If everyone saw the same balance of power, there would be no reason to go to war.
The United States and Israel see that Iran’s leaders can be killed and its air defenses can be penetrated. Its economy is strained. Its proxies are degraded. Striking now looks like acting from strength to lock in advantage before Iran can rebuild deterrence or cross a nuclear threshold.
Iran sees itself as strategically resilient. It has missile depth. It has regional proxies. It can threaten shipping lanes and energy markets. It can impose long term attritional costs. It believes the U.S. lacks appetite for prolonged war and that Israel cannot sustain multi-front escalation indefinitely.
There is also a timing component. If Israel believes Iran is approaching a capability that would dramatically shift the balance, delay is costly. If Iran believes its strategic position improves with time, sanctions fatigue, or great power backing, then waiting is rational. Different expectations about the trajectory of power create incentives to strike now versus endure now.
