Ghettoside: A True Story of Murder in America

Jill Leovy writes in this 2015 book:

* [John] Skaggs had been a homicide detective for twenty years. In that time, he had been in a thousand living rooms like this one—each with its large TV, Afrocentric knickknacks, and imponderable grief.

* Skaggs, like most LAPD cops, was a Republican.

* She lived in a federally subsidized rental apartment, and she was a Democrat who would weep in front of CNN later that fall when Barack Obama won the presidential election, wishing her mother were still alive to see it.

* Homicide had ravaged the country’s black population for a century or more. But it was at best a curiosity to the mainstream.

* They [black men] were the nation’s number one crime victims. They were the people hurt most badly and most often, just 6 percent of the country’s population but nearly 40 percent of those murdered. People talked a lot about crime in America, but they tended to gloss over this aspect—that a plurality of those killed were not women, children, infants, elders, nor victims of workplace or school shootings. Rather, they were legions of America’s black men, many of them unemployed and criminally involved. They were murdered every day, in every city, their bodies stacking up by the thousands, year after year.

* According to the old unwritten code of the Los Angeles Police Department, Dovon’s was a nothing murder. “NHI—No Human Involved,” the cops used to say. It was only the newest shorthand for the idea that murders of blacks somehow didn’t count. “ Nigger life’s cheap now,” a white Tennessean offered during Reconstruction, when asked to explain why black-on-black killing drew so little notice.
A congressional witness a few years later reported that when black men in Louisiana were killed, “ a simple mention is made of it, perhaps orally or in print, and nothing is done. There is no investigation made.” A late-nineteenth-century Louisiana newspaper editorial said, “If negroes continue to slaughter each other, we will have to conclude that Providence has chosen to exterminate them in this way.” In 1915, a South Carolina official explained the pardon of a black man who had killed another black: “ This is a case of one negro killing another—the old familiar song.” In 1930s Mississippi, the anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker examined the workings of criminal justice and concluded that “the attitude of the Whites and of the courts … is one of complaisance toward violence among the Negroes.” Studying Natchez, Mississippi, in the same period, a racially mixed team of social anthropologists observed that “the injury or death of a Negro is not considered by the whites to be a serious matter.” An Alabama sheriff of the era was more concise: “ One less nigger,” he said. In 1968, a New York journalist testifying as part of the Kerner Commission’s investigation of riots across the country said that “for decades, little if any law enforcement enforcement has prevailed among Negroes in America.… If a black man kills a black man, the law is generally enforced at its minimum.”
Carter Spikes, once a member of the black Businessman Gang in South Central Los Angeles, recalled that through the seventies police “didn’t care what black people did to each other. A nigger killing another nigger was no big deal.”

* John Skaggs stood in opposition to this inheritance. His whole working life was devoted to one end: making black lives expensive. Expensive, and worth answering for, with all the force and persistence the state could muster. Skaggs had treated the murder of Dovon Harris like the hottest celebrity crime in town. He had applied every resource he possessed, worked every angle of the system, and solved it swiftly, unequivocally.

* America has long been more violent than other developed nations, and black-on-black homicide is much of the reason. This is not new. Measurements are problematic, since few official efforts were made to track black homicide before 1950. But historians have traced disproportionately high black homicide rates all the way back to the late nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth, “nonwhite” homicide rates exceeded those of whites in all cities that reported federal data. In the 1920s, a scholar concluded that black death rates from homicide nationwide were about seven times white rates. In the 1930s, Southern observers also noticed startling rates of black violence, and in the 1940s, a Philadelphia study found that black men died from homicide at twelve times the white rate. When the U.S. government began publishing data specific to blacks in 1950, it revealed that same gap nationwide. The black homicide death rate remained as much as ten times higher than the white rate in 1960 and 1970, and has been five to seven times higher for most of the past thirty years.
Mysteriously, in modern-day Los Angeles, young black men are murdered two to four times more frequently than young Hispanic men, though blacks and Hispanics live in the same neighborhoods. This stands out because L.A., unlike well-known murder centers such as Detroit, has a relatively small black population, and it is in decline. By Skaggs’s time, there were few solidly black neighborhoods left; most black residents of South Los Angeles lived in majority-Hispanic neighborhoods. Yet black men died here as they died in cities with large and concentrated black populations, like New Orleans, Washington, D.C., and Chicago—more often than anyone else, and nearly always at the hands of black assailants. In L.A., it was strange how all those bullets seemed to find their black targets in such an ethnically jumbled place; it was, as one young man put it, as if black men had bull’s-eyes on their backs.
Violent crime was plummeting in Los Angeles County, as it was across the country, by the spring of 2007, when Dovon Harris was murdered. But the disparity between black male death rates and those of everybody else remained nearly as large as ever. No matter how much crime dropped, the American homicide problem remained maddeningly, mystifyingly, disproportionately black.

* Despite so much evidence of a particularly black homicide problem, however, there was relatively little research or activism specific to black-on-black murder. That gruesome history of Southern racism made the topic an uncomfortable one for many Americans. One of the enduring tropes of racist lore had been the “black beast,” the inferior black man who could not control his impulses and was prone to violence. By the early twenty-first century, popular consensus held that any emphasis on high rates of black criminality risked invoking the stigma of white racism. So people were careful about how they spoke of it.
Researchers describe skirting the subject for fear of being labeled racist. Activists have sought to minimize it. “When the discussion turns to violent crime,” legal scholar James Forman, Jr., has pointed out, “ progressives tend to avoid or change the subject.” Privately, some black civil-rights advocates describe feeling embarrassed and baffled by the stubborn persistence of the problem. “Like incest,” is how one L.A. street activist, Najee Ali, put it, talking of the shame and secrecy the issue evokes. Other concerned blacks cite their fear of inflaming white racism: Why emphasize what seems sure to be used against them?
Yet the statistical truth was undeniable, and most Americans understood it intuitively even if they didn’t talk about it in polite company.

* Randall Kennedy: “It does no good to pretend that blacks and whites are similarly situated with respect to either rates of perpetration or rates of victimization. They are not,” Kennedy wrote. “The familiar dismal statistics and the countless tragedies behind them are not figments of some Negrophobe’s imagination.”

* Black humor helped. But it still got to him—the him—the attitude of black residents down here. They were shooting each other but still seemed to think the police were the problem. “Po-Po , ” they sneered. Once, De La Rosa had to stand guard over the body of a black man until paramedics arrived. An angry crowd closed in on him, accusing him of disrespecting the murdered man’s body. Some of them tried to drag the corpse away. The police used an official term for this occasional hazard: “lynching.” Some felt uncomfortable saying it. They associated the word with the noose, not the mobs that once yanked people from police to kill or rescue them. De La Rosa held back the crowd. “You don’t care because he’s a black man!” someone yelled. De La Rosa was stunned. Why did they think race was a part of this? Sometimes, in the Seventy-seventh, De La Rosa had the sense that he was no longer in America. As if he had pulled off the freeway into another world.

* To other cops, ghettoside was where patrol cars were dinged, computer keyboards sticky, workdays long, and staph infections antibiotic-resistant. To work down there was to feel a sense of futility, forgo promotions, and deal with all those stressful, dreary, depressing problems poor black people had. But to Skaggs, ghettoside was the place to be, the place where there was real work to be done. He radiated contentment as he worked its streets. He wheeled down filthy alleys in his crisp shirts and expensive ties, always rested, his sedan always freshly washed and vacuumed.

* The qualities that make great homicide detectives are different from the qualities that make great patrol cops. But they are related. Wally Tennelle had a baseline of attributes that steer many young people toward police work. Although he was not college-educated, he was smart and energetic. Police work can be a haven for brainy, action-oriented people who do not, for some reason, gravitate toward formal education—the type afflicted with what DeeDee Tennelle diagnosed in her whole family as “a touch of ADD.”
It made them uniquely suited for a job that was carried out almost entirely out of doors and involved sleepless nights, relentless bursts of activity, and the ability to move from one situation to the next quickly without leaving too much behind. A great cop—or a great detective—needed to be smart and quick, but not necessarily bookish or terribly analytical. A good memory, a talent for improvisation, a keen interest in people, and a buoyancy of spirit—one had to like “capering”—ensured that the hyperactive flourished in a job that left others wilting with stress.

* “Nobody cares” was a universal lament south of the Ten during the Big Years, and for many years after.

[LF: Were the accomplishments of those who died sufficient for wider society to mourn them? You can’t expect out-groups to care about you just because you once breathed.]

* Very few murders were covered in the media. Television stations covered more than the papers, but without any particular consistency, and many, many deaths received no mention by any media outlet, especially if the victims were black. It rankled deeply. The lack of media coverage seemed to convey that black-on-black homicide was “small potatoes” in the eyes of the world, said a father who lost a daughter. “Nothing on the news!” a mother cried, weeping, at the sight of a journalist the day after her son was murdered. “ Please write about it! Please!”

* “I remember a banner headline in the Los Angeles Times one weekend,” recalled a detective named Paul Mize. “A bomb in Beirut had killed six people. We had nine murders that weekend, and not a one of them made the paper. Not one.”

* But to brass, detective work was “strictly reactive,” as one high-ranking officer called it, dismissing the whole function. Crime prevention was seen as more progressive, and so competing priorities always seemed to win out over investigations: preventive patrol projects, gang sweeps. “Just all upside down,” said a Newton homicide detective named Johnny Villa.
Law, of course, isn’t like hygiene, and crime “prevention” inevitably leads to stereotyping people as potential threats. But “proactive” patrol work sounded better. Prevention carried an added bonus, as legal scholar Carol Steiker has noted: it gave police wide latitude, since the Constitution places many constraints on legal procedure after a crime, far fewer before it.

* The smallest ghettoside spat seemed to escalate to violence, as if absent law, people were left with no other means of bringing a dispute to a close. Debts and competition over goods and women—especially women—drove many killings. But insults, snitching, drunken antics, and the classic—unwanted party guests—also were common homicide motives. Small conflicts divided people into hostile camps and triggered lasting feuds. Every grudge seemed to harbor explosive potential. It would ignite when antagonists met by chance, gunfire erupting in streets or liquor stores. Vengeance was a staple motive. In some circles, retaliation for murder was considered all but mandatory. It was striking how openly people discussed it, even debating the merits from the pulpit at funerals.

* When the Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal studied the black South in the 1940s, he found that, despite rampant complaints about law enforcement, black Southerners everywhere also said they wanted more policing—to protect them from other black people.

* Wally Tennelle was idiosyncratic, even a little radical. He lived in the Seventy-seventh Division.
Among LAPD officers, the proscription against living in the city of Los Angeles went without saying. It was something that had long annoyed various liberal critics of the department. For years, most officers in the department had refused to live in the city they policed and instead commuted into the city from distant suburbs. They formed little red-state bastions sprinkled around the five-county area of Southern California—Santa Clarita and Simi Valley to the north, Chino and as far as Temecula to the east, and Orange County to the south. But with a few exceptions, such as San Pedro, a historic enclave of ethnic whites, Los Angeles was considered off-limits, the length and breadth of this beautiful city disdained by its police.

* Watts claimed an equal share of the city’s best attributes. It was Mediterranean and golden, with air that was soft in summer and crisp in winter. Gardens there burst with bird-of-paradise flowers and purple-blooming jacarandas. Palm trees lined streets, their glossy fronds flashing in the sun. There were still paddocks in Compton and a stable in Athens, and people rode horses up the grassy median of Broadway. They sat on couches on front porches, barbecued in their driveways on summer evenings as their children played.
The setting made much of the literature about the urban “underclass” based on observations in places such as Philadelphia, Baltimore, and the Bronx seem like some dark fantasy. A foreign visitor in 2008 said she was surprised by the pleasant surroundings; referencing George Kelling and James Q. Wilson’s famous essay, she noted that there were no broken windows at all.

* Only people who weren’t familiar with this kind of “inner-city” environment would attribute its problems to alienation or lack of community solidarity. The truth was that “community spirit” in the sense of both local pride and connections among neighbors was far more in evidence in Watts than elsewhere. It was one of the defining aspects of the ghettoside setting: a substantial portion of the area’s residents were related to each other through extended family ties, marriage, or other intimate connections. Relatives who were only nominally related by blood often saw each other daily, ate together, celebrated together, quarreled and comforted each other. They shared food, money, and living quarters.
They raised each other’s children. They traded off transportation and housework… In contrast to wealthier neighborhoods, where most people worked at day jobs and neighbors knew each other in passing or not at all, the unemployed people of these places were home all day, hanging out together, confined to a few blocks.

* Among officers in the division, the company line was that most of South Bureau’s population were “good people.” But a minority—some cops put it at 1 percent, some as high as 15 percent—were “knuckleheads.” This term referred to unemployed, criminally involved men, and gang members, especially black ones.
Blacks “could better their lives, but they don’t,” said one officer of Hispanic ethnicity. “They love it. They love selling drugs. They love forcing old people out of their homes so they can sell drugs there.” Said a white officer: “The true victims are Hispanic. Black suspects prey on Hispanic victims.” There was plenty of Hispanic crime and “gang activity,” too. But the hard-core underclass in Watts was black, and it was impossible for patrol cops not to see that. All day long, their radios buzzed with familiar suspect descriptions. “Male black, five-six to six-two, eighteen to thirty-five, white shirt, black pants,” a gang officer intoned drily, reading aloud from a report in the Watts station one day. All the cops present laughed, for they all sought the same suspect. But even as officers laughed, some cops also searched their souls, trying to figure out how to accommodate their experiences at work with the antiracism they shared with most of their countrymen.
They sometimes wrestled with race in disarming ways. No one in the wider world seemed to want to talk about it, but black residents, to many officers, appeared more violent than Hispanics. Their own eyes told them so. Statistics backed them up. Few officers wanted to believe that black people were somehow intrinsically wired for violence.

* Nearly every official who dealt closely with crime in Watts felt the same way. “ They have their own businesses … their own law!” prosecutor Joe Porras said of the participants in the gang cases he tried in Compton Courthouse. “It’s a parallel world, and you are trying to bring your law into it.” Cops and prosecutors felt like door-to-door salesmen, trying to peddle a legal system no one wanted anything to do with.

* Compassionate by nature, Barling was unafraid to air his distress over the bloodshed in Watts. He was appalled by the Monster, tormented by what he perceived as the public’s indifference and political neglect, baffled by the black tilt to the stats. “It’s either society’s racism, or something is wrong with them—something wrong just with black people. And I don’t believe that!” Barling said, his voice rising in distress. “I believe we are all created equally, men, women, all races! That’s why I cannot buy that.”

* By the late twentieth century, the criminal justice system was no longer very corrupt. Many police and prosecutors were sincere and professional, and legal outcomes were relatively color-blind. But because the reach of the system was so limited, the results were similar to those produced by masquerade justice. Even when criminal justice procedures were clean and fair, violent-crime investigations remained too ineffective and threadbare to counter the scale of black-on-black murder.

* If you don’t incapacitate violent actors, they keep pushing people around until someone makes them stop. When violent people are permitted to operate with impunity, they get their way . Advantage tilts to them. Others are forced to do their bidding.
No amount of “community” feeling or activism can eclipse this dynamic. People often assert that the solution to homicide is for the so-called community to “step up.” It is a pernicious distortion. People like Jessica Midkiff cannot be expected to stand up to killers. They need safety, not stronger moral conviction. They need some powerful outside force to sweep in and take their tormentors away.

* Her parents had split while Jessica was young, and she said that an abusive stepfather had raped her repeatedly. By the time she was eleven, she was performing oral sex for cash, food, and clothes. She was turning tricks in cars by fourteen.
Prostitutes such as Midkiff are effectively slaves. But they tend to spin a narrative about their own lives that suggests more agency. Midkiff referred to various pimps over the years as “boyfriends.” Some were pimpier than others. In her mind, there existed the possibility of a man being “kind of like a pimp.” She had straight pimps who kept her with a stable of other prostitutes and appropriated all her earnings. She also had boyfriends like Derrick Starks, with whom she was paired as a couple but who also asked her to turn tricks now and then.
Her daughter’s father, who had gotten Jessica pregnant while she was a student at Washington High, had been one of the few men in her life who was not abusive and didn’t try to pimp her. But after his brother was murdered, he joined a gang and ended up in prison, she said.
While still an adolescent, Midkiff traveled as a prostitute. She worked in Los Angeles, Riverside, Las Vegas, and parts of Arizona. She worked Sunset Boulevard, peddling ten-minute intervals in cars: oral sex for $50, intercourse for $100, both for $150. She was hired by a professional football player and for pricey all-night parties, once earning $850 for a single trick. She’d also worked Figueroa Street—that dangerous bargain basement for prostitutes. You were down-and-out when you found yourself working the long murderous stretch that plunged southward along the Harbor Freeway. Years later, the thought of it still caused her to shudder. “I hate Figueroa,” she said.

* Prostitutes tended to be among the most dysfunctional people in the street environment, their problems intractable, their unreliability profound.

* Brent Josephson, the old ghettoside hand from the previous generation, had a memorable story from the peak years. It involved a scoop-and-carry homicide case in a park. Assigned after the fact, with the evidence cleared away and no witnesses, Josephson was standing helplessly at the scene, thinking he didn’t have a prayer of solving the case, when he noticed a skinny Hispanic youth in the distance. Josephson called out to him, thinking the kid might have some pointers. Thunderstruck, the young man hung his head and shuffled over. “You got me,” he told Josephson, and proceeded to confess. The specter of an LAPD detective beckoning from across the park had apparently been too much for him. It was like a summons from God.

* “As homicide creeps up, witness cooperation drops off,” he said. A feedback loop exists between murder rates and ambient fear;

* For the city of L.A., it is clear that demographic change is an important driver. The city’s black population is fast disappearing: black Angelenos were once nearly a fifth of the city’s population, but they made up a scant 9 percent in the 2010 census. Their numbers have been dropping steadily each year as the city’s black residents scatter to the exurbs. To some extent, their high homicide rates travel with them.

* enrollment of working-age African Americans in SSI in 2009 was nearly twice their representation in the population, and African American children made up nearly one-third of SSI recipients age fifteen to seventeen.

* Money translates to autonomy. Economic autonomy is like legal autonomy. It helps break apart homicidal enclaves by reducing interdependence and lowering the stakes of conflicts. The many indigent black men who now report themselves to be “on disability”—many of them with mental disabilities, such as ADD and bipolar disorder—signal an unprecedented income stream for a population that once suffered near-absolute economic marginalization. An eight-hundred-dollar-a-month check for an unemployed black ex-felon makes a big difference in his life. The risks and benefits of various hustles surely appear different to him. He can move, ditch his homeys, commit fewer crimes, walk away from more fights. Doubtless many people will criticize this trend and decry the expense of SSI. But this author can’t condemn a program that appears to have saved so many from being murdered or maimed.

* Another factor reducing murder rates is a bleak one—large numbers of black men in prison. Imprisonment brings down homicide rates because it keeps black men safe, and they are far less likely to become victims in prison than outside it. California’s rate of imprisonment increased fivefold between 1972 and 2000. Homicide deaths among this largely black and Latino population of tens of thousands number just a handful per year. But this is, it need hardly be said, a rotten—and expensive—way to combat the problem. Other factors, such as the shift to cellphone sales of drugs, the abuse of legal pharmaceuticals, computer games that keep adolescents indoors, and the improved conduct of police (former chief Bernard Parks deserves much credit for the latter in L.A.), probably count, too.
People are much safer, on the whole, in America than they used to be, and this is good. But anyone who tracks homicide in L.A. County and elsewhere still can’t escape the obvious: black men remain disproportionately victimized.

Posted in Blacks, Los Angeles, Murder | Comments Off on Ghettoside: A True Story of Murder in America

Facebook & Twitter Censor New York Post Story On The Bidens

Here are some of the comments at Steve Sailer:

* “Why was it a good idea to set up a handful of zillionaire monopolists as the intermediaries between individuals and web content they want to access?”

The problem got its start a long time ago however, when people decided they wanted to use corporate chats like AOL Instant Messenger over IRC, web message boards and reddit over nntp/usenet, etc.

Facebook just took that trend and made it worse. And of course now people are moving from blogs to twitter, from e-mail to facebook messages.

The sad truth is, people want the zillionaire intermediaries. For one thing, they do a better job at blocking spam than e-mail and usenet.

People also seem to like “smart feeds” where they follow/friend 500 people, and the zillionaire’s algo picks and chooses for them what to display.

Finally there’s ease of use.

* Notice that the way the First Amendment is worded does not enumerate freedom of speech, assembly, press or religion as positive rights that people possess, but rather as activities which the Legislative branch of the national government may not regulate. If Bill of Rights author James Madison had meant to stipulate them as positive “rights” belonging to the citizenry all he had to do was write it that way, but he chose not to. In the next clause of the amendment, peaceful assembly and petitioning the government are clearly stated in Madison’s deliberate and careful legal language as rights (presumably inalienable) of the people.

In any case the first sentence of the amendment imposes no restrictions on the Judicial or Executive branches or on state governments or non-governmental entities concerning the stated “freedoms.”

* I’m a trial lawyer in NYC and pick juries all the time. I always ask prospective jurors where they like to get their news as a way to determine potential bias.

In the last 4-5 years, I was amazed at how many people respond that they get their news from Facebook. I have a Facebook account but rarely go on it. So was initially confused by these responses.

But the reality is that Facebook is the largest purveyor of news content in America now. To treat it as something different than a publisher is insanity.

Posted in Censorship | Comments Off on Facebook & Twitter Censor New York Post Story On The Bidens

War For Eternity: Inside Bannon’s Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers

From the European Conservative:

It has been nearly three years since Steve Bannon was pushed (or jumped) out of the Trump Administration. Since then, he has become something of a genre. In 2018, the documentary filmmaker Errol Morris (The Thin Blue Line, The Fog of War) released American Dharma, a film-length journey through Bannon’s mind. In 2019, filmmaker Alison Klayman released The Brink, a fly-on-the-wall look at Bannon’s attempt to cobble together a coalition of right-wing populists around the world to spearhead a global nationalist movement. And earlier this year, Harper Collins published Benjamin R. Teitelbaum’s War for Eternity: Inside Bannon’s Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers.

Unlike other ‘Bannon-watchers’—many of who seem unable to resist casting him as a Rasputin-like figure, while being simultaneously repulsed and fascinated by his insistence on speaking in symbolic and often apocalyptic terms—Teitelbaum approaches his subject from an unlikely angle. An assistant professor of ethnomusicology and international affairs at the University of Colorado Boulder, Teitelbaum has spent years developing relationships with those on the far right. His 2017 book, Lions of the North: Sounds of the New Nordic Radical Nationalism, focused on the right-wing fringe in the Nordic countries. In War for Eternity, he suggests that some of Steve Bannon’s views might be a lot weirder than most people realize. Specifically, Teitelbaum believes Bannon is a student of ‘Traditionalism.’…

Perhaps what is most refreshing about Teitelbaum’s work is that he is willing to enlighten where others are ready to condemn. “Studies of right-wing extremism are uncommon in the extent to which they thrive on conforming to readers’ stereotypes and expectations,” Teitelbaum told me. “The prevalent discourse among scholars and commentators to not normalize or platform the people we study, though motivated by legitimate concerns, also leaves little room for inquiry and education. I would like for all my work—including this book—to work against that instinct.”

In the case of War for Eternity, he says: “I offer a study that not only exposes thoroughly radical and disruptive visions for the future being pursued by figures with significant (if intangible) influence—[but] I hope that I have also shown the peculiarity of their lives and thinking, and provided an example of the ways that our old categories for thinking about politics—right, left, fascist, etc.—may not serve us well when trying to understand the actual ideas now infusing our governments. If concern and alarm as well as increased inquiry and reflection are the products of my book, I will have done my job.” By those metrics, Teitelbaum has certainly succeeded.

Here are some highlights from this 2020 book by Benjmain R. Teitelbaum:

* LATE IN THE EVENING ON NOVEMBER 8, 2016, A FEW hours’ drive away from the spot of Trump’s final rally in Grand Rapids, a young man named John B. Morgan walked into the bar of the Gandy Dancer restaurant perched on the banks of the Huron River in Ann Arbor, Michigan. John had been the founding editor in chief of a Traditionalist publishing house called Arktos. Now he worked for another
publisher, Counter-Currents, which was more plainly white nationalist than Traditionalist. It wasn’t a perfect fit for John, but nothing was.
John lived in Budapest, and India before that. But Ann Arbor still felt like home, and he was in the midst of a pilgrimage. This election was something special. Trump had no chance of winning, he thought.
And John couldn’t really call himself a fan per se. But the fact was that someone who was less than
completely hostile to his ideals of white identity politics was in contention for the U.S. presidency. John
wanted to vote in person to commemorate that unbelievable state of affairs. This was a once-in-a
lifetime event.
He was meeting an old friend at the bar to watch the results that night. They were drinking beer, paying little attention to the TV screens showing CNN’s coverage of the vote. The hour arrived at and passed seven. They noticed when the states of Indiana and Kentucky were called for Trump. That was expected, but still, it was nice, John thought, to confirm that Trump had won something. Back to what their conversation: old jobs, old places, old people, old . . . shit!
Wolf Blitzer was saying on CNN that Trump was competitive. Of course he’s winning the southern states, and he’s leading in Florida. Hillary is struggling to wrap up Virginia. But the real battle is taking place around the Great Lakes, in America’s industrial region—the Rust Belt. He’s got a chance there.
Here.
Another round of beers. Blitzer was back on TV before long, interrupting their conversation. Trump is a favorite, even likely at this point. Was John drunk?
His friend had to work the next day, so they parted ways and John hustled back to the apartment where he was staying. He poured himself a Dark Horse beer and turned CNN back on. Trump was going to win. States including Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—his part of the country—were pivotal. He was thrilled, proud—full of solidarity with the working people of Michigan whom he’d lived among for so many years. He was jumpy, almost. For about thirty seconds.
Then a different sentiment washed over John. He took another deep draw of Dark Horse. “Now we actually have to do something.”
We? The alt-right, or whatever people are calling them. Those on the edges—the extremes rejected by mainstream conservatives—who dare to make politics an explicit fight for the fates of white people. If they had a role in electing Donald Trump, then they could also have a role in helping him govern. But they had a considerable resource on the inside. John thought to himself, There is this Bannon guy, I’ve been reading about him. He’s one of us! Maybe he’ll be sitting there in the White House, telling Trump Traditionalist ideas.
On that night in front of the television, John felt something he had never felt following U.S. politics: optimism. It was almost frightening, he later told me, and profoundly un-Traditionalist.

* Meanwhile, our night is drawing to a close. Darren Beattie and I are chatting. Prior to his days in the Trump administration, he was a philosophy professor, and we are talking about obscure authors we knew about.
“Do you know Michael Millerman? A Heidegger scholar, into Aleksandr Dugin,” Darren asked. I replied. “Yeah, yeah. I’ve read his stuff. Another guy I know from my research, his name is Jason Jorjani, he’s—”
A clatter. Did Steve just drop his silverware? That’s what it sounded like, but my eyes were turned away at that moment.
“How . . .” Steve is suddenly in our exchange, staring at me with a new intensity. “How do you know who Jason Jorjani is?”
“I know him from my past research,” I say, taken aback. “I know a lot of those guys.”
Bannon says nothing and turns back to peek at his cell phones. How does he know who Jason Jorjani i —an obscure intellectual moving in the darker corners of the far-right and associated with Arktos?

* Jason Reza Jorjani is the son of an American mother of Scandinavian and Irish ancestry and an Iranianexile father, and he grew up wealthy in New York. Most people who meet Jason comment on how young he looks for his thirty-eight years. His eyes are bright; his hair is full and youthful. His face is evidence of a gentle life.
But Jason had a vision, and he was willing to sacrifice for it. You could call it an Iranian nationalist vision, but that wouldn’t capture its fervor or eccentricity. He dreamed of a unified Aryan world where societies with Indo-European spiritual roots would mobilize as one to assume leadership in a new global order. This would include Buddhists in Japan; Hindus in India in the East; Europe and its satellites in North America; and Iranians—the fount of Zoroastrianism and its Shia Islamic incarnation —at the center. These are the great peoples, the superior civilizations best positioned to handle the challenges facing humanity and the world. The unification begins, Jason believes, with a cultural and political revolution in Iran aimed at returning the nation to its own roots and throwing off its allegiances toward Islamic counterparts in the Sunni world, followed by integration with its true spiritual brethren, the other Aryan states, including the U.S.
Jason talks big. At times it sounds fanciful and unserious, especially considering his background and
lack of direct contacts with government. He was a humanities professor at the New Jersey Institute of
Technology and a philosopher (he earned his doctorate in philosophy in 2013). He’s a writer, in other
words, not an official policy maker. However, his was a Traditionalist, Evolian vision, one that seeks to
base state formation and geopolitics on historical essences and spiritual roots, with not always veiled
allusions to racial determinism (Jason has discussed using eugenics programs to rid Iran’s population
of its Mongol genetic traces), not to mention a specific celebration of Indo-European spirituality and thehierarchical exaltation of “Aryans.” And this approach had a chance to be implemented in the brave
new world that emerged following the rise of Trump and the arrival of a Traditionalist in the White
House. At least Jason thought it had a chance. That is why he attempted a daring campaign that would bring him into partnership with parapsychological terrorists and international money launderers,
transform organized white nationalism, and eventually present a public relations hurdle for the Trump
administration.
On the phone, Jason began to tell me the story. He explained that in February 2016, well before the
presidential election in the United States, he had published a book arguing for the West to embrace the spiritual archetypes of its pre-Christian Greek heritage: Prometheus and Atlas—the same book that
Jason later asked me to give to Steve Bannon. In it, Jason claimed that reviving ancient spiritualities
would allow the West to not only escape dry rational modernism but even unleash repressed ways of
thinking and knowing—most specifically ESP and psychokinesis. He published the book through an
outlet he had just recently come to know: Arktos. Arktos was not only a controversial outlet but anunstable one. Its then editor in chief John Morgan warned him during the production phase of the bookthat interpersonal conflicts at Arktos were flaring and that his own ouster appeared imminent. Still,
Arktos was open to his commentary on psychic and telekinetic powers, and it turned out that this was aplus for both author and publisher. Prometheus and Atlas garnered an award from the American
Parapsychological Association.
However, you write a book on topics like these, and freaks of all kinds come out of the woodwork. By
mid-spring 2016, Jason was receiving emails hard and fast from people making outrageous claims
about their psychic abilities, professing to have unlocked secrets of the universe and to be
representatives of hidden orders. Some even threatened to attack Jason through parapsychological
means.

* A few months after his lunch with [Michael] Bagley, Jason would again be sitting in Persepolis restaurant. This
time, however, he was meeting with white nationalist Richard Spencer.
Jason had just returned from a trip to London, where he spoke before an Iranian nationalist crowd and
met the Londoner for the first time. The Londoner received a full report about his and Bagley’s
meeting, and he wanted to help develop the idea that the two had hatched, that of building a new
organization. It should be a “think tank,” the Londoner insisted, one that combined the best resources
in the radical right these days. Arktos could cover the deeper intellectual stuff, but Red Ice—another
Sweden-based outfit headed by a man named Henrik Palmgren and specializing in slick radio and video
shows—could serve as a media outlet. And perhaps an American organization could be involved, too,
like Richard Spencer’s National Policy Institute, which had been hosting large white nationalist seminars
and conferences for years. They could call the umbrella organization the AltRight Corporation. And, the
Londoner added, he could make sure it was well funded.
That was the conversation that brought Jason back to Persepolis. He was here to solidify the American
wing of this new project. Spencer had been catapulted into the public eye as the face of the alt-right
movement, amid claims by journalists, pundits, and Hillary Clinton herself that the alt-right was deeply
involved in Donald Trump’s then floundering campaign for the U.S. presidency. Spencer wasn’t sure
that those allegations were true. Steve Bannon had publically referred to his media company Breitbart
as a platform for the alt-right, but it was unclear what he meant by that (the term alt-right was still
new and its meaning a matter of debate). Still, during the campaign, Trump had been slow to reject
the endorsement he received from former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, though he eventually issued
a condemnation. Small stuff, but even the slightest hint of receptiveness from a major presidential
candidate was cause for elation among the likes of Spencer. It was something they had only dreamed
of—namely, momentum, and the potential that the most maligned and rejected political cause in the
post–World War II West might have made an inch of progress toward the goal of relevance, maybe
even influence. Further, it was a position they achieved not by camouflage or clandestine infiltration of
the mainstream, but as themselves—as unapologetic white nationalists. The radical right saw this as
an age of possibilities, a time for innovation and ambition.
Perhaps that is why Richard was so eager to say yes to Jason—yes to a new three-way partnership
among Red Ice, Arktos, and his own organization, the National Policy Institute. Their partnership would
mark the unification of the major transatlantic cultural and intellectual platforms associated with white
nationalism today. The AltRight Corporation was going to be a reality.
The lunch at Persepolis was just the after-party. Jason and Richard had reached their agreement the
day before and had then headed to a private club for a night of booze and celebration. During the wee
hours of the morning the two posed for a picture. Against a wall behind them stood a statue of Herme
—the Greek god of trickery. Jason had included Hermes in the picture on purpose.

* The [Alt Right Corporation] organization was supposed to be run equally by all the leaders—a Knights of the Round Table model. However, Richard was the outward face of the organization, whether they liked it or not. He had become famous as an icon of the new white nationalism. Both he and his ideology were constructions of the media, Jason believed. But Spencer’s persona was a liability. In late January, he was punched in the face during a filmed interview outside on the street, and the video of the attack was spread virally by liberal America. Richard, meanwhile, had taken to carrying weapons, even to work. A mythos seemed to be forming around him. This presented a major branding problem, because thanks in part to Richard’s antics, their name was starting to mean something other than what Jason wanted.
Alt-right. The term was originally coined not by Spencer as the media kept saying, but by a renegade philosopher and professor named Paul Gottfried who published books with Arktos. Its rise to public attention during the 2016 presidential election came in part when Steve Bannon was quoted describing Breitbart News as a “platform for the alt-right.” The term was further solidified about a week after Bannon took over Trump’s campaign, when Hillary Clinton devoted a speech in Reno, Nevada, to exposing the alt-right as a white nationalist cause that—via Bannon and Breitbart News—had “effectively taken over the Republican Party.” Alt-rightists themselves were thrilled by the attention, although they also knew that the characterizations were somewhat inaccurate. Alt-right was being used internally as a catchall for a wide range of actors and ideologies, some of them ideologically irreconcilable. What they shared was a strong opposition to immigration, hostility toward the established conservatism in the Republican Party (hence the alt, or alternative right), and—the main innovation meriting a new moniker—a methodological focus on internet activism. All that, plus a relative lack of squeamishness about sharing space with white nationalists. Political extremes are dens of sectarianism, but this new term was uniting a broad coalition.
Now Richard had taken it over, and this made Hillary Clinton retroactively correct in her characterizations— alt-right was becoming synonymous with old-fashioned white nationalism. Daniel Friberg was basically in that camp; the Traditionalism that Arktos published seemed like a side interest of his. Jason was now swept up in it, too. Shortly after Trump’s election, Richard held a gathering for white nationalists in Washington—a victory rally, basically—and toward its conclusion held a press conference. Jason was invited to the stage and he obliged, saying nothing and appearing less than comfortable with this degree of visibility, sitting between famous American white nationalist ideologues like Kevin MacDonald and Jared Taylor before a sea of international cameras and journalists.
Jason wished the term alt-right had retained its more open definition—he bet Bannon did, too—if only because association with the movement was becoming riskier to him professionally. Already in late 2016, his faculty colleagues at the New Jersey Institute of Technology were beginning to take notice of his emerging public profile. But Jason was willing to sacrifice: the alt-right was offering him a megaphone.

* Steve saw his role in the White House as one of holding the president to his earlier campaign promises, and putting an end to gratuitous war-making had been a pillar of their pitch to voters. It was part of Trump’s pledge to American workers that his administration would start prioritizing them, making decisions based on whether or not their interests were being served. Spending their money and lives in wars that didn’t directly involve them and their welfare was antithetical to that cause, the reasoning went.
America first.

* THEY MET in McIntire Park in Charlottesville, Virginia, on Saturday, August 12, 2017, a little before eleven A.M . Daniel Friberg, Richard Spencer, and Henrik Palmgren—three of the four leaders from the AltRight Corporation—joined hundreds of other protesters assembling for the Unite the Right rally, its official purpose being to contest the removal of a local public statue of Civil War Confederate general Robert E. Lee. But as its name indicates, this rally was also intended to bring together actors who identified with the alt-right.
The most colorful attendees were masses of militant white nationalists, swastika-toting neo-Nazis, and Ku Klux Klan members. There were plenty of Confederate flags, too, of course. Marchers even seemed to have studied, rehearsed, and performed renditions of the Civil War Confederate war cry, the Rebel yell.

* Richard, Daniel, and their nearest associates at first defied the order, but chaos ensued as protesters and authorities scattered in multiple directions. After some initial confrontations with police, Richard Spencer ran to his getaway car and left the scene. On his way out, he happened to see his informal predecessor walking the streets—the last man to emerge in American popular culture as an outspoken white nationalist, former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, who jumped to safety in their car.

* ILL-FATED, TRAGIC, CATASTROPHIC —these were the words being used by the white nationalist intelligentsia during the immediate aftermath of Charlottesville. The menacing tiki-torch gathering, the militarized garb, the Nazi sloganeering, and of course the violence would wipe out any potential that the alt-right movement had to rebrand white nationalism and anti-liberal activism. Far from a display of ingenuity and innovation, the people marching in Charlottesville surely looked all too familiar to onlookers. Even participants voiced their reservations. Richard Spencer denounced the event organizer’s response to the death of Heather D. Heyer online. And in the wake of an op-ed I wrote in the Wall Street Journal highlighting Daniel Friberg’s uncharacteristic willingness to march alongside visible Nazis and Klansmen, he clarified to the Scandinavian media that he was unsettled by the presence of those actors and would have prohibited their participation had he been an organizer.

* Bannon was thrilled with Trump’s response. Despite the fact that he had been isolated in the administration for months, the New York Times reported that he consulted with Trump about the response to Charlottesville. Indeed, all public communications from the White House following the rally aligned with Bannon’s reported long-standing advice to the president, as the Times reported it, “not to criticize far-right activists too severely for fear of antagonizing a small but energetic part of his base.” The president’s behavior at the press conference marked a breathtaking stand in Bannon’s eyes—a stand for the importance of history, a stand on behalf of who he believed were righteous people on the streets made invisible by the Nazis next to them, and a courageous refusal to bow to media pressure.
Being in step with the president at this particular moment turned out to be a liability, however. When the president received blowback for his remarks, critics blamed the incident on Bannon’s influence, meaning that his dismissal could palliate to the ongoing outcry. They could attribute Trump’s racism to the presence in the White House of a man who had presided over a news organization—Breitbart—that produced consistently positive coverage of European identitarian groups and seemed obsessed with crime committed by African Americans; a man who had allegedly developed ways to stir racial animus as vice president of Cambridge Analytica; who had celebrated the online world of the alt-right; and who had a tendency to be drawn to racialist culture and literature, from the Nazi war-era films of Leni Riefenstahl to the writings of Jean Raspail, Charles Murray, and of course, Julius Evola.
Three days after Trump’s second press conference, Steve Bannon resigned, under pressure.
On the same day that Trump gave the press conference, August 15, Jason Jorjani left both the AltRight Corporation and Arktos. Ask him why and he’ll tell you that he left in part because his original vision for a more dynamic and encompassing alt-right movement seemed dead. He was especially sobered by user comments on his own AltRight site. “Iranians is brown poo-poo people,” rang one. The alt-right was a narrow white nationalist initiative after all, just as its most vocal critics alleged. There wasn’t room for his cause there. The “Charlottesville disaster,” as he referred to it, solidified those impressions in spectacular fashion.

* In order to understand the motive behind an action, look at its effects, Jason thought. This premature centralization of the alt-right without proper capital investment—this attempt to bring together the likes of Richard Spencer, Daniel Friberg, and Henrik Palmgren—destroyed the AltRight Corporation. It also destroyed his career.
I thought back to my early suspicions when he first told me about the Londoner, that the figure sounded too sensational to be true, and that he might have been a law enforcement plant and spy. A conspiracy, perhaps, targeting the alt-right and Jason.

* About a month after the Unite the Right rally, on September 19, 2017, the New York Times published an article featuring Jason. He had met a young Swedish man named Erik Hellberg earlier that spring at a gathering called the London Forum. And later, in June, the two reconnected for a drink at an Irish pub close to the Empire State Building. What Jason didn’t know was that “Erik Hellberg” was really Patrik Hermansson, an anti-racist activist who had infiltrated rightist circles in Europe and the United States. He was wearing a hidden camera during their conversation at the pub, and quotes from that conversation—to his horror—were now appearing in one of the largest newspapers in the world.
“It’s going to end with the expulsion of the majority of the migrants, including citizens who are of Muslim descent. That’s how it’s going to end. It’s going to end with concentration camps, expulsions, and war, that’s how it’s going to end. At a cost of a few hundred million people,” Jason had told the undercover activist. He had been characteristically articulate in form and grand in content. But in print this didn’t sound good either: “We will have a Europe, in 2050, where the bank notes have Adolf Hitler, Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great. And Hitler will be seen like that: like Napoleon, like Alexander, not like some weird monster who is unique in his own category—no, he is just going to be seen as a great European leader. You know like we say in English, you don’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs.”
Jason contended that he was describing a “nightmarish prediction of a future that would follow from Western policy makers’ failure to address the Muslim migrant crisis” rather than his own ideals.

* Jason wasn’t just out of the AltRight Corporation, which would soon be dormant. His university in New Jersey would eventually fire him, too.

* Steve: “But why does a guy who is that sophisticated get hooked up with Richard Spencer?” Something about Jason’s story as I presented it made him sound suspect. “Richard Spencer is a goofball, and you can’t get in business with goofballs like that.”

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The Rocket That Fell to Earth: Roger Clemens and the Rage for Baseball Immortality

Jeff Pearlman writes in his 2009 book:

* To those who had come to know [John] McNamara during his time in Boston, the shifting of blame was hardly a surprise. Though popular with a handful of Red Sox veterans, the 54-year-old skipper was a guarded, crotchety man who trusted few people outside his tight ring of coaches and friends. Upon being hired by the Red Sox, McNamara McNamara owned a lifetime major league record of 751-805 and had been fired three times. He saw himself as one of the geniuses of the game, and anyone who dared question his moves or motives was, in his eyes, a buffoon. “Everybody thinks he can do your job,” he snarled. “Everybody.” So when the press asked about Clemens’ departure from game six, what was he supposed to say? That he was wrong? No way. Not McNamara’s style. He would blame his ace before taking any personal responsibility. Clemens was livid. “Did McNamara tell you that he’s a drunk?” he later asked television announcer Tim McCarver in an unsubstantiated off-the-air rant. “Did he tell you that he had the clubhouse guys fix him a drink in the fifth inning? That he was completely clueless?” Upon reporting to spring training, Clemens’ mood hardly improved. Because he had slightly more than two years of major league service, Clemens was required to pitch one more season before becoming eligible for arbitration. Hence, while Yankees first baseman Don Mattingly, the MVP runner-up, was being awarded a $1.975 million salary via arbitration, Clemens was forced to accept Boston’s offer of $500,000—a mere $160,000 raise from 1986. “We decided to renew Roger’s contract at a figure we think is fair,” Lou Gorman, Boston’s general manager, said at the time. “This is fair.”

What frustrated Clemens wasn’t necessarily the paltry contract offer but that the Red Sox had lied to him. During the off-season, Clemens, his agents and Gorman had agreed to a one-year, $1 million contract that left all sides smiling. Yet when Peter Ueberroth, baseball’s commissioner, learned of the agreement, he called Gorman in a tizzy. “Lou, I’m reading that you’re going to pay Roger Clemens $1 million,” said Ueberroth. “Please tell me it’s not true.” “That’s right,” said Gorman. “I shook hands and made a deal with the man.” A lengthy pause. “Well, Lou, I’m ordering you not to give him $1 million,” said Ueberroth. “You can’t pay him more than $500,000. Not a penny more.” “But Pete,” asked a stunned Gorman, “what am I supposed to do here?” Over the previous two years, baseball’s ruling class had colluded to drive down wildly escalating salaries.

* As Jordan would later write of Clemens in a piece for The New York Times Magazine:

“A French dilettante once said, “I am such an egotist that if I were to write about a chair I’d find some way to write about myself.” Clemens’s egotism is more childlike and innocent. He doesn’t realize that he sees himself as the center of his small universe, at the center of every story he tells… Everyone is a bit player in Clemens’s universe, even his beloved mother, Bess, who reared him and his five siblings mostly without a father. She left her first husband when Clemens was a baby, and her second husband died when Clemens was 9. Bess has been fighting emphysema for years. “She has her good days and bad,” Clemens says. “I only hope she can hang on to see me go into the Hall of Fame.” Clemens assumes everyone’s pleasure revolves around him…. He says he hates to miss a start because that might deprive his fans, especially young boys, from the pleasure of seeing “the Rocket Man punch out 20.” The Rocket Man is his nickname. He sometimes autographs his book “Rocket Man” or “Roger ‘The Rocket’ Clemens” and then adds a list of his awards.”

When the Clemens family purchased a Porsche, Roger insisted on a CY-MVP vanity license plate. When Clemens ate out at a restaurant, he would look around, hoping someone would recognize him. (Then, when he was recognized, he would audibly complain about the lack of privacy.)

* As the hundreds of major league ballplayers who turned to performance-enhancing drugs throughout the 1990s did their absolute best to keep the media at arm’s length, Piazza took the opposite approach. According to several sources, when the subject of performance enhancing was broached with reporters he especially trusted, Piazza fessed up. “Sure, I use,” he told one. “But in limited doses, and not all that often.” (Piazza has denied using performance-enhancing drugs, but there has always been speculation.) Whether or not it was Piazza’s intent, the tactic was brilliant: By letting the media know, off the record, Piazza made the information that much harder to report. Writers saw his bulging muscles, his acne-covered back. They certainly heard the under-the-breath comments from other major league players, some who considered Piazza’s success to be 100 percent chemically delivered. “He’s a guy who did it, and everybody knows it,” says Reggie Jefferson, the longtime major league first baseman. “It’s amazing how all these names, like Roger Clemens, are brought up, yet Mike Piazza goes untouched.” “There was nothing more obvious than Mike on steroids,” says another major league veteran who played against Piazza for years. “Everyone talked about it, everyone knew it. Guys on my team, guys on the Mets. A lot of us came up playing against Mike, so we knew what he looked like back in the day. Frankly, he sucked on the field. Just sucked. After his body changed, he was entirely different. ‘Power from nowhere,’ we called it.” When asked, on a scale of 1 to 10, to grade the odds that Piazza had used performance enhancers, the player doesn’t pause. “A 12,” he says. “Maybe even a 13.”

* Perhaps his strangest away-from-the-family pursuit came in the form of Charlize Theron, the bombshell South African actress with the 36B-24-36 body and the form-fitting red-carpet outfits. Clemens had long fancied the starlet, who during the 2002 season came to New York to promote a new film. While eating dinner at Serafina—one of Manhattan’s snazziest bistros—an apparently intoxicated Clemens looked up and spotted his Hollywood crush. He approached the actress, introduced himself and asked whether she’d like to join him for a drink. When Theron—who, as a baseball ignoramus, likely had no idea who the pitcher was—declined, Clemens trailed her through the restaurant until a bouncer stepped in his way. “Take one more step,” he growled, “and there’ll be some real trouble here.” With that, Clemens stopped, looked up as Theron exited through the front door and yelped, “But Charlize, I’d do you right…”

* In the insular world of professional baseball, there exists a code of honor that, in any other sector of society, would make no sense whatsoever. On the diamonds and inside the clubhouses, loyalty means standing up for your teammates, no matter the circumstance. Boston outfielder Wil Cordero is arrested for beating his wife in 1997? He’s welcomed back with hugs and open arms. Mets pitcher David Cone allegedly exposes himself to female fans in the Shea Stadium bullpen in 1989? Most Mets laugh it off as wacky hijinks.

* The once-bashful kid now lived for the attention. He didn’t merely want it—he needed it. “You’re talking about the ultimate narcissist,” says Pat Jordan, the writer and former minor league pitcher. “Actors are fearful—their narcissism is a product of their fear. But an athlete’s narcissism doesn’t spring from fear, it springs from arrested development. A person like Roger Clemens has never cultivated anything but himself. Everything is about the arm, about maintaining the arm. The longer it goes on, the easier it is to become a Roger Clemens. You constantly call attention upon yourself, because you’re all you know. I used to be like that when I played, and I wasn’t one one-thousandth of the pitcher Roger was. It took me a long time to get out of the idea that if it rains on my parade, I’m the only one get

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Yelp Enables One Click Smearing

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