Many U.S. elites, including Trump administration officials and foreign policy experts, have increasingly framed the conflict as an opportunity for “regime change” in Iran, moving away from earlier narratives of negotiation or containment. For instance, President Trump has reportedly considered overthrow options if Iran does not dismantle its nuclear program, viewing the war as a path to a “better deal” that could weaken the Islamic Republic’s leadership. Brookings Institution experts have highlighted the international and domestic stakes, warning of the dangers but acknowledging the strikes as a catalyst for broader confrontation. Similarly, analyses from outlets like Newsweek argue that once conflict begins, arguments for regime change become “difficult to counter,” citing Iran’s uranium enrichment and internal repression as justifications. A Politico piece notes the administration’s bet on Iranian protests leading to internal overthrow, with U.S. strikes weakening the regime enough for citizens to “finish the job.” Divisions Within the MAGA Base and Anti-Interventionists: However, there’s pushback from elements of Trump’s “America First” supporters, who see the war as a betrayal of promises to avoid Middle East entanglements. High-profile figures like Tucker Carlson have urged Trump against escalation, calling it “disgusting and evil,” while others like Erik Prince and Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene label it “always America last.” This dissent has led to efforts in Congress, such as a potential War Powers Resolution vote, highlighting fatigue with “elite-driven” wars. A Western official noted that the confrontation escalated dramatically after Trump backed Iranian protests, framing it as an “existential threat” to Tehran—but this has not unified U.S. elites fully.
Broader Expert Consensus: Commentators like Ed Price (NYU fellow) describe the war as “regime change lite,” suggesting a new Iranian government would be more compliant with U.S. interests. Middle East Institute analyses emphasize that while regime collapse is possible, democracy is unlikely without careful external involvement, marking a pragmatic shift from idealistic “reformist” hopes. Overall, U.S. attitudes have hardened against Iran’s “reformist” facade, with elites like Mark Dubowitz noting a “vibe shift” where confidence-building measures are collapsing in favor of outright opposition to the regime.
European and Broader Western Attitudes: Growing Hesitancy and Fractures
Lackluster Support and Criticism of Escalation: European leaders have shown a more cautious, divided response compared to the U.S., with many viewing the strikes as illegal and prioritizing stability over regime change. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has explicitly stated his government does not believe in “regime change from the sky,” reflecting a broader European consensus breakdown with the U.S. EU foreign ministers have condemned the repression in Iran but focused on sanctions and designating the IRGC as a terrorist group, rather than endorsing military action. Outlets like The Spectator Australia highlight this divide: while allies like Australia and Canada offer unequivocal support, Europe is “fainthearted,” with U.S. officials regretting the “hand-wringing” over force. Think Tank and Media Perspectives: European-aligned analyses, such as from Foreign Affairs, underscore Iran’s divided opposition and the regime’s surprising resilience, cautioning that unified protests are needed for real change but expressing doubt about Western intervention’s effectiveness. Commentators warn of a return to a “law of the jungle” era, with the strikes opening a “Pandora’s box” of risks. There’s also criticism of longstanding Western narratives that predict Iran’s collapse while ignoring external interventions, with some elites now reviving these to justify action but facing pushback for oversimplification.
Geopolitical Implications: Broader commentary, like from American Thinker, describes the conflict as exposing Western Europe’s geopolitical irrelevance, with the U.S. shifting to unilateralism akin to “shock and awe” doctrines. This marks a departure from pre-2026 multilateral approaches, with elites in places like France and the EU emphasizing de-escalation.
The conflict, now in its early days, has accelerated a pre-existing trend: Western elites are increasingly abandoning illusions of Iranian moderation or internal reform, especially after regime crackdowns on protests and nuclear escalations. However, this is not uniform—U.S. hawks push for decisive action, while European counterparts prioritize avoiding a broader war that could disrupt oil flows or regional stability. Iran’s preparations, including alliances with Russia and China (who show no appetite for direct involvement), further complicate attitudes. If protests intensify or U.S. casualties rise, these shifts could evolve further, potentially eroding even hawkish support.
Since the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes began on February 28, 2026, Brookings, Chatham House, and the Council on Foreign Relations have moved in lockstep to adopt the war of choice framing.
At Brookings, the rhetoric has shifted toward highlighting the gap between military decapitation and political transition. Their analysts argue that while the strikes successfully killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the deep institutions of the Islamic Republic—the IRGC and the clerical bureaucracy—remain a structural reality that a few weeks of bombing cannot dismantle. This is a classic complexity defense. By emphasizing that the Iranian state is a deeply embedded network rather than a single point of failure, they argue that the current administration’s regime-change gamble is strategically naive. It reinforces the necessity of the managerial class, who claim to understand these nuances.
Chatham House is focusing on the regional fragmentation and the limits of deterrence. Their recent commentary argues that the United States and Israel underestimated the Iranian response, which has now expanded to include strikes on energy infrastructure in the UAE and threats to the Strait of Hormuz. In Alliance Theory terms, this is a process error explanation. They are not arguing that the goal of degrading Iran’s nuclear program was wrong, but that the execution failed to account for regional spillover. The lesson they are pushing is that the administration ignored the need for multilateral coordination with Gulf allies, who are now paying the price in economic uncertainty.
The controlled mea culpa is also visible in the way these institutions reference the 12-Day War of June 2025. They use that previous conflict as a baseline to argue that limited strikes without a diplomatic endgame are counterproductive. They admit that past pressures did not lead to collapse, and they use this admission to claim a superior, more mature understanding of the current crisis. This allows them to maintain their status as the responsible guardians of the international order while distancing themselves from the immediate risks of the 2026 campaign.
This collective behavior serves to protect the prestige of the internationalist coalition. By framing the war as an impulsive act of imperial aggression or a manufactured war of opportunity, they ensure that if the conflict becomes a long-term quagmire, the blame rests entirely on the personalist leadership of the president. The coalition itself remains the only respectable source for the inevitable cleanup and reconstruction efforts.
