The Ball is Round: A Global History of Soccer

Here are some highlights from this 2008 book by David Goldblatt:

* The British historian Eric Hobsbawm encapsulated this oddity when he wrote ‘The twentieth century was the American century in every way but one: sport.’ This is not exactly news to anyone, but it remains an extraordinary and under-explored anomaly; an almost unique reversal of the dominant patterns of global influence and power.
The Ball Is Round attempted to answer Hobsbawm’s question by looking at the reasons why soccer had fared so poorly in the United States. The main lines of the argument are well known. Basically, soccer’s timing was bad. By the early 1870s when soccer, played according to the FA rules of 1863, was beginning in America, baseball had already claimed the emotional and cultural high ground of America’s emerging sports culture.
Through the rest of the nineteenth century, soccer thrived in the United States amongst certain working-class communities, but was indelibly marked as European, foreign and in some quarters as un-American. The predominance of ethnic affiliations in team names—from Hakoah New York to Brooklyn Hispano—is testament to both soccer’s deep local roots and its still unbroken connections to the old world. The cultural space and market share available to soccer was further narrowed over the twentieth century as, successively, ice hockey, American football, and basketball went professional.

* The central pillars of American sports culture—American football, baseball, and basketball, along with hockey—have enjoyed only a limited global embrace, which has, I believe, entrenched their American rather than universal characteristics. This in turn has helped consolidate a wider American sports culture that finds soccer not merely foreign but alien, both incomprehensible and reprehensible. The private and mysterious timekeeping of the referee in soccer is contrasted with the open, public, and democratic clock in American football, basketball and hockey. The draw is considered nonsense at best, an outrage at worst. The rarity of not only goals, but clear scoring opportunities, is anathema not merely because it appears, at first sight, tedious, but more profoundly because it allocates such a large role to chance in determining the outcome of the game. The enormous number of scoring chances in basketball and the immense length of the baseball season are two devices that ensure, over both individual games and entire seasons, that luck evens out and other factors prevail. It is the same distaste for unaccountability and chance that finds the diving, faking, gamesmanship and chicanery of soccer unbearable.
Perhaps most fundamentally of all, soccer offers modes of storytelling and narrative structures that the American sporting public finds unsatisfactory. You have had, after all, a century of the most extraordinary and compelling sporting stories to savor and reflect upon. America possesses a literary culture that has, like no other, risen to the challenge of expressing them—a dual heritage I found condensed in Red Smith’s homage to the “Shot Heard Round the World,” Bobby Thompson’s homerun that clinched the 1951 National League pennant race for the New York Giants after an epic chasing down of the Brooklyn Dodgers: ‘Now it is done. Now the story ends. And there is no way to tell it. The art of fiction is dead. Reality has strangled invention. Only the utterly impossible, the inexpressibly fantastic, can ever be plausible again.’ I now see that when this kind of performance is on offer, soccer, both domestic and international, appears to many, at best, a distraction.
Soccer can match the epic quality of the 1951 pennant race—European leagues have often featured season-long slugging matches between two or three top teams only resolved on the final day in the final minutes of multiple games. It can also offer the condensed moments of brilliance, beauty, and meaning that Thompson’s homer exemplifies: Maradona’s Hand of God, anyone? However, on a day-to-day basis, the level of narrative quality control is lower. Although soccer can do fantastical last-minute comebacks, collapses, turnovers, winners, and equalizers, there are less than in American sports. For all the really compelling 0-0 draws there are an awful lot of excruciating ones. For all the simple 5-0 routs and hopelessly unjust 1-0 victories for the poorer team, there are reams and reams of confusing, avant-garde, and just plain boring scripts. Ultimately, the entire logic of American sports culture chaffs at soccer’s draws and low scores.
One could argue that American sports exceptionalism, its sense of glorious self-isolation, is in fact a perfect expression of the only superpower left standing and its willful unilateralism. However, American power has always rested on more than free agency. Its global hegemony has rested on the capacity to shape international institutions in its own image, determine the rules of the game to its own advantage, to force, cajole, and pressure others into accepting them and adapting to them.

* A number of key decisions and local preferences shaped Australian Rules football to create a sport quite different from association football. In the first place, the topography of gum-tree fields made any accurate or regular implementation of an offside rule impossible. In any case, the English public-school disapproval of sneaking and goal-hanging that the rule was designed to offset did not offend the sporting or social sensibilities of Australian colonial society where neither the chancer nor the short cut were objects of moral opprobrium. Second, while the debates in England over the rules were constantly driven by deep-seated disagreements between different public schools, determined to preserve their distinct traditions of handling or kicking, these differences and their social significance were meaningless 12,000 miles away. Rather, the founders of the code sought the most enjoyable game, consciously looking to draw upon the best of every previous code. Above all, the new football was to be open, accessible and available to the new colonists streaming into Melbourne.

* By the turn of the century rugby union and rugby league were proving the most popular winter games in New South Wales and Queensland. Football was stuck as the second or third sport in every state of the country. The game’s revival would have to await a new influx of migrants from Greece, Italy, Croatia and other parts of Europe in the late inter-war and early post-Second World War years. For these communities, football connected them to their homelands rather than to Britain. They created a football revival which, in the context of the narrow and provincial racism of mid-century Australia, only served to reinforce the minority status of football or, as it was derisively known, ‘wogball’. The entry of football into the Australian mainstream would only be possible when these new migrant communities had been allowed admission into ‘white Australia’ in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

* ‘America’s sports exceptionalism … remains inextricably linked to the other exceptionalisms that have rendered American politics, American social relations, and American culture, so similar yet at the same time so different from other comparable phenomena, particularly in Europe …’

* First, America developed without creating a successful or enduring socialist party and the institutions created by its working classes are among the weakest in the Western world. Football, unlike baseball and American football, was an overwhelmingly working-class sport and suffered accordingly. Second, many features of American life – sport and education in particular – have lacked any kind of central national direction or organization and have been shaped by the market and financial forces to a greater extent than their European counterparts. So it has been with football, which has particularly suffered from the fragmentation and market orientation of social life and from its exclusion from the nation’s elite educational institutions.

* The obvious slot for football, if it were to parallel the English model, was as the winter game of the elite in educational institutions and old boys’ clubs, but this had been taken by the newly minted gridiron. This left space for football as a lower-middle-class and working-class recreation and entertainment.

* The sheer distance of Australia and America from Britain was a central factor, if not the only one, in explaining the emergence and then triumph of an alternative football code. In both countries the indigenous version of football came with a certain amount of nationalistic baggage, helping assert the independence and difference of the new world from the old; but in neither case could the explicit politicization of the game be considered a central component of its success.

* Oceania was the land that football forgot. Despite arriving in Australia and New Zealand in the nineteenth century, football remained a poor relation to cricket, rugby and Australian rules. 24 Until 1974 both nations had attempted to reach the World Cup through the Asian qualifying rounds and neither had succeeded.

* Australia’s relative football backwardness was not derived from the geography of isolation alone. At home, in the post-war era, football remained a minority, amateur sport. It was a distant fourth or fifth in the nation’s sporting affections behind Aussie rules, both rugby codes and cricket. It also remained, like everything else at the time in Australia, a British concern.

* The reception of Southern and Eastern Europeans into Australian society was not a smooth one. Although welcomed by labour-short employers their lack of English and their perceptibly darker skins evoked tiresomely predictable patterns of racism, exclusion and discrimination. Unlike the earlier generations of Italians and Greeks that went to the United States, who assimilated in part by adopting baseball, this generation came to Australia with their sporting preference already formed – and that was for football. To many, Aussie Rules appeared ludicrous, while rugby and cricket were so obviously and self-consciously English games that they didn’t even bother. Football was another matter, and by 1950 ethnic communities were creating their own social and football clubs. Australia’s leading sports newspaper The Sporting Globe was worried.
“The whole question of these New Australians being allowed to form national clubs should be the subject of special investigation and although one does not advocate a boycott of these recent arrivals from the playing fields it certainly would be much better if they were assimilated into the ranks of teams of mainly British stock and thus became better mixers instead of keeping to themselves and in some cases endeavouring to settle political differences on the football field.

The conflict was intensified by an obvious contrast of playing styles and expectations. The Anglo-Australians were shaped by a wider sports culture in which high levels of on-field violence were tolerated; they played an exceptionally rough and physical version of the already characteristically muscular English game. The Europeans, by contrast, were schooled in an entirely different playing culture which was rather more cerebral. There was, among the first generation of footballers and their clubs, almost no assimilation at all, although no ethnic club systematically excluded outsiders. But then why would they have wanted to join Anglo-clubs anyway? The New Australians were proving themselves adept footballers.

* White Australia’s antipathy towards football was swirled into a minor moral panic by the expression of political differences on the football field and the sporadic violence that accompanied this, particularly when teams from the Serbian and Croatian communities were playing. A small number of Croats had migrated to Australia earlier in the century, but after the war they came in their tens of thousands. Croatia Adelaide was founded in 1952 and teams followed in Melbourne and Sydney. Their members and supporters tended to come from the most conservative and nationalistic elements of Croatian political culture, many fleeing the new communism of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and they included in their ranks many supporters and officers of the brutal Ustashi regime that ruled Croatia as a puppet state of the Germans during the Second World War. While they remained a minority among Croatian Australians, the clubs were fiercely nationalist in their display of Croatian colours and insignia. Serbs also came to Australia, including within their ranks some Chetnik supporters – the royalist resistance groups who were allied with and then defeated by Tito’s partisans. This community gravitated to teams like JUST and Yugal – though their Chetnik connections were sufficiently small that both retained friendly relations with the Yugoslav embassy in Australia and were treated to flights home by Yugoslav Airlines. The bitter conflicts between Serbs and Croats during the Second World War were certainly not left behind in Europe. In the early 1960s a game between Croatia Melbourne and Yugal descended into a full-scale riot, and in 1972, after a particularly nasty incident in the game between Croatia Melbourne and Hakoah, the Croatian team were expelled from the Victoria league and effectively dissolved, although they were back in it five years later.
Australian football provided an instrument of solidarity and partial integration into mainstream society for Southern Europeans in the 1960s and early 1970s. In turn their contribution was to raise the quality of organization and performance to the point where Australia finally qualified for the 1974 World Cup with a squad that included Anglo- and Slavic Australians. Australia’s performance was predictably poor at the finals in Germany, failing to score a single goal, and though the excitement generated around the campaign was enough to convince the football federation that the time had come to create a national league, football remained a peripheral sport in Australia. Its failure to win over the mainstream was in part a failure of its initial policy of de-ethnicization. After the national league was launched in 1977, teams were meant to abandon their ethnic tags and act against overt displays of aggressive nationalism among their crowds. But the clubs were not prepared to take on their hardcore support and the authorities lacked the clout to enforce it. Indeed matters got worse in some ways. A newly created club like Canberra City, which was intended as a model of wholesome non-ethnic family entertainment, became a bitter redoubt of an explicitly Anglo-Australian identity. Worse, as the temperature of ethnic politics in Yugoslavia heated up, the relations between Balkan teams deteriorated, and this state of affairs endured through the 1990s. The ethnic identities and solidarities that had revived and reinvigorated Australian football would also prove the limiting factor in the successful commercialization of the game.

* The high industrial football created in the 1950s and 1960s reached its terminal point in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A measure of its exhaustion was the decline in innovation, for after the development of Dutch total football in the early 1970s European football saw no significant tactical developments until Arrigo Sacchi’s Milan sides of the late 1980s. Off the field, the increasing ungovernability of minority but visible fan cultures in Northern and Southern Europe – of which the Liverpool casuals and Juve ultras were emblematic – had brought the organizational capacity of the game and its commercial viability to breaking point. In the end, however, football was rescued from its predicament by the forces of the market and the application of an unalloyed commercialism that had been germinating through the 1980s. After Heysel, that whirlwind of technological, social and economic change would provide the instruments for the sanitization and selling of football. The slum game, shorn of its most belligerent and chaotic supporters, excluded by surveillance and cost, would be transmuted from social outcast to one of the central collective cultural experiences of the new millennium.

* The St George flag had of course been a staple of the crowds at England matches but not for that long. Its ubiquity was quite new. Looking back to the crowd at the 1966 World Cup, barely any St George crosses can be seen as the stands appear to be waving British Union flags. As late as Italia ’90 the balance between the two flags is half and half. But from 1997, as the devolution plans of the New Labour government took shape and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland all acquired a significant level of political autonomy, the Englishness of the football team rose in importance. For it remains the case that there are precious few English institutions around which the notion of a distinctly English civic nationalism could be created. The royal family, the armed forces and parliament remain British; the legal system is shared with Wales. This leaves the Church of England and English National Opera as potential repositories of an English national identity. The England football team remains the most potent public expression of the imagined English national community available.

* First, in contrast to almost everywhere else on the planet, football in the USA became a middle-class rather than a working-class game; by the late 1990s over half of the country’s regular football players came from households with an annual income of over $50,000. Second, the relative significance and prowess of women’s football is greater in the US than anywhere else. Finally, the American national team – male or female – has been unable, despite successful international performances, to mobilize a significant level of nationalist support and public interest.

* For the middle classes, whose emotional and political disposition had been shaped by the parenting techniques of Dr Spock and the enduring psychic ripples of the counter culture, America’s dominant professional sports presented a series of problems. American football was too violent, too confrontational and too authoritarian in its internal structures. Baseball’s high-pressure solitary performances for pitcher and batter were suspect. Basketball was rapidly becoming the game of the African-American ghetto. Football offered a game to the suburbs that could be moulded and made markedly less confrontational and violent than gridiron. It is worth noting that the paranoia of the American middle classes was so great that heading the ball was actively discouraged (owing to potential brain damage) and a small industry emerged attempting to sell protective gear to the enthusiastic header of the ball. Unlike baseball, football offered a game in which teamwork was at a premium over individual performances and in which the precious and fragile egos of the players could be protected.
Football was also feminized. Soccer mums took the lead in organizing the game at a grass-roots level and the number of girls and women playing the game in organized leagues soared. By 2000 the USA had 7 million registered female footballers, compared to around 300,000 in Germany…

* What explains the reticence of the whole nation to follow the men’s national team despite a plausible performance at the 1994 World Cup and successful qualification campaigns for the 1998, 2002 and 2006 World Cups? The former threw up the USA-Iran clash, a game which in any other universe would have served as an irresistible proxy for America’s neurotic relationship with the Middle East. The latter produced a stunningly gutsy series of performances in which the USA beat Portugal and went on to lose the quarter-final to Germany. What would in almost any other nation have brought life to a complete, if momentary, halt barely flickered on the collective radar. Football continued to be suffocated by the mainstream belief that it was just not American.

Posted in America, Australia, England, Soccer | Comments Off on The Ball is Round: A Global History of Soccer

The Game of Our Lives: The Meaning And Making Of English Football

Here are some highlights from this 2015 book by David Goldblatt:

* Sir Richard Turnbull, the penultimate governor of Aden, told Denis Healey, then Britain’s defense secretary, that, “When the British Empire finally sank beneath the waves of history, it would leave behind only two monuments—one was the game of association football, the other was the expression ‘Fuck off’.” 1 Spoken in the mid-1960s as the last remnants of the British Empire were abandoned, Turnbull’s predictions were perhaps overly pessimistic. A case can still be made for the lasting impact of English jurisprudence, engineering, and education. The canon of English Literature may not have the demotic presence of rough Anglo-Saxon cursing, but it continues to shape the linguistic imagination of much of the world. Yet Turnbull was right to believe that among the most important legacies of nearly two centuries of global influence was a product of working-class industrial Britain. Cricket, the game of gentlemen, would leave its mark in much of the Empire, but football, the game of the people, would be present everywhere.

* Football is a complex phenomenon with family resemblances to many other cultural forms but identical to none. In its capacity to gather significant numbers of people on a highly regularized calendar, in a highly ritualized fashion, and, on occasion, to create moments of community and collective ecstasy, it has something of the church about it. Shorn of any religious dimension, it is closer to the theater. Like the cultures of music it combines a professional commercialized circuit with a huge web of amateur organizations and a great hinterland of informal play and practice. And ultimately, when seen not just as a sequence of unrelated individual matches but as the multicharacter, multilayered narrative of a season, football’s closest competitor is soap opera. On their own territory, football gives all of these activities a run for their money.
Both soap operas and professional football are significant components of Britain’s popular culture, but they are sharply separated by gender. Soaps retain a predominantly female audience and offer an infinitely more gender-balanced array of characters. Football, despite marginal shifts in the composition of its crowds and the growth of grassroots women’s football, remains an overwhelmingly masculine world. The leading British soap operas attract regular audiences that are easily in excess of most live football and collectively offer a weekly program at least as extensive as the football fixture list. Coronation Street and EastEnders , the old form of the genre, have the same kind of narrative and romantic connection to working-class urban Britain that football has acquired. The shows, like football, find themselves referenced and debated in a variety of other media, their stars endlessly featured in other contexts and their storylines taken as a sustained real-time commentary upon contemporary events. Football now manages all these and on a scale equivalent to the entire genre of soap opera. Moreover, beyond the emotionally disturbed, the soaps do not evoke collective ecstasy or carnival, nor do they provide the bedrock of collective identities. The Church, the theatre, festivals, and soap operas—football has acquired a place in British culture that exceeds them all, for it alone is the equal of each in their own domains of ritual, performance, ecstasy, and national narrative.
The sheer volume of newsprint and digital space occupied by football is the most obvious marker of the game’s ubiquity.

* Perhaps a better measure of football’s new cultural weight than the sheer volume of news output or the uncountable hours devoted to video games in bedrooms across the nation, was the degree to which the game had become the subject of other cultural forms. Television, although it had covered football for over two decades from the mid 1960s to the late 1980s, had never really explored its possibilities beyond the sports slots. Outside of highlights shows and Football Focus , there were just a handful of documentaries and one-off dramas, like John Boorman’s Six Days to Saturday or Jack Rosenthal’s comedy Another Sunday and Sweet FA . In the 1990s this changed. Fantasy Football League brought together the worlds of stand-up comedy, the chat show and football fanzine trivia, the hosts both languorous and loquacious stitching it all together from the couch. Drama departments, which had steered clear of football, dipped their toes in the water: Cheri Lunghi took on the dressing room as The Manager , in which, quite unbelievably for the time, a woman was made the coach of a struggling professional men’s team; Arthur Smith’s bitter sweet comedy A Night with Gary Lineker was hugely popular on TV and in the theater. ITV ran its sex, shopping, and shooting soap Footballers’ Wives . Sky made ten series of Dream Team, Roy of the Rovers for the Premiership era, reduced eventually to Dynasty levels of implausible plot line, death, and betrayal. 8
From almost a century of cinema up until 1990, British football had been featured in just a handful of films: the backdrop to a whodunnit in the 1939 Arsenal Stadium Mystery ; the jaunty art-house documentary Goal! —the official film of the 1966 World Cup; in the early 1980s, there was the sweetly observed teen romance of Gregory’s Girl ; and the hapless hi-concept of Sly Stallone’s Victory , Hollywood’s take on “football meets the prisoner of war escape movie.” They were all eclipsed by the short, but utterly heart-rending, football sequence in Ken Loach’s Kes , in which Brian Glover’s PE teacher treats a coaching session as a chance to regress to his inner playground bully. The last twenty years, by contrast, have seen dozens of football movies released. The Sisyphean task of bending the arc of a Hollywood script to English football culture was tried again, but both Goal! and When Saturday Comes looked clunky and clichéd. A slew of hooligan movies, drawing on the new genre of hooligan memoirs, were equally dismal. Bend It Like Beckham had the easy charm of Gregory’s Girl transported from new-town Scotland to multi-ethnic London, but was slight. Mike Bassett: England Manager —a low-budget comedy about the trials of the England manager—had its moments, but it paled beside the real thing: Channel 4’s documentary Impossible Job , which followed Graham Taylor’s final days as England manager, was cruelly funny but bathed in the most acute pathos. As with so many attempts to dramatize football, fiction has found it hard to compete with football’s own spontaneous capacity for narrative. The art-house montage Zidane , released in 2007 and produced by the Turner Prize–winning artist Douglas Gordon and French filmmaker Philippe Perreno, succeeded by abandoning abandoning narrative entirely. Only The Damned United , an adaptation of David Peace’s coruscating novel about Brian Clough and his time at Leeds United, and Ken Loach’s Looking for Eric have risen to the challenge. Loach’s film manages this by combining Mancunian magic realism with Ealing Comedy , gently telling the tale of a struggling post-office worker and Manchester United fan who sorts out his life with the help of a magical Eric Cantona, played by himself.
Neither TV nor film was ever going to bestow serious cultural capital on football. Its elevation in British cultural life owed more to the sudden engagement of key members of its male literary elite with the sport. What sporting energies had existed among British writers had hitherto been directed elsewhere, towards cricket especially, but the haul of literary encounters with football was meager. 9 In the 1980s and early 1990s this changed. Martin Amis, Julian Barnes, Sebastian Faulks, Geoff Dyer, Blake Morrison, and Nick Hornby all published pieces on football. The leading literary journals, previously football-free zones, took note. Karl Miller, editor of the London Review of Books , started commenting on the 1990 World Cup in the magazine’s Diary section, while the following year Granta published Ian Hamilton’s Gazza Agonistes . 10 Literary England had deemed football a permissible topic of inquiry, but despite this rapprochement football acquired only a very marginal place in the fictional landscape, more often than not used as a jokey satirical stage, like its cameo in Marin Amis’s London Fields . 11 Rare exceptions to this have been D. J. Taylor’s English Settlement , in which money laundering at a south London club becomes entangled in a wider story about the rise of the city, David Peace’s The Damned United and its follow-up Red or Dead , which fictionalizes the football life of Bill Shankly. 12
Of all the arts, poetry’s relationship to football has been the easiest and closest, an amity facilitated by the shared interest of poets and crowds in chants, rhythm and rhymes. Three of the most significant postwar poets—Philip Larkin, Seamus Heaney, and Ted Hughes—all found space for football as a potent childhood memory or a telling element of the urban landscape. 13 In the last twenty years poetry and football have moved closer together. Brighton and Hove Albion made Attila the Stockbroker, the postpunk poet and troubadour, club poet in residence; Ian McMillan was awarded a similar position at Barnsley. Andrew Motion, when Poet Laureate, backed the establishment of a nationwide football laureate. 14 More substantively, Tony Harrison’s “V,” still the most significant poetic reflection on the end of industrial Britain, drew widely on the oppositional and conflictual imagery of the game. Motion’s successor, Carol Ann Duffy, wrote a poem for the nation on David Beckham’s Achilles Heel, while Simon Armitage declared that “I’d always thought of poets as the goalkeepers of the literary world.” Don Paterson, one of Scotland’s leading modern poets, framed his own poetic account of national postindustrial decline through the story of a failing football club in his long collection Nil Nil . 15
The Royal Family had graced football with their official patronage, and their actual presence on the big occasions, since before the First World War, but they had hitherto been studiedly nonpartisan. In the last decade the royal house has let it be known that Her Majesty is a fan of Arsenal, a preference inherited from her mother.

* both the archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, and the chief rabbi, Jonathan Sacks, were very public Arsenal supporters.

* The language of faith and salvation, miracles and curses is long established in the game, but in the absence of any real belief in the supernatural or the divine, let alone an established theology and morality, the comparison simply will not hold. What remains of religion in a secular world—and Britain has become among the most secular of societies—is the abiding need for collective energies, identities, and shared meanings. As Durkheim put it over a century ago, “The only way of renewing the collective representations which related to sacred things is to retemper them at the very source of religious life, that is to say in assembled groups . . . men are more confident because they felt themselves stronger; and they really are stronger because forces which are languishing are now reawakened into consciousness.” 7 In recent years the British public has assembled in increasing numbers, not only at football, but other sporting occasions, occasions, evangelical gatherings, carnivals, street parades, music festivals, royal celebrations, and urban riots.
Why? Secularization is not the only social change at work here. The passing of industrial Britain has thinned the great crowds that once assembled in huge workplaces and fragmented the communities of the old urban working class. There have been immense individual gains from breaking with the narrow life courses and suffocating conservatism of these communities, but as the growth of these new postindustrial crowds suggests, there is also now a longing for the communal and the public in an individualized and privatized world. Perhaps the most salient social change of all in modern Britain is the fact that we increasingly live alone.

* Eating together, our most basic common activity, has become less prevalent in households of all kinds. By contrast, we go to the football match together and not just as a single unstructured mob, but as couples, families of all kinds in various cross-generational combinations, as well as in loose skeins of acquaintance and tight networks of friends: less than 10 percent of football crowds go to the game alone. We also, increasingly, live apart. The long-term polarization in the distribution of wealth, in England, combined with the geography of the housing market and schools, has produced a society in which rich and poor, indeed every gradation of the class culture, are less likely to live and learn in a broad social mix. 9 Football, by contrast, remains a place of social mixing, where crowds gather and make space, if only for a short moment, truly public.

* John Crace described the close connection between his mental well-being and going to the football. “At the best of times the idea of milling with crowds of shoppers on the high street makes me anxious and homicidal. Yet even when I’m nuts, I feel safe in a football crowd: over and beyond a sense of common purpose. I feel as if I am in a bubble, where there’s nothing getting between me and the moment . . . there is no me: only football. It is the most perfect time off, time out from myself.”
Or Nick Hornby, depressed, on the way to the game after visiting his shrink: “I felt better, less isolated, more purposeful . . . I no longer had to try to explain to myself where I was going or where I had been.” In this guise football appears as a salve for the fragmentation of society and the psyche, for the diseases of affluence rather than the cruelties of poverty.
Finally, there is the longing for narrative, for stories that make sense. This includes the match itself, but more than that, in an era of incredible social and technological change, football offers a sense of how each match and each season fits into a wider and meaningful narrative of personal, sporting, and social history. Certainly the football memoirs and oral histories of the last two decades have often been set over the course of a whole life of watching football and structured structured around the transition from childhood to adolescence, from adulthood to middle age. They invariably track the shifts from the postwar consensus (the golden age of the terraces) to the death of social-democratic industrial Britain (the rise of hooliganism, Thatcherism, Hillsborough, and its aftermath) to the emergence of the deregulated, globalized and deeply polarized postindustrial economy of the twenty-first century (the era of the Premier League). Nearly all are afflicted by a real melancholy that entwines the coming of age with the loss of a gilded if problematic past. From the very earliest days of its new commercialism football was simultaneously serving as a giant obituary notice for the death of industrial Britain, the passing of a masculine working-class world, rough but impassioned and alive, and its replacement with the comfortable but effete bourgeois world of the high arts. As David Thomas predicts, in the Daily Telegraph:
“A decade or two from now, the roar of the crowd may well have dwindled to an appreciative murmur as upscale audiences applaud the subtle interplay of footballers moving with balletic grace.… But as dusk approaches, the ghosts of footballing legends, will look down from on high. They’ll remember the passion. They’ll think of the steam as it rose from a pulsating, shouting, singing crowd, who watched hard men play a hard man’s sport.”

* Like any imagined community, the English football nation is predominantly a mediated occasion. England’s games are, for most, a television experience. But in a telling parallel with much of the nation’s political conversation, the tone of media coverage has consistently been set by the tabloid press. Over the two decades since the 1990 World Cup the steady decline in newspaper sales, and the huge expansion of space for football in the broadsheet press as well as on TV, radio, and Internet, have diluted the impact of the tabloids, but they remain the most powerful voices. Their contribution has been fourfold. First and foremost they have consistently set the narrative arc of every tournament in which England have played. That arc runs from the generation of overinflated expectations to the splenetic recriminations and vacuous post mortems that follow defeat. Secondly, within that arc, the press have elevated the role of the England manager in the story and then pursued a highly personalized and vindictive agenda usually reserved for politicians in their sights. Thirdly, the tabloids have taken the lead in framing England’s opponents in terms of comically antiquated stereotypes. And, fourthly, as sex and violence sell, the press have gone looking for such stories. In the 1990s they simultaneously pilloried and delighted in the violence that accompanied many of England’s games, actively searching out trouble.

Posted in England, Soccer | Comments Off on The Game of Our Lives: The Meaning And Making Of English Football

Day 35 Down Under – I Am On The Ledge And The Tide is Coming In

Posted in Australia | Comments Off on Day 35 Down Under – I Am On The Ledge And The Tide is Coming In

Guillaume Faye, the Golden one and the metapolitical legion

Professor Ico Maly writes in 2021:

Metapolitics 2.0 is deeply woven into the new media system. The impact and the influence of The Golden One, and thus his role in the distribution of far right ideology, cannot be reduced to his content alone. We have to understand it in relation to online persona and thus also the digital and algorithmic environment in which he produces his voice. The management of visibility, as well as avoiding non-visibility, is a constant worry for all actors in this media system. Making yourself visible is thus critical for all ideological projects. Over The Golden One’s long social media career he has proven himself a master of this game. Further he has remained fully integrated on all major digital platforms (YouTube, Twitter, Instagram and Facebook) for almost a decade. He used the affordances of each platform and adopted classic influencer techniques to grow an audience, keep that audience, and build a community around him.

Key to any contemporary metapolitical project is thus being and staying integrated in each platform’s culture and adjusting to community rules. It is their integration in the new media ecology that allows them to become so influential. Since the end of 2020, the Golden One has struggled to remain integrated. His personal Instagram and Facebook accounts have been deleted. He is now using his existing mainstream accounts to move his audience to new platforms like GAB and Telegram. In a desperate attempt to remain on YouTube, he has announced that he will stop posting political videos there. His attempts to reinstate his Instagram and maintain his YouTube account show us just how important mainstream digital media are for the metapolitical project.

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WHO’S WHO IN THE DISSIDENT RIGHT: BRITTANY PETTIBONE

Colin Liddell writes:

As an e-THOT, it can safely be assumed that she has no ideas, originality, or authenticity of her own worth commenting on. So, why even mention her in a serious compendium like this?

The main and perhaps only reason to keep tabs on Brittany is as an “historical artefact” demonstrating how the combination of social media and thottery became conduits for the degenerative sub-intellectual and sub-ideological content that undermined the once potent force known as the Alt-Right. From a high-IQ, “Apollonian” movement, forging a future spiritual and philosophic elite, it instead transmuted into an impotent, infantalised, emotionalised, and over-feminised hot mess, which is where it kind of remains today.

Characters like Brittany played their part in this tragic downward spiral.

Luckily, I don’t have to do all the tedious research to demonstrate this, as a hard-working academic at a Dutch university has spent years trawling through Pettibone’s Twitter and other social media to build up a convincing picture of how she was turned from an apolitical airhead with a petty interest in sci-fi writing into part of the mooing herd of Alt-Righters stumbling off the conspiritard and meme cliffs.

The academic, Professor Ico Maly details how Pettibone was a nobody on Twitter with low engagement until she started to pick up on the noise generated by the Alt-Right and Trump’s presidential run, and started to tentatively chime in, about one month before the election in November 2016.

Professor Ico Maly (in the Culture Studies Department, Tilburg University in the Netherlands) writes in this 2020 paper:

Far-right movements, activists, and political parties are on the rise worldwide. Several scholars connect this rise of the far-right at least partially to the affordances of digital media and to a new digital metapolitical battle. A lot has been written about the far-right’s adoption of trolling, harassment, and meme-culture in their metapolitical strategy, but researchers have focused less on how far-right vloggers are using the practices of influencer culture for metapolitical goals. This paper tries to fill this gap and bring new theoretical insights based on a digital ethnographic case study. By analyzing political YouTuber and #pizzagate propagator Brittany Pettibone, this paper contributes to our understanding of radicalization processes in relation to the use of digital media.

…Mainstream digital media like YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram are used by radical right and far-right actors in connection to niched websites, boards, crowd funding platforms, click farms, bot-networks, and alt-tech to engage in a metapolitical battle: a cultural or ideological war for hegemony.

The Alt Right works in niches because the mainstream means of cultural production (New Yorker, New York Times, Harvard, etc) are shut to them.

Ico Maly writes: “The appropriation of digital culture and digital technologies has changed the metapolitics of the far-right. Not only the intellectual, but also the activist, the politician and the prosumer are now imagined as part of the new right metapolitical battle.”

Colin Liddell points out that prior to 2014, the Alt Right was primarily a written medium, but after 2014, it became primarily a lower IQ podcasting and livestreaming and s***-posting medium.

Maly:

* People do not radicalize in relation to abstract phenomena, but in relation to (a network of) very specific individuals, websites, channels, and discourses. The Trump campaign under Steve Bannon succeeded in connecting several of these niches together (the so-called alt-right, incels, #maga-activists, 4channers, anti-feminists, pizzagaters) in one movement…

* At its core, every new right metapolitical project is about the
production and hegemonization of an ideology that rejects liberal democracy, the left and the (radical) Enlightenment tradition in general.

* micro-celebrity should be understood as ‘a self-presentation technique in which people view themselves as a public persona to be consumed by others, use strategic intimacy to appeal to followers, and regard their audience as fans’…

* This “edited self,” as García-Rapp and Roca-Cuberes (2017) call it, is at the same time a product of the internal norms of each community (shaping its discourses, styles, looks, and ideologies) and the technical affordances and the media-ideologies connected to the platform (visible in its community standards and norms), and the intrinsic features of online content. Influencer culture is thus a socio-technical assemblage: the voice and performance of the social media influencer is not entirely
“free,” but a product of socio-technologic interaction between the vlogger, the platform(s), his or her followers, and the larger niche in which the influencer acts.

* Influencers are an integral part of the so-called attention-economy or what Venturini calls the ‘economy of virality’ (Venturini 2019, p. 133). They capture the attention of the users and activate them (García-Rapp and Roca-Cuberes 2017). Audience labour (Fisher 2015), or more specifically, the interaction between people, interfaces, and algorithms, is the fundament of the contemporary digital economy. This audience labour and attention is measured, quantified, and standardized in the form of “reach,” “views,” “interactions,” “likes,” and “shares.”

* Such claims give readers the impression that those recommendation algorithms work independently and overrule human agency. New research shows that YouTube’s recommendation mechanism does not promote inflammatory or radicalized content (Ledwich and Zaitsev 2020). Both claims do rely on a technological determinism, as they seem to understand the algorithms as completely independent actors. By adopting an ethnographic interactionist approach, the focus is not on the algorithms and the platforms alone, but on what people do with interfaces and algorithms.

* …Pettibone links to a thread from the infamous pro-Trump-reddit
/r/The_Donald as “proof” that the Democratic party organized pedophilia rings. The whole thread is based on one email from performance artist Marina Abramovic to John Podesta in which she says that she is ‘looking forward to the Spirit Cooking dinner at my place’ (Wikileaks 2016). In those tweets, Abromovic’s arty “dinner party” concepts called Spirit Cooking were de-contextualized. They were now read literally as an invitation for “occult/magic gatherings” where children were molested and
murdered. Art—fiction—was turned into “reality.” This re-entextualization has had profound and powerful effects, as it was the start of a new conspiracy theory—Pizzagate…

* In less than one month, Pettibone developed a feel for hashtags and tapped into very successful ones like #DNCleak2, #spiritcooking, #ClintonCult, and #SavetheChildren. The success of these hashtags was not only a matter of organic uptake. Twitter found that 5% of the activity related to the #podestaemail hashtag came from bots (O’Sullivan 2018). The #spiritcooking hashtag was supported by the Russian internet agency (DiResta et al. 2019) and the #pizzagate hashtag was also pushed by
extensive bot-activity, primarily focused on internationalizing the affaire (Guenon des Mesnards and Zaman 2018). This made pizzagate into a global phenomenon getting global traction. Pettibone’s hashtag tactics helped turn Brittany Pettibone, the aspiring teenage writer, into an influential political tweep playing a major role in spreading the #pizzagate conspiracy theory…

* Pettibone, together with the Canadian far right YouTuber and activist Lauren Southern, started travelling to Europe and published vlogs on
their travels and especially on the identitarian movements and their actions in Europe.

7. From Activist Tweep to Metapolitical Influencer

In less than one year after her first political tweet, Pettibone had acquired large visibility—a key value within the attention economy (García-Rapp and Roca-Cuberes 2019)—within the global far right
niche. The name Brittany Pettibone had become a brand with a substantial audience of alt-right and identitarian activists. In the next months and years, she would capitalize on this position. Since May 2017, Pettibone started to craft her channel around her own personality. The banner ‘Virtue of the West’ was replaced by a professionally crafted intro positioning her name and her own logo.

In less than one year after her first political tweet, Pettibone had acquired large visibility—a key value within the attention economy (García-Rapp and Roca-Cuberes 2017)—within the global far-right
niche. The name Brittany Pettibone had become a brand with a substantial audience of alt-right and identitarian activists. In the next months and years, she would capitalize on this position. Since May 2017, Pettibone started to craft her channel around her own personality. The banner ‘Virtue of the West’ was replaced by a professionally crafted intro positioning her name and her own logo.

Since April 2017, we also see that Pettibone more regularly starts to use her Instagram account, giving her followers more insight in “the back office” of her political activism and seemingly giving unfiltered access to her private life. This influencer practice is commonly understood as “networked intimacy.” The concept was initially introduced to try to understand how people use digital media to make friends or to display intimacy in the context of social media (Miguel 2018). In relation to influencers, it has gotten a slightly different meaning. Networked intimacy has become an instrument to bind audiences to the influencer and create a perception of authenticity.
Whereas in 2016 pictures on Pettibone’s Instagram mostly showed typical family pictures, we see a clear break in 2017. From her invite to Trump’s inauguration, over selfies with Lauren Southern to her performance at the Free Speech Rally in Berkeley in April 2017: Instagram was now regularly
used to give her fans a look behind the scenes of her activist life. With the exception of some old #TBT pictures—showing her travelling with friends, celebrating her dog’s birthday and pictures with her family—most pictures were now carefully staged and stylized to contribute to her brand as an “important activist.” The intimacy of these “old family” #TBT photos were re-entextualized in a political context and blended with more glamorous pictures reminiscent of fashion shoots with behind the scenes pictures and stories on her political activism. Influencers, Hou (2019) argues, try to create an aura of authenticity through the (interactive) representation of the intimate and private self.
A practice Hou calls staged authenticity. A good example of how Pettibone uses staged authenticity for metapolitical goals is her wedding. In the weeks and months before her wedding with Martin Sellner (see Figure 8)—a key figure within the pan-European identitarian movement Generation
Identity—followers on her Instagram could see her getting her wedding ring sized, kissing Martin Sellner on a carriage under the caption ‘Du bist die liebe meines lebens,’ and pictures of both giving their wedding vows in a church on the Austrian countryside.

* Uptake refers to (1) the fact that within the digital ecology users are not only consumers but also (re)producers of discourse, so-called prosumers (Miller 2011) and (2) that algorithms and the interfaces of digital media play an important role in the dissemination and reproduction of ideas (see Maly 2019a, 2020c). Uptake through human and non-human actors (from bots to the algorithms organizing the communication on a platform) has become a crucial part of any political and metapolitical battle. Metapolitical messaging in the digital age is thus not a linear process between sender (the intellectual) and receiver (the people), but involves a multitude of human and non-human actors that
are all potential senders and receivers. This “uptake” is as crucial as the input.

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