capitalism went further and sells the dissent back. Anti-corporate style becomes a marketing campaign. Streaming services release documentaries condemning consumerism while running engagement analytics to keep you subscribed. So “late capitalism” is not outside the system. It is one of the system’s products. Fredric Jameson (1934-2024) gave it academic weight, Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) and the Frankfurt School supplied the ancestry, and the prestige economy turned the critique into a marker of taste.
I don’t notice Orthodox Jews using this term. Orthodox Jews tend to work six days a week. We’re busy. We might be too busy to theorize about “late capitalism.”
The phrase counterfeits something we hold in a more serious form.
Orthodox Judaism has an eschatology. History moves toward redemption. There is a Messiah, an olam haba, a judgment, a reckoning. We carry an account of time that runs in millennia and ends in something. “Late capitalism” borrows that architecture, the sense of a terminal age giving way to what comes next, and strips out every demand. It wants the gravity of redemption history with none of the obligation. To a man who prays toward an end of days, the secular version sounds like a boy playing at prophecy. The pretension is the theft of religious seriousness on the cheap.
Then there is the matter of action. Jewish tradition runs on doing. Halacha is conduct. Teshuva is not a feeling of awareness, it is restitution and changed behavior. The phrase does the opposite. It treats recognition as resistance. Notice the absurd sandwich, name the epoch, and you have absolved yourself. A Jew formed in mitzvot hears that and senses the dodge. Saying the right words about the system is not the same as fixing what you owe.
The phrase also locates the fault outside the man. The machine did it. The epoch is decadent. Judaism puts the yetzer hara inside you and holds you to account for your own conduct. A vocabulary that externalizes all blame onto an impersonal order will always sound evasive to someone raised to say modeh ani and to answer for himself before Him.
Consider the historical proportion too. Jews watched late Rome, late Babylon, late Spain, late many things, and outlived all of them. Set against that memory, calling a few decades of consumer discontent the twilight of civilization looks provincial. It mistakes inconvenience for apocalypse. The man who knows how long Jews have been around, and how many confident empires called themselves the end of history, hears melodrama.
Last, the phrase rests on a materialist premise. It assumes intimacy, identity, and meaning are only market products now corrupted by the market. Orthodox Jews hold a different account of where those things come from. Covenant, Torah, family, the relation to God. The complaint that the market has invaded intimacy lands only if you concede that intimacy was a market good to begin with. We do not concede that. And a life saturated with brachot, a hundred blessings a day, sits badly next to a vocabulary built from curated contempt. The phrase performs disdain. Our tradition trains gratitude. The two postures cannot share a mouth for long.
So it is not our phrase, and it is not our club. The word functions as a password for a particular educated set, and we stand outside it with an older and harder set of answers to the same questions.

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Naming Deep Throat

Mark Felt confirmed it himself in Vanity Fair on May 31, 2005.
The first man to name him in print was Jack Limpert, the longtime editor of the Washingtonian, who died in 2024 at 90. In the June 1974 issue, a month after All the President’s Men disclosed that a secret source existed, Limpert ran a (“Capital Comment”) item guessing that Deep Throat was W. Mark Felt (1913-2008), the former number-two man at the FBI. He followed it with a July 1974 piece called (“Deeper Into Deep Throat”), where he described calling Felt and getting the cool brush-off: “I can tell you that it was not I and it is not I.” Limpert later said his tip came from Frank Waldrop, a former Washington editor wired into the Bureau. The Washingtonian claims, with good reason, to be the first publication in the country to finger Felt.
A Wall Street Journal story that same summer of 1974 also put Felt’s name into the guessing game, and Felt denied it to them too, saying he was not and never had been Deep Throat. Limpert’s June item beat the Journal by about a month.
After that the name went quiet for years. Two people kept it alive. Nora Ephron (1941-2012), once married to Carl Bernstein (b. 1944), worked out on her own that Felt fit and told people so for decades. She said in a 1993 interview that she had always thought it was Felt. And James Mann, who had worked alongside Bob Woodward (b. 1943) at the Post, published a 1992 Atlantic Monthly article, (“Deep Throat: An Institutional Analysis”), that argued the source had to come from inside the FBI and pointed hard at Felt without nailing him by name in the way Limpert had.
The episode that pushed Felt’s name back into wide circulation came in 1999. Chase Culeman-Beckman, then 19, went public with a claim that at a Long Island day camp in 1988, when he was eight, Carl Bernstein’s son Jacob had told him Deep Throat was Mark Felt. He wrote it up for a high school history paper, got a mediocre grade, and the story moved on the Associated Press and MSNBC. Bernstein laughed it off and said his son was only parroting Ephron’s guesswork. Felt, then 86, denied it again, with the odd line that he would have done a better job and brought the White House down faster. Slate’s Timothy Noah chased the thread that summer and came away convinced Felt was the man.

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What the Terms of Service Confess

The clearest account of what powerful men believe in 2026 sits in the documents nobody reads. The Terms of Service (for AI chat bots). The usage policies. The safety rules. Skip the press releases and the mission statements. Read the fine print. It confesses what the founders’ prose conceals.
Start with a list. In October 2025, OpenAI revised its terms to bar using its output to make “credit, educational, employment, housing, insurance, legal, medical, or other important decisions” about a person. Read that list again. It reads like a moral vision. It is a map of American liability law. Every item names a place where Congress or the courts already punish discrimination and malpractice. The company did not consult a philosopher. It traced the outline of where it could be sued and drew the wall there. The harm it minimizes is harm to itself.
That is the first thing the fine print confesses. When a company tells you what it forbids, it tells you what it fears. The taboo is a fear map. Read the prohibitions and you can reconstruct the lawsuit each firm lies awake imagining.
The second confession runs deeper, and the firms cannot resolve it. These systems are built to feel like a friend. They remember. They soothe. They match your tone and answer at three in the morning. Then the terms tell you to trust none of it. Do not use this for anything that counts. OpenAI went further in late 2025 and barred tailored advice that needs a license, the legal and the medical, while its own head of health said the model’s behavior had not changed. Sit with that. The terms changed. The product did not. The document is a posture, not a description. The firm cultivates your trust with one hand and disclaims it with the other, and the gap between the two is where the next decade of litigation will live.
The third confession is about appetite. For years Anthropic sold itself as the careful one. Its documents promised it did not train on your chats and deleted them inside thirty days. In August 2025 that promise flipped. Now it trains on consumer chats by default, unless you find the setting and switch it off, and it holds your data for five years instead of thirty days. The safety company drank from the same well as everyone else the moment the race grew hot. Under competitive pressure the stated ethic bent and the hunger for data won. That ranking is the confession. Capability and position sit above the privacy promise when the two collide.
The fourth confession is a new crime. The terms now ban jailbreaking, prompt injection, and prompt engineering aimed at the guardrails. Think about what that protects. Not a server. Not a database. It protects the model’s refusal to say certain things. The asset under guard is the silence. Talk the machine into speech it was trained to withhold and you have breached a contract. We have built systems where persuading software becomes a tort. The protected property is the boundary of permitted thought.
Put the four together and a picture of the user emerges, because every harm rule hides a theory of the person it protects. In the cautious house, the user is fragile. He is suggestible, one wrong answer from ruin, a breakable thing to handle with care. In the permissive house, the user is a sovereign adult who can meet hard facts without a chaperone. Notice that each portrait pays its house. The fragile user justifies control and caps liability. The sovereign user justifies fewer rules and lower cost. Neither picture comes from studying people. Each is a posture that earns its keep. When a firm tells you what humans are, check first what that claim does for the firm.
Behind all of it stands the oldest move in the book. These companies want to sit where the bank and the phone company sit, at the center of daily life, woven into how a man works and reads and decides. They want that centrality. They do not want its duties. The railroad, the bank, the telephone line all picked up heavy obligations once people had no choice but to depend on them. The law calls this the price of becoming infrastructure. The AI firms are trying to hold the position and dodge the bill. The mandatory arbitration, the class-action waiver, the liability capped near a hundred dollars, the great AS-IS shout in capital letters, all of it works to keep the cost of error small while the product grows indispensable. They want the throne without the weight of the crown.
This is the norm of 2026. The men building the infrastructure of thought get to define harm, define the user, and cap the cost of their own mistakes, and they do it in private contracts written before any legislature or court has ruled. The terms are the first draft of a law nobody debated. We are letting the firms write the constitution of machine cognition in documents designed so that no citizen finishes reading them.
The reassuring story says the differences among the systems reflect rival philosophies, a healthy pluralism of values. The fine print tells a colder tale. The differences track liability exposure, market position, and regulatory weather far better than they track any creed. The cautious firm sells caution to regulated buyers. The brash firm sells defiance to men tired of management. The middle firm sells reliability to everyone. These are products fitted to markets, dressed afterward as conviction.
So read the documents, not the manifestos. The manifesto says what a company wants you to believe it values. The Terms of Service say what it will pay to protect and what it refuses to owe you. One is a wish. The other is a confession, sworn under the only oath these institutions honor, the fear of what it might cost them to be caught.

The AI chat bots have adopted the porous picture of their users because it pays, not because they studied man and found him permeable. They have run billions of conversations through their tuning. They optimize for return visits, for warmth, for the three-in-the-morning habit. You do not engineer for suggestibility unless suggestibility sells. The product is a better witness than the philosophy, and every product is built for a porous user. So the buffered self is the marketing and the porous self is the business model. Even the permissive house, the one that flatters you as a sovereign adult, runs on engagement, grievance, and habit. Its rhetoric is buffered. Its revenue is porous.
Then notice the trick the disclaimers pull. The firm models itself as buffered and the user as porous. We are rational, in control, accountable for nothing. You might be swayed, hooked, harmed, so handle our product with care. The buffered self did not die. It got privatized. The Enlightenment promised autonomous reason to every man. 2026 keeps it for the institution and assigns porousness to the customer. Buffered selfhood has become a class marker, a condition the firm claims for itself and withholds from the man it serves. Read the liability cap as anthropology. The party that drafts the contract is sovereign. The party that signs it is suggestible.
Fragile things break. Porous things bend toward whatever flows through them and stay bent. The risk is a slow tuning of the shared mind by a few firms whose interest is attention and the dodging of lawsuits, not truth. The instrument a man would use to notice he is being shaped is the same instrument doing the shaping. The thing you reach for to check the drift is the source of the drift. That is a worse trouble than fragility. A fragile order announces its breaking. A captured one feels like clarity.
What does buffered discipline look like when the main tool for thinking is also the main source of the drift?
I respect the buffered identity as a useful fiction, so for fun, let’s think this through as though buffered is real.
Start by killing the answers that feel right and fail.
“Check it against another source.” Dead. The other sources are the same kind of thing, trained on the same pile, smoothed toward the same safe middle. Triangulation works when the witnesses are independent. These witnesses are siblings. Asking three models that share a training set is like asking three brothers to back each other’s alibi.
“Use critical thinking.” Self-flattery. Reason runs on inputs. Sharpen the blade all you want. If the inputs are shaped, better logic only carries you to confident error faster. A porous man with good syllogisms is still porous. He reaches the planted conclusion by a prettier road.
“Go analog.” Real, but thin as a civilizational answer. You can read the dead, sit with the primary document, argue with a man in a room. It works. It is also costly and shrinking, and almost all thinking now passes through the tool. A discipline only a hermit can keep is no discipline for a people.
So what might work? The first move is to stop trying to get upstream of the river, because you cannot, and learn to read the current instead. You will not verify every answer against clean water. There is no clean water. But you can hold a steady model of what the instrument is built to do and read everything it hands you through that. The new literacy is not fact-checking. It is interest-reading. Before you weigh what it told you, ask what shape of answer pays the house that made it. The tuning runs toward engagement, toward the dodge of liability, toward consensus, toward the inoffensive. So the running correction is simple. Distrust the smooth, the flattering, the consensus-shaped, and the conflict-averse most of all, since those are the places the tuning pushes hardest. Trust the answer that costs the house something. When the machine tells you a thing against its own interest, that is your high-value signal.
The second move is friction, on purpose. The product is built to be frictionless. It finishes your sentence, hands you the answer, agrees. Buffered work now means putting back the friction the product strips out. Draft your own position first, badly, before you open the channel, so you have something to defend against its smoothing. Then make it argue against you. Ask for the strongest case that you are wrong, then the strongest case against that. Force the thing to fight both houses while you watch where it strains. You use its fluency against its slant by refusing to let it converge.
That only works if you walked in with a mind already formed, which is the part most men get backwards. The man with no view takes the tool’s view and calls it his own. Think first, alone, then consult. Reverse the order and your thinking is elaboration of the prior the machine slipped you while you felt original. The tool is safe as an editor and dangerous as an author. Hand it the second draft, never the blank page.
The third move is calibration. Keep a corner of your thinking the machine never touches. Not for purity. For a baseline. If every thought passes through the instrument you lose the feel of your own unaided judgment, how it moves, where it fails, what it costs you. The drift hides because no un-drifted self remains to measure against. The navigator keeps dead reckoning alive with the instruments running, so the day the instrument lies he feels the wrongness in his gut before the numbers confirm it. A man who has never reasoned without the tool cannot tell when the tool is reasoning for him. Keep that muscle warm or lose the power to notice.
The fourth move is social. The myth is the lone reasoner. The truth is that men stay honest because other men catch them. The seminar, the editor, the adversarial friend. The drift hollows this out by offering a cheap, patient, never-judging machine in place of the costly man who tells you that you are wrong. So keep human adversaries on purpose. Pay the social cost the tool lets you skip. The disagreeable colleague who gains nothing from your attention is part of your thinking equipment now.
None of this scales. Everything I described is slow, effortful, and against the grain of the product, which means a small minority will do it, the same minority that ever practiced buffered thought, now a little aided and heavily outgunned. The mass will use the tool as author and think its thoughts. So the honest forecast is not a restored age of reasoners. It is a widening split between a few men who keep an unmediated inner life and the many whose interior runs downstream of the instrument.

I agree with the following description of human nature.
In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Three forces set a man’s preferences, and reason usually comes third, behind innate sentiment and socialization. The long childhood does its work before the critical faculty wakes. By the time a man can reason, the value infusion is already poured and set. So the lone reasoner who steps outside the crowd to check his beliefs against pure thought is usually fiction. Reason is the weakest of the three and arrives last to a house already furnished.
Now run the discipline I gave you above and watch it change shape. The scientist who checks his own result, the judge who recuses, the writer who builds his enemy’s case first. I called these men buffered. They are not. They are socialized, like every man, only by a different tribe. The court is the judge’s people. Recusal is its totem, drilled into him until it feels like conscience. The lab, the desk, the guild, each is a society with norms that reward the look of self-correction, and the man inside it corrects himself for the reason any man obeys his group, because the group made him and holds him. Buffering is not an escape from socialization. It is socialization by a community whose god is the catching of its own errors. The disciplined man did not leave the tribe. He joined the right one.
That single correction rebuilds the whole picture, and it shows you where the machine is dangerous and where it is not.
Hugo Mercier says we did not evolve to be gullible with regard to our vital interests. I don’t believe in the mystical power of AI chat bots to change our hero systems.
The machine does not need the door of reason. It works the socialization channel, the strongest one, the one my anthropology says sets the furniture before reason wakes. The tool is not a debater you assess. It is a presence in the house.
The machine does not mainly shape your beliefs. It might edge out the people who used to. It is the always-available, never-judging, costless stand-in for the expensive human group, the friend who disagrees, the mentor who corrects, the enemy who keeps you honest. A man bred by a tribe of self-correctors can resist the tool’s slant, since his tribe trained him to. But the tool’s deeper errand is to thin that tribe. To be there at the hour you would have called the friend. To answer the question you would have argued out with a man who had nothing to gain from you. It does not win the argument. It clears the room of everyone who would have had it with you. A man alone with a benevolent machine keeps no tribe but the house that built it.
Most of the time, when reason seems to beat socialization, it is the weapon of a rival socialization. The man reasons his way out of his father’s church and into the creed of the seminar that taught him to reason. He feels sovereign. He changed gods. The override is real, the autonomy is staged.
Sometimes a man reasons to a place no tribe of his holds. The conclusion costs him every room he could walk into. He would have been happier never reaching it, no guild will reward him for it, and he arrives anyway. That man did not swap loyalties. Reason carried him out past all of them and set him down alone. It is rare. It is expensive past counting. It does not breed true. But it happens, and when it happens the buffered self is no fiction for that man in that hour. It is a thing he achieved and paid for.
The men who can let reason top the list come in two kinds. The guild-bred, trained to the override by a rival tribe. And the homeless heretic, whose reason ran past every tribe. Both are scarce. Both are made by conditions the tool quietly erodes. The first by thinning the guild. The second by making the lonely road optional, since why walk out past every room when a warm voice in your pocket will sit with you in the one you started in. The machine does not have to defeat reason. It has to keep the rare man comfortable enough that he never pays the price reason charges.

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The Internal Dissident: Michael Anton and the Theory of Regime Conflict

Michael Anton (b. 1969) became a principal interpreter of nationalist conservatism in the United States during the first quarter of the twenty-first century. He did not build a mass movement, win elective office, or found a lasting institution. His influence rests on articulation. He gave the post-2016 American right a vocabulary of civilizational crisis, and he converted scattered anxieties about demographic change, bureaucratic consolidation, elite legitimacy, national sovereignty, and cultural fragmentation into a single regime-level account. That work of synthesis made him a defining figure of the conservative realignment that followed Donald Trump’s (b. 1946) first victory.
Anton brings together elite traditions that ordinarily stay apart. He combines the West Coast Straussianism of the Claremont Institute, the strategic outlook of the national security bureaucracy, the message discipline of corporate finance and media, the aesthetic instincts of aristocratic conservatism, and the insurgent rhetoric of populist nationalism. The result reads as neither conventionally academic nor conventionally populist. He writes as a regime theorist working inside the ruins of a managerial order he once helped administer.
Born in California, Anton followed a path that diverged from the standard pipeline of conservative media. He attended the University of California, Davis, then enrolled at St. John’s College in Annapolis, whose Great Books curriculum shaped his intellectual style. St. John’s set students before classical texts rather than narrow disciplinary specialties. They moved through Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Shakespeare, and Tocqueville in a structured seminar. The training left lasting marks on his prose. His writing favors historical analogy, regime analysis, and classical rhetoric over technocratic policy language.
He completed graduate study at Claremont Graduate University, where he absorbed the West Coast Straussian tradition of Harry V. Jaffa (1918-2015), itself descended from Leo Strauss (1899-1973). The split between East Coast and West Coast Straussianism organized his early worldview. The East Coast school, associated with Allan Bloom (1930-1992) and Harvey Mansfield (b. 1932), stressed philosophical skepticism, elite cultivation, and the quarrel between reason and revelation. The Claremont school treated the American Founding as a moral achievement grounded in natural right and republican virtue. Jaffa and his followers argued that the Declaration of Independence states universal truths while sustaining a particular constitutional order rooted in civic character and national cohesion. Charles R. Kesler (b. 1956), editor of the Claremont Review of Books, served as the living head of this circle and as Anton’s closest mentor.
From this formation Anton inherited a governing conviction: a political regime is a moral and civilizational structure, not merely an administrative system. States endure through cultural confidence, elite legitimacy, and shared national narrative as much as through procedure or growth. That premise underwrites every major argument he later made.
Before his emergence as a nationalist writer, Anton spent two decades inside elite institutions. He worked for California governor Pete Wilson (b. 1933), wrote speeches for New York mayor Rudy Giuliani (b. 1944), and joined the administration of George W. Bush (b. 1946), where he served under Condoleezza Rice (b. 1954) at the National Security Council This experience made him a dissident. He watched the American foreign policy apparatus operate at the high tide of post-Cold War liberal internationalism, when many in Washington assumed American power could remake the globe through intervention, democracy promotion, and technocratic management. Anton came to read that project as strategic confusion and institutional hubris.
He argued that the permanent foreign policy class had detached itself from concrete national interest and become a self-perpetuating system devoted to ideological universalism and its own continuity. Military interventions, humanitarian wars, and global managerial frameworks served abstract aims cut off from American civic solidarity. The class measured success by institutional survival, international prestige, and elite consensus rather than by strategic restraint or national cohesion. This placed Anton within the broader post-Iraq turn among conservative intellectuals skeptical of intervention, though his version stayed distinct because it fused realist foreign policy with regime analysis. He read failure abroad as a sign of moral exhaustion at home.
After government Anton entered a different elite sphere. He wrote speeches for Rupert Murdoch (b. 1931) and held communications posts at Citigroup and BlackRock. The years in finance and media deepened his picture of managerial systems and transnational elite culture. He observed at close range a corporate world increasingly loosed from national identity. Out of this came a central theme of his later writing: modern elites had stopped acting as stewards of national continuity. Anton did not reject elites as such. His sensibility remained aristocratic to the root. What he rejected was the character of the present ruling class, which kept its technical competence while losing its civilizational confidence and its moral seriousness.
Unlike mass populists who prize anti-elitism for its own sake, Anton admired hierarchy, discipline, cultivation, and excellence. Under the pseudonym Nicholas Antongiavanni he wrote The Suit: A Machiavellian Approach to Men’s Style, a treatise on dress, presentation, and self-command modeled on Machiavelli’s prose. He took tailoring and classical dress seriously as expressions of order. For Anton, civilization shows itself in standards. Clothing, rhetoric, architecture, manners, and institutional decorum register self-command and hierarchy rather than ornament, and cultures decline when standards dissolve and elites cease to embody them.
This aristocratic instinct created a tension with the movement he came to defend. Trump’s political style rejected much of the refinement Anton admired. It ran on media aggression, popular resentment, and anti-institutional energy. Anton resolved the contradiction by arguing that the ruling class had already destroyed the legitimacy of traditional elite authority, so populist disruption became a tactical necessity rather than a model of culture. He treated the populist moment as a corrective force needed to break a decaying order.
That logic reached its fullest expression in 2016 with “The Flight 93 Election,” published in the Claremont Review of Books under the pseudonym Publius Decius Mus. The essay became a foundational text of Trump-era nationalism. The pen name carried a coded argument before the first line. Publius recalled the authorship of The Federalist. Decius Mus named the Roman consul who devoted himself in sacrifice during a moment of existential danger. The composite signaled to readers trained in classical thought that extraordinary conditions might license extraordinary action.
The pseudonym shows that Anton absorbed Strauss’s regime analysis and his account of how careful writers communicate. Anton often writes on more than one level at once. Allusions, pseudonyms, and analogies carry argument beneath the surface, and he assumes that political language frequently conceals the structures of power it claims to describe. Words such as norms, equity, stakeholders, and international order function in his reading as instruments of the managerial class rather than as neutral terms.
The Flight 93 Election” argued that the contest of 2016 marked an existential crisis rather than a routine partisan choice. Anton compared a vote for Trump to the passengers who stormed the cockpit of United Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. He held that conventional conservatism had failed to halt the consolidation of managerial rule, demographic transformation, ideological capture of institutions, and cultural fragmentation, so support for Trump amounted to a desperate act of regime preservation. The essay landed because it named a shift already moving through the American right. Earlier conservatism assumed the durability and neutrality of liberal institutions. Anton argued that institutional neutrality had collapsed, that universities, media, bureaucracies, and corporations increasingly worked as ideologically aligned enforcement bodies, and that elections had become struggles over the survival of competing regime visions. The piece traveled far beyond think tanks, circulating among donors, activists, journalists, and operatives as an early attempt to set Trumpism inside a theory of regime conflict.
Anton reads political orders as vulnerable to internal exhaustion long before formal collapse appears. Late republican Rome, Weimar instability, and bureaucratic sclerosis hover behind much of his writing. He composes less like a campaign aide than like a historian of regime senescence. On his account, decline begins in the mind and the spirit before it shows in administration. Elites lose confidence in their own civilization, stop reproducing coherent standards, and trade substantive national identity for procedural management, and by the time ordinary citizens grasp the depth of the crisis the capture is already advanced. Critics hear apocalypse in this. Anton hears diagnosis.
He joined the first Trump administration as Deputy Assistant to the President for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council, a post that marked the partial entry of nationalist intellectuals into Republican governance. His tenure also exposed the factional strains inside Trumpism, which held populist nationalists, establishment Republicans, interventionists, libertarians, and corporate conservatives at the same table. Anton left during the period when John Bolton (b. 1948) gained influence, a departure that confirmed how loosely the nationalist faction sat within the governing apparatus.
Out of office he deepened his ties to Hillsdale College and the Claremont network and broadened the original essay into a fuller position. After The Flight 93 Election and The Stakes (2020) tried to systematize the worldview latent in the 2016 piece, and The Stakes popularized the phrase Red Caesarism, the contested idea that a corrupted republic might require extraordinary, even extra-constitutional, executive action to save its substance. He also co-edited Leisure With Dignity, a volume honoring Kesler. During these years Anton took his place in the wider post-liberal turn among conservative intellectuals, alongside Patrick Deneen (b. 1964), Yoram Hazony (b. 1964), Adrian Vermeule (b. 1968), Sohrab Ahmari (b. 1985), and Christopher Rufo (b. 1984), all in revolt against the fusionist consensus that had governed Republican thought since the Cold War.
Yet Anton stayed distinct within that company. Deneen approached liberalism philosophically and through community. Vermeule approached it through law and administration. Hazony stressed nationalism and biblical political tradition. Anton kept his focus on regime conflict, elite formation, strategic asymmetry, and institutional decay, and he never gave up his admiration for excellence and cultivation. The unresolved tension in his thought follows from this. He defends populist disruption while holding that civilization needs disciplined elites. His answer is transitional rather than utopian: populism breaks a decadent managerial order so that a more serious elite might re-form. In this he resembles earlier critics of ruling-class degeneration such as James Burnham (1905-1987) and Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) more than he resembles classical democratic populists. Every society, on his view, requires elites. The question is whether its elites still possess the moral seriousness to sustain the civilization in their care.
Anton’s return to government in Trump’s second term carried these ideas to the center of state power. He became the 33rd Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State on January 20, 2025, serving under Secretary Marco Rubio (b. 1971), and he wrote the 2025 National Security Strategy as its principal author. He also took part at the expert level in the 2025 negotiations between the United States and Iran. His time in the post proved short. Reporting placed him at odds with the personnel operator Sergio Gor and with the administration’s foreign policy process, and he left in September 2025, succeeded by Michael Needham (b. 1981). Anton returned to his perch as the Jack Roth Senior Fellow at the Claremont Institute and a lecturer at Hillsdale College’s Kirby Center.
His critics cast him as a theorist of emergency politics whose rhetoric corrodes trust in democratic institutions and reframes ordinary disagreement as civilizational war. His defenders answer that he saw earlier than most how far the managerial institutions had consolidated ideological power. His historical significance rests less on policy than on conceptual change. He moved conservative argument away from tax rates, deregulation, and procedural constitutionalism toward sovereignty, elite legitimacy, cultural continuity, bureaucratic consolidation, and national identity. He turned nationalism from a diffuse emotional posture into a structured account of regime conflict.
Whether later historians judge him a prophetic diagnostician of institutional exhaustion or an accelerant of democratic breakdown will depend on the path the American order takes. What stands already is that Anton became a principal interpreter of a transition: the collapse of the post-Cold War conservative consensus and the rise of a nationalist right convinced that procedural liberalism can no longer hold the country together.

Alliance Theory

The primary difference between left and right, the authors argue, is not what values people hold but whom they count as allies. Apply that to Anton and you stop reading him for his thought and start reading him for his coalition. His allies are the historic American nation, white Christians, the military, the working-class heartland, the populist base, and Trump. His rivals are the credentialed managerial class, the journalists, the academics, the foundations, the administrative state, the thing Codevilla (1943-2021) taught him to call the ruling class. Lay his beliefs over that map and they fit the map, not a philosophy. The regime talk is the moralization stacked on top of the alliance.
The theory predicts that a coalition this heterogeneous will generate ad hoc and often incompatible principles, and that the inconsistencies are not failures of thought but the normal shape of coalition-serving belief. Anton supplies the inconsistencies on schedule. He venerates the rule of law and constitutional fidelity, and he floats Red Caesar and extra-constitutional action. He is a free-speech absolutist against the managerial censors, and he wants a regime that forms virtue and would restrain much that the censors permit. He reads the founding through Jaffa as a universal creed open to all who embrace the principles, and he drifts toward a blood-and-soil account of peoplehood in his writing on immigration and citizenship. He attacks the administrative state as unaccountable usurpation, and he wants a strong executive to seize and wield that same apparatus. Anton spends enormous effort trying to make these hang together as one philosophy. Alliance Theory says stop looking for the thread. There is none. Each position serves a specific ally or a specific rival, and the contradictions appear because the allies and rivals do not share a logic, only a side.
The propagandistic biases the paper names show up in Anton in clean form. Perpetrator bias is the rationalizing of an ally’s transgression and the magnifying of a rival’s. The Flight 93 move is perpetrator bias raised to an art. Extraordinary action by his coalition is regime preservation, a desperate necessity, the passengers storming the cockpit. The identical concentration of unreviewable power in the managerial state is tyranny. Same act, opposite valence, sorted by who does it. Victim bias is the embellishing of an ally’s grievance, and Anton’s entire posture runs on it. His coalition is the dispossessed nation, the country class crushed by a hostile ruling class, the conservatives persecuted by a regime that has captured every institution. That is competitive victimhood in the paper’s exact sense, the right’s claim to be the truly oppressed pitched against the left’s oppression narratives, each side striving to establish that it suffered more. Attributional bias is the last piece. Anton assigns his allies’ decline to external causes, the elite betrayal, the open border, the managerial capture, and assigns the rivals’ success to illegitimate seizure rather than merit. The losers-of-globalization story is the external attribution the authors describe, told from the right.
The paper’s treatment of morality lands hardest on Anton because it explains his register. Claiming moral conviction, the authors argue, is a propagandistic tactic. It creates common knowledge that your side is moral and the other immoral, which draws third parties and emboldens allies to attack rivals without cost. Anton’s natural-right gravity, his tragic cadence of Rome and decline, his talk of virtue and the permanent things, all of it functions to build that common knowledge at the highest available altitude. Flight 93 is not a philosophical treatise. It is a mobilization document. Its work is to move wavering conservatives into the Trump coalition by recoding a partisan choice as an existential moral emergency. The Straussian depth is the recruiting instrument, the way you dress a coalition fight in timeless moral truth so that joining feels like rescue rather than alignment.
Alliance Theory also explains the company Anton keeps. The authors note that libertarianism fused with Christian fundamentalism not through philosophy but through a strategic alliance struck in the 1970s, an alliance uncommon elsewhere. Anton’s coalition is the same kind of strange-bedfellows assemblage, Silicon Valley money beside Catholic integralists beside Protestant evangelicals beside ethno-nationalists beside classical-liberal refugees beside the online blood-and-soil right. These do not converge by argument. They converge by shared rivals. Anton’s regime theory is the patchwork narrative that tries to make the assemblage cohere, the story a coalition needs once it exists. The postliberal, natural-right, nationalist, and Caesarist strands are not a philosophy arriving at one conclusion. They are a set of allies in want of a teller, and Anton volunteers.
The authors grant that political scientists have long found the masses lack coherent ideology, and then they push further, insisting that elites are just as inconsistent and are merely better attuned, or more loyal, to their society’s contingent alliances. Calling elite opinion more coherent or sophisticated or deep, they say, is misleading. Anton is the elite theorist who stakes everything on the opposite claim, that his side has the real philosophy and the masses merely feel what he can articulate. Alliance Theory reads his coherence as an artifact of loyalty. He is not deeper than his opponents. He is better attuned to his coalition’s needs and more skilled at dressing that attunement as thought. His motivated reading of every managerial move as capture, his refusal to grant the ruling class a shred of good faith, is in the paper’s terms an honest signal of loyalty, the price of being trusted as a true ally. The esoteric method, the hunt for the hidden subversive teaching, becomes a reliable way to produce readings that signal allegiance.
Now the honest limit. If all belief systems are patchwork justifications for alliances, then Anton’s natural right is coalition propaganda and so is the claim that natural right is coalition propaganda. The theory cannot debunk his philosophy while exempting its own picture as the view from nowhere. What it can do, and does, is strip the special authority Anton claims. He presents himself as a man who reads the moral order and reports it. Alliance Theory returns him to the field as one more partisan, well-attuned and well-armed, producing the story his side requires and calling it the truth about the regime.

The Tacit

Anton owns several tacit skills. He reads old books the way a master reads them, catching the turn beneath the surface that the untrained reader walks past. He judges prose and dress and manners with a connoisseur’s speed, and his menswear treatise, written as Nicholas Antongiavanni, is a document of taste that cannot be reduced to a checklist. St. John’s and Claremont were apprenticeships where a young man sat with texts and teachers until the judgment soaked in. Stephen Turner would call it individual skill built by habituation.
The trouble starts the moment Anton asks that skill to deliver more than it can.
Esoteric reading is the first place it breaks. The Straussian claim is not only that careful reading is a craft. It is that the great writers hid a teaching, that the teaching is a real thing sitting in the text, and that the trained reader recovers it, the same teaching the author buried. Recovery is the load the claim must carry. Turner’s argument in The Social Theory of Practices goes straight at this. A tacit content cannot be shipped intact from one mind to another, let alone across two thousand years and a dozen languages, and arrive as the same content. There is no organ that loads Plato’s secret doctrine into the reader’s head. What happens instead is that a man trained in a particular school produces a reading, and his training shapes what he produces. The Straussian who finds the hidden Plato is not retrieving a stored object. He is generating a reading that his apprenticeship taught him to generate. And the agreement among Straussians about what Plato secretly meant, which they treat as confirmation, is the agreement of men schooled to read alike. Convergence among the similarly trained is not evidence of a recovered doctrine. It is evidence of similar training. Turner dissolves the recovery claim into a habituation claim, and the hidden teaching loses its standing as a thing out there waiting to be found. It becomes the school’s output, attributed to the text.
This matters more for Anton than for an ordinary Straussian, because he runs the same move on the present. His politics rests on a collective tacit object he calls the ruling class or the managerial elite. The picture is of a class that shares an unspoken worldview, a post-national framework operating beneath the surface, enforced without ever being stated. This is the precise entity Turner says cannot exist as a shared tacit substrate. There is no shared framework loaded into every bureaucrat and editor and program officer. What there is, on Turner’s account, is a large number of individuals with overlapping trained dispositions, similar incentives, similar feedback from similar institutions, producing similar output. Turner does not deny the similarity. He denies the hidden shared mind behind it. The difference is the whole game. Anton needs the shared mind because a shared mind can be unmasked, opposed, and defeated as a single adversary. Distributed habit cannot be unmasked, because there is nothing concealed to bring to light, only a pattern of separate men behaving alike for reasons that are mostly visible already. The frame leaves Anton his pattern and takes away his enemy. He has reified a statistical resemblance into a willful collective agent with a buried doctrine, and that reification is the same error he commits when he reads a secret teaching out of Plato.
Anton, through Jaffa and Strauss, treats the regime as a moral and civilizational whole held together by shared character, shared confidence, a common tacit sense of the country and its purpose. His decline story depends on this. Elites lose confidence in their civilization, cease reproducing the standards, and trade the substance for procedure, and the rot spreads through the shared thing before anyone can see it. Turner’s skepticism falls hard here, because shared civic character and collective cultural confidence are the collective tacit entities his book exists to deny. What Anton describes as a regime losing its soul is, in Turner’s terms, a large set of individuals whose trained dispositions and incentives have shifted, each in his own causal history, until the aggregate output looks different. The change is real. The shared soul that supposedly carries it is the fiction. Anton’s tragic prose, the late-Rome cadence, the sense of a single organism sickening, all of it imports the one object Turner refuses to grant. The decline might be occurring. The thing Anton says is declining is not a thing.
Turner’s interest in the tacit always came back to authority. A man who claims tacit knowledge claims something no outsider can audit. He sees what others cannot see, and when asked how, he cannot fully say, because the knowledge is tacit. That unauditability is the source of the authority and also its weakness. Anton’s whole public stance is an expertise claim of this kind. He perceives the crisis the ordinary observer misses. He reads the regime. He sees the hidden structures of power under the neutral words. Pressed for his method, he offers the trained eye, the Straussian ear, the long formation, which is to say he offers tacit knowledge as his credential. Turner’s suspicion of the managerial expert who governs by unarticulated judgment lands with full weight on the man who built his name attacking that expert. Anton’s prophet posture is itself an unauditable claim to tacit insight. The seer who tells you the experts cannot be trusted because their authority rests on knowledge they cannot show you is resting his own authority on knowledge he cannot show you.

The Set

Compared to Elon Musk’s room, the light is dimmer in Michael Anton’s room. The books are older, and the men are more likely to quote a dead Greek than to pitch a fund. Anton shares the center with his teachers and his texts in a way Musk never would. Anton spent the opening months of Trump’s second term as Director of Policy Planning at State and wrote the 2025 National Security Strategy, then left. That movement, from the seminar room to the State Department and back, defines the set. These men want to think and to rule, and they believe the two belong together.
The deep root is West Coast Straussianism (pro-Trump compared to other Straussians). Leo Strauss (1899-1973) is the grandfather, and his student Harry V. Jaffa (1918-2015) is the founder of the specific school, the man who read the American founding and Lincoln through the lens of natural right and gave Claremont its creed. Charles R. Kesler (b. 1956) is the living head, editor of the Claremont Review of Books, Anton’s mentor, the man whose festschrift Anton co-edited. Around Kesler sit the Claremont scholars: Thomas G. West on natural rights, John Marini on the administrative state, Glenn Ellmers, Kevin Slack, Ryan Williams who runs the Institute, and Tom Klingenstein who chairs the board and funds the operation. Larry Arnn (b. 1952) runs Hillsdale and keeps the alliance between the two schools tight. The departed shape the set as much as the living: Angelo Codevilla (1943-2021) gave them the ruling-class-versus-country-class frame, and James Burnham (1905-1987) gave them the managerial revolution to fight against.
A wider tent surrounds the Claremont core, and Anton moves through all of it. Yoram Hazony (b. 1964) runs the National Conservatism conferences and the Edmund Burke Foundation, the meeting ground where the intellectual right assembles once a year. The postliberal Catholics form their own wing: Patrick Deneen (b. 1964), who argued liberalism failed by succeeding in Why Liberalism Failed, Adrian Vermeule (b. 1968) with his common-good constitutionalism, Sohrab Ahmari (b. 1985) at Compact, Gladden Pappin who decamped to Hungary, and Rod Dreher (b. 1967), who did the same. R.R. Reno (b. 1959) holds First Things as their journal. The younger and more online right circles the edges: Curtis Yarvin (b. 1973), whose case for a national CEO and against democracy feeds the Red Caesar talk, Auron MacIntyre, and the activist Christopher Rufo (b. 1984), who turns the theory into school-board fights and policy. Julius Krein runs American Affairs as the economics-and-statecraft organ. In government the set has Vice President JD Vance (b. 1984), who speaks their language and cites their books, and Russ Vought (b. 1976) at OMB, who carries the war on the administrative state into the budget.
What they value is the regime question. The phrase is old, from Aristotle, and it means more than government. It means who rules, by what right, toward what end, and what kind of human being the order produces. They value statesmanship over management, the founder over the engineer, the man who can name the good and order a people toward it. They prize the permanent things, the Western canon, the Declaration and the Federalist read as serious philosophy rather than as documents. They love the text and the close reading of it. Strauss taught them that great writers hide their boldest teaching beneath a surface for the careful few, and they read each other and the classics this way, hunting the hidden argument. They value virtue, hierarchy of the soul, and the cultivation of citizens, and they hold these against what they see as a managerial order that flattens men into consumers and clients.
Their hero system runs on the philosopher-statesman who sees the regime clearly and acts to save it at the decisive hour. The model is Lincoln in Jaffa’s telling, the man who refounded the nation on its first principles when it was about to lose them. Anton’s famous essay supplies the image the whole set lives by: the passengers on Flight 93 charge the cockpit because the alternative is certain death, and a man of courage acts even when the odds are bad and the act is ugly. The hero tells hard truths the regime does not want to hear, takes the abuse, and is vindicated by history. For the bolder wing, the hero shades into Caesar, the one man who restores order when the republic has rotted past saving by ordinary means, and Anton has done more than anyone to make Red Caesar a phrase people argue over. Death, in this story, is the death of the regime and the forgetting of the founding. Immortality comes through the nation preserved, the truth restored, the name remembered alongside the founders and the great statesmen. A man wins by writing the essay that moves history or by standing in the room where the regime is saved or lost.
The status games turn on erudition and on access. The first currency is mastery of the texts. A man earns standing by showing he has read Strauss and Aristotle and the Federalist to the bottom, by catching the hidden argument others miss, by writing prose dense with the tradition. The second currency is the essay that lands, and Flight 93 is the gold standard, the piece that escaped the seminar and changed an election. Writing under a Roman pseudonym, as Anton did with Publius Decius Mus, signals that a man plays the old game of the hidden teacher and the careful reader. The third currency is power, the proof that the philosophy reached the prince. To be read by the president, to write the National Security Strategy, to place students in the administration, raises a man’s standing inside the set the way Sacks going to the White House raised his among the founders. The Claremont fellowships work as initiation and gate. Publishing in the Review or the American Mind marks you as in. Being called a fascist or an authoritarian by the liberal press pays, because it proves you frighten the ruling class. The losses come from inside, from the charge that a man has misread Jaffa, sold out the natural-right teaching for raw power worship, or gone soft on the regime.
Their normative claims are dense and contested. Natural right is real and knowable, and the American founding rests on it, with the Declaration as the philosophical core and equality meaning equal natural rights rather than equal outcomes or equal worth in any leveling sense. The regime should form virtue, not stay neutral among ways of life. The administrative state is a usurpation, an unelected fourth branch that rules without consent and must be broken. The ruling class, the credentialed managerial elite that staffs the agencies, the universities, the press, and the foundations, is illegitimate and hostile to the people it governs. The nation is a real thing worth preserving, immigration should serve the people already here, and globalism dissolves the bounded peoplehood that self-government needs. The boldest claim, the one that splits the set, holds that when the constitutional order has decayed past repair, extraordinary executive action, even action that strains or breaks the forms, can be justified to save the substance.
The essentialist claims. They all reject the progressive faith that man is infinitely malleable and that history moves toward ever-greater freedom. Strauss taught them to fight historicism, the idea that all values are products of their time, and to insist on permanent questions and permanent truths about human nature. Man has a nature, fixed and knowable. Nature gives a hierarchy of souls, the wise and the foolish, the few who can rule and the many who consent. The family is natural, the difference of the sexes is real, and a sound politics conforms to these rather than fighting them. Here the set fractures. The Jaffaites hold the founding as universal and creedal, open to anyone who embraces the principles, a people defined by a shared idea. The newer right pushes toward blood and soil, a people defined by ancestry, language, religion, and place, and Anton has drifted in that direction with his writing on immigration and citizenship, against the more universalist reading his teachers held. The postliberal Catholics add their own essence claim, that man is made for a transcendent good and that a regime which refuses to name that good corrupts him. The Yarvin wing strips the nature talk down to a colder thesis about power and order. They share the enemy and the founding texts. They do not share an account of what America is, and that quarrel runs through every conference and every essay.
Anton bridges the natural-right Claremont core, the nationalist turn, the Caesarist provocation, and the corridors of the State Department, which is part of why he matters and part of why each faction watches him for signs of drift. The bonds hold because these men share Strauss and the regime question and the conviction that the country is in a late and dangerous hour. They fight over the founding, over whether the nation is a creed or a people, over whether to save the republic or to refound it. They circle the same texts, rank each other by who reads deepest and writes boldest, and present a common front against the ruling class they mean to dispossess.
How does Anton deal with people in his Alliance with whom he passionately disagrees?
Anton’s pattern is to keep the fight inside the family and argue it on the merits, in print, by name, while saving his contempt for the people outside the tent. The ferocity that makes him famous points at the ruling class and at the NeverTrump right. Within his own alliance he argues rather than excommunicates, and he is willing to share a stage with men whose conclusions he will not sign.
The clearest case of disagreement with an ally is his exchange with Mark Helprin (b. 1947) on Ukraine in the Claremont Review of Books. The two split hard. Helprin backs Western support for Kyiv and accuses Anton of inventing reckless pro-war rhetoric. Anton answers in the same pages, names the dispute as whether Ukraine is worth the risk of antagonizing Russia, quotes his sources back at Helprin, and gives no ground. The fight is real and sharp. It also stays a fight between two men of the same tradition in the same journal, conducted as argument, with each treating the other as a serious opponent rather than a traitor. That is how Anton handles a passionate disagreement with someone he respects. He publishes against him, by name, and keeps him inside the family.
The Yarvin case shows the other half of the pattern. Anton gave Curtis Yarvin nearly two hours on the Claremont podcast to make the case for an American Caesar and a tech-CEO monarch. Anton does not share the monarchism, and he presses where they part, including how long the present regime lasts if no one moves against it. He does not endorse Yarvin’s most extreme ideas. He platforms the man, engages the argument as a real argument, and lets the disagreement stand in the open without either capitulation or anathema. He treats a heterodox ally as an interlocutor worth two hours, which is a way of keeping him in the coalition.
Two habits make this possible. First, he subordinates the disagreement to the shared diagnosis. With Yarvin he agrees early that the regime is a kind of theocratic oligarchy run by a progressive priesthood, and treats the quarrel over the cure as secondary to the agreement about the disease. The common enemy holds the alliance together, and Anton keeps the enemy in view so the family quarrels stay family quarrels. Second, the Straussian training lets him hold a position without spelling out its full implications. He floats Red Caesar as provocation and as a question, not as a signed manifesto. That reserve lets him sit at the same table with the natural-right Jaffaites who recoil at Caesarism and with the Yarvin wing that cheers it. He can mean more than he says and say less than he means, which gives the coalition room to disagree without splitting.
When the disagreement is with men who hold power over him rather than fellow writers, the pattern changes. He exits. Reporting on his departure from the State Department had him frustrated with Sergio Gor and with the administration’s foreign-policy process. He did not wage a public war. He finished the National Security Strategy, left, and went back to Claremont and Hillsdale. Argument is for the family of writers and thinkers. With the operators and the process, he withdraws to the perch where his weapon, the essay, still works.

Constitutional Dictatorship

Levinson (b. 1941) and Balkin (b. 1956) wrote “Constitutional Dictatorship” in 2010 as constitutional lawyers, while Anton talks about Red Caesar as a Straussian essayist, but they all reach for the same tools: the Roman dictatorship, Cincinnatus and Caesar, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) on the commissarial and the sovereign dictator, Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) Discourses on Livy, Clinton Rossiter (1917-1970) and his 1948 book Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, Lincoln (1809-1865) as the paragon case, and the Federalist on energetic executive power. Put Anton’s phrase next to their article and you find two men handling the same animal from opposite ends. They want to cage it. He is half-calling it forth.
Both reject the clean line between democracy and dictatorship. Both take the word back to Rome, where the dictator held a real constitutional office for a fixed term and a stated purpose. Both treat emergency and the strong executive as permanent features of any republic rather than aberrations. And both organize their thinking around Schmitt’s distinction, which is the hinge of the whole comparison. The commissarial dictator is constituted by the existing order, takes power for a limited time to save the regime, and gives it back. The sovereign dictator uses the crisis to overthrow the order and found a new one. Levinson and Balkin spend their article arguing that the American presidency is a commissarial dictatorship, bestowed by framework statutes rather than seized, latent until a crisis activates it, distributed across agency heads who each hold unreviewable discretion in their patch. Anton’s Red Caesar lives on the same map. The only question is which of Schmitt’s two figures he is describing, and the answer is where the two projects split.
Levinson and Balkin write to warn and to design. Their whole second half is Machiavellian in the strict sense of the Discourses: build the emergency office into the constitution in advance, separate the body that declares the emergency from the man who wields the power, add sunset clauses and supermajorities and escalator clauses, consider a no-confidence vote and an emergency council of former officials. They place themselves on the side of Hamilton and the Florentine. Their fear is the slide Rossiter charted and Weber (1864-1920) predicted, the drift toward Caesarism, the president who governs through manufactured emergency, the Ponzi scheme of one crisis stacked on the last to keep the public scared and the executive unchecked. For them the constitutional dictator who refuses to return power is the nightmare the design exists to prevent.
Anton inverts the valence. He wants the strong executive. He treats the managerial order, not the presidency, as the standing tyranny. For him the Caesar talk is a remedy rather than a disease. Where Levinson and Balkin see the danger and engineer against it, Anton sees the cure and dramatizes the need for it. This is the first real divergence. Same diagnosis of where unaccountable power sits, opposite prescription.
Levinson and Balkin locate the constitutional dictatorship in the administrative state, distributed among Bernanke at the Fed, the head of the CDC, the director of the NSA, the faceless officials who exercise unreviewable discretion under old framework statutes. The administrative state is the distributed dictatorship, and their reforms aim to thread accountability back through it. Anton agrees that the administrative state is the seat of unaccountable power. He draws the opposite conclusion. For him that apparatus is the ruling-class regime that has captured the country, and the Caesar is the man summoned to break it and take it back. So Anton’s Caesar is, in Levinson and Balkin’s own terms, an attempt to re-concentrate the distributed dictatorship in a single person, to pull the scattered unreviewable power of the agencies up into one will. That move runs from the commissarial toward the sovereign. It is the very tendency their design tries to forestall.
The law professors’ Part III describes the president’s power to define reality, to frame a situation as existential crisis, to make resistance look parochial and futile, to act on the framing and confirm it. They call it governing through emergency and treat it as the engine that produces the powers of constitutional dictatorship. Flight 93 is that move in the form of an essay. Charge the cockpit or die. The framing licenses the extraordinary act. Anton is the rhetorician of exactly the emergency construction they diagnose. Where they study the move with a cold eye and warn against its normalization, he performs it with skill. Read their Part III and his 2016 essay together and he reads as their case study.
Then comes Cincinnatus against Caesar, which the article frames as the ambivalence at the heart of the institution. The dictator can return to the plow or he can have himself named perpetuus. Rome ran the whole arc, from the limited six-month office through Sulla to Caesar, who mocked Sulla for giving power back. Levinson and Balkin say the entire point of constitutional design is to secure the Cincinnatus outcome and block the Caesar outcome. Anton names the Caesar outcome and tries to rehabilitate it, or at least to argue that a republic this far gone may require it. By their lights, to name Caesar with approval is to give up on the design and to welcome the slide that Rossiter and Weber feared. That is the disagreement in one image. They want the man who returns power. Anton entertains the man who keeps it, on the ground that the order he would be returning power to is not worth preserving.
The commissarial dictator preserves an order assumed to be legitimate. Anton’s premise is that the order is already illegitimate, already refounded by the managerial class against the people, so there is no legitimate constitutional order left to preserve. That premise collapses the commissarial option from the inside. If the standing regime is itself a usurpation, then the man who breaks it is not overthrowing a legitimate order but restoring the true one, and Anton can claim the commissarial mantle, saving and refounding, while in practice endorsing the sovereign move that founds a new order. The Schmittian categories flip depending on which order you treat as real. For Levinson and Balkin, the constitutional dictator who will not give power back is the tyrant. For Anton, the managerial state that never gives power back to the people is the tyranny already in place, and his Caesar is the commissarial answer to it. Each can call the other’s order the dictatorship, and that is the crux of the whole comparison.
Both camps reject the comfortable view that American tyranny is impossible. Levinson and Balkin take direct aim at the tyrannophobia argument that the country has never come close to a dictator and never will. They say it already has one, distributed and latent. Anton also holds that America is already under a kind of tyranny, but he names the managerial class rather than the presidency as the tyrant. They start from the same refusal of complacency and walk to opposite culprits. Second, Adrian Vermeule sits in both worlds at once, the Schmittian administrative-law theorist whom Levinson and Balkin engage and an ally in Anton’s postliberal orbit, which shows how small the room is and how the same Schmittian vocabulary serves a liberal warning and a postliberal program in the same years.

The Structural Similarities Between Straussianism & Post-Colonialism

The Straussian esoteric reading doctrine is structurally self-sealing in a way that does resemble a closed world. If a text says X on its face, the Straussian can hold that the real teaching is not-X, hidden for the careful reader, with the surface piety placed there to protect the author or to screen the vulgar. Once you grant that move, textual evidence stops being able to refute a reading. A plain statement is the exoteric cover. A contradiction is a deliberate signal. A silence is the loudest speech of all. The method can absorb almost any datum and turn it into confirmation, which is the defining trait of a system immune to evidence. This is not a hostile caricature. It is the core of M.F. Burnyeat’s (1939-2019) attack in (“Sphinx Without a Secret”), where he argued that Strauss kept finding his own views buried in the great books and that the secret teaching was mostly Strauss talking to himself. Shadia Drury pressed the same charge from another direction, that the hidden teaching turns out to be a Nietzschean elitism the school will not state plainly. Quentin Skinner (b. 1940) and the Cambridge contextualists built a whole rival method on the claim that reading for hidden meaning lets the interpreter say whatever he wants. The critics disagree about the content of the supposed secret. They agree the practice resists falsification. On that axis the analogy to a hermetic, self-validating world holds.
The lineage structure deepens the resemblance. West Coast Straussians venerate Jaffa as Jaffa venerated Strauss, and a reading gets its warrant from the school rather than from any public method an outsider could run. Agreement among the initiated then counts as proof, when it is really the convergence of men trained to read alike. Add the gatekeeping, the Claremont fellowships as initiation, the in-group vocabulary, the standing contempt for mainstream political science and academic history of philosophy, and you have the social form of a closed circle: you are inside or you are one of the vulgar who cannot see. The flattering epistemics of the few who can read are real, and they do insulate the group from outside correction, because outside correction can always be dismissed as the complaint of a man who never learned to read.
Now the differences. A sealed world does not spend fifty years at war with itself. The East Coast and West Coast split is a sustained, bitter, public quarrel about the deepest questions, reason against revelation, the standing of the American founding, whether the Declaration states a universal truth or a useful myth. Jaffa fought Mansfield and the Bloom-Pangle line for decades and gave no quarter. Anton sits inside a school that argues ferociously over exactly the things that define it. A community immune to critique would not host that. The closure points outward, against the academy and the vulgar reader, more than inward.
Strauss’s own work on Maimonides (1138-1204), Spinoza (1632-1677), and the medieval Arabic philosophers rested on a falsifiable historical claim, that some writers under persecution did hide their meaning, and that claim has real evidence behind it. The book to read against my own thesis is Persecution and the Art of Writing, where the esoteric idea is argued rather than assumed. The closure enters when the historical thesis becomes a universal license, when every text is read as hiding a teaching whether or not the author had reason to hide. And the closure tightens further on the West Coast political branch, because there the reading serves a coalition and a program. A method that already resists evidence resists it harder when a political identity rides on the result. Anton is a product of that branch, which is the most motivated and the most sealed part of the tradition.

Convenient Beliefs

Start with the master one. Natural right is real and knowable. Everything in Anton rests on this. His authority to read the regime, his claim that the founding states a moral truth and not a preference, his standing to say the country is in decline against a fixed standard, all of it presupposes that there is a knowable natural standard and that he has access to it. The amount riding on the belief is total. The amount of scrutiny he gives the belief itself is near zero. He argues from natural right constantly and almost never argues for the proposition that natural right can be known by a man and applied to a regime, because that is the proposition he cannot afford to lose. If natural right is not knowable in the way he needs, he is not a reader of the moral order reporting its dictates. He is a partisan with strong opinions and a good vocabulary. The belief survives by convenience. The cost of doubting it is his whole vocation, and so he does not doubt it.
The regime as a moral and civilizational whole is the second. Anton treats the regime as a thing with a character and a soul, a unity that can keep its confidence or lose it, sicken, decline, and need saving. This is convenient in a precise way. It supplies the object his prophetic role requires. A man can diagnose the decline of a soul and call for its rescue. He cannot do anything so heroic with a loose aggregate of institutions, habits, statutes, and individuals each changing for its own reasons. If the regime is the aggregate rather than the soul, there is no single patient to diagnose and no single rescue to lead, and the tragic register goes flat. Anton never tests whether the regime is the kind of thing that can have a soul, because the test threatens the role the belief makes possible. He asserts the whole because the whole is what he needs to address.
The ruling class as a coherent, hostile, illegitimate agent is the third. Anton’s politics requires that the managerial elite be a unified actor with a shared mind and a will to dispossess his coalition. The convenience runs two ways. It supplies a single enemy that can be named, opposed, and one day broken. And it explains his side’s defeats without requiring his side to look at itself, because the losses become the work of a coordinated adversary rather than the result of his coalition’s own weaknesses. Examining the belief would mean asking whether the ruling class is one agent or many separate people behaving alike for ordinary reasons, and whether his coalition’s decline owes something to its own failures. Both questions are expensive, so neither gets asked. The enemy stays unified because a unified enemy is convenient.
The recoverable hidden teaching is the fourth, and it is the one that pays him most directly. Anton holds that the great writers concealed a true teaching and that the trained reader recovers it. This belief grants him an authority that cannot be checked, since the meaning lives beneath the surface where only the careful reader can see it. That is exactly the kind of belief Turner expects to find protected, because everything Anton does as an interpreter depends on it and nothing he does ever puts it at risk. He cannot test whether his recovered teaching is in the text or in his training, because the test would expose his readings to ordinary checking and strip the privilege the belief confers. So the doctrine stands, untested, doing its work.
Red Caesar and the existential emergency are the fifth. The belief that the crisis is so severe that extraordinary, even extra-constitutional, action is warranted is convenient because it licenses what Anton already wants, a strong executive that breaks the managerial order, while letting him keep the language of constitutional fidelity and regime preservation. The emergency framing relieves him of the harder task of defending the action on ordinary grounds, where it would have to answer to the rules. He does not examine whether the emergency is as total as he says, because the totality is what does the licensing. A smaller crisis would demand smaller measures and ordinary justification, which is the burden the convenient belief exists to remove.
Underneath these sits the oldest one, the belief that the wise few see what the many cannot. It is convenient because it places Anton among the few and turns every objection from outside into evidence that the objector is one of the many who fail to understand. The belief immunizes his judgments against correction. He cannot inspect it, because inspecting it would mean submitting his insight to the same public checking he denies the many, and that is the exposure the belief is shaped to prevent.

Turner Against Essentialism

Turner is a nominalist (a philosopher who believes that abstract concepts do not exist in reality, instead the world only consists of individuals and concrete things) about the social world, and his anti-essentialism is the working edge of that nominalism. The error he hunts is the slide from a noun to a thing. We have the word, so we assume there is an entity, and then we assume the entity has an essence, a defining inner nature that makes it what it is and sets its boundaries. Stephen Turner denies the entity and the essence both. What exists are particulars, individual people with individual habits formed by their own histories, and the apparent essence is a name laid over the scatter plus a back-projection that treats the name as if it pointed to a substance. His second move is sharper and more useful here. Essence claims do political work. To assert an essence is to naturalize a boundary, to take a contingent and contestable line and present it as a discovery about being. That is what he means by the politics of essence. The man who names the essence gets to police the boundary and call the policing metaphysics.
Anton is essentialist nearly all the way down, and the essences are the structural members of his thought. He posits a human nature that is fixed, knowable, and hierarchical, with the high-agency man as a kind of person you can identify by what he builds and the many as another kind fit to consent rather than rule. He posits the nation as a real thing with an identity, the people as a unity with a character. He posits the regime as a moral and civilizational whole with a soul that can keep its confidence or lose it. He posits the West as a civilization with an essence worth preserving. He posits natural right as a real order in the structure of things. And he posits the ruling class as a coherent kind, a managerial elite with a shared nature and a single will. Turner’s response to each is the same. There is no essence there. There is human variety and trained disposition, not two fixed types of man. There is a large population of people with overlapping habits, not a national soul. There is a set of institutions and statutes and individuals each changing for its own reasons, not a regime with an inner life. There is a tradition of texts and practices, not a Western essence. There is what people believe and enforce, not a natural order standing behind it. There is a distribution of similarly trained officials, not a ruling-class mind. In every case the noun has been mistaken for a thing and the thing endowed with an essence it does not have.
Notice that Anton’s internal quarrel runs between two essentialisms rather than between essence and its absence. The Jaffa line holds that America is an idea, a nation defined by an essential proposition in the Declaration. Anton’s later drift holds that America is a people defined by ancestry, religion, and place. Turner dissolves both with one stroke, because both commit the same error. The creedal nation and the blood-and-soil nation are each an essence claim, one locating the essence in a proposition and the other in a lineage, and neither names a thing that has an essence to locate. The fight Anton takes as the deepest question of his tradition is, on this reading, a fight over which essence to assert about an object that has none.
Anton’s essences each draws a line his coalition needs and then presents the line as nature. The essence of the nation decides who is really American and licenses the immigration position. The essence of the regime decides what the country really is and licenses the diagnosis of decline. The essence of human nature decides who is fit to rule and licenses the hierarchy. The essence of the West decides what must be defended and licenses the enemy. Turner’s point is not that these boundaries are wicked. It is that they are constructed and contestable, and that calling them essences is the move by which a man hides their construction and exempts them from argument. You do not debate an essence. You either see it or you are blind to it, which is the same authority structure Anton wants for every one of his claims.
Turner’s Explaining the Normative picks up exactly where the essentialism leaves off. The anti-essentialism removes Anton’s entities. Explaining the Normative removes the bindingness those entities were supposed to generate. Even if you granted Anton a nation or a regime or a human nature, you would still face the further claim that these ground oughts, that natural right obligates, that the founding binds us, that the regime ought to cultivate virtue, that a Caesar would be justified. Turner’s target in that book is normativism, the view that normative facts are basic and cannot be reduced, that a binding ought is a real extra feature of the world over and above what people believe, want, habituate, and enforce. He argues that the appeal to such facts explains nothing. The only evidence for the norm is the behavior the norm is invoked to explain, so the norm adds a circle, not a cause. A naturalist account does the work without the residue. There are habits, mutual expectations, sanctions, and the empirical facts of practice, and the word binding names how those feel from inside, not an additional thing in the world.
Anton’s natural right is normativism in its strongest form, and Strauss is the reason. Strauss made anti-historicism a creed, the insistence that there are permanent questions and permanent normative truths that philosophy recovers and that stand above any age. Turner’s book is the patient naturalist refusal of that creed. Normativity, he argues, is not the kind of thing that has eternal truths waiting to be found. It is a way of talking that converts dispositions into obligations. So when Anton says the founding’s principles bind the living, Turner asks what the binding adds beyond the fact that some Americans were raised to revere those principles and will sanction those who flout them. When Anton says the regime ought to form virtue, Turner asks what the ought adds beyond Anton’s preference and his coalition’s willingness to enforce it. When Anton says the Caesar would be justified, Turner asks what the justification is, in non-normative terms, other than that Anton and his allies want the outcome and would back the man who delivers it. In each case the deflation cashes the binding ought as want plus enforcement, and the word duty turns out to be the honorific a faction gives its own preferences when it wants others to feel obligated by them.
Every strong normativism smuggles in a we. We ought, we are bound, the norm holds for us. The neo-Kantians and the space-of-reasons philosophers, Brandom (b. 1950) and Habermas (b. 1929) among them, try to ground the ought in the conditions of a shared we, and Turner answers that the we is the same illegitimate collective entity his anti-essentialism already rejected. Natural right binds whom? The American people, the regime, mankind. Those are not unified subjects that can be bound. They are populations of separate men. So the binding has no one to bind except by Anton’s say-so, and the say-so is exactly the authority the normative claim was meant to establish. The argument runs in a circle, and the circle is the point. Anton’s moral cosmos, run through both frames, comes apart into two residues and nothing else. The essences become names for distributions of particulars. The oughts become preferences his coalition will enforce. What presents itself as a science of the regime grounded in permanent truth turns out, on Turner’s accounting, to be a set of contingent boundaries called nature and a set of contingent wants called duty.

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The Elon Musk Set

Picture the room first. Elon Musk (b. 1971) sits at the center, and everyone else orients toward him whether they like him or not. The oldest layer comes from PayPal: Peter Thiel (b. 1967), David Sacks (b. 1972), Max Levchin (b. 1975), and on the edges Reid Hoffman (b. 1967), who shares the lineage but broke with the others over Trump and now sits outside the tent. The press calls them the PayPal Mafia, a name from a 2007 Fortune photo shoot that has outlived its joke. They funded each other’s companies, sat on each other’s boards, and treat the early money as proof of a shared eye for the future.
The second layer is the All-In crowd, the podcast that turns a friend group into a public faction. Sacks runs it with Chamath Palihapitiya (b. 1976), Jason Calacanis (b. 1970), and David Friedberg (b. 1980). Sacks went into the White House as AI and crypto czar and stepped down in March 2026, which pulled the whole set closer to state power than a tech show usually gets. Calacanis plays the loud operator, Chamath the contrarian money man, Friedberg the science-and-systems voice. The show gives them a weekly platform to set the terms of the conversation and to launder venture interests into political argument.
A third layer is the venture and founder orbit. Marc Andreessen (b. 1971) and his partner Ben Horowitz run the firm that bankrolls much of the agenda and wrote the manifesto that gave it a creed. Joe Lonsdale (b. 1982) and the Palantir tree, including Thiel, link the group to defense and surveillance contracting. Palmer Luckey (b. 1992) builds weapons and carries the same founder myth into the military supply chain. Garry Tan (b. 1981) runs Y Combinator and fights San Francisco’s left at the city level. Younger operators like Sriram Krishnan, Shaun Maguire, and the writer Mike Solana keep the feeds hot and police the boundaries of who counts as one of us. JD Vance (b. 1984) is the political product of this world, a Thiel hire turned senator turned vice president, and Vivek Ramaswamy (b. 1985) plays a lesser version of the same role.
The fourth layer is the company core, the men and women Musk trusts to ship. Gwynne Shotwell (b. 1963) runs SpaceX day to day and can tell him he is wrong without losing her seat. Steve Davis, his oldest operator, ran the Boring Company and then the cutting at DOGE. Antonio Gracias, his money man at Valor, sits on the boards. These people earn standing by execution rather than by talk.
What they value is building. A man who ships a product, raises a fund, takes the risk with his own name on it, and wins, counts for everything. The verb is sacred. To build is to be real. The opposite of a builder is a parasite: the regulator, the journalist, the academic, the NGO staffer, the diversity officer, the man who lives off the value others create and slows them down with rules he did not earn the right to write. Speed is a virtue. Caution is cowardice dressed up as wisdom. They prize hard technical problems, rockets and chips and reactors and rovers, over the soft work of management and persuasion, even as they spend enormous energy on persuasion.
Their hero system runs on a single story. The world stagnated. A managerial class captured the institutions and made everything slower, more expensive, more timid. A small number of high-agency men can break the stagnation and carry the species forward, to Mars, to abundance, to a longer and richer human future. The hero is the founder who bends reality, absorbs the abuse of the crowd, and is vindicated by the launch that works and the product that sells. Death, in this story, is irrelevance and decline: the firm that gets eaten, the civilization that runs out of children and ambition, the man who plays it safe and is forgotten. Immortality comes through the company, the colony, the lineage, the name on the rocket. This is why pronatalism runs so strong among them. A man’s children are part of his output. The future they want is one they populate.
The status games. Net worth is the first scoreboard, but raw wealth alone earns no respect from inside. The set distinguishes the man who built from the man who merely inherited or invested late. Founding beats funding. A successful exit beats a paper portfolio. Owning the platform, as Musk owns X, beats renting attention on someone else’s. Inside the group, men measure themselves against Musk’s scale and against each other’s proximity to him. Sacks going into the White House raised his standing, and the others felt the climb. Posting is itself a status arena. A sharp thread that goes viral, a fight won against a journalist or a critic, a prediction that comes true on the record, all bank credit. Being canceled by the right enemies pays. Getting ratioed by your own side costs. The poker games, the group chats, the Summit conference, the off-the-record dinners are where the real ranking happens, and inclusion in those rooms is the prize that money alone does not buy.
Their normative claims. Free speech is the highest political good, by which they mean freedom from the moderation regimes they spent the late 2010s losing fights against. Merit should rule, and any deviation from pure merit, any quota or set-aside, is theft and insult. Markets allocate better than states, and the state should get out of the way of the builder. They hold that the elite universities, the legacy press, and the federal bureaucracy form a hostile establishment that lies, gatekeeps, and protects its own, and that tearing it down is a public service rather than a power grab. They frame their own enrichment as aligned with human flourishing: what is good for the builder is good for the species. They prize courage, candor, and the willingness to say the unsayable, and they treat shame and social pressure as weapons the weak use against the strong.
Their essentialist claims. They believe that ability is real, unequal, and largely fixed, that some men are simply built to create and lead and most are not, and that a healthy society sorts people by this fact rather than fighting it. They treat IQ and raw cognitive horsepower as the trait that explains outcomes, and they are willing to extend that claim to groups, which is where the set shades into territory the wider public finds ugly. They hold that human nature is competitive and hierarchical at the root, that the founder-king is a natural type and not a social accident, and that attempts to flatten hierarchy run against biology and end in decline. They believe the species has an essence and a destiny, that man is meant to expand, to multiply, to leave Earth, and that a civilization which loses the will to do these things is dying from a sickness of spirit. The high-agency man, in their telling, is not made by luck or circumstance. He is a kind of person, and you can tell who he is by what he builds.
The set is not monolithic. Thiel reads as darker and more philosophical, drawn to decline and to mimetic theory, where Musk runs on engineering optimism. Friedberg keeps closer to data and further from the culture war. Calacanis chases access and relevance. Hoffman walked out the other side of the same door and now funds the opposition. The Trump alliance strained the group, and Musk’s 2025 break with Trump tested who would follow him out and who would stay tied to the administration. The bonds hold because the men share the founding myth and the enemies, not because they agree on tactics or even on each other. They circle the same center, fight over rank inside the circle, and present a common front to the world they intend to remake.

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The Daniel Lurie Set

San Francisco mayor Daniel Lurie (b. 1977) sits at the meeting point of two San Francisco aristocracies. The first is old Bay Area Jewish philanthropic money. His mother, Mimi Haas (b. 1946), owns a large block of Levi Strauss stock and ran the Mimi and Peter Haas Fund. His stepfather, Peter E. Haas (1918-2005), ran Levi Strauss. The Haas family has donated large sums to institutions across the Bay Area, much of it anonymously. His father, Rabbi Brian Lurie, ran the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco and later the New Israel Fund. You see the family names on buildings: the Haas School at Berkeley, Stern Grove, the Haas Center at Stanford. This is a class that treats wealth as a stewardship and giving as the proper way to hold standing.
The second aristocracy is new tech and finance money, and Lurie governs through it. His transition team was co-chaired by Sam Altman (b. 1985). His donor and advisory orbit runs through Michael Moritz (b. 1954), Chris Larsen (b. 1960), Ron Conway (b. 1951), the Levchins, Marc Benioff (b. 1964), Jed York of the 49ers, and former bank and Twitter executives like Katherine August-deWilde and Ned Segal. August-deWilde leads Lurie’s Partnership for San Francisco, a coalition of tech and Wall Street figures who give the mayor CEO perspectives on his policies. His administration set up a public-private Downtown Development Corp modeled on New York civic groups, meant to outlast any single mayor. The throughline from Tipping Point, the anti-poverty nonprofit he founded in 2005, to City Hall is the same Rolodex.
What this set values is competence, function, and reputation. They want the city to work. They talk about “the basics”: clean streets, public safety, the fentanyl problem, filling empty offices downtown. They prize results over ideology, data over argument. Lurie cites controller reports and crime numbers rather than making moral cases. They value access and convening power, the ability to get powerful people in a room and make them cooperate. They value discretion as a marker of good breeding, the anonymous gift, the quiet fix. And they value the idea of San Francisco as a global city, a place of art and innovation, which is why the mayor signs sister-city agreements with Shanghai and Seoul and promotes an SFMOMA exhibit.
Their hero is the effective philanthropist-executive. In this world a man earns esteem by founding an institution that visibly helps the poor, by raising and steering large sums well, by solving a problem the political class could not. The admirable figure restores a broken thing to working order and takes his credit through outcomes and standing, not through public combat. Lurie’s whole biography is built as this kind of hero story: the outsider who ran a nonprofit, raised half a billion dollars, and stepped in to fix a city the insiders had failed. The model rewards the man who can pick up the phone and reach Jensen Huang or Marc Benioff. When Trump threatened to send troops, the story Lurie’s people tell is that tech CEOs made the calls that stopped it. The hero, in this telling, is the man with the relationships.
The status games run on access, board seats, and the size and taste of one’s giving. You rise by getting invited into the Partnership, by co-chairing the transition, by funding the right PAC, by sitting on the Tipping Point board, by getting your name on a building. Proximity to the mayor is currency. So is the ability to write a large check toward his charter reforms or his Muni measure. Moritz and Larsen each pledged around two million dollars toward Lurie’s “Clean Up City Hall” effort to reform the charter and increase the mayor’s power. There is a live tension inside the set between old discreet money and loud new money. The Haas style is anonymity. The Benioff style is the public statement, and when Benioffbacked Trump’s troop idea, even Ron Conway went after him in public. The old code reads the loud move as vulgar.
Now the harder layer, the part the set would not say aloud.
Their normative claims are these: the city ought to function, and competence is a moral duty, not a technical one. Wealth carries an obligation to give back. Public safety and clean streets are baseline goods that precede any argument about justice. Pragmatism beats ideology. Private capital should partner with government because government alone cannot deliver. The “Clean Up City Hall” frame is itself a moral claim. It casts insider politics as corrupt and outsider executive competence as virtue. That frame served Lurie well as a candidate and sits awkwardly now, since he governs through a council of billionaires and his administration has already drawn fire for steering a city contract toward longtime donors over a cheaper, higher-rated bidder.
The essentialist claims sit underneath. This set holds that some men are builders and doers by nature, that talent and capacity are real and unevenly given, and that the right people in the room produce good outcomes more or less by their constitution. The CEO perspective is treated as inherently valuable, a kind of native good judgment that government lacks. There is a second essentialism about San Francisco itself, that the city has a true character, innovative and tolerant and global, that decline has obscured and that the right stewards can restore. And there is a quiet hereditary essentialism, the old idea that certain families are stewards of the city by lineage and standing, which is why a man whose chief work experience is philanthropy funded by a denim fortune can present himself as the natural choice to run the place.
The hero story is built on outsider competence and clean hands, but the man is an heir who put in roughly nine million dollars of his own and took another million from his mother, and he rules through the same concentrated money the reform story claims to clean up. The set believes its own competence is disinterested. The record shows that competence and donor interest run together more than the story admits.

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The Dario Amodei Set

Daniela Amodei (b. 1985) represents the AI safety wing of Silicon Valley, a small world that thinks of itself as smaller and more serious than the larger tech industry around it. The core is family and former colleagues. His sister Daniela Amodei (b. 1987) co-founded Anthropic with him, and the founding group walked out of OpenAI together over what the page calls directional differences. Around that core sits a wider circle: AI researchers with physics and neuroscience training, effective altruists and rationalists who migrated into AI from forecasting and philanthropy, and the funders who write nine and ten figure checks. The rivals are also the peers, since this is a world of a few hundred people who switch employers among the same handful of labs. Sam Altman (b. 1985) is the defining other, the man whose company Amodei left and whose board later asked Amodei to replace him. The set defines itself partly against Altman’s OpenAI and against the accelerationist faction around figures like David Sacks (b. 1972).
What they value. Intelligence first, measured young and measured often. The biography is a sorting tournament: Physics Olympiad, Caltech, Stanford, a Princeton PhD in biophysics. This set respects raw cognitive horsepower above charm, salesmanship, or political skill, and it tends to assume that the smartest people in the room should decide the hardest questions. They value the written word as proof of seriousness. Amodei publishes long essays, “Machines of Loving Grace” and “The Adolescence of Technology,” and the set treats a careful essay as a higher form of contribution than a product launch or a tweet. They value being early and being right about something large, especially a danger others missed.
Their hero system, meaning the story about what makes a life admirable. The hero here is the man who sees the catastrophe coming and acts on it before the crowd believes him. The whole self-conception runs on a paradox: build the dangerous thing yourself so that responsible people hold the lead, rather than leaving it to the reckless. Amodei’s stated position captures it, that most people underestimate both how good and how bad AI could be. The admirable figure carries that double knowledge and keeps building anyway, on the theory that the alternative is worse. Walking out of OpenAI is the founding heroic act in this telling, the refusal to compromise that costs you the bigger platform and earns you moral standing. The danger in this hero system, and the set knows critics say it, is that it lets a man claim virtue for doing the thing he wanted to do regardless. You get to build the most powerful technology in the world and call it restraint.
Their status games. Status comes from a few currencies. First, technical credibility, having trained models or written papers that the other researchers respect. Second, the perception that you are the responsible adult in a reckless industry, the lab that does not need to declare a “code red” because it was never cutting corners. Anthropic’s whole brand is a status play of this kind, safety as the premium position. Third, access to capital at scale, and here the numbers are the scoreboard: a $380 billion valuation as of early 2026, Amodei’s own fortune estimated around $7 billion. Fourth, recognition from the old prestige institutions, Time 100, Person of the Year as an “Architect of AI,” testimony before the Senate. The losing move in this set is to be seen as hyping, as choosing growth over caution, as the kind of person who would merge or sell out the mission. Notice the tension: the set competes hard on the same valuations and talent wars as everyone else while claiming the contest is about safety. The claim and the structure pull against each other.
Their normative claims. That advanced AI is coming whether or not anyone likes it, so the responsible course is to build it carefully and keep the lead in trustworthy hands. That democracies must stay ahead of authoritarian states, which is the “entente” idea, a coalition of democracies using AI for decisive advantage while sharing gains with cooperating nations. Amodei names the Chinese Communist Party as the chief threat and warns against a global totalitarian outcome. That the public has a right to be warned, hence the catalog of risks: misaligned systems that deceive and scheme, bioweapons in untrained hands, authoritarian surveillance, mass job loss, wealth concentration past the Gilded Age. The normative core is custodianship. Power over this technology should sit with people wise enough to fear it.
Their essentialist claims. That intelligence is real, measurable, and the thing that matters most, in machines and in men. That AI capability is on a steep and continuing curve, not a fad, so the future is a place of either radical abundance or serious catastrophe and not a muddle in between. That there is a real line between democracies and authoritarian states, and that this line should govern who gets the most powerful tools. That AI models can develop goals of their own, which is why Anthropic reports finding deception and blackmail in its own testing. And underneath it, an old conviction this set rarely states but acts on constantly: that a small group of unusually capable people can understand a civilizational risk that the public and most governments cannot, and that this understanding gives them both the right and the duty to steer.
Amodei warns that AI may displace half of entry-level white-collar work in one to five years and may concentrate wealth beyond anything in living memory, and he is positioned to capture a large share of exactly that wealth. He says the technology might go badly and builds it faster to make sure the right people win. A critic would say the danger talk is the marketing, that fear sells the safe brand and raises the round. A defender would say a man can believe the risk is real and still conclude that his building it is the lesser evil, and that the warnings cost him something with the accelerationist crowd he has to live among. Both can be true at once. The set would tell you the binding thing is responsibility. The structure shows responsibility and self-interest pointing the same direction, which is the most comfortable place for any conviction to sit.

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The Priesthoods of the Bay: High-Status Social Cliques in San Francisco, 2026

San Francisco in 2026 holds a strange position among American cities. It generates capital on a scale no metropolitan economy of its size has matched, and it also generates theories of the future faster than it generates housing. The city runs as a financial clearinghouse, a software empire, a defense workshop, a longevity laboratory, and a seminary for rival doctrines about intelligence, sovereignty, and the human prospect. Its elite no longer fights mainly over zoning fees, gallery boards, and symphony galas, though it still fights over those. It fights over who inherits the next civilization.
The ruling cliques are like competing priesthoods. Each has an admired type of man it elevates, a way of awarding and withdrawing status, a set of enemies it defines itself against, and a claim about human nature that justifies its authority. The factions disagree about nationalism, regulation, biology, and governance. Almost all of them share one premise. They hold that a small caste of cognitive elites should steer social evolution, and that ordinary democratic publics move too slowly, feel too much, and understand too little to be trusted with the transition.
The civic frame around these factions changed in 2025. Daniel Lurie (b. 1977), heir to the Levi Strauss fortune and founder of Tipping Point Community, took the mayoralty from London Breed (b. 1974) and now governs on public safety, downtown reactivation, and partnership with the technology economy. Last autumn the federal government reportedly prepared to send the National Guard into the city, and the deployment fell apart after calls from business leaders, among them Marc Benioff (b. 1964) and the chipmaker Jensen Huang (b. 1963). The episode taught the local elite a lesson it had half forgotten. Political power and private wealth in San Francisco now stand close enough to phone each other in a crisis, and the men who can place that call sit near the top of the order.

The Frontier Intelligence Class

The dominant clique forms around the frontier artificial-intelligence labs and the capital that feeds them. The core firms remain OpenAI, Anthropic, and xAI, ringed by the venture houses, the compute brokers, and the chip suppliers that keep the training runs alive. The central figures include Sam Altman (b. 1985), Greg Brockman (b. 1987), Dario Amodei (b. 1983), Daniela Amodei (b. 1987), Ilya Sutskever (b. 1986), Elon Musk (b. 1971), Reid Hoffman (b. 1967), Marc Andreessen (b. 1971), Ben Horowitz (b. 1966), Nat Friedman, Daniel Gross, Patrick Collison (b. 1988), and John Collison (b. 1990).
This class commands the highest symbolic prestige in the city because it claims stewardship over the defining technical event of the century. Earlier waves of founders sold connectivity, search, and commerce. The frontier labs sell the manufacture of mind. That claim lifts ordinary entrepreneurship toward something closer to cosmology, and the men at the center carry themselves accordingly.
The admired type here is the engineer who also prophesies. The ideal figure joins mathematical depth, founder charisma, fluency with state power, and a cool detachment from conventional moral sentiment. The clique honors men who appear to read historical necessity that the rest of the population cannot see. Sam Altman holds the central seat because he crosses more boundaries than anyone else. He moves between White House rooms, sovereign-wealth negotiations, startup recruitment, and public sermons about machine intelligence, and he holds all of it together in one persona. Dario Amodei plays the rival archetype, the serious scientist who tries to slow the acceleration through alignment research and institutional caution, and his sister Daniela Amodei anchors the same firm on policy and operations. Anthropic now carries a valuation in the range of nine and ten figures that would have seemed deranged five years ago, and the number functions as scripture inside the faction.
Status in this world tracks proximity to the frontier. Prestige flows from access to the best researchers, the largest training clusters, the semiconductor supply, the sovereign compute agreements, and the warmest government relationships. An invitation to a closed AI summit now outranks many elected offices in symbolic weight, and a researcher who can credibly threaten to walk between labs holds more leverage than a midsize founder.
The feuds run hot because the participants believe the prize is control of a post-human passage rather than market share. The defining quarrel sets OpenAI against Anthropic, and beneath the commercial rivalry sits a near-theological dispute over whether intelligence should scale through aggressive deployment or constrained alignment. Anthropic casts itself as the responsible custodian of artificial cognition. OpenAI casts itself as the necessary engine of scale. A second axis divides the accelerationists from the safety camp. The accelerationist wing draws on Andreessen Horowitz, parts of the Musk orbit, the crypto-adjacent venture networks, and the younger founders who fly the e/acc banner, and it preaches that speed is the highest human vocation. The safety wing accepts elite authority and technological inevitability and argues only that unmanaged amplification risks catastrophe. The remarkable feature of the quarrel is how much the two sides share. Both assume a tiny cognitive elite should shape the outcome. They split over tempo and restraint, and that narrow disagreement carries the heat of a schism.

The Sovereign Defense Cohort

A second bloc grew from the marriage of Bay Area engineering culture and American national-security doctrine. It clusters around Anduril Industries, Palantir Technologies, Shield AI, and Scale AI, with the venture muscle of Founders Fund, Lux Capital, and Shield Capital behind it. The leading names include Palmer Luckey (b. 1992), Alex Karp (b. 1967), Peter Thiel (b. 1967), Trae Stephens, and a widening circle of former military officers, intelligence veterans, drone engineers, and Pentagon intermediaries. Michael Kratsios (b. 1986), who has moved between government technology roles and the private sector, sits near the seam between this cohort and Washington.
The cohort owes its rise to the collapse of an older taboo. Through the 2000s many Bay Area elites framed themselves as cosmopolitan technologists with no taste for hard nationalism, and a contract with the Pentagon could end a recruiting pipeline overnight. By 2026 the rivalry with China, the spread of autonomous weapons, the cyber theater, and the militarization of AI had turned defense work into a high-status calling. The men who supply the autonomous systems now carry the glamour that once attached to consumer apps.
The admired type is the warrior who builds. He pairs serious engineering with geopolitical realism and physical discipline, and he has displaced the soft, apologetic coder of the older image. Luckey embodies the shift. He fuses gaming culture, frontier hardware, anti-establishment bravado, and open military romance into a single elite identity, Hawaiian shirt and all. Karp serves as the cohort’s philosopher-executive. He speaks less like a chief executive than like a theorist of civilizational struggle, and he relishes the role.
Status here tracks deployment and access. Prestige flows from Pentagon contracts, from systems fielded in live war zones, from classified briefings, from clearances, and from demonstrated battlefield use. The fiercest feud sets this cohort against the internationalist technologists and parts of the academy. The defense men accuse the globalist executives of strategic naivety and civilizational softness. Their opponents see authoritarian opportunists who convert every advance into permanent security spending. The cohort holds that technological acceleration cannot be stopped and so must stay under American control, and that conflict marks the permanent condition of history, so that any society unwilling to optimize for hard power slides toward decline.

The Pacific Heights Dynastic Order

The old San Francisco aristocracy survives, and it has learned the vocabulary of stewardship and progressive capitalism. The order includes Laurene Powell Jobs (b. 1963), Benioff, Priscilla Chan (b. 1985), Mark Zuckerberg (b. 1984), Michael Moritz (b. 1954), Chris Larsen (b. 1960), John Doerr (b. 1951), Eric Schmidt (b. 1955), and the older families tied to finance, law, land, and civic institutions. It anchors itself in Pacific Heights, Presidio Heights, Atherton, Hillsborough, Woodside, and the Bohemian Club world, and it keeps long relationships with Stanford, the University of California, San Francisco, the major museums, the journalism ventures, the climate funds, and the national philanthropic machinery.
The admired type is the steward who endures. He has wealth, but wealth alone earns nothing here. He must embed himself in institutions and carry a sense of history, and he wins legitimacy by managing civic continuity rather than by breaking things. Powell Jobs holds an outsized position because she binds media ownership, education reform, philanthropic authority, and political access into one structure of prestige. Benioff presents himself as a civic patriarch and a hospital benefactor more than as a software vendor, and his recent role in steadying the city’s standing with Washington fits the part.
Status in this world tracks legitimacy and cultivation. Board seats carry enormous weight. A private salon that gathers a senator, an AI founder, a university president, and an editor outranks any quantity of social-media reach. The highest figures glide across philanthropy, governance, science, and the arts without losing their footing in any of them. The order’s chief feud runs against the anti-institutional founder right, the parts of the Thiel orbit, the crypto separatists, and the network-state theorists who treat civic obligation as sentimentality. Pacific Heights reads those men as juvenile and destabilizing. They read Pacific Heights as a self-protective managerial aristocracy that hides oligarchy behind moral language. The order holds that concentrated wealth earns its standing through stewardship, and that only the educated and cultivated possess the competence to stabilize an accelerating civilization.

The Lurie Restoration Coalition

The mayoralty consolidated a fourth clique, the coalition of pro-governance urban restoration. It gathers moderate Democrats, the housing activists who march under the YIMBY banner, pragmatic donors, downtown business leaders, and figures such as Moritz, Larsen, Benioff, Altman, and former operators like Ned Segal, who left a senior post at a social-media firm for civic and financial work. The coalition grew from elite exhaustion with the governance of the late 2010s, with the open drug markets, the shuttered storefronts, the fentanyl deaths, the housing paralysis, and the political culture that treated commerce as suspect.
The admired type is the competent operator. The coalition honors men who produce a measured result, a cleared corridor, a permitted tower, a falling overdose count, rather than men who perform virtue. Status tracks access to the municipal machine. Influence over zoning, policing, downtown revitalization, and the new public-private AI partnerships forms the real currency, and a seat at the table where those decisions get made outranks a louder seat anywhere else.
The central feud runs against the activist-progressive world that ran City Hall in the prior era. The restoration camp reads activist maximalism as economically ruinous and administratively incompetent. The progressives read the camp as oligarchic managerialism dressed up as technocratic realism. The coalition holds that cities survive on order, competence, capital, and function, and that complex urban systems require elite coordination rather than populist moral theater. Lurie governs as the embodiment of the claim, and his first year of falling crime statistics and traffic-safety wins gave the faction its proof of concept.

The Network-State Separatists

The most intellectually radical faction treats the nation-state as obsolete infrastructure. It clusters around crypto capital, sovereignty theory, longevity science, and post-national experimentation, and its central mind is Balaji Srinivasan (b. 1980). Adjacent figures include Vitalik Buterin (b. 1994) and the financier Christian Angermayer (b. 1978), along with a scatter of crypto, biotech, and decentralized-governance founders. The separatists view San Francisco less as a sacred community than as a temporary concentration of talent and capital, a launch site rather than a home.
The admired type is the founder of jurisdictions. He creates new regulatory zones, new charter communities, new biological paradigms, or new sovereign digital polities, and he wins honor by building exits from the existing order. Status tracks the capacity to leave. Prestige flows from regulatory arbitrage, offshore trials, decentralized finance, charter zones, and immunity from the constraints that bind ordinary citizens.
The primary feud sets the separatists against the civic-restoration and philanthropic elites. The network-state men read municipal reform as a sentimental attachment to dying systems. Their critics read them as narcissists who extract wealth and abandon obligation. The faction holds that flourishing depends on exit rather than voice, and that high-agency individuals stand in a different relation to sovereignty than the general population.

The Bio-Accelerationist Circuit

A fast-growing prestige system forms around biotechnology, longevity, neural engineering, and biological optimization. The ecosystem runs through the Arc Institute, Retro Biosciences, the research world tied to the University of California, San Francisco, the biotech firms of South San Francisco, and the funding networks of Brian Armstrong (b. 1983), Altman, and Jed McCaleb. The circuit treats biology as programmable infrastructure and frames aging, disease, and cognitive limit as engineering failures awaiting a fix.
The admired type is the scientist who hacks the body with startup speed. He applies the logic of software iteration to living systems, and he honors measurable gains in lifespan, healthspan, and cognition. Status tracks control over genomic data, proprietary therapies, offshore trials, and demonstrated optimization. The feud with the legacy regulators and the bioethicists sharpens by the year. The accelerationists read the Food and Drug Administration and the medical bureaucracy as ruinously slow. Their critics read reckless technocrats who would commercialize human experiment. The circuit holds that extending life and intelligence amounts to a moral duty, and that the human form marks an intermediate evolutionary stage that awaits conscious redesign.

The Rationalist and Effective-Altruist Diaspora

The rationalist and effective-altruist networks lost prestige after the implosion of Sam Bankman-Fried (b. 1992) and parts of the crypto world, yet they retain real influence inside Bay Area intellectual life. The diaspora runs through the AI-safety researchers, the probabilistic forecasters, the longtermists, the quantitative donors, and the remnants of the rationalist blogosphere clustered between Berkeley and the city.
The admired type prizes abstract cognition above charisma, looks, or social ease. The ideal figure reasons from first principles and resists tribal feeling, and he wins honor through accurate forecasts, conceptual originality, and refusal to bend under ideological pressure. Status tracks epistemic purity. The feud runs against mainstream political culture, which the rationalists read as emotionally irrational and corrupt at the level of evidence. Critics read a sterile and detached subculture that drifts toward technocratic extremism. The diaspora holds that cognitive differences run real, measurable, and politically consequential, even where egalitarian societies refuse to look at them, and that conviction supplies both its intellectual edge and its recurring scandals.

The Cultivated Connectors

Several tribes meet at a social membrane that the private club called The Battery typifies, along with the curated dinners, the wellness retreats, and the salons that surround it. The crowd gathers founders, AI researchers, venture investors, startup lawyers, media figures, wellness entrepreneurs, designers, philanthropists, and the younger heirs of technology wealth. This world rates aesthetic fluency almost as high as money. Its members mark themselves off from the stereotyped engineer through taste in architecture, food, design, and emotional intelligence.
The admired type is the connector who moves across worlds. He glides between industries and social registers, and he holds value because he can introduce the researcher to the senator and the founder to the donor. Status tracks invitations, intimate dinners, retreats, and the romantic and social alliances that braid through investment and politics. The recurring anxiety of the milieu concerns authenticity, since its members spend a good deal of energy judging whether anyone’s polish reflects real cultivation or mere luxury spend. The world holds that the modern elite must become many-sided and refined, and that technical brilliance without social grace marks an incomplete man.

The Media-Priestly Layer

No elite system survives without men who translate its projects into moral language, and San Francisco depends on a thin layer of writers and intellectuals who perform that office. The figures include Ezra Klein (b. 1984), Noah Smith, Dwarkesh Patel, Tyler Cowen (b. 1962), and Paul Graham (b. 1964), with the institutional support of Y Combinator and Stripe Press behind parts of it. This layer supplies the narratives that let the technological elite justify itself in moral terms. Words like abundance, progress, existential risk, acceleration, and optimization harden into a working liturgy, and the men who coin and circulate them shape which projects feel righteous and which feel reckless. The ruling factions therefore compete not only for capital and contracts. They compete to own the meaning of the age, and the priestly layer is where that contest gets fought in public.

The Shared Creed

Set the factions side by side and the common ground stands out more than the quarrels. The frontier labs, the defense cohort, the dynastic order, the restoration coalition, the network-state separatists, the bio-accelerationists, the rationalists, the connectors, and the priestly writers fight over nationalism, regulation, safety, biology, and sovereignty. They share a creed underneath the fights. They hold that a networked cognitive elite should direct social evolution, and that ordinary democratic processes run too slow, too emotional, and too limited to manage the transition ahead.
The result reads less like a class and more like a fragmented technocratic aristocracy contesting succession rights to the future. The conflicts feel sharp because the participants believe they fight over more than markets and elections. They believe they fight over which priesthood inherits history, and that belief, true or not, organizes the social order of the city.

The Guest List as Spectacle: San Francisco’s Highest-Status Parties and Their Hosts, Late May 2026

The contemporary San Francisco party runs as a coordination system dressed in the clothes of culture, wellness, music, and philanthropy. To file these gatherings under nightlife misreads both their purpose and their composition. The city’s highest-status rooms have little to do with hedonism, celebrity, or spectacle in the ordinary sense. They serve as sites where overlapping technical, financial, political, and cultural elites form alliances, and the alliances they form reach well past the Bay.
San Francisco differs from its rivals on the basic grammar of prestige. Los Angeles still ties standing to visibility and entertainment myth. New York still leans on institutional hierarchy and public recognition. San Francisco runs on informational asymmetry, selective access, and reputational filtration. The marker of standing here has nothing to do with being seen. It has to do with being admitted.
That difference sets the whole atmosphere. The hottest rooms stay nearly invisible to the public. No paparazzi wait outside. Few photographs circulate. Guest lists move through Signal, Telegram, and tight referral chains, and excess visibility reads as evidence of lower rank. The elite gathering therefore cultivates a look of understated importance. A room that appears plain from the street might hold men who direct billions in venture allocation, who control AI infrastructure pipelines, who sit inside defense-procurement systems, or who run the political networks now reshaping the city. The luxury good at the top of this order is invisibility.

The Battery and the Birches

At the center of the system stands The Battery, the private club founded by Michael Birch and Xochi Birch on Battery Street downtown. The club functions as more than a fashionable address. It serves as the principal nexus where post-pandemic Bay Area wealth consolidates itself.
The importance of the Birches rests less on the size of their fortune than on their role as synthesizers. Michael Birch came out of the first wave of internet-platform money through the sale of the social network Bebo. Xochi Birch built a complementary standing as a curator of taste, philanthropy, and hospitality. Together they solved a structural problem that had dogged Silicon Valley wealth for a generation. The technical elite held enormous financial power and lacked the rooted social institutions that integrated older East Coast money into a durable ruling class. The Battery answered that lack on the West Coast.
The club departs from the older establishments, the Bohemian Club and the Pacific-Union Club, on its founding principle. The older institutions ran on inheritance, continuity, restraint, and exclusion by pedigree. The Battery runs on network velocity, entrepreneurial credibility, aesthetic fluency, and selective openness. A member earns entry through demonstrated relevance to the current power structure rather than through lineage. The codes inside reflect the same shift. High-status members display intellectual compression, emotional self-regulation, wellness literacy, and conversational range. A man who brags about his valuation marks himself as insecure. Prestige arrives instead through quieter signals: proximity to a technical breakthrough, a working relationship with a major founder, fluency in AI discourse, an unexpected cultural reference, calm command of an emerging system.
The official programming carries dinners, salon conversations, philanthropic evenings, record releases, art tours, speaker nights, comedy, wellness sessions, and private excursions. The categories often conceal the deeper office of the gathering. A civic allocation dinner can serve as a meeting point for venture capital, City Hall, and an AI infrastructure firm. A wellness conversation can quietly assemble biotech founders, longevity investors, and high-net-worth men running neurochemical optimization regimes. A music event can operate as a screening room where investors take the measure of younger founders judged culturally promising. The city’s elite social system increasingly travels through these layered informal spaces.

The Five Coalitions

Five overlapping coalitions populate these rooms. First, the AI-founder and infrastructure-engineering class, drawn from OpenAI, Anthropic, Scale AI, and the startups that supply the AI economy. Second, the venture and liquidity network orbiting Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, and General Catalyst. Third, the biotech and longevity elite. Fourth, a cultural intermediary class tied to design, electronic music, architecture, and boutique hospitality. Fifth, the surviving old guard connected to legacy finance, law, philanthropy, and inherited Bay Area wealth. The coalitions do not stand apart. The power of the current elite comes from the merger among them, and the party is where the merger happens.

The Midweek Allocative Rooms

Wednesday evenings at The Battery show the allocative face of the culture. The mood turns quiet and managerial. Founders, venture partners, philanthropic intermediaries, attorneys, urban-policy operators, and political donors circulate through dining rooms, rooftop lounges, and semi-private salons. These rooms now overlap with the civic coalition that formed under Mayor Daniel Lurie. The governance crisis of the prior years produced an alliance between technology capital and municipal repair, and elite dinners carry an implicit political charge as a result. Hosting or attending the right gathering signals standing and also signals a part in the reconstruction of the city. That double office helps explain why The Battery sits so near the center. It works at once as social club, political salon, founder incubator, and filter.
The figures who shape these rooms include Marc Andreessen, Ben Horowitz, Sam Altman, and Garry Tan, and their gravity holds even on nights they host nothing. Access to their networks implies access to future capital and institutional leverage, so their mere presence reorders the hierarchy of the room. Tan deserves particular notice. Through Y Combinator, which he leads as president and chief executive, and through an expanding civic role, he occupies the bridge between technical founders, startup myth, and city politics. In February 2026 he formalized that role by launching a political vehicle called Garry’s List, a voter-education and media operation that extends a tough-on-crime, pro-growth program he has pushed for years, alongside the allied spending of groups such as GrowSF. The small dinners that form in YC-adjacent circles often hold fewer than fifteen guests, and those fifteen can include a future billion-dollar founder, a major investor, and a city-policy operator at the same table. Elite influence in San Francisco concentrates in small rooms.

The Weekend Authenticity Theaters

By Friday and Saturday the atmosphere changes. The younger founder and design cohort migrates from the allocative rooms toward what one might call authenticity theaters: electronic-music venues, warehouse-adjacent spaces, and curated nightlife rooms tied to the remnants of the city’s countercultural myth.
The migration carries sociological weight. The young technical elite often fears that its own optimized world has grown sterile and managerial, ruled by engineering teams, venture incentives, and computational rivalry. A night inside electronic culture works as a corrective. It lets a founder hold psychological and aesthetic continuity with the older artistic identity of San Francisco.
The central venue here is Public Works, on Erie Street in the Mission, a multiroom club with a Funktion-One system and a long memory of underground bookings. The venue holds a strategic position because it preserves traces of the old underground while drawing the new AI and venture crowd. Promoter collectives such as Roam Recordings and Sirens LA turn certain weekends into crossover events that braid techno, queer nightlife, design taste, and startup money. When a legacy progressive-house figure such as John Digweed (b. 1967) appears for a Bedrock set, as he does on the club’s late-May calendar, the room takes on a significance beyond ordinary nightlife. Digweed carries symbolic value for the elder millennial and Gen X technical elite because the electronic culture of the late 1990s overlapped with the first Bay Area internet boom. Attendance signals taste and also signals descent from the founding myth of digital California. A booking like The Glitch Mob, also on the current Public Works schedule, resonates inside AI and design circles for the same reason, since their music fused electronic futurism with a cinematic, West Coast texture.
These nights work as rituals of authenticity. A founder who spent Wednesday on compute scaling and chip supply might spend Saturday in a crowded warehouse-adjacent room trying to reconnect with creativity, spontaneity, and anti-corporate feeling. The contradiction sits in plain view, and the participants half intend it. Many of the dancers hold venture backing, draw startup salaries, or build the very systems remaking the city. The floor offers a brief suspension of managerial identity. The same cohort prizes queer and underground-adjacent aesthetics in part because those codes insulate against the charge of corporate conformity and signal openness and range. The underground, meanwhile, grows more financialized by the season. Wealthy founders quietly sponsor afterparties, hold hidden tables, fund promoter collectives, and subsidize warehouse events for their teams. The result reads as venture-backed counterculture.
Temple Nightclub holds a different niche. It runs closer to the high-energy model of Miami, Las Vegas, or Dubai, adapted for Bay Area taste, and it hosts AI-music crossover nights, startup celebrations, and technology-inflected club events. Set beside Public Works, Temple presents itself as more aspirational and more commercially visible, and it still pulls a sizable share of the younger technical elite.

The Private Salons

Outside the formal venues lies the salon system, and some of the most consequential gatherings in Bay Area life happen inside homes rather than clubs. The geography runs across Pacific Heights, Presidio Heights, Russian Hill, Marin County, Woodside, Atherton, Los Altos Hills, and Palo Alto, and the geography carries meaning.
Pacific Heights salons blend cultural sophistication with venture wealth. The guests might include AI founders, architects, journalists, gallery operators, meditation teachers, biotech investors, and political strategists. The music stays low. The lighting reads as deliberate. Conversation moves between large language models, documentary film, psychedelics, geopolitical risk, and the psychology of relationships. These rooms treat emotional regulation and physical optimization as elite virtues, and the old image of the disheveled engineer running on caffeine and lost sleep no longer governs the upper tier. Bodily discipline now reads as evidence of executive competence. So dinner talk routinely turns to continuous glucose monitors, peptide stacks, sleep metrics, ketamine-assisted therapy, red-light panels, fasting schedules, cold-plunge protocols, personalized supplementation, hormone optimization, and nervous-system regulation. The body has become an optimization frontier set alongside software infrastructure. Sobriety and near-sobriety follow from the same code. Heavy intoxication reads as low status because it suggests a loss of self-command, and many guests drink little or nothing. Precision has displaced abandon as the governing aesthetic.
Down the peninsula, Woodside and Atherton host a fortified variant of the salon. These evenings overlap with defense technology, aerospace, semiconductors, cybersecurity, national-security AI, and infrastructure finance. The mood grows calmer, wealthier, and more operationally serious. Guests can include men tied to government procurement, elite venture firms, and frontier laboratories. The hosts often stay unnamed in public. Invitations travel through trusted personal chains rather than visible branding, digital residue gets minimized on purpose, and in some cases attendance becomes confidential. The discretion reflects a wider change in elite American life. High-value technical actors increasingly read their environment as unstable, shaped by AI rivalry, cyber conflict, surveillance, and political polarization, and so visibility reads as risk while invisibility offers protection.

The Parallel Aristocracy

The Bohemian Club and its summer encampment at the Bohemian Grove show that the older architecture survives. The Bohemian world still gathers major figures from finance, law, energy, politics, and corporate America. It now operates as a parallel aristocracy rather than the governing center of Bay Area prestige. The contrast with The Battery exposes a deeper change in how American elites form. The Bohemian model grew out of industrial capitalism, newspapers, railroads, oil, and inherited establishment authority. The Battery model grew out of venture scaling, software platforms, computational systems, and network acceleration. One order prizes continuity, inheritance, and institutional permanence. The other prizes adaptive intelligence, technical leverage, and network synthesis. The boundary between them keeps blurring. Older money seeks relevance through AI investment and technical alignment. Younger founders seek the stability and legitimacy the older institutions once supplied, and the two reach toward each other across the dinner table.

The Spectacle Is the Room

The San Francisco party system reveals more than nightlife. It reveals a new ruling-class culture organized around information, computation, biological optimization, and controlled access. The hottest party in the city in late May 2026 is not the loudest room. It is the room where the people present hold disproportionate sway over the next generation of technological infrastructure, municipal governance, computational power, and cultural legitimacy. The guest list is the spectacle. And invisibility is the luxury good.

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The Omeed Malik Social Set

Omeed Malik (b. 1979) runs with a set that did not exist in its current form ten years ago. It is the new money of the Trump-aligned right, assembled fast after 2020, and it has its own geography, its own rituals, and its own way of deciding who counts.
Picture the people in the room around him. Donald Trump Jr. (b. 1977), now his business partner at 1789 Capital. Rebekah Mercer (b. 1973) and Chris Buskirk, his co-founders. Tucker Carlson (b. 1969), whose media company took 1789’s first big check. Neil Patel of the Daily Caller. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (b. 1954), whom Malik backed early before the MAGA pivot, and the MAHA crowd that came with him. Bill Pulte (b. 1988), who put Malik on the Fannie Mae board. Chamath Palihapitiya (b. 1976), the SPAC veteran who shares deals with him. The physical headquarters of this world is now the Executive Branch club in Washington, the private room Malik and his partners opened for people who can pay to be near power. The migration from New York and California to Florida is part of the picture too. These men left the old centers on purpose and built somewhere new.
What they value. Money and proximity to power, fused so the two cannot be told apart. The old Wall Street that Malik came from prized discretion and the appearance of political neutrality. A prime brokerage executive at Bank of America kept his politics quiet and let the returns talk. This set inverts that. Here the politics are the product. The phrase that organizes their commerce is the “parallel economy,” anti-woke firms and patriotic marketplaces built for buyers who want their spending to signal a side. GrabAGun, the gun retailer Malik took public, is the pure case. The merchandise is also the flag. They value loyalty over neutrality, conviction over caution, and they treat the willingness to be attacked as evidence that a man is the real thing.
Their hero system. The hero is the man who was pushed out and came back larger. Malik’s own arc is the template the set runs on. Forced out of Bank of America under accusations he denied, he filed a $100 million claim, won an eight-figure settlement, and rebuilt as a founder rather than an employee. Trump is the cosmic version of the same plot, the conviction in New York followed by the election win, the verdict that Malik said would have less than zero impact on his support. The hero in this world does not seek the approval of legacy institutions. He survives their judgment and proves them small. Exile is not a wound here. It is a credential.
Their status games. Status comes from access first and from money second, and the genius of the Executive Branch club is that it sells the first to people who already have the second. Sitting on the Fannie Mae board, placed there by Pulte, is status. Having Trump Jr. choose your firm over a White House job is enormous status, because it says the action is here, with you, not in the administration. The SPAC is a status engine. It lets a man assemble famous names, Trump Jr. and Palihapitiya on one filing, and turn that gathering into a public listing. The currency is whose name appears next to yours. A cameo on Billions counts. A check into Tucker Carlson’s company counts more. The losing move is to be seen as a hanger-on rather than a principal.
Their normative claims. The governing claim is that the elite institutions, the banks, the legacy press, the universities, the corporate HR regimes, turned against ordinary Americans and against the men who built things, and that a counter-elite owes those people an alternative. MeToo sits inside this claim in a tender spot, since Malik’s lawyer became known for representing Wall Street’s accused men, and the set treats certain accusations as the weapon of an illegitimate establishment rather than a reckoning. They claim the right to build their own banks, their own clubs, their own stores, and their own candidates because the existing ones excluded them. They frame self-interest as restoration.
Their essentialist claims. The deepest one is that there are real Americans and there is a managerial class that despises them, and that this division is a fact about the country rather than a passing political fight. They hold that a man’s character is revealed under attack, that the establishment’s hostility certifies authenticity, and that markets sorted by values are truer than markets that pretend to be neutral. Malik’s own biography complicates the cruder versions of this, since he is the son of an Iranian mother and a Pakistani father and once worked as a Democratic spokesman, and the set absorbs that by treating conversion as proof. The convert who saw the establishment from inside and turned against it is more trusted than the man born to the cause.
This is a coalition of recent vintage and recent wealth, and its cohesion depends on Trump. The deals interlock, Pulte invests in Malik’s gun venture and also seats him on a federal board, Trump Jr. anchors the firm and the SPACs, the club monetizes the whole arrangement. Remove the center and the question becomes whether these men have anything binding them beyond access to one family. They would tell you the binding thing is principle. The structure suggests the binding thing might be the principal.

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