Different communities have different gifts and different needs in different times and different places. They have different moral grammars around specific practices, and that what counts as truth, cheating, as legitimate cooperation, as appropriate boundary maintenance, and as proper institutional behavior varies significantly across communities that formed by different traditions. The yeshiva students calling answer-sharing chevrusa learning, the various test-gaming strategies documented across multiple communities, the specific moral culture of the white shoe firms and their equivalents, these are all instances of the same underlying phenomenon. Communities develop their own internal moral codes and their own definitions of legitimate and illegitimate behavior, and those codes are not always congruent with the codes of the institutions those communities enter.
The chevrusa example is analytically rich because it is not simply rationalization of dishonesty. Chevrusa is a valuable pedagogical tradition in Jewish learning, the practice of paired or small-group study in which students work through texts together, challenge each other’s interpretations, and arrive at understanding through collaborative dialogue rather than individual silent study. This tradition has deep roots in Talmudic learning culture and it produces specific intellectual virtues, the capacity for sustained argument, the willingness to have one’s interpretation challenged, the understanding that truth emerges through dialogue rather than through individual authority. When yeshiva students apply this framework to test situations in secular institutions, they are not simply cheating in a straightforwardly dishonest sense. They are applying a legitimate moral framework from one domain to a situation where that framework is defined as illegitimate by the rules of a different domain. The collision is between two moral frameworks rather than between honesty and dishonesty in any simple sense.
This is the first thing the observation adds to the custodianship question. The custodianship problem is not only about who transmits a tradition and what is gained or lost in the transmission. It is about what happens when the moral grammar of the entering community is not congruent with the moral grammar of the institution being entered, and specifically about which moral grammar prevails in cases of conflict. The white shoe firm question illuminates this most clearly because the white shoe firms developed their specific moral culture as a way for specifying which moral grammar would govern behavior in the institutional context. The explicit norms of those firms, the dress codes, the manner codes, the codes around financial relationships with clients, the codes around insider information, the codes around conflict of interest, were not arbitrary status markers. They were a technology for establishing which community’s moral grammar would define legitimate behavior and for enforcing that grammar against the competing moral grammars that members brought from their communities of origin.
Turner’s framework adds the essential theoretical dimension here. The tacit formation that a community develops through generations of practice in specific conditions is not simply a set of explicit moral rules that can be listed and compared. It is a set of embodied intuitions about what is natural, what is normal, what goes without saying, and what requires explicit justification. The yeshiva student who shares test answers is not typically making a conscious decision to violate an explicit rule. He is acting on the tacit intuition that collaborative learning is how you approach intellectual challenges, that the goal is understanding rather than individual performance demonstration, and that the test’s requirement of individual work is an institutional convention that may or may not override the deeper obligation to help a fellow student understand the material. The tacit formation generates the behavior without requiring explicit moral reasoning about rule violation.
This is where the custodianship question gets extra interesting. The institutions that professional communities enter have been built by and for people with specific tacit formations. The white shoe firms were built by and for WASP Protestant men whose tacit formation included specific intuitions about financial relationships, about the boundary between institutional and personal interests, about what counted as legitimate and illegitimate advantage-seeking, and about the relationship between individual and collective reputation. Those intuitions were not formulated as explicit rules in the first instance. They were the tacit common ground that made the explicit rules legible and enforceable. When you enter the institution, you are not simply agreeing to follow a list of rules. You are entering an environment whose moral grammar is embedded in a specific tacit formation that may or may not be continuous with the tacit formation you bring from your community of origin.
The Jewish entry into the white shoe firms, and more broadly into American professional institutions, involved a specific negotiation of this tacit moral grammar question. The firms that remained explicitly Anglo-Protestant used their admissions and partnership decisions to exclude people whose tacit formation they regarded as incompatible with the institutional moral culture. The firms that opened to Jewish partners, and later the firms that were founded primarily by Jewish lawyers or financiers, had to develop explicit rules to substitute for the tacit common ground that the WASP formation had provided. This is the origin of the specific culture of explicit compliance that characterizes American financial and legal institutions today, the dense network of explicit rules, monitoring systems, disclosure requirements, and formal conflict of interest protocols that substitute for the tacit moral grammar that a more homogeneous institutional culture could have taken for granted.
Alliance Theory adds a dimension here that neither Turner’s tacit knowledge framework nor the custodianship argument captures fully on its own. The question of which community’s moral grammar governs behavior in mixed institutions is not decided by philosophical argument about which moral grammar is objectively superior. It is decided by the same alliance formation logic that Pinsof documents in political belief systems. The dominant coalition within an institution defines what counts as legitimate behavior, and it does so partly through the explicit rules it promulgates but primarily through the tacit enforcement mechanisms of reputation, social approval, and institutional advancement. The WASP firms did not primarily exclude Jews through explicit antisemitic rules. They excluded Jews through the tacit enforcement of a moral grammar that valued specific forms of social behavior, specific relationships with clients, specific attitudes toward institutional reputation, that Jewish entrants did not share and that could not be easily articulated as explicit criteria without appearing arbitrary or discriminatory.
The custodianship question this raises is therefore not simply who has the right to transmit a tradition but who has the right to define what counts as legitimate behavior in a mixed institutional environment. When the white shoe firms admitted Jewish partners, they were not simply welcoming individual talented lawyers. They were introducing into the institution people whose tacit formation generated different intuitions about legitimate behavior in specific situations. The negotiation of this difference, which was never fully explicit because the most important dimensions of it were tacit rather than articulable, is one of the most important and least examined dimensions of the Jewish entry into American professional institutions.
The Novick dimension adds the most specifically Jewish content to this analysis. Throughout That Noble Dream Novick documents specific cases where Jewish scholars in the American historical profession operated according to moral intuitions that were not congruent with the profession’s stated norms. The most important of these involves what he documents about letters of recommendation, where established scholars used explicitly racialized language about Jewish candidates, and about the specific ways that Jewish scholars navigated the profession’s claims to objectivity while pursuing specifically Jewish political and communal interests. What is notable about these cases is not that Jewish scholars were uniquely dishonest. It is that the profession’s stated norms of objectivity and scholarly disinterestedness were themselves a specific moral grammar that reflected the tacit formation of the WASP Protestant scholars who had built the profession, and that those norms were applied selectively in ways that reflected the coalition interests of the dominant group even when they were being nominally applied universally.
The test-gaming question (in my Protestant upbringing, prepping for the SAT was considered not sporting) is therefore not primarily about honesty and dishonesty in any simple sense. It is about the collision between different moral grammars in situations where the rules of the game have been set by one community and are being navigated by members of other communities who have different tacitintuitions about what counts as legitimate and illegitimate behavior. Different communities have developed different strategies for navigating this collision, and those strategies reflect the specific character of the tacit formation each community brings.
The East Asian test-gaming patterns are analytically similar to the Jewish chevrusa pattern even though the specific content is different. East Asian educational cultures in South Korea, China, and Japan developed specific practices around competitive examination that involved forms of cooperation and information sharing that Western educational institutions define as cheating but that make complete sense within the moral grammar of communities where family and community investment in education is understood as a collective rather than an individual enterprise. When students from these communities enter Western educational institutions, they bring tacit intuitions about what counts as legitimate and illegitimate advantage-seeking that are not congruent with the institution’s rules, and the navigation of this incongruence produces behaviors that the institution designates as cheating even when the students understand themselves as acting in accordance with legitimate obligations to their families and communities.
The custodianship problem operates at the level of moral grammar as well as at the level of cultural content. Previous cases in my analysis focused primarily on what is gained and lost when the custodians of a literary or historical tradition change. They examined whether the non-Christian custodians can fully inhabit the Christian tradition they are transmitting, whether the formation required to transmit it faithfully is continuous with the new custodians’ formation, and what is lost when it is not. This a different dimension. The question is not only whether new custodians can transmit an existing tradition faithfully. It is whether the moral grammar that the new custodians bring is compatible with the institutional culture that the existing tradition requires for its operation.
This is where the white shoe firm observation is most analytically precise. The white shoe firms were not simply custodians of a legal tradition in the content sense. They were custodians of a specific moral culture, a specific set of tacit intuitions about the relationship between professionals, clients, and institutions, that was embedded in a specific community’s formation and that required that formation for its reproduction. When the firms opened to members of other communities, they were not simply diversifying their cultural content. They were introducing people whose tacit moral grammar was different in specific ways, and the institutional response, the proliferation of explicit rules and compliance systems, was an attempt to substitute explicit moral specification for the tacit moral common ground that homogeneous formation had previously provided.
The loss in this substitution is real and analytically important for the custodianship question. A moral culture that operates primarily through explicit rules and monitoring systems is different from a moral culture that operates primarily through tacit formation and social enforcement. The explicit rule culture is in some ways more legible and more formally equitable because it applies the same articulated standards to everyone regardless of their formation. It is in other ways less robust because explicit rules can be gamed in ways that tacit formation resists. The person who has internalized a moral culture’s tacit formation does not need explicit rules to know when she is violating its spirit even when her behavior is technically within its letter. The person operating primarily through explicit rule-following can comply with every specific rule while violating the spirit of the moral culture those rules were designed to express.
The yeshiva student who shares test answers may be violating the test’s explicit rules while acting in accordance with the spirit of the culture his formation has given him. The student who games a standardized test through intensive drilling on format-specific strategies that have no relationship to the underlying knowledge being measured may be technically complying with every explicit rule while violating the spirit of the assessment’s purpose. Both behaviors reflect the navigation of a situation where the explicit rules of an institution are not congruent with the moral grammar of the community navigating them, and both are therefore better understood as instances of the custodianship problem than as simple cases of dishonesty.
The most honest conclusion is that what is at stake is not only the transmission of cultural content but the transmission of moral grammar, and that the replacement of tacit moral formation by explicit rule systems, which is one of the consequences of institutions becoming diverse in their membership, involves real gains and real losses in exactly the same structure as the other custodianship changes.
The gains from the replacement of tacit moral formation by explicit rules are real. Explicit rules are more formally equitable, more legible to people who lack the specific formation that made the tacit moral culture intelligible, and more accountable to external scrutiny. They make the institution’s moral culture available to people who were previously excluded from it by the exclusion of their community rather than by any deficiency in their individual moral character.
The losses are equally real. Explicit rule systems are more gameable than tacit moral cultures, less robust against the sophisticated exploitation of the gap between rule compliance and spirit adherence, and less capable of generating the moral formation that makes institutional culture something more than a compliance exercise. The dense network of compliance systems, disclosure requirements, and monitoring mechanisms that characterizes contemporary American financial and professional institutions is both the product of the diversification of those institutions and a less robust moral culture than the tacit formation of the communities that originally built them, whatever the other deficiencies of those communities and whatever the gains from their diversification.
This is the custodianship question at a fundamental level. Every institution that has been built by and for a specific community embeds in its culture the tacit moral grammar of that community. When the institution’s membership diversifies, the tacit moral grammar must either be explicitly articulated and enforced, which transforms it into something different and less robust, or it must be abandoned and replaced by an explicit rule system that cannot fully substitute for what it replaced. The choice between these options is never fully explicit because the most important dimensions of the problem are tacit rather than articulable, and the outcome is always a loss of something that the previous culture provided alongside a gain in the formal equity and accessibility that the diversification produces.
The most famous case of the spirit versus letter problem in American financial history is the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. The old savings and loan culture had been built by men who knew their depositors personally, who had attended the same churches, who belonged to the same civic organizations, and who understood their fiduciary obligations through a tacit moral grammar rooted in community membership rather than regulatory compliance. When deregulation opened the industry to new entrants who lacked this formation, the explicit rules that remained were gamed. Charles Keating at Lincoln Savings is the paradigmatic case. He did not simply violate explicit rules, though he did that too. He operated in the gap between the letter of the regulations and the spirit of the moral culture those regulations had been designed to express, and he did so with considerable sophistication because he understood the explicit rules well enough to find the gaps while having no formation in the tacit moral culture that the gaps had previously been filled by. The depositors who lost their savings were overwhelmingly elderly people who had trusted Lincoln Savings because it looked like the institution they had dealt with all their lives. What they had encountered was a formal shell of that institution populated by people whose relationship to its moral culture was purely technical.
A second documented case involves the transformation of the major accounting firms in the 1980s and 1990s. The old accounting culture, whatever its limitations and its self-serving dimensions, operated according to a tacit moral grammar that understood the accountant’s primary obligation as being to the public rather than to the client. This was not primarily an explicit rule. It was a professional formation that the major firms transmitted through apprenticeship, through the specific character of the mentorship relationships between senior and junior accountants, through the social enforcement mechanisms of a relatively small and relatively homogeneous professional community where reputation was a constraint on behavior. The rapid expansion of the big accounting firms, their diversification in every sense, and their transformation into full-service professional services firms generated an explicit rule culture that replaced the tacit formation and that proved considerably more gameable. The Enron collapse and Arthur Andersen’s destruction are the documented consequences. The partners who signed off on Enron’s accounting were not people who had abandoned a formation they once possessed. They were people who had been formed in a compliance culture rather than a professional culture and who understood their obligations primarily through explicit rules rather than through tacit moral intuitions about what their role required.
The Glass-Steagall separation between commercial and investment banking, enacted in 1933 and repealed in 1999, is a third documented case that illuminates what was lost from a slightly different angle. Glass-Steagall was a legislative response to the discovery that the tacit moral grammar of the banking profession had not survived the transformation of American banking from a community-based institution into a national industry. The explicit rule that commercial banks could not engage in investment banking substituted a legal prohibition for the tacitformation that had previously generated something resembling that prohibition through professional culture. When Glass-Steagall was repealed on the argument that the explicit prohibition was no longer necessary because the industry had developed sufficient internal culture to manage conflicts of interest without legal mandates, the argument proved wrong because it mistook the presence of explicit compliance systems for the presence of the tacit moral formation that Glass-Steagall had been substituted for. The 2008 financial crisis is the consequence.
Now move to the chevrusa and test-gaming dimension with documented cases.
The history of standardized testing in the United States is full of documented cases of communities developing systematic strategies for gaming the format of tests in ways that are technically within the rules but that violate the spirit of the assessment. The SAT coaching industry, which grew from essentially nothing in the 1950s to a multi-billion dollar enterprise by the 1990s, is the most documented case. The test was designed by its creators at ETS on the assumption that it measured something relatively stable and relatively immune to short-term coaching, an assumption that reflected the tacit moral grammar of the psychometric professionals who built it. The explicit rules of the SAT did not prohibit coaching. The moral grammar of the testing profession assumed that extensive format-specific coaching was not something students or families would do, or if they did, that its effects would be minimal. When it became clear that format-specific coaching could reliably raise scores by substantial amounts, the testing professionals found that they had built an assessment whose explicit rules permitted behavior that violated its spirit, and they had no recourse because the spirit was tacit rather than codified.
The specific communities that most aggressively developed test coaching strategies were disproportionately those whose tacit formation included a specific understanding of competitive examination as a domain where collective family and community investment was legitimate and expected. The Korean hagwon industry, which by the 1990s had become a massive infrastructure of after-school test preparation academies, reflected a tacit moral grammar in which intensive preparation for competitive examinations was understood as a legitimate collective enterprise rather than an individual performance. The SAT was not designed with this moral grammar in mind and the explicit rules it operated by could not distinguish between the individual preparation its creators assumed and the intensive collective preparation that the hagwon model provided.
A documented case from the Jewish community specifically involves the history of New York City’s specialized high schools and their relationship to test preparation. Stuyvesant, Bronx Science, and Brooklyn Technical high schools admit students exclusively through a single examination, the Specialized High Schools Admissions Test, and the competition for admission has been extraordinarily intense for decades. The Jewish community in New York, particularly the Orthodox community, developed extensive networks of test preparation that reflected the tacit moral grammar of a community where educational achievement was a collective communal value rather than an individual performance. The chevrusa dimension is present in specific ways, including the sharing of previous year test questions, the development of community-based study groups, and the understanding that preparing for a competitive examination was an enterprise in which the community’s resources were legitimately deployed. None of this violated explicit rules. All of it reflected a tacit moral grammar that was different from the tacit moral grammar of the test’s designers, who assumed that preparation would be primarily individual and primarily based on the curriculum knowledge the test was designed to measure.
Now move to fictional illustrations, clearly labeled as such, that develop dimensions of the problem where the empirical record is thinner.
Fictional illustration one, on what is lost in the transition from tacit to explicit moral culture.
Imagine a mid-sized law firm in Philadelphia in 1955, founded and led by men from similar Protestant backgrounds who had attended the same universities and belonged to the same clubs. The firm has no written policy about client entertainment. It has no explicit rule about the gifts partners may accept from clients. It has no formal procedure for managing conflicts of interest when two clients’ interests diverge. None of these things need to be written down because the tacit formation of everyone in the firm generates reliable common intuitions about where the lines are. A partner who accepted a significant personal gift from a client would not need to be told explicitly that this was wrong. He would feel it as wrong in the same way that he would feel it was wrong to use a client’s inside information for personal stock purchases, not because he had memorized a rule against it but because his formation had given him a sensibility that generated the right intuitions automatically. When the firm begins admitting partners from different backgrounds, starting with Jewish lawyers in the early 1960s and expanding from there, the partners from the original formation discover that certain things they had always assumed went without saying do not in fact go without saying. Not because the new partners are dishonest, but because their formation has generated different intuitions about where exactly the lines fall. A partner whose formation included a more fluid understanding of the relationship between professional and personal dealings with business associates does not immediately recognize the gift prohibition because his formation has not generated a tacit intuition that marks it as obviously wrong. The response of the firm is to write things down. The partner handbook grows from twelve pages to eighty to two hundred. The compliance system is built. The monitoring begins. The firm is now technically more rigorous about its ethics than it was in 1955. It is also, in a specific and important sense, less ethical, because the explicit compliance culture that has replaced the tacit formation produces partners who understand their ethical obligations as a set of rules to be followed rather than as a formation to be inhabited, and rules can be followed in ways that violate their spirit in ways that tacit formation resists.
Fictional illustration two, on the chevrusa collision with institutional expectations.
Imagine a talented young man, call him David, who has grown up in an Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn and who has been formed in a learning culture where chevrusa study is the natural and obvious way to approach any intellectual challenge. He enters a competitive pre-medical program at a large university in the early 1980s. His first organic chemistry examination is approaching and he organizes a study group with three other students from his community. The four of them work through the practice problems together, explain their reasoning to each other, correct each other’s errors, and develop a shared understanding of the material. The evening before the examination they work through the previous year’s examination together, sharing the questions that one of them has obtained from an older student. This feels entirely natural to David. It is how learning works. It is how he has approached every intellectual challenge since he was old enough to sit at a table and open a Gemara. The examination the next day is taken individually and David performs well. His professor notices that several students from the same community produced very similar patterns of errors and very similar patterns of correct answers and suspects collaboration. The collision that follows is tragic rather than simply disciplinary because it is a collision between two moral frameworks rather than between honesty and dishonesty. David is not a cheater in any sense that his formation recognizes. He is a student who prepared for an examination in the way his formation tells him intelligent and serious students prepare for examinations. The professor is not wrong to identify that something has violated the spirit of individual assessment. The institution’s explicit rules against collaboration during the examination itself were not violated. The tacit assumption that preparation would be individual was violated. Neither party has the analytical framework to understand what has happened.
Fictional illustration three, on the specific losses in legal and financial professional culture.
Imagine a Wall Street firm in 1970 that has just admitted its first Jewish partners after decades of operating as an exclusively WASP institution. The WASP partners have a tacit understanding about analyst research that no one has ever written down because it has never needed to be written down. Research reports are not published until the analyst is confident in his conclusions. The firm’s reputation for careful, conservative research is an asset whose value depends on maintaining standards that the explicit rules do not specify. The Jewish partners who join the firm are highly talented and motivated. But their formation has given them a slightly different intuition about the relationship between individual achievement and institutional reputation. In the community they come from, individual accomplishment has been the primary route to status in a world that has not always been willing to extend institutional credit to Jews, and the result is a formation that places somewhat more emphasis on individual achievement metrics and somewhat less on the maintenance of institutional standards whose value is diffuse and long-term. This is not dishonesty. It is a different tacit moral grammar operating on the same explicit rules and generating slightly different behaviors. The research reports begin to come out a little faster, the confidence thresholds shift slightly, the individual analyst’s career interest in being first with a recommendation begins to compete slightly more with the institutional interest in being right rather than first. No explicit rule is violated. The tacit moral culture that the explicit rules were designed to express is being imperceptibly eroded. Twenty years later the firm has a compliance department that would have been unimaginable in 1970. The explicit rules are tighter than they have ever been. The tacit moral culture that made the explicit rules workable is gone.
Fictional illustration four, on what is gained.
Imagine the same Philadelphia law firm in 1965, five years after it has begun admitting Jewish partners. A client comes to the firm with a case involving discrimination against an employee on the basis of religion. The WASP partners look at the case and calculate that it is not winnable, that the legal framework for religious discrimination claims is weak, and that the firm’s conservative client base would be made uncomfortable by the firm’s involvement in a discrimination case. They decline the matter. The Jewish partner who has recently joined the firm looks at the same case and sees something the WASP partners cannot see, not because he is more talented but because his formation has given him a specific sensitivity to the experience of institutional exclusion that the WASP partners, who have never experienced it, simply do not have. He recognizes in the client’s experience something that his own community has navigated for generations, and he brings to the analysis of the legal framework a moral urgency rooted in personal and communal formation that generates a different and more creative legal analysis. He takes the case, develops arguments that the WASP partners would not have developed, and wins. The firm is better for his presence in a way that the explicit diversity rationale, which speaks of broadening the talent pool and expanding the client base, does not adequately capture. What the firm has gained is a specific angle of vision, rooted in a specific formation, that the WASP partners’ formation could not generate. This is the gift of the outsider’s perspective operating in a legal rather than a literary or historical context, and it is as real as the loss of the tacit moral culture that the firm’s diversification has begun to erode.
Fictional illustration five, on the internal Jewish version of the same problem.
Imagine an Orthodox Jewish day school in the 1990s that has developed a highly effective test preparation program for the specialized high school admissions test. The program draws on the chevrusa tradition, on the community’s emphasis on collective educational investment, and on the specific culture of intellectual competition that the yeshiva environment has cultivated for generations. The students who go through the program gain admission to Stuyvesant and Bronx Science at rates that are far above the community’s proportion of the applicant pool. The program’s director is proud of this. He sees it as the application of a tradition of intellectual seriousness to the specific challenges of secular educational competition. What he does not fully see, because his formation has not given him the tools to see it, is that the program is also teaching his students a specific relationship to institutional rules that will create problems for them later. The students are learning to find the gap between explicit rule and tacit expectation, to maximize performance within the letter of the rules regardless of the spirit, and to understand competitive examinations as a domain where collective community resources are legitimately deployed. These habits of mind, which serve them well in the specific domain of high school admissions testing, will create specific difficulties when they enter professional environments where the gap between rule and expectation is patrolled by a different community’s tacit moral grammar and where the violations they do not recognize as violations will be recognized immediately by the people around them.
The custodianship problem operates not only at the level of cultural content but at the level of moral grammar, and the replacement of tacit moral formation by explicit rule systems is a form of custodianship change with its own specific gains and losses. The gains are real, including formal equity, accessibility, the elimination of exclusions based on community membership, and the introduction of outsider perspectives that generate insights the insider formation cannot produce. The losses are equally real, including the erosion of tacit moral cultures that were more robust against gaming than the explicit systems that replaced them, the replacement of formation-based moral intuition by rule-based compliance, and the creation of environments where the gap between rule and expectation generates systematic friction between communities whose moral grammars are not congruent.
The most honest single conclusion the examples support is not about the moral superiority of any race. It is about the specific friction that arises when communities with different tacit moral grammars inhabit the same institutions, and about the specific ways in which that friction is managed, mismanaged, and occasionally resolved. The chevrusa tradition produced both the behavior many find troubling and the specific intellectual virtues that made Jewish scholars disproportionately valuable in the institutions they entered. Both came from the same formation. You cannot take the gifts without the friction, and the honest custodianship analysis requires acknowledging both with equal precision.
