George Friedman:
One of the things that Trump has done—he hasn’t broken relations with Australia, Japan, or South Korea—but he’s looking at their economic development and saying, “Okay, you’re no longer solely dependent on the United States. Will we come to your aid?” Yes, because it’s in our interest. If Japan fell to China, or South Korea fell, or Australia fell, our control of the Pacific would be endangered.
So the real issue here is that nations that once assumed the Americans had a moral obligation to defend them, while they enjoyed healthy economies, are now finding that assumption moderated. Can we be relied upon? Yes, but only because it serves our interests. And that’s what drives nations—interests.
Interviewer:
You touched on Taiwan, which we haven’t talked about yet. But before we go there, how much of this Pacific balance is about the US and its allies wanting to maintain the current trade order and structure? At what point, if that balance tips, does something go wrong?
Friedman:
Geopolitics has two dimensions. One is economic. Without economics, you can’t have a military. Without a military to defend your country, you can’t have an economy. These two dimensions are now being negotiated with the Chinese.
The United States has become very dependent on Chinese exports. That’s dangerous, because if you have hostile military relations with a country and depend on its economy to supply goods and services, you could end up in a bad position if conflict breaks out. So the US is saying to China: we can’t both have deep economic entanglement and also live in constant military hostility.
In fact, negotiations are happening on two tracks—economic talks and separate military discussions about how to make ourselves safer from each other. When we talk about geopolitics, both dimensions matter. You can’t be economically dependent on a country and at the same time treat it as a potential military enemy. Make your choice—friends or foes—but not both.
What Trump is basically saying is: we’re happy to have trade, we need it, and you need it too, but we can’t maintain this military tension at the same time.
Recently, the Chinese fired nine senior generals—cleaning out part of the high command. Maybe that’s internal politics, but it’s also a signal that they might be changing their military stance. Their number of exercises has declined. They’ve stopped surrounding Taiwan with blockades lately. So I think talks are moving forward.
There are two ways to pressure countries: economic and military. When we talk about relationships between nations, both dimensions must align—the economic and the military. They can’t contradict each other.
Interviewer:
Before World War I, people said Britain and Germany would never go to war because they were too economically interdependent. What’s the difference here?
Friedman:
Well, they went to war. Economic interdependence wasn’t enough. The Germans had a hostile relationship with Britain. They were worried about the Poles and the French. The British didn’t want Germany on the other side of the English Channel.
So there was a military interest—because nations can be threatened both militarily and economically. Sometimes economic relations prevent war, but sometimes they trigger it, because distrust between interdependent powers grows too great.
There has to be moderation. Since World War II, the United States has often lacked that moderation. We built alliances through economic policy while fighting wars against Soviet proxies. Trump, strange as he is, actually reintroduced moderation—aligning economic and military policy.
He’s the ultimate anti-war guy. I once called him the oldest, ugliest hippie in the world. Like in the 1960s: “Negotiate, don’t go to war.” When he does that in Ukraine, people get mad. But the shift began under Biden too—it’s not just one president.
Now the Australians are looking at the world and saying: it’s not just a question of whether we can rely on America. Will we pitch in? Because if we don’t, why should the Americans come to our aid?
Interviewer:
Let’s finish by talking about Taiwan. What’s the geopolitical case for the US defending it?
Friedman:
If you look at a map, Taiwan sits between Japan and the Philippines. The US has close ties to Japan and four bases in the Philippines. We want to make sure no Chinese fleet can safely enter or return from the Pacific.
The gaps between Taiwan and Japan, and between Taiwan and the Philippines, are narrow enough to be dangerous for Chinese ships in wartime. If they tried to pass through, they could be hit by drones and missiles. Taiwan therefore acts as a strategic plug on China’s access to the Pacific.
From the Chinese point of view, controlling Taiwan would open those routes. From the US point of view, keeping Taiwan independent blocks them. That’s why Taiwan matters—it’s not sentiment or moral duty, it’s geography.
Invading Taiwan would be very difficult. Landing craft would take about 15 hours to cross the strait, and at least two days to mass troops at the port—plenty of time for US satellites to detect it. Drones from Guam could attack them during the crossing. Even if they landed, supplying forces across the ocean would be nearly impossible with US and allied air bases in Japan and the Philippines.
That’s why China hasn’t invaded—it can’t. Taiwan is part of a heavily defended structure in which the US, Australia, and Japan all have a stake.
If China controlled Taiwan, its fleet would have open access to the Pacific. Defending Taiwan limits that access. Would you rather fight near Tokyo or Sydney, or contain them around Taiwan? From that view, it’s a cheap and effective defense.
The Taiwanese want the partnership, they’re not hostile, and it deters China. That small island may not seem worth a war, but its position makes it invaluable.
Grok says: China’s overall military exercises remain robust (e.g., 113 joint drills with Russia through June 2025), but intensity around Taiwan and the Western Pacific has moderated post-major 2024–early 2025 events, possibly due to the purge’s disruptions.
No full-scale blockade simulations since early 2025, a shift from 2024’s aggressive “Joint Sword” series. China has dialed back overt encirclement while maintaining gray-zone tactics.Evidence: Last major blockade drill was “Strait Thunder-2025A” (March 31–April 2, 2025), involving 76 aircraft and 15 ships simulating multi-directional closure.
Subsequent activity: Routine ADIZ incursions (e.g., 300+/month average) and Coast Guard patrols around Kinmen/Pratas Islands, but no “surrounding” envelopment. Taiwan’s Han Kuang 41 (July 2025) focused on counter-blockade prep without triggering PLA response. ISW reports CCG “full control” claims around outlying islands but no main-island encirclement since April.
Why “stopped lately”?: Post-April, focus shifted to economic diplomacy (e.g., Trump-Xi APEC meeting yielded soybean/oil deals, rare earth pause).
Analysts (CSIS, Atlantic Council) note blockades as a preferred low-risk coercion tool over invasion, but current restraint avoids provoking U.S. amid tariffs.
Ongoing pressure: Smaller “quarantine” probes (e.g., Kinmen incursions since Feb 2024) continue, per Taiwan’s National Security Bureau.
