Here are some highlights from this 2023 book by Stephen Turner and George Mazur:
* The term “administrative state” is now being treated as an invention of the paranoid Right and a misunderstanding of the nature of the state itself.
* The administrative state from its origins has aimed at making public opinion ineffective or undermining its independence, often in the name of leading it, educating it, or providing “justice,” that is to say, something beyond mere “opinion.”
* The administrative state…does not limit itself.
* In the decades after John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and especially over the past 20 years or so, many books have been published with the same aim: to vindicate and explicate something that is usually called social democracy on philosophical or social science grounds. After the intense ideological rivalries of the twentieth century, this political ideal has become the default position of virtually all academic thinkers in relevant areas. A century that began with the frank acceptance of the irreconcilability of political value choices, and proceeded with extraordinarily intense ideological warfare, ended with a surprisingly broad, though loose, consensus.
* These writers all reject the idea of freedom as non-interference or choice as inadequate or wrong; they all decry great wealth, the power of money or the power that money gives people, as a form of injustice; and all involve some idea of autonomy governed by reason.
Who are the major thinkers today in the West who deny the great god of “[personal] autonomy governed by reason”?
ChatGPT says:
Most of these thinkers are not centrally concerned with domination in the modern liberal-left sense—i.e., oppression as lack of recognition, microaggressions, or identity-based exclusion. Here’s a breakdown:
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MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel
Some concern with domination, but understood through tradition, community breakdown, and moral fragmentation rather than identity politics.
Taylor is closest to liberal recognition theory, especially in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition.
MacIntyre and Sandel care more about the loss of moral language and community than “recognition” per se. -
Deneen, Milbank, O’Donovan
Skeptical or critical of the modern focus on domination as identity-based humiliation.
They worry more about spiritual or metaphysical alienation—how liberalism’s elevation of autonomy fractures tradition, religion, and authority.
Milbank and O’Donovan explicitly critique modern secular liberalism for replacing theological truth with “recognition” discourse. -
Scruton
Opposes the idea that society owes identity affirmation or recognition.
Emphasizes duty, beauty, sacredness, and the conservation of institutions—not freedom from domination as defined by progressive politics. -
Manent
Sees liberal focus on identity as a symptom of moral and political fragmentation.
Concerned with the loss of shared political purpose, not domination in the recognition-theory sense.
Bottom line:
These thinkers mostly reject the liberal shift toward defining freedom as the absence of domination via misrecognition.
Their critiques aim higher: the spiritual, moral, and metaphysical breakdown behind modern individualism—not the interpersonal slights or systemic marginalizations that dominate current progressive discourse.
Back to Turner & Mazur:
* The right thing is collective; the tension is between the collectively acknowledged good and the distorted private good, which is distorted because it is at heart a quest for something like autonomy and recognition but expresses itself in greed and power seeking, which are the things that need to be collectively controlled.
ChatGPT:
That quote reflects a progressive or Marxian moral-political view: that private desires (like autonomy or recognition) are distortions, and the collective must correct them through control or reeducation.
The thinkers in question reject that paradigm.
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MacIntyre believes the good is teleological and tradition-based, not a collective imposition on private distortion. He critiques liberal individualism, but not in favor of collective correction—rather, a return to virtues embedded in practices and communities.
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Sandel and Taylor see selves as socially situated, but not in need of being corrected by the collective. They critique procedural liberalism, not to elevate collectivism, but to recover deeper sources of meaning and moral depth.
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Deneen would argue that the collective (as structured under liberalism) is the very thing producing distorted private goods. He’s not calling for collective regulation of desire, but for cultural renewal through tradition and virtue.
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Milbank and O’Donovan reject both private autonomy and secular collective authority. For them, the only legitimate “collective” is the ecclesial body (the Church), not the state or society acting as moral enforcer.
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Scruton champions traditional institutions and duties, but deeply distrusts any collective effort to “fix” individuals. He believes in cultivation, not coercion.
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Manent sees the political as a shared moral space, but one that arises from history and religion—not abstract notions of correcting private distortion.
Bottom line:
These thinkers reject the idea that private goods are inherently distorted and need to be overridden by a collectively defined good. They are skeptical of both radical individualism and collectivist moral engineering. Their goal is neither unrestrained autonomy nor collective control—but the recovery of meaning through tradition, virtue, and transcendent sources of order.
Turner and Mazur write:
* There are many other explanations of why “social democracy” has not happened: the media, the pre-existing culture (which is racist, patriarchal, anti-egalitarian, suffused with false beliefs derived from religion, or scientism), a failed public sphere, or other sources.
* They want a social matrix in which the bad effects of competitiveness and striving are tempered, or replaced, by a regime of personal relations in which dignity is respected, autonomy is granted, and people trust each other―a decent society, as Avishai Margalit calls it (1996). All of the “social” goals involve more discretionary power for officials. These authors all embrace the idea of an activist, paternalist, benevolent state. Health care is often the model for the proper role of the state. Where it is done correctly, it combines dignity, compassion, paternalism, efficiency, the proper use of expertise, universalism, respect for autonomy, and sufficient provision with a rational allocation of scarce resources.
ChatGPT says:
Why would a reasonable, decent person object to this vision?
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1. It expands discretionary power dangerously.
The more discretion officials have, the more room there is for bias, coercion, and mission creep. What starts as “benevolent” paternalism can easily morph into soft authoritarianism. Good intentions don’t guarantee just outcomes. -
2. It assumes the state can embody moral virtue.
Critics argue that the state is a blunt instrument. It’s built for enforcing rules, not embodying compassion, dignity, or trust. Trying to make it do so often leads to bureaucratic overreach and unintended consequences. -
3. It infantilizes citizens.
A paternalist state may protect, but it also disempowers. Critics like Hayek or Rieff would say: the more the state manages your moral and social life, the less you develop responsibility, virtue, or independence. -
4. It replaces organic trust with engineered dependency.
Real trust grows in families, associations, and local communities—not by central planning. Making dignity and compassion into functions of state design risks undermining real social fabric. -
5. It idealizes health care as a political model.
Health care is important, but its goals (efficiency + compassion + universalism) don’t translate well to education, family life, religion, or moral development. Many fear a technocratic mindset creeping into areas where it doesn’t belong. -
6. It fails to limit itself.
Once you justify “more state” for one good (like health or dignity), where do you stop? Critics worry this logic gives the state a mandate to do everything in the name of the good, which is inherently dangerous—even if benevolent at first.
Bottom line:
Good people can want dignity, trust, and compassion—and still oppose a paternalist state—because they believe these values flourish better under limits, subsidiarity, and moral traditions that lie outside politics.
Turner and Mazur write: “They err on the side of protecting the culture of the minority group. For the dominant culture, however, matters are different: it needs to be reformed to accord with reason.”
Who are the most eloquent spokesmen on behalf of the majority culture of America, England, Australia and don’t think it needs to be reformed to accord with reason?
ChatGPT says:
Here’s a list of eloquent and influential voices in the U.S., U.K., and Australia who defend the legitimacy and value of the majority culture—without insisting it must be reformed to meet abstract rational ideals or minority-driven frameworks.
They argue that traditions, inherited norms, and majority ways of life deserve respect—not just critique.
Bottom line:
These thinkers argue that the dominant culture isn’t just a power structure to be rationally critiqued—it’s a moral inheritance to be respected. They reject the elite stance that says only minorities need cultural protection, while the majority must justify itself by reason.
Monty Python and the Holy Grail:
King Arthur: (to the peasant) Will you shut up! Will you shut up! [Arthur grabs and shakes him]
Dennis the Peasant: Ah, now we see the violence inherent in the system!
King Arthur: Shut up!
Dennis the Peasant: Oh! Come and see the violence inherent in the system! Help! Help! I’m being repressed!
King Arthur: Bloody peasant!
Dennis the Peasant: Oh, what a giveaway! Did you hear that? Did you hear that, eh? That’s what I’m on about! Did you see him repressing me? You saw him, didn’t you?
Stephen Turner writes:
* Economic power for Ringen seems to be defined simply to mean the influence of business money on political campaigns and lobbying. The fact, for example, that Swedish politics is dominated by a major union confederation which owns a controlling interest in the most important newspaper, is the main force in the party that has ruled with only slight interruptions for decades, and is well represented on government panels is apparently not an instance of economic power for Ringen. If one scaled up its membership to fit the population of the United States, this confederation would be a mind-boggling 66 million strong. This kind of overwhelming power would produce “consensus” even in the United States. Obama, who received the highest vote total in American history, had only 63.25 million votes.
