Maariv’s Ben Caspit: Shorter, faster, deadlier: World’s militaries stunned by power of Israel Air Force

Report: “Three raids a day and a staggering munitions pace that shattered global standards. As pilots raced to Iran on stimulant pills, the partnership with the United States and the ingenuity of the women in the force created a single arm that choked off Tehran’s launching capabilities.”
The sortie tempo is the real story here. Flying to Iran three times per day per pilot is extraordinary. Modern air campaigns usually hinge on sortie generation, and the U.S. Air Force struggles to sustain two combat sorties per day per aircraft in prolonged operations. Tripling that tempo means Israel tried to win the launcher race before Iran could adapt.
The logic is simple. Missile wars are a race between launchers firing and bombers destroying launchers. Israel tried to overwhelm the cycle.
This also confirms the central operational problem Iran faces. Its missile force is powerful but brittle. Launchers must emerge from tunnels or dispersed sites to fire, and the moment they do, ISR systems can track them. High sortie tempo combined with good intelligence shrinks the window between launch and destruction. This is the vulnerability analysts like Mahmoudian have been describing.
The U.S. role is larger than the article implies. One hundred tankers means the United States essentially built an aerial logistics highway over the Middle East. Without that refueling support, long-range Israeli strike tempo would collapse quickly. The tankers are the hidden infrastructure of the entire campaign.
Intelligence is the real force multiplier. The pilots saying “everything starts there” is not rhetoric. Modern air campaigns depend on signals intelligence, satellite tracking, drone surveillance, and cyber penetration of communications. The Israeli intelligence apparatus combined with U.S. sensors likely provided near-continuous tracking of Iranian launch units, which is what makes rapid strike cycles possible at all.
The Iranian adaptation described is worth noting. Bulldozers at tunnel entrances show they anticipated runway denial tactics and planned to reopen launch sites quickly after strikes. That suggests Iran expected a long attritional campaign rather than a quick knockout.
On the stimulant question: modafinil is not a stimulant, and the article is wrong to call it one. It promotes wakefulness through a different mechanism, mainly by activating orexin circuits and mildly blocking dopamine transporters rather than flooding the brain with catecholamines the way amphetamine or methylphenidate does. The manufacturers deliberately marketed it as a wakefulness-promoting agent to distinguish it from classic stimulants with their addiction and crash cycles. Journalists call it a stimulant because its operational purpose looks identical and because “pilots flying on stimulants” reads like wartime intensity. But pharmacologically it sits closer to very clean caffeine than to Adderall. The U.S. Air Force moved toward modafinil precisely because it produces fewer jitters and crashes than the dextroamphetamine that older “go pill” protocols used.
The piece is also psychological messaging. Israeli media publish pieces like this to reinforce deterrence narratives. The message to Iran is that its launch capability is collapsing and that Israel can sustain overwhelming air pressure. Whether that claim holds fully is another question, but it is part of the information war running alongside the kinetic one.
The real strategic question is sustainability. High sortie tempo produces spectacular early results but is hard to maintain for weeks. Iran only needs to keep some launch capability alive to continue harassment attacks. The question now is whether Israel destroyed enough launch infrastructure in the first phase to permanently reduce Iran’s missile throughput, or whether Iran regenerates that capacity over time. That answer will determine whether the early air campaign success becomes a lasting strategic advantage or just a very impressive opening act.
YNET reports: Historically, some air forces addressed fatigue with stimulant drugs from the amphetamine family, commonly referred to as “go pills.”
“Those were widely used in the past,” Raziel said. “But in recent decades many Western air forces have shifted to modafinil.”
Modafinil was originally developed to treat sleep disorders characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness, including narcolepsy, shift-work sleep disorder and sleepiness associated with sleep apnea.
The medication promotes wakefulness and improves concentration and functioning during the day.
Neurochemically, modafinil affects several systems in the brain, including dopamine, norepinephrine and histamine, all of which play key roles in alertness and attention.
“Unlike traditional stimulants such as amphetamines, modafinil generally has a better safety profile and causes fewer rebound crashes after its effects wear off,” Raziel said.
Elkan added that the drug works essentially in the opposite way of sleeping pills.
“It helps people stay focused for longer periods,” he said. “But it still has side effects. It can cause increased blood pressure and a faster heart rate, similar to high doses of caffeine.”
Studies conducted for the U.S. Air Force have shown that modafinil can help preserve cognitive performance even after more than 24 hours without sleep.
“In fighter pilot simulation studies, abilities such as decision-making, reaction time and accuracy in complex tasks were maintained significantly better with modafinil compared to a placebo,” Raziel said.
A report submitted last year by the U.S. Congressional Research Service documented that the U.S. military uses a two-pronged strategy to address pilot fatigue: behavioral measures and limited pharmacological assistance.
U.S. Air Force policy allows the use of modafinil as a non-amphetamine stimulant, alongside dextroamphetamine, which the Food and Drug Administration classifies as having a high potential for abuse.
All branches of the U.S. military restrict such medications to specific operational circumstances. Their use is voluntary and requires authorization from aviation physicians as well as approval through military command channels.