The Translator: David Klinghoffer and the Argument Against Materialism

David Klinghoffer (b. 1965) works as a journalist, editor, and cultural critic. For more than three decades he has argued that modern science has overreached its proper boundary and turned itself from a method of inquiry into a comprehensive picture of reality. His career runs through Jewish journalism, conservative magazines, trade publishing, and the intelligent design movement, and across all of it he serves as a translator between worlds that rarely speak to one another.

His importance rests less on any single original argument than on his role as an interpreter. He explains scientific controversies to religious readers, theological questions to secular readers, and philosophical disputes to a general audience. He stands at the meeting point of several arguments at once: religion and science, Judaism and modernity, Darwinism and design, and the reach of materialist accounts of mind, morality, and culture.

He was born in Santa Monica, California. He graduated magna cum laude from Brown University in 1987 with a degree in comparative literature and religious studies. His formation differed from that of most figures who debate evolution. He did not come up through laboratory science or academic philosophy. He came up through literature, history, religion, and classical texts, and that training shaped the kind of argument he makes. Where many critics of Darwinian theory press technical questions in biology, Klinghoffer approaches the subject through philosophy, history, and religion.

His early career unfolded in journalism. He wrote and edited for several publications and moved into conservative intellectual circles, serving as a senior editor and literary editor at National Review. He contributed to The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, Commentary, and other publications, and he wrote a column for the Jewish newspaper The Forward, to which he still contributes.

One concern runs through these years. He asks whether a secular society can hold together after it abandons its religious foundations. He does not treat religion as a private spiritual matter. He treats inherited traditions as stores of civilizational memory, moral authority, and continuity across generations. That concern shapes his memoir The Lord Will Gather Me In: My Journey to Jewish Orthodoxy (1998), which records his move toward Orthodox Judaism.

The book shows a pattern that marks his later work. His attraction to Orthodoxy did not rest on mystical experience or sudden emotional conversion. It grew from his doubts about radical individualism and from his respect for inherited authority, communal obligation, and historical continuity. He came to see tradition not as an obstacle to freedom but as the frame that makes a serious freedom possible. That view placed him among thinkers who defend the past against the assumption that each generation must build its world from nothing.

Klinghoffer has written across a wide range. The Discovery of God: Abraham and the Birth of Monotheism (2003) reads Abraham as the figure who discovers the one God and carries that message into history. Why the Jews Rejected Jesus: The Turning Point in Western History (2006) argues the Jewish case against Christian claims and treats that refusal as a hinge of Western history. Shattered Tablets: What the Ten Commandments Reveal About the Future of America takes up the Ten Commandments and the cost of ignoring them. These books show a writer at home in theology, scripture, and the history of religion.

His widest public visibility came through the Discovery Institute and its Center for Science and Culture. As a senior fellow and as the editor of the Institute’s daily publication, he became a central voice in the intelligent design movement.

To grasp his role there, one must separate scientific research from intellectual advocacy. He does not claim original discoveries in the laboratory. His contribution lies elsewhere. He curates, interprets, and advocates. He takes technical disputes and recasts them as cultural and philosophical arguments. He explains why a given controversy matters and how it connects to larger questions about human nature, purpose, mind, and faith.

Nowhere does this work show more clearly than in Evolution News & Science Today, the daily site he edits for the Discovery Institute. Across hundreds of essays, reviews, and editorials, he has built the public narrative of intelligent design. His task is not only to defend particular scientific claims. He finds developments in biology, genetics, neuroscience, philosophy, education, and public policy that can be read as strains within scientific orthodoxy.

A typical Klinghoffer essay opens not with molecular biology but with a newspaper article, a campus dispute, a disciplinary proceeding, a line of poetry, or a philosophical quarrel. From that opening he builds an argument about how scientific institutions behave and about the assumptions that sit under contemporary materialism.

That focus on institutions defines much of his writing. He attends less to evolutionary theory itself than to the structures that hold a scientific consensus in place. He examines hiring decisions, peer review, publication standards, professional sanctions, and the press coverage of scientific debates. When a dissenting scientist meets professional resistance, he reads the episode as a sign that consensus rests on institutional pressure as well as on evidence and argument. His critics call this an attempt to manufacture controversy where little scientific disagreement exists. His supporters call it a defense of intellectual freedom against conformity.

The deeper question in his work concerns authority. The issue is not only whether a biological theory holds. The issue is who holds the right to define reality and to set the limits of acceptable knowledge. That concern explains why his writing often reads like media criticism. He watches mainstream science journalism the way a political reporter watches a powerful office. He reads reports in newspapers and journals not only for their factual claims but for the assumptions buried inside them, and he argues that much science reporting carries metaphysical commitments dressed as neutral conclusions.

A larger philosophical claim sits beneath these critiques. Klinghoffer separates science as a method of empirical inquiry from materialism as a total picture of the world. Many scientific institutions, he argues, blur that line and treat materialist explanations not as provisional hypotheses but as settled assumptions. His quarrel with Darwinian evolution matters less, then, than his quarrel with materialism. He argues that a purely material account cannot explain consciousness, reason, free will, moral obligation, the experience of beauty, or religious belief. The debate over biology becomes, in his hands, part of a larger argument about whether a human life reduces to physical process.

That argument places him in a tradition older than the modern creation-evolution fight. It reaches back into natural theology and its claim that nature shows order and purpose pointing beyond blind matter. His later work leans toward classical philosophy, and Platonism in particular. Plato’s Revenge: The New Science of the Immaterial Genome (2023) argues that discoveries in genetics and developmental biology reveal forms of organization that resist a strictly mechanistic account of life. Whether a reader accepts the case or not, the book tries to move intelligent design out of the American culture war and into the older ground of metaphysics and the history of ideas. He presents design not as a biblical doctrine seeking scientific cover but as a philosophical inference about the nature of order.

His reliance on literature and high culture sets him apart from most advocates of intelligent design. He draws on Shakespeare, Yeats, Dostoevsky, classical music, European history, and Jewish religious texts. A discussion of genetics can turn into a reflection on poetry. A scientific dispute can open into a meditation on art, beauty, and mind. This habit serves his argument. He holds that materialism flattens human experience by reducing rich realities to process, and he invokes literature, music, and philosophy to point at parts of human life that a reductive account cannot hold. The result reads like neither scientific prose nor ordinary political commentary.

New Atheism runs through his work as a steady adversary. Richard Dawkins (b. 1941), Sam Harris (b. 1967), Daniel Dennett (1942-2024), and Christopher Hitchens (1949-2011) appear again and again as his opponents. He reads their project not as a critique of religion alone but as an effort to turn scientific materialism into a full account of reality. Their writers, he argues, move past empirical science into claims about morality, meaning, mind, and human purpose. Much of his work tries to pull empirical inquiry back from the metaphysical conclusions those writers draw from it.

His place within American Judaism deserves note. Intelligent design has belonged mostly to Protestant evangelical institutions. Most Jewish denominations and intellectual bodies have made room for evolutionary theory with little conflict. Klinghoffer therefore occupies an unusual seat in Jewish thought. He argues that religious Jews should attend to the philosophical reach of materialist readings of evolution, since the issue, in his view, is not the biology but the wider tendency to treat material explanation as the whole story. He has sought to build alliances between Orthodox Jewish thinkers and Christian defenders of intelligent design around shared commitments to creation, purpose in nature, and biblical tradition.

That effort has met mixed results. Many Jews committed to traditional practice see no conflict between evolutionary biology and faith, so Klinghoffer remains a minority voice within much of organized American Jewish intellectual life. The position fits him. He has preferred to contest dominant assumptions rather than accommodate them.

Seen across the long history of American letters, Klinghoffer belongs to a recurring type: the religious dissenter who challenges the authority of secular institutions. His forerunners include anti-materialist philosophers, religious journalists, natural theologians, and cultural critics who held that the modern age mistook a method, naturalism, for a complete picture of the world. Whether a reader counts him a defender of intellectual pluralism or a skilled advocate for a contested idea, his work turns narrow disputes into broad civilizational arguments. He asks not only how life arose but what a person should conclude from scientific knowledge, who holds the authority to interpret it, and whether the modern scientific picture can account for the deepest parts of human experience.

For more than thirty years those questions have formed the center of his project. He lives near Seattle, in Washington State, and continues to write and edit from there. His career stands as a sustained argument that the great disputes of modern science cannot be separated from equally serious disputes about philosophy, religion, culture, and the meaning of a human life.

The Standards He Cannot See: Klinghoffer and the Authority of Experts

Stephen P. Turner (b. 1951) spends his career on one question. How does expert authority survive in a society that governs itself by consent? Experts claim the right to settle matters that the rest of us cannot judge. They rest that claim on knowledge laymen lack. In a democracy this creates a standing problem, since the people asked to defer cannot check the grounds on which they are asked to defer. Turner refuses both easy answers. He will not dismiss experts as frauds, and he will not grant that expert authority justifies itself. He sits in the hard middle and asks how the claim gets made, who certifies the certifiers, and what happens when the grounds of an expert judgment cannot be laid out for outside inspection. Klinghoffer lives in that hard middle. He works the gap Turner maps.
Start with what a field is. For Turner a field runs on competence that men acquire through apprenticeship and habit. A trained scientist knows what counts as a clean result, a promising line, a question worth asking, a paper worth citing. He cannot write that knowledge down in full. He carries it as skill. The standards that make biology a field live in the trained judgment of its practitioners, and that judgment passes from teacher to student through years of work rather than through a rulebook a stranger can read. Peer review, hiring, and the sanction of careless work are the visible edge of this tacit competence. They are how a field keeps faith with its own standards.
Klinghoffer reads the same surface and sees enforcement. He watches peer review the way a political reporter watches a powerful office. He reads a hiring decision, a retracted paper, a denied tenure, and he reads policing. Consensus, in his account, holds because the institution punishes dissent. Turner lets us name the alternative he leaves out. The same acts might be a field protecting its tacit standards rather than a cabal protecting its power. A geneticist who rejects a design paper might be exercising trained judgment that the paper fails by criteria he holds in his hands and cannot fully spell out. Klinghoffer cannot see those standards, because he never served the apprenticeship that installs them. The question is whether he names a real overreach or refuses the competence that makes the field a field.
Here Turner exposes the move that powers Klinghoffer’s whole project. Klinghoffer asks science to justify its consensus in public terms a layman can audit. Show me the argument. Show me the evidence that rules out design. Show me why this dissenter was wrong rather than merely unwelcome. The demand sounds fair. It cannot be met. Trained judgment does not reduce to a public proof, because the grounds are tacit and acquired. A field cannot hand an outsider the years of habituation that let an insider see at a glance what fails. So the demand sets a test the field must flunk, and Klinghoffer reads the failure as proof of bad faith. The opacity that Turner treats as the normal condition of expertise becomes, in Klinghoffer’s hands, evidence of ideology.
Turner cuts the other way too, and this is where Klinghoffer earns a hearing. Turner takes seriously that experts smuggle substantive commitments into claims they present as neutral and technical. An expert can dress a value, a metaphysic, or a guild interest as a finding. He can pass off a worldview as a result. This is the heart of Klinghoffer’s charge. He argues that materialism rides into the public square disguised as method, that scientists state a philosophical position about what exists and call it science. Turner gives that charge standing. The separation of science-as-method from materialism-as-worldview is the separation Turner himself insists on when he warns that expert authority covers more ground than expert knowledge licenses. On this point Klinghoffer is not a crank. He presses a distinction a serious theorist of expertise would defend.
When a scientist says the evidence favors common descent, he speaks within his competence, and Klinghoffer’s demand for a layman’s audit asks for what no expert field can give. When a scientist says that common descent shows the universe has no purpose and no author, he has stepped past his competence into metaphysics, and Klinghoffer’s complaint lands. The trouble is that Klinghoffer rarely sorts the two. He treats every act of gatekeeping as the second case. He needs the materialist overreach to be everywhere, because his cultural argument depends on it, and so he reads trained judgment and smuggled worldview as a single offense. Turner forces the sorting that Klinghoffer skips.
In The Social Theory of Practices Turner doubts that a field shares a single hidden substrate passed intact from mind to mind. He breaks up the collective. What looks like one shared body of tacit knowledge is, on his account, many individual habituations that resemble one another closely enough to pass. This denies Klinghoffer the picture he wants. His narrative needs a unified scientific orthodoxy, a collective will that enforces a party line. Turner hands him instead a loose crowd of trained men whose judgments converge without a central script. That convergence is harder to indict as conspiracy, because no one wrote the script and no committee guards it. The agreement Klinghoffer reads as enforcement might be many separate practitioners arriving at the same place by the same training. The frame takes away his villain.
Klinghoffer is right that expert authority outruns expert knowledge, and right that materialist metaphysics often travels first class on a scientific ticket. He is wrong to read the tacit, unstatable character of expert competence as evidence that the competence is fake. He asks a field to prove in public what fields hold in trained hands, and he treats the impossibility of that proof as a confession. Turner shows that both things hold at once. Experts overreach, and Klinghoffer overreaches in his charge against them. The work lives in the space between a real critique of expert authority and a refusal of the apprenticeship that gives any field the right to judge its own. Klinghoffer never decides which one he is making. That undecided question drives thirty years of his prose.

The Set

Klinghoffer lives at the meeting point of three circles, and the same posture binds all three. The first is the intelligent design world that runs out of the Discovery Institute in Seattle. The second is the conservative magazine world that raised him as a writer, the world of National Review, Commentary, and the old Weekly Standard. The third is the traditionalist Jewish world he entered by conversion and never left. Each circle holds a different membership, yet each shares a single conviction. A secular establishment has seized the authority to define reality, and a faithful remnant must stand against it.

Take the Discovery Institute first, since it pays him and prints him. Bruce Chapman (b. 1940) and George Gilder (b. 1939) built the place, two Harvard men who started a Republican journal as undergraduates and carried that taste for insurgency into middle age. The intellectual founder of the design movement sits beside them, Phillip E. Johnson (1940-2019), the Berkeley law professor who wrote Darwin on Trial and called himself the father of the cause. Around them gathered the men who give the movement its scientific face. Stephen C. Meyer (b. 1958) holds a Cambridge doctorate and runs the Center for Science and Culture. Michael Behe (b. 1952) teaches biochemistry at Lehigh University and built the argument from irreducible complexity. William Dembski (b. 1960) brought the mathematics of what he calls specified complexity. Jonathan Wells (1942-2024) attacked the textbook icons of evolution. Michael Denton (b. 1943) wrote the book that started many of them doubting. David Berlinski (b. 1942) plays the urbane secular skeptic who doubts Darwin without professing a creed. James Tour, the Rice University chemist with his long list of papers, presses the origin-of-life question. Younger hands fill in around them, Casey Luskin, Douglas Axe, John West, Guillermo Gonzalez, Ann Gauger. Behind all of it stands a patron saint who never joined, C.S. Lewis (1898-1963), whose Christian apologetics gave the founders their template for fighting a confident secular age.

What does this set value? Purpose over accident. Mind over matter. The person over the machine. They hold that a human being carries a dignity no arrangement of atoms can produce, that consciousness and conscience point past the physical, that the order of living things shows craft rather than chance. They prize the Western inheritance, the literature and music and philosophy that Klinghoffer drags into every essay, and they treat that inheritance as proof of a height in man that materialism cannot reach. They prize liberty, which they cash out as the freedom to dissent from a reigning scientific consensus. Above all they prize the idea that the cosmos means something, that it was made, that it speaks.

Their hero is the credentialed insider who breaks ranks and pays for it. Johnson the Berkeley jurist who turned his courtroom skills against the reigning theory carries the founding charisma. Behe earns honor because his own department at Lehigh posted a notice disowning his views, and he kept his chair and kept teaching. The set venerates the punished dissenter above the comfortable believer. Richard Sternberg edited a design paper through peer review at a Smithsonian-affiliated journal and saw his standing collapse. Guillermo Gonzalez wrote on cosmic fine-tuning and lost his tenure bid at Iowa State University. Dean Kenyon, the San Francisco State University biologist pulled from his own classroom, gave the movement its first martyr and gave Meyer his first cause. The expelled scientist is the saint of this world. Suffering at the hands of the establishment reads as a credential, almost a sacrament. The convert ranks high too, the man who walks away from comfort toward a harder truth, which is the role Klinghoffer wrote for himself and the role Wells lived when he left a secular life for a religious one.

The status games follow from the central wound. The charge against them is that they are not real scientists, so they wage a constant war for legitimacy. They advertise pedigree without rest. Cambridge, Berkeley, Lehigh, Rice, the doctorate, the named chair, the count of published papers. They prize the breach of a respectable wall, the op-ed that lands in The Wall Street Journal, the book that climbs the bestseller list the way Meyer’s Darwin’s Doubt did. A blurb from a recognized name buys more than money. And the game runs in reverse as well. To be attacked by Richard Dawkins or by the National Center for Science Education raises a man’s standing inside the set, because a large enemy confirms that the fight is large. Eugenie Scott (b. 1945) and her organization, Kenneth Miller (b. 1948) on the witness stand, Stephen Jay Gould (1941-2002) in his prime, each functioned as an honor-conferring adversary. There is even an intramural contest with the believers who made peace with Darwin. Francis Collins (b. 1950), the geneticist who heads a theistic-evolution project, draws sharper fire from this set than any atheist, because he holds the ground they want and concedes the point they will not.

Now their normative claims, the things they state as ought rather than is. Science must follow the evidence wherever it leads, and any rule that forbids a design conclusion in advance offends against inquiry. Materialism is a metaphysics smuggled in as method, and it ought to be unmasked rather than obeyed. A teacher ought to be free to teach the controversy. A person ought never be reduced to chemistry. These read as commandments, not hypotheses. The academic-freedom claim does heavy work, since it lets a religious project speak the secular language of free speech and open debate, and it turns every professional sanction against a member into a violation of conscience.

Their essentialist claims run deeper and harder. They hold that the line between human and animal is a true line, not a gradient, that human exceptionalism names a real kind rather than a flattering story. They hold that mind is its own thing and will not dissolve into brain. They treat design as an objective property present in nature, readable in the cell, so that irreducible complexity and specified complexity name features that are simply there to be found rather than impressions in the eye of a believer. Denton built his early work around fixed types in biology, forms that matter cannot generate on its own. Information becomes, in their hands, a category as basic as matter and energy, and one that points to a mind as its source. The moral law gets the same treatment, a fixed order written into the world rather than a custom men invent. Klinghoffer’s later turn to Plato fits this exactly, since he wants form and order to be real and prior, not late arrivals from below.

Their moral grammar is a drama of courage against conformity. The brave few stand for truth while the many bend to power. The vocabulary is the vocabulary of persecution, blacklist, inquisition, and witness. They cast themselves as Galileo and the scientific establishment as the Church that silenced him, a reversal they never tire of. Capitulation to materialism is the sin. Standing firm under professional fire is the virtue. The founding strategy paper called itself the Wedge and spoke of renewing the culture, language of mission and reformation rather than of a research program. To join is to enlist. To leave under pressure is to fall.

Truth asks for the other half of the picture, and Klinghoffer’s set hears it daily. The mainstream of science calls the project pseudoscience and treats the controversy as manufactured. The courts agreed in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District in 2005, when a federal judge ruled that intelligent design is religion in a lab coat and barred it from a Pennsylvania science class. The early money came from religious-right donors, the Ahmanson family above all, and the Wedge document laid out aims that sit awkwardly beside the public claim that this is science and only science. So the set lives a permanent double posture. Inside, they are persecuted truth-tellers keeping a flame. Outside, they are a well-funded movement dressing a religious aim in scientific clothes. Both readings have evidence behind them, and the gap between them is the air this world breathes.

Klinghoffer holds an odd seat in it. He is the man of letters among the lab men, the one who answers a genetics argument with Dostoevsky. His standing comes from articulacy and range rather than from a degree in biology, and the set needs him because he can write for readers the scientists cannot reach. He is also the Jew among Protestants and Catholics, which carries us to his second and third circles. Most Orthodox Jews never enlist in this war. They make peace with evolution and feel no loss. Klinghoffer crosses a line few of his coreligionists cross when he allies with Christian design advocates, and the few Jewish parallels are thin, men like the physicist Gerald Schroeder who labor to reconcile Torah and cosmos. His bridge into the Christian world runs largely through Michael Medved (b. 1948), the film critic and talk host who is at once an observant Jew, a Discovery Institute fellow, and a man who praised Klinghoffer’s books. Around Medved stands the broader Jewish-conservative milieu that formed Klinghoffer the journalist, Dennis Prager (b. 1948), Rabbi Daniel Lapin (b. 1947), Joseph Telushkin (b. 1948), the Commentary world of Norman Podhoretz (b. 1930), the National Review world of William F. Buckley (1925-2008), and the newer national-conservative circle around Yoram Hazony (b. 1964). These men do not all sign the design petition. They share something prior to it, a reverence for inherited authority, a distrust of the autonomous modern self, and a sense that the secular order has hollowed out the West.

That shared prior is the thread through all three circles. The design scientists, the conservative writers, and the Orthodox faithful disagree on much. They agree that a powerful establishment has mistaken its method for the whole of reality, and that a faithful minority owes the world a refusal. Klinghoffer found three rooms furnished with the same conviction, and he has spent thirty years moving between them, carrying the argument from each into the others.

About Luke Ford

I teach Alexander Technique in Beverly Hills (Alexander90210.com).
This entry was posted in David Klinghoffer. Bookmark the permalink.