If you take David Pinsof’s incentive determinism seriously, the first step is to stop explaining antisemitic attacks in terms of “evil people” or “irrational hatred.” Pinsof’s point is that behavior follows incentives. People do what their environments reward or make emotionally satisfying.
So the useful question becomes: what incentive structures make attacking Jews attractive or useful for certain actors in the United States?
1. Status and signaling inside ideological coalitions
In polarized movements, attacking Jews can function as a signal of loyalty to the group. On the far right, antisemitic conspiracy theories about “globalists” or Jewish control serve as identity markers for white nationalist subcultures. On parts of the far left, the framing of Israel as a “settler-colonial state” sometimes morphs into rhetoric that treats Jews collectively as oppressors. This framing makes attacking Jews appear morally justified inside those circles.
The incentive is simple. If attacking Jews earns applause from your ideological peers, people who want status in that group will do it.
2. Online attention incentives
Social media platforms reward outrage and shocking content. Antisemitic memes, conspiracy theories, and threats often generate engagement, which can translate into followers, notoriety, or influence. Reports show that most Americans who witness antisemitism now encounter it online, illustrating how digital platforms amplify the phenomenon.
For a fringe activist, attacking Jews may bring far more attention than ordinary political commentary.
3. Coalition-building incentives in political activism
Sometimes antisemitism is not the primary goal. It emerges as a side effect of coalition politics. Activists trying to mobilize large movements may adopt narratives that unify supporters against a symbolic enemy. Jews or Israel can become that symbol because they are already embedded in historical narratives about power, colonialism, finance, or media.
In Pinsof terms, moral rhetoric often functions as coalition glue. It binds allies by defining a villain.
4. Low-risk targeting incentives
Another structural factor is perceived vulnerability. Jews are a small minority in the U.S. but highly visible through institutions like synagogues, schools, and community centers. Attackers may perceive these targets as symbolically powerful yet physically accessible. This helps explain why Jews make up a tiny percentage of the population but account for a large share of religion-based hate crimes.
When the perceived cost of targeting a group is low relative to the symbolic payoff, attacks become more likely.
5. Moral framing incentives
In many movements, the key incentive is moral self-image. If a narrative convinces people they are fighting oppression or defending civilization, hostility toward Jews can be reframed as righteous activism. Once that moral frame is established, extreme behavior becomes psychologically easier. This is why antisemitism often appears across ideologically opposed groups. Each coalition embeds Jews into its own moral story.
6. Event-trigger incentives
Antisemitic incidents spike around highly visible events involving Israel or global crises. For example, U.S. antisemitic incidents increased sharply after the Hamas attack and the war that followed. These events activate pre-existing narratives and create opportunities for mobilization.
Instead of asking “why do people hate Jews,” the incentive model asks:
What rewards does attacking Jews provide?
Common answers:
status within an ideological tribe
attention online
psychological relief through scapegoating
coalition solidarity
moral self-justification
low perceived risk
Once those incentives exist, some individuals will inevitably exploit them.
The uncomfortable implication of Pinsof’s approach is that reducing antisemitism requires changing incentives, not just condemning hatred.
That means altering what social groups reward, what platforms amplify, and what narratives confer moral status. Without those changes, the same patterns tend to reproduce themselves.
7. In academic or bureaucratic environments, Jews often represent a meritocratic standard that conflicts with newer equity-based hiring or promotion models. Attacking Jewish influence or institutional presence allows competitors to de-legitimize existing hierarchies to make room for their own advancement. This provides a material reward for professional actors who might otherwise have no personal animosity toward Jews.
8. The “middleman minority” position. Jews in the United States often occupy visible roles in retail, real estate, and professional services within urban areas. For local political leaders or activists, Jews serve as a buffer. Directing the frustration of a disadvantaged constituency toward Jewish landlords or shop owners diverts anger away from the state or more distant corporate entities. This provides a political safety valve for leaders who cannot or will not provide systemic economic improvements.
The data on hate crimes highlights the incentive of low-risk, high-visibility targeting. While Jews make up approximately 2.4% of the U.S. adult population, the FBI consistently reports they are the targets of over 60% of all religion-based hate crimes. In 2023, the Anti-Defamation League recorded 8,873 antisemitic incidents, a 140% increase from the previous year. These numbers suggest that for those seeking to make a public statement, the Jewish community offers a target that ensures immediate national media coverage.
9. Narrative simplicity. Complex geopolitical or economic problems are difficult to communicate to a mass audience. Jews have been used as a shorthand for “the elite” or “the oppressor” for centuries. Using an existing, recognizable villain reduces the “cost” of storytelling for a movement. It is easier to mobilize a crowd against a specific, identifiable group than it is to explain the interplay of global capital or historical grievances.
